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(I will periodically update this answer to include the latest information on the investigation. Check at the bottom of the narrative.)Here is a good radar track of the aircraft involved, a Atlas Air Flight 3591, a Boeing 767, under contract by Amazon.There was severe weather in the vicinity, between the aircraft and the Airport, IAH, Houston Intercontinental. At approximately 7500 feet, the aircraft began to descend at a high rate, and ultimately reached a descent rate of 7000 FPM at 3000 feet. This occurred at the northern edge of Trinity Bay, just prior to ATC losing radar contact. This would be over 4 times the maximum descent rate that would be expected for a Boeing 767 at 3000 feet AGL. Another flight in the vicinity, UAL 1788, reported that the flight conditions were IMC (Instrument Flight Conditions), with a high level of turbulence, “pretty moderate chop”, meaning that they probably were “getting hammered” in the clouds.Now for the difficult tasks ahead by all involved, including the FAA, the NTSB, the DOT, next of kin, Amazon, Atlas, Boeing, etc.The worst possible thing that can be done in an aircraft accident investigation is to conjecture about what may have caused it, prior to the relevant evidence being collected and analyzed. Good Scientific method must be used to arrive at reasonable and well supported conclusions, and that must prevail over the urge to reach quick conclusions, and then support them with Confirmation bias. A well run accident investigation should ultimately reach unbiased conclusions, which are then only stated as being probable causative factors and contributing factors, and not as absolute causative factors.Those who are quick to jump to premature conclusions almost always look foolish once the data is collected and analyzed.The first thing that will be done, is for the NTSB to begin their investigation. They will use this handbook:https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/process/Documents/MajorInvestigationsManualApp.pdfIt spells out every procedure that will be followed in the investigation, down to the smallest details.For example, this is an excerpt covering a critical portion of the evidence recovery process that will be used in this investigation:Underwater Wreckage RecoveryIf the accident aircraft had a CVR and/or FDR installed, make sure that a search for the underwater locator beacon is initiated immediately.Request that AS management contact Department of Defense/Supervisor of Salvage personnel to determine their level of participation in search and recovery planning. (Consider foreign authority responsibilities if the wreckage is in international waters.)Depending on the circumstances of the accident, obtain witness statements, weather data, radar tracking data, and trajectory analyses to aid in locating the wreckage.Once a search and recovery plan is approved, using U.S. Government resources prepare a letter from the Safety Board Chairman to the Chief of Naval Operations to initiate funding.Before recovery is attempted, ensure that personnel have been thoroughly briefed on the recommended locations for attaching cables, straps, hooks, etc. Be sure to consult specialists from the operator or the airframe/engine manufacturer.Immediately treat recovered wreckage with appropriate solvents to prevent rapid corrosion.It will be a long and drawn out process, and in the end they should have a pretty definitive idea about the causative factors that contributed to this accident.This is a good example of ultimate findings in an accident investigation, which involved the crash of American Airlines Flight 587, which occurred on November 12, 2001:Some of the initial conjecture involving this particular accident was downright absurd. In one circumstance, a former Union (ALPA) safety chairman, a retired Delta Captain, called CNN shortly after the accident, and was quoted on live television stating that the accident was obviously caused by both of the aircraft’s engines falling off. He sounded authoritative and credible, but wasn’t even close to the actual probable causes. It sounded plausible to many of those who heard it, but it was a very irresponsible act.What actually happened:The engines fell off because the vertical stabilizer detached, which resulted in the violent oscillations that caused the engines to detach.The vertical stabilizer detached because the pilot flying at the time overcontrolled the aircraft’s rudders during an encounter with wake turbulence.He overcontrolled the rudders because of a very flawed simulator training syllabus that he had been subjected to at American Airlines.American had erroneously trained their pilots to use rudders to roll their aircraft out of unusual attitude, aircraft upset situations.Airbus had also not been very forthcoming about how