Ship Afrika: Fill & Download for Free

There’s a common misunderstanding about the second battle of El Alamein. Just because it was fought in the desert doesn’t mean it wasn’t a NAVAL battle. Montgomery, it’s claimed,only fought where he outnumbered the enemy in both men and materials. That’s because he was a smart guy. And he GOT to be on the side with more soldiers, more tanks and more fuel by being on the side that was sinking the ships bringing supplies to his enemy. Not a coincidence. Not an accident. Germany was losing more ships than reached their troops. The Luftwaffe had sustained an unspectacula - but nonetheless devastating - loss of over 400 Ju52’s transport planes during the invasion of Holland - a fact that would repeatedly haunt - and frustrate - German ambitions: Germany simply lacked an ability to adequately re-supply by air.Amateurs talk about tactics and about “Military geniuses”. Professionals tend to be more concerned with logistics. Germany could not adequately supply an army in North Africa, either by sea (thanks to raids on shipping from Malta by both planes and ships) nor by air (Thanks to previously sustained losses to an arm of the Luftwaffe which was insufficiently glamorous to be allocated the resources to rebuild itself.

Lack of interest and terrible planningGermany was never truly committed to the ground game in North Africa, being dragged there more or less against her will due to the ineptitude of the Italian Army. The most Germany ever committed to the theater was the Afrika Korps and Erwin Rommel, possibly one of the greatest tacticians of all time, to keeping their Italian allies in the fight in Africa.There’s only so much a man can do with limited supplies and supportWhile Rommel was great, he wasn’t invincible and the Second Battle of El Alamein showed that Germany wasn’t willing to risk sending ships to resupply the Afrika Korp, who could only keep their gains with consistent supplies. The odds were always against Rommel despite having better tactics, short supply lines, technologically superior Panzers, crack troops, and victory after victory. Rommel was forced to beg for supplies time and again to ensure he could keep the Korp running, but the paltry amount that was sent to him usually ended up at the bottom of the Mediterranean. Germany, specifically Hitler and much of the Wehrmacht higher-ups, didn’t see Africa as a decisive theater and were more concentrated on planning for Operation Barbarossa and the coming war in the East. Africa was simply a nuisance that had to be contained.Italy lost because she made mistake after mistake when it came to military matters. She held naval and air superiority throughout much of the Mediterranean during the initial stages of the war but setback after setback sent the Italians reeling. When Italy declared war on Britain and France in June of 1940, she held a 4–1 advantage in the number of combat ships present in the Mediterranean, as well as a 10–1 advantage in submarines, the odds, were in their favor.The problem was that Italy didn’t know how to exactly make use of their advantages, keeping most of her fleet in harbors for protection and to act as a “fleet in being”. What crippled her was the Battle of Taranto, not for the sheer amount of ships lost, which was many, but the fact that it displayed that naval aviation was to become the dominant force in the world of battleships. What the British learned at Taranto gave them an invaluable edge over the Italians, they would use the RAF to keep Italy and Germany out of North Africa while simultaneously strangling supplies to the troops already there.In a world of planes, ships are the preyThe Italian Army’s performance in North Africa was already paltry and it took the arrival of the Afrika Korps to bail them out. With supplies cut from both the Italians and the Afrika Korps, victory in North Africa was only a matter of time for the Allies.

The humble Sea Container.This allowed the world we live in today to exist. Before its introduction, ships were loaded by hand, cargo nets or small pallets.These methods were labour intensive, time consuming and prone to theft. Not to mention how much time was spent securing the cargo once on board ship to keep it from movement.The US Army came out with a limited design for a container in 1948 but it was not until 1949 that Keith Tantlinger working for Brown Trailers Inc developed the precursor to the containers we know today.In 1955, Pan-Atlantic Steamship Company owned by Malcolm Maclean developed a new container, where Keith Tantlinger was head of the Engineering and Research. It was designed according tto the Pennsylvanian traffic code. Matson Navigation followed suit with their container based on California traffic codes two years later.In 1968, ISO (International Organization for Standardization) established the first standards for containers.The US Army started using containers to support the effort in Vietnam in 1968.If this method of moving supplies for the Allies had been used in World War II, port capacities would have grown exponentially from what they did accomplish in the war. It would have allowed for the rapid loading and unloading of shipping.In 1965, dock labour could move 1.7 tons a hour. In 1970, using containers, the same amount of labour could move 30 tons a hour. The amount today is even higher.Using standard fittings, the containers could be stacked on one another, loading directly onto tractor-trailer units or railcars.An effect of this technology can be seen in the Longshoremen’s union attempts to get the use of containers limited. They wanted all loading of containers themselves within 50 miles of a port to be done only by union members and a fee attached to each container shipped. The US Supreme Court ruled against the Longshoremen in 1980.Now, the Western Allies in 1945 were in a logistical realm that was sheer fantasy to some of the other powers of the day. However, the use of containers could have eliminated the need for the Red Ball Express or other logistical shortfalls that they had in 1943/44 time frame.The biggest effect would have been the use of containers by the Germans in the one theatre that has been described as a tactician’s dream and a logistics officer's nightmare: North Africa. The German advance team determined that most the infrastructure in North Africa could support was about two and half divisions. The nature of the theatre required that these divisions be motorized or mechanized. Hence the size of the original Afrika Korps (DAK), two panzer divisions (15th and 21st) and some other elements that eventually became the 90th Light Division. Afrika Korps - WikipediaNow, if the Germans and Italians had access to containers, the size of the DAK could have been increased to the original proposed size of 4 panzer divisions. Or the time required to build up for the next offensive could have been cut in half.