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In practice, yes. There are many countries where the presumption of innocence is fallacious. There is no express mention of the presumption in the US Constitution.Welcome to America. America where, when accused of a crime your rights are immediately curtailed. You may be required to post bail, or remain in jail. If granted release there are conditions regarding your movements, your right to travel can be restricted, your passport must be ‘surrendered,’ you cannot possess firearms, you cannot consume alcohol, you must submit to drug testing, you must report/check-in to supervision/court clerk, you maybe required to wear an ankle monitor, your property can be seized (pending trial), assets frozen, and any other ‘reasonable’ restrictions to guarantee the safety of the community.In the USA:After non-citizens are arrested they may be transferred to immigration custody if they are released from criminal custody on their own recognizance or after paying a criminal bond. At this point, they must secure a separate immigration bond from an immigration judge to be released to attend their criminal hearing and defend themselves in criminal court.The problem with this system is that immigration bonds are much higher than criminal bonds for minor offenses (usually between $5,000 and $20,000). Some immigration judges set high bond or deny bond completely even for misdemeanor charges or suspicion of criminal behavior [pdf]. In these cases, the accused have no chance to defend themselves in criminal court and are stuck in detention purgatory. They cannot get out of immigration detention because they have not yet been found innocent of the charges against them, but they cannot be found innocent because they cannot get out of immigration detention.Immigrants Accused of Crimes Presumed Guilty.Rights of Accused TerroristsThe arrest of Ahmad Khan Rahami, the man suspected of Saturday's bombing in New York and explosion in New Jersey, is reviving a debate that's become familiar when American citizens are implicated in terrorism post-9/11: Whether or not they can be considered enemy combatants. What the US government can and cannot do to US citizens suspected of terrorismEnemy Combatants“No alien unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may invoke the Geneva Conventions as a source of rights.” The defendant does not have the right to file Habeas Corpus petitions and can receive the death penalty. 10 facts about enemy combatants

The following explanation is a brief summary of a few papers and other sources that explain various parts of the crisis. This is not a full analytical treatment, but I believe that it's more complete than what I've read in most news outlets. The articles by Lane (2012) and De Grauwe (2012) that are linked to in the bibliography are far more complete than this explanation and they're quite accesible for people with little to no economics background. All credit goes Massimo Guliodori ( http://www1.fee.uva.nl/toe/giuliodori.shtm) for compiling these papers as part of the Monetary and Fiscal Policy course at the University of Amsterdam. For the record, I am an undergraduate economics student. I am not a researcher, I have no affiliation with the University of Amsterdam (other than studying there) and I am by no means an expert. I encourage everyone to read the referenced literature. Do not just take my word for it.The answer is divided into 3 sections. The first section looks at the agreements that were made prior to the creation of the European Monetary Union. The second section concerns itself with risk factors that were present before the banking crisis. The final section looks at how the banking crisis became a sovereign debt crisis.1. The creation of the European Monetary Union.The Maastricht treaty [1]The Maastricht treaty was signed on the 7th of February, 1992 and went into effect on November 1st 1993. One of its goals was to "establish economic and monetary union"[1]. The objectives were to create a single currency and to ensure price stability. The creation of the monetary union (MU) consists of three steps: first there's liberalisation of capital movement, next there's convergence of economic policies, and finally there is the establishment of the European Central Bank and a single currency. The Maastricht Treaty also established that the Central Bank is independent of national and community political authorities. This is important because politicians may form goals that harm the system. For instance, during elections a politician may exercise policy that reduces unemployment below the natural level. However, such a policy can lead to increases in inflation and subsequent welfare loss. The ECB sticks to keeping inflation at its target level and doesn't take directions from politicians.Stability and Growth Pact[2]The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was proposed by German finance minister Theo Waigel in the mid 1990's. Its purpose was to safeguard fiscal discipline in the European Monetary Union. The three most important takeaways from the SGP are:Countries are permitted to have a budget deficit that is at most 3% of their GDP. That is, the difference between what a government spends and what it receives (tax revenues) should be no more than 3% of GDP.