fragile the vertical stabilizer was in relation to the amount of shear that the rudders could induce upon the vertical stabilizer components at higher airspeeds.This shoot-from-the-hip accident investigation genius came out looking incredibly foolish, and certainly should have known better about jumping to conclusions. Professional Accident investigators strive to avoid looking like rank amateurs, as did the trigger happy Delta Captain, by following good accident investigation protocols.Updates:Check out this article from USA TODAY:One body recovered, search ongoing in Texas Amazon Prime Air cargo plane crashUpdated February 27, 2019:Amazon Car:go Jet Dove Steeply Into Bay Near Houston, Video Shows:Video recorded from a nearby jail captured the plane’s final five seconds before it smashed into the water, Sumwalt said in a briefing Sunday afternoon. “It’s descending in a steep descent, steep nose-down attitude,” Sumwalt said. “By looking at the video, I saw no evidence of the aircraft trying to turn or pull up at the last moments.”The plane fell thousands of feet in just seconds after what had been a routine descent, according to Sumwalt and the flight-tracking website FlightRadar24. Two bodies have been recovered, Chambers County Sheriff Brian Hawthorne said.Update February 28, 2019:NTSB Investigating Deadly Crash of Amazon Cargo Flight, Atlas Air 3591 - AvionicsThis one has a video of the aircraft descending in a steep dive before impact. Great commentary by Greg Feith, former senior NTSB investigator:Video shows cargo plane moments before crash at Trinity BayUpdate March 2, 2019:Voice recorder found.NTSB begins examining cockpit voice recorder from cargo plane crashUpdate March 4, 2019Flight Data Recorder recovered. 3rd pilot’s remains identified.Remains found at cargo plane crash site confirm pilot's identityNTSB recovers Atlas Air black boxesUpdate March 5, 2019:NTSB: Atlas Air crew lost control 18 seconds before black box stopped recordingUpdate March 6, 2019:NTSB News ReleaseNational Transportation Safety Board Office of Public AffairsNTSB Laboratory Completes Initial Review of Cockpit Voice Recorder, Recovers Flight Data Recorder3/5/2019​Engineers at the National Transportation Safety Board’s Office of Research and Engineering Vehicle Recorder Division completed the initial review of the Atlas Air Flight 3591 cockpit voice recorderSaturday evening and recovered the airplane’s flight data recorderSunday.Three people (the two pilots for the flight and a non-revenue jump-seat pilot) died when Atlas Air Flight 3591, a Boeing 767-300 cargo jet, crashed in the muddy marshland of Trinity Bay Feb. 23, 2019, about 40 miles from Houston’s George Bush Intercontinental Airport. The airplane was destroyed. The airplane was carrying cargo for Online Shopping for Electronics, Apparel, Computers, Books, DVDs & more Inc., and the US Postal Service from Miami to Houston.The condition of the accident site made locating the recorders challenging.In this photo, taken Saturday in the NTSB laboratory in Washington, an NTSB engineer from the Office of Research and Engineering’s Vehicle Recorder Division inspects memory boards from the cockpit voice recorder of Atlas Air Flight 3591 for signs of damage and water intrusion. Atlas Air Flight 3591 crashed Feb. 23, 2019, about 40 miles from Houston’s George Bush Intercontinental Airport, and the NTSB recovered the airplane’s CVR March 1, 2019. NTSB photo.Directors from the Office of Research and Engineering and the Office of Aviation Safety conducted an audition of the CVR as part of the NTSB’s ongoing investigation of the accident. The audition revealed the following information, which is preliminary and subject to change as the investigation continues:The length of the recording is approximately two hours and was obtained from a download of a solid-state type cockpit voice recorder.The recording included the final portion of the flight; however, the quality of the audio is poor.There are times during the recording when the content of crew discussion is difficult to determine, at other times the content can be determined using advanced audio filtering.The crew was in communication with air traffic control and were being provided radar vectors for the runway 26L approach into George Bush Intercontinental Airport.Crew communications consistent with a loss control of the aircraft began approximately 18 seconds prior to the end of the recording.The flight data recorder arrived at the NTSB’s Recorder Lab Sunday at 11:45 p.m. The memory module was disassembled, cleaned and dried, and download of the data was achieved Monday afternoon. Initial review of the data revealed:The accident flight was captured, and the FDR contained a total of about 54 hours of data from 17 flights.There were approximately 350 parameters recorded by the FDR detailing the motion