Reference Letter 4 References Per Adoption Prospective: Fill & Download for Free

Let's take the case of Narendra who had applied for a credit card from ABC Bank about a year ago. 12 months after getting the card, Narendra realized that he did not receive much benefits from the card, and it was simply an additional headache to manage. So he decided to cancel the card and adopted the following process while closing his credit card –Step 1: Narendra contacted the customer service desk of the bank by dialing the number given behind the card. He then found out what is the actual amount outstanding in the card.Step 2: He made an online payment for this amount and cleared all dues in the card account. As the amount was small, he made the payment in one go. Sometimes, the amount outstanding is quite large for an individual to pay it at once. In such a case, make regular payments, either on a weekly or monthly basis and clear the dues. Note that if a monthly payment is made, you will still accrue interest on the balance, and the final payment should include all fees and charges. Narendra kept a record of his payment as proof.Step 3: On making a full payment of the outstanding balance, Narendra contacted the customer service desk again and placed a request for cancellation of the card. He made a note of the date and time of the call, as well as the name of the representative who took down the request. Narendra also got a request confirmation number, which would be the reference for all future correspondence on the request.Step 4: Narendra then wrote to the credit card company/bank and sought verification that the account has been closed. He mentioned the details of his call with the customer service representative. He sent the letter through Registered Post, so that there is a legal record of the same. (It can be done via email also however please make sure to communicate via your registered email id which is with the card issuing Bank.)Step 5: After a few weeks, Narendra received confirmation from the bank that the credit card has been cancelled and closed. He then proceeded to cut the credit card into small pieces across the magnetic strip. This completes the cancellation process.Things to keep in mind while cancelling the credit card:The first most important thing to remember is that the bank will not cancel your card unless you have paid all dues. This not only includes the expenses you incurred on your card, but also includes all interest, fees and charges on the card. Sometimes, you may cancel your card after the billing date, and as a result, there may be a residue amount which is not reflected in your last statement.Most customers feel that some card charges are unfair and proceed to cancel the card without paying these. However, the bank will not cancel the card unless you pay these dues. Further, you will have to continue paying interest and late payment charges on these dues till you settle everything.Simply cutting the card at your end and mailing it to the bank will not cancel the card. Insist on getting a written acknowledgement from the bank that the card has been cancelled.Does closing a credit card affect your credit score?Closing a credit card can reduce your credit score. This is because you are reducing your overall credit limit by closing a card. As a result, your credit utilization will go up on an overall basis. Assume you have three cards with a total credit limit of Rs.1.5 lakhs and you spend Rs.75,000 in a month. So your credit utilisation is 50 per cent. Now supposing you want to close one of the cards which has a credit limit of Rs.50,000 as you are not using this card - Then your overall credit utilisation will be 75 per cent (75,000/100,000). This can suggest that you are credit hungry in nature.Does this mean that you should not close unused cards?No. It is better to close unused cards to prevent misuse or fraud. However, if you wish to close more than one card, you should do so gradually and not all at once.Further, the older the credit history, the better it is for your credit score. A long track record will help lenders judge your track record and hence determine future behaviour and default chances. Hence you must always look at keeping older credit cards alive, and close the newer ones if the need arises. This is because the history of closed unused cards goes off the report after some years. Remember, if you already have a weak score, then work on improving your score first before proceeding to cancel the cards.What happens if the credit card is not closed properly?If you do not follow the proper steps in closing the card, there may be a case when there is an outstanding balance on your card. For instance, if you do not get an acknowledgement from the bank, the bank may charge renewal fees which will get showed as unpaid dues, even though you may have cut the card. This will get carried on month after month, attracting penalties. This will automatically affect your credit score, affecting your future prospects of availing a loan. So remember to actively follow up with the lender and get your credit card closed.Closing a credit card is just as important as opting for one. Always follow the right protocol when opting for a credit card closure and check its impact on your credit score once done.Hope this will help…Cheers..

The following details are given on Central Adoption Resource Authority, India. I am directly putting from website. The complete procedure is explained in detail. Also I assume you are a resident India.Procedure for AdoptionCHAPTER IIIADOPTION PROCEDURE FOR RESIDENT INDIANS9. Registration and home study of the prospective adoptive parents. -(1) Every resident Indian prospective adoptive parents, who intends to adopt a child, shall register online in Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System by filling up the application form as provided in Schedule-5 and uploading the relevant documents.(2) The registration shall be complete and confirmed to the prospective adoptive parents immediately on receipt of the completed application form and required documents on Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(3) The prospective adoptive parents shall get their registration number from the acknowledgement slip and use it for viewing the progress of their case.(4) The home study report of the prospective adoptive parents shall be prepared by the specialised adoption agency in the State, where prospective adoptive parents are located, through its social worker or through a social worker from a panel maintained by the State Adoption Resource Agency or District Child Protection Unit, as the case may be.(5) The home study report shall be completed in the format given in Schedule – 6, within one month from the date of submission of requisite documents and shall be shared with the prospective adoptive parents immediately, thereafter.(6) The home study report shall be posted in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System by the specialised adoption agency or District Child Protection Unit or State Adoption Resource Agency as the case may be, as soon as it is complete.(7) The home study report will remain valid for two years and shall be the basis for adoption of a child by the prospective adoptive parents from anywhere in the country.(8) The prospective adoptive parents shall be declared eligible and suitable by the specialised adoption agency based upon the home study report and supporting documents and in case any prospective adoptive parent is not declared eligible or suitable, the reasons for the same shall be recorded in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(9) The prospective adoptive parents can appeal against the decision of rejection to Central Adoption Resource Authority.(10) The appeal referred to sub-paragraph (9) shall be disposed of within fifteen days and the decision of Central Adoption Resource Authority in this regard shall be binding.