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To date of 4,783 Boeing 737MAX on order, 377 have been delivered. That means odds are that 1 in every 177 MAX flying will crash. This aircraft avoided the FAA certification process through a legal loophole called Grandfather Rights.Even though there is not a single mechanical system left on the 737MAX that has anything identical to the original Boeing 737–100 series first launched in 1967, it was allowed to be flown on the certificate granted 50 years earlier.Design work on the MAX began in 2011. The advantages of this MAX design over the previous B737–800NG centred on a LEAPS-1B engine. This engine had a bigger Low Pressure fan with blades which could change angle of incidence thanks to a novel gearbox design. This feature gave these engine 15% superior fuel efficiency over a contemporary equivalent.Rival A320 neoIn 2006 Airbus started a project to re-engine their A320 design with a new much more fuel efficient CFM International LEAPS engine. The key feature of this engine was a gearbox in the Low Pressure fan which changed incidence of the fan blades much like changing gear in a car. This was how these engines could operate more efficiently. Airbus saw the opportunity from these engines long before Boeing did.Boeing’s rival aircraft the A320/A321 neo use LEAP-1A engines or in some variants the Pratt & Whitney PW1127G employing a similar geared fan concept.Boeing realized their 737 model could never compete with economics of the A320 neo, so back in 2011 a decision was made to rush into production a version of the popular B737NG with LEAP engines. Many corners were cut in terms of engineering solutions and safety certification.The biggest problem for MAX was only discovered during test flights was longitudinal instability. The MAX breached FAR part 25.173 regulations on stability.FAA certificationFAA who had been underfunded for many years could not manage to keep up with certifying all the aspects required so delegated safety certification to manufacturers. Certification is essentially testing an aircraft and all its systems to make sure they all work safely as intended.Boeing deliberately exploited a legal loophole with FAA that by not changing the name of the aircraft from 737, the MAX could be launched as a mere variant on an assumption that the variant would only have slight modification from previous variants.The problem with this however is the first version of 737 -100/200 models had vastly different engine design, smaller and more primitive airframe. The 737 then went through a significant change with larger engines to become the 737 Classic -300/-400/-500 series. This is the real ancestor of the MAX and already the design was much different to the first certified version.Enter MAXThen came the Next Generation or 737NG family -700/-800/-900 series. The MAX is in effect modified from the NG with more sophisticated avionics and the much larger LEAP-1B engine. The addition of this engine made the aircraft unstable. The engine was heavier and further forward affecting balance on landing.In the take off and climb this engine posed the opposite problem. It tended to push the nose up risking a stall in the climb. Boeing only realized this very late when they began prototype test flights. For that reason MCAS was a late addition to digitally manipulate the aircraft’s flight characteristics.Boeing had to modify the Boeing 737–800 to accept a larger engine, yet remain within constraints of the undercarriage & wing ground clearance. Undercarriage still had to attach the wing at the same structural points. The legs still had to retract into the same wheel housing. These features couldn’t be changed without a major redesign.Boeing’s automatic trim for the 737 MAX was not disclosed to the Pilots - Leeham News and AnalysisBoeing performed this feat by pushing the engine and thus mass weight further forward. Pushing the engine’s weight further forward causes a gyroscopic effect around the pitch axis in steep turns & steep climbs which change aerodynamics Now because it is nose heavy it does not naturally want to stall or flare upon landing. It has different stall characteristics. This was only discovered by test pilots flying it for the first time.Boeing’s New Jet Hit Problem in Tests Before Fatal CrashBoeing elected to fix the problem with MCAS which electronically manipulates flying controls to change the pitch trim and mimic the previous control feel of the 737NG aircraft. Boeing’s selling point for the MAX was that crew familiar with the NG series would not need expensive retraining to convert to the MAX.AOA sensor blamedProblem come however when MCAS responds to incorrect or conflicting flight data as happened on JT610. It is still not conclusively understood what went wrong on Lion Air and so far all we have is a working hypothesis blaming the Angle of Attack sensor.What is not in dispute is that JT610’s flight computer received conflicting Angle of Attack data. What is disputed is that faulty AOA sensors caused this faulty data. It may be that the data was corrupted when digitally encoded rather than the sensor itself being faulty. This poses a danger for re-certification if Boeing & FAA make false assumptions how to cure this?Boeing say LionAir JT610 was caused by a faulty Angle of Attack sensor (AOA), however I dispute this. My contention is that this was a digital signal encoding failure by the Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit (DFDAU) possibly related to sensor logarithms used to trigger MCAS.I say likely this caused MCAS to activate features out of context and fight against pilot actions. Boeing call it a simple software problem. I say Boeing is wrong and over simplify the issue.Boeing 737 Max Major Design Flaws, Not a Software Failure - Mish TalkBoeing 737 Max approval documents subpoenaed by fraud unitSeveral faults experienced by JT610 or previous flights could not be directly