California Petition Appointment: Fill & Download for Free

There's nothing magical about there being nine Justices on the Court. The Court has had other sizes over history. The First Congress established the Court in 1789 to have six Justices. A seventh Justices was added in 1807, and two more were added in 1837 to bring the total to nine. In this era each Justice was also the chief judge of one of the several judicial circuits, and in that capacity they would, each summer during the Court's annual summer recess, "ride" the circuit, personally hearing intermediate appeals of cases that arose within that circuit. (Congress made the requirement to "ride circuit" optional in 1911; today the Justices still have this authority, but it would take an extraordinary circumstance for a Justice to actually exercise it.) The additions in 1807 and 1837 reflected the increase of the size of the nation and thus the need for additional judicial circuits. A tenth Justice was added in 1863 (during the Civil War), to preside over the newly-created Tenth Circuit to cover California and Oregon; this action was motivated by President Lincoln's desire to put respected California jurist (and ardent Unionist) Stephen J. Field on the Court.In 1866, Congress reduced the number of Justices to seven, but the Constitutional provision of lifetime appointments meant that the three supernumerary Justices would continue to serve as such, and simply would not be replaced when they left the Court. It should be noted that the reason for the 1866 change was not because Congress felt the Court was too large, but instead was driven by the desire of Congress to reduce the influence of the South on the Supreme Court. Prior to the 1866 reorganization, five of the ten circuits included former slave states, while after it only two (of nine) did. The requirement that Justices ride circuit had led to a custom that the Justice for each circuit would be appointed from that circuit, and this custom meant that a near-majority of the Court in 1866 (five of ten) was to be appointed from the South, which the post-war Congress was not happy with. The reduction in the number of Justices (decoupling the number of seats from the number of circuits) was largely intended to block deeply unpopular President Andrew Johnson from appointing anyone to the vacancies the Court then had. (The Court actually sat as ten Justices for only one week in 1863.)Two Justices left the Court during the next three years, dropping the number to eight, but in 1869 (Johnson no longer being President) Congress decided to bring the number back up to nine to once again match the number of federal circuits, and it has been nine ever since (although there was a brief flirtation in 1937 with increasing the number to possibly as large as fifteen).The Court is perfectly capable of functioning with eight, seven, or even six Justices. Below six, however, the Court ceases to function because 28 USC § 1 establishes the quorum of the Court to be six members; with fewer than six members the Court's only power is to declare that the Court is not in session due to the lack of a quorum, and to return petitions filed with it as "affirmed by a Court lacking a quorum" pursuant to 28 USC § 2109.There is not even any real reason why there needs to be an odd number of Justices. It is not necessary to have an odd number to avoid ties, since it's already well-established in general parliamentary law that an act that requires the support of a majority of a body which receives the support of an exact moiety of that body is not approved, a moiety not being a majority.Simply put, the Court will function just fine with eight instead of nine Justices. Indeed, if Congress really wants to prevent President Obama from appointing another Justice, all it has to do is amend 28 USC § 1 to replace "eight" with "seven".

California passed a bill that would keep President Trump off the 2020 ballot unless he releases his tax returns. Is this something that's legal?Probably, as long as the same restriction is applied to all other candidates. That is to say, arbitrary state ballot access laws have consistently kept third party presidential candidates off many state ballots for decades. And if the Talented Mister Trump wants to appear on the California ballot, all he has to do to overcome such a limitation is release his tax returns. Like he said he would, back in 2016.But here's the thing: Trump lost California by a two to one margin in 2016, so not appearing on the ballot in the General Election wouldn't matter as far as capturing California’s Electoral College votes. Where it might matter is in California's potentially open primary, where people who are not Republicans could vote for a Republican candidate other than Trump, although the Republican Party would have to state its preference for an open primary for this to happen. On a related note, there is nothing stopping non-Republicans from registering as Republicans and voting for “anyone but Trump” as a Republican nominee while