A Guide To Troop 91: Fill & Download for Free

The Northrop Grumman MQ-8 Fire Scout - comes to mind.The MQ-8B is fitted with stub wings which serve both an aerodynamic purpose as well as an armament carriage location. Weapons to be carried include Hellfire missiles, Viper Strike laser-guided glide weapons, and, in particular, pods carrying the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS), a laser-guided 70 mm (2.75 in) folding-fin rocket, which the Army saw as ideal for the modern battlefield. The Army was also interested in using the Fire Scout to carry up to 200 pounds (91 kg) of emergency supplies to troops in the field.

The answer is as simple as looking at what other NATO nations used in the same role. In the Luftwaffe, it was the Alpha Jet, a trainer, and the G.91 light strike aircraft. Other NATO air forces pressed similar aircraft into this role. Why? They knew that the life expectancy of a close air support aircraft would be measured in minutes, and there was little point in putting a lot of resources into what amounted to a suicide mission. And, by the way, you can't hang enough armor on an airplane to make it survivable in a high-intensity air defense environment. At least not and have it be able to get off the ground.Also, other air forces invested the bulk of their anti-tank firepower in attack helicopters, rather than fixed-wing aircraft.However, the main reason has to do with doctrine. Very few, if any, other air forces truly do Close Air Support in the sense that US forces do it. Most other nations do what we would call "Battlefield Air Interdiction" and call it CAS. BAI missions are not in such close proximity to friendly forces that they require positive control from the ground. They are therefore less dangerous to friendly troops and can be done with far less complexity and precision. They still support the troops by hitting the enemy a few hundred or thousand meters behind enemy lines, but artillery is relied on to do the close-in work. Given this view of things, a purpose-built machine probably was unnecessary in their concept of operations.Mythology has it that the A-10 was conceived as an answer to Soviet tank columns (which, I would point out, one wouldn't find as a CAS target as they would be in a more survivable tactical formation as they approached the line of contact...but I digress). However, the A-10 was developed in response to the needs of the USAF CAS community as they operated over South Vietnam. In fact, the first artist's renderings I saw of the A-X aircraft in the late 1960s were of a twin turbo-prop aircraft operating off a jungle airstrip. It bore more than a passing resemblance to the Argentine Pucara. While the GAU-8 30mm cannon may not have been an afterthought, it wasn't considered to be an integral part of the A-X concept at that time. Since we had several Wings of F-100 Super Sabres dedicated to CAS in South Vietnam and as the war dragged on for years, it made perfect sense to replace these aircraft with something purpose built for the task.By the time the A-10 hit the ramp, we were out of Vietnam and refocused on Central Europe. I'm sure it was easy to see the A-10 as an answer to tank columns, but that was more by coincidence than design. A GAU-8 loaded up with HE ammunition would have worked wonders against the Viet Cong, but it was large enough to prove adaptable to armored threats with the development of depleted uranium sabot rounds. It should be noted, however, that even with DU rounds, the GAU-8 couldn't penetrate even a T-62's armor frontally. This is very elequently put in an illustration from a humerous training "coloring book" for A-10 pilots in 1977:Since most rounds were likely to impact the target tank on its far less thickly armored top surfaces, and pilots were free to attack from the sides or rear - which were likewise less protected - the GAU-8 could be pressed into service against armored vehicles. While the GAU-8 is a great piece of ordnance, any other 30mm - like the DEFA or ADEN - would have a pretty good chance at ruining a tanker's day, if the attack came from above the side or rear of the vehicle.However, it should be stressed that the A-10s "go-to" weapon of choice was always the AGM-65 Maverick missile - which was carried by all of our other tactical aircraft, as well. This is why it took until relatively recently for the aircraft to get even a marginally accurate bombing capability - it wasn't deemed necessary as the Maverick was precision-guided, anyway. The Maverick was, itself, overkill when targeting a lowly tank. It could be fired from over 20km away, came downhill at supersonic speed and delivered its 57kg shaped-charge warhead with 1-meter accuracy. No tank ever conceived could withstand that. In this context, the GAU-8 was just icing on the cake.All right. With all that as background, why would a European air force invest in a single-purpose airplane for a mission that is: a. suicidal, b. can be done by much less expensive and much more numerous training & light-strike aircraft, and c. will be mostly done by BO 105s, or other similar helicopters?It didn't make sense then for other NATO air forces back then, and it no longer does for a shrinking USAF that can't afford a single-mission airframe sucking up ramp space and budget dollars.

It's like asking which Avenger is better? You just can't say Iron Man cause he's cool and he shut the worm hole(Finishing the Act) or Captain America cause he guided all troops.It doesn't matter who's knock was better it couldn't have been possible without both their innings. True that Dhoni was given MoM but it's just opinion of few people in the committee. Gambhir's was important to get back stability in inning and Dhoni's was important to keep target in site.Stop comparing they both were playing for India to get WC and not get MoM.