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A2A on question “Will Pakistan retaliate the Indian Air Force attacks on JeM camps, as the attack was non-military in nature?”Thanks for the A2A but to be honest, I’m a little out of the loop from my friends in the government who could tell me more about the incident as well as Indo-Pak news in general.Before I post a response to your question, I need to set up some context:From what I can gather, it seems the truth lies somewhere between the accounts from both sides.The Indian account: A large formation took off from the Indian side. It crossed the LOC into Pakistani airspace. A Pakistani interception force was launched but turned back due to the size of the formation. The Indian formation successfully delivered their payload and killed somewhere between 200–350 terrorists. The Indian formation returned home.The Pakistani account: A Large formation took off from the Indian side. It crossed the LOC into Pakistani airspace. A Pakistani interception force was launched. The Indian formation returned before they could complete their mission and dropped their ‘payload’ which fell into an empty area. There were no terrorists or anything in the region.The truth seems to lie somewhere in the middle of both accounts.Neither side seems to deny that the Indian air force formation crossed the LOC into the Pak side.Neither side seems to deny a Pakistani air force interception was carried out.So we can assume those two points as fact.The dispute seems to be about success/failure of the mission and the terrorists on the ground if there were any.The Indian side claims around 350 terrorists were killed in the operation which seems to be an enormous amount for one bombing run. It states that terrorists were gathered there by Pak authorities for fear of retaliation after the recent bombings in Kashmir. This seems odd because Pak authorities normally scatter their assets when fearing retaliation as seen by the sprinkling of Afghan Taliban from Quetta to North Waziristan.The only evidence from the ground seems be coming from the ISPR side which showed the the impacted area. Some of those do indeed seem like bomb craters. So it seemed the Indian side did deliver a bombing run rather than ditch their payload. However, given the relatively empty field in which the payload was found and the lack of any destroyed buildings/infrastructure, the 350 terrorists killed account seems to be inflated.Now for the Pakistani side: The claim seems to be that no target was even possible in the area.Which is doubtful because the area around the LOC is known for having madrasahs that were set up during the 90s to funnel weapons and fighters over to the Indian side. So there must have been some hard target the Indians were hitting.Which brings us to the account of the villagers in the area who report that there was indeed a madrasahs in the area known to host and serve as a base for militants being funneled to Kashmir.But according to ground witnesses who don’t wish to be named: The IAF missed it by 1 km.It doesn’t seem like the IAF with sophisticated strike aircraft and training could miss one target on the LOC. So why was the madrasah not hit?Which brings us to re-evaluate the earlier PAF interception.It seems that a PAF force was scrambled as there are social media videos and so on showing the force and the Indian side doesn't seem to deny the interception.It seems that the IAF pilots were under strict orders not to engage hostile aircraft in an air to air battle which could have culminated into a major encounter and were restricted to a strike mission only.The IAF seems to have deployed even EW and AWACS systems to further jam any air defenses on the Pakistani side but only for a short duration: This was to give the IAF bombers more time but at the same time not trigger wide spread anti-radiation detection on the Pak side.The aerial tactics seem to clearly point that the IAF was under strict orders to not just shoot their way into Pakistan with a large force (which, they kinda could have) but to avoid air to air engagements, just deliver the payload, not get shot down and get back on the Indian side.It seems that 12 units were involved in the run which suggests that air to air defense was provided to the bomber group (12 units suggest six air to air cover and six bombers or 8 A2A and 4 bombers). The only reason they could have to avoid engaging Pak interceptors is not lack of capability but lack of orders.In any case, The scrambling PAK fighters may have drastically limited the time window for pilots to achieve a bombing run.The IAF pilots seemed to have delivered their bombs to the target more hastily than they would have liked and then returned to their airspace without loitering that could have resulted in an air to air battle.The bombs seemed to have missed the target in the area which was reportedly a militant training camp by 1 km.But there seems to actually have been a militant training camp in the area as confirmed by villagers in the area, who were also the source of the claim that the target was missed.Information seems to still be coming in but forgive me if i’m disinclined to read too much into the nationalist claims of either side.I dont accept as fact any of the narratives coming from either side since they seem more suited for a film script. I think the reality is somewhat more boring and technical than either side would like.I roll my eyes at the Pak claim that the interceptors immediately