An Ordinance Amending Chapter 290: Fill & Download for Free

It does. The Bill of Rights prevents the government of the United States (and the States and other government entities, too, since passage of the 14th Amendment) from passing ANY law respecting either an institution of religion or interfering with freedom of religion.A number of Supreme Court decisions have made sure our government can pass no law about religion — but that Court doesn’t make laws, only ruling on their constitutionality.Article [I] [The First Amendment]Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.Article XIV [The Fourteenth Amendment]1: All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws….From the Bill of Rights Institute:Reynolds v. United States (1879)The Court examined whether the federal anti-bigamy statute violated the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause, because plural marriage is part of religious practice. It unanimously upheld the federal law banning polygamy, noting that the Free Exercise Clause forbids government from regulating belief, but does allow government to punish activity judged to be criminal, regardless of an activity’s basis in religious belief. (Citation: 98 US 145) BRI e-Lesson AvailableMinersville School District v. Gobitis (1940)The Court looked at whether a Pennsylvania law requiring students in school to salute the United States flag infringed on liberties protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It decided 8-1 in favor of the school policy, ruling that the government could require respect for the flag as a key symbol of national unity and a means of preserving national security. In 1943, the Court reversed this ruling in another case, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (319 US 624). (Citation: 310 U.S. 586) BRI e-Lesson AvailableCantwell v. Connecticut (1940)The Court considered whether a Connecticut statute requiring a permit to solicit for religious or charitable purposes violated First Amendment Free Speech or Free Exercise rights. It ruled unanimously against the state, noting that although general regulations on solicitation are legitimate, in allowing local officials to determine which causes were religious and which ones were not and to issue and deny permits accordingly, the state of Connecticut took on the role of determining religious truth—which violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court also held that the peaceful expression of beliefs is protected by the First Amendment from infringement by not only the federal government, but also by state governments. This was the first time the Court applied the Free Exercise Clause to the states. (Citation: 310 US 296) BRI e-Lesson AvailableEverson v. Board of Education (1947)The Court examined whether a New Jersey law allowing reimbursements to parents who sent their children on buses operated by the public transportation system to public and private schools, including parochial Catholic schools, was indirect aid to religion and thus a violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the law was constitutional, because the transportation reimbursements were provided to all students regardless of religion. Also, the reimbursements were made directly to parents and not to any religious institution. This case also applied the Establishment Clause to the actions of state governments. (Citation: 330 U.S. 1)Braunfeld v. Brown (1961)The Court looked at whether a Pennsylvania “blue law”—which allowed only certain types of stores to remain open for business on Sundays—violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by imposing an undue economic burden on members of the Orthodox Jewish community, whose faith requires them to close their businesses from nightfall Friday to nightfall Saturday. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the blue law did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, because it had a secular basis and did not make any religious practices unlawful. (Citation: 366 U.S. 599)Torcaso v. Watkins (1961)The Court considered whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was violated by a Maryland requirement that a candidate for public office declare a belief in God to be eligible for the position. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that the requirement violated the Establishment Clause by giving preference to candidates who believed in God and were willing to state their beliefs, over other candidates. In this, Maryland effectively aided religions involving a belief in God at the expense of religions or beliefs that do not, a position that a state is expressly prohibited from taking. (Citation: 367 U.S. 488)Engel v. Vitale (1962)The Court looked at whether the daily reading of a state-composed nondenominational prayer in school violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In a 6-1 decision, the Court ruled that New York’s official prayer to begin the school day was an unconstitutional violation of the Establishment Clause. (Citation: 370 U.S. 421) BRI e-Lesson AvailableSherbert v. Verner (1963)The Court examined whether the state of South Carolina violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment in denying unemployment benefits to a person for turning down a job, because it required him or her to work on the Sabbath. The Court ruled 7-2 that the South Carolina statute did impede a person’s right to freely exercise religion, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause. (Citation: 374 U.S. 398)School District of Abington Township, Pennsylvania v. Schempp (1963)The Court considered whether a Pennsylvania law and policy of the Abington School District requiring public-school students to participate in classroom exercises involving daily Bible verse reading violated the religious freedom of students under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In an 8-1 decision, the Court found that the Pennsylvania law and school-district practice violated