Oregon Open Source Software Inventory Results. Open Source Software Inventory Report: Fill & Download for Free

Not going to lie: I’m going to jack a few sections of the capstone report I wrote for my degree that I have listed as my credential. I’ll modify it to make more sense. Modifications will be in italics.I’ll break it down up here before you get into the meat, potatoes, and general stew of what is probably 17 pages of a 103 page report on the Viability of Small Modular Reactors in the United States:Small: Less than 300 MWe (Megawatt Electrical; that is, output power total, not thermal power of the reactor) output.Modular: Can be installed in packs with other reactors of the same classification. For instance, the NuScale Power Module is intended to be installed in six pairs for a total of twelve reactors; you do not need every reactor, which is a great benefit - you can build a few, cheaper than a full-sized large reactor, then use the proceeds to fund more, meaning that the “OMG THEY COST SO MUCH” problem of nuclear reactors isn’t really an issue anymore; or rather, you spread out that initial upfront cost over the top of the ridiculously low running-cost. But that wasn’t the question you’re asking.That answers “what they are,” but you also want to know “why are they safer?”We have reactors which are small installed on Naval vessels, and many Pressurized Water Reactors (PWRs) bear a lot of knowledge and design from their submarine and carrier predecessors. No doubt that NuScale has a lot to owe to the US Navy; the technology is tried and true. We have a lot of OE, (Operational Experience) - that is, things we’ve learned about Pressurized Water Reactors. What to do, what not to do.One thing I know from operating reactors of this size: Good luck melting them down. Seriously, for five years on the USS George Washington and three years on the MTS-626 Daniel Webster, one of my fun games to keep myself and my fellow watchstanders engaged and focused on nuclear power instead of mental games (#MovieGame) was to ask: “If you had to, how would you melt this thing down?” Ultimately, we determined no singular human could, no matter how knowledgeable. No two humans could. Not without killing everyone who would interfere, and you’d still have to have as much education and experience on them as we did.Reactors of this size are very safe: Why? Unlike larger reactors, their Surface Area-to-Volume ratio means that they bleed heat readily, so that decay heat is much less an issue. If you add in a passive cooling system, that is, a system that requires no power to operate and ideally can self-initiate without human intervention, the meltdown factor goes away. The reactor is literally meltdown-proof, save for the intervention of a torpedo… and civilian reactors typically have that covered (even a missile would have a tough, if not impossible, time of it. I’d put my money on “impossible” for anything but a direct nuclear blast. At that point, you’ve got bigger issues than a meltdown; you’re dead).NuScale is wise-enough to not say “meltdown proof.” Forget that they’re nuclear experts, if the general public hears you say that, they freak out and start saying “well they said the Titanic was unsinkable.” Yeah, well, they also didn’t understand metallurgy the way we do now. “Iceburg” was an obvious counter to the Titanic, tell me, what’s the obvious counter to an SMR sitting in a pool of water when it’s passive-cooling system is also it’s normal operating system? (That is, the passive cooling system is sufficient enough to remove all heat from fission when operating at 100% power, let alone after shutdown.)They’re safe. They’re ridiculously safe.If you want to read on, here’s a more detailed description.Special thanks to my project partners, Jordan Bosserman and Jerrad Smythers. Of note is also, Cory Stansbury, who assisted me with finding sources, and even wrote a couple of them in relation to the Westinghouse SMR. Also, I thank Andrew Karam who first recommended to me the American Nuclear Society, where I found some of the most helpful sources.A small modular reactor is, as the name implies, a smaller reactor plant, and one which can be installed in modules. These are not exclusive from designs such as the PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor; the same would go for a BWR (Boiling Water Reactor) or PBR (Pebblebed Reactor); the SMR title is more related to size than it is to capability. In fact, the most developed SMR, the NuScale Power Module, is also a PWR (Doyle 2016)[1]. Previously built, traditional reactors are on the order of several hundred to several thousands of megawatts in power, whereas small modular reactors tend to be on the scale of only a few hundred at most, with the maximum cap of 300MW(electrical) (World Nuclear Association, 2019)[2]. The smallest of these proposed is approximately 10MWe, and several countries are exploring them as future power sources, to include the United States, Russia, China, France, Japan, and South Korea (Glaser, Hopkins, & Ramana, 2013)[3] . These reactors may be of varying designs, either entirely new designs, or may be heavily derivative smaller versions of larger reactors, such as the designed Westinghouse Small Modular Reactor being derivative of the larger, established and in-use AP1000Ⓡ(Smith & Wright, 2012)(no link available, this was sent to me by a friend who works at Westinghouse).Size is not the only factor to consider when referring to SMRs, as naval reactors have been around for decades, and these all fit into the “small” category of reactor plant. These reactors do not fill the “modular” category, though the eight reactors of the aircraft carrier USS Enterprise might qualify. Modular reactors are designed to be installed in packs, are easily replaceable, mass-produced, and many of them can perform a wide variety of functions (Doyle, 