influenced by AOA sensors. We know that following wild rides as JT2749 and JT775 the same aircraft had a new replacement AOA sensor fitted.JT775 was the last flight performed with the original factory fitted AOA sensor. In theory after this AOA sensor was replaced with a brand new sensor the problems should have stopped, but in fact they continued.Control Problems experienced after AOA sensor replacement:It next flew again as JT776 after the AOA sensor was replaced, but still suffered flight control problems. Then as JT43 from Bali the problem struck yet again. This time on JT43 the presence of a pilot from a sister airline, Batik Air in the cockpit saved their flight.Pilot Who Hitched a Ride Saved Lion Air 737 Day Before Deadly CrashOn JT43 an extra pilot riding in the jump seat is said to have intervened and disabled MCAS saving that flight. Why Lion Air allowed other pilots to keep flying the aircraft without briefing all pilots is a question for Lion Air management now?The Jump-Seat Pilot Who Saved a 737 MaxA day before it crashed, Lion Air's Boeing plane was reportedly saved by an off-duty pilotFinally the doomed MAX airliner operated JT610 flying with a brand new AOA sensor fitted after JT775, but still the wild rides and control problems continued.Thus I say it was not the AOA sensor itself which caused these crashesWhere this went dreadfully wrong on Lionair 610 was MCAS created a cascade of failures with Runaway Stabilizer Trim. Pilots are aware how to disconnect Stabilizer Trim, but a control yoke override feature present on the 737NG which allowed pilots to cancel a Runaway Stab Trim with a firm pull on the control yoke was deleted in the MAX design.What baffled pilots on Lion Air and which was different from anything explained flying previous models or expressed in their QRH handbook was that the Stabilizer trim would resume pushing the nose down every 10 seconds or so.Why this became dangerous is because of of a situation called elevator Blow Back in which eventually air pressure overcomes the strength of actuators to push the elevator back to level. At this point pilots on JT610 and presumably ET302 as well each lost control and their aircraft entered nose dives.None of the modifications proposed by Boeing for re-certification, can overcome Elevator Blow Back. Proposed modifications simply change MCAS settings to try and prevent entering this situation.Boeing’s explanation refutedBoeing blames the Angle of Attack sensors on PK-LQP, the Lionair 737MAX jet which crashed. Boeing’s theory however is easily disproven.It can be shown that the Lionair jet suffered a series of failures on 27 October 2018 flying JT776 Denpassar to Manado, (dates in images are just when posted)Then later the problem re-appeared on JT2749, Manado to Tianjin.Upon return from Tianjin as JT2748 the problem appeared resolved. Next date 28 October the problem repeated flying as JT775.After JT775 landed from a flight on October 28, the aircraft PK-LQP was removed from service and inspected. The suspect Left Angle of Attack sensor was removed and replaced with a brand new AOA sensor.It emerges that although the Lion Air jet had two AOA sensors MCAS only acted on data from the sensor on the Captain’s side.These roller coaster ride problems resumed as it flew JT43. More inspections were conducted after JT43 and no fault was found. Then PK-LQP flew the fateful flight as JT610.What was the Cause?The dilemma for re-certification is whether the problem was actually caused by the AOA sensor or originated in another related system called the ADIRU or DFDAU which the AOA sensor is connected to?The Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit (DFDAU) may have encoded the data signal incorrectly. The Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) may have measured the AOA sensor incorrectly, or either system may have been subject to voltage irregularity.If any of this was the case then Boeing’s software patch may address the wrong issue. This is why proper certification is vital and also why China and the EU are correct to demand tougher certification from the FAA.Proposed SolutionUS airline Pilots drew President Trump’s attention to loss of control in 737MAX aircraft flown in US airline service. It appears something influenced President Trump to intervene and somebody made the President understand what both Boeing and the FAA were in denial about.From the flight manual to automation, why pilots have complained about Boeing's 737 MAX 8The point missed by Boeing was that these wild rides with loss of control happened both before and after AOA sensors were replaced. Nobody has satisfactorily explained why problems before replacement of the AOA sensor persisted after installation of a new sensor?For this reason I urge caution in re-certification that Angle of Attack sensors may not be the primary cause.Furthermore some of the problems experienced on earlier flights could not have been the result of AOA sensors because the AOA sensor had no direct input to themFlap Position influences MCASWith JT610 we can observe once flaps were raised Stabilizer Trim became highly active. This was immediately followed by arrested rate of climb and loss of altitude. Pilots on JT610 managed to restore the rate of climb but they increased airspeed to achieve this.Lion Air pilot Capt Bhavye Suneja lowered flaps again for a few seconds and inadvertently stopped Stab Trim stopped pushing the nose down. When he raised flaps again the Runaway Stab Trim resumed.Every time Captain Suneja hand trimmed up to correct Stab Trim down, MCAS pushed the nose back down again 9 seconds later.Neither pilot were ever trained to recognize the effects of MCAS. The crew became hung up on trying to identify what the problem was in their QRH handbook not realizing their manual had no advice about MCAS. In fact at that time Boeing had not even informed any airlines about MCASCockpit Voice Recorder (CVR) reveals the