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This is gonna be a long answer because the question posed here cannot be answered without going over the historical development of South Korea and Pakistan from the colonial era to modern times and understanding how they differed.Much of the difference in Pakistan’s and South Korea’s different economic track record lies in the historical differences between their political economy.The key historical difference of note is the differences between how the Japanese Empire colonized and developed South Korea vs how the British Empire colonized and developed the territories that comprised of Pakistan.For starters, Japanese colonization of South Korea was far more brutal and intense compared to the British colonization of India. The Japanese empire made far more effort to break down the political structure of the then Yi Dynasty of Korea and reshape it into a strongly centralized state structure than the British who were content to let state structures remain in place that co-opted the local elite into the resource extraction model of the British colonial empire.The British empire was content to utilize India as a market for British goods, extract resources from, rely on as a pool for the Royal Indian army and so forth. Little to no attempts were made to industrialize India.The Japanese though, were determined to integrate Korea into the overall War Economy of the Japanese empire leading up to the second world war. This meant that a far more intense industrialization effort was undertaken in the Korean territories with nearly 3 decades of GDP growth averaging more than 3% per anum taking place in Korea up until Korean independence. Nothing of the sort happened in India or Pakistan. The Korean economy was comprised of nearly 35% by the manufacturing and mining sectors alone which are key indicators of industrialization.Even more importantly, the Japanese colonization of Korea dramatically altered the social fabric of Korean society and reshaped the power relations between different social groups that made Industrialization far more easier. They destroyed the predator relationship between the Landowning elite and the peasants as well as the weak control of the Yi ruling elite on the country and replaced it with a technically competent middle class, western style laws of property and inheritance, a strong state structure backed up by a police force and internal security, an industrial class and strong, consistent tax revenues for the state.Park Chung-Hee, the architect of South Korea’s economic miracle, was for the most part, simply following the lines in the sand left behind by the Japanese empire’s colonial efforts in Korea (and was reported a big admirer of the Meiji reforms in Japan as well).Thus, it is imperative that we understand Korea and it’s economic miracle under the context of the historical circumstance that led up to it, whether it was Japanese colonization, US patronage, the revolutionary movements of North Korea or the corrupt courtly intrigues of the Choson under the Yi dynasty.The Imperial Sun rises on Korea.The Korean colonization by the Japanese empire can be broadly categorized into 3 major core points:The corrupt and ineffective monarchy of the Yi dynasty was replaced with a high authoritarian centralized state that had extremely strong penetrative power in all levels of Korean society using intensive police force and domestic spying agencies. This allowed a strong state to emerge that could transform Korean society in a manner conducive to economic growth.The Japanese colonial states alliances with local forces of production, namely the Korean industrialist class.Brutal repression of the lower classes and the country side via state power.These measures can best be understood by first analyzing why the Korean territories required such measures on the part of the Japanese in the first place.By the time the Japanese empire cast its shadow over Korea (after the Russo-Japanese war of 1904), the Choson state that had ruled Korea was somewhat outmatched by the Industrialized behemoth that was Japan.The Choson of the Yi Dynasty had ruled Korea with relative stability for over 500 years but this stability came at a cost: the state was hamstrung when it came time to implement the necessary reforms needed to modernize and keep pace with the Industrial powers. The monarchy had to tip toe around the powerful Yangban, landowning elite and was unable to tax them effectively, and thus resorted to squeezing what little tax it could from the peasantry.This in turn, caused peasants to resort to brigandry to challenge an already weak central state.The Korean state was also a ‘suzerainty’ of the Chinese empire and thus did not have the legitimacy of the mandate of heaven that Chinese emperors possessed. On top of all this, local elite like the land owning Yangban were closely interleaved into the state bureaucracy and thus there were no independent state institutions capable of influencing state pressure on local elite.Thus, the Korean Yi dynasty remained a weak state with considerable strife and factionalization between the elites, little to no state control over the countryside where one magistrate had to govern nearly 40,000 people and magistrates were rotated too frequently to have any control of the area thus increasing the influence of the Yangban. Tax collection was haphazard and weak and when faced with external pressures, the state resorted to predatory measures and squeezed what little it could out of the local peasantry.The state resembled any modern, war torn and destabilized African state in our times. So how was it able to achieved developed status in such a short time?Japanese colonization.When the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 led to the Japanese rise onto the modern stage as a rising power thanks to the Meiji restoration of the 1860s, the mercantile nature of the Japanese economy back then identified national power with wealth and wealth was associated with overseas economic opportunities.The key element to understand here is that the Japanese colonization of Korea differed heavily from the British colonization of India/Pakistan in that the Japanese considered the Koreans culturally and racially close enough to them to consider them a geographic extension of Japan and fully planned on integration the Korean colonies into the Japanese state.The British had no such plans for India which was to remain a resource extraction project, to serve as a market for British goods and to serve as the base of the mighty Indian Royal Army. And the idea of the British considering the Indians and Pakistanis their racial and linguistic or cultural equals is laughable.Thus, the Japanese preferred to colonize geographically closer states with whom they shared traits and wished to integrate into their empire whereas the British colonized far off, distant countries for whom they had no such plans.The Japanese colonial project was also heavily influenced by the Meiji era reforms that sought to transform states through political and economic transformation. The model had been successfully carried out in Japan and would now be carried out in Korea. It involved creation of an effective, centralized state with powerful resources available to allow it to transform society (police, internal intelligence etc). Transformation would be phased with the first phase involving agricultural development, followed by Industrial development and the creation of an educated workforce.Contrast this with the British model which just created a private property regime for the local elites like the Bengali Zamindars and ….that’s it. There was no heavy state intervention to alter India or Pakistan.The transformation of the Korean state.First things first, the Japanese sought to reestablish the Choson state with far more centralization and effectiveness than before. The project was spearheaded by Ito Hirubumi who was part of the Meiji reforms and had lead the destruction of the old Shogunates in Japan to replace them with a modern state. Ito was a huge fan of the Prussian model of a powerful state bureaucracy permitting state transformation, and thus sought to replicate it in Korea with unlimited power.The first moves were simply the military occupation of the Korean state, the destruction of its army and integration of amiable Koreans into the Japanese military as well as the capture of the Korean monarch.The next step was a major uptick in the number of Japanese civil servants