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you have to first understand and know how government is structured in the Philippines to be able rationalize the answer to your questions….first, the streets are governed my the lowest branch of the government, the Baranggay. the baranggay was an offshoot from the time of Marcos where a geographical area was broken into a smaller area composed of several hundred families or more and is headed by a baranggay chairman and his baranggay council. thus all local management is under the authority of the baranggay executive… that is the idea. they are given the authority to enact their own baranggay ordinances giving them self-governing powers with all ordinances having to comply with the existing national laws and the Phil Constitution.thus, anything that happens on the streets is under the direct supervision and control of the baranggay.a city is broken down into several barangays, maybe hundreds of them depending on the city size (politically and geographically). the city is under the authority of a mayor with a vice-mayor and the city council. they have the same function as the baranggay albeit with a greater area of responsibility since there will be so many baranngays under its wing.the whole of the Phils is broken into several regions, with a region under the control and authority of a governor and his vice governor. a region can have several cities comprising it.the whole of the Phils is governed thru the national government the head of which is the sitting President with cabinet members in charge of the different departments. Rodrigo Duterte is the sitting president and sits on top of the government administration ladder.now, solving the traffic problem…. this is not easily done because theres is just too many vehicles on the streets and too little roads. every year, thousands of cars, trucks and other land vehicles are purchased…. old vehicles are not retired and take off the street thus the small road areas becomes choked with too much vehicles.now, about the use of the streets as terminals where illegal loading/unloading/waiting on the streets are allowed…Duterte does not allow the police… that practice has been going on since the 1970s.The police does not collect payment from those terminals… there are transport associations that man and manage the collection of those terminals. i can tell you though, the baranggay, the local precint commanders and police in the area and the association shared on the money collected in these terminals.why are they not closed down? because they are a necessary evil. they serve as a central point where commuters can ride and alight from the vehicles and terminals are designed to be centrally located for the convenience of the passengers.what is bad about them? usually, they are on the streets and public lands and contribute to crowding on the streets. there are some located on properties being rented by the association but this is not a norm.so in summary, it is not Duterte’s job to solve the traffic. i think it is the Mayor’s job to solve it with the assistance of the national transport department and other government agencies. The MMDA is doing its best to alleviate the traffic problems. It is not Duterte’s call to allow the police to collect money from the transport terminal. he does not have direct supervision over local policemen.

Amphibious assaults almost certainly wouldn’t be conducted today except in unavoidable extremes; however, large-scale amphibious landings are still an emphatic ‘yes’, and for a variety of political and doctrinal reasons. I’ll attempt here to differentiate the two and explain how and why the latter is conducted, and why amphibious warfare is a focus of military capability and doctrine in the 21st Century.Firstly, let us consider amphibious assaults:British Royal Marines undertaking an amphibious assault exercise in North Devon. Please note that the civilian motor vehicle is not an indication of UK defence budget limitations, and was filmed as part of a feature for BBC’s ‘‘Top Gear’ with Jeremy Clarkson, making it too surreal not to use here!Another amphibious assault, but this time on the infamous ‘Omaha’ zone as part of D-Day, June 1944. No Clarkson - just ordinary young men doing extraordinarily deeds.While of course we must give a respectful ‘hat-tip’ to the European and Pacific theatre amphibious epics of World War Two, amphibious assaults are very much a course of absolute last resort - although they certainly aren’t defined by scale, but rather by the fact that they’re ‘opposed’. That is, they’re planned and undertaken as a direct engagement, almost certainly with naval and/ or air fire support assets, as part of an immensely complicated and sequenced fire support, assault and exploitation plan and operation that transitions from water-borne to land-based deployment. They are predicated