the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. (Citation: 374 U.S. 203)Murray v. Curlett (1963)The Court examined this case in combination with Abington v. Schempp (1963), determining whether Baltimore, Maryland, public schools violated the Establishment Clause in conducting daily opening exercises involving reading of the Bible and reciting of the Lord’s Prayer. As with Abington v. Schempp, the Maryland school-day religious exercises were declared a violation of the Establishment Clause. (Citation: 374 US 203)Epperson v. Arkansas (1968)The Court looked at whether an Arkansas law prohibiting the teaching of evolution violated the free-speech rights of teachers and/or the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In its unanimous decision, the Court held that the law did violate the Establishment Clause because, as Justice Abe Fortas wrote in the Court’s opinion, “Arkansas has sought to prevent its teachers from discussing the theory of evolution, because it is contrary to the belief of some that the Book of Genesis must be the exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man. No suggestion has been made that Arkansas’s law may be justified by considerations of state policy other than the religious views of some of its citizens.” The Court further ruled that the First Amendment does not permit a state to require teaching and learning to be tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma. (Citation: 393 US 97)Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)The Court considered whether a Pennsylvania law reimbursing religious schools with state funds for textbooks and teacher salaries for non-public, non-secular schools violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In an 8-0 decision, the Court set out a three-pronged test for the constitutionality of a statute, by which a statute is constitutional if: (1) it has a primarily secular purpose; (2) its principal effect neither aids nor inhibits religion; and (3) government and religion are not excessively entangled. On this basis, the Court struck down the Pennsylvania law as in violation of the Establishment Clause, finding that the statute constituted an excessive government entanglement with religion. (Citation: 403 US 602)Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)The Court examined whether the state of Wisconsin’s requirement that all parents send their children to school at least until age 16 violated the First Amendment by criminalizing the conduct of parents who refused to send their children to school for religious reasons. In their unanimous decision, the Court ruled that Amish adolescents could be exempt from the state law requiring school attendance for all 14 to 16-year-olds, because their religion required living apart from the world and worldly influence. The state’s interest in having students attend 2 additional years of school did not outweigh the individual’s right to free exercise of religious belief. (Citation: 406 US 205)McDaniel v. Paty (1978)The Court looked at whether a Tennessee law that barred members of the clergy from serving in public office violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court ruled unanimously that the statute violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, because it made the ability to exercise civil rights conditional on the surrender of religious rights. (Citation: 435 US 618)Stone v. Graham (1980)The Court considered whether a Kentucky state law mandating the display of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Applying the three-prong test from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), the Court found 5-4 that the Kentucky law was unconstitutional, because it had no secular legislative purpose. The Court also found that by mandating posting of the Commandments under the guidance of the legislature, the state was providing official support of religion, which was a violation of the Establishment Clause. (Citation: 449 US 39)Mueller v. Allen (1982)The Court examined whether a Minnesota state law allowing taxpayers to deduct from their state income tax expenses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for their children’s elementary or secondary school education—including for private secular and parochial schools—violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld Minnesota’s tax-credit law as constitutional because—applying the three-pronged test from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)—the tax credits did not have the effect of advancing religion (primarily secular purpose), were available to all parents and applied to sectarian and nonsectarian tuition (principal effect neither aids nor inhibits religion), and did not excessively entangle government and religion. (Citation: 463 US 388)Marsh v. Chambers (1983)The Court looked at whether the Nebraska legislature violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment in its practice of opening each of its sessions with a prayer offered by a chaplain paid out of public funds. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that the Nebraska Legislature’s chaplaincy practice does not violate the Establishment Clause; however, in that decision, it looked past the three-pronged test from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), which the practice does not pass, to the long historical custom of the practice—dating back to the Continental Congress and the first Congress that framed the Bill of Rights. In the opinion for the majority, Chief Justice Warren Burger wrote, “In light of the unambiguous and unbroken history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our society. To invoke Divine guidance on a public body entrusted with making the laws is not, in these circumstances, an ‘establishment’ of religion or a step toward establishment; it is simply a tolerable acknowledgment of beliefs widely held among the people of this country.” (Citation: 463 US 783)Lynch v. Donnelly (1984)The Court considered whether the city