caused the IAF pilots to turn tail at the sight of our brave jawans. I think the IAF was under strict orders to avoid Air to Air engagements due to the restricted mission profile the Indian military wanted to keep to prevent escalation. And i also doubt the bombs just fell in the middle of nowhere. There must have been a target in the area they were trying to hit. That target seems to be an actual militant madrasahs which almost got hit, just missed by a km due to the bombing run having not enough time to complete because of the interception and strict orders to Indian pilots not to engage in air to air combat.And if the message from the Indian side was a political one of escalation i.e. that we are willing to dial up the heat and cross the LOC into Pak airspace, than at least from a political standpoint rather than a military one, they got something done politically even if the bombing run missed its target.At the same time, the bombing highlighted something the PAF has somewhat struggled with: Interceptions close to the border are something Pak air defenses still struggle with. The PAF just couldn’t catch IAF strike mission inside Pak airspace when those missions are very close to the LOC only and with a short mission duration window. An analysis of the Soviet incursions into Pak airspace in the 1980s when bombing Afghan refugee camps shows a similar pattern where Soviet bombers could quickly bomb and strafe refugee camps on the borders and return to Afghan airspace before the PAF could respond. The only time they could catch the Soviets was when they either already had interceptors in the air or when the Soviets went too deep/loitered too long. Neither of which the IAF did, and backed up by the use of terrain, low level maneuvers and EW support, it was almost 100% certain that an IAF strike mission close to the LOC could easily succeed if no PAF fighters were already in the air and the IAF was willing to trade accuracy for time. And the cost of a 24/7 CAP mission across the entire LOC is something the Paks cant can afford except under war time conditions. I dont see any way the PAF can prevent such future strikes and they could become a regular pattern similar to the Soviet bombings of Afghan camps during the Afghan Jihad in the 80s but with the IAF having way better strike capability than the Soviets. A future cold war across LOC airspace could develop.Similarly, I have an equal amount of eye rolling at the govt-friendly Indian media claiming almost 350 dead terrorists without much proof going around. The Pak side is surprisingly open about strikes taking place in Pakistan as seen by the OBL raid and the DG ISPR publishing of photos. I would have thought they would cover it up. But the recovery of debris in the area does show the location of the strike seemed to have missed the target. And 350 is a kill count even the Americans dream about in a single strike. Counter insurgent operations rarely if ever yield such an overnight victory, its the over time attrition that’s inherent to such wars. I also doubt the narrative that just beholding the size of the Indian formation was enough to make the Paks turn tail: This is an air force that was ready to fly one way missions on Mirages armed with Exocet missiles to strike Indian air craft carriers should a war have broken out during the Kargil crises. One way missions because the Indian carriers operated way beyond the operational range of PAF mirages. Which is why those mirages would have to fly one way to extend their range enough to hit the Indian navy. And the PAF was willing to do that. When the IAF developed BVR capability before the PAF, the PAF pilots were taught to conduct low level maneuvers to reduce their chances of being shot down from afar but to still engage IAF fighters despite the psychological tension of being shot at but being unable to shoot back. Suicidal bravery is something the PAF does well at least.The post-Kargil doctrine among Indian strategic circles places an imperative of maintaining the media narrative at all costs. Which is why the usage of friendly media and the single minded pursuit of sticking to a single story that can be projected diplomatically is something that the Indian side is likely to pursue. So i don’t see the strike’s accuracy or inaccuracy as being much of a feature in the Indian media in the near future: Just the fact that a strike was conducted on Pakistani soil.So the facts that i’ll base my answer on are:An Indian strike did take place across the LOC.A Pakistani interception did take place.The IAF was under strict orders not to engage the PAF.This limited the bombing window for IAF pilots who delivered their bombing run but it missed the target.The target was a militant base in the region and the IAF wasn’t just flying around the area for no reason.Based on these facts: No, I don’t think the PAF will respond.First things first, there’s no equivalent non-military target available on the Indian side.Second of all, the Pak authorities wont want the escalation. The strategic planner in Rawalpindi would prefer to keep the cold stasis on the low intensity conflict. Given that the IAF pilots were operating under strict orders to not escalate by firing at PAF interceptors, the window for escalation for the PAF too is narrow.Third, outside powers dont want an escalation. Some of these powers are putting money into Pakistan. They don’t want a jeopardizing of their investments.Fourth, the PAF is oriented mostly as a defensive