(11) The District Child Protection Unit shall facilitate online registration of prospective adoptive parents, uploading of documents and also for addressing technical difficulties faced by the specialised adoption agencies.Provided that the adoption of a child by the prospective adoptive parents, after completion of their registration and home study report, shall depend upon the availability of a suitable child.10. Selection of a child by the prospective adoptive parents. -(1) The seniority of the prospective adoptive parents shall be from the date of registration in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(2) On the basis of seniority, the prospective adoptive parents shall be given an opportunity to view the photographs, child study report and medical examination report upto six children, in their preference category if any, in one or more specialised adoption agencies through the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(3) After viewing the photographs, child study report and medical examination report of the child or children, the prospective adoptive parents may reserve one child within a period of forty eight hours for possible adoption and the rest of the children would be released through Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System for other prospective adoptive parents in the waiting list.(4) The specialised adoption agency will get the details of the prospective adoptive parents referred from the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System site and fix appointment with the prospective adoptive parents to assess the suitability of the prospective adoptive parents by an Adoption Committee, consisting of its adoption in-charge or social worker, pediatrician or visiting doctor and one official from the District Child Protection Unit.(5) The specialised adoption agency shall also organise a meeting of the prospective adoptive parents with the child.(6) The entire process of matching shall be completed within a maximum period of fifteen days from the date of reserving the child.(7) While accepting the child, the prospective adoptive parents shall sign the child study report and medical examination report in the presence of the social worker or chief functionary of the specialized adoption agency.(8) In case, the prospective adoptive parents are not selected for the child by the specialised adoption agency, the reason for non-selection of the prospective adoptive parents shall be recorded in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(9) In case, the prospective adoptive parents do not accept the reserved child or the specialised adoption agency does not find the prospective adoptive parents suitable, then, the prospective adoptive parents will be shifted to the bottom of the seniority list, as on that date, who can avail a fresh chance when the seniority becomes due and the same procedure shall be followed in the subsequent chances.(10) The registration of prospective adoptive parents shall be valid for two years.(11) The prospective adoptive parents can also get the medical examination report of the child reviewed by a medical practitioner of their choice.(12) If the prospective adoptive parents opt for one of the children shown, they shall accept the child by signing the child study report and medical examination report of the child, which may be downloaded from the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System and the specialised adoption agency shall record the acceptance by the prospective adoptive parents in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.11. Pre-adoption foster care. -The child shall be taken in pre-adoption foster care by the prospective adoptive parents within ten days from the date of acceptance, after signing the pre-adoption foster care undertaking in the format provided in Schedule-7.12. Legal Procedure. -(1) The specialised adoption agency shall file the adoption petition in the court, having jurisdiction over the place where the specialised adoption agency is located, within seven days from the date of acceptance by prospective adoptive parents for obtaining the necessary adoption orders under the Act.(2) In case the child is from a children’s home which is located in another district, the specialised adoption agency shall file the adoption petition in the concerned court of that district.(3) The adoption petition shall contain all requisite documents as per Schedule- 8.(4) The court will hold the adoption proceeding in-camera and dispose of the case within a period of two months from the date of filing of the adoption petition by the specialised adoption agency.(5) The specialised adoption agency shall obtain a certified copy of the adoption order from the court and will forward it to the prospective adoptive parents within ten days and it shall also post a copy of such order in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System and make necessary entries in Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(6) Registration of an adoption deed shall not be necessary.(7) The specialised adoption agency shall obtain the birth certificate of the child from the birth certificate issuing authority within ten days from the date of issuance of adoption order, with the name of adoptive parents, as parents, and date of birth as recorded in the adoption order.13. Follow up of progress of adopted child. -(1) The specialised adoption agency shall report the progress of the child online in the format as provided inSchedule-11 in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System along with photographs of the child on six monthly basis for two years from the date of pre-adoption foster placement with the prospective adoptive parents.(2) In case the child is having adjustment problem with the adoptive parents, the specialised adoption agency shall arrange necessary counselling for such adoptive parents and the child and if such counselling efforts do not succeed, the specialised adoption agency shall make effort for placing the child temporarily in alternative care.14. Adoption leave. -Adoptive parents, working in the offices under the control of the Central Government or the State Government or the Central or State Public Sector Undertakings shall be entitled for adoption leave for proper care of adoptee, as per the extant instructions of the concerned Government or authority and the benefit of this facility shall be available from the stage of pre-adoption foster care.CHAPTER IVADOPTION PROCEDURE FOR NON-RESIDENT INDIAN, OVERSEAS CITIZEN OF INDIA AND FOREIGN PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE PARENTS15. Non-resident Indian to be treated at par with resident Indian. - Non-resident Indian prospective adoptive parents shall be treated at par with Indians living in India in terms of priority for adoption of Indian orphan, abandoned or surrendered children.16. Registration and home study report for prospective adoptive parents for inter-country adoption. -(1) Any non-resident Indian, overseas citizen of India and foreign prospective adoptive parents, living in a country which is a signatory to the Hague Adoption Convention and wishing to adopt an Indian child, can approach the concerned authorised foreign adoption agency or the Central Authority, as the case may be, for preparation of their home study report and for further necessary action.(2) In case, there is no authorised foreign adoption agency or Central Authority in their country of residence, then the prospective adoptive parents shall approach the concerned Government department or Indian diplomatic mission in that country for the purpose.(3) The authorised foreign adoption agency or Central Authority or the concerned Government department or the Indian diplomatic mission, as the case may be, on completion of the home study report, shall register the application of the prospective adoptive parents in Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System in the format along with the required documents mentioned in Schedule – 5.