of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by including a nativity scene in the Christmas display in a public park, among other figures and decorations traditionally associated with Christmas. The Court applied the three-pronged test from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) and, in a 5-4 decision, held that “notwithstanding the religious significance of the creche, the city of Pawtucket has not violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.” The principal purpose of the nativity scene was to celebrate and depict the origins of a national holiday, and in that, it passed the three-pronged test. (Citation: 465 US 668)Wallace v. Jaffree (1985)The Court examined whether an Alabama law authorizing a period of silence for “meditation or voluntary prayer” (the law’s wording) violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In a 6-3 decision, the Court struck down the law as violating the Establishment Clause, because it had no secular purpose (thus failing the 3-pronged test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971), and because the addition of “and voluntary prayer” to the wording of an almost identical earlier statute “indicate[d] that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored practice, effectively endorsing a religion.” (Citation: 472 U.S. 38)Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985)The Court looked at whether a Connecticut statute providing employees with the absolute and unqualified right not to work on their chosen Sabbath violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In a 7-1 decision, the Court held that the Connecticut statute violated the Establishment Clause, because it effectively gave Sabbath religious concerns automatic control over all secular interests at the workplace and took no account of the convenience or interests of the employer or of other employees who do not observe a Sabbath. In this, the statute had a primary effect of advancing a particular religious practice. Thus, the statute failed all parts of the 3-pronged secular purpose test from Lemon v. Kurtzman (403 U. S. 602, 1971). (Citation: 472 U.S. 703)Goldman v. Weinberger (1986)The Court considered whether a U.S. Air Force regulation regarding wearing of headgear violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment by preventing an Orthodox Jewish soldier from wearing his yarmulke while on duty and in uniform. The Court ruled 5-4 that the Air Force regulation did not violate the Constitution. In the opinion, Chief Justice William Rehnquist noted that the Court’s “review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society” and that “to accomplish its mission, the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps.” The Air Force’s purpose in its dress regulations is uniformity, and it “reasonably and evenhandedly regulate[s] dress in the interest of” that need. Thus, the First Amendment does not prohibit the Air Force from applying the challenged regulation to the wearing of a yarmulke by a soldier on duty and in uniform, even though that effectively restricts the wearing of headgear required by one’s religious beliefs. (Citation: 475 U.S. 503)Edwards v. Aguillard (1987)The Court examined whether a Louisiana law that forbade the teaching of the theory of evolution in public schools unless accompanied by instruction in “creation science” violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the Louisiana statute violated the Establishment Clause, because it failed all parts of the 3-pronged test from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), in that it: (prong 1) lacked a clear secular purpose, (prong 2) endorsed religion by advancing the religious belief that a supernatural being created humankind, and (prong 3) entangled the interests of church and state by seeking “to employ the symbolic and financial support of government to achieve a religious purpose.” (Citation: 482 US 578)County of Allegheny v. ACLU (1989)The Court looked at whether Allegheny County and the City of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, violated the Establishment clause by the county’s public holiday display of a Christmas nativity scene (creche) and the city’s display of an 18-foot-tall Chanukah menorah next to a 45-foot decorated Christmas tree. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the creche display was unconstitutional, but the menorah was permissible. The creche was displayed alone in the courthouse and included an angel holding a banner that said “Gloria in Excelsis Deo” (Latin for “Glory to God in the highest”). The Court said that by including that message and displaying the creche with nothing around it to detract from this religious message, the county was not just celebrating Christmas as a national holiday—which in Lynch v. Donnelly (1984) was ruled permissible despite the holiday’s religious origins—but also was “endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for the birth of Jesus Christ,” and thus violated the Establishment Clause. The city’s menorah and decorated Christmas tree were displayed just outside the City-County building, with a sign at the foot of the tree with the mayor’s name and text declaring the city’s “salute to liberty.” The Court held that by including the menorah with the tree and the sign saluting liberty, “the city conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of belief” and thus did not violate the Establishment Clause. (Citation: 492 U.S. 573) BRI E-Lesson AvailableBoard of Education of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens (1990)The Court considered whether the Equal Access Act (1990) prohibits a high school from denying a student religious group permission to meet on school premises during non-instructional time, and if it does, whether the Act itself violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In an 8-1 decision, the Court affirmed the lower court’s judgement that, because the school allows other non-curricular groups to meet, it is bound