Supervisory Assessment Of Potential (1 And 2 Levels) Us: Fill & Download for Free

This being a area, once I studied voraciously and came up with an article , I will try to address the question partly from my write-up.Extract from the article catering your question about Basel I and II:Banks are one among the major triggers in most of the economic crises. Banks are the veins of circulation of money in an economy. So the soundness of banking system is imperative to prevent the collapse of the system. The premature liberalization of the local financial markets and the failure to keep adequate checks on lending functions of the banks are the major reasons for the Asian economic crisis of 1997. Absence of effective regulation and supervision led to large capital inflows in the domestic short term debt market. Banks lent on long term basis using the foreign inflows. Later when signs of pessimism became visible foreign inflows to economies such as Philippines, Malaysia etc... started to decline. (Buckley n.d.) Similarly, in the year 2008 the reckless lending of US banks like Lehman brothers and securitization of the sub-standard loans into instruments known as CDO-s (Collateral Debt Obligations) and trading of the securities in the stock market led to the sub-prime crisis of 2008 and resultant recession in the follow-up. Thus a perfect regulation and prudential supervision of banks is tellingly important for the smooth sailing of an economy.Basel ICapital is the last recourse that would be available for any bank to prevent its failure. In the year 1974, after the failure of Herstatt bank in Germany the need for better regulation of banking sector was felt by G-10 countries. They constituted the Basel Committee for Banking Supervisory practices (BCBS) under the aegis of Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Basel I was recommended for implementation by the BCBS for mainly addressing the issue of Credit risk in the year 1988. Credit risk implies the risk involved in the recovery of loans that were lent. In order to address the issue BCBS fixed a minimum capital adequacy requirement to be maintained by the banks. It pegged the Capital adequacy ratio (CAR) at 8%. (Tarullo n.d.) Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) = Tier 1 Capital + Tier 2 Capital/ Risk Weighted Assets Tier 1 capital represents the capital that is more permanent in nature and is more reliable. Tier 1 capital or core capital of a bank includes the normal paid up share capital of the bank and other disclosed reserves as reduced by the intangible assets of the bank such as Goodwill, fictitious assets such as debit balance to the Profit and loss account, any expenditure that is not written off and the Deferred tax asset. The Tier 1 capital should form atleast 50% of the bank’s total capital base. Tier 2 represents the capital that is not as much reliable as the Tier 1 capital because of the lack of corroborated ownership as in the case of Tier 1 capital. Tier 2 or Supplementary capital consists of Undisclosed reserves, Cumulative non redeemable preference share capital, General provisions and loss reserves written back as surplus if the actual loss or diminution is found to be in excess of the provision or loss reserves created earlier, Revaluation reserves, Hybrid capital instruments and Subordinated debt with minimum maturity of 5 years. There are also restrictions such as subordinated debts could not exceed 50% of the core capital, general provisions and loss reserves could not exceed 1.25% of the total risk weighted assets. ‘Risk weighted assets’ is the value of the assets adjusted for the risk of the asset failing to liquidate as valued. Risk WeightsUnder Basel I, risk weights were classified into 5 Categories namely, 0%, 0% to 50%, 20, 50%, 100%. (Tarullo n.d.)The weight of zero percent was assigned to assets such as loans lent to OECD states, Investment with OECD central government’s securities, loans to borrowers, who are backed by the guaranties of the OECD states or who had given the securities of the OECD countries as collateral. Since OECD states are considered to be developed countries their securities were assigned zero credit risk. Loans to non – OECD countries and central banks too were assigned 0% risk weights, provided loans advanced to them were in their own currency i.e., in the currency of the borrowing country. This is done to eliminate the risk of exchange rate movements on the loans advanced in view of the probable depreciation of the currencies of the non-OECD countries.Loans or investment with domestic public sector enterprises that remain outside the ambit of central government were given risk weights ranging from 0% to 50% at the discretion of nation’s regulator , which could be 0%, 10%, 20% and 50%.Loans or investment with institutions such