(4) The seniority of the prospective adoptive parents shall be from the date of their registration in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(5) The home study report and other documents of the prospective adoptive parents referred to in this Chapter shall be scrutinized at Central Adoption Resource Authority in order to determine their eligibility or suitability.(6) Profiles of two children shall be referred to the authorised foreign adoption agency or Central Authority or Government department or Indian diplomatic mission, as the case may be, which may forward such profiles to the prospective adoptive parents concerned as per local rules. In case of a foreigner or overseas citizen of India, such profile of children shall be referred to the prospective adoptive parents.(7) The prospective adoptive parents may reserve one of the referred children within ninety six hours and the profile of the other child shall stand automatically withdrawn.(8) In case the prospective adoptive parents fail to reserve any of the children within ninety six hours, then the profiles of both the children stand automatically withdrawn.(9) As far as possible, preference of the prospective adoptive parents shall be taken into consideration when sending referrals to them.(10) If the prospective adoptive parents opt for one of the children shown, they shall accept the child by signing the child study report and medical examination report of the child within thirty days from the date of referral.(11) The child study report and medical examination report and photograph in original shall be sent by the specialised adoption agency to the concerned authorized foreign adoption agency or Central authority or the Indian diplomatic mission.(12) In case the prospective adoptive parents fail to accept the referred children within thirty days, then, the profile of the child will stand withdrawn to the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System and the seniority of those prospective adoptive parents will shift to the bottom of the list, who shall be given another opportunity to select a child when their turn becomes due.Provided that the registration of such prospective adoptive parents shall continue for two years from the date of registration.(13) If the prospective adoptive parents desire to visit the specialised adoption agency to see the child in person, before accepting him for adoption, such visit may be made after their adoption application is approved by Central Adoption Resource Authority, and the prospective adoptive parents can also get the medical examination report of the child reviewed by a medical practitioner of their choice.(14) The authorised foreign adoption agency shall forward the original documents of the prospective adoptive parents, as specified in Schedule-8, to the concerned specialised adoption agency.17. No Objection Certificate of Central Adoption Resource Authority and pre-adoption foster care. -(1) The Central Adoption Resource Authority shall issue no objection certificate in favour of the proposed adoption in the format at Schedule - 9 within ten days from the date of receipt of the acceptance of the child by the prospective adoptive parents and letter of approval/permission of the receiving country as per Article 5 and Article 17 of the Hague Adoption Convention, wherever applicable and a copy of such no objection certificate shall also be endorsed to all concerned and posted in Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System forthwith.(2) The prospective adoptive parents may take the child in pre-adoption foster care within India after issuance of no objection certificate by Central Adoption Resource Authority, pending court order, by furnishing an undertaking to the specialised adoption agency in the format at Schedule- 7.18. Legal Procedure. -(1) The specialised adoption agency shall file an application in the competent court with relevant documents as mentioned in Schedule- 8 within seven working days from the date of receipt of acceptance of the child by the prospective adoptive parents, for obtaining the adoption order from court and the specialised adoption agency shall enclose the documents in original along with the application.(2) In case the child is from a child care institution, which is located in another District, the specialised adoption agency shall file the adoption petition in the concerned court of that district.(3) The court will hold the adoption proceeding in-camera and dispose of the case within a period of two months from the date of filing of the adoption petition by the specialised adoption agency.(4) The specialised adoption agency shall obtain a certified copy of the adoption order from the court and will forward it to the prospective adoptive parents within ten days, besides posting a copy of such order and making necessary entries in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(5) Registration of a deed of adoption shall not be necessary.(6) The specialised adoption agency shall obtain the birth certificate of the child from the birth certificate issuing authority and provide it to the prospective adoptive parents within ten days from the date of availability of adoption order, with the name of adoptive parents, as parents, and date of birth as recorded in the adoption order.19. Passport and Visa, intimation to immigration authorities, conformity certificate, birth certificate, etc. -(1) The Central Adoption Resource Authority shall issue a conformity certificate under Article 23 of the Hague Adoption Convention in the format provided in Schedule – 10 within three working days from the date of availability of the adoption order in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System, in case the receiving country of the adopted child is a Hague Adoption Convention signatory.(2) The Central Adoption Resource Authority shall inform the concerned immigration authorities and the foreigner regional registration office or as the case may be, the foreigner registration office about confirmation of adoption.(3) To obtain Indian passport for the adopted child, the specialised adoption agency shall submit the application to the regional passport officer within three working days from the date of receipt of a certified copy of the adoption order.(4) The regional passport office shall issue passport for the adopted child within ten days from the date of receipt of application, in accordance with the circulars vide number VI/401/2/3/2010 dated 16th May, 2013; VI/401/2/3/2010 dated 8th January 2015; VI.I/401/2/3/2010 dated 19th March 2015 and such other circulars that may be issued by the CPV Division of the Ministry of External Affairs regarding issuance of passport to inter-country adopted children, from time to time.(5) In case the adopted child has been provided with a passport of the country of nationality of the prospective adoptive parents by its diplomatic mission in India, the foreigner regional registration office or as the case may be, the foreigner registration office shall issue exit visa to the adopted child within three working days from the date of online application for the same along with all supporting documents by the prospective adoptive parents.(6) The specialised adoption agency shall also obtain birth certificate for the adopted child from the issuing authority within ten days from the date of receipt of the adoption order, with the name of adoptive parents and date of birth as recorded in the adoption order.(7) The adopted child shall be entitled to receive overseas citizen of India card, if found eligible.