of the aircraft and operation of its engines, flight controls and other systems.NTSB recorder investigators are currently verifying and validating the FDR data, and the NTSB plans to provide a summary in an investigative update in a few days.Technical experts in the CVR group will convene in the coming week to review the entire recording and produce a transcript of the accident recording. It will be a time-consuming process to complete the transcript.The CVR group is one of the seven investigative groups established by the Investigator-in-Charge for the accident investigation.Imagery of the NTSB’s investigation of the accident is available via the NTSB Flickr account at https://flic.kr/s/aHsmabxem8 and B-roll is available via the NTSB YouTube Channel at https://www.youtube.com/user/NTSBgov.Follow @NTSB_Newsroom on Twitter for updates on this, and other, NTSB investigations.Related News ReleasesMarch 05, 2019NTSB Laboratory Completes Initial Review of Cockpit Voice Recorder, Recovers Flight Data RecorderRelated ReportsRelated EventsRelated InvestigationsAtlas Air #3591 crashed into Trinity BayMore NTSB LinksInvestigation ProcessData & StatsAccident ReportsMost Wanted ListContact: NTSB Media Relations490 L'Enfant Plaza, SWWashington, DC 20594Keith Holloway(202) [email protected]###The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents, promoting transportation safety, and assisting victims of transportation accidents and their families.Updated March 7, 2019:Another video of Atlas 3591’s final moments:Chilling video shows final moments of doomed Atlas Air flight over TexasUpdate March 10, 2019:Pieces of the wreckage are being collected, and will be assembled into a facsimile of the Boeing 767 in the hangar, then analyzed by the NTSB.Update March 12, 2019:From the initial FDR analysis: The aircraft momentarily leveled off, and pitched 4 degrees nose up at 6200 feet, with maximum engine power being applied. The aircraft then proceeded to pitch down to a 49 degree nose down attitude. It reached a maximum speed of 430 knots before impact, and impacted at approximately 20 degrees nose down angle.Cargo plane that crashed near Houston, killing 3, appears to have hit turbulenceUpdate March 13, 2019:Atlas Air 3591 Pitched Down in Response to Elevator Deflectionby Rob FinfrockMar 12, 2019 - 9:16 PMThe Atlas Air Boeing 767 Freighter that crashed on February 23 on approach to Houston Intercontinental Airport entered its steep descent into Trinity Bay after encountering turbulence, followed by nose-down elevator deflection, according to an update issued by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board Tuesday.The report said data obtained from the aircraft's flight data recorder (FDR) and cockpit voice recorder (CVR) indicate Houston Approach control advised the crew of precipitation along their flight path as the aircraft descended normally through 12,000 feet mean sea level (msl) at a ground speed of 290 knots on the LINKK ONE arrival to the airport.Following an ATC inquiry, the pilots asked to divert to the west around the weather. The controller responded that they “would need to descend to 3,000 feet expeditiously” to accommodate their request. ATC then instructed the crew to turn to 270 degrees heading while descending through 8,500 feet msl.Approximately one minute later, controllers told the pilots to expect a northerly turn to a right base for Runway 26L after clearing the weather, which the pilots acknowledged with “sounds good” and “OK,” according to the NTSB. At around the same time, the FDR recorded "small vertical accelerations consistent with the aircraft entering turbulence."Shortly thereafter, as the aircraft flew between 6,200 to 6,300 feet msl, "the engines increased to maximum thrust, and the airplane pitch increased to about 4 degrees nose up and then rapidly pitched nose-down to about 49 degrees in response to nose-down elevator deflection," although the stick shaker did not activate.The aircraft then entered a steep descent along the 270-degree heading, reaching approximately 430 knots airspeed. The board added that, based on FDR data, the aircraft pitched up to an approximately 20 degrees nose-down attitude shortly before impact.The NTSB released no further communications from the flight crew and noted that it would issue a full transcript when the public docket opens. The flight crew appeared fully qualified and current in the Boeing 767, the Board added.Update March 15, 2019:NTSB evaluation:DCA19MA086Update March 16, 2019:Experts Doubt Turbulence Caused Crash of Cargo Jet in TexasUpdate March 18, 2019:Pilot error suspected by NTSB:Federal investigators reportedly suspect that pilot error played a role in the fatal Amazon Air cargo crashUpdate March 17, 2019:I would investigate the possibility of a Horizontal Stabilizer jackscrew failure, causing a nose