by the Act to permit other groups to meet and cannot deny such permission on the basis of religious content of those meetings. The Court further ruled that the Act did not violate the Establishment Clause, because it passes the 3-pronged test outlined in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) in that it grants equal access to both secular and religious speech (secular purpose), and it expressly limits participation by school officials at student religious group meetings and requires that such meetings be held during non-instructional time (does not advance religion and avoids excessive entanglement of religion and government). (Citation: 496 US 226)Employment Division v. Smith (1990)The Court examined whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment allowed the state of Oregon to deny unemployment benefits to someone fired from a job for smoking peyote as part of a religious ceremony. Peyote is a controlled substance under Oregon law, and its possession is a criminal offense. The Court first determined whether such prohibition is constitutional and found that it is constitutional, because the law is “valid and neutral,” applying to everyone and not specifically aimed at a physical act engaged in for a religious reason. In a 6-3 decision, the Court then held that, because ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon did not violate the Free Exercise Clause in denying persons unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug. (Citation: 494 U.S. 872)Lee v. Weisman (1992)The Court looked at whether officially approved, clergy-led prayer at public school graduations in Providence, Rhode Island, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The Court applied the 3-pronged test from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) and in a 5-4 decision, held the practice to be a violation of the Establishment Clause. In the Court’s opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that the state government’s involvement in the practice of the clergy-led graduation prayer was pervasive “to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-directed religious exercise in a public school.” (Citation: 505 US 577 ) BRI E-Lesson AvailableChurch of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993)The Court considered whether ordinances passed by the city of Hialeah, Florida, banning animal sacrifice violated the Free Exercise Clause. The texts of these laws and the way they operated showed that they were not neutral and generally applicable, but instead targeted the Santeria religion, in which animal sacrifice is an important ritual. In a unanimous decision, the Court held that because the ordinances were designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices, they violated the Free Exercise Clause. (Citation: 508 US 520)Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District (1993)The Court examined whether, based on the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, a school district may refuse to provide a sign-language interpreter to accompany a deaf student to classes at a religious high school. In a 5-4 ruling, the Court held that the Establishment Clause does not prevent a school district from furnishing a disabled child enrolled in a sectarian school with a sign-language interpreter to facilitate the child’s education. (Citation: 509 US 1)Kiryas Joel School District v. Grumet (1994)The Court looked at whether a New York state law creating a special school district to benefit disabled children in the Satmar Hasidic Jewish neighborhood Kiryas Joel violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In a 6-3 decision, the Court found the law to be unconstitutional, because it failed the second prong of the 3-prong test set out in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), in that it advanced religion by creating a school district unit of government that coincided with the neighborhood boundaries of a religious group. (Citation: 512 US 687)Capitol Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette (1995)The Court considered whether the Advisory Board of Columbus, Ohio, violated the free speech rights of the Ku Klux Klan when it used the Establishment Clause to deny them permission to erect an unattended cross on Capitol Square (the state-house square) during the Christmas season. Under Ohio law, Capitol Square is a forum for discussion of public questions and for public activities, and so is a space that is open to all on equal terms. In a 7-2 decision, the Court held that the denial of permission did violate the Ku Klux Klan’s free speech rights. In the opinion, Justice Antonin Scalia wrote that the display of the cross “was private religious speech that is as fully protected under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression” and that, because Capitol Square is a traditional public forum, “the Board could regulate the content of the Klan’s expression there only if such a restriction is necessary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest.” (Citation: 515 US 753)Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe (2000)The Court examined whether the state of Texas’ Santa Fe Independent School District’s policy permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer at football games violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that it did, upholding the appeals court’s earlier ruling. In their decision, the Court rejected the school district’s view that, because students controlled the pregame invocation by voting on and delivering its content, it was private speech protected by the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. Rather, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote in the Court’s opinion that it was public speech, because “the delivery of such a message—over the school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the student body, under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer—is not properly characterized as ‘private’ speech.” Because of this and the context of the message’s delivery being an official school event, the school district’s policy impermissibly “involve[d] both perceived and actual endorsement of religion.” In addition, the Court applied the 3-pronged test from Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), which the policy failed for having no secular purpose (prong 1), because it “was implemented with the purpose of endorsing school prayer.” (Citation: 530 US 290)Mitchell v. Helms (2000)The Court looked at whether Chapter 2 of the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981, as applied in Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Chapter 2 was a federal program that through state and local agencies provided educational materials and equipment (e.g., library and media materials and computer software and hardware) to public and private elementary and secondary schools to implement secular, neutral, and nonideological programs. At the time of the case, about 30% of Chapter 2 funds spent in Jefferson Parish went to private schools, most of which were religiously affiliated. In a 6-3 decision, the Court held that Chapter 2 was “not a law respecting an establishment of religion” simply because many of the private schools receiving Chapter 2 aid in the parish are religiously affiliated, but rather what is important is whether the government assistance was neutral toward religion. For this, the Court set out three primary criteria for whether government aid has the effect of advancing religion, under which it does so if it: (1) results in governmental indoctrination, (2) defines its recipients by reference to religion, or (3) creates an excessive entanglement.” According to these three criteria, as applied in Jefferson Parish, the Chapter 2 aid was religiously neutral and so did not violate the Establishment Clause. (Citation: 530 US 793)Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001)The Court considered two questions: (1) whether Milford Central School in New York state violated the free speech rights of the Good News Club, a private Christian organization for children, when it excluded the club from meeting after hours at the school, and (2) whether any such violation was justified by Milford’s concern that permitting the club’s activities would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In a 6-3 decision, the Court concluded that Milford’s restriction did violate the club’s free speech rights and that no Establishment Clause concern justified that violation. As Justice Clarence Thomas wrote in the Court’s opinion, “When Milford denied the Good News Club access to the school’s limited public forum on the ground that the Club was religious in nature, it discriminated against the Club because of its religious viewpoint in violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.” The Court also rejected Milford’s Establishment Clause concern as justification for their exclusion of the club, noting that it is unlikely that elementary schoolchildren would perceive Milford’s allowance of the club as endorsing it, and because children could not participate in the club without the written permission of their parents, it was unlikely that they would have felt coerced to participate in its religious activities. (Citation: 533 US 98)Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002)The Court examined whether the state of Ohio’s Pilot Project Scholarship Program violated the Establishment Clause in providing tuition vouchers for certain students in the Cleveland City School District to attend participating public or private—including religious and nonreligious—schools of their parents’ choosing. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the program aid was neutral in all respects toward religion, and that therefore the program did not violate the Establishment Clause. Tuition aid under the program was distributed to parents according to financial need, and where the aid was spent depended solely on where parents chose to enroll their children. (Citation: 536 US 639) BRI E-Lesson AvailableElk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004)The Court looked at whether California’s Elk Grove Unified School District’s pledge policy violates the Constitution. The policy requires each elementary school class to recite daily the Pledge of Allegiance. Michael Newdow, the father of a child in one of the district’s schools, challenged the constitutionality of the district’s policy, because the Pledge contains the words “under God.” In a unanimous decision, the Court found that Newdow, as a non-custodial parent, did not have standing to bring the case to court. Therefore, it reversed the lower court’s finding that Newdow did have standing and that the Pledge policy was unconstitutional. From this position, the Court procedurally could not proceed to answer the constitutional question. However, Justices William Rehnquist, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Clarence Thomas (for part) wrote separate, concurring opinions that also examined the constitutionality question. They wrote that “on the merits” they concluded that the school district’s policy that requires reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, which includes the words “under God,” does not violate the Establishment Clause. Further, they noted, “the phrase ‘under God’ in the Pledge seems, as a historical matter, to sum up the attitude of the Nation’s leaders, and to manifest itself in many of our public observances. Examples of patriotic invocations of God and official acknowledgments of religion’s role in our Nation’s history abound.” They concluded that “the recital, in a patriotic ceremony pledging allegiance to the flag and to the Nation, of the descriptive phrase ‘under God’ cannot possibly lead to the establishment of a religion, or anything like it.” (Citation: 542 US 1)Locke v. Davey (2004)The Court considered whether the state of Washington’s decision not to award scholarship funds to