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Q. In World War II, was there any battle that occurred on American soil?U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Published on May 18, 2018Attu, Alaska's most distant island in the Aleutian chain, is both a National Wildlife Refuge and the site of the only land battle of World War II fought on North American soil. In May of 2018, we commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Battle.Thousands of Japanese fought in a bloody World War II battle for the Aleutians. Only 28 survived (washingtonpost.com) History UncoveredFrom June 1942 until August 1943, Allied forces fought the Aleutian Islands campaign against invading Japanese forces. Japan had occupied sovereign United States soil of two Alaskan islands, the only time during World War 2 where that occurred. The main battle of Attu that took place during May 1943 was the only time during World War 2 where a land battle took place on incorporated United States territory. Japan was completely defeated by August 1943 and the campaign in Alaska was over. The entire campaign was remembered as the "Forgotten Battle" as other events of the time overshadowed it.By Alex HortonThe williwaw gusts swirled thick fog among transport ships off Attu Island, and the waiting infantrymen nervously mulled the name of their landing site: Massacre Bay.Native Unangans were slaughtered there by Russian traders in the 18th century, and few who had survived disease were left when Japanese troops captured the island in June 1942. Nearly a year later, 2,000 U.S. troops waded onto the icy shore, bracing for the dreaded shriek of artillery on the westernmost edge of the Aleutian Islands chain.Weeks before it would become one of the deadliest battles in the war, capped by a barrage of suicidal, grenade-wielding Japanese, Americans there found eerie quiet as they marched on the boggy soil on May 11, 1943.A lone raven cawed and fluttered away. U.S. scouts took an abandoned hillside artillery position long after the Japanese defenders, 2,600 in all, fell back into the island’s interior and to the high ground among the treeless, snow-capped ridges.But hours later, frostbitten, starved Japanese troops began attacking the U.S. assault force in what became the only World War II ground battle fought on American territory, capped by the “banzai” rush attack and mass suicide of Japanese soldiers on May 29.The brutal coda — with hundreds of Japanese in the final charge killed while wielding samurai swords, grenades and even bayonets tied to sticks — left only 28 survivors taken as prisoners. U.S. troops buried 2,351 Japanese soldiers in mass graves when the fighting ended May 30.That was 75 years ago Wednesday, and calls have been renewed from the families of the dead for the Japanese government to secure their remains.Of 12,500 U.S. troops on the ground, 549 were killed, and more than 1,100 were wounded.As a percentage of forces involved, it was the second-deadliest battle in the Pacific. Only Iwo Jima was more costly.U.S. Forces Blast Japanese from Attu US National ArchivesPublished on Jul 30, 2015‘The weirdest war ever waged’Historians have long debated the Japanese strategy to capture a string of islands in the western Aleutians in June 1942.One theory is that Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of Japan’s navy, attacked the undefended islands to divert U.S. ships from the Battle of Midway and thereby crush the depleted force that remained.That never happened, and U.S. forces prevailed in the massive June carrier battle, considered the turning point of the war in the Pacific Theater.[Listen to a first-person account on the “Letters From War” podcast]Brian Garfield, in his 1969 history “Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians,” also suggested that Japanese war planners did not know that the Doolittle bombing raid over Tokyo that April originated from an aircraft carrier.Some among the Japanese staff suggested that the islands may have been the point of origin for the flights and must be taken to blunt future raids.But what is known is that the Aleutian Islands are among the world’s most remote and difficult-to-reach areas. Attu, at the far end of a whip of islands in the Bering Sea, is about as close to Tokyo as it is to Juneau.Soldiers carry a wounded man on Attu. (National Park Service)And yet — despite its extreme location, its Arctic conditions and its claim to fame as the site of the first horrific banzai charge of the war — the Aleutian campaign has been relegated by history to a footnote amid bigger conflicts in the Pacific, Garfield wrote.A B-24 pilot who flew raids over nearby Kiska Island said the campaign was “the weirdest war ever waged,” history professor Terrence Cole wrote in Garfield’s foreword.Most of the campaign’s oddities, command failures, and tragedies emerged from the extreme weather — an unofficial belligerent in the conflict. A low-pressure storm permanently churns over the Aleutians, channeling thick fog, torrential rain, and 100-mph winds.Members of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, a unit within the 7th Infantry Division, had trained for desert warfare and were unprepared for the harsh conditions when they arrived at Attu. They trudged through waist-deep snow in leather boots unsuitable for the soggy marsh. Sweat on their feet crystallized, causing crippling frostbite, Garfield wrote.U.S. warplanes crashed into uncharted peaks cloaked by fog. One bomber commander turned back after flying eight hours over the Attu battleground without seeing a single patch of ground. The planes were often grounded during the Attu battle, undercutting a key strategic component.“Despite all human courage and mechanical genius, the forces of nature in the Aleutians could always call the turns,” Garfield wrote. “No general or admiral was as powerful as the weather.”The marshy tundra on Attu was the second enemy that U.S. troops encountered. The thick muskeg swallowed boots and mired vehicles and artillery pieces. Ammunition and food took days to make it ashore as the Japanese intensified their attack in Massacre Valley and elsewhere.Soldiers famously march on their stomachs, but one platoon cut off early in the battle “traveled on sheer guts,” Garfield wrote. The soldiers vomited green bile after going days without food.Others were more cold than hungry. When they encountered dead enemy troops, U.S. soldiers would sometimes take their superior boots and coats — an act that risked friendly fire from other soldiers mistaking them for Japanese.Assaulting troops crawled to stay warm from movement, when walking upright was a deadly risk with snipers and machine gun positions embedded into the high ground throughout Attu.The defending Japanese called out to the U.S. troops, dying by gunfire and grenade explosions and exposure.“Damn American dogs, we massacre you!” they shouted through megaphones, Garfield wrote.Every inch of frozen soil captured by U.S. troops was a reckoning. Author Dashiell Hammett served in the Aleutians and wrote an Army history of the campaign in 1944.“We would have to learn as we went along, how to live and fight and win in this new land, the least-known part of our America,” he said.A bugler sounds taps during a memorial service while a group of GIs visits the graves of comrades who fell in the reconquest of Attu Island in August 1943. (Associated Press)A brutal endDuring the 19-day battle, violence percolated through the occasional lifting of the blanketing fog. On many occasions, the opposing forces searched in vain for each other. U.S. warships launched depth charges on suspected Japanese submarines while battleships fired salvos when they veered into range.American troops suffered heavy losses but had the advantage of reinforcements. Their blockade meant that no Japanese forces could arrive to evacuate wounded or provide fresh soldiers and ammunition.Attu battle map. (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service)The U.S. troops, in a pincer movement from two positions, pushed the remaining Japanese toward Chichagof Harbor on the northeastern side.The Japanese commander on Attu, Col. Yasuyo Yamazaki, counted about 800 fighting men left on May 29 and ordered a last-ditch counterattack — a raid on Engineer Hill to capture artillery and replenish supplies.Any troops still able to walk were ordered to make the final assault. Other patients who could not, Japanese medical officer Nebu Tatsuguri wrote in his diary, were killed by various methods, including morphine injections.“The last assault is to be carried out. All patients were made to commit suicide … only thirty-three of living and I am to die: I have no regrets,” he wrote on May 29, the day he was killed.The raid startled rear-echelon troops as starved Japanese raided medical tents and killed the wounded. In brutal, point-blank fighting with bayonets, grenades and bare fists, U.S. forces beat back the raid short of the artillery guns on Engineer Hill. Yamazaki was killed, samurai sword in hand, by machine gun fire.In the closing moments of battle ending May 30, hundreds would die with grenades clutched tightly to their chests in a violent display of gyokusai, or honorable suicide in combat. Their torn bodies lay on top of one another like stacks of firewood blown over by a strong wind.“They were a tenacious group,” engineer soldier Joe Sasser told the Anchorage Daily News in 2013. “I was surprised. It was a dishonor for them to be captured and an honor to be killed.”That moment, and other violent encounters, still haunt Attu veterans.“I wake up in the middle of the night and I can’t go back to sleep,” communications soldier Allen Seroll told KTVA. “That’s what this has done to me. That’s how much it affected me and still does.American soldiers and equipment at Massacre Bay on Attu. (U.S. Navy, via AP)The families rememberSeventy-five years later, the families of the dead have not forgotten the battle of Attu.Nobuyuki Yamazaki, grandson of the Japanese commander, spoke at an Anchorage commemoration May 17 and delivered a petition for the Japanese government to repatriate the remains of soldiers still buried in the sub-Arctic soil there.“We war-bereaved families wish to take all the remains back to our homeland,” he said, adding that it was the third request through the Japanese government.The petition had nearly 4,000 signatures, KTVA reported.“Japanese people find great comfort when the remains of the Japanese are buried in our homeland,” Yamazaki said.Nobuyuki Yamazaki and Japanese descendants. (Lisa Hupp/U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service)The State Department did not respond to a request for comment on its role in negotiating the return of the 2,351 remains, plus more than 200 more unaccounted for, likely buried by artillery barrages or by the Japanese themselves.Recovering and repatriating those remains would be a logistically and ecologically difficult task on Attu, a nature preserve since 1913 that has been uninhabited for years, said Steve Delehanty, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service manager who oversees the island.Husks of destroyed planes and vehicles and snaking pipelines have damaged Attu, and thickets of unexploded ordnance make traversing the land a difficult proposition.Wooden markers outlining the graves have rotted away, Delehanty told The Washington Post, but surviving maps point to their rough locations. But his role is limited to protecting the environment as diplomats huddle to work out a plan. Talks years ago did not lead to a solution, he said.Wildlife, including tufted and horned puffins and thick-billed and common murre, flourishes on the abandoned island. Delehanty said the Aleutian tern, which has faced endangerment, breeds on Attu.But other life has yet to return after the war. The few dozen Unangans captured by the Japanese in 1942 were sent to prison camps, where many died.Nearly 900 from other Aleutian islands were evacuated by the U.S. government and confined in internment camps. Many of them died, as well. That prompted an apology last year from the federal government.Those who lived later returned to home islands, but not natives from Attu. The military built depots there, and it became off-limits. The war-weary natives had to settle elsewhere.Seventy-five years after the battle ended, only the birds and the bodies remain.Alex Horton is a general assignment reporter for The Washington Post. He previously covered the military and national security for Stars and Stripes, and served in Iraq as an Army infantryman.

Obviously, America took many lessons from their experience in Vietnam. You do not need to look far to find a wealth of resources on politics, military strategy, economics, counterinsurgency, etc.I’m sure you can find something; there are only ~65 million results to choose from.However, I think you may find some interest in the question: Where did America put into practice some lessons learned from Vietnam?For that, one of the clearest examples is the overwhelming victory of the United States and its coalition against Iraq in the 1991 First Gulf War. To explain, I will lay out the lesson, how it was learned in Vietnam, and finally, how the lesson was applied in Kuwait.U.S. Marine Corps troops during a welcome home parade held after Operation Desert Storm, June 10, 1991.[1]The background of this US military action can be traced to the brutal Iran-Iraq War which lasted from 1980 - 1988. This war saw many atrocities, ranging from child soldiers to indiscriminate chemical weapon attacks between the two Islamic regimes.Iranian child soldiers marching off to fight Iraq.[2]Saddam's chemical attack on Halabja,Iraq.[3]The important takeaway from this event, however, is that the war left Iraq in deep debt with its neighbors, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Iraq owed its fellow Gulf states at least $80 billion. Additionally, Iraq accused Kuwait of overproducing oil, driving down prices and further impeding Iraq’s ability to recover its economy.[4] Internal unrest due to the war was also rising.However, Saddam Hussein, the dictator and leader of Iraq, had the fifth largest military at this point in time and after exhausting diplomatic options, decided that a war would solve many of its ongoing problems…[5]Kuwait Maps - Perry-Castañeda Map Collection - UT Library OnlineColorado Springs Gazette, August 3, 1990, p. 3While the Invasion of Kuwait was quite short, the United States faced an uphill battle.[6] Keep in mind, at this point in time, there was no guarantee of US victory. Saddam's army was vast and many were battle-hardened veterans of the previous war. The memory of Vietnam still lingered in everyone's mind as it become increasingly clear that Iraq would refuse to withdraw from Kuwait.Iraqi Military Parade, 1990.[7]But America stuck to a narrowly defined objective. It played to its strengths and capitalized on what its enemy lacked. It isolated Iraq from the world and won the world opinion battle.And luckily, we had some extremely brilliant diplomats and military leaders who did all the right things in all the right places.James Baker, US Secretary of State, met with world leaders and convinced many to join the coalition. Major accomplishments include Saudi Arabia and Kuwait footing a major portion of the bill and a rare Chinese Security Council abstention to allow outside forces to intervene in Kuwait (China dislikes foreign intervention in almost all circumstances).[8]Thomas Pickering was the US Ambassador to the UN, crafting the legal framework that would eventually justify military intervention in Kuwait and how the resulting peace would look like. He got almost every Security Council member to approve the various Resolutions; no small feat in diplomacy.[9]Herbert Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. was the overall military commander of coalition forces during the Persian Gulf War. He was a brilliant leader, tactician, and master of working with the press. One of America’s greatest generals.[10][11]Collin Powell as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff had a notable disposition for diplomacy before military action. But in his hands, the US military would maximize its potential, to the utter devastation of its adversaries. The “Powell Doctrine,” as he is popularly known for, is a well-crafted answer to the Vietnam War experience.