serving in Korea. In 1910 there were 10,000 Japanese civil servants in the joint Japanese-Korean government. By 1937, there were 52,000. Compare this with the low number of British and French civil servants in their colonies. The French had 3000 only in Vietnam which was then a similar sized colony to Korea. So 15 Japanese civil servants to every one French civil servant in a colony. And as the second world war progressed, these civil servants were increasingly replaced by native Koreans.The huge civil service permitted state penetration of society and transformation of society that would never have been possible under the Choson state of old. The size of the bureaucracy was accompanied by strengthening the links between the central government in Seoul and the officers in the far reaches by experimenting: entertainment allowances for good performance, high salaries, rule based rather than discretionary behavior and separating civil servants from society by making them dress in uniforms with swords to increase their social distance from the citizenry.A huge and powerful police force was also formed that grew from 6000 in 1910 to 60,000 in 1941. Koreans collaborated to a high degree with such a police force with nearly 10 to 20 applications for each post. And the police force was essential in compelling the locals to follow central government economic policy such as switching from food crops to cash crops, implementing birth control policies and so on. Thus the state established a firm control of economic resources in it’s reach.The politics of the state were also transformed. A brutally repressive regime was set up that heavily censored newspapers and frequently ‘thought policed’ its citizens. At the same time, education was heavily expanded so that the number of students grew from 10,000 to 1.7 million from 1910 to 1945. These would form the backbone of the state bureaucracy and the future industrial policy.One should also remember that the local elite were also incorporated into the Japanese colonial project in Korea to the extent that the Korean local elite were very favorably inclined towards Japan.All of this is in stark contrast to the British colonial project which made no such investments in India (possibly because India was too large) and the state, bureaucratic control and literacy rate in India was confined to a small privileged group only. The Indian elite were also more at odds with Britain than inclined towards it.While the local elite in Korea of the landowning class would lose their power after land reforms were implemented in Korea, the police force and the powerful state would remain long after the Japanese had left Korea.This:A powerful centralized state replaced the Yi dynastyA powerful bureaucracy and police force was set up to carry out central government economic policyLocal elite were heavily incorporated into the Korean colonial projectState repression was highMassive efforts were made to develop an educated class that would permit industrialization and recruitment into state bureaucracy.The development of Korea under the Japanese.The point of how the local elite were incorporated into Japanese colonial rule gains further momentum when the Japanese began making more full scale efforts to economically transform Korea according to their needs.Initially, Japanese plans for Korea involved using Korea as a breadbasket for feeding the burgeoning population of Japan which had exceeded the capacity of Japanese agricultural ability to sustain it. And thus Korean agriculture was developed to meet Japanese needs. The strong central authoritarian state developed by the Japanese proved essential in enabling this transformation of Korea according to Japanese economic policy.Korean industrialization was initially discouraged to maintain Korea as a market for Japanese industrial goods: The Koreans would produce agricultural outputs in exchange for Japanese industrial imports. This was similar to what the British had planned for India which is why India never industrialized under the British (infact, what little Industry India possessed such as silk and cotton production were eradicated under British rule to make India reliant on cheap, factory produced cotton exports from Britain).However, Japanese policy towards Korea began to shift up to the lead up to the second world war. The Japanese empire during the depression era allowed massive industrial projects to grow in Korea in order to maintain empire wide economic growth levels. Japanese companies were already flush with capital and looking to invest it abroad and the Korean industrialization project looked like an enticing area to invest in. This is similar to how Globalization lead to several companies moving their manufacturing to low cost zones like China in the 21st century.Industrialization also permitted the Japanese to reduce Korean nationalist fervor by allowing select businessmen in Korea to start their own Industrial projects that would continue buying the local elite’s loyalties. Alliances of production with the local elite, as it were, ensured the Korean integration into the overall Japanese imperial industry.The Industrialization of Korea also had two other desired outcomes: an increasingly more capable war economy would be developed empire wide. For example the rubber, leather and textile production in South Korea and the mining and power generation in the Northern Korea.And Korea would start to become a colony capable of producing revenue for the Japanese state, rather than being a drain for the imperial treasury.Japanese Land reforms in the Korean state and how they replaced land owning feudal with career bureaucrats.The scale and ambition of Japanese land reforms in Korea boggle the mind when contrasted with how little land reforms took place in British India.The Japanese invested 30 million Yen (in 1910 currency standards) into the overall mapping and recording of land data and revenue streams at a time when the revenues from the Korean colony were only 24 million Yen. The newly created police and civil service forces of the Korean colony were deployed to co-erce the locals and the local Yangban landowning elite into sharing land records. The Yangban elite were pensioned off from government positions and thus lost their control of the Korean state and their property was only safe if they themselves assisted the land reform process. The Japanese replaced the old property schemes with Western style, private property laws and established proper legal streams of taxation from the country side.The impact was enormous. Within only a few years from the time Japanese influence in Korea began to grow in Korea in 1905 till a year after formal annexation in 1911, overall state revenues from land reform and other reforms caused tax income for the state to increase from 7.3 million yen to 24 million yen. An increase of nearly 300%.Even more so, the Japanese invested heavily in local infrastructure like roads and rail so that independent Korea would have some of the best infrastructure of any developing country at the time of independence. The investments in primary education would lead to a literate population ready to serve any industrial project at the time of Korean independence. The Japanese also left behind efficient institutions such as profitable businesses in railways, communications, tobacco and salt to banks such as the Bank of Chosen that saw deposits double from 18 million yen in 1911 to 37 million yen in 1913. Local capital accumulation was further fine tuned when Japanese officials used Korean banks to float bonds that accumulated capital for industrialization drives in Korea.Korean agriculture benefited immensely from Japanese technical expertise in farming, seeds and fertilizer usage that permitted Korea to become the granary of the empire after Japanese riots due to rice shortages and wars with China led to heavy Japanese investments in developing Korean agriculture. Korean rice production increased 2% per annum from 1910–1940. Compare this to India’s post-Green revolution that saw cereal production increase by 2% per annum in the 1970s.It should be pointed out that while food production in Korea increased substantially, the overall food consumption of Koreans actually declined due to most food being used for exports to Japan and so on. The export oriented nature of Korean agriculture led to major increases in productivity and efficiency of Korean food production though.The impact of the highly developed and functioning