2016). This design to be both small and modular means that these reactors have the ability to be road-, train-, or boat-transportable. These design features are critical to making SMRs more economical, as this lessens the necessary construction costs of a nuclear reactor by having many of the components able to be assembled safely in a factory then transported to the location to be assembled in their packs (Harkness, 2012)(another Westinghouse source). This standardization also allows for standardized training and operations, and will allow for problems to be spotted, mitigated, and regulated more easily as more reactor plants will be in existence.Installing reactors in packs gives SMRs a unique advantage over larger reactor plants; a few reactors can be installed, bankrolled by investors, and the main facilities built. Then, as these reactors make money, they can self-finance the construction of the rest of the reactor plant, reducing the initial burden upon investors. This self-financing model has been looked upon with interest by the INCAS (Integrated model for the Competitiveness of SMRs) being developed by the Politecnico di Milano university, assisted by the IAEA. INCAS considers the economy of scale, co-siting economies (that is, use of reactor packs), construction cost savings due to using packs, international usage of these reactors, effects of delaying construction in self-financing, and cost of financing in construction (Boarin et al., 2012)[4]Because they are to be installed in packs, outage effects of a power plant’s total power output are reduced for common instances like maintenance or refueling, to unplanned outages from problems with the powerplant. Instead of losing several hundred megawatts to full gigawatts of power in a region, in which a nation like Hungary could be utterly devastated (Holgate & Saha, 2018)(oh, crap, just realized I never included this source in my bibliography and my professor didn’t catch it), only a few dozen to a few hundred megawatts of power would be lost while the rest of the reactors in the power-pack would remain operational. These reactors also work well in situations where a reactor plant is desired, but a larger reactor is too expensive for an initial investment, or where the financial situation is more dynamic.There you have the first question.As for safety?Deep breath…3.2. SafetyRegarding the actual operation of reactor plants, one of the public’s largest concerns involves safety concerning the reactor plant, both for the reactor regarding the potential for fission product release and the dangers this release could pose to the public, how the plant responds to extreme events such as tsunami, earthquake, extreme weather, or terrorist attack, and environmental safety. The latter in particular is often focused around the disposal of spent fuel, also known as high-level waste, and its ability to survive extreme events and prevention of release of this spent fuel to the environment.3.2.1. Reactor SafetyReactor safety is the concept of utilizing design features, fabrication of materials, the location of reactor plant, training safe and knowledgeable operators, active safety systems, and passive safety systems to ensure safe operations of a nuclear power plant. This includes preventing damage to the reactor core, prolonging reactor lifespan, preventing fission product release, and preventing harm to the environment, the operators, and the public, as well as ensuring that the public does not violate legal radiation exposure limits.One of the core concepts used by the U.S. Nuclear Industry is redundancy; that is, planning on at least one system to fail, and so installing similar, redundant systems to ensure that at least one method is able to provide protection. This concept is carried through in SMR designs, for example, the NuScale Emergency Core Cooling System (NuScale Power LLC, n.d.a)[5] and the Westinghouse SMR’s reactor coolant pumps (Harkness, 2012).Safety systems can be split into several categories including passive safety, active safety, and inherent safety. A passive safety system will initiate without any action at all, active safety requires action, and inherent safety is built into the design itself, and does not necessarily require a system to function.3.2.1.1. Inherent SafetyIntegral PWRs have a significant advantage over other reactor designs that utilize pumps and coolant loops. By keeping the entire primary-coolant system inside the reactor vessel, there are fewer connections, welds, and less surface area from which a loss-of-coolant accident can initiate, and therefore no isolation valves are needed. As well, during normal operation, the space between the reactor vessel and containment vessel can be kept at a vacuum to eliminate insulation needs to improve efficiency as well as adhere to NRC regulations regarding sump-blockage. This also prevents the generation of non-condensable gases such as flammable hydrogen (Reyes, 2012)[6].As SMRs are smaller, it is possible to design a system that is able to run at full power without the use of coolant pumps. So long as coolant remains in the system, it is possible for such a system to remove decay heat. In particular, the X Energy Xe-100 utilizes specific plant materials in the form of graphite fuel matrices that, even if decay heat were not adequately removed, would prevent meltdown and fission product release due to exceptional temperature resilience.Like with most reactor plants in the United States, the analyzed reactor plants all have a negative temperature coefficient of reactivity, leading to the ability to naturally control reactor power and therefore prevent inadvertent power spikes. Such designs can be considered to run themselves.In any event, a small modular reactor inherently cannot produce the same scale of catastrophe as a larger event. If any reactor has a problem, having much