down pitch jam. Here is an AD concerning the 767 jackscrew, from 2005:Airworthiness Directives; Boeing Model 767 AirplanesA Proposed Rule by the Federal Aviation Administration on10/07/2005AGENCY:Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.ACTION:Notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM).SUMMARY:The FAA proposes to adopt a new airworthiness directive (AD) for all Boeing Model 767 airplanes. This proposed AD would require the following actions for the drive mechanism of the horizontal stabilizer: Repetitive detailed inspections for discrepancies and loose ball bearings; repetitive lubrication of the ballnut and ballscrew; repetitive measurements of the freeplay between the ballnut and the ballscrew; and corrective action if necessary. This proposed AD is prompted by a report of extensive corrosion of a ballscrew in the drive mechanism of the horizontal stabilizer on a similar airplane model. We are proposing this AD to prevent an undetected failure of the primary load path for the ballscrew in the horizontal stabilizer and subsequent wear and failure of the secondary load path, which could lead to loss of control of the horizontal stabilizer and consequent loss of control of the airplane.Here is the Atlas Air 3591 jackscrew, after being recovered. It appears to be in the full nose down position.Update March 18, 2019:Atlas 767 crash probe strives to comprehend pitch upsetKAMINSKI-MORROWUS investigators probing the Atlas AirBoeing 767-300 freighter crash have yet to explain fully the initiating circumstances behind the elevator deflection which pushed the aircraft into a fatal dive on approach to Houston.Crucially the National Transportation Safety Board has shifted its immediate emphasis, through the unusual decision to amend its phrasing while detailing preliminary findings.While the NTSB had initially stated that the aircraft had pitched down “in response to column input”, it subsequently revised this, saying the downward pitch was the result of “nose-down elevator deflection” – an amendment designed to avoid premature conclusions being drawn over the relation, if any, between actions in the cockpit and the unusual attitude of the aircraft.Although the initial use of the term “column input” might suggest there was a nose-down command of some degree, the NTSB has not clarified the extent of any pressure placed on the yoke – or the reason – nor whether the elevator deflection was in line with the command.Weather radar images indicate that the 767 would have encountered the edges of a band of precipitation as the jet headed west over the north-eastern shore of Trinity Bay.The inquiry says the aircraft, which was being vectored to avoid the heaviest of the weather, appeared to enter a region of turbulence as it briefly levelled at around 6,200ft.Investigators then found that the aircraft, for reasons still unclear, then experienced an increase in engine power to maximum thrust, even though the airspeed was steady at 230kt. The jet pitched upwards, to around 4°, although the NTSB has not specified whether this was a natural consequence of the increased power.There is no evidence of a stall – the stick-shaker was not activated – and the NTSB has not explained whether the subsequent nose-down manoeuvre was a reaction to the pitch-up attitude, an input to continue an expedited descent to 3,000ft previously advised by air traffic control, or attributable to other factors.But the extraordinary transition to a 49° nose-down pitch, which took place over 18s, is central to the inquiry. The NTSB has not specified whether the aircraft was in cloud at the time of the transition, but it had clearly emerged from the cloud base into good visibility during the last few seconds of its descent.With investigators yet to establish conclusively whether there is a connection between control column movements and the aircraft’s excessive nose-down attitude, the possibility of a mechanical reason for the elevator deflection is yet to be ruled out.The 767 has previously been the subject of airworthiness directives including measures to prevent corrosion of ballscrew components in the drive mechanism for the horizontal stabiliser, which could potentially lead to loss of stabiliser control.Elevator power control actuators have also been a previous focus of 767 directives; a 2014 bulletin ordered checks to ensure aircraft were not operating with failed shear rivets in the actuator mechanism and to prevent jamming and a possible elevator hardover – which could result in a significant pitch upset.The NTSB has not disclosed any information on the position of the horizontal stabiliser or the condition of the drive mechanism and the elevators’ mechanical linkages.But it does indicate that the severity of the dive had lessened as the aircraft descended towards Trinity Bay, with the pitch reducing by some 30°, to around 20° nose-down, before impact. The inquiry has not stated, however, whether this was the result of recovery actions – including column input – in the cockpit, movements of the elevator or stabiliser, or other aerodynamic effects.Update March 30, 2019:VIDEO: Weird Details Emerge With Amazon Prime/Atlas Air Crash - Plane & Pilot Magazine