agriculture sector in Korea cannot be understated. We have all grown up in era when food availability was in abundance in the post-Green revolution era. But nations have historically struggled to develop an agricultural sector. While many African nations have struggled to develop agriculture even today and nations like Pakistan, India and Philippines had their Green revolutions in the 1960s, Korea had a functioning agricultural sector in the first half of the century! And it’s rice yields were second only to Japan which had the highest rice yields in the world back then (Japan 154, Korea 111 and US 100 in 1938).More details on Industrialization of the Korean penesuila under Japanese rule.To put it straight: Korean industrial growth averaged 10% per annum from 1910 to 1940 such that by 1940, nearly 40% of all commodities produced in Korea originated from the Industrial sector in Korea.While large segments of Korean industry were destroyed in the Korean war and Korea would inherit little of the pre-war industry, a war-destroyed economy with significant industrial experience behind it, backed up by elimination of land owning classes, an educated populace and strong centralized state was far more advanced in development than any static, agrarian society that was stagnant under the stranglehold of predatory feudal land lords. As the German and Japanese case studies go on to show, industrialization is as much a social and political phenomena as it is an economic one. And Korea had already been socially and politically transformed into the basis needed for an industrial state.As already covered, the initial period of Japanese colonization in Korea was marked by keeping Korea a market for Japanese goods. However heavy investments were made in education, infrastructure and other sectors to create a pool of government employees for a strong centralized state and to facilitate the agricultural industry being set up in Korea. Koreas were allowed to set up small private businesses in light industries like dyeing, paper, ceramics, cotton socks, sake and soy sauce though.WW1 turned Japan from a debtor state to a creditor as the Japanese policy of staying out of the war led to their economic rise vis a vis the ravaged European powers. Japanese companies, swollen with profits, sought avenues of investment abroad and Japan itself was too saturated. Korea presented the perfect choice and the Korean governor general generously facilitated Mitsubishi and Mitsui and other Japanese companies with cheap land and credit. Industrial growth in Korea in the 1920s averaged 8%. Factories with more than 50 workers grew from 89 in 1922 to 230 in 1930.The rise of Korean national sentiment also lead the Japanese to invite certain Korean businessmen and merchants to form Industries and businesses on the behalf of the Japanese to operate in Korea, thus allowing them to coopt the Korean elite into the Korean colonial project. This was facilitated again with cheap capital and favorable conditions for Korean businesses. Such businesses would be known as the Korean “Chaebols” and industries like Samsung, Hyundai and Daewoo today owe their origins today. Older Chaebols included Kyungbang, Kongsin Hosiery, Paeksan Trading Company, Hwasin Department Store and Mokpo Rubber Company.The Industrialization of Korea accelerated in the 1930s when industrial growth averaged 15% annually. The great depression had led several countries to adopt protectionist, import substitution measures for their economies and Japan was no different. The Korean industrialization effort underwent a massive boost as import substitution and domestic production became Japanese priorities. The war effort in China also led to massive investments in Korea as a supply base. And the overall effort of the Japanese to build up a massive war economy in anticipation of war led to further industrial investments in Korea.Korean industrial efforts were further bolstered by other indirect factors. The development of hydroelectric dams in North Korea led to cheaper electricity in the country which made industrial investments more sound. The Korean economy also had less regulations as the Japanese government tightened its grip on Japanese industries on the mainland. And Korea had little to no labor protection laws.The Korean local industries similarly benefited from the Korean Governor Generals directives to promote Industries in Korea for the benefit of the overall empire. Korean Chaeols like Kyongbang had nearly 25% of their revenues come from generous government subsidies in the 1924–1935 period.The sheer scale of Korean industrialization is awe inspiring to capture in figures: Industrial production in the 1940s was equal for both the agriculture and industrial sectors and by 1943, heavy industry in Korea provided 50% of gross industrial production.The Japanese also believed heavily in the large scale business enterprise that was promoted during the Meiji restoration and the Gov-General of Korea made cheap credit primarily available to big business enterprises n Korea. In Korea, this meant the family centric, gigantic enterprises known as the chaebols.More important to note is the level of Korean participation in the industries with nearly 23000 Korean run factors, 30% of all firms jointly owned by Japanese and Koreans and a large entrepreneurial Korean class developing in the southern half of the country that would become South Korea.South Korea would also inherit most of the lower capital intensive, low cost production units like textiles, food processing, machine and tools and tobacco. They comprised 40% of all industries in Korea and its a myth that South Korea was mostly agricultural. The heavy industries of North Korea were mostly high capital, high cost production units that were white elephants, requiring continuous government protection compared to the nimble, labor intensive export oriented industries of South Korea.Further more, Korea had developed as an economy with a long history of exports to Japan or on the behalf of Japan to overseas markets. Korean foreign trade ration in 1938–39 was 0.54 meaning the country was exporting twice as much as any other comparable economy. Contrast this with other emerging developing countries, post WW2 such as India (which associated openness with stagnation), Brazil (import substitution policies). The South Korean economy emerged on the world stage as one that was already primed for exports abroad.The costs of prosperity.While the Japanese colonial era was marked by the formal ending of slavery (already in decline in the 1800s), The Japanese era was marked by extreme repression of the peasantry and a replacement of traditional slave based agricultural schemes to formal tenant schemes under western style law.As previously discussed, while food production increased in Korea, its per capital consumption actually declined during the Japanese colonial era. And a well armed, sophisticated police and intelligence service were established to counter any peasant rebellions.The number of industrial workers grew from 10,000 in 1910 to 1.3 million in 1943 and nearly 20% of the population got income from industrial work. The Japanese also introduced massive levels of worker mobility as factories in the north attracted workers from the south. The rise of industrial workers and worker mobility greatly altered Korean society.The Japanese ferociously put down all talks of labor unions and strikes and made efforts to cultivate a dedicate class of Industrial workers with generous benefits for loyalty and skill and punishments for unionizing etc.Factories themselves resembled prison camps and workers required permission to leave. Young peasant girls worked grueling 12 hour shifts and were cut off from families.If Korea was a mini China at the turn of the 20th century, it sure as hell was a mini Japan by the middle of the century.This is key to understanding why Korea went though the trauma of World War 2, the Korean war and the partition of the nation into two halves but still ended up in the state we find it today.How did the South Korea of Park-Chung Hee end up resembling colonial Korea in societal outlines?The reason for this is because the US occupation of Korea largely kept the Japanese colonial state intact. At that time, replacing the Japanese colonial state would have meant unleashing the revolutionary forces in Korea that were budding in the north. The US kept the colonial structure of the Japanese state in Korea intact in order to use the power of its