[12][13]The man at the top, who made the critical decision to intervene in Kuwait and draw the line in the sand when many were reluctant to get involved. This answer was written a couple weeks after George H. W. Bush passed away and may he rest in peace. While he had his flaws, Bush Sr. was truly an honorable man and a worthy President of the United States of America.[14]Clearly defined military objective; no mission creepMajor American involvement in the Vietnam War was started by a rather innocuous document, the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.”[15] Congress had passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to address the purported attack of North Vietnamese patrol boats on US Navy destroyers.[16]However, President Lyndon Johnson used the open-ended provisions of the document to vastly expand the American presence in the region. US forces went from simple advisers to the South Vietnamese militaryU.S. Army Adviser trains at the Battalion Level.[17]to boots on the groundUS Marines of the 9th Expeditionary Brigade land at Da Nang in March 1965 to protect the local air base.[18]to conducting full-scale military operations.7th Cavalry riflemen engage Vietnamese snipers in Ia Drang Valley, November 1965.[19]Soldiers on a search and recovery mission.[20]Mobile Riverine Force monitor torches potential enemy ambush points.[21]A B-52 Stratofortress drops its payload during Operation Linebacker II.[22]Obviously, this mission creep hurt American effectiveness in pursuing long-term strategies.[23] Simply put, the escalating involvement of the United States precluded any sort of attempt to consolidate US military and civil development toward a cohesive and clearly-defined objective. US leaders merely reacted to the situations of the day and allowed the adversary to determine the pace of the conflict.The First Gulf War was different. From the outset, the mission was clear: expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait, restore the sovereignty of Kuwait, convince Iraq to comply with the United Nations resolutions. At the request of President H. W. Bush, Congress passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution.”[24]What separates the “Gulf of Tonkin Resolution” from this document is the narrow scope of the latter. It cites the relevant UN Security Council Resolutions granting use-of-force (Resolution 678) and sets up a system of regular reports to ensure the objectives of this authorization are being met by the President (as per the War Powers Act).“In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power. We will stand by our friends. One way or another, the leader of Iraq must learn this fundamental truth.”[25]Once Saddam withdrew from Kuwait, President Bush had offensive military operations stopped, only 100 hours after such operations had begun.[26][27] He faced heavy criticism for not capitalizing on the crushing victory and taking the opportunity to overthrow Saddam.[28] However, Bush Sr. stuck to his guns and limited his gains to that which he had sought, avoiding American entanglement with Iraq, at least for awhile.Play to American strengthsAmerica is one of the best countries at conventional warfare. [29] Within its doctrine, is an emphasis on the use of overwhelming force and superior technology to quickly cut off and crush enemy forces with minimal casualties to friendly forces.[30]The Vietnam War was mostly a guerrilla war, as North Vietnamese and Vietcong forces capitalized on self-imposed US limitations to blend in with the local population, ignore national boundaries, and choose when to engage with military force.[31]A Vietcong lays a mine.[32]Wary of expanding the conflict and possibly risking war with China (as had happened in Korea), the US did not invade North Vietnam, which controlled the Vietcong and the instigator of the conflict. It also did not use ground forces to permanently cut off the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos or Cambodia, the vital supply route that sustained Communist forces in South Vietnam.[33]Map of Vietnam and some major events that occurred. The invasions of Cambodia and Laos would be too little, too late.[34]Furthermore, the insurgency nature of the conflict meant that neutralizing upper leadership targets was less effective and that in general, enemy forces could escape, recoup and plan new attacks, even after devastating losses.An NVA Platoon leader with a PPSh-41.[35]US technology, while certainly destructive and even useful under certain circumstances, could not overcome such deep deficiencies in US conventional strategy and doctrine.[36]Helicopters like the UH-1 Huey and the air assault tactics their usage envisioned could not be used to full effectiveness in the jungle environment.[37][38] The resourceful guerrillas developed a series of countermeasures to neutralize these vehicles’ superior mobility and firepower advantage.[39]US Army helicopters fire into the tree line as they cover a South Vietnamese ground assault in March 1965.[40]Napalm and Agent Orange created fear in the enemy, but also consternation among allies and the public at large.[41] Their usage was seen as needlessly cruel and barbaric, crippling the minds and bodies of those exposed to such untested chemicals. [42]A napalm strike erupts as US troops patrol in South Vietnam, 1966.[43]Agent Orange defoliant sprayed in South Vietnam, September 1965.[44][45]All these factors culminated in the US military being unable to decisively defeat the Communist forces while its own casualties continued to mount and leading to the eventual withdrawal from South Vietnam.In September of 1991, Saddam bragged that attempting a war against his country would be a repeat of Vietnam for America.[46] He could not be farther from the truth, because he was, unfortunately, going to find himself in a conventional war with the United States.This picture contains more firepower than many small countries can summon in their entire armed forces.[47]US military planners could utilize their full conventional knowledge to quickly neutralize enemy logistics and support, overrun weak Iraqi positions, and isolate and destroy stronger concentrations.In the lead-up to offensive ground operations, a variety of aircraft and cruise missiles bombed airfields, anti-aircraft sites, radar stations, command facilities, and other military infrastructure and targets. Meanwhile, fighter-bombers engaged the Iraqi Air Force and established air supremacy over the battlefield.[48][49]F-14 Tomcats await their turn refueling from a KC-10A during Desert Storm.[50]America used the high profile nature of its naval assets and the US Marines to draw the attention of the Iraqi higher command and make them orient their forces against a perceived amphibious landing.[51][52]This left the Iraqi forces concentrated in Kuwait dangerously isolated if, for instance, a mass infantry and armoured push up the Saudi Arabian desert somehow cut off the route back in Iraq proper.Coalition forces broke through the seemingly impassable desert, overrunning the lightly-held Iraqi positions. These forces could then turn east and attack Iraqi forces in Kuwait from the vulnerable rear.[53]1st Armored Division Abrams pass the burning remnants of an Iraqi tank. [54]Soldiers of the 502nd Infantry Regiment provide security as their ground assault convoy moves through Iraq.[55]In this conventional fight, US technology definitely provided a superior edge.[56] Stealth aircraft could fly undetected by radar and bomb with unsuspected impunity. Cruise missiles and smart bombs gave a new depth to precision bombing and allowing for selective destruction of high value targets.[57]F-117 dropping a GBU-27 laser-guided bomb during a live exercise bombing run.[58]BGM-109 Tomahawk being launched.[59]Iraqi military planners believed the allies would have trouble navigating the featureless desert, but GPS enabled soldiers to maintain their bearings and continually surprise the enemy with their rapid movements and coordination.[60][61]The Battle of 73 Easting, was named for the UTM coordinate line it took place on due to the lack of any other distinguishing features in the area.[62]The sheer strength and rapidity of the coalition attack whittled down Iraqi resistance and enabled the swift resolution to the conventional fight.Ensure world opinion is on your sideVietnam is partly famous for just how much of an American endeavor it was. The British and Canadians politely refused to officially help, France had enough of Vietnam during the First Indochina War, while USSR and Chinese aid were key to keeping North Vietnam and the Vietcong in the fight.[63][64][65]North Vietnamese pilots discussing tactics on their flightline in front of their Russian-made MiG-19s. [66]North Vietnam successfully convinced many in the world that the Vietcong was a homegrown Communist insurgency from the South and that it had little to do with what was going on in the South.[67]The deception helped to create general unwillingness to get involved in the perceived internal conflict, leaving America with few allies to rely on.[68] The only countries that were really committed to aiding the US in Vietnam were Australia, New Zealand, and South Korea.[69]Australian of the 6RAR during a "search and destroy" mission[70]Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment go on patrol in Vietnam, 1969[71]Soldiers of the South Korean 9th Infantry Division in Vietnam.[72]All told, the allies provided roughly 60,000 soldiers, who served alongside 550,000 US soldiers in 1968.When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the United States assembled one of the largest international coalitions since World War II. With no small effort by United States diplomats and many other partners around the world, the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions, with the first being Resolution 660, condemning Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait and calling for its immediate withdrawal, enacting sanctions, and finally, Resolution 678, which authorized “all necessary means” to ensure Iraqi compliance with the UN Resolutions.[73][74]And many countries would answer the call.Coalition countries in blue vs. Iraq in orange[75]In total, 697,000 US military personnel along with approximately 172,000 personnel from 39 other countries would be assembled; a formidable 20th century military force that the world had never seen before.Multinational group (Qatari, French, U.S. Air Force, & Canadian) of fighter jets during Operation Desert Shield.[76]14th/20th King's Hussars, a part of the 4th Armoured Brigade pose in front of some Scorpions.[77]A combat group from the French 3rd Marine Infantry Regiment (RIMa) on Al-Salaman Street in Iraq, 1991.[78]Saudi Arabian soldiers flash the victory sign following the Battle of Khafji, February 2, 1991.[79]A Kuwaiti M-84 tank during Operation Desert Shield, 1990.[80]This potent coalition allowed the US to portray itself as leading a liberation that had worldwide support against a clearly hostile and uncooperative Iraqi regime.[81] Moreover, the participation of Muslim-majority countries like Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt denied Saddam the opportunity to liken the struggle as a grand “Islam vs. the West” struggle.[82]However, I would like to point out that the situation in Vietnam and the situation in Iraq were very, very different. As can be seen in my answer, Iraq was not a competent player in the diplomatic front, often relying more on blatant thuggery and intimidation to achieve its goals.[83] Its administration was highly centralized around fulfilling the personal ambitions of its dictator, often to the detriment of Iraqi national interests or independent thought.[84] Its military, while indeed massive and having some decent units, turned out to be mostly poorly motivated, lacking in equipment, and often entirely incompetent.[85][86][87] World opinion on the various atrocities committed by the Iraqi Army in its occupation of Kuwait and against coalition forces only inflamed world public opinion.Iraq Puts Clearly Beaten POWs On TVYet, it is obvious that America and the coalition had won a stunning victory that could not have been possible without appreciating the experience in Vietnam. Iraq had around 22,000 combat deaths while the coalition experienced 300 deaths. [88][89] I am not a big believer in body count indexes, but all objectives of the coalition were fulfilled with an insanely small casualty ratio; by any standard - that must count as a win.But I like to think that the real lesson we learned from Vietnam is that bad things happen to people, sometimes through no fault of their own. Sometimes, America makes the wrong choice and it ends up hurting people even more. But even so, we need to learn from our mistakes and continue trying to help. Because we need to if we want to leave a better, brighter future on this Earth. I will end with a speech excerpt from the recently-departed President H. W. Bush about a long-term goal for why we had to go into Kuwait.“We stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian Gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective—a new world order—can emerge: a new era—freer from the threat of terror, stronger in the pursuit of justice, and more secure in the quest for peace…Today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world where the rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle. A world in which nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. A world where the strong respect the rights of the weak.”[90]All mistakes made were my own, but please tell me so I can correct them. Thank you for reading.Footnotes[1] 'Mother of All Battles' lasted only 100 hours[2] The horrifying way Iran cleared mines in the Iran-Iraq War[3] 20 things the U.S. did to help Saddam against Iran[4] Iraq & Kuwait[5] Iraqi Army: World's 5th Largest but Full of Vital Weaknesses : Military: It will soon be even larger. But its senior staff is full of incompetents and only a third of its troops are experienced.[6] Superpowers unite on Iraq[7] Iraqi Military Parade 1990 استعراض الجيش العراقي[8] MIDEAST TENSIONS; How U.S. Won Support to Use Mideast Forces The Iraq Resolution: A U.S.-Soviet Collaboration -- A special report[9] The 1991 Iraq War - The Battle at the UN - Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training[10] Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. - Wikipedia[11] Oral History - Norman Schwarzkopf[12] Colin Powell - Wikipedia[13] Powell Doctrine - Wikipedia[14] George H. W. Bush Announces Start of Persian Gulf War[15] Transcript of Tonkin Gulf Resolution (1964)[16] Gulf of Tonkin Resolution[17] The Crucial Years, 1960-1964[18] Marines in the sands of Red Beach at Da Nang, 1965[19] The 50th anniversary of the battle of Ia Drang Valley, Vietnam[20] The UH-1 Iroquois in Vietnam[21] From Blue to Green and Brown[22] Join a B-52 on a Linebacker II mission with this story about the Christmas bombing campaign over Hanoi[23] The Military and Diplomatic Course of the Vietnam War[24] Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution[25] Presidential Address on Persian Gulf[26] Iraqis Welcome Saddam's Withdrawal From Kuwait [27] Bush Halts Offensive Combat; Kuwait Freed, Iraqis Crushed[28] Why the U.S. Did Not Overthrow Saddam Hussein - FPIF[29] 2018 United States Military Strength[30] An Assessment of U.S. Military Power[31] Vietcong: Definition & Tactics | Study.com[32] Vietnam War: The Vietcong[33] MUST WE INVADE THE NORTH?[34] An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Vietnam War[35] Viet Nam; VC & NVA; They called him 'Charlie'[36] https://digitalcommons.wou.