I think the Batman-like crime solving is miles away… Most people have ultra-tech-savvy understanding of crime solving, we probably owe it to NCIS Miami or whatever these series are. Real life is much simpler and usually - in case of a murder, for example - the dots aren’t that hard to connect: jealousy, greed, passion or covered-up accident. Investigators are using and will use still almost exclusively of their head.Until ASI comes around and plays us everything back in AR/VR so we understand something (as we aren’t using our brains that much any more anyway).Then we’re all off-duty :)

Too Long, Didn't Read:Boeing and the FAA chased money and cut corners and in the process did unethical and bad things that made the MAX seem safe using manipulated data so that nobody knew about MCAS, which crashed two planes. The majority of the time was spent collecting evidence which was hard due to the cover-up by Boeing and the FAA, along with punishing Boeing and the FAA along with cleaning up the organizations so that they wouldn’t do something like it again.The full story:To understand why it took so long, you have to understand what went wrong in the first place. I’m going to answer/explain everything as I would explain it to someone with zero aviation knowledge just to make sure anyone reading can understand.First, Boeing was chasing costs and trying to keep them as low as possible. Airliner manufacturers like Boeing and Airbus try to make planes as efficient and maintenance-free as possible so that the airline that buys the plane can make a larger profit off of the aircraft, costing less in fuel and parts over the course of its life. Airliner parts are not cheap, along with the aircraft themselves. The average price of the 737 MAX 8 (the two that crashed) is 121.6 million US dollars. The ways Boeing tried to cut the costs are what ended up causing the two crashes. Here’s what they did:They fitted larger engines onto the plane, which were more fuel and maintenance efficient. The new engines were 10–12% more fuel-efficient than the previous 737NG the 737MAX generation was replacing. A 737 flight from Miami to Chicago costs the airline roughly $7,201 USD for only the fuel. Now if you factor in the 12% lower fuel burn, that amount comes down to $6336.88. I am including cents to emphasize how important a small cost saving is to them, as a 10 cent reduction for a gallon of Jet Fuel means large savings. For example, a 10 cent per gallon price drop (originally $2.02 USD) on our Miami to Chicago run means they save 10 cents on all 3,565 gallons (estimated) used during the flight, bringing the per-gallon price to $1.92 USD, total fuel cost to $6844.80 USD, and saving them $356.20 USD. However, the 737NG’s engines are already very low slung and there wasn’t enough ground clearance with the new engines on the MAX if they left them in their original spot. What Boeing then did was move the engines forward, where they were further in front of the wing, and then raised them up with the new room achieved by moving them forwards.Here are some diagrams:Here’s the point where we switch from economics/business to science.So when Boeing changed engines and moved their position they changed how the aircraft behaved as a whole. The reason for this can be explained by a little bit of basic physics and Aviation Knowledge.Every plane balances on a point called its Center of Gravity. This is the ideal balance to maintain the aircraft in optimal flight. It’s usually located in front of the Center of Lift, CL. The Center of Lift is the point at which the aircraft is balanced on the lift of its airfoils while flying. Both of these points are usually at the level of the aircraft wing. If you mess with the CG and CL you can drastically change how an aircraft behaves. Incorporated into the CG and CL along with the overall balancing of the aircraft is the thrust provided by engines. Because the engines are below the Center of Gravity and Center of Lift, they have an effect on the plane. Planes have something called trim where a preset angle is set on a control surface so that even if the plane is not perfectly balanced on the CG and CL, the plane remains in level flight through that continuous control input counteracting the imbalance in the CG and CL. However it can only compensate to an extent, and planes that are horribly imbalanced will either not fly or be uncontrollable.Physics Time!I’m not going to do calculations but I will explain why the engine change