bureaucratic, police and intelligence cadres to repress communist and other revolutionary flavors throughout the country.Japan’s impact on Korea would last beyond the Korean war and the departure of the Japanese.The colonial state structure of Korea where the state directed economic change under a strong central authority was kept in place and the Korean businessmen retained the same relationship they had with Park Chung Hee that they had with the Japanese Governor General. Infact, the top 50 Chaebols of the South Korea’s business class had their roots in the Japanese colonial era. The South Korean business class retained the state alliances for production that they had in the colonial era.Its important to recognize that the state South Korea finds itself in today is not inevitable. As we can see from the North Korean case, South Korea could have taken any direction. The chaos of the Rhee era could have continued, revolutionary leadership could have taken South Korea elsewhere. But the Park-Chung Hee coup did occur and the Park leadership chose continuity with the Japanese colonial model.And this should not come as a surprise. Park Chung Hee was an officer of the Japanese colonial Korean army, trained at the Japanese military academy of Manchuria. Chong-Sik Lee, a leading Korean scholar, described him as a Japanophile and fascinated with the Meiji model.Japan would remain a reference society for South Korea long after they left and the Park would continue to maintain the highly pervasive and penetrating, authoritarian state left behind by the Japanese colonial era. One that was purged of corruption and could direct economic policy completely, with a network of production alliances with the business class and extreme repression for the working class.This is why its key to realize that the South Korean model’s comparisons with Pakistan and India and Brazil and Nigeria and so on are all erroneous and fraught with error. If you start all these countries on a time scale beginning in the 1950s and assume they have low capita income same as India or Pakistan, you are missing a major point: South Korea’s starting point as a society, a government, an economy and so on are extremely different. It had a much more dynamic society, dynamic economy and one that was experiences in industrialization and export oriented economics.In fact, the export model of South Korean economics, which came to dominate economic discourse as the import substitution model fell out of favor, had already been the model of the colonial South Korean economy. The Japanese had developed the South Korean economy initially to export food to the Japanese mainland and later on, to serve as an industrial hub to export on the Japanese corporations behalf.The main crux of the above content was to detail out how the predatory Choson or Yi state which only preyed upon its peasantry, was factionalized, had little reach outside of it’s capital, penetrated by the landowning class, lacking tax revenues and incapable of exerting change on society was replaced by the Japanese colonial state.One that represented a strong centralized authority, a depersonalization of authority structures so that public and private property could be distinguished. A strong state was established with effective bureaucratic, police and intelligence to penetrate all layers of society. Production alliances were established with a growing business class and industrial workers. State controlled banks, currency and credit institutions permitted the rolling out of long and short term economic plans that altered the economic landscape of Korea.And an economy with the workforce, society tuning and societal changes embedded in it to act as an industrial, export oriented economy.Quite a different start from Pakistan in 1947.The post Japanese era.The irony of the Korean development model being touted by the US, the World Bank and other Western financial institutions and powers in order to serve as the poster boy for Western style economics and politics lies in the central historical fact that Korea’s economic development plans ran counter to what the World Bank recommended Korea should do. Korea’s export oriented model was being used at a time when the World Bank was telling developing countries to “specialize in what they were good at” and “import substitution at best”.That is, agricultural countries stay agricultural and let the civilized nations of the west handle industry for them. Even economics can sometimes not be free of racial stereotypes.South Korea represented a harsh, authoritarian dictatorship that was heavily backed by the US to quell socialist and pro-democratic forces within the country and which suffered from a lot of environmental degradation as the result of it’s economics.The success of South Korean economics was thanks to the Japanese colonial apparatus left behind as discussed above (land reforms, strong central state, state control of the central bank, currency and capital flows, alliances of production with the business class, authoritarian planning and export orientation during the 1910–1940 period. Also massive amounts of US financial and technical assistance to the South Korean regime serving at the fore front of anti-Communist bulwarks and most importantly: South Korea had no natural resources and thus the US PERMITTED South Korea to industrialize in order to allow it’s anti-communist regime the economic stability needed to survive.Korea had none of the strategic resources that Venezuela or the Persian gulf states had and thus was permitted more flexibility by the US regime to industrialize rather than being treated as a supply base only.The US does not deliberately promote the emergence of powerful competitors possessing both large natural resources and diversified industrial activities. Something the Shah of Iran learned when his industrialization provoked the US to slowly cool towards him as his nation grew in power, possessing both resources and industry, leading to the US withdrawing support for him during the Iranian revolution.And something Prince Salman might learn soon as well.The arrival of US and USSR troops to occupy Korea had mixed reactions on both sides. North Korea experienced massive economic success in the early years of it’s existence as the large industries left behind by the Japanese coupled with the pro-USSR forces own land reforms and economic efforts allowed huge economic growth in the North.In the South, Koreans were angered by the US decision to set up a Military government in South Korea rather than a jointly run government with the South Koreans. A civilian government of Syngman Rhee was set up (he had spent 39 years in Washington previous to this) and his party, the Korean democratic party, imposed extreme repression on the Korean citizenry backed up by the USAMGIK military government and the US trained, Korean CIA. Several of the Korean freedom fighters who had fought to liberate Korea from the Japanese were murdered under his regime.Similarly, the nations; division along the 38th Parallel was widely unpopular in Korea and when the North Korean army invaded, the South Korean military melted in front of it mostly because of the immense popular support in the South for the North Korean military and mass desertions from the South Korean army that did not believe in fighting for the puppet government in the South (remind you of Afghanistan today?).Only the US military combined weight turned the tide of the war and left 3 million Koreans dead as well as brutal reprisals by the Rhee regime on any left wing suspects in the South Korean territories.It is important to understand that the Rhee regime was based on the support of the Korean upper class industrialists and business men. And therefore, they were happy to continue the Japanese colonial model of state alliances of production with the business class with the added patronage of the US to serve as an anti communist front.Some key facts about this era:Generous US financing of Korean state budgets, even more than the Marshall Plan financing for UK and France!The World Bank passes over the fact that Korea did not rely on loans for 17 years after the end of WWII, and that later it only contracted limited loans until 1967. From 1945 to 1961 it neither borrowed money nor received any foreign investments. According to the criteria of the World Bank and neoclassical economics, such a situation is a complete anomaly.On the other hand, it received over USD 3,100 million as grants from the United States over the