as Multilateral development banks, OECD banks, Non-OECD banks with tenor extending upto 1 year, loans guaranteed by OECD incorporated banks, short term loans guaranteed by non-OECD banks were assigned a weight of 20%.Loans to non-OECD banks given on a tenor of more than 1 year are assigned a weight of 50%.Loans or investment with private sector enterprises, Non – OECD banks with tenor more than one year, capital market instruments issued by other banks were assigned a weight of 100%.In order to capture the risk that resides with the off – balance sheet items such as contingent liabilities, a new parameter called "Credit conversion factor" (CCF) was deployed. For instance :General guarantees against loans were assigned 0%Letter of credits against Shipments were assigned 20%In 1996, in response to the financial innovations, as instruments like derivatives were started to be widely used, a new factor called market risk was introduced to strengthen the standards. Market risk is the risk of losses on account of movements in market prices with the on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet positions. (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2005) The way CAR would be calculated was modified to factor in Market risk and a new category of capital called as Tier 3 capital. The Tier 3 capital is composed of Short term subordinated bonds that would exclusively cover market risks. Market risk consists of interest rate risk, equity position risk, foreign exchange risk and commodities risk. For measuring market risk, BCBS proposed two approaches namely Standardized approach, where the principles of gauging the market risk were completely prescribed by the BCBS and Internal grading based approach, where a certain degree of independence was granted to banks in assessing market risk.Basel II​​Image Source: Basel II | Asymptotix As years passed by, Basel II evolved. Basel II was given approval in the year 2004. The norms of Basel II accord were on three fronts, which are given by the three pillars viz: 1.The minimum capital requirement; 2.The supervisory review; 3.The market discipline. The level of minimum capital requirement was continued to be maintained at 8% under the new framework. A new benchmark of risk called Operational risk was introduced. Operational risk is defined as the risk of loss resulting from the failure of internal processes or from the external events. For instance, Operational risk includes employee frauds, sabotage of assets of the bank, external frauds etc… Put simply, the losses that the bank may suffer, other than, in the normal course of business.Pillar 1Basel II provided three different approaches for credit risk determination. They are:Standardized approachFoundation internal rating based approach (F-IRB)Advanced internal rating based approach (A-IRB).The standardized approach provides that the risk weights should be assigned based on the ratings given by the External Credit Rating Institutions (ECAI). Under the new approach risk weights may range from 0% to 150%. Unlike Basel I, where loans to OECD central banks and OECD states where assigned a lower risk weights considering their credibility, in Basel II ratings assigned by the external credit rating agencies were considered as benchmarks and loans to foreign banks were assigned risk weights based on the ratings given by them. However when a foreign bank that is operating in a country lends to the central bank of the country, where it is incorporated then a lower risk weight may be applied to such asset provided the loan is funded and denominated in the domestic currency of the foreign bank. Another prominent feature of the Basel II accord is a corporate may get rated by an ECAI and be assigned a lower risk weight based on the ratings. This stands in contrast to the Basel I accord, where all the corporates were assigned a uniform risk weight of 100%. This might cause the banks to infer that lending to SME-s (Small and Medium Scale Enterprise) may prove to be expensive. (Francis n.d.) Internal ratings based approach allows the banks to devise their own models to assess the risk. Under the other two approaches, Banks use their own model to measure the parameters like PD (Probability of default), EAD (Exposure at default), LGD(Loss given default), which are used in calculating the Risk weighted assets (RWA). To cover operational risk of loss, Basel II prescribes three approaches namely basic indicator approach, standardized approach and advanced measurement approach.Basic indicator approach and standardized approach requires an appropriation of 15%, 12% to 18% respectively of bank’s average annual gross income to the reserves in the preceding three years.Under the standardized approach, bank’s activities are divided into eight business lines each possessing a different "Denoted beta" ranging from the 12% to 18%. The past three years average of the gross annual income of each business line is multiplied with the respective beta to arrive at the capital charge.Under the Advanced measurement approach banks can quantify the capital to cover operational risk using their own internal model taking into account internal risk variables and profiles.Pillar 2Pillar 2 specifies the norms for regulatory authorities. The banks should have deployed a system for assessing the stability of the capital and preclude any fall below the standard level. The regulator should mandate the banks to operate above the minimum capital requirement and should prevent the capital of the banks from falling below the minimum level, which is specified. Pillar 3 Under the Pillar 3, banks are required to follow a formal disclosure policy. Disclosures regarding capital adequacy, credit risk mitigation, the internal ratings systems that it follows under the IRB approach were all specified under Pillar 3.Works CitedBasel Committee on Banking Supervision. "Amendment to the Capital Accord to incorporate market risks." 2005.Buckley, Ross P. International Finance system - Policy and regulation.Francis, Smitha. "The Revised Basel Capital Accord: The Logic, Content and Potential."R.Kannan. "How to swat the NPA bug." Business Line, 4 5, 2013.Tarullo, Daniel K. Banking on Basel: The Future of International Financial Regulation.Source : Basel Capital Accords: An Overview*Now I will add up to this by pointing to the key modifications with the Basel III:Basel III:Basel III was introduced in December 2010. It came as a response to the sub-prime crisis in the year 2008. As of now, it's implementation has been extended to 31st March 2019.The Key modifications happened with Basel III are as follows :​​Image Source: Basel II-III: Disclosure Requirement on RemunerationThe requirement of minimum Tier 1 capital has been increased from 4% in Basel II to 6%A new buffer called as Capital conservation buffer with Tier 1 capital needs to maintained and the requirement level for this has been pegged at 2.5% of the RWA.The total "Capital adequacy ratio" requirement has been maintained at 8%But when combined with the newly introduced conservation buffer, the requirement of capital increases to 10.5%At the discretion of the central banks of the countries, banks may be required to maintain a "Counter cyclical buffer" ranging from 0% to 2.5% depending on the economic conditions.A new measure called leverage ratio is introduced. It measures the proportion of Tier 1 capital to the total exposure of the bank ( Not RWA). A minimum ratio of 3% is to be maintained.

In my review today of the DOJ OIG's "Review of Four FISA Applications and Other Aspects of the FBI's Crossfire Hurricane Investigation"; found here on the OIG IG's site (Yes I have, haven't you?); https://www.justice.gov/storage/120919-examination.pdf,… I didn't find any type of "Heads Will Roll" recommendations or language directed at any one or group of individuals.I've seen many & much more scathing recommendations sections in Veterans Administration IG office reports from the last 2 years.Here is my "short version"...Page 412; “FISA WARRANTS”:“As with the first FISA application, we do not speculate whether or how having accurate and complete information might have influenced the decisions of senior Department leaders who supported the renewal applications, or the court, if they had known all of the relevant information.Nevertheless, it was the obligation of the FBI agents and supervisors who were aware of the information to ensure that the FISA applications were "scrupulously accurate" and that 01, the Department's decision makers, and ultimately, the court had the opportunity to consider the additional information and the information omitted from the first application. The individuals involved did not meet this obligation."From “Executive Summary”, Pages 14 - 19:"We concluded that the failures described above and in this report represent serious performance failures by the supervisory and non-supervisory agents with responsibility over the FISA applications.These failures prevented OI from fully performing its gatekeeper function and deprived the decision makers the opportunity to make fully informed decisions.Although some of the factual misstatements and omissions we found in this review were arguably more significant than others, we believe that all of them taken together resulted in FISA applications that made it appear that the information supporting probable cause was stronger than was actually the case. (...)(...) While we did not find documentary or testimonial evidence of intentional misconduct on the part of the case agents who assisted OI in preparing the applications, or the agents and supervisors who performed the Woods Procedures, we also did not receive satisfactory explanations for the errors or problems we identified. (...)