as such on the basis of the amphibious assaulting forces coming under anticipated, pre-positioned, direct and/or indirect enemy fire (irrespective of efforts to neutralise or suppress it) that is specifically planned to oppose such an assault in the area it’s being undertaken (a token enemy force unfortunate enough to be in the area and is not deployed, equipped or prepared to specifically oppose the operation would not in itself necessitate a ‘bells and whistles’ assault, as the example of ‘Operation Sutton’, below, demonstrates). Therefore, scale - as referenced with due respect to two other respondents here who consider that anything not to the scale of D-Day indicates amphibious operations are of the past - is not the defining factor. The application of planned military violence by both sides prior to and during the amphibious delivery of forces is. This immensely complex and carefully orchestrated fire support, transportation and assault plan, anticipating opposition and inevitable commensurate losses, is what delineates the amphibious assault from the amphibious landing.Amphibious landings are equally not defined by scale, but are anticipated in their planning to be wholly or at least largely unopposed, while obviously making contingency with ‘on call’ naval and/or air support assets in the event of this not being the case. Doctrinally, landings as opposed to assaults are the default preference for modern military planners wherever possible when undertaking amphibious operations. This is partly because the latter represent ’attritional’ rather than ‘manoeuvre’ warfare (more to follow on this), and western doctrine is very much grounded on avoiding attrition. Amphibious assaults might, therefore (but still only ‘might’) be undertaken by those nations that are culturally and politically prepared to absorb significant attrition in order to achieve an important strategic goal. China with regard to Taiwan is an obvious but still unlikely example, but even then, with the Chinese in the process of developing their amphibious capability and doctrine, the option of securing said goal without an amphibious assault version of the Chinese ‘human wave’ tactics of Korea would most likely be sought.Consider the picture of the Omaha landing above, and picture yourself among those troops packed in the LCT (still the most likely mode of ‘first wave’ amphibious delivery: an agonisingly slow-moving vessel even in their modern guise; barely ‘bulletproof’ to even small calibre fire; zero overhead protection depending on the class of LCT; and - worst of all - a man-made ‘bottle neck’ at the point it beaches, attracting direct fire onto - and into - the beached vessel and the troops who are bunched, slowed and exposed as they struggle to deploy in the face of even outnumbered opposition forces. Significant attrition is inevitable in such circumstances, and such heavy attrition is absolutely counter-intuitive to modern doctrine by the fact that it would be attempting to force an outcome at a point of the enemy’s strength rather than their weakness, as well as being politically intolerable in our (rightly) casualty-sensitive modern age. This is not to suggest of course that US and allied powers wouldn’t be prepared to incur heavy casualties by undertaking such a surely large-scale amphibious operation and assault if its strategic goal was of supreme importance and there really was no viable alternative; as such, it would be supported by the considerable naval gunfire, missile and air support available to such a US and/or coalition fleet. But by its very nature, and given the capabilities of the likely opponent(s) in the region of the world where such a titanic clash would occur, it would be an exceptionally bloody affair indeed - and the strategic end had better justify such extreme means.The amphibious assault of the 4th US Marine Division on Iwo Jima, 1945. One in ten of the amphibious assaulting force - around 3, 000 men - were killed or injured on the first day of the operation. Offensive operations during WW2 incurring high daily attrition rates of 10–15% or more - especially among infantry units - were an expected and accepted norm even among the less profligate and casualty-averse western allies; today, such losses, anticipated or incurred, are doctrinal anathema and would result in heavy political and public consequence unless it was to achieve the highest strategic outcome. .In modern doctrine, an amphibious landing - as opposed to an assault - is a concept of ‘manoeuvre warfare’ in that the ‘centre of gravity’ shifts to accommodate a ‘concentration of force’ at a point of the enemy’s weakness and so avoid significant casualties while still being timed, located and framed within a mission statement that achieves the ‘unifying purpose’ or ‘higher intent’ for that landing. Like a skilled chess player if you will, the key