less fuel - in the NuScale case, 5% the amount of a larger reactor - such a release would be scaled down. The likelihood of more than one reactor having such a problem is understandably even smaller than the singular reactor (Reyes, 2012).3.2.1.2. Passive Safety SystemsThe NuScale and Holtec design in particular hinges on passive-safety systems, making the process less complicated by not relying on active safety systems that must be in operation to protect the reactor (Reyes, 2012; Holtec International, n.b.a)[7] . Because NuScale Power Unit and SMR-160 utilize no coolant pumps and are fully capable of removing their full 100% heat capacity through passive cooling, it achieves “walk-away safety.” When a reactor is shut down, some fission products continue to undergo radioactive decays that generate heat, which could potentially heat the core if not otherwise cooled. Each of the twelve NuScale modules is not only contained within the reactor vessel but in a containment vessel that sits in a pool that can provide ambient cooling for at least thirty days without the need to add any new water, and the water volume to thermal power ratio is four times greater than that of a traditional reactor, and such cooling is far better. This water, combined with redundant Decay Heat Removal Systems and Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) which works in conjunction with the Containment Heat Removal System provide further redundancy the passive cooling for these reactor designs and can provide total cooling for the core for the 30 days required for the NuScale Power Modules decay heat to be sufficiently cooled by air (Reyes, 2012). This satisfies Federal Regulation 10CF50.46(b)(5) which states “after any calculated successful initiation operation of the ECCS, the calculated core temperature shall be maintained at an acceptably low value and decay heat shall be removed for the extended period of time required by the long-lived radioactivity remaining in the core.” (Reyes, 2012) Instead of a surrounding-volume of water, the SMR-160 design instead uses above-core water inventories for this use, meeting the same requirements (Holtec International, 2015)[8]. Proof-of-concept tests are being carried out at Oregon State University for the NuScale Power Module to certify safety measures (Reyes, 2012).The Westinghouse design takes the Emergency Core Cooling Systems further with its Passive Core Cooling Systems which includes borated water injection into the core. This borated-water supplements control rod insertion, which can be considered both passive upon loss of power.One of the most popularized methods of passive safety is the scram, which is included in all evaluated designs (Smith & Wright, 2012; NuScale Power LLC, n.d.a; Holtec International, n.d.b). A scram is the insertion of control rods, usually via gravity and/or spring action, in order to shut down the reactor rapidly. Reactor scrams can be either passive or active. Passive scramming would be a scram resulting from a loss of power. Control rods are normally held by their CRDMs, and during a loss of power that would also cause a loss of flow in reactors reliant on reactor coolant pumps, a scram would result to shut down the core. Due to design, extreme shock may also initiate a scram, so several “extreme events” could force a reactor to shut down rather than melt down (Smith & Wright, 2012).The Xe-100, utilizing helium as a coolant instead of water, does not have the same level of natural cooling to rely upon, and instead must rely on convection of the helium gas. Heat is removed from the pebbles in the core to the side reflector, then convection and radiation to the core barrel and Reactor Pressure Vessel to the Reactor Cavity Cooling System (RCCS). The RCCS then utilizes more stereotypical natural convection in conjunction with conduction through concrete to the outside environment. (Bowers, 2017)[9]3.2.1.3. Active Safety SystemsActive safety systems are those which require active operation in order to operate. As mentioned before, reactor scrams can be active-safety as well, relying on control systems to initiate a scram automatically, or scrams can be initiated manually by operators when deemed necessary to shut down the reactor in a rapid manner.The NuScale Power Module utilizes Emergency Core Cooling Systems, Decay Heat Removal Systems, and the concept of an Ultimate Heat Sink (NuScale Power LLC, n.d.a), concepts which are parroted in the Holtec SMR-160, both of which rely on gravity-driven ECCS for guaranteed cooling in the non-credible event of a failure of normal passive cooling systems.Active safety systems such as the Highly Integrated Protection System Platforms, or HIPS platforms, are used as instrumentation and control (I&C), are functionally independent and redundant from one another to prefer protection active that is unnecessary due to equipment malfunction, which would increase downtime and therefore cost money in reduced capacity factor (NuScale Power LLC, n.d.b.)[10] To augment this, the NuScale Power Module analysis shows that it and other SMRs, being simpler in design, allow fewer opportunities for equipment failure, and the lack of need to scram on a loss of offsite power thanks to 100% steam-turbine bypass features and aforementioned Island Mode Power.Figure 3.2.1.3.