force. Their strike capabilities can only extend to the border regions where its mostly Indian ground based targets, not Indian aerial targets. So no equivalent response kit exists.Fifth, the PAF will take a limited win than risk another fight: The interception narrative had a limited success that it prevented an accurate bombing run by the IAF. That the bombing run happened in the first place an a penetration of PAk air space occurred is bad enough, so the limited win kinda covers for that.Sixth, the Pak side has too many uncoordinated actors ranging from the army, the air force, the ISI, the political class, the militant factions etc to muddy the waters on what their response should be. They sure as heck aren’t coordinating with each other. And i doubt the PAF pilots even knew what the IAF was trying to bomb. Such lack of coordination inhibits a coherent narrative in Pakistan that would allow a decisive action like the strike to take place.Lastly, previous data: When the Pak Army COAS Musharraf told the PAF to conduct strikes on IAF bases during the Kargil conflict, the PAF straight up refused: They told them the order needed to come from the Prime Minister’s office because such a strike would lead to full scale war. And the PAF wasnt dragging itself into the covert proxy operations of the Pak Army which were being run without notification of the civil government.So yea, I would be very surprised to see if an actual air strike from the PAF occurs. I doubt it will.Sorry to disable comments but I dont feel like dealing with the nationalist sentiments of Indians and Pakistanis in this fine morning. Cheers!Edit: Some kind of strikes did occur from the PAF. Apparently munitions were fired at ‘open’ ground on the Indian side of the LoC to send a political message that the PAF too could shoot into the Indian side. PAF munitions apparently detonated in an empty area, same as the IAF. I guess this is a logical response, no personnel on the Indian side were targeted whose deaths would have further inflamed tensions but at the same time the Paks didn’t lose face by not responding at all.Some kind of aerial battle occurred with one confirmed kill of a Mig 21 so far with its pilot captured.I guess the mood for escalation is there and the PAF is way more in sync with the army thanks to Kayani era reforms where the army and air force commands were integrated for anti-insurgent operations in the north west against the Taliban. The Kargil era is over.I’m curious to see how the fighting affects the upcoming May elections in India.Sources:Villagers Near Balakot Say Indian Warplanes Missed Jaish-Run Madrasa By A KilometreLive Updates: Indian intrusion into Pakistan airspaceIndia fails to provide evidence of claimsPakistan Army releases pictures of Indian Air Force payload near Bala KoteBalakot: One Person Wounded In Air Strike, Says Pakistan VillagerFactbox: India's air strike on Pakistan - the strategy and the risksIAF air strikes live updates: Sushma Swaraj briefs counterparts in US, China, Bangladesh & Afghanistan on Air strikes - The Economic TimesIndian strikes target militants in PakistanLIVE: IAF strikes in Pakistan: 350 terrorists killed in Indian air strikes in Balakot

Atal Tinkering Lab (ATL) is a program initiated under the Atal Innovation Mission (AIM). It is an approach by Central government of India to create an environment of scientific temper, entrepreneur quality among students, innovation among young minds, spirit of curiosity, creativity among Indian Students.ATL are work spaces in schools and other educational centers. AIM is providing grant-in-aid that includes a one-time establishment cost of ₹ 10 lakh to 12 lakh and operational or capitol expenses of ₹ 10 lakh for a maximum period of 5 years to each ATL. It is a place where juvenile minds can give shape to their thoughts and imagination by performing activities and experiments on their own. ATLs are innovation play work spaces for students between Class 6 to 12 with stimulating innovations combining science and technology.It is a perfect peaceful ambiance and the company of peers with the same interests that further speeds up the learning process and invites more attention. They consist of different tools required for experimenting as well as manuals briefing them about the same. The tinkering kits are provided by the school, to the students so that they can experiment and learn by the do-it-yourself mode. They also will get a chance to work with variety of equipment to understand the concepts of STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math) which are not only learned by the students but also felt and experiences.ATL would contain educational and learning ‘do it yourself’ kits and equipped with state-of-the art technologies like – science, electronics, robotics, open source micro controller boards, sensors and 3D printers and computers. Other desirable facilities include meeting rooms and video conferencing facility where one can get answer to their questions from the professionals. In order to foster inventiveness among students, ATLs have been conducting different activities ranging from school, regional and national level competitions, exhibitions, workshops on problem solving, designing and fabrication of products, lecture series etc. at regular intervals of time. These activities makes them enthusiastic in studies and make them enjoy what they are studying by letting them apply things in practical life.It would therefore introduce students to the