(8) The adoptive parents shall come to India for taking the adopted child to their country.20. Follow up of progress of adopted child under this chapter. -(1) The authorised foreign adoption agency or the Central Authority or Indian diplomatic mission or concerned Government department, as the case may be, shall report the progress of the adopted child in the format provided inSchedule – 11 online in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System along with photographs of the child on a quarterly basis during the first year and on six monthly basis in the second year, from the date of arrival of the adopted child in the receiving country.(2) If an adjustment problem of the child with the adoptive parents comes to the notice of the authorised foreign adoption agency or Central Authority or the concerned Government department in the receiving country on the basis of the progress report or in course of post-adoption home visits, then, necessary counseling shall be arranged for the adoptive parents and for the adoptee, wherever applicable.(3) If it is found that the child is unable to adjust in the adoptive family or that the continuance of the child in the adoptive family is not in the interest of the child, the authorised foreign adoption agency or Central Authority or the concerned Government department in the receiving country or Indian diplomatic mission , as the case may be, shall withdraw the child and provide necessary counseling and shall arrange for suitable alternate adoption or foster placement of the child in that country, in consultation with the Indian diplomatic mission and Central Adoption Resource Authority.(4) In the event of adjustment problem of the child with the adoptive family, the child shall be entitled to receive care, protection and rehabilitation through the child protection services of that country.(5) The authorised foreign adoption agency or Central Authority or concerned Government department, as the case may be, shall organise annual get-together of Indian adoptees and their adoptive parents and forward a report on the event to Central Adoption Resource Authority and the Indian diplomatic missions shall facilitate such get-togethers.(6) The prospective adoptive parents shall furnish an undertaking to the effect that they would allow personal visits of the representative of authorised foreign adoption agency, the foreign Central Authority or concerned Government Department, as the case may be, to ascertain the progress of the child with the adoptive parents/family at least for a period of two years from the date of arrival of the child in the receiving country.21. Adoption by overseas citizen of India or foreign national living in India. -(1) In case of an overseas citizen of India or foreign national, who is a citizen of a country that has ratified the Hague Convention and has been living in India for one year or more, shall apply online in prescribed format as specified inSchedule–5 along with the required documents uploaded in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(2) On receipt of the application, along with the required documents, the Central Adoption Resource Authority shall refer the case to a specialised adoption agency for preparing the home study report in the format given at Schedule-6and the specialised adoption agency shall upload the home study report in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System.(3) All other procedures shall be followed as per the provisions of sub-paragraph 6 to 14 of paragraph 16 and paragraphs 17 to 19.Provided that the prospective adoptive parents may reserve one of the referred children within forty eight hours.Note: The role of the authorized foreign adoption agency or Central Authority or Government department or Indian diplomatic mission in the above referred paragraphs shall be performed by specialised adoption agency.(4) The specialised adoption agency shall report the progress of the child in the Child Adoption Resource Information and Guidance System in the format provided at Schedule – 11 along with photographs of the child on a quarterly basis during the first year and on six monthly basis in the second year from the date of pre-adoption foster care.(5) If any adjustment problem of the child with the adoptive parents comes to the notice of the specialised adoption agency, through the progress report or in course of post-adoption home visits, counselling shall be arranged for the adoptive parents and for the adoptee, wherever applicable.(6) During the follow-up, if the specialised adoption agency finds that the child is unable to adjust in the adoptive family or the continuance of the child in the adoptive family is not in the best interests of the child, it shall withdraw the child and provide necessary counselling and the specialised adoption agency shall also arrange for suitable alternate adoption or foster placement of the child, in consultation with State Adoption Resource Agency and Central Adoption Resource Authority.(7) A no objection certificate shall be required from the concerned diplomatic mission in India in favour of the proposed adoption.(8) The concerned diplomatic mission shall also ensure that the adopted child acquires citizenship of the country of his parents immediately after adoption decree and a copy of the passport of the child from the country of the nationality of the Prospective adoptive parents shall be forwarded to Central Adoption Resource Authority and the concerned specialised adoption agency.(9) An overseas citizen of India or foreign prospective adoptive parents, as the case may be, living in India, shall give an undertaking to the effect that if they move out of India before completion of two years after adoption, they shall inform to the Central Adoption Resource Authority about their movement and provide their new address, and continue to send their post-adoption progress report to Central Adoption Resource Authority for the remaining period.(10) Such prospective adoptive parents living in India, are required to give an undertaking to the effect that they would allow personal visits of the representative by the specialized adoption agency or District Child Protection Unit or State Adoption Resource Agency, as the case may be at least for a period of two years from the date of adoption.22. If one of the prospective adoptive parents is foreigner and other is an Indian, such case shall be treated at par with Indians living in India or living aboard, as the case may be.23. Procedure for adoption of a child from a foreign country by Indian citizens. -(1) Necessary formalities for adoption of a child from a foreign country by Indian citizens shall initially be completed in that country as per their law and procedure.(2) Central Adoption Resource Authority shall issue approval, as required under Article 5 and 17 of the Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in respect of Inter-country Adoption 1993, in the cases of adoption of children coming to India as a receiving country.(3) If the child adopted abroad by the Indian citizens having a foreign passport, then the child would require Indian visa to come to India and on submission of the visa application, the Indian mission in the country concerned may issue entry visa to the child after checking all the relevant documents to ensure that the adoption has been done following the due procedure.(4) The immigration clearance for the child adopted abroad shall be obtained from the Foreigners’ Division, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, through the Indian diplomatic mission to that country.