-1 Number of 2015 reactor scrams expected to be precluded by the NuScale Design — (Reyes & Ingersoll, 2018)[11]These redundant safety systems also ensure that reactor scrams will happen when they are necessary, by allowing for there to be components which have failed without operators recognizing these failures, yet statistically other redundant systems in the network will still be operational and able to cause reactor scram or other protective features (NuScale Power LLC, n.d.b).These styles of systems are expected to be used in all Small Modular Reactors, and NuScale Power principles have been evaluated by multiple companies to be utilized on new builds; it can be reasonably ascertained that such evaluations can be parroted across most new builds. While redundant safety systems are readily used in even old designs, the ability to use Island Mode Power and 100% Steam Turbine bypass are specific capabilities of small modular reactors operating in packs, a method of operation which traditional large reactors operating singularly cannot execute.3.2.1.4. Plant Response to Extreme EventsNuclear plant operators must always consider the possibility of external threats to their reactors, either natural or man-made. Terrorism is a constant possible threat to a nuclear power plant. Reactor plants in the US require aircraft-grade protection to be able to withstand a strike from a commercial aircraft, such as those which have been used in previous attacks (Reyes, 2018). SMRs like the NuScale Power Module will be equipped with concrete containment buildings able to withstand these strikes (Doyle, 2016). Additionally, it is common for reactors to be built partially underground, and future plants like the Xe-100 and Holtec SMR-160 could be built entirely underground for added security and protection (Bowers, 2017 and Holtec International, n.d.a).Cybersecurity is a growing problem in today’s society, a factor which old reactor plants mitigated by not attaching themselves to the growing internet networks, save for administratively. The NuScale Power Module further protects itself by not using software or microprocessors in the protection systems, instead favoring field programmable gate arrays, leaving them immune to cyber-attack (Reyes, 2018). These exist in the form of Highly Integrated Protection System Platforms, or HIPS Platforms, developed in partnership with Rock Creek Innovations LLC (NuScale Power LLC, n.d.b). These HIPS Platforms control the safety-related systems and are physically and electrically independent for redundancy, ensuring persistent reactor safety in a platform that is modular to ease replacement should they be damaged or faulty, reducing maintenance and training costs (NuScale Power LLC, n.d.b). Electromagnetic attacks or natural occurrences could also render the electrical grid or reactor plant in danger. To combat this, the planned NuScale plants will utilize protected backup generators to allow “black-start” capability, not relying on the external electrical grid to return to a power-producing state (Reyes, 2018).Following the Great Tōhoku Earthquake and subsequent tsunami event that enabled fission product release at the Fukushima power plant for failing to cool the fuel adequately, public concern was raised over the safety of existing nuclear power plants. Future SMRs will be constructed with Seismic Category 1 buildings, capable of withstanding such a cataclysmic event, to include earthquakes, flooding, tornadoes, et cetera, in accordance with the findings of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 (Reyes, 2018). Furthermore, such an event would have to knock out all modular reactors in a reactor-pack setup, as each reactor is capable of Island Mode Power, where it provides support power for all other reactor systems in its pack. In any case, they are to adhere to Nuclear Regulatory Commission guidelines regarding distance from fault lines and establishing guidance for a Safe Shutdown Earthquake protocol for any historical epicenters within 200 miles2 (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2019), as well as any state and local guidance.On the contrary, SMRs can provide enhanced grid reliability following natural disasters, enabling first responders to utilize electrical power once off-site grid components are restored. Following a disaster resulting in loss of a portion of the electrical grid, NuScale Power Modules specifically can be restored using black-start features, or if a single reactor remains online in Island Mode Power, the NuScale plant can utilize a turbine-bypass feature to keep the reactors throttled to 100% power if it is predicted that the offsite need exists, or they can throttle down electrical output appropriately to begin providing power at a moment’s notice once the offsite components are restored and maintain that power production for an extended period of up to twelve years (Reyes, 2018) whereas fuel deliveries to fossil fuel plants may be delayed. This feature can save lives during a natural disaster, where power and clean water may be scarce necessities.3.2.1.5 Analysis of Evaluated Reactor Safety SystemsAs before, the SMR with the best prospects in terms of safety is the NuScale Power Module. Smaller size makes for easier cooling, and unlike the Xe-100 and SMR-160, the NuScale Power Module makes few assumptions about safety by setting the reactors in a massive cooling pool, even though it realistically has the most reason to be able to make these assumptions. This aspect makes the design more promising to be approved by even the most prudent of those who are pro-Nuclear power and win over more of those individuals who are against it.The NuScale model has nearly all safety features of those evaluated except for the design-exclusive Doppler broadening of PBRs, and uses redundant coolant systems that are, by design, technically unnecessary; these entire systems are themselves redundant with additional cooling systems, and as several of these systems are similar to those used onboard naval power plants, their mechanisms are well understood and tested. As such, the NuScale model, above all others, can almost certainly be evaluated as “meltdown proof,” even though its designers, perhaps wisely, make few such claims.3.2.2. Public SafetyHuman beings fear what they do not understand. It is our nature to be cautious of new and strange things to increase our likelihood of survival in