mattered. When Boeing moved the engines they changed the distance to be further from the CG and CL. Engines also provide thrust, which is a Force. I think you can see where this is going. The new 737MAX engines provided a greater torque force that would raise the nose of the plane up more than the 737NG’s would. This is because of not only the larger lever arm (distance from CG/CL) but also the increased torque force (roughly 3,000 more lbs of thrust). This meant the MAX behaved differently than the NG, especially at takeoff when the engines were at full thrust. This was bad for Boeing, as it meant that 737NG crews would have to be retrained and Type Certified to fly the MAX, something which would cost a lot of money. So how did they work around that?CG diagram of 737 MAX:Boeing created a solution to the problem which was called Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System, or MCAS. What MCAS did was adjust the trim of the entire elevator (the wing in the back which pushes the nose of the plane up or down) on the fly to make sure that the new plane behaved like the old one by pushing the nose of the plane down at times to counteract the new nose-up tendencies of the MAX caused by the engine change. The MCAS read the Angle of Attack (AoA) through AoA sensors located on the nose of the plane. If a plane’s AoA is too high (nose up), the air going over the wing is disturbed to the point where it can no longer give the lift that makes the plane fly. The only way around this is if you have enough thrust to keep the plane going. However, that means that the plane has to have more engine thrust than weight, which the 737 does not have. The MCAS system did not move the actual elevator but used smaller movements of the entire horizontal tailplane via the existing trim system to have a smaller trim movement have a greater effect.Here is a picture of the horizontal stabilizer with visible trim measurements in degrees. The MCAS system would move the stabilizer so that the front of it was pointing up a little so that the nose of the plane would lower.As another cost-saving measure, Boeing made it an option to have 1 or 2 AoA sensors, and airlines looking to save money chose the cheaper 1 sensor option. Boeing reasoned that modern tech would never fail and one sensor would be enough and the second redundant sensor would be an extra-cost option.Now Boeing was scoring big. Its new plane was cheaper to operate, would raise airlines’ profits over the 737NG and other offerings from AIRBUS, and since the cockpit was barely changed and the MAX now had the same flight characteristics of the 737NG because of MCAS, this meant 737NG pilots would not have to be extensively retrained and Type Certified to fly the MAX, saving tons of money for airlines. Pilots would only have to receive light retraining on some of the new features and procedures of the MAX from the NG. The last thing to do before the plane could be sold, however, was to get an FAA Airworthiness Certificate for the MAX.What is the FAA?The FAA is like the DMV or whatever other Driver’s License/Motor Vehicle certifying system is where you live. The FAA certifies Planes and pilots, oversees the manufacturing of aircraft, manages Air Traffic Control practices and procedures, as well as conducting studies to make flying better for not only the passengers but the airlines and aircraft manufacturers too.So Boeing went to the FAA with their brand spanking new 737MAX and asked the FAA to check the plane out to give it an Airworthiness Certificate so Boeing could start selling the planes to airlines. The FAA is a US federal body, and Boeing is a major US aircraft and research company. The FAA and Boeing also had a very close relationship, which resulted in alarming situations arising. Boeing also put lots of pressure on the FAA, as literal Billions of dollars were on the line with aircraft orders. So the FAA did Boeing a few favors and ignored things that were very wrong and corrupt.Here is what the FAA did:The FAA rushed the Certification and testing as fast as possible and missed crucial things or wasn’t thorough enough. This was apparent with the MCAS failures and approving Boeing’s very sparse 737NG to 737MAX training program, which barely mentioned MCAS.The FAA investigators sometimes left early, relying on Boeing to provide them with full data or leaving with incomplete data.The FAA had test pilots do some of the 737MAX tests in a simulator that wasn’t programmed with MCAS, meaning the test results were worthless.The FAA conducted tests in a simulator that was programmed with MCAS, but Boeing officials were present and instructed the test pilots when to hit the switch that turned off MCAS, corrupting the tests.The FAA heavily punished whistleblowers who tried to warn about the incorrect and corrupted testing and backroom dealings