voting for other parties’ candidates down ballot in the “jungle primary.” Bottom line: If Trump is denied access to California’s primary ballot, he might not win any of California's Republican delegates, and might not be able to win the Republican nomination against Republican challenger William Weld.. . . Hey, it could happen!The individual citizen has no federal constitutional right to vote for electors for the President of the United States unless and until the state legislature chooses a statewide election as the means to implement its power to appoint members of the Electoral College. U.S. Const., Art. II, §1. This is the source for the statement in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 35 (1892), that the State legislature’s power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary; it may, if it so chooses, select the electors itself, which indeed was the manner used by State legislatures in several States for many years after the Framing of our Constitution. Id., at 28—33. History has now favored the voter, and in each of the several States the citizens themselves vote for Presidential electors. When the state legislature vests the right to vote for President in its people, the right to vote as the legislature has prescribed is fundamental; and one source of its fundamental nature lies in the equal weight accorded to each vote and the equal dignity owed to each voter. The State, of course, after granting the franchise in the special context of Article II, can take back the power to appoint electors. See id., at 35 (“[T]here is no doubt of the right of the legislature to resume the power at any time, for it can neither be taken away nor abdicated”) (quoting S. Rep. No. 395, 43d Cong., 1st Sess.).Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000)Added 7:14am PDT Tue Jun 11 2009:In his answer to this question, Quoran Brad Smith, Professor of Law at Capital University Law School in Ohio and Former Chairman of the Federal Election Commission (FEC) under President George W. Bush [first appointed to the FEC by President Bill Clinton] failed to address my apposite citation to Bush v. Gore, which points to Article II, Section One of the United States Constitution as the relevant portion of the Constitution with regard to ballot access for presidential candidates. Bush v. Gore also cites the longstanding precedent of McPherson v. Blacker for the proposition that a State’s power to select the manner for appointing electors is plenary.Compared to Quoran Smith, I am little more than a punk with a law degree, but you don’t need to be a graduate of Harvard Law School and a law school professor to understand that a disclosure requirement for presidential candidates regarding income tax returns does not in any way preclude any presidential candidate from appearing on the ballot. This is analogous to ballot access laws that routinely require candidates to collect signatures, pay filing fees, etc., and it has nothing to do with the inapposite holdings in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton and Cooke v. Gralike cited by Quoran Smith, both of which deal with the unconstitutional imposition of term limits on Members of Congress. (Pursuant to the Twenty-Second Amendment of the United States Constitution, presidents are limited to two elected terms.) Apples and tomatoes, so to speak, both of which are fruits, but one of them sure doesn’t act like it, much like Powell v. McCormack, also cited by Quoran Smith, which has absolutely *NOTHING* to do with ballot access, holding that Congress could not prevent a duly elected Congressman from taking his seat in Congress.In other news, Abraham Lincoln did not appear on any of the ballots distributed to various Southern States in 1860, and that’s because the concept of “ballot access” did not exist prior to the introduction of state-sponsored secret ballots in 1880, making the issue of constitutionality utterly moot, even in the modern context of state ballot access laws. Simply put, the Founding Fathers had no concept of secret ballots, and they fully expected candidates and voters to provide their own ballots, cast openly. Prior to 1880, all ballots in the United States were printed and distributed by agents of the candidates and their parties, and Lincoln was so unpopular in Slave States that it was impossible to organize and distribute any ballots with his name on them, much less find someone who would openly cast a ballot for Lincoln in a Slave State, although anyone was supposedly free to do so. Similarly, anyone who wants to vote for Trump in California can simply write in his name, disemboweling almost any ballot access argument based on filing requirements.Added 7:43am PDT Wed Jun 12 2019:In a reply to a comment to his answer to this question, Quoran Brad Smith wrote:The Court says [in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995)] the legislature can’t keep a person or persons off the ballot because it wishes to impose some qualification—say that he reveal his tax