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1050&context=his[37] Vietnam War Helicopters (1955-1975)[38] Air assault - Wikipedia[39] NLF and PAVN battle tactics - Wikipedia[40] Vietnam War: The Early Years, 1965-1967[41] Napalm in Vietnam War - The Vietnam War[42] Agent Orange and the Vietnam War - Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training[43] Vietnam War: The Early Years, 1965-1967[44] Agent Orange a risk for US personnel working on planes after Vietnam war[45] VA Nearly Done With Agent Orange Claims - VAntage Point[46] Saddam Refuses to Withdraw[47] #PartnershipsMatter Now and Mattered in 1991 during Operation Desert Shield[48] Gulf War air campaign - Wikipedia[49] Gulf War–Air Campaign 1989–91 - The History Reader[50] Gulf War air campaign - Wikipedia[51] This fake amphibious assault saved hundreds of lives in Desert Storm[52] Schwarzkopf's Strategy[53] File:DesertStormMap v2.svg[54] One Hundred Hours[55] CNN.com Specials[56] Weapons | The Gulf War | FRONTLINE | PBS[57] Stealth, GPS, 'Smart Bombs' and More: How Desert Storm Changed Warfare Forever[58] Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk - Wikipedia[59] https://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/bgm-109.htm[60] Weapons - Global Positioning System[61] GPS Goes to War - The Global Positioning System in Operation Desert Storm.[62] Battle of 73 Easting - Wikipedia[63] The United Kingdom Involvement in the Vietnam War - The Vietnam War[64] First Indochina War - Wikipedia[65] Chinese and Soviet involvement in Vietnam[66] Countering MiGs: Air-to-Air Combat Over North Vietnam[67] The Viet Cong[68] How Europe Sees Vietnam | News | The Harvard Crimson[69] What Countries Involved in the Vietnam War? - Part 2 - The Vietnam War[70] Vietnam War 1962-75[71] r/HistoryPorn - Soldiers of the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment on patrol in Vietnam, 1969 [640x280][72] South Korea in the Vietnam War - Wikipedia[73] ODS HOME PAGE[74] Security Council resolutions - 1990[75] 21 facts about the First Gulf War[76] Coalition of the Gulf War - Wikipedia[77] CVR(T) Scorpions - Operation Granby[78] “One hundred years of photography in the French Armed Forces”. Fithteenth episode. Desert Storm and Opération Daguet.[79] Stock Photo - Saudi Arabian soldiers flash the victory sign during clean up operations following the Battle of Khafji February 2, 1991 in Khafji City, Saudi Arabia. The Battle of Khafji was[80] Invasion of Kuwait - Wikipedia[81] Saddam Refuses to Withdraw[82] Muslim Leaders Reject Hussein's Call for Holy War on the 'Infidels' : Arabs: His plea finds favor with some. But Iran labels it a 'propaganda ploy' and Syria spurns Iraqi policies.[83] https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1992/10/21/state-department-cable-traffic-on-iraq-kuwait-tensions-july-1990/ff97c773-ea84-41ec-8c7c-f811ea61d2e5/?utm_term=.d7054091ad49[84] IRAQ: The Country[85] https://fas.org/nuke/guide/iraq/agency/army.htm[86] CONFRONTATION THE GULF; A Million Strong? Some Experts Question Iraq's Military Strength[87] Iraqi Armed Forces - Wikipedia[88] Persian Gulf War | Definition, Combatants, & Facts[89] Appendix - Iraqi Death Toll[90] September 11, 1990: Address Before a Joint Session of Congress | Miller Center

This is a good question, but, not easily answered in only a few words. The best way I can answer this question is by providing an excerpt about ROLLING THUNDER from my December 2017 published book, “The 99th Strategic Reconnaissance Squadron: The Air Force’s Story of Unmanned Reconnaissance in the Vietnam War.” The chapter content included below will answer your question fully. Please keep in mind, however, the context is tied to the perspective of unmanned drone reconnaissance.The ROLLING THUNDER Bombing Campaign in North VietnamThe Genesis of the American Bombing Campaign in North VietnamOne of the major, outside influences on reconnaissance drone usage in Vietnam was the ROLLING THUNDER bombing campaign. It is well understood by now that the drone’s Southeast Asian deployment in August 1964 under Operation BLUE SPRINGS, was as one-of-two (eventually three, with the SR-71) National Intelligence Assets used for collecting strategic intelligence for the National Command Authority. BLUE SPRINGS’ mission results were never withheld from the air war planners at 2nd Air Division/7th Air Force. Early ROLLING THUNDER mission planning, however, was not reliant upon high-altitude drone imagery as a “must-have” tool. The optional aspect of BLUE SPRINGS’ imagery would not last very long, however. What is described below are the facts, problems and mission planning requirements of Operation ROLLING THUNDER, and how the Model 147 drones became an integral factor in the successful planning & execution of bombing North Vietnamese targets.In March 1964, President Johnson told his National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, to issue NSAM 383 directing the DOD to begin preparing a targets and forces study of North Vietnam. Based on intelligence estimates and analysis opined by the CIA and DIA in January/February 1964, Secretary of Defense McNamara issued a Top Secret-NOFORN memo to JCS Chairman, General Maxwell Taylor, directing him to engage the Joint Staff in compiling a list of potential bombing targets throughout North Vietnam. The contents of the completed study became the genesis of the RTTL (Rolling Thunder Target List). As time went by, the RTTL transitioned from a study to a dynamic, constantly changing campaign management tool. The RTTL eventually took on the slang sobriquet, the “94-Targets List” or just the “94-List.” Cable traffic most often used “RTTL” as an informal description/title.The analysis and management of the RTTL would continue unabated for the next 11 years until South Vietnam capitulated in April 1975. In May 1964, three months prior to the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, the Joint Staff could already see the handwriting on the wall in Indochina. With concurrence from McNamara, a dedicated special team under the Joint Staff was set-up to take ownership of the RTTL’s iterative management process. By 1967, the RTTL became so detailed and comprehensive that it ran to 900 pages!The JCS Issues Memo 2343, Directing the Joint Staff to Develop a Targeting PlanWhen memo 2343 came to the Director of the Joint Staff, he reached-out to CINCPAC, asking him to develop a high-level concept of operations (OPLAN 37-64) and deliver it to the Joint Staff so they could immediately begin their analysis and planning of the Top Secret/SCI RTTL study. The Joint Staff gave CINCPAC a general list of “target sets” shown in the gray column in the following table. CINCPAC then identified specific targets in North Vietnam in each target set. That effort yielded 99 actual targets. OPLAN 37-64 envisioned a multi-phased bombing campaign designed to be a “no-holds-barred” affair. The air war in Operation DESERT STORM is a worthy example of a no-holds-barred, multi-phased bombing campaign that did not stop until all the objectives in each phase were achieved. NSAM 383, however, stated bombing campaign objectives in two bullet items that were far short of no-holds-barred:1. Cause the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) [here after referred to as North Vietnam] to desist from supporting the Pathet Lao (PL) and Viet Cong (VC), and;2. Reduce the capability of that [North Vietnamese] Government from renewing any such support in the future.Needless to say, there was much about North Vietnam and its people the American air war planners knew little or nothing about; this dearth led to three years of ROLLING THUNDER… not just 20 weeks as stated in OPLAN 37-64.After completing the OPLAN 37-64 targeting (RTTL) study, it was sent to the JCS on May 28, 1964 under the signature of Joint Staff Deputy Director, J.W. Davis, Rear Admiral, USN. Two days later on May 30th the JCS forwarded the RTTL study to McNamara and Bundy.The completed RTTL study included 94 of CINCPAC’s original list of 99 targets. The JCS memo accompanying it stated, “The intensity of execution can range from selective strikes in an ascending order of gradually increasing military pressure to a concentration of effort designed to attain the effect of a sudden blow.” Planners believed that “the most effective application of military power will result from a sudden sharp blow in order to bring home the penalties for violating international agreements, and the intent of the United States is to bring a cessation of DRV support of the insurgency in Laos and Vietnam.”Based on OPLAN 37-64 from CINCPAC, the Joint Staff planners sorted through the 99 targets, compiling and categorizing their recommendations in three categories, and then ranked them in each category based on the perceived priority in relation to the other listed targets in the same category. The three target categories were:· Category A included armed reconnaissance along highways leading to Laos, airfields identified with supporting enemy supply and ammunition depots, petroleum storage, as well as military headquarters and barracks;· Category B targets consisted of smaller airfields, important railroad and highway bridges, supply and ordnance depots in northern North Vietnam, aerial mining, and petroleum storage in Hanoi and Haiphong.· Category C covered “significant industrial targets, the destruction of which would effectively destroy the NVN industrial base.”In actuality, the memo’s original wording prepared by the service chiefs was much stronger. JCS Chairman, Maxwell Taylor, softened the tone based on his political interpretation of National Security Council discussions with President Johnson, Robert McNamara, John McCone, and McGeorge Bundy. In 1961, President Kennedy issued NSAM 55, which directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct their duties as “more than military men,” by taking-in the geo-political realities underlying national security issues. Although NSAM 55 was not rescinded by the three Vietnam Era Presidents to follow (Johnson, Nixon, Ford), each one did as he pleased, regardless of 55’s wording or intent.Taylor’s communication skills, and ease of maneuvering in the halls of power, fit well with NSAM 55. It was Taylor’s desire to comply with NSAM 55 which led him to soften the tone of the May 30th JCS recommendation. The JCS’ original wording stated the bombing campaign represented by the 94-Targets List was designed to eliminate (through destruction by bombing) North Vietnam’s physical ability to support the Viet Cong and Pathet Lao in waging an insurgency. Taylor’s rewording sought to look at things from a political standpoint based on the reactions of a reasonable man to a major, multi-pronged air attack on his homeland for supporting the destabilizing, political goals, and insurrection of groups in adjacent sovereign countries. The Johnson Administration bought-in to the “reasonable man” theory.To a certain extent, Johnson’s own political style of arm-twisting and backing the other guy into a corner, played a role in the Vietnam War policies adopted by the White House. Throughout Johnson’s tenure on Capitol Hill, he counted on his opponent’s reasonableness when confronted with the opportunity to either acquire something they wanted, or avoid something they did not want. Every reasonable man has his price. Johnson, and other western democratic leaders, failed to understand that as far as North Vietnam was concerned, the struggle by the Viet Cong, and Pathet Lao (and the Khmer Rouge later on), put them all in the same boat. These communist-aligned insurgencies, as well as North Vietnam, all viewed the Saigon-based democratic government as being “on-the-wrong-side.”It is worth mentioning that for many decades I have felt that as long as someone is not a psychopath or sociopath, and has a reasonable level of maturity, it puts them in the largest segment of the global population, or what I would call the reasonable and rational majority. Being in the majority has nothing to do with right or wrong, moral or immoral, nor does it mean a group member is always reasonable & rational; we all have our days. This means the majority of the population covers a broad spectrum of society, to include the likes of: Dwight Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Ho Chi Minh, Nikita Khrushchev, and Fidel Castro. Each of these well-known leaders had many followers, and many detractors. Clearly, what one of these men felt was rational behavior on a given day, might be viewed by one of the others as irrational, or unreasonable.To illustrate my point, let me refer to the 2003 documentary entitled, “The Fog of War.” The show is about Robert McNamara and the 11 truths he coined about national security, foreign policy & war. Truth #2 states: “you cannot count on rationality to save the day.” This is 100% applicable to Washington’s frustration with the “never say die” behavior of Hanoi in the face of mounting military pressure. To American leadership, Hanoi was clearly being irrational & unreasonable. McNamara arrived at his opinion about rationality and reasonableness based on his experience with the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, and an encounter 30 years later that completely overturned his view.After resolving the impasse with Moscow about the missiles, and tensions abated, McNamara and other Kennedy Administration officials thought rational and reasonable behavior won the day. In 1993 McNamara attended a global symposium where he ran into Fidel Castro. Civility & restraint were maintained by both men as they chatted for a few minutes. McNamara commented to El Presidente that a near catastrophe was averted in 1962 when cooler heads prevailed. Castro said nuclear annihilation came a lot closer than anyone knew, including McNamara and his cohorts. McNamara’s interest was aroused, and he inquired as to Castro’s meaning. Castro told him that contrary to popular belief, when Washington thought they had nipped things in the bud, there were actually 126 nuclear warheads already on the island! Until that moment in 1993, McNamara & the U.S. Government thought the warheads were still on a ship at sea, and had been turned back as a result of the Cuban blockade by the U.S. Navy. Stunned, McNamara told Castro he had three questions: 1.) Did Castro know the warheads were there the whole time? 2.) What was Castro’s greatest concern throughout the Crisis? 