same period [6]. No other external aid was received. But the amount is more than significant. It represents twice what the Benelux countries received from the Marshall Plan, one third more than France received, 10% more than Britain. The grants Korea received from 1945 to 1961 amount to more than the World Bank’s total loans to newly independent developing countries (colonies not included).From 1962 onward, Korea would borrow, though only moderately. From 1962 to 1966, U.S. grants still amounted to 70% of in flowing capital, while loans accounted for 28% and foreign investments for 2%. Only from 1967 did capital inflow mainly consist of loans from foreign (mainly Japanese) banks. And foreign investments only became significant in the late 1980s once Korea had successfully carried out its industrialization.As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedThe US military launches their own land reforms in the South after seeing the popularity of Communist land reforms in the North.U.S. military authorities then proceeded to implement a drastic land reform to counter the communist influence [7]. The large estates that had been taken from the Japanese [8] without any compensation money and from Korean land owners with compensation money were broken up and most peasants became owners of small pieces of land [9] (estates could not exceed 8 acres for one family [10]). The State’s intervention was active and coercive. The rent that peasants used to pay to their landlords was replaced by taxes to be paid to the State. The State took over the farming surplus that formerly went to estate owners. The State made it compulsory for farmers to reach given production quotas for certain products. This quota was to be delivered to State entities at a price determined by the authorities. The set price was very low, often less than production cost [11]. It has been estimated that “until 1961, the price at which rice was bought did not cover farmers’ production costs and remained well below market price until 1970. Until 1975, public trading offices controlled at least 50% of the amount of rice and 90% of the amount of barley placed on the market” [12].As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedMilitary aid in South Korea from the US doubling as development budget.Military aid which amounted to more than USD 1,500 million, should also be taken into account [14]. A large part of it went into the building of roads, bridges and other infrastructures that were used for industrial production. Finally we have to add what the US expeditionary corps in Vietnam ordered - in the early 1970s they amounted to 20 % of South Korean exports.As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedThe Park coup and the use of World Bank loans by South Korean authorities to industrialize under the blessing of Washington.Mobilisations were stopped by General Park Chung Hee’s coup which set up a military dictatorship, further reinforcing the State’s intervention in the economy. The new government nationalised the whole financial system, from the largest bank to the smallest insurance company, to turn it into its instrument in the economy.From 1962, the structure of external financing would gradually change but grants were still the main supply source until 1966. The United States urged Korea to resume economic relations with Japan. Japan signed a ten-year agreement (1965-1975) that included economic aid to the amount of USD 500 million, 300 of which was in the form of grants.A posteriori Mahn-Je Kim, who had been Deputy PM, Finance minister and minister for economic planning under dictator Chun Doo Hwan in the1980s [16] and who then became CEO of a steel company (POSCO), declared his satisfaction at the government’s excellent relations with the World Bank and gave a favourable assessment of the dictatorship. He wrote that the Bank helped dictator Park to gather support on the domestic as well as on the international level: “Such recognition from the Bank - the world’s most authoritative international development organization - positively influenced Korea’s international relations, but was even more important domestically. It provided a powerful and persuasive justification to the Korean public for the existence of a dictatorial government devoted to economic development” [17]. The World Bank’s complicity with the dictatorship cannot be more bluntly stated.General Park Chung Hee tried to win greater autonomy from Washington in his economic policies. Calling on World Bank’s loans from 1962 onward, then mainly on loans by private foreign banks since 1967 was part of this determination to gradually diminish Korea’s dependence on financing by the U.S. government. This also suited Washington since the US administration had started to take measures to limit the outflow of U.S. dollars in 1963.As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedThe continued use of Chaebols in the South Korean economy, same as the Japanese era, and the cheap credit sources that made them global MNCs.The State favoured the development of chaebols, vast conglomerates bringing together a number of private companies selected by Park to spearhead the new industry.These chaebols are now known the world over: Samsung, Hyundai, Lucky Goldstar, Daewoo [18], Kia, etc. Year after year they have benefited from substantial and virtually free financial help from the State. The government’s or the banks’ borrowings (at market price) mainly from US banks before Japan took pride of place in the 1970s provided the chaebols with a virtually inexhaustible source of fresh capital at very low interest rates, when not at a loss for the loaning party. Direct subsidies from the State were added to this. In actual fact it took over the management of the country’s economy through a Board for economic planning. And steered all development choices within the chaebols with a steely determination.As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedThe World Bank opposed South Korea’s industrialization schemes but SK had enough political leverage with the US due to it’s front line status in the Cold War to permit the Park regime to have it’s way. The industrialization led to immense indebtedness for the Korean regime.At first the World Bank considered Korea’s intention to develop a heavy industry as premature [19] and tried to dissuade the authorities. But faced with Seoul’s insistence and anxious to safeguard its influence in the country, the World Bank changed tack and supported the import substitution industrialisation policy. It should be mentioned that this was when McNamara became World Bank President (1968) and that his chief economist Hollis Chenery was not opposed to developing countries using the import substitution model.In the mid 1970s, when Korea was on the way to developing a powerful heavy industry sector, the World Bank once again voiced its doubts about the chosen strategy. It felt that Korea was over-ambitious and suggested that the country scale down its efforts in this sector [20]. The Korean authorities chose not to follow these recommendations.The most dramatic illustration of this policy was the programme for the development of heavy industries in 1977-1979. For two years 80 % of all state investments were devoted to this end. Its financing was supported by a huge increase of the economy’s indebtedness, the State’s as well as the banks’ and private companies’, but also by the immobilisation of all pension funds and the enforced use of private savings [21].As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedThe huge amounts of debt South Korea accumulated during its industrialization efforts could have sunk the entire South Korean economy in the 1970s during the spike in interest rates that sank economies like Brazil, Mexico and Japan but South Korea’s strategic position meant it received bailouts that prevented economic meltdowns which sank other economies:After the assassination of dictator Park Chung Hee in 1979 and his replacement by General Chun Doo Hwan, the country’s economic orientation remained basically unchanged. Korea, which during the 1970s was heavily in debt to foreign banks, mainly Japanese, was harder hit than the other developing countries by the brutal hike in interest rates because it had mainly borrowed at variable rates. In 1983, South Korea was fourth on the list of most heavily indebted countries in absolute figures (43 billion dollars), behind Brazil (98 billion), Mexico (93 billion) and Argentina (45 billion). But once