essential 21st century learning and teaching skills which will help them develop their personal as well as professional skills. It promotes to inculcate skills such as design mind set, computational thinking, adaptive learning and physical computing to make the child active.SRJNA an educational start up provides models, tools, workshop and mentoring to enhance curiosity and innovation for students. It works to enhance creativity and imagination by 5d pedagogy which allows them to SEE, TOUCH, FEEL, UNDERSTAND and PERFORM. SRJNA creates an environment to play, design, create and discover subjects of interest along with proper mentoring by professionals and workshop where they are open to the windows of new ideas. They organise tinkering camps and provide schools with tinkering kits and other modern equipment at an affordable cost. The tinkering camps allows the kids to design, scale and express their vision and introduces them to the skills which are required to turn them into successful Entrepreneurs or Scientists. These camps has no pre decided curriculum, no tests and so no stress. They are just made to do fun activities that teach them life skills and make them more advance.There has been a constant rise in the number of Tinkering Labs across India. It started with nearly 500 schools and now ATLs are being extended to over 98% smart cities, 93% plus of the districts (655-plus districts). It is a platform to nurture the curiosity of youth. ATL is a place where minds can give shape to their ideas and turn them into new and incredible innovation. It is a wonderful step towards reaching the dream of a developed nation, India.

The first thing to note is that the original plan for Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of and may have been responsible for some of the confusion as Monty’s plan, stated before D-Day and stuck to throughout, wasn’t primarily concerned with taking territory but for the British to shield US forces and for the US forces (Bradley’s First US Army) to build up their resources and then break-out.“That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed….…….Morgan’s original COSSAC plan had envisaged a primary British-Canadian break-out to the Seine from the Caen lodgement area, and this may have added fuel to his vision of Allied failure, for which Monty was to be the scapegoat.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944.Montgomery presented his alternative strategy for Normandy at St Paul's school on 7th April and 15th May 1944. Omar Bradley was there and wrote:“The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them into their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to a Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans.Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944.Order No. 1 was issued on April 21, I Corps Operation Order No. 1, WO 171/258.‘The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place........Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defenses prove to be strongly organized thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of it’s forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit it’s usefulness and to make it’s retention a costly business.’——————————————————————————————————————————————On 12th June 1944 the British had no room to sidestep any German divisions before Caen because the Germans totally blocked them. This is why a wide hook on Caen was attempted. To the south of Panzer Lehr’s sector in the vicinity of Viller’s Bocage there was thought to be an area devoid of German forces, so this wide right hook was attempted on the morning of 13 June (any wider and it would have overrun into the American lines). Unfortunately, unknown to the British, Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung turned up into this area on the night of the 12th/13th June and blocked this right hook with their Tigers and closed the door on Caen.There was no other room to manoeuvre onto Caen. All attempts had to go right through the German Panzer divisions through the rest of June and early July, with the Germans having excellent defensive country (fields broken up by hedgerows everywhere) with which to utilize their advantage.The Germans had over 1,500 tanks in the British/Canadian sector, including Tigers and Panthers. Even the King Tiger and Jagdpanther made their WW2 combat debuts around Caen in July.Caen had more German tanks per mile than Kursk. In just a few miles 8 Panzer divisions in a very small area of front. Caen had the highest concentration density of German tanks ever seen in WW2. These were pitted against British armour. At Kursk the Panzer divisions were spread out over a much wider area and were not concentrated as densely as around Caen. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front.