3.) After the Crisis became public knowledge, and negotiations commenced between the White House and the Kremlin, what was Castro’s advice to Khrushchev? Castro admitted he knew all along the warheads were on the island. His greatest fear was an all-out conventional air, land and sea attack on Cuba by the United States. If this had occurred, his recommendation to Premier Khrushchev was to launch a nuclear attack on America from Cuba.Castro’s revelation changed McNamara’s mind about a man’s reasonable behavior in the face of adversity. Whereas, Hanoi’s unreasonable behavior was seen by McNamara and others as a one-off anomaly, it was instead, a validation that rational or reasonable behavior is not universally defined. Johnson, McNamara and General Taylor’s failure to comprehend Hanoi’s brand of reasonableness, led to a lot of deaths on all sides, and numerous unresolved issues at War’s end. North Vietnam’s reaction to ROLLING THUNDER was just one of the manifestations that defied Washington’s logic.At the time of the RTTL’s creation, Taylor’s rewording of the purpose behind the bombing campaign, highlighting the concept of delivering a “sudden sharp blow,” was believed it would cause North Vietnam and its citizens to rationalize they did not want to be punished for supporting the struggle of someone else, ergo, they would cease & desist further involvement with the Viet Cong insurgency down south. The sudden sharp blow was undertaken in February 1965 in Operation FLAMING DART; it did not have the desired effect. This led to the escalated bombing campaign, Operation ROLLING THUNDER. The campaign ultimately failed, due in large part, to incessant White House meddling in military operations when North Vietnam gave no indication they were willing to back down.General Maxwell Taylor was roundly lauded as the JCS Chairman for his contribution in defusing the 1962 Soviet/Cuban Missile Crisis. After Johnson became President in November 1963, it was readily apparent to Washington that South Vietnam was crumbling rapidly. To that end, McNamara and Taylor were sent to Saigon twice in early 1964 on fact-finding missions for the President. Seeking to leverage Taylor’s widespread credibility, Johnson dispatched him to South Vietnam in June 1964 to replace Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. as the U.S. Ambassador. Taylor resigned after a year due to his and Johnson’s increasingly divergent views on military support for South Vietnam.It was readily apparent that Johnson’s opinion of Taylor was mostly about using him as a public relations tool, not for his military expertise. In fact, Johnson had little use for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Taylor’s replacement as the JCS Chairman was Earle Wheeler, the Army Chief of Staff under Taylor. Wheeler found out just how little regard Johnson had for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Shortly after Wheeler took over for Taylor, Johnson instituted the practice of weekly luncheons every Tuesday to discuss national security matters. The permanent lunch guests were McNamara, McCone and Bundy; Wheeler was never invited. This practice continued for more than three years until Wheeler was finally given a seat at the Tuesday luncheon in 1967.The JCS 94-Target List’s Usage and the Policies & Practices of ImplementationThe possibility of an American -managed and executed bombing campaign in North Vietnam was quite murky in 1964. The JCS activated a code word labeling any activity about a possible North Vietnamese bombing campaign, Operation ROLLING THUNDER.On August 29, 1964, the Joint Staff formally released the approved 94-list with embedded policies and procedures for managing the program. The formalized document was labeled “JCSM-729-64.” The 94 targets were listed in Appendix A of the JCSM. This JCS memo, as noted above, would eventually grow to 900 pages during the War. The JCSM summarized the:1. Types of targets included on the list;2. Status of ordnance and POL requirements;3. Aircraft availabilities, capabilities and sorties required;4. Types of detailed strike plans under development by CINCPAC.In February-March of the following year, the bombing campaign would begin using the compiled information.The easiest part of compiling the list was identifying the targets. The real problem lay in fleshing-out the background data needed to do the job properly. The planners needed to know details about the target. The following information was needed:1. What is the structural condition of the target? For example, if it is a building, is it made from brick & mortar, or reinforced concrete?2. What is the significance of destroying the target?3. What sort of environment surrounds the target, such as a church located next door?4. What is the target’s known defensive measures, such as a SAM site less than a kilometer down the road?5. What sort of damage would render the target unusable by the enemy?6. What sort of problems will target elimination create for the enemy?7. What type of munitions and quantity are necessary to destroy the target?8. What is the estimated time and effort to repair the damage and make the target usable again?After reading the information above you can see why target selection was the easiest part of developing the list; the other 90% was harder to come by and took planning, resources and time to compile the missing data. The good news about collecting the missing information was: Quite a bit could be found through open source intelligence (i.e.; unclassified, publicly available), and several classified means. Once it was collected, evaluated and added to the targeting file, the background details did not change very often. The two major pieces of background data that might change at some point were the enemy’s anti-aircraft defense measures, or the rationale justifying a target’s ongoing retention on the list was no longer valid. This could happen, for example, if the list showed an army ammunition dump, and if the ammunition stored there was relocated elsewhere, it was likely the target would be taken off the list. Another common practice used by the Joint Staff RTTL planning cell was re-prioritizing the targets in the three categories as each target’s importance ebbed and flowed.The RTTL planning cell’s real-time list management included several pragmatic policies to keep the list “clean,” functional and accurate. In a nutshell, the planning cell guarded the RTTL zealously. Using a common term in the lexicon of computer experts, the planning cell believed in “GIGO” (garbage in, garbage out), avoiding practices that could marginalize the list’s utility, thereby rendering it unreliable. A critical factor in avoiding GIGO was the methodology for deciding when a listed target was released for fragging on the ATO (air tasking order). But, as time would tell, the JCS’ RTTL planning cell and the 2nd AD/7th AF mission planners learned that what seemed like adequate target information prior to ROLLING THUNDER was, in many cases, proving insufficient.War of any kind exacts a human toll that is disagreeable to anyone with a shred of moral decency. From my own perspective, I hesitate to discuss war-related deaths because in just about any context, without deliberately intending to do so, and exercising great care to not disrespect any of the dead, I do not want to marginalize the suffering and fate of any population in wartime. That being said, and relating it back to the RTTL planning cell’s release of targets for ATO scheduling, the wartime exigencies and pressure placed on all ROLLING THUNDER participants was not the same as it was during World War II. The moral imperative to soundly defeat Germany and Japan was never far from the minds of Allied leadership. Throughout the six years of World War II, the war-related casualty rate averaged 32,000 deaths per day. During the years of America’s direct participation in the Vietnam War, the casualties in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia averaged about 460 deaths per day.My grandfather served in World War I and World War II. He wrote in his World War II journal, “Each man I have talked to believes that he is doing his patriotic duty in manning the [Merchant Marine] ships that are carrying vital war supplies to the Army and the Navy.” He further noted, “…and if he should get it [be killed], it would be no more of a personal sacrifice than thousands of other Americans are making on the front lines.” In a nutshell, defeating Germany and Japan was seen as a moral imperative on behalf of all mankind that was worth the personal risk of the combatants on the Allied side.Seeing this from the perspective of the Allied bombing campaign against the backdrop of 32,000 deaths per day, the air war planners, leaders and aircrews accepted missions & targeting risks that the RTTL planning cell and decision-makers would have nixed in Vietnam. ROLLING THUNDER’s target planning criteria, and overall ROE (rules-of-engagement), were far more rigid in determining if, or when, there was adequate justification and targeting data to allow the RTTL planning cell to “greenlight” a target, and put the lives of American aircrews at risk. And even if the planning cell said a target was ready to put on the ATO, it was not formalized until the National Command Authority (often at the Tuesday luncheons) signed-off on it.The Original 94-Targets List of JCSM-729-64Chart Notes1 = JCS-recommended targets for the first three days of ROLLING THUNDER in North Vietnam. The Pentagon preferred a 24/7 bombing campaign until all targets had been hit, or Hanoi formally requested a ceasefire and agreed to certain concessions. The Pentagon’s preference also included, within the first day-to-day-and-a-half, simultaneous strikes on key Laotian targets critical to Hanoi’s support of the Viet Cong in South Vietnam. The targets included the NVA’s FOB-Tchepone, FOB-Ban Tay, Nape highway bridge, and Route 7’s Ban Ken bridge. Immediately following the initial strikes, the balance of North Vietnamese fixed targets and route targets on the “94 Targets List” would be hit. President Johnson never approved the Pentagon’s operational preference.2 = JCS-recommended targets for the first eight weeks of ROLLING THUNDER after the option of striking all targets in a huge, Lightning-quick campaign was disapproved. Besides the 14 targets flagged above, the following targets were also laid-on for attack during the eight-week span: Dong Hoi highway bridge (18.1), Thanh Yen highway bridge (18.2), Cau Tung highway bridge (18.3), Huu Hung highway ferry (18.4), Tam Da railroad/highway bridge (18.6), Ben Quang barracks southwest (39.1), FOB-Tiger Island (39.16), Vinh Linh barracks northeast (39.2), Mu Gia Pass NVA base (39.3), Quan Len NVA base (39.4), Xom Trung Hoa NVA base & supply depot northwest (39.5), Vinh Son radar station (67.2), Phuc Loi naval base (71.1), and Quang Khe naval base (74.1).3 = In 1964, seven storage facilities held a combined 76% of North Vietnam’s POL supply. Besides the three targets flagged above, they included Bac Giang POL storage (51.11), Do Son POL storage (51.13), Viet Tri POL storage (51.14), and Duong Nham POL storage (51.17).4 = In 1964, seven thermo-electric power plants, and Hanoi’s main transformer station, generated 83% of North Vietnam’s electricity. Besides the two targets flagged above, they included the following power plants: Haiphong East (82.12), Hon Gai (82.13), Thai Nguyen (82.16), Viet Tri (82.17), Hanoi’s Le Pap sub-station (82.24), and the Bac Giang plant (82.26). For the most part, Johnson would not authorize the bombing of power plants until February 1967. As with many other geo-political blunders during the War, Hanoi capitalized on Washington’s distaste for anything that smacked of looking like the “bad guy.” In the 2½-year vacuum of bypassing the destruction of North Vietnam’s electric power grid, Hanoi moved quickly to purchase and install several hundred transportable diesel generators (identical to the back-up diesel generators seen behind hotels, office buildings and shopping malls.Operation FLAMING DART: A Prelude to ROLLING THUNDEROperation ROLLING THUNDER commenced on March 2, 1965, after much pent-up frustration in the White House. After the reprisal airstrikes in August 1964 resulting from the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, President Johnson clamped a lid on any high-visibility U.S. military activity in SEA for the balance of the year. This was an election year, and Johnson wanted to avoid actions that could generate bad press, giving an advantage to his presidential opponent, Senator Barry Goldwater. Hanoi was well aware of the political sensitivity during the election season, and sought to test Johnson’s patience. On Sunday, November 1, 1964, just two days before the election, Viet Cong insurgents launched a major rocket attack on American planes and personnel at Bien Hoa AB. Things were boiling inside the White House, but, the President stayed his hand in public. Johnson won the election in a landslide. Not content with Washington’s lack of reaction, Hanoi ordered the Viet Cong to poke the caged bear with a stick again in a 2nd rocket attack at Bien Hoa a few weeks later. Several Americans died in this attack.After Johnson won the election, White House activity related to Vietnam picked-up dramatically. Johnson and his national security team decided to hold-off for the time being in terms of a combat operations in response to the Viet Cong rocket attacks. Everyone expected Hanoi to order another attack on one or more of the in-country bases, so, it was only a matter of time.Time ran out early in the morning of February 7, 1965 when the Viet Cong’s 409th Infantry Battalion attacked the U.S. Army’s Camp Holloway (built in 1962 as a helicopter assault support base) near Pleiku City in the strategic Central Highlands. The Air Force also had an air base in Pleiku. The attack killed seven, and injured 90 American servicemen, as well as, destroying four C-7 Caribou transports, four U-6 Beaver utility planes, four CH-34 helicopters and damaged 11 others. Before the day was over, Johnson authorized reprisal bombing raids in North Vietnam, labeling it Operation FLAMING DART. The Air Force completed all 49 sorties later in the day. This would have been impossible if the RTTL did not exist with pre-planned & approved targets. The targets were #4, Dong Hoi airfield, and #33, Dong Hoi Army Barracks & Division Headquarters. Both targets were near the DMZ.Several days later the Viet Cong bombed a hotel in Saigon billeting American service personnel. A 2nd FLAMING DART attack was immediately scheduled for the U.S. Navy and Air Force. The Navy laid-on a massive raid using 99 planes from three different aircraft carriers, hitting target #24, the Chanh Hoa Army Barracks & Division Headquarters near the coast. The Air Force hit target #39, the Chap Le Army Barracks. The combined combat operations taken by both sides during February became the catalyst for President Johnson to commit U.S. forces to an ongoing, active combat role in Vietnam. Operation ROLLING THUNDER commenced on March 2nd and the Marine Corps’ 3rd Battalion/9th Marines landed at DaNang on March 8th.How Did ROLLING THUNDER Look After 90 Days of Operation?Based on the “reasonable man” theory, 90 days of bombing by the U.S. Air Force and Navy should have been enough to convince anyone in their right mind that the havoc wreaked by American air power was so intense, it was not worth Hanoi leading the country to the brink of disaster. Much to the dismay of President Johnson, and his advisors, Hanoi showed no signs of backing down.There were numerous problems & challenges unearthed at the beginning of ROLLING THUNDER. Many of the issues were solvable, and put to bed sooner or later. Some problems could not be mitigated within a reasonable timeframe, so, the air war managers devised workarounds until a more permanent solution could be found.The basic fact that North Vietnam, the Viet Cong, and the Pathet Lao, were not pursuing an agenda based on reasonability, escaped the Washington politicians. America’s own Civil War should have taught the Johnson Administration that both the North and South fought for more than three years, with each side thinking the loser of the next big battle would see reason, and sue for peace; it never happened. The scales finally tipped when President Lincoln appointed General Ulysses S. Grant as Commander of the Union Army. Grant was not a big fan of war. He felt that when further efforts to resolve a problem proved fruitless, and war was the next step, you fought it with the throttles wide open. Instead of fighting until the other side chose to quit, you fought until one side literally had nothing left to fight with, or for. Johnson did not allow the Pentagon to fight a full-throttle war in Vietnam.The issues associated with bombing missions over North Vietnam should not have been surprising to anyone in the Pentagon. After the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, President Johnson authorized retaliatory airstrikes in North Vietnam on August 5, 1964, under Operation PIERCE ARROW. The raid hit four North Vietnamese PT boat facilities, and target #50, the Vinh POL storage depot, using 69 planes from two Navy aircraft carriers. All five targets were either on the coast, or close to it (Vinh was only seven miles inland). The Navy pilots were only “feet dry” for a couple of minutes, and then quickly back over water. In those few minutes two planes were shot down. The Navy lost a Douglas A-1 Skyraider flown by Lt. j.g. R.C. Sather, and a Douglas A-4 Skyhawk flown by Lt. j.g. Everett Alvarez. Sather’s remains were not recovered until 1985, and Alvarez spent the next 8½ years as a prisoner in the infamous “Hanoi Hilton.” Commenting in the July 16, 1965, Tactics & Techniques Bulletin #14, PACAF leadership stated: “These aircraft were lost to an unsophisticated defense environment; quite simply, intense ground fire. Enemy aircraft were not a factor. Surface-to-air missiles had not yet made an appearance.” Even with 21st century hindsight being 20/20, the Pentagon, at the time, still should have seen this as a harbinger of things to come; it did not work out that way. Ten months later, and 90 days into ROLLING THUNDER, the mission planners at 2nd Air Division in Saigon knew they had some serious problems on their hands.Two A-4 Skyhawks fly past the USS Constellation a week after PIERCE ARROWSome of the major problems to surface during the