(...) FBI Headquarters established a chain of command for Crossfire Hurricane that included close supervision by senior CD managers, who then briefed FBI leadership throughout the investigation.Although we do not expect managers and supervisors to know every fact about an investigation, or senior officials to know all the details of cases about which they are briefed, in a sensitive, high-priority matter like this one, it is reasonable to expect that they will take the necessary steps to ensure that they are sufficiently familiar with the facts and circumstances supporting and potentially undermining a FISA application in order to provide effective oversight, consistent with their level of supervisory responsibility.We concluded that the information that was known to the managers, supervisors, and senior officials should have resulted in questions being raised regarding the reliability of the Steele reporting and the probable cause supporting the FISA applications, but did not.In our view, this was a failure of not only the operational team, but also of the managers and supervisors, including senior officials, in the chain of command.For these reasons, we recommend that the FBI review the performance of the employees who had responsibility for the preparation, Woods review, or approval of the FISA applications, as well as the managers and supervisors in the chain of command of the Carter Page investigation, including senior officials, and take any action deemed appropriate.In addition, given the extensive compliance failures we identified in this review, we believe that additional OIG oversight work is required to assess the FBI's compliance with Department and FBI FISA-related policies that seek to protect the civil liberties of U.S. persons.Accordingly, we have today initiated an OIG audit that will further examine the FBI's compliance with the Woods Procedures in FISA applications that target U.S. persons in both counterintelligence and counterterrorism investigations."Here is where a whole n’other favorite Trump conspiracy theory and Trump rally highlight is debunked: “They had an inside guy spying on our campaign!!”:The Use of Confidential Sources (Other Than Steele) and Undercover Employees”:"As discussed in Chapter Ten, we determined that, during the 2016 presidential campaign, the Crossfire Hurricane team tasked several CHSs, which resulted in multiple interactions with Carter Page and George Papadopoulos, both before and after they were affiliated with the Trump campaign, and one with a high-level Trump campaign official who was not a subject of the investigation.All of these CHS interactions were consensually monitored and recorded by the FBI.As noted above, under Department and FBI policy, the use of a CHS to conduct consensual monitoring is a matter of investigative judgment that, absent certain circumstances, can be authorized by a first-line supervisor (a supervisory special agent).We determined that the CHS operations conducted during Crossfire Hurricane received the necessary FBI approvals, and that AD Priestap knew about, and approved of, all of the Crossfire Hurricane CHS operations, even in circumstances where a first-level supervisory special agent could have approved the operations.We found no evidence that the FBI used CHSs or UCEs to interact with members of the Trump campaign prior to the opening of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation. (...)(...) Through our review, we also determined that there were other CHSs tasked by the FBI to attempt to contact Papadopoulos, but that those attempted contacts did not lead to any operational activity.We also identified several individuals who had either a connection to candidate Trump or a role in the Trump campaign, and were also FBI CHSs, but who were not tasked as part of the Crossfire Hurricane investigation.One such CHS did provide the Crossfire Hurricane team with general information about Crossfire Hurricane subjects Page and Manafort, but we found that this CHS had no further involvement in the investigation."From Page 19; “Recommendations”:"Our report makes nine recommendations to the FBI and the Department to assist them in addressing the issues that we identified in this review:The Department and the FBI should ensure that adequate procedures are in place for OI to obtain all relevant and accurate information needed to prepare FISA applications and renewal applications, including CHS information. In Chapter Twelve, we identify a few specific steps to assist in this effort.The Department and FBI should evaluate which types of SIMs require advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the DAG, in addition to the notifications currently