again, its geostrategic position meant that it received a different treatment from that of the other developing countries. Japan came to the rescue by paying Korea 3 billion dollars (by way of war reparations), which Korea used to keep up debt repayment to Japanese bankers. In this way Korea avoided having to appeal to the IMF and comply with its strict conditions [29]. In exchange, the Japanese government was able to avoid bankruptcy for some of its banks and obtain more flexible investment facilities from South Korea.As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedOnce South Korea’s geo-strategic honeymoon was ended with the US, the economic favors were quick to be withdrawn, starting with tariffs imposed by the US on South Korean industries and withholding of any special treatment or support during the Asian crises of 97.In 1981, under the Reagan administration, the last economists in favour of State intervention had been replaced by hardcore neo-liberals headed by chief economist Anne Krueger. A few years previously, she had written a book on Korea to demonstrate the superiority of export substitution over import substitution [30]. Seoul’s determination to produce cars for export was an aggressive example of export substitution, and in theory it should have received the World Bank’s full support. However, this was not to be, because Seoul’s decision was seen as a threat to the U.S. automobile industry. The flexibility of World Bank economists is quickly stretched to the limits when U.S. interests are at stake.Korea continued to occupy a strategic military position, but the United States government, which had 37,000 soldiers posted in the country, decided it was time to curb Korea’s economic appetite. Washington applied pressure, using various measures such as tariff protection against Korean products.As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedAnd of course, lets not gloss over the fact that South Korea’s post world war 2 history was for the most part, until recent times, fairly repressive and frequented bouts of state violence against citizens.Deplorable worker conditions under the Park regime.In 1963 there were 600,000 industrial workers, in 1973 1.4 million and in 1980 over 3 million, half of whom were trained workers. They are subjected to extreme exploitation: in 1980 the wage costs of a Korean worker amounted to one tenth of the wage cost of a German worker, 50% of a Mexican worker, and 60% of a Brazilan worker. One of the components in the Korean miracle was the exploitation of industrial manpower. A Korean worker’s working week in 1980 was the longest in the world. There were no legal minimum wages. After the General Council of Korean Trade Unions was crushed between 1946 and 1948, workers had no right to a genuine trade union any more. In 1946 the Syngman Rhee government created the Federation of Korean Trade Unions with the support of the U.S. and of the US TU Council AFL-CIO. The FKTU was the only legal trade union confederation in South Korea until the 1990s. It was a mere relay for the dictatorship and the bosses. The working class was shackled, at least until the 1980s.As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedThe brutal repression of farmers by military authorities.In addition, taxes paid by farmers were used by the State to invest in infrastructures for communications, electricity and industry.As J-P Peemans observed, writing about the demands made on farmers, “It was in no way a virtuous accumulation resting on the virtues of the market, but a brutal form of primitive accumulation resting on the most coercive methods to create ‘‘virtue’’by force” [13].As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedWidespread state violence against the Korean citizenry, with US military backing:On 14 April 1980 Chun Doo Hwan was appointed at the head of the KCIA while retaining his functions within the army. Demonstrations proceeded apace. Undisguised military dictatorship was back on 18 May 1980. Fierce repression resulted in all opposition leaders being arrested, which led to violent urban uprisings culminating in the Kwangju insurrection.Immediately after martial law had been proclaimed anew on 18 May 1980 several thousands of students from the Chonam University in Kwangju took to the streets. Paratroopers were sent out and killed demonstrators (including young girls) with their bayonets. On the following day over 50,000 people were out to face the army. In the ensuing confrontations over 260 of them were killed. After four days of street fighting some 200,000 inhabitants out of 750,000 were out and determined to be heard. They eventually took control of the city.When new paratroopers marched on Kwangju, the insurgents formed a crisis committee in order to negotiate with the authorities in charge of the martial law. They demanded that the authorities apologise to the people of Kwangju for the atrocities they had been responsible for, that they pay compensation money for the wounded and the dead, that they promise not to retaliate, that military leaders would not move their troops before an agreement was reached. Yet in spite of those negotiations about 17,000 soldiers marched on the town in the early hours of 27 May and set up military occupation. Several hundred students and inhabitants were killed [24]. Repression was carried out with the blessing of Washington and of the U.S. army [25]. In the following months repression struck all over the country. According to an official report dated 9 February 1981 over 57,000 people were arrested during the ’Social Purification Campaign’ that had been launched in the summer 1980. Some 39,000 of them were sent to military camps for ‘physical and psychological reeducation’ [26]. In February 1981 dictator Chun Doo Hwan was received at the White House by the new U.S. president Ronald Reagan [27].As tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposedArmed with all of this knowledge, we can begin to understand what the problem is as far as Pakistan is concerned.A quick skim over them:British colonization vastly differed from Japanese colonization. British colonization involved making alliances with the existing local landowning, feudal elite and allowing them to retain their perks and privileges while utilizing their political clout combined with the clout of the British Indian army to control India as a resource extraction effort and marketplace for British good. The Japanese in contrast, completely replaced the South Korean Yangban landowning feudal elite.The British made no concerted effort to direct social and economic change in British India the way the Japanese had.The British were not interested in forming an effective, centralized and authoritarian state (mostly because they were not interested in directing social and economic change in India). The Japanese in contrast were quick to form one.The British did not view Indians (and future Pakistanis) as cultural, linguistic kin that could be integrated into the overall empire at some point. The Japanese viewed Koreans as such (while still inferior).The British had no plans or impetus to industrialize India and British companies did not outsource production to India on any significant scale. The Japanese however, did industrialize Korea.The British did not incur any social and political changes that would have made India and Pakistan more amenable to industrialization after Independence. Korea was already an export oriented economy before World War 2 and had all the social and political apparatus at hand to become one again after world war 2.So when Pakistan emerged from Independence, we were a weakly centralized state with significant feudal land lord sway over our society. Our country had no previous industrialization background nor were we primed for industrialization (illiteracy, large rural population, no existing business groups like the Korean cheabols). We had no state capacity to tax the country side or implement massive social and economic change.This doesn't mean Pakistan didn't try out some of the policies that the South Koreans did. The “Elite Farmer” and industrialization policies under Ayub Khan were our first stabs at a Korean style industrialization and the 22 families that emerged in the Pakistani business economy could easily have passed for Korean chaebols.However, the economic growth instead produced civil war in Pakistan because we were not an authoritarian, centralized state with the capacity to suppress at the level South Korea could repress