Captain calmly flew the aircraft hand trimming the nose up again each time against the Runaway Stabilizer Trim. His First officer consulted the Quick Reference Handbook (QRH), but could not find relevant advice how to cope with the problem.The Quick Reference Handbook (QRH) is organized by identifying symptoms and then leading pilots through a multiple choice menu to correctly identify a problem, then advise how to resolve that problem.Then frustrated when the First Officer could find the problem in their QRH, Captain Suneja asked his co-pilot to fly the plane whilst he looked through the QRH himself. The problem was that his First Officer never fully trimmed the nose back up but only partially did so.Because of this failure eventually air pressure overcame strength of actuators. JT610 violently pitched over. During the dive the aircraft went past vertical to become inverted. Both Pilots pulled frantically exerting over 100kg of force on their control yoke. Even with both pulling they could not raise the stabilizer again. This rare effect is called Elevator Blow back.Boeing never included any advice to the pilot’s QRH manual on MCAS.How to disconnect a runaway stabilizer was listed in their QRH however their Stab Trim was not behaving like a normal Stab Trim failure and this may have been cause of confusion. They had no idea that stopping the problem required a second step to disconnect MCAS.Neither their QRH nor FCOM mentioned MCAS. The problem kept resurrecting itself every 9 seconds unless MCAS was disconnected.Post Script:Originally, being in the dark along with everyone else I proposed different scenarios from those cited above. I interpreted lowering flaps intervening to halt runaway Stabilizer Trim as having triggered MCAS by disconnecting the autopilot. I am now advised the autopilot was not connected in the climb, so if this advice is accurate then I accept that.My theory of Autopilot disconnect when flaps raised was challenged in the replies below by Michael Groszek and I am willing to remove my theory, but meantime I have asked Michael for more information. This is what he had to say and I think it worth quoting him:Pontifications: Fluid, dynamic events upend MAX story - Leeham News and AnalysisI recommend reading the link Michael provided above.Other SpeculationsI also proposed back in November 2018 when the same thing happened on Flight JT43 that because it coincided with a PCU failure alert for elevators, which warns pilots of differential pressure on elevators, that perhaps MCAS recognized this as a jammed elevator?I suggested that this may have prompted spoiler deployment during the climb as illustrated below, killing lift:One of the tools which MCAS uses to counter a jammed elevator is to raise spoilers on top of the wing. These counteract a climb and dump lift.Pilots increased speed to counter stallThus if JT610 pilots were trying to maintain a climb or even just maintain altitude the MCAS system was constantly fighting them to descend the plane. JT610 pilots fought this by increasing to maximum speed. By increasing speed pilots inadvertently encouraged elevator Blow Back.Unfortunately given a barrage of stall warnings in the cockpit without accurate airspeed data maintaining high speed was a perfectly reasonable response.Similarity with Ethiopian ET302 is immediately obvious from both aircraft losing rate of climb.Proposed changes for re-certificationAccording to Vice President of Product Development and Product Strategy Mike Sinnett Boeing has developed an improved version of MCAS since the Lion Air crash.The key feature of Boeing’s changes is to prevent MCAS commanding recurring nose down Trim. Pilots were told at a briefing to pilots at Seattle on 27 March 2019, by Boeing, that MCAS which forces the nose downwards to avoid a stall, or loss of lift - will now only operate one time for each event rather than impose repeated corrections.Boeing have also decided to follow Airbus procedure and if AOA sensors are in disagreement by more than 5.5 degrees, in manual flight with flaps retracted MCAS will be disabled by the flight computer. So far the new system has undergone two test flights for FAA certification.Boeing’s responseWhat is of concern about Boeing is their management’s philosophy of denial & evasion until forced to act by others. This is not a culture of safety. It is one thing to fix a problem under massive public scrutiny and pressure by customer airlines and groundings by foreign aviation authorities.What Boeing lack is a culture of safety. The company is ruled by sales managers and accountants. Boeing has lost touch with aviation.I would whole heartedly support the current CEO being replaced by Captain Sully Sullenberger, famous for his ditching in the Hudson River of Cactus 1549. Sully is a through and through aviation minded guy. Most importantly he can be trustedBREAKING NEWS:Bjorn’s Corner: Why did Ethiopian Airlines ET302 and Lion Air JT610 crash? - Leeham News and AnalysisLatest development is the FAA is now under Federal investigation accused of encouraging Boeing to certify itself and also analyze the cause of LionAir crash with suggestions that the FAA abdicated its statutory duties.Report: Self-Regulation of Boeing 737 MAX May Have Lead to Major FlawsThe missteps that may have made the 737 Max crash-proneSince this was written it came to light the FAA had known of but ignored a database of reports by US airline pilots about control problems with the 737MAXBoeing 737 Max 8 planes: Were red flags ignored?Here is a link to loss of control problems with 737MAX reported by US pilots which FAA ignored after the Lionair crash:ASRS Reports for 737 max8FAA published Boeing’s proposed software fix in the CANIC report of 11 March 2019, but same report it notes that FAA proposes the fix without understanding what went wrong with JT610 or ET302. In other words, so far everyone is just guessing how to fix it. The FAA suggest the