[3]Countries are permitted to have an outstanding debt-to-GDP ratio of no more than 60%. [3]There is a "no bailout" clause. If a country can't meet its debt obligations, it defaults. [3]The SGP has been criticised. The above demands do not account for business cycles, meaning that if there's an economic slump and the government decides to boost the economy and temporary run a slightly larger deficit, they are punished. There's new legislation underway that deals with this. Another critique of the SGP is that by using a bit of clever accounting you can make it look as if you're hitting the marks outlined above, but you're really not. [4] This is what happened in Greece, who basically hid their debt. [5]The first countries to break the SGP requirements were Germany and France. The SGP was not enforced against them, probably because they were the countries that drafted the SGP and thus the decision was made to exempt them from this slip up.The SGP has been reformed in 2005 and 2011. [4]2. Pre-crisis risk factorsDivergence of competitiveness in the Eurozone [6]The divergence in competitiveness levels is one of the most remarkable imbalances in the EU. De Grauwe (2012) offers the following figure[6]:At the top we see countries such as Ireland, Spain, Italy and Greece. At the bottom we see countries such as Austria, Germany and France. Starting from a base level in 2000, this graph shows us is that over the years it has become relatively more expensive to produce in Greece when compared to Germany. The countries that are currently in trouble seem to be situated at the top of the graph.How is this a problem? For a country like Greece, it means that there's not a lot of demand for their products because the same products can be bought cheaper elsewhere. The result is that Greece becomes an importing nation rather than an exporting nation. When your imports exceed your exports (that is, you are running a current account deficit), you're paying more money than what you are earning on your exports. If all of a sudden there's a stop in funding markets, like a financial crisis, then you need to quickly close that deficit. You can't export more, because you're not competitive, so you have to start importing less. Doing so results in a contraction of output because you're hammering the importing industry. A contraction in output can also be viewed as a rise in unemployment levels. This is a very simplified version of what's actually going on and I encourage you to read Lane (2012) [3] pp. 52-53.So how do you deal with competitiveness issues? Basically your labor is too expensive, i.e. wages are too high. Cutting wages is one option but it's not a practical one due to "downward wage rigidity", people – and more importantly unions – do not like it when wages are lowered. Another option is to simply become more productive, you could think about higher levels of education in this context, but this is easier said than done. What countries do when they are not in a monetary union is that they devalue their currency. If you make your currency really cheap it makes the stuff you produce really cheap. Imagine the pre-Euro period: Greece could and would simply devalue the Drachma, which would make Greece's products relatively cheap and thus demand would be maintained. Italy had a similar tactic.But now they're in a monetary union. The exchange rate of the Euro is controlled by the ECB and the ECB is independent of local and community politics. A Monetary Union can be seen as the most extreme form of pegging your exchange rate, i.e. you fix your exchange rate for good by accepting an outside monetary authority. Now countries like Greece are screwed with regards to productivity. In order for these countries to become competitive they need to resort to internal devaluation. They need to bring down wages and prices. But this calls for a recession. Recessions make the markets nervous as investors see the economic conditions in a country deteriorate. If a financial shock (banking crisis) hits a country when it's going through such a fragile economic period, a country can find itself in deep trouble.Debt levels [3]Figure taken from Lane (2012) [3].We can see that there's quite a bit of difference between our usual suspects and the countries that have performed relatively well when it comes to their public debt-to-GDP ratios. Lane (2012) provides the following analysis. Italy and Greece have had debt-to-GDP ratios of over 90% since the early 90's. They never hit the 60% mark as required. Ireland, Portugal, and Spain achieved declines in debt in the 90's and while Portugal's debt started to climb since 2000, Ireland and Spain actually pushed their debt down. In fact between 2002-2007 Germany and France had higher debt ratios. Germany and France used to have debt ratios in the 90's that were around the 60% mark (I believe that's how they set the requirements, along with the 3% deficit mark.)But obviously debt isn't the only explanation for the crisis. Greece and Italy were in deep trouble in terms of debt, but Spain was doing fine. Ireland seemed to have been doing fine. So there has to be more to it than just debt.Overlevered banksBanks are huge. Bank assets are bigger than the economies of the countries in which they reside. So when a financial crisis hits and banks are suddenly in trouble, pulling with them a large part of the public (businesses and households), the country decides to step in and bail out the banks. Why? Because they're so big that if you let them fail you're going to wreck the nation (this is obviously being debated in some circles).From the above figure we can see that in 2007 banks issued more credit than what some countries were able to produce in terms of output. In the most extreme case, Ireland, the loans added up to 184.3% of GDP.Bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans (%)This figure shows how the amount of bad debt increased in the wake of the financial crisis. Ireland, Greece and Italy are up there. Notice the dramatic rise in bad loans in Ireland.Banking assets as percentage of GDP[7](click for a larger picture)Another chart proving that banks are huge. One of my professors maintains that this was the biggest risk factor contributing to the financial crisis turning into a sovereign debt crisis. I think you understand the point of this by now, if a government has to bail out a sector that is so much larger than what that country produces then it's going to be painful, even if it's just a partial bailout.The 2003-2007 Boom and failure to tighten fiscal