the wild. However, most people living in first world countries are far from fending for themselves and most of the gaps in our knowledge are due to ignorance more so than lack of availability of information. The unfortunate truth concerning nuclear power and health physics is that public knowledge and understanding of these topics is extremely limited if there is any at all. So little is known by the public that during the Fukushima incident, reporters occasionally showed diagrams of PWRs instead of a simple BWR drawing as appropriate for the Fukushima Daiichi reactors, not understanding that the two reactor designs are quite different.Fear is easily propagated by opponents of the nuclear industry. For instance, the comparison of a nuclear reactor to a nuclear bomb, which for anyone in the nuclear industry is almost a laughable one. The truth is that those in the know are a very small majority and public opinion reflects that. Since the first nuclear power plants opened in the 1950s, and “in over 17,000 cumulative reactor-years of commercial operation in 33 countries, there have been only three major accidents to nuclear power plants.” (World Nuclear Association, 2018a)[12] Of those three accidents, one of them occurred in the Soviet Bloc in a reactor design which was never used or approved for use anywhere in the West.The three most known and criticized reactor accidents are Three Mile Island (TMI), Chernobyl, and most recently the Fukushima Dai-Ichi incident. The accidents occurred in 1979, 1986, and 2011 respectively with the first two being due to human error and a lack of safety culture. The only true failure of a reactor system, in part or in whole, without human error being the cause was the most recent in Japan. The catastrophic natural disaster which caused the damage at the plant which led to subsequent meltdowns was the perfect storm of the power plant being at the very end of its life, the 9.0 magnitude earthquake, and the original design was meant to withstand wave heights of “5.7 m for Daiichi…[when] tsunami heights coming ashore were about 14 meters.” (World Nuclear Association, 2018a)The new designs for SMRs would limit not only the number of employees per reactor but also the number of support systems. In doing so the likelihood of human error would significantly decrease even further than the level they are now and support system issues or failures would also be minimized. For current large power plants, “cooling requires water circulation and an external heat sink. If pumps cannot run due to lack of power, gravity must be relied upon.” (World Nuclear Association, 2018a) SMRs, specifically the analyzed designs, safely shut down and self-cool, indefinitely with no operator action, no AC or DC power, and no additional water. It is the first self-protecting reactor which eliminates both human error and natural disasters as culprits for a reactor accident to occur.3.2.2.2. Actualized SafetyIn reality, safety regulations are stringently controlled by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Radiation exposure limits that are annually allowed for adults are restricted to an occupational annual 5 rem total effective for adults, with higher limits for certain portions of the body in accordance with 10 CFR 20.1301, and less for infants and pregnant women. (Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2019)[13] . This is half of the World Health Organization’s listed 10 rem to show an increased risk of cancer and twenty times less than the WHO noted amount linked to radiation sickness (2016)[14] . It should be noted that the NRC required value is an annual allowance, whereas the WHO value is an acute, or short-term, dose allowance, which is far more damaging than the same dose over a longer period. Reactors plants in America accomplish this guarantee via proper construction of containment, training operators, and Design-Base-Casualty analysis. SMRs expand upon this through the previously mentioned reduced risk for a meltdown.For each individual reactor design, a shield must be set in place and optimized to attenuate gammas and neutrons to acceptable levels. If the shield is not appropriately designed, workers at the power plants may suffer health consequences and materials in the reactor rooms could undergo changes in their molecular structures causing them to weaken and become unreliable over time. As such, is possible for a nuclear power plant worker to receive less radiation exposure than the general public, being shielded both from the reactor’s radiation as well as solar radiation.3.2.2.3. Public Safety RegulationsSafety is stringently governed and regulated for the nuclear power industry to protect the public, the employees of the power companies, and the environment. For the nuclear industry to survive, the public must feel safe and be kept safe. The federal agency responsible for this task has changed over the years and has developed into an efficient and effective monitor of private nuclear power generating corporations in the United States.The regulation of nuclear power in the United States has evolved since the development of fission reactors and began with the United States Atomic Energy Commission. Due to concerns that the USAEC started to favor the industry it was tasked with regulating, making the regulation of the industry less effective, there was a shake-up in regulatory agencies and the distribution of responsibilities. The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 caused the United States Atomic Energy Commission to be split into two major agencies: one that monitored and regulated nuclear reactors and power generation, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and another that was responsible for the progression of research and development of nuclear weapons and technologies, known as the Energy Research and Development