first 90 days, not including Hanoi’s lack of “seeing reason,” were:1. Extremely poor weather over North Vietnam;2. Post-attack reconnaissance BDA revealed facts about targets that were previously unknown, and/or the amount of ordnance planned to be dropped was seriously underestimated;3. Inadequate aerial reconnaissance for mission planning and target ingress & egress routing;4. The lack of situational awareness, and non-existent American air traffic control over North Vietnamese airspace;5. Bombing accuracy, and the amount & type of ordnance used was not optimal;6. A deepening, and improving North Vietnamese air defense system;7. Little knowledge of Hanoi’s electronic-order-of-battle, and the necessary electronic warfare & ECM tactics to defeat it;8. Destruction of North Vietnamese targets (on the RTTL or not) seemed to have little impact on Hanoi’s warfighting capacity;9. Previously unknown functional and design vulnerabilities of American planes in terms of mechanical, electrical and electronic equipment and systems.Extremely Poor Weather over North VietnamIn March 1969 Lt. Col. Philip R. Harrison, Deputy Chief of the Air Operations Staff for 7th AF, wrote a CHECO Report entitled, “Impact of Darkness and Weather on Air Operations in SEA.” Harrison clearly summarized and substantiated the adverse weather problems encountered in all facets of air combat operations throughout the warzone from 1964 to 1969. Harrison stated, “Weather was the single-most important factor which determined that a mission could be successfully accomplished.” Weather affected both manned and unmanned flight operations to varying degrees. Unfortunately for ROLLING THUNDER bombing operations commencing in March 1965, it was just one month prior to the annual bad weather season, running from April to September each year.After 90 days of ROLLING THUNDER missions in North Vietnam, pilots, mission planners and combatant commanders were well aware of the operational problems caused by bad weather. By March of the following year, every military and civilian leader from Saigon to Washington, D.C., had heard about poor weather hampering flight operations in Southeast Asia. In one of President Johnson’s Tuesday luncheons, CIA Director, Richard Helms, took the action item to find out how bad the weather actually was/is. Helms assigned his deputy director for science & technology, Albert Wheelon, to go find out. In a subsequent memo to Helms on April 11, 1966, Wheelon noted the following information [author paraphrased for brevity]:1. Any attack aircraft or imagery platform (i.e.; tac recce, U-2s, SR-71s, KEYHOLE satellites, and the Model 147B high altitude drones) that by equipment design, operates above 2,000 ft. AGL, was/is negatively impacted by poor weather over North Vietnam;2. Any aerial platform designed to operate below 2,000 ft. AGL, which is the altitude that cloud cover typically bottoms-out in North Vietnam, were only affected by sub-par weather on an infrequent basis. For the first 16 months of ROLLING THUNDER, American forces did not possess an airborne imagery platform that could consistently survive in denied airspace operating at low-altitude.Wheelon prepared the simple chart below to quantify the number of good weather days vs. the bad ones, while comparing low-level flight (below 2,000 ft) to everything else.A Primer on Southeast Asia’s Typical Weather ConditionsBefore delving into the specific air combat problems during ROLLING THUNDER due to bad weather, we need to discuss the region’s perennial weather phenomena and patterns. Indochina has two monsoon seasons: a dry one and a wet one. The northeast monsoon lasts from approximately October to March. The typical weather pattern for the northeast monsoon is warm, sunny days, with high humidity and no rain. They call it the northeast monsoon because a strong breeze blows in a northeasterly direction keeping storms in the South China Sea from coming ashore in Southeast Asia. SEA countries including Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam and North Vietnam all experience the effects of the northeast monsoon. However, as will be noted below, certain other environmental factors only present in North Vietnam cause that area to experience far more bad weather from the monsoons than the other four countries.The second type of weather phenomena in Indochina is the southwest monsoon lasting from April through September, and nearly the complete opposite of the northeast monsoon. With no breeze blowing toward the northeast, the storms forming out over the South China Sea northeast of North Vietnam have nothing to stop them from pushing in a southwesterly direction into Southeast Asia, hitting North Vietnam first. The Annamite Mountains, running north to south along the western borders of both Vietnams, have a tendency to block or decrease many weather patterns trying to continue southwest into Laos or Cambodia. The net result is it rains about 25% less on the western side of the Annamites in Laos & Cambodia. In general, the whole of Southeast Asia has the infamous, but deserved, reputation for lousy weather – just about the exact opposite of Southern California’s good weather.If you dig deeper into this bad weather reputation, however, you will find that North Vietnam’s weather is considered the worst-of-the-worst! During the first couple of months of the northeastern monsoon the breezes are stronger, creating dry, warm weather throughout the region. However, in the latter months of the northeastern monsoon (January-March), the breezes are weaker and tend to dissipate to a large degree over the vast mountain area of western North Vietnam. This creates a weather phenomenon called “crachin” over North Vietnam. The crachin weather system with its lack of sufficient breezes, allows a prolonged period of cloudiness, fog and drizzle to creep in from the northeast.When you summarize all of this it reads as follows:· The southwest monsoon causes: The months of April through September to be hot, humid and excessively rainy for days at a time. All five Indochina countries are affected; but the Annamite Mountains holdback some of the moisture and cause North & South Vietnam to experience more rainfall than the other three countries.· The northeast monsoon causes: All five countries to have fall and winter months that are sunnier, warmer and drier; but still very humid. However, the breezes pushing northeast tend to weaken starting in late December, and will often blow themselves out before reaching North Vietnam. This lack of air movement through North Vietnam in a northeasterly direction allows cloudy, drizzly crachin weather to creep into North Vietnam from Southeastern China and/or the South China Sea. This sort of “blue funk” weather will linger for three or four months. Unfortunately, when the crachin weather begins to fade, the weather worsens – spending the next six months with torrential rain, flooding and mud everywhere.The net effect of all this was/is: Mid-October through mid-December is the only two-month stretch in North Vietnam with somewhat better, sunnier, drier weather. This is definitely not what any of the mission planners or flight crews wanted to hear. The bad weather, at times, was just as much an enemy as the Viet Cong or the NVA. The net result was American combat sorties up north were blessed with good weather only about 65 days per year and bad weather with plenty of cloud cover on the other 300 days. The North Vietnamese weather reminds me of Mark Twain’s famous quote, “the coldest winter I ever spent was a summer in San Francisco!”Air Combat Problems Caused by Southeast Asia’s Bad WeatherDepending on the Region’s weather severity, but, with a focus on North Vietnam, it often caused one or more of the following results:1. Decreased mission effectiveness (this is overly broad; specifics are noted below);2. Aircrews had to divert to alternate targets;3. Ordnance and delivery methods were unsafe, sub-optimal or not usable at all;4. If no workarounds could be applied, missions were aborted or cancelled, and;5. For safety purposes unexpended munitions (except cannon/machinegun ammunition) were jettisoned before landing. This significantly increased American military operational costs during the War.In general, the U.S. did not have a fighter-bomber with a self-contained target acquisition and bombing system that was accurate enough for use during Vietnam’s bad weather. Before anyone says, “but, wait a minute, what about the Republic F-105 Thunderchief, the McDonnell F-4 Phantom II, or the Grumman A-6 Intruder?” Although these planes were advertised as night/all-weather platforms, the designation was a real stretch under actual combat conditions.The other American fighter-bombers available during ROLLING THUNDER, including the Martin B-57 Canberra, Douglas A-4 Skyhawk & A-1 Skyraider, and the North American F-100 Super Sabre, were considered “day fighters.” A day fighter was limited to visual target acquisition, and weapons release only. This is not to say these aircraft were unable to fly at night, or during bad weather. The problem lay in their inability to navigate and/or attack a target in denied airspace during poor weather or at night, without outside assistance. Outside assistance refers to the fact that ROLLING THUNDER missions flown in the northern and western portions of North Vietnam were sans navigation aids, like TACAN, for pilot use, nor did they have a FAC (forward air controller) orchestrating the attack, or indirect radar bomb directing from a ground station. North Vietnam’s 85% cloud cover often made visual target bombing an ineffective campaign tool for the day fighters.The F-105, F-4, and A-6, on the other hand, had varying degrees of onboard avionics for navigation and bombing; this included specialized bomb-navigation radars, and inertial Doppler navigation systems. On an aircraft-by-aircraft basis, one of these planes could navigate on its own reasonably well at night, or in bad weather. Sticking with the single-plane concept on an attack mission over a cloud-covered target in denied airspace, using its bomb-navigation radar with unguided munitions, it could attain decent accuracy with some of its salvo likely hitting the target, but, not all of it. There was also a strong possibility of collateral damage. When you add-in that ROLLING THUNDER missions were always flown in at least a two-ship formation (some missions had up to 16 aircraft in one attack formation), plus enemy anti-aircraft defense, and bad weather, the result was too many variables that reduced the odds of mission success. For these reasons, bombing missions in North Vietnam, regardless which aircraft you used, were done by visual target acquisition and weapons release only. Not until the General Dynamics F-111 Aardvark worked-out its growing pains, and returned to the War in 1972, did the U.S. have a reliable, supersonic, all-weather tactical bomber, with the added bonus of terrain following/ terrain avoidance radar.Bad weather could affect any and all phases of a ROLLING THUNDER mission: takeoff & join-up; target ingress; target acquisition & weapons release; target egress & join-up, and RTB/recovery. Each phase had its own unique problems created by poor weather conditions. Looking at the problem purely from the “putting-ordnance-on-target” viewpoint, weather over the target was the #1 concern. Target ingress weather was the #2 concern, and takeoff/join-up weather was concern #3.Takeoff and Join-Up Problems Associated With Poor WeatherLt. Col. Harrison noted in his CHECO report that “most takeoffs in SEA were made at high gross weight, with many close to the maximum. Very few fighter-bomber pilots deploying to Vietnam had ever flown heavyweight takeoffs with live ordnance.” The planes were sluggish, lacked reserve engine power, and climbed slowly. Poor weather made formation join-ups dicey, and took a lot longer to accomplish. Lacking outside references, pilots experienced spatial disorientation, and had difficulty judging closure and turn rates. Join-up complications in bad weather were multiplied as the number of aircraft in the attack formation increased. It became common practice when there was excessive cloud cover after takeoff, to delay formation join-up until the pilots had VMC (visual meteorological condition), either between cloud layers or on top of the overcast.Mission En Route and Target Ingress Problems Associated With Poor WeatherBecause of the numerous mountains throughout Southeast Asia, there was always the possibility of being a victim of “controlled-flight-into-terrain” due to bad weather. To prevent this from happening en route to the target, flights often operated at an MEA (minimum en route altitude) 1,000 ft. above the highest obstacle within three miles of the planned course. As AAA defenses multiplied, MEA became a hazardous tactic, and had to be limited to low threat density areas. Ingress route planning became very meticulous, trying to avoid areas of bad weather, and high density AAA. It required numerous course & altitude changes based on terrain, weather and AAA threats. Thunderstorms encountered on the way to the target usually required a route deviation, adding more complexity to the mission. This could be especially hazardous if the formation was scheduled to top-off fuel before the attack phase, and the flight leader had to work out a join-up in a clear weather location that was safe enough for the less nimble and unarmed KC-135 tanker.Target Acquisition and Weapons Release Problems Associated With Poor WeatherAlthough the AAA threat density over North Vietnam was not a major factor in the opening stages of Operation ROLLING THUNDER, it quickly became an issue. Aircrew vigilance ratcheted-up significantly when a strike formation entered North Vietnamese airspace, regardless of weather conditions. As the SAM threat increased, if an aircrew detected a missile launch, no amount of sophisticated avionics was a cinch in preventing a shoot down. In a life or death situation, the only thing aircrews trusted were their own eyes and seat-of-the-pants flying skills. If there was too much overcast after entering enemy airspace, it did not permit adequate separation from the clouds to allow visual detection of launched missiles & subsequent evasive action. ROLLING THUNDER-developed TTPs stated if a plane could not stay at least 8,000 ft. above an undercast, and/or 3,000 ft. below an overcast, while operating between 13,000 ft. and 17,000 ft. AGL, the mission was aborted. This operating altitude negated AAA guns, but, was perfect for SAMs. Missions over North Vietnam were also scrubbed if weather reduced visibility to less than five miles.After reaching the target area, if ingress weather caused the strike formation to fly under IMC (instrument meteorological conditions), the flight leader had to determine where, when, and how to letdown to VMC altitude to begin target acquisition. Without benefit of external navigation aids, TTPs recommended transitioning from IMC to VMC by descending no lower than 2,000 ft. above the highest obstacle within 25 miles. Although it kept a good safety margin to prevent controlled-flight-into-terrain, aircrews felt it was too predictable, making it easier for AAA gun crews. Pilots preferred to find a break in the cloud cover to descend through, then fly VMC into the target. If the formation could not find a means to letdown for visual target acquisition without deviating too far from the planned mission track, the attack was aborted.If an attack formation had to fly the ingress portion of the mission under IMC due to weather, it was entirely likely the strike force commander’s navigation to the proper roll-in point to commence target acquisition, was going to be inaccurate. In order to prevent arriving at the wrong roll-in point, it took the commander at least 10-15 miles to get everyone realigned to the right roll-in spot. If there was more than 35-40% cloud cover in the target area, it was almost impossible to get the strike force realigned in-time for accurate ordnance delivery.The F-4 Phantom had one option if the target could not be visually acquired, and that was offset bombing using a WRCS (weapons release computer system). The WRCS was not as useful against a