MAX will be back in airline service in May 2019.Breaking News update16 March report by Seattle Times that elevator jackscrew from ET302 found in same fully extended position as witnessed on Lionair JT610.alsoLion Air flight (JT43?) before JT610 crash successfully disconnected MCAS to avert disasterA day before it crashed, Lion Air's Boeing plane was reportedly saved by an off-duty pilotFurther reading:Youtube documentary on QualityControl problems at BoeingSimon Gunson's answer to Why has the US been preventing South and North Korea unification for the past 65 years?Simon Gunson's answer to What caused a brand new Ethiopian 737MAX to crash?Simon Gunson's answer to What is wrong with Boeing 737 Max Aircraft?Simon Gunson's answer to How are the engine position and center of gravity different on a Boeing 737 Max aircraft as compared to earlier 737 models?I also wrote this not long after the crash of LionAir JT610:Simon Gunson's answer to Is it true that the Boeing 737 Max is highly unsafe and risk riddled but its manufacturer is reluctant to call it back owing to the huge cost considerations?Why Boeing’s design department are responsible for loss of Malaysian flight MH370 through electrical failure causing hypoxia:Simon Gunson's answer to What happened to Flight 370 Malaysia from the pilot’s perspective?Simon Gunson's answer to Where is MH370, four years on?Simon Gunson's answer to Who is responsible for the Colombo serial blasts in Sri Lanka?

Once upon a time, there was a boy named Steven who wanted to be a police officer, really bad. He was only 18, so he had to be diligent in trying to find police agencies that would hire him. I met him when I was working as a Records Clerk for a mid-sized police department while I attended college and he was a police explorer for the same agency. He would talk to me frequently about which agencies he had applied with and interviewed with, mostly because I was the only other person he had met that had interviewed with the California State Police (they have since become extinct as an agency). I was later told that he had been fired from our agency because he had been taking the police cars to the car wash (that’s always helpful), but then driving Code 3 (lights and siren) back to the police station. That is not an approved method of drying the police vehicles.When I moved on the local university police as a police officer, I didn’t think too much of Steven, until I was in Briefing one day, flipping through the BOLs (Be On The Lookout printouts). There, on a flyer from the California State Police was Steven. The flyer said that Steven had been driving around our county, in his white, Ford Tempo, pulling people over with a red spotlight, and then telling them he was a State Police officer. I was slightly amused, but I didn’t imagine that I would interact with him again.Years later, I read a newspaper article about Steven. It seemed that Steven had finally gotten hired as a civilian police officer on a local military base. But while working there, he decided to purchase a fully outfitted police car from the CHP, using department letterhead and (I guess) his personal checking account. He painted this police car with the logo of a fictional federal law enforcement agency, like the Western District Federal Police, or something similar. He then went down to a local county courthouse and obtained a handful of outstanding warrants and set out to serve them.Steven drove around that county (not my county, but about an hours drive away) and served a bunch of arrest warrants, taking people into custody and booking them into the county jail. Unfortunately, one of the people he arrested was not the person from the warrant; it was a case of mistaken identity that the arrestee couldn’t resolve…because he was developmentally disabled. Much later, when the family finally found their disabled relative in jail, they raised holy hell (as they should). The Sheriff’s Office demanded to know which agency had booked the young man into their jail. Um…the Western District Federal Police? Who the F*** is that? I imagine someone shouting at shrugging shoulders.Steven was located and arrested for his crimes and sentenced to federal prison. I was telling a group of my students this story at the police department when my Captain walked in. My Captain had come to my agency from the local airport police department and he was an excellent commanding officer and kind of a badass. He listened to the story for a moment and said, “That sounds like Steve Nemec.”Shocked, I told him that it was Steven. The Captain then shared with us that while he was working at the airport, he began hearing reports that someone was driving around the tarmac in a white, Ford Tempo, with a magnetic sign on the door that said “FAA Inspector.” The Captain said this person would board commercial aircraft and inspect them. The Captain began searching this person out and finally caught him and sure enough, it was Steven. Steven, following his stint in federal prison, was out on probation, which required that he not work in either law enforcement or security, immediately went out and got a job with airport security. It was during his lunch breaks that he felt the need, or desire, to pretend to be an FAA Inspector. He was arrested for a violation of his probation.But that is not the end of the story. If you want more, simply Google “Steven J. Nemec” for the rest.Part II: To answer your specific question, though, I did have to actually deal with a fake cop. The dispatcher sent me to a call that she couldn’t quite explain over the radio, so I called her on the phone so that she could explain better. She told me that last year, one of the investigators had been looking into a case about a man wearing a gun to class. The professor at the time was concerned because he wasn’t sure if the man was a police officer or not. It seemed that the student was very non-committal when asked about it. When