*There were EIGHT Panzer Divisors in the Caen area by the end of June 1944 and FIVE lines of anti tank-guns. The Germans kept sending more and more Panzer divisions around the Caen area as June went on and into July. These were the Panzer divisions deployed to the Caen area:♦ 21st Panzer Division (117 Panzer IVs)♦ Panzer Lehr Division (101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers)♦ 2nd Panzer Division (89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers)♦ 116th Panzer Division (73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). In reserve just behind the front♦ 1st SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 panthers)♦ 9th SS Panzer Division (40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers)♦ 10th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 29 Panzer IVs)♦ 12th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 29 Panzer IVs)♦ Tiger Battalion SS101 (45 Tigers)♦ Tiger Battalion SS102 (45 Tigers)♦ Tiger Battalion 503 (45 Tigers)Source: Bernages Panzers and the Battle for Normandy and Zetterling’s Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness.The Americans who were not equipped or experienced to face massed German armour,were given primarily an infantry role by Montgomery- the Americans met very little armour in WW2. The US forces didn’t face any German armour until June 13th, and that was only a mere battalion of assault guns. The British destroyed about 90% of German armour in the west.Meanwhile June storms meant that the loss of the US Mulberry harbour had forced Bradley to close down his southern offensive at the same time of the advance on Cherbourg. This meant that, for a month, Dempsey had to keep up his costly feint on the eastern flank, and Bradley take the heavy casualties necessitated by a belated St Lo offensive.Despite the ‘real tragedy in delaying build up and deployment of your forces’ as Brooke had called it in June, Montgomery was nevertheless determined to stick to his strategy.*And at Kursk there were still battalions of Panzer IIIs with 50mm guns in the Panzer divisions. In Normandy all the tanks, tanks destroyers and assault guns all had at least 75mm L/48 guns. Only two battalions of Panthers at Kursk.———————————————————————————————————————————-Yet Eisenhower now became impatient and concerned by the seeming lack of progress.“If Eisenhower had criticisms of the way his Ground Forces Commander was directing the battle, Brooke therefore stated, he should go to Normandy and put them to Monty, not cavil behind his back. The suggestion was even made that Brooke accompany Eisenhower; but as General Simpson later recalled, the notion ‘was a little worrying to Ike. He knew jolly well that if he went to Monty, Monty would run circles round him with a clear exposition of his strategy and tactic.’ No visit was thus arranged.Brooke, however, was worried that he had not completely stopped the rot, and the next morning penned a long letter to Monty warning him of Eisenhower’s ‘mischief-making’:‘My dear MontyThe trouble between you and the P.M. has been satisfactorily settled for the present, but the other trouble I spoke to you about is looming large still and wants watching very carefully.Ike lunched with P.M. again this week and as a result I was sent for by P.M. and told that Ike was worried at the outlook taken by the American Press that the British were not taking their share of the fighting and of the casualties. There seems to be more in it than that and Ike himself seemed to consider that the British Army could and should be more offensive. The P.M. asked me to meet Ike at dinner with him which I did last night, Bedel was there also.It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war!I drew attention to what your basic strategy had been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw the Germans onto the flank while you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the Armour had continuously been kept against the British.He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch major offensives on each Army front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy is 2 ½ times that on the Russian front, whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% on the Russian superiority on the Eastern front, I did not consider that we were in a position to launch an all out offensive along the whole front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of opening up Brest by swinging forward Western Flank.’”[Emphasis mine]To Brooke, Monty’s strategy was so clear that he could not understand Eisenhower’s apparent obsession with side issues, such as accusations in the American press that the British were leaving all the fighting up to the Americans:‘The strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight-forward. The British (on the left) must hold and draw Germans on to themselves off the western flank whilst Americans swing up to open Brest peninsular,’Brooke noted in his diary.-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944.It seems that Eisenhower’s criticisms and impatience were due to the fact that he didn’t understand Montgomery’s plan in Normandy.——————————————————————————————————————————————Montgomery in the planning gave the end time of Normandy, the bits between were put in by his planners, who needed something to fill in. Monty allowed them to put some in. Caen was strategically unimportant, one of those bits between.“the timings, when all this was going to happen. The answer is again found in the strategic plan, which states that the Allied armies would have driven the Germans back to the Seine on or about D plus 90, say September 1. Various intermediate targets -phase lines- were introduced into the plan but these were largely, as stated above, for administrative reasons, to give the logistical planners some time frame. Indeed when Lt Colonel C.P. Dawnay, Monty’s military assistant, was helping his chief prepare for the first presentation of plans on April 7, 8 weeks before D-Day, he asked Montgomery where the phase lines should be drawn between D-day and D plus 90.Monty replied, ‘Well, it doesn’t matter, Kit - draw them where you like.’‘Shall I draw them equally, Sir?’, asked Dawnay.