thanks to the Japanese colonial apparatus left behind. Nor were we ethnically homogeneous enough to bypass economic disparities across ethnic lines.I wrote a long answer about why Pakistan emerged as a weakly centralized state acting like a British colonial entity in another answer here, if you are interested:Usama Ahmad's answer to What are your thoughts about Imran Khan as Pakistan's​ prime minister?We can talk about some window dressing issues like the high cost of electricity or the FTA with China that is flooding our market with cheap goods.Or we can say that Pakistan would need to brutally exploit its own labor force the way the South Koreans did and we need to quadruple our military and police forces and develop production alliances with a business class etc. And try to get some favorable geo strategic alliance with US or China that will shield us from harsh economic downturns the way South Korea did.We can talk about how Industries comprise only 13.5% of the GDP (down from 15% earlier) and yet are taxed at an extremely high rate whereas the retail and agricultural sectors which comprise huge swathes of our economy are barely taxed at all for political reasons.We can talk about Ahmedi economists being ousted despite their credentials and having them replaced by brain dead idiots who think banning cheese imports will solve our problems.We can talk about how our ruling classes never formed alliances of production with the industrial class (with some exceptions like Ayub etc) the way South Korea did.We can talk about how South Korea had unique geo-strategic points in its favors that Pakistan did not have.But at the heart of it all, if there’s one lesson we can learn from South Korea its that the structure and nature of the state is what will determine whether you industrialize or not. Whether you are a predatory African state in the midst of a civil war, a parliamentary democracy with ethnic diversity like India or a stagnant economy in Latin America, the role and structure of the state will determine if you industrialize or not.The Chinese economic growth must be studied from the perspective of the nature of their government before we even begin to understand the economics of it.Pakistan, is currently running a colonial resource extraction model developed in the 1800s by our British overlords well into the 21st century. A modernization of the state structure must come before we even talk about industrialization.All this won’t be possible until the Pakistan state is modernized. For the last 71 years, the country has been very careful in preserving Macaulay’s system of colonial rule with additions of a more arbitrary ‘raja rule’. The civil service, judiciary, legal system and the army all are running on 19th century colonial terms where centralized authority is used purely for extracting rent from the local economy.Government functionaries in this colonial system seldom consider public good as they are maximizing colonial benefits –plots, perks (houses cars, trips etc), and protocol (VIP pleasures). Living in gated estates at the government’s expense, these people are fully disconnected with the local population and their problems. Their view is to let them eat cake.It is, indeed, surprising that our economists and policy thinkers don’t see the extremely high costs of running a 21st century state with a 19th century colonial extraction system. No wonder, the recommendations of our economists remain empty. We repeatedly hear about the need to increase productivity, growth and exports. That is tantamount to going to the moon on a bullock cart.Why does our economic policy fail us?To elaborate on this, I need to quote a previous answer of mine where I talked about the state structure of Pakistan which supports colonial era practices of resource and rent extraction based economy supporting a tributary political structure.Pakistan’s state structure has it’s roots in the last decades of the Mughal empire and the British colonial state that replaced it.The idea of a tributary system where networks of patronage extended the long arm of the Delhi sultanates over the distant hinterland are older than any living Pakistani today.Pakistan is quite libertarian in it’s attitude of what the role of the state is. Local clans and baradaries expect their chosen district leader to operate in the same way the Naibs and Nazims of the colonial and pre-colonial rule operated. Tribute and loyalties flowed to the center in exchange military protection and resource extraction rights.When the British replaced the Mughals, the colonial extraction state was perfected into the most efficient resource extraction mechanism modern civilization had produced so far. Local leaders pledged loyalty to the British in exchange for keeping their titles and lands and were protected by the British Indian army. Meanwhile, the Colonial bureaucratic apparatus extracted local resources in coordination with said local rulers and maintained the market for British products in the colony.The only threat against the entire colonial state was the development of a local political bourgeoisie who wanted more autonomy. Gandhi, Jinnah and Nehru fall under these. Parallel to these were the rise of revolutionary figureheads who wanted the complete expulsion of the British colonial extraction state. The NWFP rebellions under the Red banner and Chandra Bose were examples of these.The British created the powerful civil service and bureaucratic state (the so called “Iron frame of the Indian state”) to counter the indigenous political movements. A lot of India and Pakistan’s tussles between civil service bureaucrats and elected politicians have roots in the British legislation of the 1920s and 30s to empower British civil service officials to fight off the growing power of Indian political movements.And of course, the Brits formed the British Indian army for the revolutionaries.This is where Alvi’s Marxist doctrine describes the idea of an overdeveloped State apparatus presiding over territories not yet gelled together into a nation. An overdeveloped state presiding over an underdeveloped nation. The idea of a “Pakistan” and “India” did not exist back then. There was no sense of national identity. But a powerful state did exist over “Pakistan” and “India” which was rooted in colonial resource extraction concepts and composed of a highly developed bureaucracy and military to maintain state control against indigenous politicians and revolutionaries.In the West, the state developed first over centuries, organically, as long independence struggles formed the idea of national community with shared language, heritage and values gelling together into a nation with territorial definitions. These nations developed indigenous political movements which birthed their civil services and militaries.The reverse was true for us. Our over developed state presided over us long before we developed ideas for a shared nation and community. This rooted into us the ethnic conflict and political divisiveness we inherited as a nation upon independence. And its why our ex-colonial institutions like the judiciary, military and bureaucracy have long clashed with the indigenous political movements in the provinces.Post 1947, India manged to rid itself of most of these colonial extraction institutions under Nehru’s Jihads against the princes and their titles, his development of resource distribution institutions that redistributed extracted resources among the people rather than extracting them for a neo-colonial enterprise. His legacy has long been derided in India with slurs like the “license Raj” and “Hindu rate of growth” but his socialist practices were key to dismantling the colonial extraction institutions the British had left behind as well as granting local political autonomies among Indian regional elites so that the idea of an Indian nation could take root.Pakistan never underwent this process and although we have made major strides forward in this direction since the beginning of the 21st century, we still hold on to the same neo-colonial resource extraction model left behind by the British. It’s why we treated Bangladesh as a mere colony up until the 70s and are doing the same to Balochistan today. The state is only doing what it was originally designed to do: Colonial resource extraction through unelected bureaucratic and military complexes.What Imran Khan labels as corruption is merely the tributary system in place since the Mughals and the British: Votes go up, money goes down. Your