the investigator started to look into it, the man stopped coming to class. But on this day, the student had returned and was waiting for something in the department office.I went to the department office to contact this man, unsure of what I was walking into. I met, we’ll call him Adam, at the department office and saw immediately that he was wearing a full Navy uniform. I explained that I was trying to investigate a weapons violation that may have occurred last year and asked if he was a peace officer of any kind. Adam said that he was a peace officer with the California Youth Authority, but that he had recently been activated by his Navy Reserve unit and was busy trying to get some unfinished business resolved prior to being shipped to the Middle East. Even though it all appeared in order, something about him seemed off. With Steven Nemec rolling around in my head, Adam’s behavior piqued my suspicion.I confirmed that he didn’t have a firearm on him and he was unable to show me his agency ID because he had left it with his firearm. I asked him if I could search his car to determine that he did not have a gun in his car. He said that was okay. When we got out to his car, I saw that his 20 year old Nissan had registration that was expired by about a year. California law allows police officers to tow away vehicles from public property that have expired registration over six months. When I asked for the key, Adam changed his mind and rescinded his consent to search the car. That’s fine, I told him, but I was going to tow his car for expired registration and department policy required that I conduct an inventory search prior to towing.I searched the car and found a local police agency ticket book, a large metropolitan police agency’s training video, a personal checkbook belonging to some random person, and a stack of letters his creditors with certified mail receipts. No gun, but again, things seemed off. I asked about the items and his answers were vague and non-committal. (If I actually try to recreate the conversation, this will go on way too long). But so far, this was enough for me to investigate a form of theft in the Penal Code called Theft of Lost Property, as he told me that he had found the items, but had made no effort to return them. I placed him in custody, towed the car, and drove him to the police station.I placed him in the holding cell, but removed his handcuffs because he was being cooperative. I asked for his commanding officer’s name and unit number and called the local Air Force Base, where he said that his unit was waiting until they where shipped out. I called the Air Force and asked them for the unit that Adam had identified. They had no idea what I was talking about. They asked me to go back and confirm the unit number. I went to the holding cell and immediately noticed that all of his navy insignia were gone. I went in and found all the insignia in his pocket.I said, “You aren’t even in the Navy, are you?”He responded, “I’d like to be.”I went and apologized to the Air Force. No one wanted to press charges for the lost property, so I had to release him as a detention only, but I kept those letters. It seemed that he was asking all his creditors to forgive his debts due to his activation by the US Navy Reserves, per the Soldiers and Sailors Relief Act. I called the Postal Inspectors and spoke to them. The US Attorney requested copies of the evidence and pursued a case against Adam for a mail fraud case. I do not know the final outcome.During the course of this investigation, I learned that Adam had been a county probation officer for less than a year, and had never worked for the California Youth Authority or any other law enforcement agency. When I stopped him, he was working for a local grocery store as a loss prevention officer. He had never been in the Navy. At some point, his fiancée called me to ask why he was being harassed. I asked her what he did for a living and she told me that he was a cop, that he put on his badge and gun every morning and went to work. I told her the truth. Strangely, she believed me right away.

(I will periodically update this answer to include the latest information on the investigation. Check at the bottom of the narrative.)Here is a good radar track of the aircraft involved, a Atlas Air Flight 3591, a Boeing 767, under contract by Amazon.There was severe weather in the vicinity, between the aircraft and the Airport, IAH, Houston Intercontinental. At approximately 7500 feet, the aircraft began to descend at a high rate, and ultimately reached a descent rate of 7000 FPM at 3000 feet. This occurred at the northern edge of Trinity Bay, just prior to ATC losing radar contact. This would be over 4 times the maximum descent rate that would be expected for a Boeing 767 at 3000 feet AGL. Another flight in the vicinity, UAL 1788, reported that the flight conditions were IMC (Instrument Flight Conditions), with a high level of turbulence, “pretty moderate chop”, meaning that they probably were “getting hammered” in the clouds.Now for the difficult tasks ahead by all involved, including the FAA, the NTSB, the DOT, next of kin, Amazon, Atlas, Boeing, etc.The worst possible thing that can be done in an aircraft accident investigation is to conjecture about what may have caused it, prior to the relevant evidence being collected and analyzed. Good Scientific method must be used to arrive at reasonable and well supported conclusions, and that must prevail over the urge to reach quick conclusions, and then support them with Confirmation bias. A well run accident investigation should ultimately reach unbiased conclusions, which are then only stated as being probable causative factors and contributing factors, and not as absolute causative factors.Those who are quick to jump to premature conclusions almost always look foolish once the data is collected and analyzed.The first thing that will be done, is for the NTSB to begin