Administration; which later integrated into the United States Department of Energy.The NRC was designated the responsibility of regulating the nuclear power industry and ensuring standards were upheld to guarantee public safety and protect the environment. They are a federal agency tasked with holding commercial power companies and reactor R & D laboratories accountable to safety and environmental standards and regulates all things nuclear power related in the United States. The duties of the NRC include but are not limited to: overseeing reactor safety and security, administering reactor licensing and renewal, licensing of radioactive materials, radionuclide safety, and managing the storage, security, recycling, and disposal of all radioactive materials.Figure 3.2.2.3-1 Reactor Oversight Framework (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018)The NRC is currently split into four separate regions to oversee all reactors in the United States, whether they are for testing and research, currently generating power, in the construction phase, or the decommissioning phase. These regions are based on the density of nuclear power related activities in their respective region, and they are split at the Mason-Dixon Line with regions one and two being the northeast and the southeast. Region three is based out of Lisle, Illinois and covers east of the Mississippi River and west of regions one and two while region four is based in Arlington, Texas and covers everything from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean. There was formerly a region five which was based in California but was absorbed into region four when nuclear power lost prominence in the western United States.It is crucial for the NRC to remain independent of the industry to avoid what is known as regulatory capture, in other words, the neutralization of regulators due to the influence of private corporations taking control of the industry. The favoring of the industry was what originally led to the shake-up, of the Atomic Energy Commission and the creation of the NRC to begin with. The number one concern for the NRC and the inspectors that work there is to “ ensure public health and safety in the operation of commercial power plants” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018)[15] and it must remain that way for the agency to remain relevant and effective.Inspectors of the NRC perform a range of duties for the agency including monitoring day to day operations, special inspections, accountability monitoring, complacency resistance, provision of suggestions for the training of operators, and enforcement of the reactor oversight program. Ultimate objectives of this program are: “reactor safety (avoiding accidents and reducing the consequences of accidents if they occur), radiation safety for both plant workers and the public during routine operations, and protection of the plant against sabotage or other security threats.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018)The reactor oversight process is an inspection process developed through years of inspections and evaluations on reactors across the country. Using this data, the NRC “determine[s] an appropriate response using the guidelines in an action matrix” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018) to any specific issue the inspection teams find. The owners of the reactors, the licensees, “collects performance indicator data” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018) from the inspections as well to better improve their own processes and procedures.Figure 3.2.2.3-2 Reactor Oversight Process (United StateS Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018)Poorly written procedures or improper use of approved procedures can cascade and amplify casualties like the incident at Three Mile Island. “[The stuck open relief valve on top of the pressurizer] was a failure for which the TMI operators had never been trained, and which was not described in their written emergency procedures. This lack of preparation led to a misreading of the symptoms and mistaken responses that would uncover the reactor core.”(United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2016)[16] Through collaborative efforts, the nuclear industry constantly evolves and adapts to tackle issues from security to material conditions and in doing so ensures that the nuclear industry is allowed to exist.The modularity and simplistic design of SMRs will allow inspection teams to be more efficient in a multitude of ways. SMRs are much smaller than traditional fission reactors, “the reactor vessel has both a smaller nuclear core, with only 5% of the fuel of a typical large reactor, and a much larger fluid inventory,”(Reyes, J. 2012) and require a much smaller crew of trained individuals to monitor and operate them safely. The support systems are based more on passive “processes such as natural convection heat transfer, vapor condensation, liquid evaporation,pressure-driven coolant injection, or gravity-driven coolant injection”(Reyes, J. 2012) and require fewer moving parts and fewer support systems making material failures less likely. “It does not rely on external mechanical and/or electrical power, signals, or forces such as electric pumps.”