required for SIMs, especially for case openings that implicate core First Amendment activity and raise policy considerations or heighten enterprise risk, and establish implementing policies and guidance, as necessary.The FBI should develop protocols and guidelines for staffing and administrating any future sensitive investigative matters from FBI Headquarters.The FBI should address the problems with the administration and assessment of CHSs identified in this report, including, at a minimum, revising the FBI's standard CHS admonishments, improving the documentation of CHS information, revising FBI policy to address the acceptance of information from a closed CHS indirectly through a third party, and taking other steps we identify in Chapter Twelve.The Department and FBI should clarify the terms;(1) "sensitive monitoring circumstance" in the AG Guidelines and the DIOG to determine whether to expand its scope to include consensual monitoring of a domestic political candidate or an individual prominent within a domestic political organization, or a subset of these persons, so that consensual monitoring of such individuals would require consultation with or advance notification to a senior Department official, such as the DAG, and...(2)..."prominent in a domestic political organization" so that agents understand which campaign officials fall within that definition as it relates to "sensitive investigative matters," "sensitive UDP," the designation of "sensitive sources," and "sensitive monitoring circumstance."The FBI should ensure that appropriate training on DIOG § 4 is provided to emphasize the constitutional implications of certain monitoring situations and to ensure that agents account for these concerns, both in the tasking of CHSs and in the way they document interactions with and tasking of CHSs.The FBI should establish a policy regarding the use of defensive and transition briefings for investigative purposes, including the factors to be considered and approval by senior leaders at the FBI with notice to a senior Department official, such as the DAG.The Department's Office of Professional Responsibility should review our findings related to the conduct of Department attorney Bruce Ohr for any action it deems appropriate. Ohr's current supervisors in CRM should also review our findings related to Ohr's performance for any action they deem appropriate.The FBI should review the performance of all employees who had responsibility for the preparation, Woods review, or approval of the FISA applications, as well as the managers, supervisors, and senior officials in the chain of command of the Carter Page investigation for any action it deems appropriate."Nope, no future rolling heads in evidence there….

Basel III, risk and compliance management trainingBasel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA)The Basel iii Compliance Professionals Association (BiiiCPA) develops and maintains four certification programs and many tailor-made training programs for directors, executive managers, professionals, consultants, vendors, service providers, auditors and legal counsels around the world. Subject matter experts review and update this body of knowledge.1. Course TitleCertified Basel iii Professional (CBiiiPro)Objectives:The seminar has been designed to provide with the knowledge and skills needed to understand the new Basel III framework and to work in Basel III Projects.The course provides with the skills needed to pass the exam and become a Certified Basel iii Professional (CBiiiPro).Target Audience:This course is intended for managers, professionals, consultants, service providers and vendors working for Banks, Financial Organizations, Financial Groups and Financial Conglomerates. They need to understand not only the new Basel III requirements, challenges and opportunities, but also the regulatory differences for branches and subsidiaries or their bank around the world.This course is highly recommended for:- Managers and Professionals involved in Basel III (decision making and implementation)- Risk and Compliance Officers- Auditors- IT Professionals- Strategic Planners- Analysts- Legal Counsels- Process OwnersCourse Synopsis:What is Basel III?•The Basel III papers•Was Basel II responsible for the market crisis?