their investigation. They will use this handbook:https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/process/Documents/MajorInvestigationsManualApp.pdfIt spells out every procedure that will be followed in the investigation, down to the smallest details.For example, this is an excerpt covering a critical portion of the evidence recovery process that will be used in this investigation:Underwater Wreckage RecoveryIf the accident aircraft had a CVR and/or FDR installed, make sure that a search for the underwater locator beacon is initiated immediately.Request that AS management contact Department of Defense/Supervisor of Salvage personnel to determine their level of participation in search and recovery planning. (Consider foreign authority responsibilities if the wreckage is in international waters.)Depending on the circumstances of the accident, obtain witness statements, weather data, radar tracking data, and trajectory analyses to aid in locating the wreckage.Once a search and recovery plan is approved, using U.S. Government resources prepare a letter from the Safety Board Chairman to the Chief of Naval Operations to initiate funding.Before recovery is attempted, ensure that personnel have been thoroughly briefed on the recommended locations for attaching cables, straps, hooks, etc. Be sure to consult specialists from the operator or the airframe/engine manufacturer.Immediately treat recovered wreckage with appropriate solvents to prevent rapid corrosion.It will be a long and drawn out process, and in the end they should have a pretty definitive idea about the causative factors that contributed to this accident.This is a good example of ultimate findings in an accident investigation, which involved the crash of American Airlines Flight 587, which occurred on November 12, 2001:Some of the initial conjecture involving this particular accident was downright absurd. In one circumstance, a former Union (ALPA) safety chairman, a retired Delta Captain, called CNN shortly after the accident, and was quoted on live television stating that the accident was obviously caused by both of the aircraft’s engines falling off. He sounded authoritative and credible, but wasn’t even close to the actual probable causes. It sounded plausible to many of those who heard it, but it was a very irresponsible act.What actually happened:The engines fell off because the vertical stabilizer detached, which resulted in the violent oscillations that caused the engines to detach.The vertical stabilizer detached because the pilot flying at the time overcontrolled the aircraft’s rudders during an encounter with wake turbulence.He overcontrolled the rudders because of a very flawed simulator training syllabus that he had been subjected to at American Airlines.American had erroneously trained their pilots to use rudders to roll their aircraft out of unusual attitude, aircraft upset situations.Airbus had also not been very forthcoming about how fragile the vertical stabilizer was in relation to the amount of shear that the rudders could induce upon the vertical stabilizer components at higher airspeeds.This shoot-from-the-hip accident investigation genius came out looking incredibly foolish, and certainly should have known better about jumping to conclusions. Professional Accident investigators strive to avoid looking like rank amateurs, as did the trigger happy Delta Captain, by following good accident investigation protocols.Updates:Check out this article from USA TODAY:One body recovered, search ongoing in Texas Amazon Prime Air cargo plane crashUpdated February 27, 2019:Amazon Car:go Jet Dove Steeply Into Bay Near Houston, Video Shows:Video recorded from a nearby jail captured the plane’s final five seconds before it smashed into the water, Sumwalt said in a briefing Sunday afternoon. “It’s descending in a steep descent, steep nose-down attitude,” Sumwalt said. “By looking at the video, I saw no evidence of the aircraft trying to turn or pull up at the last moments.”The plane fell thousands of feet in just seconds after what had been a routine descent, according to Sumwalt and the flight-tracking website FlightRadar24. Two bodies have been recovered, Chambers County Sheriff Brian Hawthorne said.Update February 28, 2019:NTSB Investigating Deadly Crash of Amazon Cargo Flight, Atlas Air 3591 - AvionicsThis one has a video of the aircraft descending in a steep dive before impact. Great commentary by Greg Feith, former senior NTSB investigator:Video shows cargo plane moments before crash at Trinity BayUpdate March 2, 2019:Voice recorder found.NTSB begins examining cockpit voice recorder from cargo plane crashUpdate March 4, 2019Flight Data Recorder recovered. 3rd pilot’s remains identified.Remains found at cargo plane crash site confirm pilot's identityNTSB recovers Atlas Air black boxesUpdate March 5, 2019:NTSB: Atlas Air crew lost control 18 seconds before black box stopped recordingUpdate March 6, 2019:NTSB News ReleaseNational Transportation Safety Board Office of Public AffairsNTSB Laboratory Completes Initial Review of Cockpit Voice Recorder, Recovers Flight Data Recorder3/5/2019​Engineers at the National Transportation Safety Board’s Office of Research and Engineering Vehicle Recorder Division completed the initial review of the Atlas Air Flight 3591 cockpit voice recorderSaturday evening and recovered the airplane’s flight data recorderSunday.Three people (the two pilots for the flight and a non-revenue jump-seat pilot) died when Atlas Air Flight 3591, a Boeing 767-300 cargo jet, crashed in the muddy marshland of Trinity Bay Feb. 23, 2019, about 40 miles from Houston’s George Bush Intercontinental Airport. The airplane was destroyed. The airplane was carrying cargo for Online Shopping for Electronics, Apparel, Computers, Books, DVDs & more Inc., and the US Postal Service from Miami to Houston.The condition of the accident site made locating the recorders challenging.In this