That the Japanese were prepared to surrender and the two atomic bombs were not necessary, as succinctly stated by British historian Max Hastings:The myth that the Japanese were ready to surrender has been so comprehensively discredited by modern research that it is astonishing some writers continue to give it credence.Let’s examine how the myth emerged and debunk it.The Big SixThe fate of Japan rested in the hands of the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War which consisted of 7 prominent figures of the Japanese military and political establishment.Emperor HirohitoMitsumasa Yonai: Navy MinisterSoemu Toyoda: Chief of the Naval General StaffKorechika Anami: Army MinisterYoshijirō Umezu: Chief of the Army General StaffKantarō Suzuki: Prime MinisterShigenori Tōgō: Foreign MinisterJapan was ruled by a military dictatorship. The army was more dominant than the Navy and wielded absolute political power. The minister was an actively serving general in the Japanese Army. He had the power to dissolve a cabinet if it opposed army’s policies and found a new cabinet more amenable to the ambition and demands of the military.Also, contrary to the popular but mistaken belief that Emperor Hirohito was merely a figurehead who was manipulated by the militarists and that he was kept in the dark about the war, the truth was that he actually had real political power and was fully aware of the course of the war and its outcomes. In an underground chamber, he monitored the progress of the war, domestic conditions, and inquired about war plans with the aid of senior military commanders. The hearing sessions during which the Emperor passively listened to major military plans were intended to create the misleading impression that he was controlled by the military. In reality, the emperor had questioned those plans, voiced his opinions, concerns and suggestions behind the closed doors.Therefore, military leaders and the Emperor had the power to make decisions that determined the fate of Japan. No one else outside of this exclusive circle could negotiate or carry out any diplomatic initiative without unanimous approval of the group. This very fact will explain why the various attempts at peace negotiation carried out by Japanese diplomatic and military representatives in foreign countries failed.Magic and UltraUltra: intelligence about anything related to the Japanese military. It comprised information derived from decrypts of military messages and radio intelligence.Magic: decrypts of Japanese diplomatic messages. Before the outbreak of war between Japan and the US, American codebreakers had begun intercepting and deciphered Japanese diplomatic communication. Thereafter, they had uncovered huge amount of diplomatic information communicated between Japanese officials all over the world. In 1945, Magic became highly successful because in many cases, Japanese diplomatic messages were deciphered and read before they reached the intended recipients.An elite group of intelligence analysts was entrusted with separating the wheat from the chaffs - analyzing the mountain of information gathered to extract actionable insights. Specifically, the analysts would scrutinize decrypts, retain only the most significant parts and translate them into English. Whenever advisable, the analysts would complement those parts with their own assessments + cross references to other texts and ultra information. Finally, they would assemble those passages into Magic Diplomatic Summaries - top-secret documents spanning 6–32 pages to be delivered to a small circle of US wartime leaders every day.The value of Magic consisted in its truthfulness. Because Japan’s leaders were unaware that US intelligence regularly broke their code and read their messages, they expressed themselves candidly in coded messages. This makes Ultra and Magic the most definitive evidential basis for assessing claims of Japanese intention in the last year of the Pacific War: including the claim that Japan was prepared to surrender.How did the myth originate?Since the end of the war, critics of the A-bombs have promoted the following two assertions:The Japanese were prepared to surrender and actively seeking to do so in 1945.US wartime leaders were aware of Japanese peace-seeking attempts.From both of these assertions came the judgment that the use of the A-bombs were unnecessary and war atrocities.Now to be fair, there is some truth in those two assertions.The source of that basis? - Declassified Magic documents.At some point after the war, the US government declassified wartime documents, among which were Magic documents concerning Japanese peace-seeking attempts in 1945 and American awareness of those attempts. When people alighted on those documents, they concluded that the Japanese were prepared to surrender and the two atomic bombs should not have been dropped.BUTWhat these people did not realize at the time was that the declassification was partial, meaning that the US government did not declassify in one go all there was to be declassified.Particularly, the first batch of information was released in the early 1950s and they contained no Ultra information and only partial Magic information, the latter of which was about Japanese peace negotiation with the Soviet Union since mid-July 1945. Being partial, the released Magic information was only a fraction of all Magic information related to all Japanese diplomatic overtures in 1945.These initial disclosures were followed by disclosures of translations of all archived Japanese diplomatic communications. These disclosed documents lacked all the remarks and edits made and attached by intelligence analysts as well as cross-reference to Ultra.In 1978, a relatively complete set of the Magic Diplomatic Summary was released. Finally in 1995, a complete set of the Magic Diplomatic Summary was released.Because the first and second batches of Magic information contained selected pieces that only indicated that the Japanese were seeking peace and were missing all the assessments and cross references by intelligence experts, people were misled into thinking that Japan was truly near surrender and that top-level US leaders were aware of this. The lack of expert assessments plus the missing pieces of sensitive information contained in subsequent disclosures allowed a false picture of historical reality to emerge. By the time the complete set of Magic information was released in 1995 which allowed the actual situation to be accurately and completely reconstructed, the myth had become well-entrenched in public consciousness after 40 years of perpetuation.That is how the myth developed and has lingered as long as it has. The misunderstanding created by partial declassification of Magic information which distorted historical reality and gave rise to the mistaken belief that the Japanese were ready to surrender. By the time all Magic information became public knowledge, this mistaken belief had gained so much credence that it became “historical truth”, and its proponents have refused to consider the other pieces of Magic information that contradicted their belief.This begs the question: what was the rationale of the partial declassification?The answer to this question derives from comparing the two batches of information released in 1978 and 1995. As it turned out, American codebreakers were reading diplomatic messages not only of Japan but also of other allied and neutral nations: Argentina, Belgium, Bulgaria, Chile, China, China, Japanese puppet state, Colombia, Cuba, Free France and Vichy France, Greece, Iran, etc… This amounted to an act of spying.Because the revelation of the fact that the US had been reading diplomatic exchanges of friendly nations could have jeopardized diplomatic relations with those nation, the US government chose not to disclose all Magic Information in one-go.Debunk the MythLet’s examine the MAGIC Information concerning Japanese intention in 1945. This body of information could be divided logically into 2 time frames: before and after 13th July 1945 - the date on which Emperor Hirohito personally intervened into diplomatic attempts.Content-wise, it can be logically divided into two categories: Intention toward the US and intention toward the Soviet Union.These documents had three underlying themes in common:The Big Six’s consistent lack of any desire for peace negotiation with the Western Allies.The rejection of Allies’ demand for unconditional surrender.The will to fight to the bitter end.On January 20, 1945, American codebreakers deciphered a message transmitted to French Ambassador to Japan Henri Cosme. According to the message:thinking people at the Court and in the Navy . . . appear inclined to believe that an end must be put to this war.The so-called thinking people in Cosme’s message did not include Army leaders. As explained the above, Army leaders wielded absolute power in Japan’s government. According to Cosme, they were not among those who wanted to end the fighting.A summary report of 1944 produced by the German military attache in Tokyo indicated that the attitude of the Japanese government toward the war had changed very little. The report points out:recent increases in preparations to defend the Homeland and noted that total mobilization is progressing. The Japanese Army and the circles it influences were determined to go through with the war without compromise on the side of Germany.A Magic decrypt of a mid-January 1945 cable sent to Berlin by German Ambassador Stahmer in Tokyo reported the precarious situation of the cabinet under Kuniaki Koiso. Stahmer expressed concern over the attitude of the Japanese Navy and warned that anew Cabinet would probably be formed of liberal personalities whose past would facilitate a settlement with the Americans. Such a Cabinet would then be overthrown, however, by ultranationalist groups who demand total war until final victory and would oppose with their full strength - and probably with violence - a compromise Cabinet. If these nationalist groups obtain control - which is possible - it will mean a substantial increase in Japan’s total war effort.On 12th March 1945, a deciphered message sent by Swiss Minister Camille Gorge indicated that although the Japanese government “is being criticized more more.”, there was a conspicuous determination to continue the war:there was even talk of transferring the greater part of Japan's war industry to Manchuria in order to carry the war as far as possible to Chinese soilAfter the collapse of the Koiso cabinet on 5th April 1945, Magic experts monitored diplomatic traffic to gauge the intentions the new government led by Kantaro Suzuki and found some glimmers of hope in the assessment of the German ambassador in Japan:To judge by its inner make-up, the new Cabinet is devoting itself to continuing the war with the utmost exertion of energy. It is seeking to reach an agreement with Russia, even if this involves the greatest sacrifices. By this means, in addition to protection in the rear, a more favorable basis for later negotiations with America is expected.However, subsequent Magic information dissolved any hope of and end to hostilities. On 5th May 1945, Swiss Minister Gorge reported to his government that he:no perceptible difference between the present government and its predecessor.The Portuguese minister suspected that the Suzuki cabinet would be short-lived:since the military and the nation in general are not yet prepared to make peace.On 6th May 1945, a message sent from Portuguese Minister Fernandes to his government indicated that:the fortification of coasts and mountains continues, giving the impression that this country, like Germany, is disposed to prosecute the war to its very end without the least probability of victory.On 22nd June 1945, Swiss Minister Gorge noted in his report:Japan does not expect to win, but is still hoping to escape defeat by prolonging the war long enough to exhaust [her] enemies.When the battle of Berlin was raging, a Magic decrypt of a message dated 28th April 1945 indicated that Japan’s government instructed its military attache in Lisbon to:report as fully as possible on the last stage of resistance [in Berlin] in order to furnish reference material for the decisive battle in the Homeland. His attention was directed to matters such as the training of civilian militias, as well as whether the direct participation of the German High Command in combat and the death of Hitler in Berlin would brace German morale and determination to defend the capital to the bitter end.This message unambiguously demonstrated the determination of the Japanese military to commit the nation to one last desperate battle modeled after the Battle of Berlin.One Magic decrypt featured a message announced by the Vice Chief of the Japanese Army general staff to his attaches in Europe. Magic experts commented on this message that while the Vice Chief expressed pessimism over all aspects of the war and concern over a potential invasion of the Home Island, he also proclaimed thatJapan preserves unaltered her conviction of inevitable victory.Other Magic decrypts indicated that despite heavy destruction and death tolls inflicted, there was no sign that the military’s resolve to fight to the bitter end wavered. A total of at least 13 diplomatic messages indicated that the Japanese resolved to continue the war no matter how dire the situation had become for them, as implied by their plans to:produce synthetic aircraft fuelsorganize regional governments designed to continue the war in case an invasion occurred and occupy parts of the countryinduct boys ages 14 and older among Japanese colonists in China.You see? All the Magic decrypts showed an unequivocal determination to continue fighting and refusal to capitulate. This fact alone makes a mockery of the claim that Japan was about to surrender.Next, let’s examine the basis of the myth: Japanese peace-seeking attempts.There were indeed attempts to negotiate an end to war made by Japanese diplomatic and military representatives in foreign nations. However, promoters of the ready-to-surrender myth have either conveniently omitted or overlooked one crucial fact: those Japanese peace-feelers were not empowered to negotiate on behalf of the Japanese government. It follows that their intentions and attempts were not approved by the Japanese government (or more accurately the Big Six)MAGIC uncovered genuine attempts to secure peace for Japan by Japanese representatives serving in Japanese embassies in foreign countries. There were several notable attempts by in Switzerland, the Vatican, and Sweden.In Switzerland, Naval attache Commander Yoshiro Fujimura sought to establish a diplomatic channel to negotiate peace between between the US and Japanese governments. I recounted his commendable attempt here. However, his attempt ended in utter failure due to Japanese military leaders’s apathy toward any peace talk with the US or Britain.Simultaneously with Fujimura’s endeavor, Japan’s military attaché in Zurich and Basel, Lieutenant General Seigo Okamoto, personally made an attempt to negotiate peace with the US. He explained his intentions to Army Chief of Staff Umezu. He hoped to gain official blessing for the talk by appealing to his long-standing friendship with Umezu. But Okamoto’s attempt also failed utterly.In Stockholm, minister Suemasa Okamoto attempted to persuade the Swedish government to facilitate peace talk between the US and Japan. Unfortunately, his commendable but unapproved attempt was flatly rejected by the vice chief of the Imperial Army General Staff as revealed by Magic decrypts dated 24th June 1945:As we have said before, Japan is firmly determined to prosecute the Greater East Asia war to the very end. There is a report, however, to the effect that some Japanese official stationed in Sweden is making peace overtures to America. That is demagoguery pure and simple, and if you have any idea as to the source of those reports please inform us.These genuine peace attempts had two commonalities:They were initiated by Japanese representatives in foreign countries, far away from the military-controlled government in Tokyo.They all failed due to army leaders’ lack of interest in peace talk with the Western Allies.The 2nd point is telling in that it demonstrated the power of army leaders in any political matter: including diplomacy. Without their authorization, no one was entitled to negotiate with the Allies. The fact that all of these secret peace talks failed utterly pointed to a complete lack of desire of army leaders to negotiate peace with the Allies, let alone surrender.That refusal to capitulate and the determination to keep fighting will become more obvious through examining MAGIC documents concerning Japanese diplomatic dealings with the Soviet Unions.Japanese dealing with the Soviet UnionWhile the Big Six shunned negotiations with the Allies, they chose to negotiate with the Soviet Unions to effect an end to the war on terms favorable to Japan. Indeed, a topic that drew great attention from Magic analysts was Japan’s evolving relation with the Soviet Unions which developed from:Japanese wartime leaders’ concern over the prospect of Soviet violation or cancellation of the Neutrality Pact (signed in April 1941) which would likely entail Soviet military aggression against Japan in Manchuria.The hope that the Soviets could somehow be persuaded to mediate an end of war. This hope arose much later in 1945.Since the start fo 1945, Japan’s foreign ministers, Mamoru Shigemitsu and later Shigenori Togo instructed Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union Naotake Satō to gauge Soviets’ intention toward Japan. The Japanese government feared that as the defeat of Germany was inevitable and Japan’s situation was deteriorating rapidly, the Soviets would exploit Japan’s weakness to opportunistically attack and seize Manchuria.Through several meetings with Soviet foreign minister Molotov, Sato realized that Japan was facing potential danger posed by the Soviet Union and urged the Supreme Council for the Direction of the War to make concessions to forestall Soviet hostile moves.Starting since June 1945, Magic decrypts revealed intriguing Japanese intention with regard to the Soviet Union.On 1st June 1945, Togo sent Sato the message below:In view of our situation both at home and abroad, it is quite clear that we will find it extremely difficult to reach any settlement with Russia. We must realize, however, that it is a matter of the utmost urgency that we should not only prevent Russia from entering the war, but should also induce them to adopt a favorable attitude toward Japan. I would therefore like you to miss no opportunity to talk to the Soviet leaders.To discourage the Soviets from entering the war against Japan, Japanese diplomats attempted all kinds of talks such as forming an alliance, renouncing fishing right in exchange for Soviet supply of oil, renouncing the terms of the Treaty of Portsmouth that ended the Russo-Japanese war, etc…Of course, the pragmatic Soviets were fully aware that the Japanese were just trying to buy time to delay defeat. Hence, they had no interest in dealing with the Japanese.Soviet indifference alarmed Togo and compelled him to try harder in the diplomatic gamble. On 11th July 1945, he sent Togo the two cables below:We are now secretly giving consideration to termination of the war because of the pressing situation which confronts Japan both at home and abroad. Therefore, when you have your interview with Molotov ... you should not confine yourself to the objective of a rapprochement between Russia and Japan but should also sound him out on the extent to which it is possible to make use of Russia in ending the war...While we naturally hope[d] to obtain a treaty through negotiations between Hirota and Malik, those talks are also intended to find out the extent to which it is possible to make use of Russia in ending the war. We should like to know the views of the Russian government on this subject with all haste.And:Despite the last statement in my previous message, it would appear suitable to make clear to the Russians our general attitude with regard to termination of the war. Therefore, please tell them that:“We consider the maintenance of peace in East Asia to be one aspect of the maintenance of world peace. Accordingly, Japan—as a proposal for ending the war and because of her concern for the establishment and maintenance of lasting Peace—has absolutely no ideas of annexing or holding the territories occupied as a result of the war.”One noteworthy point: the Japanese government was seeking to enlist Soviet help in “ending the war”. Just exactly what the Japanese meant by “ending the war” was extremely vague and suggested a lack of a definite desire for peace.On 12th July 1945, Togo sent Sato a message marked “Very Urgent”:I have not yet received a wire about your interview with Molotov. Accordingly, though it may smack a little of attacking without sufficient reconnaissance, we think it would be appropriate to go a step further on this occasion and before the opening of the Three Power [i.e Potsdam] Conference, inform the Russians of the Imperial Will concerning the ending of the war. We should therefore like you to present this matter to Molotov in the following terms:His Majesty the Emperor mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the people of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland. His Majesty is deeply reluctant to have any further blood lost among the people on both sides, and it is his desire, for the welfare of humanity, to restore peace with all possible speed...It is the Emperor’s private intention to send Prince Konoe to Moscow as a Special Envoy with a letter from him containing the statements given above. Please inform Molotov of this and get the Russians’ consent to having the party enter the country.Two noteworthy points in the cable above:Damning evidence that the Japanese government preferred fighting to the bitter end over accepting unconditional surrender.The intervention of Emperor Hirohito in diplomatic dealing with the Soviets.While his superiors in Tokyo demonstrated a complete loss of touch with reality, Ambassador Saito displayed tremendous rationality. He candidly and accurately pointed out the flaw in the various instructions Togo had sent: a complete lack of realistic terms on the part of the Japanese government. Sato argued convincingly that realistic terms were indispensable to elicit Soviet interest in engaging in a negotiation.In all of Togo messages addressed to Sato, the Japanese government offered zero realistic terms. Losing most of its naval assets, the IJN had been reduced to an ineffective fighting force. Most of Japan’s territories gained during the war were of little economic value beyond natural resources. The offer of fishing rights was just ludicrous. In response to Togo’s “Very urgent” message on 12th July, Sato conveyed his unequivocal and scathing remark:How much of an effect do you expect our statements regarding the non-annexation and non-possession of territories which we have already lost or are shout to lose will have on the Soviet authorities?As you are well aware, the Soviet authorities are extremely realistic and it extremely difficult to persuade them with abstract arguments. We certainly will not convince them with pretty little phrases devoid of all connection with reality.If the Japanese Empire is really faced with the necessity of terminating the war, we must first of all make up our own minds to terminate the war. Unless we make up our own mind here is absolutely no point in sounding out the views of the Soviet Government.Most tellingly however, is that Sato incisively argued that since the unlikelihood of enticing the Soviets meant that Japan had no choice but to accept unconditional surrender:in the long run . . . has indeed no choice but to accept unconditional surrender or terms closely Equivalent thereto.I would like to point out, however, that even on the basis of your various messages I have obtained no clear idea of the recent situation. Nor am I clear about the views of the Government and the Military with regard to the termination of the war. Moreover, I have been of the opinion that, if it were finally decided to bring the war to an end, it would be necessary to obtain a new formal resolution which would be sufficient to overrule the decision reached at the conference held in the Imperial Presence on 8 June.Now, being a rational realist that he was, Sato was also a committed patriot who revered the Emperor. Hence, he appealed for accepting unconditional surrender with one condition: the preservation of the Emperor and Imperial Institution.Here was Togo’s response to Sato’s rational assessment? The answer is in his 17th July 1945 message:Although the directing powers, and the government as well, are convinced that our war strength still can deliver considerable blows to the enemy, we are unable to feel absolutely secure peace of mind in the face of an enemy who will attack repeatedly. If today, when we are still maintaining our strength, the Anglo-Americans were to have regard for Japan’s honor ' and existence, they could save humanity by bringing the war to an end. If however, they insist unrelentingly upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese are unanimous in their resolve to wage a through-going war.The Emperor himself has deigned to express his determination and we have therefore made this request of the Russians. Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians’ mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender.Two things that stood out from the message above:A non-committal desire to “solicit Soviet’s favor” without offering any realistic term.Most conspicuous of all: the refusal to accept unconditional surrender and the determination to fight to the end.Saito responded to Togo’s message on 17th July, trying to awaken his superiors to the reality:It goes without saying that in my earlier message calling for unconditional surrender or closely equivalent terms, I made an exception of the question of preserving our national structure [i.e., the Imperial system]. Although I have no fear that you misunderstood what I said in the last part of my 8th June message, I am wiring this for your information.In connection with the question of preserving our national structure.......we must create a strong impression [with the Soviets] that our proposals represent the positive demands of Japan’s 70 million people.Except for the matter of maintenance of our national structure, I think that we must absolutely not propose any conditions. The situation has already reached the point where we have no alternative but unconditional surrender or its equivalent.Here is Togo’s response on 21st July 1945,With regard to unconditional surrender we are unable to consent to it under any circumstances whatever. Even if the war drags on and it becomes clear that it will take much more than bloodshed, the whole country as one man will pit itself against the enemy in accordance with the Imperial Will so long as the enemy demands unconditional surrender. It is in order to avoid such a state of affairs that we are seeking a peace, which is not so-called unconditional surrender, through the good offices of Russia...Therefore, it is not only impossible for us to request the Russians to lend their good offices in obtaining a peace without conditions, but it would also be both disadvantageous and impossible, from the standpoint of foreign and domestic considerations, to make an immediate declaration of specific terms.Once again the same complete absence of unambiguous and realistic terms to the Soviets AND the unequivocal rejection of demand for unconditional surrender.And here is Togo’s public announcement in response to the broadcasts by Captain Zacharias:The fact that the Americans alluded to the Atlantic Charter is particularly worthy of attention at this time. It is impossible for us to accept unconditional surrender, no matter in what guise, but it is our idea to inform them by some appropriate means that there is no objection to the restoration of peace on the basis of the Atlantic Charter.All of these messages between Togo and Saito were deciphered and commented on by Magic experts. On July 27th, the analysts delivered a Magic Summary Report which contained the following accurate assessment of Japan’s political situation:An analysis of Japan’s situation, as revealed through Ultra sources, suggests her unwillingness to surrender stems primarily from the failure of her otherwise capable and all-powerful Army leaders to perceive that the defenses they are so assiduously fashioning actually are utterly inadequate. There is nothing in the Japanese mind to prevent capitulation per se, as demonstrated by the advocacy of virtual unconditional surrender by an increasing number of highly placed Japanese abroad. However, until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies.Summary of Magic insightsHopefully the preceding presentation of facts has demonstrated beyond any dispute the true picture of Japanese intention in the chaotic last months of the Pacific War.While it is true that there were attempts to open diplomatic channels to negotiate for peace with the US, those attempts were carried out entirely by representatives of the Japanese government; and they failed utterly due to the lack of official blessing of army leaders in Tokyo who wielded absolute political influence.Even in diplomatic dealings with the Soviet Union, the Japanese government displayed appalling ineptitude evidenced through its lack of specific diplomatic objectives beyond the general desire of keeping the Soviets from entering the war against Japan and attempting to persuade the Soviets to mediate an end to the war. They did not even define exactly what “end to the war” meant; and they asked the rational Sato to negotiate with the Soviets without providing him with clear and realistic terms to elicit Soviet interest in negotiating.Most importantly, as far as Magic evidence reveals, there was NO attempt, official or unofficial, on the part of the Big Six to negotiate with the Western Allies for peace. Instead, what Magic experts had seen led them to the conclusion that Japanese army leaders consistently rejected Allied demand for unconditional and resolved to fight to the bitter end. After reading Magic Summary Report, Joseph Grew stated in an announcement to the press on 10th July 1945:We have received no peace offer from the Japanese Government, either through official or unofficial channels. Conversations relating to peace have been reported to the Department from various parts of the world, but in no case has an approach been made to this Government, directly or indirectly, by a person who could establish his authority to speak for the Japanese government, and in no case has an offer to surrender been made. In no case has this Government been presented with a statement purporting to define the basis upon which the Japanese government would be prepared to conclude peace…Japanese determination to continue fightingJapanese refusal to accept Allies’ demand for unconditional surrender was accompanied by the determination to continue fighting. In the last months of the war, Ultra uncovered an alarming increase in Japanese military strength in Kyushu - the chief target of operation Olympic. Having deduced accurately where and when the American invasion would be mounted, the Japanese stationed large number of troops, weapons near the invasion areas. In addition, they stockpiled thousands of aircraft, motor boats and sea crafts for kamikaze attacks.Japanese intention was clear. They would endeavor to inflict heavy casualties on the invaders in the hope that US leaders - horrified by the losses - would seek to negotiate an end to the fighting. At the negotiation conference, Japanese leaders would dictate terms from an advantageous position that would allow the Japanese to exit the war with the honor of the Empire preserved and some gains of their previous conquest retained.Reference(s)1/ Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire - Richard B. Frank2/ Hirohito’s War: War in the Pacific - Francis Pikes