•Introduction to the Basel III Amendments•The Financial Stability Board (FSB), the G20 and the Basel III framework1. The New Basel III Principles for risk management and corporate governanceThe key areas where the Basel Committee believes the greatest focus is necessary1.Board practices2.Senior management3.Risk management and internal controls4.Compensation5.Complex or opaque corporate structures6.Disclosure and transparencySound Practices for the Management of Operational Risk•The 9 principles2. The Quality of Capital•The numerator: A strict definition of capital•Limits and Minima•Common Equity Tier 1•Common shares issued by the bank•Additional Tier 1 capital•Tier 2 capital•Investments held by banks in capital instruments of other banks and financial and insurance entities•The corresponding deduction approach and the changes in the business model•Double Gearing and Basel III•Securitisation and Resecuritisation3. The Risk Weighted Assets•The denominator: Enhanced risk coverage•Understanding securitization4. The Capital Ratio•In addition to the quality of capital and risk coverage•Calibration•Transition period5. Global Liquidity Standards•Introduction of global minimum liquidity standards•The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) that makes banks more resilient to potential short-term disruptions•Stock of high-quality liquid assets•Total net cash outflows•The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) that addresses longer-term structural liquidity mismatches•Available stable funding (ASF)•Required stable funding (RSF)•Contractual maturity mismatch•Concentration of funding•Available unencumbered assets•LCR by significant currency•Market-related monitoring tools•Transitional arrangements6. Capital Conservation•Distribution policies that are inconsistent with sound capital conservation principles•Supervisors enforce capital conservation discipline7. Leverage Ratio•Strong Tier 1 risk based ratios with high levels of on and off balance sheet leverage•Simple, non-risk-based leverage ratio•Introducing additional safeguards against model risk and measurement error•Calculation of the leverage ratio. The January 2014 amendment.8. Countercyclical Capital Buffer•Procyclical or Countercyclical?•The new countercyclical capital buffer•Home / Host Challenges•Guidance for national authorities operating the countercyclical capital buffer•Principles underpinning the role of judgement•Principle 1: (Objectives)•Principle 2: (Common reference guide)•Principle 3: (Risk of misleading signals)•Principle 4: (Prompt release)•Principle 5: (Other macroprudential tools)•Jurisdictional reciprocity•Frequency of buffer decisions and communications•Treatment of surplus when buffer returns to zero•Interaction with Pillar 1 and 29. Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs)•SIFIs and G-SIFIs•Improvements to resolution regimes•Additional loss absorption capacity•More intensive supervisory oversight•Stronger robustness standards•Peer review•Developments at the national and regional level•The Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC)•The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)•Strengthening SIFI supervision10. Systemically Important Markets and Infrastructures (SIMIs)•The Basel Committee and Financial Stability Board endorse central clearing and trade reporting on OTC derivatives•Derivative counterparty credit exposures to central counterparty clearing houses (CCPs)11. Risk Modelling, Stress Testing and Scenario Analysis•Capture of systemic risk/tail events in stress testing and risk modelling•VaR shortcomings: the normality assumption•Need for a strong stress testing programme•Systemic risk capture in banks’ risk models12. Stressed Value-at-Risk (S-VaR), Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR), Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA), Wrong-Way Risk•Overview of the new requirements•Stressed Value-at-Risk (S-VaR)•Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR)•Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA)•Wrong-Way RiskPillar 2 Amendments: Stress testing•Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision•Use of stress testing and integration in risk governance•Stress testing methodologies•Scenario selection•Principles for sound stress testing practices and supervision•Firm-wide stress testing•15 stress testing principles for banks•6 stress testing principles for supervisorsRecognising the risk-mitigating impact of insurance in operational risk modelling•Insurance industry supervision•Banking supervisors’ assessment processes•Approval of insurance contracts•Revoking approval for recognising insurance mitigation in capital•Maximum 20% operational risk capital charge reduction•Modelling methodology•Traditional and proposed insurance policies•Criteria for recognising insurance mitigation•Partial insurance modelingUnderstanding Supervisory Colleges•Good practice principles on supervisory colleges•Principles for both home and host supervisors•Principle 1: College objectives•Principle 2: College structures•Home supervisors, Host supervisors•Principle 3: Information sharing•Principle 4: Communication channels•Principle 5: Collaborative work•Principle 6: Interaction with the institution•Principle 7: Crisis management•Principle 8: Macroprudential work•Case Study: Committee of European Banking Supervisors, Joint