college students pursuing devotional divinity degrees violated the Free Exercise Clause. The Court held 7-2 that Washington’s exclusion of the pursuit of a devotional theology degree from its otherwise inclusive scholarship aid program does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. In its opinion, the Court noted that Washington’s program “imposes neither criminal nor civil sanctions on any type of religious service or rite. It neither denies to ministers the right to participate in community political affairs […] nor requires students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.” Rather, the Court said, the state of Washington has simply chosen not to fund a particular category of instruction. (Citation: 540 U.S. 712) BRI E-Lesson AvailableVan Orden v. Perry (2005)The Court examined whether the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment allows the display of a monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds that is inscribed with the Ten Commandments. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the Texas display of the monument falls on the permissible side of the constitutional line and so does not violate the Establishment Clause. The state placed the Ten Commandments monument next to the Texas State Capitol with 38 other monuments and markers representing different aspects of Texas’s political and legal history. In the Court’s opinion, Justice William Rehnquist noted that its religious message notwithstanding, the monument was presented in a context conveying a “secular moral message about proper standards of social conduct and a message about the historic relation between those standards and the law.” Because of its context, Justice Rehnquist wrote that the public visiting the grounds would tend to consider the religious aspect of the tablets’ message as part of that broader message about cultural heritage. (Citation: 545 U.S. 677)McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky. (2005)The Court reviewed the lower court’s ruling of unconstitutionality of a display of the Ten Commandments in 2 Kentucky county courthouses, and within that, looked at whether the counties’ purpose was a sound basis for ruling on the Establishment Clause complaints, and whether evaluation of the counties’ claim of secular purpose for the final displays possibly considered how the displays evolved. In each of the courthouses, 2 large, framed copies of the Ten Commandments were displayed alone. In response to the lower court’s first 2 rulings that the displays lacked a secular purpose and were not religiously neutral and therefore violated the Establishment Clause, the counties twice changed the displays. The third version displayed the Ten Commandments with a grouping of other “foundational” documents that oddly included the words to “The Star-Spangled Banner” but omitted the Fourteenth Amendment and quoted more of the Commandments’ purely religious language than the first 2 displays had done. The lower court had found the counties’ newly-claimed secular “educational” purpose to be disingenuous and again found the display to be unconstitutional. In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the history of the displays and the litigation are legitimate to consider, and it upheld the appeals court’s ruling based on the merits. In the Court’s opinion, Justice David Souter wrote that the Court “saw no integration [of secular purpose] here because of a lack of a demonstrated analytical or historical connection between the Commandments and the other documents” in the display, and that furthermore, “the sectarian spirit of the resolutions found enhanced expression in the third display” in the additional quoted religious language of the Commandments. (Citation: 545 U.S. 844)Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005)The Court considered whether the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIP) violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. RLUIP prohibits government from burdening prisoners’ religious exercise unless the burden furthers a “compelling government interest.” In a unanimous decision, the Court held that RLUIP did not violate the Establishment Clause. In the Court’s opinion, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote that Section 3 of RLUIP (which covers state-run institutions) is “a permissible accommodation” under the Establishment Clause, because it alleviates exceptional burdens on private religious exercise created by the degree of control exerted by government in a prison. That degree of control is unparalleled in civilian society and severely disabling to private religious exercise. In addition, RLUIP does not differentiate among bona fide faiths, and gives no privileged status to any particular religious sect. (Citation: 544 U.S. 709)Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal (2006)The Court reviewed the appeals court’s ruling in favor of O Centro Espírita Beneficente União do Vegetal (UDV), finding that the government did not prove a compelling interest in barring the church’s sacramental use of hoasca—an illegal drug under the Controlled Substances Act—for religious purposes. The government maintained that the use of hoasca carried with it health risks and that the Controlled Substances Act could accommodate no exceptions. The church had filed for relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which prohibits the government from substantially burdening a person’s religious exercise unless the government demonstrates that the application of the burden to the person was the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest. In a unanimous ruling, the Court affirmed the appeals court’s ruling, noting that RFRA requires that a compelling-interest test be performed to address the particular practice at issue. Applying such a test, the Court concluded “that the courts below did not err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring UDV’s sacramental use of hoasca,” because the