difficult target, or there was a low-tolerance for collateral damage at that particular location. If aircrews had to fly below the cloud cover to visually deliver their ordnance, susceptibility to shoot down went up dramatically. Many of the weapons released at low altitude exploded upon impact before the plane could clear the blast radius, causing self-inflicted damage. Simply flying under the weather was not an option. In the final analysis, ordnance accuracy was basically dependent upon the aircrew’s ability to visually acquire the target without compromising aircrew safety. If this could not be done, missions were either cancelled before takeoff, if possible, or aborted during target ingress & acquisition.Imagery Reconnaissance Problems Associated With Poor WeatherWhen ROLLING THUNDER started, the U.S. military had six types of tactical reconnaissance jets in-theatre – The Air Force had the McDonnell RF-101C Voodoo, Martin RB-57A Canberra, and McDonnell RF-4C Phantom II. The Navy had the North American Aviation RA-5C Vigilante, Vought RF-8A Crusader, and the Douglas RA-3 Skywarrior. The RF-4s and RA-5s were the newest of the six planes, and were still in regular production in 1965. There were only a few RF-4s in Vietnam at the start of ROLLING THUNDER; most did not arrive until late 1965.Of the six types of planes, the Skywarrior, Canberra, Voodoo, and Crusader, had the oldest technology, having first flown in 1952, 1953, 1954 and 1955 respectively. Both the Phantom and Vigilante first flew in 1958, just a few years after the other four airframes. Jet aircraft and avionics technology advanced so rapidly in the 1950s that an aircraft’s design was outdated very quickly. By time ROLLING THUNDER started, the RA-3’s were being returned stateside for conversion to their new Navy role as a refueling tanker, the KA-3, and did not fly into North Vietnam, nor did the RB-57. The RF-101 and RF-8, however, flew numerous photo reconnaissance missions over North Vietnam, and paid the price for it.The imagery and intelligence collection capabilities of the RF-4 and RA-5 far outclassed the other airframes. Within a matter of months the photo reconnaissance core competency of all four airframes was marginalized due to poor weather over North Vietnam. None of the planes were capable of taking reconnaissance photographs below the cloud cover without increasing the odds of being shot down. By time ROLLING THUNDER passed the 90-day point, not only was cloud cover affecting bombing missions up north, it also stymied the photo reconnaissance platforms.The RF-101 and RF-8 were both classified as day fighters. Of the four tac recce planes to fly into North Vietnam, the RF-101 and RF-8 had the greatest difficulty in flying successful missions during inclement weather. As North Vietnam’s air defense system expanded, pilot survivability became the overriding concern. The most RF-101s dedicated at any one time to flying missions over North Vietnam was 14, but, they lost 30 planes in the process; this was a 214% loss ratio. In 1968, the RF-101s were restricted to flying ROLLING THUNDER sorties in Route Package I (adjacent to the DMZ) only. As the NVA moved more antiaircraft batteries into RP I, however, the Voodoos were further restricted to no more than 18 miles into North Vietnam above the DMZ. The other two Air Force Route Packages of V in western North Vietnam, and VI-A in the north, were too dangerous for the RF-101.With the advent of a full bombing halt in North Vietnam on November 2, 1968, the RF-101s began flying most of their missions in South Vietnam until they were returned stateside in 1970. It was just as well for the RF-101s that ROLLING THUNDER was put on-hold when it did. Earlier in March President Johnson restricted the bombing to just the North Vietnamese panhandle, comprising Route Packages I, II, III and IV. The Navy owned II, III and IV. Shortly after the bombing ceased in Route Packages V, VI-A and VI-B, NVA air defense battalions began migrating south to RP I, making it a very dangerous airspace. Route Package I contained the critical logistics routes through the Annamite Mountains into Laos, destined for the Ho Chi Minh Trail. By time the full bombing halt took effect in November, the RF-101s were already being scaled back from RP I sorties due to the extensive AAA migration; it became just as dangerous for the RF-101s as it was flying up north in RP V, VI-A, and VI-B.The RF-101s were only shot down six times in South Vietnam. The RF-8s were deployed to Vietnam throughout the war in four-plane detachments aboard Task Force 77’s aircraft carriers, with eight planes in-theatre at any given time. The Navy lost 13 RF-8s over North Vietnam, totaling a 162% loss ratio. The Navy ultimately kept the RF-8s out of the more dangerous Route Packages IV and VI-B.The two newest platforms were the multi-sensor RA-5s, and RF-4s. The RA-5 still holds the record for the heaviest plane to be stationed aboard an aircraft carrier. The base model A-5 was designed as a long range, high speed, and high altitude nuclear attack aircraft. In 1961 the Pentagon decided to focus the Navy’s nuclear weapons capability on submarines, and ceased production of the A-5 after just 23 planes were built. Before North American could shut down the A-5 production line, the Navy chose to convert the A-5 platform into a long range reconnaissance plane, becoming the RA-5C. The RA-5 deployed to the fleet in squadrons of six aircraft each. During Operation ROLLING THUNDER, two squadrons (12 aircraft) were the most flying combat sorties at one time. From 1964 through 1972, the Navy lost 19 RA-5s on North Vietnamese sorties, equating to a loss ratio of 158%. The RA-5’s greatest vulnerability in flying through denied airspace was its thrust-to-weight ratio. The RA-5’s baseline weight was 10,000 lbs. heavier than the A-5 attack model. The plane did not lose any of its top-end speed, and was surprisingly agile for such as big plane. The RA-5’s weakness, however, was its rate-of-climb because of the added weight, making it more vulnerable to a shoot down. The RA-5 had the same photo reconnaissance problem as the other airframes; it was not capable of flying low enough under the cloud cover to take unobscured pictures.Of all the tac recce platforms flying over North Vietnam, the Air Force RF-4 faired the best. Although the RF-4’s cameras still had problems with clouds obscuring the target, it had terrain avoidance radar, and did not suffer from being under powered. At a peak deployment of 72 aircraft in SEA, 38 were shot down in North Vietnam, making their loss ratio much lower at 52%. A reduced loss ratio compared to the other tac recce platforms was a welcome factor for RF-4 crews, but, it changed nothing in terms of collecting photos during bad weather.The monsoon weather greatly affected high altitude drones, the U-2, and SR-71 operations. From an intelligence collection standpoint at 70,000+ ft., which effected all high-altitude reconnaissance vehicles (including satellites), the greatest problem was cloud cover obscuring the target. Electro-optical, infrared, and radar sensor technology had not advanced far enough for high-altitude reconnaissance platforms to carry equipment capable of “seeing” through the clouds for imagery collection. The U-2 and high altitude Model 147 drones had a secondary weather problem at high altitude: Upper atmospheric winds. The wind affected the U-2 in two ways: 1.) A safety-of-flight issue stemming from high winds causing airframe damage and/or departing controlled flight, and; 2.) Pilot navigation issues from the wind blowing the plane off-course. Although there were no aircrew safety concerns, the high altitude drones were also susceptible to being blown off-course by high-level winds. The problem of returning the drone to its proper course was amplified because the remote control team in the DC-130 lacked situational awareness in seeing what the drone was experiencing. Unlike the U-2, and high altitude drones, the SR-71 did not experience high altitude weather problems, but, cloud cover was still a concern. Low-altitude drones did not have cloud cover problems, or AAA survivability issues. This is how the low-level Model 147 became the reconnaissance platform-of-choice throughout the War in heavily protected areas.Post-Attack BDA Photos Showed Insufficient Knowledge about the TargetWhen the RTTL planning cell released the 94-list in 1964 for future operations, a significant number of targets lacked enough information to release them for mission fragging. Prior to commencing ROLLING THUNDER, the U.S. had conducted very little airborne target reconnaissance over North Vietnam, neither by National Intelligence Assets, nor a tac recce platform. Target information was limited to such sources as: The CIA, DIA, Saigon’s military intelligence group, French colonial records, and Japanese files from World War II. Targeting details had a good start; often with more information than mission planners had in World War II. But, as mentioned previously, the global imperative of defeating the Tripartite Axis in World War II vs. the defeat of a communist-backed insurgency in SEA, did not carry the same tolerance for risk in aerial combat.Even if the RTTL planning cell gave a thumbs-up, however, President Johnson made certain targets off-limits. Off-limits targets included tank farms for oil & fuel storage, and any targets in and around a 30 mile radius of Hanoi, and 10 miles around Haiphong.After 90 days of bombing, the post-mission aircrew debriefs, and post-strike BDA reconnaissance photos, revealed targets were not always being destroyed as expected. Typical post-strike target concerns included:· More structures and other sub-targets than expected. When a target attack is laid-on, the “target” tends to be seen by mission planners, intelligence officers and aircrew as an abstract, inanimate object. It is easy to generalize that a target is just another target. What is your mission for today? Answer: Bomb the target. What is your mission for tomorrow? Answer: Bomb the target. What is your mission for next week? Answer: Bomb the target. In reality, most targets are a collection of different things, such as what is typically found at an air base, like: parked airplanes, runways, hangars, fuel storage tanks, barracks, ordnance storage facilities, administration buildings, etc. Using the term, “target,” might be overly generalized for what is later found to be an intricate and complex target.When a flight of four F-105s attacked Nghia Lo Airfield for the first time in October 1965, it was also the first time Americans actually had eyes on the airfield and its facilities in real-time. As it turned out, the returning pilots reported that Nghia Lo had far more equipment, structures and facility infrastructure than was anticipated. Post-mission BDA imagery revealed Nghia Lo had 75 individual sub-targets scattered across the base. It would take five more missions over an 80-day stretch, before the airfield & its facilities were completely destroyed.· Structures were expected to be “soft” (i.e.; wood, etc.), but, were brick, or concrete & rebar instead. Post-strike analysis in many cases revealed flawed assumptions about target structures. Since Vietnam was one of many Asian countries, generalizations were made based on other countries in the region, such as, Japan, China and Korea, where soft structures were prevalent. In Vietnam, however, French colonialization introduced a lot of European architecture and construction techniques, which tended toward more robust designs using brick and other types of stout materials. The net result was inadequate ordnance planning.· The “schematic” of the target’s layout was different than what was actually encountered. None of the Air Force and Navy aircrews had flown against targets in North Vietnam. Whatever layout data was available prior to the mission was what the aircrews took into battle. Since tactical bombing in SEA required visual target acquisition, if the actual target differed from pre-mission briefing data, it magnified the difficulty in correctly identifying it. As if this was not enough, poor weather could make matters worse in trying to find something based on faulty layout information.· Collateral damage factors were underestimated. Civilian casualty estimates used in North Vietnam came from aerial bombing data accumulated in the 1947 World War II Strategic Bombing Survey. ROLLING THUNDER operations ran from March 1965 through end of 1966 using the generic casualty analysis conducted in 1964 when the 94-List was first compiled. As it turned out, the analysis methodology was flawed. RTTL planners used the statistics compiled from the bombing campaign conducted against the Japanese home islands.Japan suffered more than 550,000 civilian casualties, and over two million civilian structures destroyed. The 1947 Survey researchers were surprised at the low casualty figures for having destroyed so many civilian structures. Intelligence officers assigned to B-29 operations knew Japan had a densely-packed civilian populace, and expected casualties to be 10 times higher than 550,000. Further research revealed that Japan learned an important lesson in the aftermath of Jimmy Doolittle’s surprise B-25 raid. Actual bomb damage was minimal; but, it gave Tokyo fair warning that future no-notice raids would likely be far worse. Japan quickly instituted a civil defense warning system to protect their citizenry. B-29 Superfortress raids originated from Saipan & Tinian Island in the Marianas chain 1,500 miles southeast of Japan. Cruising at 220 mph, it was a seven or eight hour trip for the B-29s. By placing Japanese fishing trawlers and submarines between the Marianas and Japan, it gave them plenty of time to radio a warning of the impending raid. By time the bomber formation arrived over the target, civilians were already tucked into their bomb shelters, drastically cutting the number of casualties.Unfortunately for the ROLLING THUNDER planners, they did not pick-up on how Japan minimized their casualties. They rationalized that civilian structures in a city like Hanoi were similar to Tokyo; ergo, the 0.26 Japanese casualties per civilian structure was incorrectly applied to North Vietnam. In order to avoid civilian casualties stemming from collateral damage, President Johnson directed the JCS to promulgate a set of “Rules of Engagement” (ROE) making both Hanoi and Haiphong no-fly zones within a 30-mile radius of the former, and 10-miles for the latter.Within the first few months of ROLLING THUNDER, Hanoi was already claiming serious civilian casualties due to collateral damage. Washington attributed Hanoi’s carping to nothing more than propaganda. As the negative press continued, it eventually led to a late-1966, CIA/DIA deep-dive review of collateral bomb damage, and civilian casualties. The vast majority of military and critical infrastructure targets were not inside the Hanoi & Haiphong no-fly zones; so, where were the civilian casualties coming from? The Review exposed the faulty logic applied in 1964. Unlike Japan’s majority populace of city dwellers, North Vietnam was a predominately agrarian society, with a mostly rural population. This meant that many of the remotely-located RTTL targets were co-mingled amongst the farms and nearby villages. It was also a fact that North Vietnam did not possess a civil defense warning network to minimize civilian casualties.An example taken from the CIA/DIA ad hoc analysis is target #39, the Chap Le Army Barracks. Between June 1965 and June 1966, Chap Le was bombed 13 times. Heavy casualties were expected in terms of military personnel. Civilian casualties arising from collateral damage were expected to be very light, based on the flawed assumptions just noted. Six of the 13 raids had five or less civilian casualties. The other seven raids had significantly more collateral damage with civilian casualties ranging from 15 to 220 per raid. Although the U.S. never revealed the results of their ad hoc casualty review, it did cause the air war planners to reassess available target intelligence for future missions. In a number of cases, targets were moved to the unapproved list until new imagery intelligence could be obtained, and analyzed to ensure missions were planned with an eye toward reducing collateral damage.