decision on model validationBasel III for international financial organizations•The Dodd-Frank Act in the USA and the Basel III framework•The Capital Requirements Directives (II, III, IV) of the European Union and the Basel III frameworkThe Impact of Basel III•Investment Banking, Corporate Banking, Retail Banking•Investment banks are primarily affected, particularly in trading and securitization businesses•The new capital rules have a substantial impact on profitability•Banks with insurance subsidiaries•Minority investments after Basel III•Interaction between Solvency II and Basel III•Regulatory Arbitrage after Basel III•Examples and Case Studies•Closing remarksReference - Islamic Banking and Basel IIIMany Basel iii professionals need to have a good understanding of the Basel iii equivalent rules in Islamic BankingThis presentation is not necessary for the examThere are no questions based on these slides•Islamic Banking and Basel ii / Basel iii•Islamic finance has continued to expand its potential as a sustainable and stable form of financial intermediation•Basel iii is designed for conventional banks•Profit Sharing Investment Accounts (PSIA)•The Basel II / Basel III equivalent rules developed by the Islamic Financial Standards Board (IFSB) and the Islamic Development Bank (IDB)•The liquidity risk management and liquidity ratios challenge•The setting up of the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) and the Islamic Financial Stability Forum (IFSF)•IFSB-13: Stress Testing principles•IFSB-12: Liquidity Risk•IFSB-10: Governance•Closing Remarks2. Course TitleCertified Pillar 2 Expert - Basel 3 (CP2E-B3)Objectives:The seminar has been designed to provide with the knowledge and skills needed to understand better the Second Pillar of the Basel III framework and to work in Basel III Pillar 2 Projects.The course provides with the skills needed to pass the exam and become a Certified Pillar 2 Expert - Basel 3 (CP2E-B3).Target Audience:This course is intended for managers, professionals, consultants, service providers and vendors working for Banks, Financial Organizations, Financial Groups and Financial Conglomerates. They need to understand not only the new Basel III requirements, challenges and opportunities, but also the regulatory differences for branches and subsidiaries or their bank around the world.This course is highly recommended for:- Managers and Professionals involved in the Second Pillar of Basel III (decision making and implementation)- Risk and Compliance Officers- Auditors- IT Professionals- Strategic Planners- Analysts- Legal Counsels- Process OwnersCourse Synopsis:•The Second Pillar of Basel 2•Revised Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision•From the Second Pillar of Basel 2 to the Second Pillar of Basel 3•The new ICAAP•Basel III Pillar 2 Guidelines•Basel III Pillar 2 Guidelines and Case Studies in the USA•Basel III Pillar 2 Guidelines and Case Studies in the EU•Basel III Pillar 2 Guidelines and Case Studies in the G20 countries•Basel III Pillar 2 Guidelines and Case Studies in Other CountriesNOTES:1.The US, EU and UK rules implementing Basel III follow many aspects of Basel III closely, but there are so many differences in approach in several key areas. Many G20 countries choose options and national discretions that make them “materially non-compliant” or “largely compliant” with Basel III. We organize in-house instructor-led training in major financial organizations, where we tailor the program to meet specific requirements.2.It is highly recommended to study the Certified Basel iii Professional (CBiiiPro) Program before the Certified Pillar 2 Expert - Basel 3 (CP2E-B3) Program.3. Course TitleCertified Pillar 3 Expert - Basel 3 (CP3E-B3)Objectives:The seminar has been designed to provide with the knowledge and skills needed to understand the Third Pillar of the new Basel III framework and to work in Basel III Projects.The course provides with the skills needed to pass the exam and become a Certified Pillar 3 Expert - Basel 3 (CP3E-B3).Target Audience:This course is intended for managers, professionals, consultants, service providers and vendors working for Banks, Financial Organizations, Financial Groups and Financial Conglomerates. They need to understand not only the new Basel III requirements, challenges and opportunities, but also the regulatory differences for branches and subsidiaries or their bank around the world.This course is highly recommended for:- Managers and Professionals involved in the third Pillar of Basel III (decision making and implementation)- Risk and Compliance Officers- Auditors- IT Professionals- Strategic Planners- Analysts- Legal Counsels- Process OwnersCourse Synopsis:•Revised Pillar 3 disclosure requirements•Introduction•Guide for disclosure of Pillar 3 information•Scope of application•Implementation