for the successful amphibious landing - or indeed assault, if that has to be undertaken - is to focus not solely on the ‘one move’ of the landing as the mission-effect outcome, but to consider the second or third move ahead on that landing’s role as the essential pre-requisite in achieving a mission-effect outcome in the moves that follow it.This last point is critical to successful amphibious landings of any scale, and I’ll use two examples from military history to exemplify them, with one conceived and executed poorly, and the other as an excellent example of manoeuvre warfare and modern doctrine.Poorly: the Gallipoli landings in 1915 were an amphibious landing operation that foolishly limited its objectives to successfully secure the landings on the beaches - virtually unopposed, as expected - but gave no consideration whatsoever to creating ‘operational depth’ by continuing inland and seizing the high dominating ground above those beaches as a firm bridgehead to achieve the campaign’s purpose of advancing on Constantinople and ‘‘knocking Turkey out of the war”. The Turks, by contrast, were quick to recognize and occupy the key terrain of those very positions, and, after eleven months of futile trench warfare and 300, 000 casualties, the allied troops were evacuated.Gallipoli, 1915: absurdly over-ambitious in its ultimate goal, this large-scale amphibious landing was anyway doomed by being undertaken as the end in itself, so cramming the beaches and the ground rising from them with ‘tent cities’ of troops lacking depth or dominating positions from which to advance towards the ultimate objective of the landings.By contrast, an excellent example of a successful, large-scale amphibious landing is ‘Operation Sutton’: that undertaken at San Carlos sound during the British campaign to retake the Falkland Islands after the Argentine invasion of 1982. The Argentinians deployed the majority of their land forces in and around centres of population over the islands, particularly Port Stanley on the eastern shore of the most prominent island in the group, East Falkland. There, they had established a strong defensive ring along the shore around, and in the hills above, the town. This was partly logical, as those centres of population offered very public and tangible ‘anchor points’ of the occupation; however, it was also because the Argentinians’ lack of logistical capacity and capability, as well as the acknowledged inability of their largely conscript units to manouevre or operate effectively in the harsh Falklands terrain. This tied them to these locations, and especially to Port Stanley.It was these factors that dominated the mindset of the garrison’s commander, General Menendez. He and his staff reasoned that, given their own limitations, the British too would be similarly unable to sustain forces and operations in the wild hinterland of those South Atlantic islands, especially with the approaching winter of the southern hemisphere. Thus, the British were expected to execute an amphibious assault on, or near to, Port Stanley for those same reasons that had the Argentinians concentrating there. However, the British commander, Brigadier Julian Thompson, had quickly dismissed such an amphibious assault as a viable option due to the catastrophic losses (including civilian collateral ones) and likely failure it would have entailed by seeking to force a decision against the Argentinian’s strength and their own planned ‘main effort’. As a result, Thompson opted instead to undertake an amphibious landing on entirely the other side of East Falkland to Port Stanley’s location.An illustrated map of East Falkland Island, indicating the Argentinians’ main position around Port Stanley, and the British amphibious landing zone at San Carlos, which avoided Menendez’s main concentration of entrenched forces around the town. This garrison included strong, pre-plotted artillery; anti-aircraft batteries and even land-based anti-ship missile instillations; entrenched units having clear fields of fire over barbed wire entanglement and minefields, reserves for counter-attack; and of course air support from the mainland. While San Carlos did come under repeated air attacks, this was after the the landing zone had been secured and it was not enough in its own to prevent the build up and advance to Stanley.This was, to all intents, manoeuvre warfare by the British, applying the focal point of their strength against the enemy’s weakness, and positioning themselves into the de facto ‘rear’ of the Argentinians, rapidly securing a deep bridgehead and logistical platform preparatory to the now legendary ‘yomp’ across the harsh terrain eastwards towards Stanley itself.Setting aside the jingoistic and simplistic reporting of events in the British print media, this headline is not an inaccurate metaphor for how the UK’s application of a