return, or whether he supports term limits—that is not in the Constitution.But that ain’t what the Court actually said in Thornton. And according to Quoran Smith’s answer, what would be at issue in the California statute under consideration is whether a disclosure requirement regarding tax returns to appear on the California ballot as a candidate for president is a “qualification.” (Pro tip: It ain’t.) This is categorically different from saying, as the Court *ACTUALLY* said in Thornton, that it is unconstitutional to say that people who have served in Congress a certain number of times cannot appear on the ballot, no how, no way.The provisions at issue in Storer and our other Elections Clause cases were thus constitutional because they regulated election procedures and did not even arguably impose any substantive qualification rendering a class of potential candidates ineligible for ballot position. They served the state interest in protecting the integrity and regularity of the election process, an interest independent of any attempt to evade the constitutional prohibition against the imposition of additional qualifications for service in Congress. And they did not involve measures that exclude candidates from the ballot without reference to the candidates' support in the electoral process.(Quoran Smith, citing Thornton, Quoran Smith’s emphasis removed.)Again, Thornton had to do with electing Members of Congress, and is inapposite to the California statute under consideration, as a completely different set of laws, regulations, and rules applies for electing a President, laws, regulations, and rules that are rooted in Article II, Section One of the United States Constitution. To wit, as the Court unequivocally stated in Bush v. Gore, the States have plenary power regarding the selection of presidential electors, which is really what a presidential election is. That’s not to say that the United States Supreme Court might not decide otherwise if the California statute under consideration is challenged by Trump. However, the Court would be the one (or five of nine) to make that call, and I effin-guarantee you that any ruling by the Supreme Court striking down the proposed California statute would not be unanimous. Rather, quite obviously, such a cynical sell out by the Court would be partitioned along party lines, as was Bush v. Gore.In sum, the people of California want to see the tax returns of all presidential candidates who wish to appear on the California ballot so that they can make an informed decision when casting their ballots, and there is a better than 50/50 chance that the statute under consideration will soon be signed into law making this a filing requirement in California as well as dozens of other states. This filing requirement would clearly be permitted under the plenary powers granted to the States under Article Two, Section One of the United States Constitution, and supposedly “being under audit” won’t qualify as an exception to this disclosure requirement unless and until five United States Supreme Court Justices overrule longstanding Supreme Court precedent.Added 6:13am PDT Sat Jun 15 2019:In the comments section of his answer to this question, Quoran Smith responded to a question about what class of persons would be excluded from office by a requirement to provide tax returns:Those who did not provide tax returns.Ask yourself this: what if Ohio’s Republican legislature and governor had signed legislation before the midterms saying only candidates who took an oath to support Trump’s agenda could appear on the ballot? The only class of persons excluded would those who didn’t take the oath. So would that be a problem?In other words, “class” extends beyond immutable characteristics such as race or ethnicity.Needless to say, there is an obvious and categorical difference between disclosing tax returns and taking an oath. Any and all oath requirements are subject to “strict scrutiny” review for constitutionality by federal appellate courts. (See: Strict scrutiny - Wikipedia.)As for whether “people who don’t disclose their tax returns” would be members of a suspect class as far as constitutional law is concerned, a class like race or ethnicity that might invoke “strict scrutiny” of ballot access statutes, . . . of course not. (See: Suspect classification - Wikipedia.) According to the very case law cited by Quoran Smith, ballot access statutes are typically reviewed for constitutionality by federal appellate courts according to a highly deferential standard of review known as “rational relationship,” as the United States Supreme Court has consistently recognized the plenary power of the States with regard to ballot access for presidential candidates. (See: Rational basis review - Wikipedia.) It seems pretty obvious that the information in a presidential candidate’s tax returns would be “rationally related” to his or her fitness for office, and it is pointless sophistry to assert otherwise.Added 1:29am PDT Fri Jun 21 2019:In the comments section of my