‘Yes, that’ll do’, replied Montgomery.’Montgomery knew that whatever was intended two months before the landing would be altered the minute the troops went ashore. Even so, two other points need explaining. The First is that changes in the plan in the course of the battle were only to be expected - and hardly matter if the overall aim of the campaign is kept broadly on track…..……The ground force plan for Overlord had been drawn up by Montgomery - and approved by Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff - and in that plan the city of Caen was to be taken - or effectively masked- on D-day.”-Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944.This is also stated in Nigel Hamilton’s three volume biography of Montgomery:”To help illustrate his presentation Monty had asked his MA - Lt Colonel Dawnay, to ink colluded phases onto the maps - as Dawnay later remembered:’I had the maps prepared and drew on them the D-Day targets for the troops along the invasion front. And the dropping zones of the paratroopers. And the after consulting with Monty I drew the D plus 90 line - showing where he felt we should get by D plus 90 - which included Paris and a line back along the Loire.And I asked Monty how I should draw the lines in between. And he said , ‘Well it doesn’t matter Kit, draw them as you like.’ ‘So I said, ‘ Shall I draw them equally, sir?’ And he said ‘Yes, that’ll do.’In his opinion it was not of any importance where he would be groundwise between D plus 1 and D plus 90, because he felt sure he could capture the line D plus 90 by the end of 3 months, and he was not going to capture ground, he was going to destroy enemy forces.Using Monty’s presentation notes, Dawnay drew in the arbitrary lines, never dreaming that they would be used in evidence against Monty when the campaign did not go ‘according to plan’…….In his later memoirs, Tedder reported the same Eisenhower allegation that would so infuriate Monty: ‘When a week had passed since D-Day without the capture of Caen it became clear to us at SHAEF that the hopes of a road breakthrough on the left were now remote.’Yet Monty had never suggested or intended a break-through on the left; only a battle around Caen that would permit him to establish and extend the shield behind which Bradley could take Cherbourg and breakout via St Lo and Avranches to Brittany.Some of the misunderstanding was undoubtedly caused by Monty himself, as his MA, Lt Colonel Dawnay, later recognised:I think he had given the RAF a totally false impression, at St Paul’s and elsewhere, as to when he was going to get the airfields, south of Caen - a totally false impression. Because when we got there [to Normandy] we realized quite quickly that he didn’t care a damn about those airfields, as long as he could draw all the German armour on to the [eastern] side and give a chance for his right swing to break out!”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.“As he explained in a letter that evening to Major-General Simpson at the war Office, Caen was only a name; he did not want to waste British and Canadians lives a la Stalingrad:The Germans are doing everything they can to hold on to CAEN. I have decided not to have a lot of casualties by butting up against the place; so I have ordered Second Army to keep up a good pressure at CAEN, and to make its main effort towards VILLERS BOCAGE and EVRECY and thence S.E. towards FALAISE.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.But this had been stated in an address he had given before D-Day.“Monty’s actual address, never published before, makes it quite clear that, with the exception of ports, the battle for Normandy would not be conducted with object of capturing towns, but of step by step building up of men and resources until the moment when the Americans would be strong enough to drive south into Brittany and to the Loire. It was a strategy that Monty unfolded with absolute conviction, two months before the new date set for the invasion: the first full moon in June. As in the address to senior officers before Alamein the calm authority with which Monty outlined his plan, the likely enemy response, and the phases through which the battle would go, was almost incredible to those present who did not already know Montgomery.At no point in this military lecture to Brooke, Churchill and Smuts, did Monty ever suggest that Dempsey was to do more than bring the German forces to battle around Caen, however - and when after the war, Eisenhower wrote that ‘in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine’, Monty was furious, for this was a complete travesty of the facts. To Churchill Monty had made it quite clear that there was no question of wild break-outs. How could there be when the Allies had only fourteen divisions ashore, many of which, particularly the parachute and first assault divisions, were inevitably running out of steam? As Churchill pointed out to Stalin the battle for Normandy would be a slow and deliberate one: ‘I should think it quite likely that we should work up to a battle of about a million a side, lasting throughout June and July. We plan to have about two million there by mid-August.Eisenhower’s unfortunate obfuscation has coloured the military accounts ever since, polarizing chroniclers into nationalistic camps. This was, Monty felt, a tragedy in view of the fact that the battle for Normandy was, at all stages, an Allied battle, in which Allied soldiers gave their lives, conforming to an Allied plan to defeat the German armies in the West - not to ‘break out towards the Seine’ in some mythical Lancelot charge...Dempsey’s brief then was not to ‘break out towards Seine’, but to play his part in a truly Allied undertaking, bringing to battle the mobile German forces that would otherwise - as Rommel wished - destroy the American assault on Cherbourg.