(Reyes, J. 2012) Their compact design and simple, yet effective, containment system make them ideal for everything the NRC is trying to do: protect the public, protect the employees, and protect the environment.3.2.2.4. Environmental RegulationsReactor accidents can cause long-lasting negative effects on a region and the people that live in that region. These accidents not only cause local problems but in some cases far-reaching and long-lasting effects. One such effect industry-wide fear and criticism by the public and boosts support for opposing interests to the nuclear industry such as fossil fuels or other green power generation alternatives. The NRC performs their duties to minimize the likelihood of accidents through the various licensing and inspection programs.The NRC works in conjunction with the United States Department of Energy and private companies in the development of new reactor designs. They perform reviews of designs and construction sites and provide licenses to build and operate nuclear power plants that meet certain stringent criteria. Licenses are normally good for a certain number of years and if a company wants to extend the operating license of a particular reactor, they must apply for an extension from the NRC.Figure 3.2.2.4-1 New Reactor Licensing Process (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018)Upon receipt of an application for extension, the site in question will be reevaluated. If it passes inspection and the evaluation is satisfactory the license can be renewed, and the plant can continue operating. However, if for some reason the NRC finds that the power plant is either designed incorrectly or an existing power plant is operating in an unsafe manner, they can deny a new license or revoke an existing one. When such an outcome occurs, the company in question will need to prove in one way or another that they have the ability to operate safely and can reapply for a license. Waste disposal sites are also part of the licensing process and must be built and maintained to a certain standard, if they are not, the license can be denied or revoked.The NRC has inspectors duties range from an “in house” inspector who monitors day to day operations to specialized teams of inspectors that perform specific inspections of different parts of reactor operation. “The baseline inspection program has three parts: inspections [conducted] of areas not covered by performance indicators or where a performance indicator does not fully cover the inspection area, inspections [done] to verify the accuracy of a licensee's reports on performance indicators, [and] thorough reviews of the utility's effectiveness in independently finding and resolving problems.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018) All NRC inspection reports, except for those done on plant security, are available to the public after they have been fully reviewed and published to promote transparency of the agency.3.2.3. Waste Storage, Reduction, & TransferWaste from nuclear power plants is separated into two different types: high-level waste which is defined as “spent reactor fuel when it is accepted for disposal [or] waste materials which remain after spent fuel is reprocessed” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2017) and low-level waste which is anything that has “become contaminated with radioactive material or [has] become radioactive through exposure to neutron radiation.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2017)[17] There are two such ways approved to store high-level waste: spent fuel pools or dry cask storage.The pools are found at reactor sites where depleted fuel can be safely transported and stored. “The water-pool option involves storing spent fuel assemblies under at least 20 feet of water, which provides adequate shielding from the radiation for anyone near the pool. The assemblies are moved into the water pools from the reactor along the bottom of water canals so that the spent fuel is always shielded to protect workers.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2017) Currently, most spent nuclear fuel is safely stored in pools at individual reactor sites around the country.The construction of the pools is also heavily regulated in terms of what materials can be used and how the pool is constructed. Especially when re-racking storage areas inside the pools, “[licensees] generally replace the original storage racks in the spent fuel pool with high-density storage racks that incorporate neutron absorber panels between the spent fuel assemblies to ensure subcriticality per NRC regulations.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2017) Having spent fuel be in any state other than subcritical could lead to major issues and must be avoided. The repair and replacement of racks in spent fuel pools has been necessary over time to increase the amount of storage space inside the pools and to replace materials inside the pools suffering from degradation. The NuScale model in particular plans far ahead for the entirety of the life of the reactor plant including sufficient storage in the same containment structure as the rest of the reactors (Doyle, 2016).“In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the need for alternative storage began to grow when pools at many nuclear reactors began to fill up with stored spent fuel.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018) Dry cask storage is generally allowed, and licensed, only for “spent fuel that has already been cooled in the spent fuel pool for at least one year” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2017) either at the reactor site itself or off-site at a designated area away from the reactor and only when sites are approaching their pool capacity limit. The off-site locations include decommissioned reactor sites or a consolidated interim storage facility. The first dry storage installation was licensed by the NRC in 1986 at the Surry Nuclear Power Plant in Virginia. (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018)There is currently no permanent disposal facility although Yucca Mountain Nevada has been designed, engineered, and built to be such a site. But the project, which broke ground in 2002, has never opened and has run into roadblocks from the state and regional governments of Nevada and other concerned groups. The NRC “received an application from the [DOE] on June 3, 2008, for a license to construct the nation’s first geological repository for