· Munitions accuracy was lacking (smart weapons were not in regular use during the first few years). Once again, the results of the 1947 Strategic Bombing Survey skewed RTTL expectations and planning. Contrary to urban legend, which led to the deliberately fabricated hyperbole about America’s Top Secret Norden Bomb Sight, the accuracy of “dumb” bombs saw little improvement with the Norden gear…it was a hoax. Aside from the Norden fallacy, other factors affecting munitions accuracy, such as: navigation, weather, air defense tactics, and a bomber’s “as-designed & flown” overall performance, all contributed to the lack of attack accuracy. Allied air war planners in Europe and the Pacific Rim, had no choice except to compensate for bombing quality by massively increasing the amount of ordnance delivered. By 1964, RTTL mission planners had better attack options due to the quantum leap in military aircraft weapon system’s capability and reliability in the 20 years since World War II. The bombs, however, were still dumb, and in many cases the actual munitions used at the beginning of ROLLING THUNDER were from World War II stockpiles!Munitions delivery accuracy improved with the newer aircraft, but, not nearly as much as they were advertised to be. Granted, it did not take a formation of 100 B-17 bombers with a 4,500 lb bomb load per plane, to strike one target. RTTL mission planners expected to need only a fraction of the number of planes and bomb tonnage in using the current crop of jet-powered fighters. These jet fighters were supposed to achieve a munitions delivery accuracy of 200 ft. CEP (circular error probable). Mission planners used a more conservative accuracy of 300 ft. CEP. BDA photographs showed actual munitions accuracy to be more on the order of 600 ft. CEP!· The type and tonnage of weapons calculated to achieve target destruction were frequently underestimated. Problems in this area were exacerbated by many of the previously mentioned difficulties.· Time estimates of the enemy’s ability to recover their operations after an attack fell short, causing a re-attack much sooner.In the case of both problems above, an example of what happened will illustrate the situation. Target #18, the Lang Son Highway/Railroad bridge was bombed 37 times between April 1965, and August 1966. BDA photographs showed the bridge was never completely destroyed, and a civilian construction team was billeted nearby with the full-time assignment of continuously repairing any bomb damage. When ROLLING THUNDER was discontinued in late 1968, the bridge still stood, and was not 100% destroyed until bombing in North Vietnam recommenced in March 1972.Inadequate reconnaissance for mission planning & target ingress/egress routingAt the beginning of Operation ROLLING THUNDER, very little imagery intelligence was available for mission planning. American aircrews quickly learned the lack of imagery intelligence on many targets was a distinct disadvantage. At first, tac recce platforms (i.e.; the RF-101C, et al) were sent to North Vietnam to photograph targets that aircrews noted in post-mission debriefs as lacking information. As ROLLING THUNDER missions continued, North Vietnam went into a “crash” program to help minimize the impact of American air strikes. As North Vietnam’s anti-aircraft system improved, mission planning became more complex with each passing day. Numerous areas in North Vietnam were rapidly becoming too risky for tac recce sorties. Mission planners at the 2nd AD/7th AF realized that learning after-the-fact about targeting problems, and new AAA & SAM sites during post-mission crew debriefs, was a dangerous precedent. A more pro-active approach was needed to gather imagery intelligence of potential targets, and ingress/egress routes. This was a mission profile highly suited to the AQM-34 reconnaissance drones. More will be said about this later in the chapter.Lack of Situational Awareness, and No Air Traffic Control over North VietnamThe original RTTL did not contain any ROEs (rules of engagement) or President Johnson’s micro-managed targeting restrictions. These “artificial” rules and restrictions would later become the nemesis of the 2nd AD/7th AF mission planners once ROLLING THUNDER started. The ROEs had one distinctive, common theme frequently espoused by President Johnson in public and private forums, “We [the United States] seek no wider war.” In applying this to the promulgated ROEs for the air war, it placed strict limits on mission aircrews to avoid certain actions that could be misconstrued as provocative [author note: I don’t know…maybe it is just me; in my opinion, incessantly bombing a sovereign country seems provocative from day one!] The ROEs were not static; they went through several revisions between the start of ROLLING THUNDER, and November 1968, when a complete bombing halt was instituted in North Vietnam. The original ROEs are listed at the end of this chapter.One aspect of the ROEs was establishing numerous “no-fly” zones in North Vietnam. The three most notable no-fly zones were:· Within 30 NM of the center of Hanoi;· Within 10 NM of the center of Haiphong;· Within 20 NM of Chinese territory along the entire contiguous border with North Vietnam. For an additional 10 NM (totaling 30 NM), American planes could fly there, but, no ordnance delivery was allowed.Within the first few weeks of ROLLING THUNDER, it was apparent that aircrews were struggling with the ROEs; especially with the no-fly zones. Aircrews were already dealing with navigation and weather problems, which exacerbated the difficulty in staying out of the no-fly zones. The entire length of the border between North Vietnam and China was mountainous, rural countryside. Similarly, the no-fly zones over Hanoi, and Haiphong, were impossible to determine from the air. Using Hanoi’s 2017 boundaries in comparison to 50 years ago, the majority of the 30-mile radius is still rural countryside with no identifiable landmarks. With no defining landmarks, it was impossible for American aircrews to avoid the no-fly zones based solely on an aircraft’s onboard systems, and the aircrew’s flying skills. They could only be avoided by careful planning of the target’s ingress & egress routes.With all of the challenges and problems encountered on ROLLING THUNDER missions, it made aircrew situational awareness very difficult. When American aircrews first heard about North Vietnamese fighter pilots flying sorties solely by GCI (ground-controlled intercept), they likened it to an “electronic leash,” thinking it meant that either the pilots were not very good, and/or it was another form of communist oppression due to lack of trust. In actuality, the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF) relied on GCI to maximize the effectiveness, and geographic coverage of their limited fighter plane inventory. After several weeks of ROLLING THUNDER with all the foregoing problems, American military leaders and aircrews decided there was a need for electronic surveillance of the North Vietnamese airspace to improve the situational awareness of aircrews.At the commencement of ROLLING THUNDER in March 1965, the U.S. military had become quite skilled in ground-based early warning & airspace control via radar stations operated by NORAD (North American Air Defense Command). Airborne early warning & control was a different matter, though. Ground-based early warning & control radars were limited in their line-of-sight detection range to less than 300 miles. Greater radar coverage was needed over the vast Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. To that end, NORAD contracted with Lockheed to build an airborne early warning & airspace control platform using the Tri-star Constellation C-121 transport. The resultant aircraft was the EC-121D. The EC-121D carried two search radars mounted on the top and bottom of the fuselage; one for azimuth & range, and the other for target altitude. Although the Navy contracted in 1960 with Grumman Aircraft to build the E-2A Hawkeye AEW plane with the first rotodome on top, it had far too many shortcomings, and technical/reliability problems when first introduced to the fleet in 1964. It would not be until 1968 when the E-2B came on-line, that the Hawkeye could fly a combat AEW sortie as a trusted asset, and not a liability.During the first week of April 1965, the 2nd Air Division at Tan Son Nhut routed a request to the JCS, with endorsements by MACV, PACAF, and CINCPAC, requesting AEW support for North Vietnamese airspace during ROLLING THUNDER operations. The JCS added their approval, and forwarded it to NORAD. NORAD issued orders to the 552nd AEWCW (Airborne Early Warning & Control Wing) to deploy an EC-121D AEW detachment of four aircraft to Tan Son Nhut AB from McClellan AFB, California. The AEW deployment was tagged “Operation BIG EYE.” In order to avoid rocket attacks at Tan Son Nhut, 7th Air Force (successor to the 2nd AD) moved the BIG EYE detachment to Ubon AB, Thailand in March 1967, and renamed it the COLLEGE EYE Task Force. Throughout the EC-121D’s deployment, their missions were flown under the call sign “Ethan.”Project COMBAT TREE Comes to the Aid of Operation ROLLING THUNDERVarious tactics were tried, and refined to optimize the usefulness of BIG EYE by strike aircraft flying into North Vietnam. Standard orbits were flown by the EC-121Ds over Northern Laos and the Tonkin Gulf to maintain surveillance of North Vietnamese airspace. In the beginning, BIG EYE was only tasked with keeping American aircraft out of the numerous no-fly zones. Eventually, BIG EYE took on a more robust AEW profile, including CSAR coordination, aircraft deconfliction, and surveillance for MiGs coming-up to harass American aircrews. This ultimately led to one of the most highly classified pieces of electronic hardware used in the Vietnam War, known as COMBAT TREE.For several decades, including the 1960s, the Air Force Systems Command had a program office for addressing immediate equipment needs for deployed combat units. In most cases an identified gap during combat operations meant time was of the essence, and was often highly classified to prevent the enemy from capitalizing on an American weakness. So, AFSC avoided the use of traditional equipment identifiers, such as AN/AQM-34 or AN/APW-23, which were in the public domain. AFSC used instead, a more generic, less identifiable labeling method that was not in the public domain. AFSC labeled these fast-track projects “QRCs” (quick reaction capability). New QRC projects were merely assigned the next available in-sequence number. In the case of the COMBAT TREE project, its identifier was QRC-248.COMBAT TREE arose in the aftermath of the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis. The Defense Intelligence Agency recognized the need for a more reliable, and precise method of monitoring the comings & goings of military aircraft in Cuban airspace. Standard airspace surveillance using search radars did not permit easy identification & differentiation between military and civilian aircraft. Cuba’s air force was nearly 100% Soviet-made planes, which all carried the USSR’s standard military IFF (identify friend or foe) transponder, the SRO-2. The DIA & CIA went about a clandestine/covert operation to surreptitiously acquire both an aircraft IFF transponder, and the fixed-station IFF interrogator (transmitter).Once acquired, the COMBAT TREE project team set about reverse-engineering the Soviet SRO-2 IFF transponder. The resultant equipment was the QRC-248 IFF interrogator set. When the QRC-248 was first used to monitor Cuban military aircraft, it was deliberately left in the passive receiver mode, in lieu of transmitting an interrogation signal. The idea was to intercept an aircraft’s transponder reply when it was interrogated by an actual Soviet IFF transmitter-interrogator signal. In essence, it was a sophisticated means of eavesdropping that was undetectable. Eventually, when the DIA determined that neither the Soviets, nor the Cubans paid any attention to who was interrogating their aircraft transponders, the QRC-248 was used in its active transmit mode to directly interrogate Soviet IFF transponders. Now the DIA could easily monitor military aircraft in Cuban airspace.Fast-forward to ROLLING THUNDER and BIG EYE operations in North Vietnam. In 1965 VPAF had the MiG-17 and MiG-19 fighter jets. Both jets were no match for American frontline fighters, such as, the F-8 Crusader, F-105 Thunderchief, or F-4 Phantom II. All three American planes were much faster than either the sub-sonic MiG-17, or the barely supersonic MiG-19. The F-8 could achieve 1.8 Mach, and both the F-4 & F-105 were legitimate Mach 2 aircraft. When BIG EYE commenced operations, VPAF sent-up MiG-17s and MiG-19s for GCI air defense. The EC-121Ds had no issue with standard radar tracking, easily calling-out MiG alerts to American aircraft over North Vietnam. As ROLLING THUNDER operations intensified throughout 1965, VPAF tried to keep pace by sending-up greater numbers of planes. The War’s intensification also brought greater numbers of civilian aircraft into North Vietnamese airspace. Deconflicting & keeping tabs on VPAF planes grew more difficult for BIG EYE. By year-end, however, things began to slacken as VPAF leaders recognized they were losing too many planes.In April 1966, everything changed when the Soviets (and the Chinese) started supplying MiG-21s to the VPAF. VPAF MiG-21s scored their first air-to-air kill in October 1966 against an F-4C, using a heat-seeking Atoll missile (a Soviet knockoff of an American AIM-9 Sidewinder). Early Mig-21 variants had an inferior combat radius compared to the F-105, and F-4. It barely achieved Mach 1 at lower altitudes, compared to the much faster American planes. Both the combat radius and slower speed made GCI a must; they did not have the luxury of trolling around waiting for something to happen. The game became more evenly matched at higher altitudes where the MiG-21’s maximum airspeed improved significantly, and were more maneuverable than the American fighters. The MiG-21’s rate-of-climb was also 3,000 ft. per minute faster.Introduction of the MiG-21 complicated AEW control for the BIG EYE Task Force. Not only were the MiG-21s more formidable interceptors, but, unbeknownst to the Americans, experienced Russian & Chinese pilots often flew combat sorties in the VPAF planes. Prior to the introduction of the MiG-21 in North Vietnam, the air controllers aboard BIG EYE planes were able to acquire and track the less capable MiG-17 & MiG-19s with only moderate effort. The EC-121D’s traditional, long-range, search radars found & tracked the older technology MiGs just as they were designed to do. By detecting the VPAF fighters almost from the moment they were airborne, BIG EYE had ample time to warn American aircrews, allowing them to take defensive measures to remain safe.The MiG-21 changed this dynamic. The previously mentioned performance improvements of the MiG-21 significantly reduced the reaction time of American forces once BIG EYE detected the enemy fighters. Tactics to evade the older MiG fighters were less effective on the MiG-21. What was a fairly typical AEW function, now became a worrisome challenge for the BIG EYE air controllers, and by extension, a serious issue for American aircrews flying over North Vietnam.One of the first steps taken by BIG EYE after the MiG-21 introduction was adding another EC-121D to both their Tonkin Gulf and Northeast Laotian orbit stations. Each station had one EC-121D flying a high orbit, and second plane flying a low orbit. This helped spread BIG EYE’s ever increasing workload over a greater number of air controllers. As the VPAF added more MiG-21s to the fray, it became apparent that BIG EYE needed a paradigm shift in managing North Vietnamese airspace. In essence, they needed a game-changer. The game changer was Project COMBAT TREE.BIG EYE air controllers were always challenged with differentiating between two aircraft in close proximity using regular “skin paint” radar echoes. This method not only made VPAF planes indistinguishable from civilian ones, but, also made it difficult to distinguish