between Boeing and the FAA.As a result, the FAA gave the green light very quickly and 737MAX aircraft quickly started entering service. Boeing started making big bank. Airlines used the Boeing training guidelines approved by the FAA to convert their 737NG pilots to the MAX. The first commercial flight was in May of 2017. Things were going well.So what happened?On October 29, 2018, Lion Air flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea 13 minutes after takeoff. Then on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302 crashed into the ground near Bishoftu, Ethiopia six munites after takeoff. Both of the aircraft were 737MAX 8 aircraft. Whenever an aircraft crashes, it is customary that air crash investigators from the aircraft manufacturer’s country assist and investigate along with the investigators from where the plane crashed. As such the NTSB from the USA were dispatched to investigate both of the crashes. The job of the NTSB is to determine the causes of crashes and recommend changes to aircraft or procedures and training to the FAA, which can then initiate and enforce those changes.Even more corruption occurred after the 2018 Lion Air crash, where Boeing revealed for the first time what MCAS was, as well as MCAS did not appear in the manuals for the aircraft. The pilots didn’t even know it existed. Boeing knew how MCAS worked so they sent a bulletin to all MAX owners on how to recover from an MCAS malfunction. When facing the FAA, Boeing deflected blame and said the crew should have been able to recover if they took appropriate action. The FAA gave Boeing a slap on the wrist and told them to update MCAS so that it wouldn’t happen again, and to do so by March 2019.The cause of the accidents themselves was MCAS. The accident investigators analyzed the planes’ Flight Data Recorders and both showed the AoA sensors were reading incorrectly, thinking the nose of the plane was too high. This activated MCAS to push the nose of the plane down so that the plane wouldn’t stall. These aircraft were only equipped with 1 angle of attack sensor, so the aircraft had no backup sensor and no other way to know that the AoA was fine and MCAS wasn’t needed. So the plane thought it was stalling when it was actually nosediving the plane into the ground. The pilots didn’t know what MCAS was so they didn’t know how to turn it off, and they could only hope the Boeing written and FAA approved recovery plan worked. It didn’t. So when the NTSB approached the FAA with questions, the FAA had to play dumb and silence whistleblowers, or else they were in big trouble for doing their job horribly wrong and with neglect.The FAA ordered the 737MAX to be grounded on March 13, 2019, two days after the second crash of the Ethiopian Airlines flight. It was during the grounding that the US Congress, Transportation Department (which oversaw the FAA), ad hoc panels, and the FBI investigated the manner in which the FAA certified the MAX. This is the main reason the grounding took so long, as it was a long and drawn-out investigation and conclusion conducted by the US government. Boeing and the FAA did not want to talk or admit blame. Some important documents the investigation requested to look at mysteriously didn’t exist. How convenient. It was after the long evidence-gathering process could there be a ruling and judgment made on who was to blame.The other long part of the recertification time was determining what changes needed to be made, what appropriate punishments for those involved were, and how to initiate and enforce those changes so similar situations wouldn’t happen again. The FAA still had to function as the governing Aviation body in the US, but there were major changes that had to be instituted. Boeing also received a lot of criticism for how they handled the incidents, all boiling down to chasing that bottom line and cutting the corners to cut costs. Public faith in the 737MAX program was lost, even though airlines still had orders for them.The FAA recently recertified the 737MAX, and it made its first commercial flight since then today, December 29, 2020. The reason it took so long was not the changes that had to be made to the aircraft, which could be done in a few months. The reason it took so long was so that the blame and responsibility for the accident could be brought down on Boeing and the FAA, which both have very important jobs. Boeing’s job is to make the next generation of airliners and improve them so that air travel is cleaner and safer. The FAA’s job was to make sure that any aircraft presented to them would be tested and certified thoroughly and in an unbiased and uncorrupted manner, as well as making sure that air travel is as safe as possible. Both organizations succumbed to greed and were chasing the bottom dollar at the cost of safety, and eventually, human lives.