answer, Quoran Brad Smith asserted (in pertinent part):Adding a requirement that a person disclose tax returns has nothing to do with running an orderly election—the only reason that the court has held is valid in upholding ballot restrictions.I wholeheartedly disagree. Ballot access restrictions can be as arbitrary as the states desire, as long as they have a rational relationship to some sort of state interest and do not impinge upon a fundamental constitutional right. That is to say, “running an orderly election” might be *A* reason why a statute might pass constitutional muster, but it ain’t the *ONLY* reason.Quoran Smith also asserted (in pertinent part):If some people in California want to see tax returns, they can ask for them. But the state cannot deprive other candidates and voters of having a candidate on the ballot for that reason.Again, I wholeheartedly disagree. As long as all candidates are held to the same standard, no one is being “deprived” of ballot access. To wit, if two or three dozen states say, “Y’all are gonna have to release your tax returns to appear on our state ballots as a presidential candidate,” then presidential candidates are probably going have to release their tax returns to appear on those state ballots.Quoran Smith then also asserted (in pertinent part):Once you have an election, the state can’t discriminate against candidates based on qualifications not in the Constitution.Requiring the disclosure of tax returns is not in any way discriminatory, as long as all candidates are held to the same standard. Again, there is no suspect class at issue that would prompt a federal court to invoke strict scrutiny.Quoran Smith then also asserted (in pertinent part):Nor, I should add, does the state review ballot access requirements under “rational basis” review. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983).Again, I wholeheartedly disagree, as did the United States Supreme Court in Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992), 432–434:Petitioner proceeds from the erroneous assumption that a law that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny. Our cases do not so hold.[ . . . ]. . . A court considering a challenge to a state election law must weigh "the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate" against "the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule," taking into consideration "the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights." [Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983); Tashjian v Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U. S. 208, 213-214 (1986).]Under this standard, the rigorousness of our inquiry into the propriety of a state election law depends upon the extent to which a challenged regulation burdens First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Thus, as we have recognized when those rights are subjected to "severe" restrictions, the regulation must be "narrowly drawn to advance a state interest of compelling importance." Norman v. Reed, 502 U. S. 279, 289 (1992). But when a state election law provision imposes only "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions" upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, "the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify" the restrictions. Anderson, 460 U. S., at 788; see also id., at 788-789, n. 9.I suppose that there is a remote possibility that the federal courts might see the requirement to disclose tax returns at issue in the proposed California statute as an issue of first impression that might require strict scrutiny. However, there is absolutely no case law precedent that would prohibit the States from using their plenary power in such a manner, and there is no way that the filing deadline arbitrarily imposed against third party candidates in Anderson is analogous to a disclosure requirement that is applied uniformly to all candidates. That is to say, the plaintiff in Anderson claimed and proved that he was being discriminated against based on an early filing deadline, and that he had a cause of action rooted in the First and Fourteenth Amendments in that he could not obtain ballot access. That was how and why the court invoked strict scrutiny in that case. In striking contrast, the Talented Mister Trump could easily get himself placed on the California ballot by complying with the wholly reasonable and rational disclosure requirement set forth in the proposed California statute, gutting both the constitutional free speech claims and the constitutional due process claims set forth in Anderson.Added 7:35am PDT Fri Jun 21 2019:Quoran Brad Smith replied to my reply in the comments section of this answer:David, I’m sorry, you’re just wrong.You don't need to be sorry, Brad. 