government’s evidence on health risks and the UDV’s countering evidence were equally balanced. In addition, the government’s claim that the Controlled Substance Act could hold no exceptions did not stand up, because there was already an exception made for the Native American religious use of peyote. (Citation: 546 U.S. 418)Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation (2007)The Court looked at whether taxpayers have standing to bring an Establishment Clause challenge against executive branch actions funded by general appropriations rather than by specific congressional grants. The George W. Bush administration issued executive orders creating an Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives for the purposes of allowing religious charity organizations to gain federal funding and hold conferences to promote those initiatives. The Freedom From Religion Foundation sued, asserting this to be a violation of the Establishment Clause, because the conferences would favor religious organizations over nonreligious ones. The Court ruled 5-4 to uphold the lower court’s ruling that taxpayers do not have standing to bring Establishment Clause challenges against programs funded by the executive branch of the government, because “Establishment Clause challenges to the constitutionality of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending clause of Art. I, §8.” (Citation: 551 U.S. 587)Christian Legal Society v. Martinez (2010)The Court considered whether Hastings College of the Law (Hastings), a school within the University of California public-school system, violates the First Amendment by refusing to officially recognize a student organization unless it allows all students to join the group, even if that requires a religious organization to admit gay students who do not adhere to the group’s core beliefs. Hastings officially recognizes student groups through a “Registered Student Organization” (RSO) program. Having this status confers valuable benefits to a group, such as use of school funds, facilities, and channels of communication, and use of Hastings’s name and logo. In exchange, RSOs must abide by certain conditions, including Hastings’s nondiscrimination policy, which follows state law barring discrimination on a number of bases, including religion and sexual orientation. Under this, RSOs must follow an “all comers” policy, allowing any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions, regardless of her status or beliefs. In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that Hastings’s all-comers policy “is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the RSO forum” and “therefore does not transgress First Amendment limitations.” (Citation: 561 U.S. 661)The Bill of Rights Institute is grateful to The George Washington Institute for Religious Freedom and The Ambassador John L. Loeb Visitor’s Center at the Touro Synagogue, Newport, Rhode Island for making Religious Liberty: The American Experiment a reality.Religious Liberty: Landmark Supreme Court Cases - Bill of Rights Institute

No Confederate committed Treason. That is postmodern Neo-Marxist Revisionism.From Teresa RoaneBefore I posted this excerpt, I wanted to verify the source mentioned. The title of the book was "A View of the Constitution of the United States" by William Rawle. It was published in1825.When Mr. Davis was a cadet at West Point, a textbook on American constitutional law was used which taught that secession was right. On page 289 of that book is the following: "If a faction should attempt to subvert the government of a State for the purpose of destroying its republican form, the paternal power of the Union could thus be called forth to subdue it. Yet it is not to be understood that its interposition would be justifiable if the people of the State should determine to retire from the Union, whether they adopted another or retained the same form of government. The States, then, may wholly withdraw from the Union, but while they continue they must retain the character of representative republics." (Page 290).Dr. E. P. LaceyConfederate Veteran MagazineDecember 1922By Philip Leigh on Sep 16, 2020A typical calumny directed at Confederate soldiers is that they don’t merit commemoration because they were traitors. It is a lie for two reasons.First, the Confederate states had no intent to overthrow the government of the United States. They seceded merely to form a government of their own. The first seven states that seceded during the winter of 1860-61 did not “make war” on the United States; they accepted it when the Washington government decided to coerce them back into the Union. The four upper-south states that remained Union-loyal until the coercion in the spring of 1861 had previously warned Washington that they regarded the coercion of any state to be unconstitutional and would fight to prevent it. Those four states provided half of the 11-state Confederacy’s white population, the chief source of her soldiers. In truth, the legal status of secession was unsettled in 1861. The Constitution neither outlawed nor authorized it. It was a remedy that geographically isolated political minorities repeatedly considered from 1789 to 1861.The Northeastern states threatened secession at least five times during America’s first fifty-six years. The first time was during George Washington’s presidency when Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton warned that the Northeastern states would secede unless the Federal Government agreed to assume an obligation to pay-off their Revolutionary War debts. In 1803 New Englanders threatened to secede over the Louisiana Purchase. They worried that the new territories would become new states thereby reducing New England’s influence.In 1807 New England again threatened secession after America announced a trade embargo, hoping to avoid the War of 1812 by use of economic sanctions. New Englanders objected because their region was then America’s maritime center. After the embargo