photo, taken Saturday in the NTSB laboratory in Washington, an NTSB engineer from the Office of Research and Engineering’s Vehicle Recorder Division inspects memory boards from the cockpit voice recorder of Atlas Air Flight 3591 for signs of damage and water intrusion. Atlas Air Flight 3591 crashed Feb. 23, 2019, about 40 miles from Houston’s George Bush Intercontinental Airport, and the NTSB recovered the airplane’s CVR March 1, 2019. NTSB photo.Directors from the Office of Research and Engineering and the Office of Aviation Safety conducted an audition of the CVR as part of the NTSB’s ongoing investigation of the accident. The audition revealed the following information, which is preliminary and subject to change as the investigation continues:The length of the recording is approximately two hours and was obtained from a download of a solid-state type cockpit voice recorder.The recording included the final portion of the flight; however, the quality of the audio is poor.There are times during the recording when the content of crew discussion is difficult to determine, at other times the content can be determined using advanced audio filtering.The crew was in communication with air traffic control and were being provided radar vectors for the runway 26L approach into George Bush Intercontinental Airport.Crew communications consistent with a loss control of the aircraft began approximately 18 seconds prior to the end of the recording.The flight data recorder arrived at the NTSB’s Recorder Lab Sunday at 11:45 p.m. The memory module was disassembled, cleaned and dried, and download of the data was achieved Monday afternoon. Initial review of the data revealed:The accident flight was captured, and the FDR contained a total of about 54 hours of data from 17 flights.There were approximately 350 parameters recorded by the FDR detailing the motion of the aircraft and operation of its engines, flight controls and other systems.NTSB recorder investigators are currently verifying and validating the FDR data, and the NTSB plans to provide a summary in an investigative update in a few days.Technical experts in the CVR group will convene in the coming week to review the entire recording and produce a transcript of the accident recording. It will be a time-consuming process to complete the transcript.The CVR group is one of the seven investigative groups established by the Investigator-in-Charge for the accident investigation.Imagery of the NTSB’s investigation of the accident is available via the NTSB Flickr account at https://flic.kr/s/aHsmabxem8 and B-roll is available via the NTSB YouTube Channel at https://www.youtube.com/user/NTSBgov.Follow @NTSB_Newsroom on Twitter for updates on this, and other, NTSB investigations.Related News ReleasesMarch 05, 2019NTSB Laboratory Completes Initial Review of Cockpit Voice Recorder, Recovers Flight Data RecorderRelated ReportsRelated EventsRelated InvestigationsAtlas Air #3591 crashed into Trinity BayMore NTSB LinksInvestigation ProcessData & StatsAccident ReportsMost Wanted ListContact: NTSB Media Relations490 L'Enfant Plaza, SWWashington, DC 20594Keith Holloway(202) [email protected]###The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents, promoting transportation safety, and assisting victims of transportation accidents and their families.Updated March 7, 2019:Another video of Atlas 3591’s final moments:Chilling video shows final moments of doomed Atlas Air flight over TexasUpdate March 10, 2019:Pieces of the wreckage are being collected, and will be assembled into a facsimile of the Boeing 767 in the hangar, then analyzed by the NTSB.Update March 12, 2019:From the initial FDR analysis: The aircraft momentarily leveled off, and pitched 4 degrees nose up at 6200 feet, with maximum engine power being applied. The aircraft then proceeded to pitch down to a 49 degree nose down attitude. It reached a maximum speed of 430 knots before impact, and impacted at approximately 20 degrees nose down angle.Cargo plane that crashed near Houston, killing 3, appears to have hit turbulenceUpdate March 13, 2019:Atlas Air 3591 Pitched Down in Response to Elevator Deflectionby Rob FinfrockMar 12, 2019 - 9:16 PMThe Atlas Air Boeing 767 Freighter that crashed on February 23 on approach to Houston Intercontinental Airport entered its steep descent into Trinity Bay after encountering turbulence, followed by nose-down elevator deflection, according to an update issued by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board Tuesday.The report said data obtained from the aircraft's flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) indicate Houston Approach control advised the crew of precipitation along their flight path as the aircraft descended normally through 12,000 feet mean sea level (msl) at a ground speed of 290 knots on the LINKK ONE arrival to the airport.Following an ATC inquiry, the pilots asked to divert to the west around the weather. The controller responded that they “would need to descend to 3,000 feet expeditiously” to accommodate their request. ATC then instructed the crew to turn to 270 degrees heading while descending through 8,500 feet msl.Approximately one minute later, controllers told the pilots to expect a northerly turn to a right base for Runway 26L after clearing the weather, which the pilots acknowledged with “sounds good” and “OK,” according to the NTSB. At around the same time, the FDR recorded "small vertical accelerations consistent with the aircraft entering turbulence."Shortly thereafter, as the aircraft flew between 6,200 to 6,300 feet msl, "the engines increased to maximum thrust, and the airplane pitch increased to about 4 degrees nose up and then rapidly pitched nose-down to about 49 degrees in response to nose-down elevator deflection," although the stick shaker did not activate.The aircraft then entered a steep descent along the 270-degree heading, reaching approximately 430 knots airspeed. The board