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944.———————————————————————————————————————————————Montgomery wasn’t concerned with taking territory but with grinding up and destroying German armour. His plan was for US forces to take territory. He specifically stated this in an interview after the war with Edward R Murrow. Transcript:”The acquisition of territory on the eastern flank of the beachhead in the Caen sector was not really important. What was important there was to draw the maximum number of German divisions, and especially the armour, into that flank. The acquisition of territory was important on the western flank [the US sector].... an accusation drawn at me, that I ought to have taken Caen in the programme on D-day! And we didn’t. I didn’t mind about that because.....The air force would get very het up because I didn’t go further down towards Falaise and get the ground suitable for airfields. I didn’t bother about that, it would have meant enormous casualties in doing it and it wasn’t necessary.“I could reply to that criticism that on the American line from which the breakout was finally launched was a line the St Lo-Periers road should have been captured in the initial plan by the American 1st Army on D-day plus 5, that was the 11th June. But they didn’t actually capture it until the 18th July. But I have never returned the charge with that accusation.... until now.”*“I have never understood why Ike said in his dispatches, that when the British failed to break out towards Paris on the eastern flank. The Americans were able [to break out], because of our flexibility, to take it on, on our western flank. I have always thought that was an unfair criticism of Dempsey and the 2nd British Army.”*For a moment on July 10, Bradley confessed that he seemed to have failed. It was at this juncture, with Dempsey offering to try to mount an alternative breakout towards Falaise on the eastern flank, that Monty showed his caliber as a great field commander. As Dempsey related to the official American historian, “Monty quietly replied: ‘Never mind. Take all the time you need, Brad.’ Then he went on to say: ‘If I were you I think I should concentrate my forces a little more’ - putting two fingers together on the map in his characteristic way. Then he turned to me and said: ‘ Go on hitting: drawing the German strength, especially some of the armour, onto yourself - so as to ease the way for Brad.Hamilton, Nigel. Montgomery D-Day Commander.The video is here:Bradley also later confirmed Montgomery's plan and that the capture of Caen was only incidental to his mission, not critical.“While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout.In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort.While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasizing the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure. For Monty’s success should have been measured in the Panzer divisions the enemy rushes against whilst Collins sped on towards Cherbourg. Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clamoured for a place named Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them.The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“-The American LIFE Magazine 1951.————————————————————————————————————————————Monty’s strategy now began to bear fruit.”The sudden ripening of Monty’s Normandy strategy had transformed the moment. At last the doubters, belly-achers, grumblers and men of faint heart were silenced, and those armchair strategists who wanted ‘gains’ could mark up their atlases once more. Von Kluge was mesmerised, and in his weekly report on 31 July believed that the Canadian diversionary attacks from the area of Caen had been the primary Allied break-out attempt. ‘After hard fighting and counter-attacks, 1st SS armoured corps gained a complete defensive victory,’ he claimed. Not only had Monty thus succeeded in keeping the German ‘Armoured Group West’ away from the American breakout, but he had kept it east of Noyers. When on 30 July Dempsey launched the start of his full-scale armoured attack from Caumont, von Kluge was therefore doubly mispositioned. He was still certain that Monty would make directly for Paris, expecting Montgomery first to enlarge the bridgehead and then to ‘make the thrust towards Paris’ from the British sector.Like Rommel, von Kluge was playing straight into Montgomery’s hands. Within hours of the 30 July kick-off, Dempsey had a British armoured division nearing Le Beny Bocage, thus shielding the left flank of Bradley’s new salient - which in turn had reached Avranches, at the base of the Cherbourg peninsula.…..There was something moving about this long-awaited moment.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944Operation Cobra and the American breakout, which American historians have tried to appropriate the credit to US generals like Patton and Bradley, had been planned by Monty some time before.