'Cause I'm not wrong!Quoran Smith continued:What you say is not what the cases say.It's like I'm looking in a mirror. To wit, you cited Anderson for the proposition that all ballot access cases were subject to strict or intermediate scrutiny, and I responded with a citation from Takushi which stated that Anderson stood for the exact *OPPOSITE* proposition. Sure, *SOME* ballot access cases are reviewed under strict scrutiny or intermediate scrutiny, "but when a state election law provision imposed only 'reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions' upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of voters, 'the State's important regulatory interests are generally enough to justify' the restrictions." Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432-434 [citing Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)].Yeah, I get that the legislation in Takushi was held to an intermediate scrutiny standard, but that's *NOT* why I cited it. (See Intermediate scrutiny - Wikipedia.) I cited it to contradict the proposition that you set forth above regarding Anderson. To wit, Takushi specifically stated that the "Petitioner [in Takushi] proceed[ed] from the erroneous assumption that a law that imposes any burden upon the right to vote must be subject to strict scrutiny. Our cases do not so hold." (Given its role at the top of the food chain, it is not uncommon for the United States Supreme Court to use obiter dicta to provide guidance for lower federal courts in the appropriate standard of review to use in future cases, which is essentially what the Court was doing here.)Quoran Smith continued:It doesn’t matter if a person “could easily” comply with a state law—the whole point is that they don’t have to comply if the law violates the constitution.Sure it matters, especially when the law in question is being reviewed by a federal court pursuant to a rational basis standard, or even intermediate scrutiny. That is to say, there ain't no First or Fourteenth Amendment issues at play with the proposed California statute. Or as I've heard one federal judge tell one federal barrister, "Sorry, counselor. That dog won't hunt."Quoran Smith continued:I give my students lots of exam points for making good arguments, but where a case or exam hypothetical has a clearly right or wrong answer, they eventually get dinged if they don’t come up with the right answer.Which is precisely why, when I was a law student, I would "dumb down" my arguments and tell my professors what they wanted to hear when writing my final exams, even when I knew that my professors were wrong. However, the one and only "A plus" that I earned in law school was in constitutional law, and I earned that grade because I knew that I had a professor who actually understood when and how federal courts would apply rational basis review, something that few law students, lawyers, or law school professors get. That is to say, getting the standard of review right in the real world is typically what determines the outcome of a constitutional challenge. I'm sure that we can both agree on that.Quoran Smith continued:Quoarans[sic] who have read all this can decide for themselves who they think has it right, looking at our comparative credentials, expertise, citations, and arguments.Comparative credentials? I already gave you that point, more than once, but that's a losing argument in federal court, every time. I specifically remember waiting for my friend United States District Court Judge Vaughn R. Walker to go to lunch with me as I watched a federal barrister make that sort of argument while asking for a temporary restraining order in a complex intellectual property case. "Pulling rank" didn't fly there, and it won't fly here on Quora. But if you want people on Quora to review your credentials and evaluate expertise, I think that's a great idea, and I suggest that they start with the Wikipedia article covering you. (See Bradley Smith (law professor) - Wikipedia.) Meanwhile, I am of the opinion that people can read the case law for themselves and determine who’s right and who’s wrong, credentials notwithstanding.Yes, you are an expert in election law. But so are the experts whom I have known and broken bread with for decades, and we all put our pants on one leg at a time. And while I am not at liberty to drop their names, *ALL* of the experts I know disagree with you on this issue. And these experts - not me - will be the ones who will be defending the State of California and the two or three dozen other states which may pass legislation requiring presidential candidates to release their tax returns.Added 9:55am PDT Mon Jun 24 2019:In a comment to Quoran Brad Smith’s answer to this question, Quoran Alan Tufft wrote:Brad, I looked up your Wiki vita, and recommend to readers as a matter of transparency your routine opposition to regulation of corporate contributions to political campaigns, and agreement with Citizens United decision that made the bizarre equivocation between abstract corporate entity and individual human voter despite fact that corporations can’t vote. In his dissenting opinion, Associate Justice John Paul Stevens argued that Court's ruling represented "a rejection of the common sense of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent corporations