added that, based on FDR data, the aircraft pitched up to an approximately 20 degrees nose-down attitude shortly before impact.The NTSB released no further communications from the flight crew and noted that it would issue a full transcript when the public docket opens. The flight crew appeared fully qualified and current in the Boeing 767, the Board added.Update March 15, 2019:NTSB evaluation:DCA19MA086Update March 16, 2019:Experts Doubt Turbulence Caused Crash of Cargo Jet in TexasUpdate March 18, 2019:Pilot error suspected by NTSB:Federal investigators reportedly suspect that pilot error played a role in the fatal Amazon Air cargo crashUpdate March 17, 2019:I would investigate the possibility of a Horizontal Stabilizer jackscrew failure, causing a nose down pitch jam. Here is an AD concerning the 767 jackscrew, from 2005:Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 AirplanesA Proposed Rule by the Federal Aviation Administration on10/07/2005AGENCY:Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.ACTION:Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).SUMMARY:The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This proposed AD would require the following actions for the drive mechanism of the horizontal stabilizer: Repetitive detailed inspections for discrepancies and loose ball bearings; repetitive lubrication of the ballnut and ballscrew; repetitive measurements of the freeplay between the ballnut and the ballscrew; and corrective action if necessary. This proposed AD is prompted by a report of extensive corrosion of a ballscrew in the drive mechanism of the horizontal stabilizer on a similar airplane model. We are proposing this AD to prevent an undetected failure of the primary load path for the ballscrew in the horizontal stabilizer and subsequent wear and failure of the secondary load path, which could lead to loss of control of the horizontal stabilizer and consequent loss of control of the airplane.Here is the Atlas Air 3591 jackscrew, after being recovered. It appears to be in the full nose down position.Update March 18, 2019:Atlas 767 crash probe strives to comprehend pitch upsetKAMINSKI-MORROWUS investigators probing the Atlas AirBoeing 767-300 freighter crash have yet to explain fully the initiating circumstances behind the elevator deflection which pushed the aircraft into a fatal dive on approach to Houston.Crucially the National Transportation Safety Board has shifted its immediate emphasis, through the unusual decision to amend its phrasing while detailing preliminary findings.While the NTSB had initially stated that the aircraft had pitched down “in response to column input”, it subsequently revised this, saying the downward pitch was the result of “nose-down elevator deflection” – an amendment designed to avoid premature conclusions being drawn over the relation, if any, between actions in the cockpit and the unusual attitude of the aircraft.Although the initial use of the term “column input” might suggest there was a nose-down command of some degree, the NTSB has not clarified the extent of any pressure placed on the yoke – or the reason – nor whether the elevator deflection was in line with the command.Weather radar images indicate that the 767 would have encountered the edges of a band of precipitation as the jet headed west over the north-eastern shore of Trinity Bay.The inquiry says the aircraft, which was being vectored to avoid the heaviest of the weather, appeared to enter a region of turbulence as it briefly levelled at around 6,200ft.Investigators then found that the aircraft, for reasons still unclear, then experienced an increase in engine power to maximum thrust, even though the airspeed was steady at 230kt. The jet pitched upwards, to around 4°, although the NTSB has not specified whether this was a natural consequence of the increased power.There is no evidence of a stall – the stick-shaker was not activated – and the NTSB has not explained whether the subsequent nose-down manoeuvre was a reaction to the pitch-up attitude, an input to continue an expedited descent to 3,000ft previously advised by air traffic control, or attributable to other factors.But the extraordinary transition to a 49° nose-down pitch, which took place over 18s, is central to the inquiry. The NTSB has not specified whether the aircraft was in cloud at the time of the transition, but it had clearly emerged from the cloud base into good visibility during the last few seconds of its descent.With investigators yet to establish conclusively whether there is a connection between control column movements and the aircraft’s excessive nose-down attitude, the possibility of a mechanical reason for the elevator deflection is yet to be ruled out.The 767 has previously been the subject of airworthiness directives including measures to prevent corrosion of ballscrew components in the drive mechanism for the horizontal stabiliser, which could potentially lead to loss of stabiliser control.Elevator power control actuators have also been a previous focus of 767 directives; a 2014 bulletin ordered checks to ensure aircraft were not operating with failed shear rivets in the actuator mechanism and to prevent jamming and a possible elevator hardover – which could result in a significant pitch upset.The NTSB has not disclosed any information on the position of the horizontal stabiliser or the condition of the drive mechanism and the elevators’ mechanical linkages.But it does indicate that the severity of the dive had lessened as the aircraft descended towards Trinity Bay, with the pitch reducing by some 30°, to around 20° nose-down, before impact. The inquiry has not stated, however, whether this was the result of recovery actions – including column input – in the cockpit, movements of the elevator or stabiliser, or other aerodynamic effects.Update March 30, 2019:VIDEO: Weird Details Emerge With Amazon Prime/Atlas Air Crash - Plane & Pilot Magazine