clan or baradari vote for you to go to the center and expect state resources in the form of development projects and jobs to flow back to them. It’s the design of the Pakistani state since the British. A weak hold from a distant center which prefers to outsource the job of state power to local feudal lords and nazims rather than sending their own institutions in. Which makes sense because this system was put into place when the British and their military were numerically inferior to the vastness of India. And relied on the loyalty of local lords who in turn relied on the loyalty of their local people. Networks of patronage were developed where extracted resources were first redistributed by the British to local lords and by local lords to their enforcers. The system benefited all involved and was enforced by the British Indian army and civil service.Upon independence, the Pakistan Army and Pakistan civil service simply replaced the above mentioned roles. They formed a localized variant of the colonial enterprise who’s supra-state nature involved Pakistan itself being the local lord patronized by the global capitalist overlord, the US as the US took over global colonial enterprise networks from the British upon the onset of the cold war.If I as a bureaucrat or politician at the center want something done in a district in Chiniot, I contact the local feudal lord (dignified as an MPA or MNA) to do the job for me. His will is carried out since he is the conduit for the tributary system. Do I need someone arrested in his district or a school built? I tell him and pay him his fee for it. He splits the fee with his supporters and carries out the role of the state in it’s place. And i save money on police and schools (money which I don’t have anyway because the state keeps taxes low in order to placate it’s patronage networks).A weak, negotiated state with localized outsourcing. By design.Usama Ahmad's answer to What are your thoughts about Imran Khan as Pakistan's​ prime minister?The state structure is what needs to transform before we even begin to talk about Industrialization and economic transformation.Given the current lethargy of the Pakistani system in disrupting the current streams of revenue and resource distribution and our lax tax policies, I don’t see this happening anytime soon.Thomas Friedman, the NYT columnist uploaded this absolute crap of an article on the NYT recently.In a snapshot, this headline and this article are perhaps an encapsulation of what is wrong with the media in the US.Robin Daverman wrote a brilliant piece recently on how the US mainstream media is driven by consumption: Journalists write what people want to hear. This is true of both the liberal and conservative media.Why China's collapse theory and China threat theory exist in the West at the same time?Friedman’s article is a testimony to the self inflicted stupidity and blindness that the US’s mainstream media has chosen to impose upon the US public when viewing the world. A Cinderella movie about an Asian women getting married in Singapore has become the lens for analyzing the Middle East. And pray tell, does the analogy ever expand to include America’s own role in de-stabilizing the Middle East while propping up dictators and toppling democrats?When I wrote this answer, I had to go through old papers written in the middle of the the 20th century by Indian, Pakistani and European scholars which went into depth of what the historical, political, economic and social dynamics of South Korea and Pakistan were and how they differed in enabling the industrialization of one but not the other.If Friedman’s article is the most American Intellectualism has to offer today, then is it any surprise they have Trump and other countries are on the rise?And are we to ignore the low key racial undertones of the articles where its deemed that certain ethnicites are by virtue of being a certain ethnicity, deemed to behave in a certain way and be fated for prosperity while the other will be in permanent turmoil?And I absolutely am moved to laughter when US liberals and conservatives alike are quick to take credit for the achievements of other nations, while distancing themselves from the mess they make in others. South Korea was permitted to rise where Iran was smacked down. The US is not in the business of raising industrialized competitors against it’s own companies. Hence the tariff wars of today.If there’s one thing I hope comes from this answer, Its that I hope Pakistanis stop attaching our colonial era automatic respect and attention to everything written by a white, American scholar while dismissing as low quality the work done by our own. I owe a lot of this answer to what was written by Pakistani Marxist Hamza Alvi and Indian Scholar Atul Kohli. Scholars from our own lands and our own societies. They will always have a better, more nuanced and more realistic understanding of our people and our problems than some dude in NYC writing trash for his ridiculed paper. Its only our own white-worship attitude that makes us dismiss our own intellectuals.Try to understand the problems of our country using our own understanding and our own intellectuals. We need to look at this stuff in a dispassionate, neutral frame of mind and account for historical, political, social and economic factors that shaped our country long before it even existed.We are not poor because we are brown and not East Asian. Otherwise North Korea would have been the same level as SK. The difference is always in the politics of a country.But even then, some factors are always beyond your control. The TseTse flies in Central Africa will keep on stunting the agriculture of their domain countries and it is no fault of the inhabitants of that land who must now work around this problem which does not exist in other countries.Similarly, we must identify the natural advantages we don’t have, the ones we do and work our way around them using our own local talent and intellect instead of the brain dead intellectualism from abroad that gets little right about us, cares even less about is and is driven by their own agenda and pre-set notions and “correct view of history” which their own people want to hear.Someone just give Allama the news,That the fields from where the peasant could not obtain bread,No one even burnt the ears of wheat in the fields,No one rose in revolt anywhere, neither a revolution came.Funerals rise from village after village,All of them are the funerals of peasants,Who committed suicide by nibbling the earth of debt.Happy 84th Birthday to Gulzar: 5 short poems for the 21st century revoluntionaryPlight of farmers - Daily TimesReferences:Government and the Development of Industry in Pakistan --1947-1967, Irvin J. Roth, Asian Survey, Vol. 11, No. 6 (Jun., 1971)Government and the Development of Industry in Pakistan --1947-1967Where do high growth political economies come from? The Japanese lineage of Korea's “developmental state”, AtulKohlihttps://www.princeton.edu/~kohli/docs/HighGrowth09_1994.pdfDevelopment From Below,VIVEK CHIBBERStudying State & Capitalist DevelopmentSouth Korea: The Miracle Unmasked,Vol. 41, Issue No. 39, 30 Sep, 2006, Special Articles, Eric ToussaintAs tensions increase with North Korea, the South Korean miracle is exposed

India has a very large population, India should do more to increase its overseas Indian diaspora. Now, I don’t know where you got the data of 6.7 lakh people giving up citizenship, please provide a link in the comments, even if that is true it’s only 0.04% of the Indian population!India should encourage more people to settle abroad so they can spread the Indian cultural footprint in other countries, today, wherever you go in the world you can find an Indian restaurant, you hardly find a German or a Canadian restaurant outside of those countries, this diaspora building must be seen as a power by the Indian government, the more Indian people settle abroad, The more money India will receive as people abroad send money to their family in India, this increases the foreign direct deposits to India.And moreover, India is a free country, you can go settle down wherever you want, depending on your likes, people in North Korea cannot leave their country, would you say the government there is somehow performing better? That makes no sense!More people should settle abroad and spread the Indian footprint! Nowadays a lot of them are coming back and investing in India too, that’s a great thing!

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