“The plan upon which the Americans were to uncurl and deliver their great thrust southwards towards Brittany and the Loire was set out before Brooke and General Simpson (the DMO, to whom a copy was sent), in simple, clear English, a month and a half before it was enacted. ‘The First US Army,’ Monty declared under the heading: ‘Para 14. Future intentions’, was:e) To hold on firmly to Caumont; to recapture CARENTAN and to hold it firmly.f) To capture ST LO and then COUTANCEg) To thrust southwards from CAUMONT towards VIRE and MORTAIN; and from ST LO towards VILLEDIEU and AVRANCHESh) All the time to exert pressure towards LA HAYE DU PUITS and VOLOGNES, and to capture CHERBOURG.A glance at the map will show that this was, town for town, the layout of Operation ‘Cobra’- the great American offensive that paved the way for Patton to be unleashed into Brittany and the Loire in August 1944.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.”PLAN IN OUTLINETo hold the maximum number of enemy divisions on our eastern flank between CAEN and VILLERS BOCAGE, and to swing the [American] western or right flank of the Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide sweep so as to threaten the line of withdrawal of such enemy divisions to the south of PARIS.Later historians, particularly the American Official Historian Dr Martin Blumenson, would try to appropriate the credit for this plan for their heroes General Patton and to a lesser extent, General Bradley. In his edition of Patton’s papers, Dr Blumenson quoted Patton’s diary entry of 2 July 1944, in which Patton noted his own new ‘Schlieffen’ plan for a ‘rear attack on the Germans confronting the First U.S. Army, and then driving on to the line Alençon-Argentan, and thereafter on on Evreux or Chartres, depending on circumstances, we will really pull a coup’. Commenting, Blumenson remarked on Patton’s ‘remarkable’ intuition and stated that some weeks later ‘Bradley would come up with an interesting idea’ for such a coup, ‘an operation called Cobra’.That ‘Cobra’ was in fact the plan given out by Montgomery at his headquarters on 30 June 1944 was to become a fact which some American historians hated to credit, preferring to take at face value Patton’s misrepresentation, penned in frustration in his English headquarters, that the Allies were merely pursuing ‘phase lines’ and that ‘we will die of old age before we finish’. However unpalatable to such writers, the fact remains that Bradley, Dempsey and Crerar all attended Monty’s conference on 30 June, all concurred in Monty’s strategy, and that Eisenhower, Brooke, the War Office and Main Headquarters of 21st Army Group at Portsmouth all had copies of Monty’s plan. Nor was it some vague notion, for Monty laid down at the conference how he wished the plan to be executed in the coming weeks. Originally, in England before D-Day, he had intended to push the British Second Army south of Caen to secure space for airfields and provide the shield he needed for Bradley’s southern thrust to Brittany. Rommel’s fierce reaction at Caen had, however, made this unnecessary. Indeed a British thrust too far from it’s present sector would open up Second Army to a German counter-thrust by extending the front to be defended, whereas although it was greatly congested, the British front was currently almost impregnable.……..Bradley’s break-out via Brittany had originally been conceived in England before D-Day, and throughout the long bitter weeks of fighting in June and July, Dempsey had been instructed to lock in combat the main enemy formations. Six thousand British and Canadian soldiers had fallen, even before ‘Goodwood’, to make possible the expansion of the American sector behind them, first to Cherbourg, and now towards Brittany.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.————————————————————————————————————————————Montgomery had envisioned a 90 day battle with all forces reaching the Seine. He emphasized Cherbourg, making it clear that the British would hold as many German divisions as possible in Caen or it’s outskirts while the Americans take Cherbourg and go south to break the front without any German Panzer divisions nearby.Result?Exactly that. It happened ahead of schedule and with 22% less casualties than predicted.Not even Stalingrad could match the strategic scale of the German defeat in Normandy…….…….By containing the bulk of the enemy armour and best infantry opposite Dempsey, and giving Bradley time and space to bring the greater numerical strength of the American divisions into battle on the western flank, Monty had out-generalled von Rundstedt, Rommel, Hausser and von Kluge who, limited by the edicts of Hitler, had insufficient strength to defend British, American and Pas de Calais sectors in equal strength. Compared with Hitler’s conduct, the impatience of Eisenhower, Tedder and Churchill had proved merely tiresome to the Ground Forces Commander, and had not affected the course of the battle. Montgomery’s victory was, without doubt in even Hitler’s mind, the decisive battle of the war: ‘the worst day of my life,’ as Hitler remarked on 15 August 1944 as the true dimensions of the catastrophe in Normandy became apparent.-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.D-Day plus 90 was 4 September 1944.Monty said Paris would be liberated on D-day plus 90. It was liberated on D-Day plus 80.Dempsey took Brussels, 183 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 89.Dempsey took Antwerp, 253 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 90.In the words of an American author, Ike & Monty: Generals at War, 1994, Norman Gelb:“By holding on the left and breaking out on the right, Montgomery had produced a triumph.“