date•Reporting location•Frequency and timing of disclosures•Assurance of Pillar 3 data•Proprietary and confidential information•Guiding principles for banks’ Pillar 3 disclosures•Principle 1: Disclosures should be clear•Principle 2: Disclosures should be comprehensive•Principle 3: Disclosures should be meaningful to users•Principle 4: Disclosures should be consistent over time•Principle 5: Disclosures should be comparable across banks•Presentation of the disclosure requirements•Templates and tables•Templates with a fixed format•Templates/tables with a flexible format•Signposting•Qualitative narrative to accompany the disclosure requirements•Format and reporting frequency of each disclosure requirement•Overview of risk management and RWA•Linkages between financial statements and regulatory exposures•Credit risk•General information about credit risk•Credit risk mitigation•Credit risk under standardised approach•Credit risk under internal risk-based approaches•Counterparty credit risk•Securitisation•Quantitative disclosure - description of a bank’s securitisation exposures•Quantitative disclosure – calculation of capital requirements•Market risk•Operational risk•Interest rate risk in the banking book (unchanged)•Abbreviations•Pillar 3 disclosure requirements for remuneration•Background and objectives•Pillar 3 disclosure requirements•Scope of application•Method and frequency of disclosure•Key disclosures•Composition of capital disclosure requirements•Introduction•Post 1 January 2018 disclosure template•Reconciliation requirements•Main features template•Other disclosure requirements•Template during the transitional period•Global systemically important banks: updated assessment methodology and the higher loss absorbency requirement•Introduction•Methodology for assessing systemic importance of G-SIBs•A. Indicator-based measurement approach•B. Sample of banks•C. Bucketing approach•D. Supervisory judgment•E. Periodic review and refinement•F. Disclosure requirements•The magnitude of the higher loss absorbency requirement and its impact•Instruments to meet the higher loss absorbency requirement•Interaction with other elements of the Basel III framework•Liquidity coverage ratio disclosure standards•Introduction•Disclosure requirements•Guidance on additional disclosures•Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements•Introduction•Disclosure requirements•Implementation date, frequency and location of disclosure•Disclosure templates•Summary comparison table•Common disclosure template and explanatory table, reconciliation and other requirements•Basel III Pillar 3 Guidelines in the USA•Basel III Pillar 3 Guidelines in the EU•Basel III Pillar 3 Case Studies4. Course TitleCertified Stress Testing Expert - Basel 3 (CSTE-B3)Objectives:The seminar has been designed to provide with the knowledge and skills needed to understand the new Financial Stress Testing requirements of the Basel III framework and to work in Basel III Projects.The course provides with the skills needed to pass the exam and become a Certified Stress Testing Expert - Basel 3 (CSTE-B3).Target Audience:This course is intended for managers, professionals, consultants, service providers and vendors working for Banks, Financial Organizations, Financial Groups and Financial Conglomerates. They need to understand not only the new Basel III requirements, challenges and opportunities, but also the regulatory differences for branches and subsidiaries or their bank around the world.This course is highly recommended for:- Managers and Professionals involved in Financial Stress Testing after Basel III (decision making and implementation)- Risk and Compliance Officers- Auditors- IT Professionals- Strategic Planners- Analysts- Legal Counsels- Process OwnersCourse Synopsis:•The Basel III papers•Stress Testing Before and After the Crisis•Basel III Stress Testing Guidelines•Basel III Stress Testing Guidelines and Case Studies in the USA•Basel III Stress Testing Guidelines and Case Studies in the EU•Basel III Stress Testing Guidelines and Case Studies in the G20 countries•Basel III Stress Testing Guidelines and Case Studies in Other CountriesNOTES:1.The US, EU and UK rules implementing Basel III follow many aspects of Basel III closely, but there are so many differences in approach in several key areas. Many G20 countries choose options and national discretions that make them “materially non-compliant” or “largely compliant” with Basel III. We organize in-house instructor-led training in major financial organizations, where we tailor the program to meet specific requirements.2.It is highly recommended to study the Certified Basel iii Professional (CBiiiPro) Program before the Certified Stress Testing Expert - Basel 3 (CSTE-B3) Program.you may contact them through email for further : [email protected]