surprise, large-scale, unopposed amphibious landing many miles distant from Port Stanley - as opposed to the anticipated amphibious assault directly against the capital - outmanoeuvred and demoralised the Argentinians, who had expected and prepared extensively for the latter.In just one day, a brigade-sized British force had landed and secured the high ground around San Carlos. Not only did this avoid the necessity of an opposed assault landing (a small unit of the Special Boat Service identified and swept away a token group of Argentinians quartered in buildings near the landing zone before the landings began), it completely wrong-footed, disheartened and wrested operational initiative from the Argentinians. For their land forces, the aforementioned limitations meant they could only seek to strengthen their entrenched positions above the town, while their morale and physical strength degraded all the time as the British forces advanced almost entirely on foot for around 70 miles over East Falkland. Those defensive positions were sieved in a series of battalion-level set-piece night attacks, compelling the surrender of the remaining enemy forces in the capital.The symbolic and famous picture of British Royal Marines advancing by foot over vast distances of the harsh terrain and climate of East Falkland. The professional British troops, well-versed in operating effectively for extended periods in such conditions with remarkably little logistical support, allowed their commander the option to execute a surprise amphibious landing as opposed to a potentially disastrous amphibious assault, which laid the foundation for victory in the campaign.Therefore, it’s perhaps missing the point to focus on the almost certain likelihood of there never being an amphibious assault on the scale of D-Day by emphasising that such assaults, of any scale, are assiduously avoided wherever possible in modern day military doctrine. Further, that large-scale amphibious landings are a far more effective option by almost every measure. Within this context, amphibious operations are still today an absolutely indispensable capability for any nation that wishes to position itself as large-scale, globally-deployable military power. To possess a truly ‘Blue Water’ navy, and with it an ability to ‘force project’ - that is, transport, deploy and sustain globally a significant (brigade/ division +) all-arms force with naval and air support is the hallmark of such a military power.Serious ‘hitters’ in the world of amphibious warfare, such as the U.K. and France, have this large-scale capability; Australia, part of the dreadfully-acronymed ‘AUSCANNZUKUS’ (a ‘cooperative’ group of nations in, or with interests in, the Pacific and likely to become formalised and expanded as the ‘NATO of the Pacific’ within the next decade to counter an increasingly powerful and ambitious China), has invested massively in developing theirs in recent years, as has China; and the US’s amphibious capability is, quite frankly, astonishing, possessing over 30 assault carriers and combat assault ships of all types, and its Marine Corps - numbering some 220, 000 including reserves - being larger than the entire armies of most of its NATO allies.While heliborne landings from amphibious platforms are a viable, smaller-scale alternative or supplement to amphibious landings - both of the UK’s QE class strike supercarriers can also temporarily convert to a part-role or dedicated role as heliborne assault carriers - heliborne landings have significant limitations with functioning in this role independently and in large scale as a means of inserting and sustaining a land-based force for protracted subsequent operations, and could never replace a large-scale amphibious Landing capability.Graphical summary of world amphibious warfare capability. Setting aside the US’s massive commitment to this form of operational capability as the pivotal means of global force projection, it comes as no surprise that two of the four other permanent members of the UN Security Council - UK and France - possess large-scale amphibious capability (China is progressing rapidly). Note also that a number of Far East nations, many of which are allied to or actively cooperating with the AUSCANNZUKUS group, also possess significant capability (graphic taken from a piece by Nick Childs titled ‘Asia-Pacific amphibious capability developments’, 2018)Therefore, amphibious operational capability - though with an emphasis on landings as opposed to assaults - are still very much the ‘must have’ of any nation that wants or needs to have a large-scale, globally deployable presence. Conducted intelligently and very much in line with modern doctrine as opposed to the chaos and attrition normally associated with the impressive but generally avoided amphibious assault, amphibious warfare is still very much warfare of the 21st Century.