from one VPAF plane to another VPAF plane. COMBAT TREE’s QRC-248 solved this problem.After several years of using the QRC-248 IFF interrogator to monitor Cuban airspace, it was understood that it was a good surveillance tool, but, had nothing to do with minimizing life or death situations. Over North Vietnam, however, maintaining positive airspace control for American aircrews was a life or death situation. To this end, the JCS authorized QRC-248s for installation aboard BIG EYE aircraft.The QRC-248 IFF Interrogator was a complicated piece of equipment. They were built one-at-a-time in an engineering lab, and required full-time field engineers to support them on BIG EYE aircraft. Like ECM jammers, there was never enough QRC-248s to install on every American plane flying into North Vietnam. They eventually had enough QRC-248s to install on just the strike leader’s plane for missions up north. This did not happen until just prior to ROLLING THUNDER’s halt. The QRC-248’s greatest use was aboard the BIG EYE EC-121Ds.The BIG EYE air controllers were able to use the QRC-248 to differentiate between civilian and VPAF planes, and also permit the assignment of target numbers to each identified enemy plane. The QRC-248 essentially put an electronic leash on each bogey for as long as its transponder signal was received. Air controllers were able to broadcast defensive MiG alerts to American aircrews with greater accuracy, and they were also able to vector MIGCAP F-4s to intercept the VPAF planes.Other Problems to Surface in the First 90 Days of ROLLING THUNDEROf the remaining nine problems listed earlier in the chapter, they include: bombing accuracy, and ordnance selection; an improving North Vietnamese air defense system; limited knowledge of Hanoi’s electronic-order-of-battle, and what was needed to defeat it; destroying targets seemed to have little impact on Hanoi’s warfighting capacity, and; latent functional and design vulnerabilities in American strike aircraft. We already touched on bombing accuracy, and ordnance selection. There is also a deep-dive discussion elsewhere in the book about North Vietnam’s evolving air defense system. This leaves us with two topics: target destruction’s minimal impact on North Vietnam’s ability to wage war, and technical deficiencies of American aircraft.The easiest one to discuss first is the technology gap uncovered on various American aircraft. Entire books and reports have been written on the topic, and much of it had no relation to the expanding use of Model 147 RPVs. An example of an aircraft technical deficiency was on the F-105 Thunderchief. The F-105 had built-in equipment redundancies to mitigate the risk of losing a pilot & plane due to combat damage. One of the most critical things was the hydraulic system; all of it had dual redundancy. The problem was: the primary & back-up hydraulic systems were installed side-by-side. One AAA hit from a 37 or 57mm cannon could destroy the dual hydraulic system in one shot. Numerous F-105s were lost due to this problem. This is just one example.The last problem encountered on ROLLING THUNDER sorties was the apparent lack of impact the bombing was having on Hanoi’s warfighting capacity. The JCS asked the CIA to analyze the lack of impact, and published a seven page report in June 1965. In terms of analyzing Hanoi’s warfighting capacity, there were several KPIs (key performance indicators) tracked by the American Intelligence Community. One of the most important KPIs was tracking Viet Cong insurgent activity in South Vietnam. If the Viet Cong continued with a high operational tempo, this meant they were receiving adequate logistics & materiel support directly, or indirectly, from North Vietnam.In mid-1965, the DIA and CIA were still collecting intelligence about the methods of infiltrating supplies & munitions to the Viet Cong. They already knew about waterborne infiltration along South Vietnam’s coast, and the Mekong River Delta. The U.S. Navy had already started interdiction operations in both areas to stem the flow of support to the insurgents. The Intelligence Community also discovered the Cambodian government was allowing cargo ships to bring-in materials for transshipment to the Viet Cong. The U.S. Navy and Coast Guard started boarding these vessels; if they found contraband, they seized the ship.Stemming the waterborne flow of goods helped. It was obvious, however, that the greatest portion of war materiel originated from inside North Vietnam, destined for ground transport through Laos. Even though Hanoi was not backing down based on the reasonable man theory, ROLLING THUNDER operations were still expected to stop their physical support of the Viet Cong, reasonable or not. This led to the June 1965 report’s basic question: “If ROLLING THUNDER is not impeding Hanoi, or the Viet Cong, then why not?”Much of the report pointed toward North Vietnam’s unique economy, society, and physical infrastructure. The economy was based on subsistence agriculture, with only a small, modern industrial sector. The majority of their industry was either inside Hanoi’s 30-mile no-fly zone, or Haiphong’s 10-mile zone. What few factories existed, were heavily dependent on machinery and raw material imports; mostly from China and the Soviet Union. On the flip side, North Vietnam imported very little food, depending mostly on domestic production to feed its citizenry.The main transportation links with other countries were the port of Haiphong, and the Dong Dang rail line going to China. North Vietnam's ability to make military products was restricted to grenades, mines, mortars, and small arms ammunition. Most of it was crudely manufactured. All of North Vietnam’s heavy military equipment, most of its small arms, and a large portion of its ammunition needs, were imported from China, the Soviets, and other Eastern Bloc countries.The upshot of the foregoing was: Viet Cong military operations neither depended on North Vietnam’s industrial sector, nor its economy, for equipment and supplies. They also did not need support from North Vietnam’s major military installations, such as airfields, and military headquarters. Ordinarily, when a combatant attacks an enemy’s key industrial, transport and military targets, it deals a serious blow to the enemy’s warfighting capacity. This phenomenon was not happening in North Vietnam; and the Viet Cong were also unaffected. This question & answer was addressed in the June 1965 CIA report.The CIA stated that attacking North Vietnamese targets such as electric power plants, heavy industry, transportation infrastructure, petroleum storage depots, and the port of Haiphong, was not going to achieve the desired results. Then the report explained why.First-up: Haiphong was in a no-fly zone. The no-fly zone was primarily in-place to avoid the very real possibility of hitting or sinking vessels belonging to non-combatant countries. As for electricity generation throughout North Vietnam, 90% of the country’s electricity needs came from only eight power plants. Knocking-out these power plants would ordinarily have an immediate and long lasting effect on industrial production and would impair operations at the port of Haiphong. But, since North Vietnam’s industrial sector was extremely small, and the power plant supporting Haiphong was located within the no fly zone, loss of power would have little impact on their warfighting capacity. On top of everything else, President Johnson had all power plants on the unapproved targets list, out of concern for power outages at healthcare facilities and schools.Second-up: North Vietnam had a total of just five large industrial plants, comprising steel production, cement, fertilizer, and only one modern machine shop. Destroying these factories would have little or no effect on curbing Hanoi’s support of the Viet Cong, since 90% of all war materiel was imported from other communist countries.Third-up: North Vietnam’s ground transportation modes were minimal, with just six rail and highway bridges capable of handling high volume traffic. It was thought that by destroying these six targets, it would severely cripple North Vietnam’s logistics system. In reality, all of these targets were bombed dozens & dozens of times, and rarely were they unusable for more than 2-3 days. All of these key transportation nodes had permanent civil engineering teams, and repair materials located close by. Within just a few hours of being bombed, civil engineers were already working on repairs to re-open the damaged bridge, road or railway. So, not even bombing North Vietnam’s transportation infrastructure made an impact on the War.Last item: The June 1965 target study convincingly demonstrated why ROLLING THUNDER was having markedly subpar success in crippling Hanoi’s war aims. The CIA decided that since the study painted such a bleak picture, they would include an idea, which if implemented, would seriously hamper North Vietnam’s prosecution of the War. Their idea was to bomb key locations in the Red River Valley that would cause widespread flooding of all the rice crops along the river. This action would cause major food shortages, and remove Hanoi’s ability to sell its cash crop on the global market. In the end, neither President Johnson, nor his successors chose this action.The Model 147 RPV’s Contribution to ROLLING THUNDER OperationsThis is a long chapter, but, necessary to help the reader understand the circumstances behind the Model 147’s expanding support of bombing operations in North Vietnam. In most cases the missions assumed by the Model 147 were not ones with multiple, safe alternatives. Either the 147 drone was used, or the problem remained unresolved without safer options for aircrews. Listed below are some of the more important roles the Model 147 assumed in support of combat operations in North Vietnam.· Replaced the U-2 for high altitude imagery reconnaissance over North Vietnam until the Lockheed A-12, then the SR-71, took over this mission in May 1967.· Replaced Air Force and Navy tac recce on critical missions deemed too dangerous for manned aircraft.· Replaced Air Force and Navy tac recce on bad weather missions by flying below the cloud cover.· Flew the vital COMPASS COOKIE and SCOPE SAVAGE electronic intelligence missions to gather critical information about the SA-2 SAM’s radar proximity fuse, and a new Fan Song tracking radar.· With the exponential growth of North Vietnam’s electronic order of battle, and air defense sites, the Model 147s were tasked with imagery collection to find new, and/or recently repositioned air defense assets (radars, AAA guns, SAMs, etc.).· Replaced manned aircraft on chaff-seeding missions in high threat density areas.· Flew decoy jamming missions to trick North Vietnamese air defense controllers into thinking they were tracking an EB-66 tactical jammer. Shooting down a limited resource aircraft like an EB-66 was considered a top priority by Hanoi. The thought was: By shooting down an EB-66, it degraded the protection of American strike aircraft.· Later in the War, 7th Air Force started the process of installing LORAN navigation systems in SEA. The ground-based LORAN equipment required grid-annotated calibration reference photographs to ensure precise geographic locations. Specialized cartographic mapping aircraft accomplished this work in permissive airspace in places like South Vietnam and Thailand. North Vietnam and Laos (Cambodia later on) were too dangerous for the slow cartographic planes, so, RF-4Cs were tasked with these missions. The really dangerous missions in the heavy threat build-up areas in North Vietnam and the Ho Chi Minh Trail, were flown by the highly successful Model 147SC low-altitude drones.Approved JCS Rules of Engagement, Southeast AsiaApril 17, 1965(during the War this document was classified Top Secret)1. Rules Related to Communist Chinaa. As defined within JCS Basic Rules of Engagement, Southeast Asia does not include communist China.b. communist China is however treated in the Rules in two contexts:(1) In countries claiming a 12-mile territorial sea limit reaching out from their shores into the ocean, the 12 mile limit shall be observed for these Rules as if it was a valid width for their territorial limit.(2) No pursuit is authorized into the 12-mile territorial sea limit or airspace of communist China.2. Rules Related to Southeast Asiaa. Definitions(1) Immediate Pursuit: Pursuit in response to attacks by hostile aircraft or vessels. Must be continuous and uninterrupted. (Legally "hot pursuit" and "immediate pursuit" are not synonymous. Within international law, "hot pursuit" is a specific term and relates to the right of a vessel/aircraft attacked in its own territorial waters/airspace to pursue the hostile into/over international waters. The right to hot pursuit ends when the pursued vessel enters territorial waters/airspace of his own or a third state. The term "immediate pursuit" exists by Washington definition and has no technical legal meaning).(2) Hostile Aircraft(a) An aircraft in Southeast Asia attacking, or indicating with reasonable certainty, the intent to attack US forces or installations.(b) A communist bloc aircraft - over South Vietnam or Thailand without clearance from the government concerned.(c) Any aircraft over South Vietnam or Thailand committing hostile acts such as unauthorized laying of mines, or landing of troops.(d) A communist bloc aircraft in Laos committing hostile acts such as unauthorized laying of mines or landing of troops.(e) Designation of aircraft (and vessels) as hostile to be tempered with judgment. Examples: communist civil aircraft off course. Aircraft or vessels manned by defectors or trying to surrender.b. General Rules(1) US forces are authorized to attack and destroy hostile aircraft in Southeast Asia (also hostile vessels, hostile ground forces only in South Vietnam).(2) Immediate Pursuit(a) If a US aircraft is attacked over South Vietnam, Thailand, North Vietnam or Southeast Asia international waters/airspace, immediate pursuit of the hostile may be conducted over:1. International waters2. North Vietnam3. Laos4. Cambodia (when actually engaged in combat)(b) US forces entering unfriendly airspace (or territorial sea or land) are not authorized to attack other unfriendly forces in installations except in direct self-defense.(c) No pursuit is authorized into the territorial seas or airspace of Communist China.3. Operating Instructions which Impose Operating Limitations in North Vietnama. Utmost caution will be exercised in attack of all targets, including those developed by armed recce, to avoid striking populated areas.b. Collateral damage will be kept to a minimum consistent with the desired objective.c. The following are not authorized targets for attack (unless otherwise directed:(1) JCS Tgt. 39.21, Yen Phu Army Bks NE (now believed to be a leprosarium).(2) Former JCS Tgt. 38, Vinh Army Bks Central NE, (now designated a population center).(3) Locks and dams.(4) Hydroelectric power plants.(5) Watercraft which are obviously fishing boats or appear to be engaged in fishing.(6) Clusters of sampans or houseboats in populated areas which are probably homes.d. Restricted areas in which no attacks of any type are authorized (unless otherwise specifically directed):(1) Within 30 NM of center of Hanoi.(2) Within 10 NM of center of Haiphong.(3) Zone along CHICOM border 30 NM wide from Laotian border to 106° E, and 25 NM wide from 106° E to Gulf of Tonkin.e. Flight paths for conducting strikes will be no closer than 20 NM of CHICOM border.f. Aircraft in immediate pursuit may pursue into restricted target areas, but pursuit must stop at the Chinese communist border.g. Aircraft in immediate pursuit will not attack SAM sites within 30 NM of Hanoi or North Vietnam air bases from which attacking aircraft may be operating. [This rule was relaxed later in the War. In the early years NVN did not have very many SAM sites; very few were photographed via tac recce and analyzed to ensure an American attack would not cause unacceptable collateral damage (i.e.; the site was next door to an elementary school, etc.)]This is probably way more than you wanted to know, but, at least, as Paul Harvey used to say: “…and now you know the rest of the story.”Ciao!