from undermining self government."Let’s be honest, your opinion is critical of progressive multi-cultural, environmentally friendly Climate Change tech leader, economic powerhouse, and Democratic juggernaut state of California. Your elections commission experience has roots in swamp of Ohio politics, a historically dysfunctional state politically, more completely disrupted environmentally by corporate greed than any other state for being married to fossil fuels, alteration of waterways, and replacing woodland with corn and soybean fields. Ohio is contributor of more than its fair share of mediocre presidents. Might be worthwhile to put on a filter mask, take a deep breath, stand back and admire the landscape of what your corporate based realpolitik has achieved for the Ohio and wants to impose on the nation.Added 9:30pm PDT Mon Jun 24 2019:In the comments section of his answer to this question, Quoran Brad Smith asserted (in pertinent part) in reply to a comment by Quoran Rick DeMent:[R]equiring candidates to disclose information or possess attributes not in the Constitution violates the qualifications clause.There is a categorical difference between disclosure requirements and “possessing attributes not in the Constitution,” a difference that Quoran Smith repeatedly and consistently elides. On this note, Quoran Smith has yet to cite a single case where disclosure requirements such as those in the proposed California statute were held to violate the United States Constitution. A federal court might so rule someday, but probably not, and certainly not unanimously, if and when such a case ultimately reaches the United States Supreme Court. Such a case would involve (at best) an issue of first impression, and - absent a justiciable First or Fourteenth Amendment claim - a federal court would probably review such a statute under the rational basis standard. Specifically, an Equal Protection claim would probably not be cognizable by someone who is not a member of a suspect class (i.e., e.g., a minority).Even under intermediate scrutiny, disclosure requirements such as those found in the proposed California statute would probably be found constitutional, unlike unconstitutional qualifications for ballot access like real property ownership. To wit, “The State may not deny to some the privilege of holding public office that it extends to others on the basis of distinctions that violate federal constitutional guarantees.” Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 362–63 (1970) (voiding a property qualification for appointment to local school board). See also Chappelle v. Greater Baton Rouge Airport Dist., 431 U.S. 159 (1977)(voiding a qualification for appointment as airport commissioner of ownership of real or personal property that is assessed for taxes in the jurisdiction in which airport is located); Quinn v. Millsap, 491 U.S. 95 (1989)(voiding property ownership requirement for appointment to board authorized to propose reorganization of local government). Cf. Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1 (1944).Added 2:13pm PDT Wed Jun 26 2019:In a reply to a comment to his answer to this question, Quoran Brad Smith wrote:As a rule of thumb, any candidate who has a remote chance of getting about 5–10% of the vote will be ordered on the ballot. See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968); Norman v. Reed 502 U.S. 279 (1992), holding signature requirements were so large as to be unconstitutional, and compare them with Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971), holding signature requirement was a reasonable administrative provision.Sort of. “Sore-loser” laws can and often do prevent major party presidential candidates from switching parties and/or running as independent candidates, regardless of how many votes they might receive in the general election after failing to win a major party nomination. I might add that all of the cases cited by Quoran Smith are cases that address the constitutionality of excluding *third party* and *independent* candidates from the ballot. To wit:Williams v. Rhodes was brought by third parties who plead and proved an Equal Protection claim in that the ballot access provisions involving signature requirements expressly treated potential third party presidential candidates harsher than it treated Republican Party candidates and Democratic Party candidates, an invidious form of discrimination.Norman v. Reed also involved invidious discrimination against a third party that was hoping to qualify for ballot access for candidates in state elections, and the Court held such signature requirements invalid on both Free Speech and Equal Protection.In striking contrast, the primary reason that Jenness v. Fortson upheld signature requirements, in spite of potentially justiciable First and Fourteenth Amendment claims, was that Georgia’s write-in provisions were considered sufficient to overcome both Free Speech and Equal Protection challenges:Unlike Ohio, Georgia freely provides for write-in votes. Unlike Ohio, Georgia does not require every candidate to be the nominee of a political party, but fully recognizes independent candidacies. Unlike Ohio, Georgia does not fix an unreasonably early filing deadline for candidates not endorsed by established parties. Unlike Ohio, Georgia does not impose upon a small party or a new party the Procrustean requirement of establishing elaborate primary election machinery. Finally, and in sum, Georgia's election laws, unlike Ohio's, do not operate to freeze the political status quo. In this setting, we cannot say that Georgia's 5% petition requirement violates the Constitution.