policy. [3]The disparities in terms of banks size and differences in productive (and thus current account imbalances) were huge in the 2003-2007 period. According to Lane there is still no complete explanation of why this happened but it seems to be tightly linked with the securitization boom in the US. The low interest rates and massive lending weren't coming from governments but from the private sector. Households and firms (and banks) were piling up (toxic) assets.The "outsider" countries, by which I mean the countries that aren't considered to be the core EU countries like Germany and France, but the peripheral countries like Italy, Spain, Greece and Ireland experienced much larger credit booms because now they had access to funds with their own currency. Instead of borrowing something in a foreign denomination such as the dollar and hoping that the exchange rate plays along nicely and doesn't destroy the value of their holdings they now had access to a very strong currency.Naturally you'd think that any sensible government is going to capitalize on such a boom and raise taxes in order to gain some reserves for when this business cycle inevitably starts to go south. Guess what, they failed to do that. They failed to use proper analytical frameworks to judge economic conditions. They failed to capitalize on higher revenue streams in order to get ready for a future economic downturn.3. Crisis hits: 2008 and onwards. [3]When the crisis hit the initial response was to deal with the financial instability that arose, there weren't any big concerns about sovereign debt. European banks were exposed to a lot of US asset backed securities (mortgages) that lost their value after the housing market in the US collapsed. This caused bank balance sheets to severely deteriorate. Subsequently banks stopped lending money to each other. When banks stop lending money to each other they really get into trouble. The banking crisis hit the system in an asymmetric fashion. Investors, now wary of risks, first started to pull away from international capital and securing their funds at home. The first country to suffer from this was Ireland, their financial system relies on short-term international credit and when credit froze up the government had to provide a 2 year liability guarantee in 2008 (Lane, 2012).The credit crisis furthermore caused a sharp reversal in the current account deficits described earlier and an end to the boom. Spain and Ireland suffered from the end of the credit boom because it hit their construction sectors very hard. Spain relied on a lot of real estate development during the growth period of '03-'07 and now that was all gone. Still the debt crisis hadn't really begun and the focus was more on stabilising the financial system. Banks valued sovereign bonds as a good investment alternative and thus demanded more debt, causing interest rates to remain calm.Things started to come apart in late 2009 as governments began to revise their deficit-to-GDP ratios. These turned out to increase faster than expected. Shit really hit the fan when Greece came out with its revised deficit forecast in October 2009. Instead of 6%, 12.7% of GDP (Lane, 2012). I don't know what exactly happened to Greece in the years prior to the crisis, but from what I've understood they used a bit of clever accounting to hide the mess that they were in. Greece was in a really bad state and very vulnerable. Everything blew up in their face and they became the poster child of the crisis. The new government just went "Hey… it's not our fault, the last guys were assholes." Not only did this shock the markets, but it also set up a political premise that the crisis was the fault of countries such as Greece even though the system was unstable prior to the crisis. Of course Greek bonds were sold and Greece's interest rate rose and rose. If a country's interest rate rises sufficiently, it's basically shut out of the bond market because the debt is going to grow faster than the economy and the country is never capable of repaying its debt.Figure from Lane showing divergence of interest rates:I'm not going to into the measures that were undertaken to rescue these countries as its not fundamental to the question (although I encourage you to read Lane, it's really accessible to non-economists), but here's one of the things you should understand about debt. A part of a country's debt burden is reflected in its interest rates. If the interest rates go up, the country has to pay back more debt in the future. So, when a country gets into serious trouble because it has high debt levels to begin with, the markets start to worry. When the markets worry, they sell, when they sell the interest rate rises and the debt burden goes up. This causes markets to worry even more and drive up the debt even more. Eventually the markets can push a country into default. A lot of what the ECB has been doing is basically showing that it has the cojones to keep buying nasty assets in order to calm down the markets.A note on dealing with shocks: Independent country vs Monetary Union [6]Let me show you 2 charts from De Grauwe (2012) [6].Riddle me this: Why is it that Spain's interest rate is higher than that of the UK even though the UK has a higher debt ratio? The UK appears to me more at risk of a potential default (keyword: appears) but the markets are worried more about Spain. Que Paso?When a country is independent and has its own central bank like the UK does (the Bank of England) it can deal with shocks in a different way than a country that has no control over its currency (like Spain and the rest of the EMU countries). Let me explain:UK scenarioImagine the UK is hit by a shock. Investors become anxious, lose confidence and start selling UK bonds. Investors are now left with Pounds, which they want to dump because – again – they don't trust the UK anymore. Dumping the pound causes the exchange rate of the Pound to depreciate. The