high-level nuclear waste” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018) and heard approximately 300 contentions prior to suspending proceedings on Sept. 30, 2011. The DOE and NRC requested more funding and has received some limited support from Congress in FY18 for Yucca Mountain. “If DOE is granted the construction authorization and, subsequently, a receipt license, the NRC will also oversee and inspect any construction, waste emplacement, and/or repository closure activities” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018) [at the site].Low-level waste, on the other hand, “is typically stored on-site by licensees, either until it has decayed away and can be disposed of as normal trash, or until amounts are large enough for shipment to a low-level waste disposal site in containers approved by the [USDOT,]” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2017) of which there are four. The “commercially operated low-level waste disposal facilities…must be licensed by either [the] NRC or Agreement States. The facilities must be designed, constructed, and operated to meet safety standards [and] the operator of the facility must also extensively characterize the site on which they are located and analyze how they will perform for thousands of years into the future.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2018) Unfortunately, due to the possible contamination of materials by fission products or fuel, the decay times for some low-level waste will be as long as some high-level waste items.Disposing of low-level waste is much easier than high-level waste because the level of contamination is normally very low but can vary depending on what process the waste came from. Decontaminating low-level waste or allowing it to decay does not take as long, in most cases, as high-level waste. Because of their highly radioactive fission products, high-level waste and spent fuel must be handled and stored with care. Since the only way radioactive waste finally becomes harmless is through decay or decontamination, which for high-level wastes that cannot be decontaminated can take hundreds of thousands of years, the wastes must be stored and finally disposed of in a way that provides adequate protection of the public for a very long time. SMRs achieve this through the use of integrating most of the primary plant components, which are transportable by the same methods that delivered the reactor initially.Once fuel rods have been removed from the core, the fission process slows significantly. The fuel rods will “still generate significant amounts of radiation and [decay] heat.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2017) Now, “because of the residual hazard, spent fuel must be shipped in containers or casks that not only shield and contain the radioactivity but also dissipate the decay heat.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2017) There have been many shipments of radioactive waste throughout the United States over the past several decades with no major incidents or release of contamination. These shipments have specific requirements for packaging depending on what is being transported.For transport of radioactive material, there are three types of containers they are loosely defined by the United State Department of Transportation. The first and least defined is “a strong tight container which is designed to survive normal transportation and handling. In essence, if the material makes it from point X to point Y without an unintentional release, the package was a strong tight container. A Type A container, on the other hand, is designed to survive normal transportation handling and minor accidents” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission), where “Type B containers must be able to survive severe accidents.” (United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission) Most of these shipments occur between different reactors owned by the same utility company to share storage space for spent fuel, or they may be shipped to a research facility to have tests performed on the spent fuel itself.Spent fuel can also have another life in SMRs. Some of the SMR designs utilize low enriched uranium and can therefore make use of spent fuel. The United States does not have a fuel reprocessing center but that does not mean that the international community will ignore this possible benefit. Other designs might allow for the use of thorium as a fuel source which is fertile instead of fissile and can actually act as a breeder to create fuel for other types of reactors that utilize uranium. The reuse of spent fuel from larger power plants and the reduction in overall fuel requirements will allow SMRs to forge a new path for nuclear power innovation.WRITTEN BY: David McFarland, Jerrad Smythers, & Jordan BossermanThat second section constituted only like 15 pages of a 103 page report.Footnotes[1] https://www.nuscalepower.com/-/media/Nuscale/Files/Technology/Technical-Publications/highly-reliable-nuclear-power-for-mission-critical-application.ashx?la=en&hash=7C0E691C7DC3ADA92493C2066CD28FCA991A90C0[2] Small nuclear power reactors[3] Small nuclear power reactors[4] Financial Case Studies on Small- and Medium-Size Modular Reactors[5] Technical Publications[6] NuScale Plant Safety in Response to Extreme Events[7] SMR LLC[8] Safe and Secure[9] http://local.ans.org/dc/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/ANS_Xe-100-Overview_04052017.pdf[10] Technical Publications[11] NuScale Power | SMR Nuclear Technology[12] Safety of Nuclear Reactors[13] Regulations Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations[14] Ionizing radiation, health effects and protective measures[15] https://www.nrc.gov/waste/spent-fuel-storage.html[16] https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1616/ML16166A337.pdf[17] Waste Incidental to Reprocessing