[ . . . ]The appellants' claim under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment fares no better. This claim is necessarily bottomed upon the premise that it is inherently more burdensome for a candidate to gather the signatures of 5% of the total eligible electorate than it is to win the votes of a majority in a party primary.Worthy of note is the Court’s use of the language “inherently more burdensome” with regard to the Equal Protection claim in Jenness v. Fortson. Indeed, this is how and why most ballot access laws succeed or fail when reviewed by federal courts, as there is absolutely nothing in the United States Constitution about whether or not a state can impose signature gathering requirements. Similarly, any disclosure requirements that are equally applied to all presidential candidates would not be “inherently more burdensome” to any one candidate, and thus would probably pass constitutional muster, a fortiori under the States’ plenary power over choosing presidential electors. On this note, the information in a presidential candidate’s tax returns are wholly relevant to their suitability as a candidate. I mean, how could that information *NOT* be relevant?In a comment to Quoran Brad Smith’s answer to this question, Quoran Ryan Morillo writes:Being the FEC chairman doesn't give you a standing in relation to the constitutionality of a states laws. Your experience does sound like you have a good idea, but either you intellectually are in favor of invalidating it, or you haven't really worked through an argument that could make a compelling case in favor.In all fairness, Quoran Brad Smith is, in fact, a widely recognized expert in election law, although many of his positions are extremely controversial among the election law scholars whom I know. To wit, Quoran Smith is widely recognized as the intellectual architect of Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), as well as being the author of legal textbooks on election law.That having been said, the case law that Quoran Smith has been citing regarding ballot access is (at best) inapposite to his assertion that the disclosure requirements in the proposed California statute would be an unconstitutional restriction on ballot access for presidential candidates. I’d say the same thing if it were Laurence Tribe, Alan Dershowitz, or Akhil Amar making that sort of assertion. In sum, there are no sacred cows in the legal profession, and I simply don’t cotton to irrational appeals to authority. We all put our pants or trousers on one leg at a time.Added 7:42am PDT Sat Jun 29 2019:In a comment to Quoran Brad Smith’s answer to this question, Quoran Arthur Clifford asks:Would a state be allowed to put a section in the ballot or at least in the ballot info package that has state standards and whether the candidates meet them?And Quoran Smith answered:Possibly in a ballot info package but not on the ballot itself. That latter case is Cook v. Gralike, discussed in the opinion. See also Bramberg v. Jones, a California Supreme Court decision on a similar law.I don’t disagree with Quoran Smith’s conclusion, but Bramberg v. Jones is inapposite to such a question. At issue in Bramberg was a California ballot initiative that exceeded the proper scope of direct democracy by directing California legislators to seek an amendment to the United States Constitution, and was thus illegal. As such, the California Supreme Court never reached the issue of whether such information could be put on the ballot. (Prior restraint of direct democracy, which is astonishingly permissible, was the topic of a law review article that I wrote as a Member of the UC Davis Law Review.) As a practical matter, most challenges to the proper scope of a ballot initiative are litigated after an illegal ballot initiative garners enough votes to pass.As we shall explain, we agree with [the] principal contention that the proposition violates Article V of the United States Constitution, which prescribes the method of amending the federal Constitution.   For this reason, we need not and do not reach [the] additional contentions that Proposition 225 also denies the rights to freedom of speech, to vote, to seek public office, to the equal protection of the laws, and to a republican form of government, all as guaranteed by the federal Constitution (U.S. Const., art.   I, § 6;  id., art.   