price will drop until someone starts buying these pounds. The BoE buys these pounds and reinvests them back into the UK economy. Some of these pounds might go back into UK bonds, but some will be used to breathe life into the UK economy. The crux is that liquidity remains bottled up inside of the UK and markets can't pressure the UK into a default.Spanish scenarioSpain gets hit by a shock, like the real estate construction shock mentioned earlier. Investors panic and sell Spanish bonds. Now these investors are left with Euro's. Guess what, Spain doesn't have a central bank. No, instead investors take their Euro's and buy German bonds…or Dutch bonds…or French bonds…or whatever stable Euro asset they might find. Spain is basically bleeding money. Liquidity is leaving the country. Interest rates are driven up and up and the country can be forced into a default position. De Grauwe [6] has a more elaborate explanation, but this gets the basic point across.Additional flight to safetyIn August Mario Draghi, the president of the European Central Bank said[8]:The governing council, within its mandate to maintain price stability over the medium term and in observance of its independence in determining monetary policy, may undertake outright open market operations of a size adequate to reach its objective. Furthermore the governing council will consider further non-standard monetary policy measures according to what is required to repair monetary policy transmission. In the coming weeks we will design the appropriate modalities for such policy measures.That's banking language for "We're not going to let the speculative bastards take us down and we will keep buying assets and injecting liquidity into the system until you all calm the hell down".That commitment in combination with the Spanish authorities showing the political will to go through painful cuts paid off: Spanish Bond Yields Drop to 8-Month Low.Some speculators have been scared off by these measures and have decided to reallocate their portfolios to include less risky debts, such as German debt.To summarizeThe Euro Crisis is the combination of irresponsible behaviour, poor fiscal policy by countries, mediocre European regulations that were never enforced to begin with, large shocks to the system in the form of a banking crisis and big underlying differences in terms of competitiveness and debt levels. Yes the banking crisis significantly contributed to the state of current affairs, but it's shortsighted to say that that was the only reason why all of this happened.For countries like Ireland, Italy, Spain and Portugal it was a combination of an economic shock and bad fiscal policy. The shock was so big that the countries couldn't handle it. What started off in the banking sector resonated throughout other parts of the economy such as the construction sector. The shock was so big that countries found themselves in huge debts trying to deal with that shock. Then the markets started to lose trust in these countries, driving up their interest rates which resulted in an inability to borrow on international capital markets. This meant that countries lost their liquidity status and had even more problems trying to tackle their debts. This in term agitated markets even more and thus a vicious cycle ensued. Subsequently countries started applying for bailouts.The reason why Greece has been turned into the poster boy of the crisis is because they screwed up in a royal fashion, even more so than the other "usual suspects" (Spain, Ireland etc.). They manipulated their acounts and withheld information. Eventually it turned out that they were in the worst shape. There are plenty of economists who think that Greece will have to default because no amount of support will save them. Secondly, there's also a political dimension in this whole scenario. Politicians from the northern countries (Germany, the Netherlands etc.) need to be able to justify these measures to their electorate. And the thing is, the north is paying for the trouble down below. Feldstein, who was critical of the Euro project before it even began wrote an article on what he thinks is going to happen with Greece[9]. I encourage you to read it.Economies are highly networked. German banks hold Greek debt, Greek banks hold bad securities, Spanish banks hold Greek debt etc. etc. Whenever something goes sour, it spills over into other countries. These network effects are significant.Research about the Euro Crisis is ongoing.References:[1] Treaty of Maastricht on European Union[2] Stability and Growth Pact[3] Lane, Philip R. (2012). The European Sovereign Debt Crisis (Free text) Journal of Economic Perspectives—Volume 26, Number 3—Pages 49–68[4] Stability and Growth Pact – Wikipedia[5] Wall St. Helped Greece to Mask Debt Fueling Europe’s Crisis[6] De Grauwe, P. (2011). A fragile Eurozone in search of a better governance. (PDF: http://www.esr.ie/vol43_1/01%20Grauwe.pdf)[7] http://www.openeurope.org.uk/Content/Documents/Pdfs/bankinguniontwohalves.pdf[8] Mario Draghi on the eurozone: in quotes - Telegraph[9] Feldstein, M. (2011). The Euro and European Economic Conditions. NBER Working Paper. http://www.nber.org/papers/w17617N.B. Feldstein has written a lot about the "Grexit" (Greek Exit), you can find his work here: http://www.nber.org/feldstein/

No, but there is female privilege in justice outcomes. Women who rape boys under 18, get much less time than males who rape boys or girls under 18. In general women are sentenced to less time for almost all crimes. For example women get much lower bond/bail amounts.[1] [2] [3] [4]Footnotes[1] Study finds large gender disparities in federal criminal cases[2] https://www.huffpost.com/entry/men-women-prison-sentence-length-gender-gap_n_1874742[3] https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/759770/women-criminal-justice-system-2017..pdf[4] Still Twisted: Teacher Mary Kay Letourneau's Affair With a 13-Year-Old