NH STATE CONSTITUTION**[Art.] 2. [Natural Rights.]** All men have certain natural, essential, and inherent rights among which are, the enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting, property; and, in a word, of seeking and obtaining happiness. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by this state on account of race, creed, color, sex or national origin.June 2, 1784,**Amended 1974 adding sentence to prohibit discrimination.**In A.J’s best interest I recommend that he attend the Burnham School in Haverhill (MA)… .Furthermore, the issue of diversity is real. *A. J. would likely find it lonely being the only Black child in a school in NH.* He has a rich Black Heritage of which to be proud. He can share with and learn from other children of his color and it can enhance his growing up years in numerous ways. *In Haverhill (MA), he has that opportunity far more that it exists in NH.*” –Patricia Frim, Esq., Court Appointed Guardian ad Litem, 07/14/03****English Language Arts-Rating-“*Low”*-*Burnham Elementary Cycle III Accountability Report 2003. *During 2000-2003, Haverhill Public Schools among the “*below average*” performing school systems in the Commonwealth. On the 2003 MCAS test,*76.9% of the African American students* and *83.9% of the Hispanic American* students in Haverhill scored in the “Needs Improvement” and “Warning/Failing” categories.-*Executive Summary-Mass Dept of Ed-Haverhill Exam Report, 2004***Marital Master Fishman wrote:“Ultimately, the court finds that the most important factors are diversity and crime. Given the information presented on the issue of diversity…the Court concludes that the Burnham school in Haverhill (MA) would be the more appropriate placement for A.J.”- Marital Master Harriet J. Fishman- Holder and Holder, Docket No. 02-M-0032 (Approved Judge Gerald Taube). 08/05/03A.J. IS BLACK ENGLISH SPEAKING U.S. BORN & RAISED NON-HISPANIC MALE. HIS MOTHER LIVED @ 52 ARLINGTON STREET ONLY DOORS AWAY FROM A DOMINICAN GANG SHOOTING. I FOREWARNED THE JIM CROW STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE OF THE GANG AND SCHOOL PROBLEM. I HAD TO TRANSPORT HIM ACROSS STATE LINES TO A PERSISTENTLY FAILING URBAN ESL SCHOOLCrime rates in Haverhill are among the highest in Massachusetts cities, surpassing Lawrence in every category and even showing that city residents and businesses are the most susceptible to burglary of any major city in the state**.” Church, Zach., “Haverhill crime high among state cities; Lawrence shows improvement’ October 01, 2007 Lawrence-Eagle Tribune.District Attorney Jonathan Blodgett offered assistance to Haverhill from the federal and state law enforcement agencies in fight local gangs…In Haverhill, there have been a lot of shootings since August, with most of the activity in the ARLINGTON ST and ACRE neighborhoods.”*Although I retained joint physical and legal custody, I was mandated by the court to transport my son across state lines to the inferior performing Haverhill Public School system, thus undermining his right to equal educational opportunity to attend public school in NH. I was deprived of my fundamental constitutional right to have a say in his educational upbringing. He had raised in NH since birth. There was never an issue of where he would attend school while me and his mother were married. .The NH Supreme Court ruled“No appeal, however, is declined except by unanimous vote of the court with at least three justices participating. No justice who considered this matter voted to accept this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal was declined. If any justice who considered this matter believed the appeal should have been accepted, this case would have been scheduled for briefing. Declined. Brock, C.J., and Broderick, Nadeau, Dalianis and Duggan, JJ., concurred. Case No. 03-0640, (Declining to hear appeal of Case 02-M-0032), 11/21/03)Marital Master Fishman ruled the issue of “Diversity” was real and justified the decision to have my son attend the Burnham School for reasons of “Diversity and Crime” The issue of “Crime” covered Frim testifying that a “rapist” lived near the Newton NH home, which happened to be the marital home which I retained. In 2003, there was only one (1) registered sex offender living in Newton, NH, yet there were eighty-eight (88) Level 2 and 3 Registered Sex Offenders living in Haverhill, MA, which Frim purposely neglected and omitted any mention during her testimony.Most of Haverhill’s registered sex offenders actually reside in the Arlington St-Acre area, which newspaper articles describe as being “traditionally known for its street crime.” Where we lived in NH was a small predominantly white middle class bedroom community of 4500 residents and Haverhill, MA is a large urban environment of 69K residents. Haverhill has the highest crime rate in the Commonwealth.Did you know I testified about the presence of gang, drugs and high crime on the lower end of Arlington Street-Acre area where my ex-wife took up residence.The Almighty Latin King and Queen Nation (ALKQN, ALKN, LKN) is the largest Hispanic and Latino street gang worldwide. Its roots date to 1954 in Chicago, Illinois. Arlington St was also the home of members of the Trinitarios gang — a well known Dominican gang that uses machetes as their primary weapon.A fit parent and positive role model is presumed to make decisions that are in the best interest of their child. THE EXCLUSIVELY WHITE MEMBERS OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE JUDICIAL BRANCH KNOWINGLY AND RECKLESSLY ENDANGERED THE PERSONAL SAFETY AND EDUCATION OF MY SONMaster of Arts, Criminal Justice & TerrorismBachelor of Science, Criminal Justice (Cum Laude)Associate in Science, Criminal Justice (Magna Cum Laude)27 YRS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT.