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Q. How has the Vietnam War benefited the Soviet Union?A. TL;DRBoth Moscow and Beijing hoped to consolidate and expand communism in the Asian hemisphere. Not only would the rise of Asian communism help tip the balance against the West in the Cold War, it would also serve Soviet and Chinese national interests. Vietnam was a costly proxy war. Soviet aid totaled about 2 million dollars a day.The Soviet Union had three clear objectives regarding the Vietnam conflict: to maintain the advantages of peaceful cooperation with the US; to support national liberation movements and their role in the eventual final victory of communism; and to reduce the influence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the world communist movement.Soviet Aid to North VietnamThe Soviet Union had three clear objectives regarding the Vietnam conflict: to maintain the advantages of peaceful cooperation with the US; to support national liberation movements and their role in the eventual final victory of communism; and to reduce the influence of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the world communist movement. The PRC was a major factor from the Soviet position. Moscow was ostensibly "pressing" for negotiations while watching the protracted conflict sap the strength of its major international foe. Washington's repeated use of bombing just after proposing an initiative for reducing the hostilities undermined Moscow's credibility.North Vietnam initially acknowledged the Soviet Union as leader of the "socialist camp" and accorded Moscow first place in its eulogies of the Communist countries. Had there not been the Russian October Revolution, there would not have been an Indochinese Communist Party, the precursor of today's CPV. Had the Red Soviet troops not defeated German fascism and Japanese militarism, the 1945 August Revolution in Vietnam would never have occurred. Had the Soviet Union not been powerful, Vietnam would not have been able to defeat French colonialism, US imperialism and international reactionaryism.Comrade Ho Chi Minh, still in France at that time, was the first Vietnamese who, after reading the first draft of Lenin's thesis on national and colonial problems, realized the truth that, to save the country and liberate the nation, there was no other road than that of proletarian revolution. (Ho Chi Minh: "Forever Following the Road of Great Lenin," Su That Publishing House, Hanoi, 1970, page 51) From that moment, Marxism-Leninism spread to Vietnam.Ho Chi Minh wrote "The Great October Revolution Has Opened the Way to the Liberation of All Nations" [1 November 1967] "By following the path charted by the great Lenin, the path of the October Revolution, the Vietnamese have won very large victories. Therefore, the bond and the gratitude that the Vietnamese feel toward the glorious October Revolution, the great Lenin and the Soviet people are exceedingly deep."Since the rise of Communist China and the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations, however, North Vietnam maintained the position, as did other Communist states, that all "socialist" states are equal and independent. Nevertheless, it acknowledges that the Soviet Union has been an important contributor of economic and military aid, especially since early 1965 when Moscow initiated measures to improve Hanoi's "defense potential."Soviet emphasis on military intervention began with Soviet aid to Cuba and Vietnam. Both countries faced confrontations against the United States. Military aid to Egypt, Syria, and Iraq was directed at Israel, considered an outpost of American imperialism. Soviet military aid to Vietnam began after the Second World War to assist Ho Chi Minh in his struggle against returning French rule. This aid continued after Vietnam divided. North Vietnamese-backed guerrillas tried to overthrow the South Vietnamese government using this aid. Estimates of the total cost of the Soviet Union's support to the North Vietnam government range from $3.6 billion to $8 billion [in then-year U.S. dollars].The top leaders and other officials of the two governments had also consulted during visits to each other's capitals: President Ho Chi Minh in 1955 and 1957; Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan in 1956 and President Kliment Y. Voroshilov in 1957. At the 1960 Lao Dong Party Congress, Premier Pham Van Dong supported the Soviet Union's thesis on the possibility of avoiding open warfare with imperialist powers and on the tactical importance of peaceful coexistence with the West. For its part, the Soviet Communist Party representative declared his government's intention to broaden its cooperation with North Vietnam.An agreement signed with Moscow in December 1960 assured Hanoi of Soviet economic and technical assistance; a similar Soviet pledge was made in an agreement signed in September 1962. Between 1961 and late 1964, Hanoi's relations with Moscow were generally cordial, although there were indications, especially after March 1963, that Hanoi was inclined to agree with the militant position of Peiping in ideological disputes between Communist China and the Soviet Union.At the 16th session of the UN General Assembly (1961), the Soviet Union proposed that 1962 be declared the year of the total elimination of colonialism and demanded an end to wars of aggression, the dismantling of military bases overseas. During this period, various nations won large and continuous victories in their brave struggle.Beginning in November 1964, relations with the Soviet Union took a new turn, evidently because of Moscow's avowed intention to render active support to Hanoi in its political and military confrontation with the United States. On 17 November 1964, the Soviet Politburo decided to send increased support to North Vietnam. This aid included aircraft, radar, artillery, air defense systems, small arms, ammunition, food and medical supplies. They also sent Soviet military personnel to North Vietnam-the Democratic Peoples' Republic of Vietnam (DRVN). Some 15,000 Soviet personnelserved in Indo-China as advisers and occasionally as combatants. The largest part of the Soviet adviser personnel were air defense officers.In February 1965 Soviet Premier Aleksei N. Kosygin visited Hanoi, accompanied by Air Chief Marshal Konstantin Vershinin, who was commander in chief of the Soviet air force and a deputy defense minister. A joint communique issued at the conclusion of his visit on February 10 announced that the two. governments had signed an agreement on measures for strengthening Hanoi's "defense potential." After returning to Moscow, Premier Kosygin said that his government had already taken necessary steps to implement the agreement. It appeared that the Soviet military aid consisted mainly of surface-to-air missiles (SAM's), jet fighters and technical advisers. In late March 1965 the Soviet Communist Party's first secretary, Leonid I. Brezhnev, announced that his government had been receiving "many applications" from Soviet citizens offering to serve as volunteers in Vietnam.Since 1965 the Soviet Union and Communist China had been haggling over the military aid each is providing North Vietnam and over the mechanics of moving Soviet aid to North Vietnam. The dispute was a facet of the broader Sino-Soviet conflict and was interwoven with issues arising from US-North Vietnamese negotiations. Parts of the continuing argument surfaced, periodically in polemical exchanges between Moscow and Peking.Both Moscow and Peking, throughout the dispute, had other considerations in mind in addition to North Vietnam's war needs. A paramount Soviet purpose was to use aid to Vietnam as a means of strengthening Moscow's influence over Hanoi and elsewhere at the expense of Peking. Sino-Soviet political enmity and military rivalry worked to limit to some extent what aid the North Vietnamese received and how they received it. Because of China's insistance on a right to inspect Soviet shipments in transit to North Vietnam, the Soviets appear to have held back or delayed shipment of some sophisticated military equipment. Third, both Moscow and Peking were constrained in their aid to North Vietnam by a desire to avoid a direct conflict with the US.The USSR repeatedly suggested that it believed the Chinese wish to provoke a conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States in the Gulf of Tonkin. A widely-distributed CPSU letter to other parties in February 1966 claimed that the Chinese sought such a conflict "in order to be able to, as they themselves say, 'observe the battle of the tigers while seated on the hill.'" In April 1966, the Soviet leaders circulated a document at the 23rd CPSU Congress which accused the Chinese of trying to force the Soviet Union to ship its military aid by sea and risk a clash with the Seventh Fleet, and thereby to force a Soviet-US showdown.The Hanoi government received continued support from Moscow on the political, military and economic fronts. Moscow endorsed the peace proposals of both Hanoi and the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam. The Soviet Union, in agreements signed in July 1965 and December 1965, respectively, also pledged to give increased military and economic aid.In early March 1965 (presumably in accordance with the understandings Kosygin had reached with the Vietnamese in Hanoi in February) the Soviets proposed to send to the DRV by rail through China eight battalions of SAMs and four thousand Soviet advisors and technicians. The Chinese strongly objected, but they repeatedly claimed in April and May that it was North Vietnamese reluctance to accept Soviet personnel that had caused the offer to be rejected, On the other hand, the Soviets claimed that the Chinese were placing a limit on the transit of Soviet personnel. Under the influence of the mounting US bombing, the DRV prevailed upon China to permit a limited quota of Soviet SAM personnel to pass. It was not until 24 July 1965 that the SAMs were fired for the first time, by Soviet crews.In December 1965 the Soviet army newspaper, Red Star, reported for the first time that Soviet antiaircraft missiles had been supplied to North Vietnam. Still another Moscow pledge of military and economic assistance was made in an agreement signed in January 1966, when Aleksandr N. Shelepin, a member of the Soviet Communist Party Presidium and Secretariat, visited Hanoi.The extent of Soviet aid, though never officially announced, was reported by various sources. In February 1966 the chairman of the Canadian Communist Party, Tim Buck, was quoted by Radio Djakarta as having said that some 5,000 North Vietnamese were being trained in the Soviet Union to become fighter pilots. This information was reported to have been obtained from President Ho Chi Minh while the Canadian Communist was visiting Hanoi in late 1965. The extent of the Soviet aid to Hanoi was estimated in some quarters to be "worth about half a billion rubles", ranging from rocket installations to planes, tanks and warships.In March 1966 Le Duan, First Secretary of the Lao Dong Party, headed a delegation to Moscow to attend the twenty-third Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Communist China had boycotted this Congress. In his speech before the Congress, Le Duan declared that he had two fatherlands, North Vietnam and the Soviet Union, and thanked Moscow for its "huge and many-sided aid."In August 1966 Soviet authorities confirmed that an undisclosed number of North Vietnamese fighter pilots were being trained in the Soviet Union. In addition, Radio Moscow on October 2, 1966, announced for the first time that Soviet officers and specialists had been sent to North Vietnam to train antiaircraft units in the use of Soviet-made surface-to-air missiles. Nhan Dan announced in October that Hanoi had signed in Moscow an agreement on the new Soviet "nonrefundable" aid to Vietnam and an agreement on supplementary Soviet loans to Vietnam for 1967.The USSR obviously had great anxiety over the sea supply route to North Vietnam -- the main channel for Soviet economic and military-support shipments to the DRV. The Soviets were concerned over U.S. bombing of DRV ports and over the possibility that the United States might take steps to close DRV ports by mining or blockade. Through repeated vigorous protests the Soviet Union sought to convey the impression that the USSR regarded access to DRV ports as important to Soviet interests.What the Soviets apparently wanted was a way to carry weapons by sea to the Far East, yet have someone else assume the burden of actual delivery to the DRV. Such a solution would be available if the Chinese were willing to accept Soviet shipments at Chinese ports -- such as Canton -- for transshipment to the DRV either by rail or by Chinese ship.After the 02 June 1967 strafing incident at the DRV port of Campha, a Soviet Foreign Ministry note threatened "to take appropriate measures to insure the safety of Soviet ships" if the incident were reported. On 05 January 1968, after two more incidents had actually occurred, a Soviet protest note said that "the corresponding Soviet departments will be compelled to take measures for insuring the safety of Soviet vessels bound for DRV ports."It is possible that the Soviet navy, in the spring of 1967, was instructed to prepare contingency plans for a possible Soviet attempt to break a hypothetical US blockade of Haiphong - leaving implementation open as a matter for politburo decision. Czechoslovak Defense Minister Lomsky reported to the collegium of the Ministry that the Soviets had issued an order to the Soviet navy to provide escorts for Soviet merchant vessels in the event that Haiphong was blockaded or a Soviet vessel bombed in Haiphong harbor. This order also allegedly called for efforts to break any blockade, including steps to sweep minefields. Lomsky, who had just returned from Moscow, said that the Soviets had told him that they would resist any U.S. moves to prevent Soviet ships from going to Haiphong. The Soviet order was supposedly issued at a time when U.S. statements pointed to a possible blockade of Haiphong. However, no Soviet naval escorts were in fact provided.The Soviet Union indicated that some of the weapons requested by the DRV had been denied. The CPSU document on Soviet military aid to Vietnam circulated among visiting foreign Communists in Moscow in November 1967, stated that "the USSR has speedily satisfied practically all the requests of the DRV for delivery of military equipment." The DRV did not receive the KOMAR or OSA-class guided-missile-firing patrol boats, which it wanted and, apparently, at one time thought it was going to receive. The failure to receive such boats must be particularly annoying to the DRV because, over the previous decade, the USSR had distributed KOMARs and OSAs to about a dozen countries around the world, including some whom the DRV must regard as far less deserving than itself.The military aid figures reflect the level and intensity of combat operations in Indochina. The high level in 1968 resulted both from replacement requirements for ground forces equipment following the 1968 Tet offensive and the delivery of substantial amounts of Soviet air defense equipment before the bombing halt that year. Combat levels were lower during the next two years and military aid declined. This trend was reversed in 1971 when Hanoi began preparations for the 1972 spring offensive. Military assistance jumped sharply again in 1972, reflecting an upsurge in deliveries of ground forces equipment and air defense equipment. Shipments apparently turned down in 1973 following the ceasefire agreement.Economic aid from the USSR exceeded $300 million annually during the l968~7l reconstruction period'and could have been higher if North Vietnam's absorptive capacity were not so limited. Soviet aid fell sharply in 1972, however, as a result of the mining of North Vietnam's ports and the halt in reconstruction activity during the 1972 bombing.Following the conquest of South Vietnam in 1975, Hanoi sought to retain the equilibrium of its wartime relations with both China and the Soviet Union, but mounting tensions with Beijing, culminating in the loss of Chinese aid in 1978, compelled Hanoi to look increasingly to Moscow for economic and military assistance. Beginning in late 1975, a number of significant agreements were signed between the two countries. One coordinated the national economic development plans of the two countries, and another called for the Soviet Union to underwrite Vietnam's first post-reunification Five-Year Plan. The first formal alliance was achieved in June 1978 when Vietnam joined Comecon.Copyright © 2000-2017 http://GlobalSecurity.org All rights reserved. Site maintained by: John PikeWhat role did the Soviet Union play in the Vietnam war? (Quora)Soviet Union in Vietnam WarSoviet Union in Vietnam War: Soviet ships in the South China Sea gave vital early warnings to NLF forces in South Vietnam. The Soviet intelligence ships would pick up American B-52 bombers flying from Okinawa and Guam. Their airspeed and direction would be noted and then relayed to COSVN headquarters. COSVN using airspeed and direction would calculate the bombing target and tell any assets to move "perpendicularly to the attack trajectory." These advance warning gave them time to move out of the way of the bombers and while the bombing runs caused extensive damage, because of the early warnings from 1968–1970 they didn't kill a single military or civilian leader in the headquarter complexes.During the Vietnam War, The Soviet Union supplied North Vietnam with medical supplies, arms, tanks, planes, helicopters, artillery, anti-aircraft missiles and other military equipment. Soviet crews fired USSR-made surface-to-air missiles at the B-52 bombers, which were the first raiders shot down over Hanoi. Fewer than a dozen Soviet citizens lost their lives in this conflict. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russian officials acknowledged that the Soviet Union had stationed up to 3,000 troops in Vietnam during the war.Some Russian sources give more specific numbers: the hardware donated by the USSR included 2,000 tanks, 7,000 artillery guns, over 5,000 anti-aircraft guns, 158 surface-to-air rocket launchers. Over the course of the war the Soviet money donated to the Vietnamese cause was equal to 2 million dollars a day. From July 1965 to the end of 1974, fighting in Vietnam was attended by some 6,500 officers and generals, as well as more than 4,500 soldiers and sergeants of the Soviet Armed Forces. In addition, military schools and academies of the USSR began training Vietnamese soldiers – more than 10 thousand people.The Soviet UnionVietnam Table of ContentsSince the earliest days of the VCP, when the party's primary mentor was the Comintern, the Soviet Union has played a complex role in VCP affairs. Many of Vietnam's leaders had trained in the Soviet Union and had formed personal ties with their Soviet contemporaries. Historically, however, the relationship between the two nations has been characterized by strain, particularly on the Vietnamese side, and the record suggests several instances of Soviet neglect or betrayal of Vietnamese interests. These included Moscow's indifference to the founding of the VCP in 1930; failure to support materially or otherwise the Vietnamese resistance war against the French in the 1930s and early 1940s; failure to recognize North Vietnam until five years after its founding; failure to support Vietnam's application for membership in the UN in 1948 and 1951; support for the partitioning of Vietnam at the Geneva Conference in 1954; and sponsorship of a proposal to admit both North and South Vietnam to the UN in 1956. These examples of Soviet policy reminded the Vietnamese of the peril inherent in placing too much trust in a foreign ally.The Sino-Soviet split in the late 1950s favorably altered the Soviet attitude toward Vietnam. Beginning in 1965, the Soviets initiated a program of military assistance to Hanoi that proved invaluable in carrying on the Second Indochina War. Hanoi, however, continued to suspect Soviet motives and perceived that Soviet aid, when offered, was insufficient and given only grudgingly after repeated appeals.Following the conquest of South Vietnam in 1975, Hanoi sought to retain the equilibrium of its wartime relations with both China and the Soviet Union, but mounting tensions with Beijing, culminating in the loss of Chinese aid in 1978, compelled Hanoi to look increasingly to Moscow for economic and military assistance. Beginning in late 1975, a number of significant agreements were signed between the two countries. One coordinated the national economic development plans of the two countries, and another called for the Soviet Union to underwrite Vietnam's first post-reunification Five-Year Plan. The first formal alliance was achieved in June 1978 when Vietnam joined Comecon. That organization, which facilitated the economic integration of the Soviet Union, six East European countries, Cuba, and Mongolia, was able to offer economic assistance for some of the projects abandoned by China.Vietnam's decision to invade Cambodia, which the leadership apparently made shortly after joining Comecon, required more than economic assistance from the Soviets. The possibility of a formal alliance between Hanoi and Moscow had apparently been discussed since 1975, but the Vietnamese had rejected the idea in order to protect their relationship with China. In 1978 that relationship had deteriorated to the point where protecting it was no longer a consideration, and circumstances in Cambodia confirmed the need for Vietnamese-Soviet military cooperation. In spite of Vietnam's needs, it is likely that the November 1978 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was imposed by the Soviets as a condition for military assistance. As a result of the treaty, the Vietnamese granted the Soviets access to the facilities at Da Nang and Cam Ranh Bay. Use of the bases represented a substantial regional strategic gain for Moscow, whose naval bases in the Pacific Ocean, until then, had been limited to the Soviet Far East.Soviet support sustained Vietnamese operations in Cambodia. Military aid in 1978 approached US$800 million annually, but after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979, the figure rose to almost US$1.4 billion. The sharp increase, reflecting the Soviet effort to replace quickly Vietnamese equipment losses on the Sino Vietnamese border, was subsequently reduced to between US$800 and 900 million in 1980 and between US$900 million and 1 billion in 1981. Military aid increased to 1.7 billion annually in the 1982- 85 period, and decreased to an estimated US$1.5 billion in 1985. Reported Soviet dissatisfaction with Hanoi's handling of Cambodia, stemming from the stalemated battlefield situation and its high costs, did not appear to affect Moscow's decision to continue to provide assistance for the war. At the end of 1987, there was no indication that the Soviets were pressing Vietnam to resolve the conflict.In addition to its role as Vietnam's exclusive donor of military aid, the Soviet Union in 1987 was also Vietnam's largest contributor of economic aid and its biggest trade partner. During the Third Five-Year Plan (1981-85), the Soviets provided some US$5.4 billion in balance-of-payments aid, project assistance, and oil price subsidies. Total economic aid for 1986 was an estimated US$1.8 billion. The Soviets also have been a major supplier of food and commodity aid on a mostly grant-aid or softcurrency basis. By 1983 they were supplying 90 percent of Vietnam's petroleum, iron and steel, fertilizer, and cotton imports and 70 percent of its grain imports.Soviet-Vietnamese ties in the mid-1980s were sound, although troubled by some underlying strain. The Vietnamese distrusted Soviet intentions and resented Hanoi's dependent role; the Soviets in turn distrusted the Vietnamese for not confiding in them. Reportedly, on a number of occasions Moscow learned of major Vietnamese policy plans and changes only after the fact. According to some foreign observers, the Soviets were not entirely prepared for the sudden deterioration in Sino-Vietnamese relations in 1978, and they may not have been aware of the full extent of Vietnamese plans in Cambodia. Others believe the Soviet Union was aware of the deterioration and was allowing Vietnam to play the role of proxy in Moscow's own dispute with Beijing.Friction was particularly evident in economic relations. The Soviets resented the enormous burden of their aid program to Vietnam and felt that much of it was wasted because of Vietnamese inefficiency. In turn, the Vietnamese were offended by Moscow's 1980 decision to reduce aid in the face of severe economic hardships in Vietnam. In the mid-1980s, aid continued at a reduced rate although Vietnam's economic situation had worsened.The prospect of an improvement in the state of Sino-Soviet relations in the mid-1980s did not appear to threaten the Soviet Union's ties with Vietnam. Although China demanded that Moscow ensure Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia as a condition to normalizing the Sino-Soviet relationship, Vietnamese leaders proceeded as if they were sure their existing policy in Cambodia would not be threatened. The Soviets even went so far as to promote improved relations between Hanoi and Beijing. At Vietnam's Sixth Party Congress in December 1986, the senior member of the Soviet delegation suggested that the normalization of relations between Vietnam and China would improve the situation in Asia and the world as a whole. The Vietnamese agreed with this premise but were unwilling to seek improved ties at the expense of weakening their position in Cambodia.Chinese and Soviet involvement in Vietnam (alphahistory.com)Ho Chi Minh photographed during a visit to the People’s Republic of China.As the United States poured men and money into South Vietnam, Chinese and Soviet involvement in Vietnam also increased. As the world’s largest communist powers, both the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China also lent moral, logistic and military support to North Vietnam. Both Moscow and Beijing hoped to consolidate and expand communism in the Asian hemisphere. Not only would the rise of Asian communism help tip the balance against the West in the Cold War, it would also serve Russian and Chinese national interests. Neither the Soviet Union or China were frank or open about the nature of the support they provided to North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front (NLF). To this day there is much speculation about exactly what was given and by whom. What can safely be assumed is that Soviet and Chinese support was vital to Hanoi and contributed to the successes of its operations in South Vietnam.Western governments, of course, condemned North Vietnam as a puppet state and Ho Chi Minh as a slave to Moscow and Beijing. The extent of Ho Chi Minh’s communism is open to question, however there is no doubt of his strong links with the Soviet Union. The young Nguyen Sinh Cung gravitated towards Marxism in late 1919, after his dreams of Vietnamese independence were rejected by Western leaders in Paris. In 1920 Ho became one of the foundation members of the French Communist Party. Three years later he traveled to Moscow, where he undertook further studies in communist theory and international activism. He also became Vietnam’s delegate to the Comintern, a Soviet committee charged with promoting and supporting socialist revolution around the world. There is no doubt that Ho Chi Minh had the pedigree of a communist – but it is also true that he was no puppet. Unlike some of the pro-Soviet rulers in eastern Europe, Ho’s first allegiance was to his country and its people, not to Moscow, the Comintern or ‘world revolution’.Ho Chi Minh speaks during an official visit to Moscow in 1955After World War II Soviet Russia gave only marginal support for communist movements in Vietnam, which was then well outside Moscow’s sphere of influence. Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin sought to maintain his wartime alliance with the West, temporarily at least, and chose not to antagonise them by backing the Viet Minh in 1946-47. Stalin also had an immovable distrust of Asian communist groups, considering them weak, undisciplined and tainted by self interest and nationalism. By the end of 1949 the situation had changed markedly. US-Soviet tensions were rising and Mao Zedong’s communist victory in China (October 1949) was a radical development in the Cold War. In January 1950, Moscow belatedly recognised Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh as the ‘official’ rulers of Vietnam. Ho Chi Minh journeyed to Moscow and sought Soviet military backing for his war of independence against the French. But Stalin, whose attentions were concentrated on Europe, rejected his overtures. Stalin instead encouraged his communist ally, Mao Zedong, to support the Viet Minh.Ho Chi Minh with Chinese leaders Mao Zedong (left) and Zhou Enlai, 1955The Chinese already had a history of working with the Viet Minh. Chinese communists and the Viet Minh had provided each other with cover and material support during their struggles to gain control in their countries. This relationship was particularly strong in border regions. Chinese communist forces often retreated into North Vietnam, to rest or prepare for further offensives. In return the Chinese provided the Viet Minh with weapons, munitions and training. Beijing continued this assistance in the early 1950s, providing significant amounts of military aid to Hanoi, while also supplying North Korea during the Korean War (1950-53). Most Chinese supplies arrived in Kunming in Yunnan province, where they were transported to the Vietnamese border, then carried down a narrow jungle track – a forerunner of the famous ‘Ho Chi Minh trail’.Chinese communism also had some influence on Vietnamese communist ideology, organisation and policy. Chinese advice and technical expertise influenced Hanoi’s programs of land reform and industrialisation during the 1950s. When the Indochinese Communist Party was reformed as the Lao Dong in early 1951, it embraced an organisation and structures modelled on those of the Chinese Communist Party. The rhetoric that passed between the Viet Minh and Beijing was usually effusive. Hoang Van Hoan, the Viet Minh’s chief diplomat in China, was reportedly offered unconditional support and a “blank cheque” for the supply of equipment. And while Chinese support was flowing, Ho Chi Minh was prepared to return the gushing praise. At a ceremony in February 1951, Hoang Van Hoan told a visiting Chinese delegation:The death of Joseph Stalin (March 1953) and the stabilisation of events in Europe drew Moscow’s attentions back to south-east Asia. While the Viet Minh were preparing to drive out the French and move toward reunification, the Soviets preferred a more conciliatory approach. Soviet delegates at the Geneva conference urged the Viet Minh to accept a negotiated peace and the proposed transitional division. A divided Vietnam, Soviet strategists argued, would allow for a period of stabilisation: the communist regime in the North would be able to consolidate its power, undertake economic reforms and improve its military capability. Moscow also had broader concerns: it was worried that US military involvement in Vietnam would require some kind of Soviet response. Under pressure from the Soviet Union, Ho Chi Minh advised his representatives in Geneva to sign the accords.A Chinese poster (1963) calling on resistance to US imperialism in VietnamThe Gulf of Tonkin incident (August 1964) and the arrival of US combat troops (1965) triggered an escalation in Chinese support. This came mainly in the form of equipment and construction. In 1965 Beijing sent several thousand engineering troops into North Vietnam, to assist in building and repairing roads, railways, airstrips and critical defence infrastructure. Between 1965 and 1971 more than 320,000 Chinese troops were deployed in North Vietnam. The peak year was in 1967, when there were around 170,000 Chinese in the communist state. Their work on military installations meant that Chinese troops were susceptible to American bombing runs. An estimated 1,000 Chinese were killed in the North in the late 1960s. Beijing also supplied Hanoi with large amounts of military equipment, including trucks, tanks and artillery.Viet Cong soldiers in front of a Soviet-supplied SA-2 anti-aircraft missileSoviet support for North Vietnam remained lukewarm through the 1950s and early 1960s. The Soviet Union supplied Hanoi with information, technical advisors and moral support – but Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev preferred to limit his backing and keep his country at arm’s length from the unfolding trouble in Vietnam. Khrushchev was removed as leader in October 1964, shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin incident. The new Soviet premier, Aleksei Kosygin, was more eager to consolidate and assert his power, mainly to placate hardliners in the Soviet military. In November 1964 Kosygin sent a public message of support to the National Liberation Front and announced a state visit to North Vietnam in the New Year. The Soviet leader arrived in Hanoi in February 1965, when he met with members of the Lao Dong Politburo and NVA commanders. They signed a defence treaty that would provide North Vietnam with both financial aid and military equipment and advisors. A public statement from the Kosygin delegation read:Moscow now became North Vietnam’s main benefactor. Like China, the Soviet Union increased its aid to Hanoi after the US military escalation of 1965. The true extent of this support has never been fully disclosed, though it was certainly substantial. In 1966 there were widespread reports that North Vietnamese fighter pilots, air crews and anti-aircraft gunners had received training in the Soviet Union. It was subsequently revealed that around 3,000 Soviet personnel served in North Vietnam in 1964-65 and that some were responsible for shooting down US planes. By the spring of 1967 TIME Magazine was reporting that a “river of aid” was flowing from Russia into North Vietnam. According to some analysts, by the late 1960s more than three quarters of the military and technical equipment received by North Vietnam was coming from the Soviet Union. And unlike the equipment and weapons supplied by Beijing – which demanded deferred payment – most Soviet assistance was supplied as aid rather than loans.To complicate matters further, the relationship between the Soviet Union and China deteriorated through the 1960s. Changes in leadership in Moscow, coupled with the 1966 Cultural Revolution in China, increased tensions between the two communist superpowers. By 1968 almost one million Soviet troops were massing on the Chinese border. The following year, a series of border clashes led to around 200 deaths. The Sino-Soviet split effectively forced Hanoi to choose between Beijing and Moscow. It was not a difficult decision. In November 1968, the Soviet Union and North Vietnam signed a new set of military and economic agreements. According to one report, they “provided for large Soviet deliveries of food, petroleum, transportation equipment, iron and steel, other metals, fertilisers, arms, munitions and other commodities, for strengthening [North] Vietnam’s defences”. Mao Zedong responded by winding back Chinese aid and ordering the withdrawal of all Chinese personnel from North Vietnam. Russian supplies bound for Hanoi still had to pass through Chinese territory, where they were often held up by suspicious officials.1. As the United States provided aid and support to South Vietnam, China and the Soviet Union did the same for North Vietnam, though the nature and extent of this support is not fully known.2. The period 1946-49 was one of co-operation between Chinese communists and the Viet Minh. This continued after the communist victory in China (1949) in the form of military aid and support with policies and rebuilding.3. The Soviet Union, in contrast, paid little regard to the situation in Vietnam. Stalin urged China to assist with the supply and development of North Vietnam, which it did through the 1950s.4. Seeking to avoid direct involvement in Asia, Moscow urged the North Vietnamese to accept the terms of the Geneva Accords (1954). Soviet interest in Vietnam increased later, under new leader Aleksei Kosygin.5. By the late 1960s Moscow had become North Vietnam’s main benefactor, providing most of its aid and equipment. The Sino-Soviet split in this period forced North Vietnam to align closely with Moscow.© Alpha History 2016. Content on this page may not be republished or distributed without permission. For more information please refer to our Terms of Use.This page was written by Jennifer Llewellyn, Jim Southey and Steve Thompson. To reference this page, use the following citation:J. Llewellyn et al, “Chinese and Soviet involvement in Vietnam”, Alpha History, accessed [today’s date], Chinese and Soviet involvement in Vietnam.Why did the Soviets support North Vietnam? 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