IV, § 4;  id., 1st Amend.;   id., 14th Amend.), and that it also denies the rights to freedom of speech, to vote, to seek public office, and to equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the California Constitution.   (Cal. Const., art.   I, §§ 1, 2, 7.)BRAMBERG v. JONES | 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 319 (1999)Added 10:33pm PDT Sat Jun 29 2019:Quoran Brad Smith replied (in pertinent part) to a comment to his answer to this question:[T]his is clearly an attempt to influence the outcome of elections by keeping candidates off the ballot if they do not disclose their tax returns.Not so clear. And this sort of conclusive language is *EXACTLY* the sort of conclusive language that would make me spill red ink all over the papers of my students when I was a teacher’s assistant for legal writing. That is to say, if it’s so damn obvious, why not just state the evidence that makes it so damn obvious?To be “clear,” Quoran Smith is making the extraordinary claim - without any proof - that he is able to divine an insidious legislative intent in the proposed California statute, something that federal courts are loathe to do, especially when there is a much more obvious and innocent explanation for something like requiring presidential candidates to make factual disclosures, and when complying with a statute requiring such disclosures would be so damn easy.Added 2:39pm PDT Thu Sep 19 2019:A federal judge ordered a temporary injunction Thursday against California’s first-in-the-nation law requiring candidates to disclose their tax returns for a spot on the presidential primary ballot, an early victory for President Trump but a decision that will undoubtedly be appealed by state officials.[ . . . ][U.S. District Judge Morrison England Jr.] spent much of the court proceeding on the question of whether a longstanding federal financial disclosure law preempts any additional rules that a state could impose.The federal law, known as the Ethics In Government Act, or EIGA, was originally passed in 1978 and applies to a range of top federal officials. Trump has filed the annual report, most recently in May, which provides an overview of his finances.“Do we even need to get here if EIGA preempts [the new California law]?,” England asked attorneys for the state. “Is that it?”Federal judge blocks California law to force disclosure of Trump's tax returnsRound One to the Talented Mister Trump, as Judge England sidesteps the issue of whether California’s new law is constitutional. I might add that it is not unusual for judges to completely ignore the issues brought before them and rule on unrelated grounds, which is what happened here. I seriously doubt that EIGA will be the final word on the matter, as a ruling on a preliminary injunction can and in this case almost certainly will appealed to the Ninth Circuit, which is what Judge England plans to issue by October 1, 2019. I’m sure the Ninth Circuit will sort things out.

Well sort of.Yes, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons) moved West in the 1840s to escape persecution in the United States.And stopped in Utah, which put them outside the boundaries of the United States and within the boundaries of Mexico.But the Mexican War broke out even before the first Mormons arrived in Utah in the summer of 1847, and it was plain that Mexico would not long hold the area, since the early days of the war saw the Mexicans expelled from California and Texas, and quietly removed from New Mexico as well. (The Mormon Battalion, recruited by the U.S. Army, assisted in that, marching from Omaha NE to San Diego CA by way of New Mexico and Arizona.)It was a reasonable plan, though. A part of Mexico, but REALLY far from any Mexican-dominated settlements, so they would have essentially been independent. Utah’s own native tribes were quite primitive (nothing like the sophisticated Hopi or Pueblo). Mexican control did not extend beyond the pueblo villages in New Mexico, and their only presence in Utah was the Spanish Trail that went from the pueblos northwest into Colorado and eastern Utah as far as Utah Valley, and then back southwest into southern California along the route of present-day I-15.The Mormon settlers named one town Spanish Fork because the Spanish Trail came out of a canyon at that point along a mountain torrent into the Utah Valley. To balance out, a town further north in the same valley was then named American Fork.When it became clear that the US was following them in, the Mormons did their best to ameliorate the authorities in Washington DC, getting them to appoint Brigham Young as territorial governor, etc., and petitioning to join the US as the State of Deseret in 1850 (they were turned down, and the territory of Utah was formed instead). But within 10 years, rumors of Mormon insubordination led Pres. Buchanan to order an army to Utah to put down a Mormon rebellion.It didn’t matter that there actually wasn’t one.I have read a number of alternate histories where the Mormons actually DO declare independence. Entertaining, but…