failed, Congress declared war on Great Britain during President James Madison’s first administration. Yet New Englanders were uncooperative in our nation’s defense. They traded with the enemy and refused to put their militia into Federal service as ordered by President Madison. When the British finally extended their blockade to New England during the last seven months of the thirty-month war, the region held a convention in Hartford to discuss secession or other steps to protect their interests from Federal powers. In January 1815 the Convention sent emissaries to President Madison to demand five additional constitutional amendments. Upon arriving in Washington, they learned that the war had ended and went home in embarrassment. They did not need the amendments because the Treaty of Ghent ended the war thereby ending the British blockade.Even as late as 1844 leaders in the Northeastern states warned they would secede over the proposed annexation of Texas. In 1843 twelve congressmen, including former President John Quincy Adams, signed a letter to the people claiming that Texas annexation would not only result in the secession of “free states” but would “fully justify it.” A year later former New York Governor and future secretary of state under Presidents Lincoln and Andrew Johnson, William H. Seward, wrote that the “free-labor states cannot yield” to Texas annexation. They would consider it grounds “for secession, nullification and disunion.” The Massachusetts legislature underscored the opinion by declaring the 1845 Texas annexation to be unconstitutional.In sum, secession was a remedy that geographically isolated political minorities repeatedly considered. As a result, it tended to find favor within those regions that were out-of-power in Washington. It was a game of musical chairs. Whenever a regional minority felt that they could never regain the majority they worried that their constitutional rights might be trampled by a tyrannical simple majority in the central government. By 1861 the South was caught without a chair in the game when the music stopped. Under different circumstances it could have been the North. Although they threatened secession often enough, Northerners were never destined to become a permanent minority as were Southerners.The second reason that Confederate soldiers were not traitors is that their loyalty was first to their state and secondarily to the central government. Prior to the war the average Confederate soldier was a yeoman farmer who rarely travelled outside his state. His taxes were chiefly paid to his state. He only paid federal taxes indirectly when he purchased imported dutiable items that implicitly included a tariff as a component of the purchase price.Northerners felt much the same way. As Shelby Foote explained, prior to the Civil War the United States was often thought of as a collection of independent states and spoken grammatically as “the United States are.” After the Civil War it was increasingly spoken of as “the United States is,” which we commonly say today without even thinking about it. The war made us an “is.”Finally, after a couple of decades postbellum Southerners welcomed reconciliation. They eagerly volunteered to fight in the 1898 Spanish-American War. One of them was former Confederate General Joseph Wheeler. President William McKinley appointed the sixty-one year old erstwhile cavalryman as Major General commanding a cavalry division that included Theodore Roosevelt’s “Rough Riders” regiment. Despite the censure historians heap upon white Southerners of the 1890s, those volunteers can be credited for fighting under a flag that belonged to their enemy only thirty-odd years earlier. Southerners also readily enlisted in World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam and later wars. Even today the South accounts for 44% of America’s army volunteers while containing only 36% of her population.In short, Confederate soldiers were not traitors in the context of the unsettled constitutional principles of their era. They were asked to do what men have done since prehistoric times: defend their homes. They did so as heroically as any army of American soldiers.About Philip LeighPhilip Leigh contributed twenty-four articles to The New York Times Disunion blog, which commemorated the Civil War Sesquicentennial. He is the author of U.S. Grant's Failed Presidency, Southern Reconstruction (2017), Lee’s Lost Dispatch and Other Civil War Controversies (2015), and Trading With the Enemy (2014). Phil has lectured a various Civil War forums, including the 23rd Annual Sarasota Conference of the Civil War Education Association and various Civil War Roundtables. He holds a Bachelor of Science in Electrical Engineering from Florida Institute of Technology and an MBA from Northwestern University.The First instance of when (THESE UNITED STATES) became (THE UNITED STATES)Enacted into Law July 2, 1862.By Lincoln's Federal Government.Known as the "Test or Iron Clad Oath"First adminstered by Edwin Stanton to the West Point Cadets around April 25, 1861. Soon everyone in Lincoln's Government and the Federal Union Military would have to take the new Oath.The old Oaths before this primarily listed THE UNITED STATES as Plurally. Whereas the new one listed THE UNITED STATES as Singular.The Oaths went from Defending the Constitution and the United States and worded as (THEM) before 1862, to the wording of the Oaths as being the United States, referring to as (IT).Cadets, Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and anyone holding Public Office, before 1862 all gave Oaths to the States of the Union, including their Home States.U.S NAVY HISTORY OF OATHSIst Sentence of 12th Paragragh says:"But such was not the case for officers. By 1862, just as the Civil War was getting heated, the oath of office for officers changed the plural United States into a singular, because now the enemy was a divided nation."SOURCES: U.S NAVY HISTORY OF OATHS, U.S ARMY HISTORY OF OATHS, WEST POINT CADET HANDBOOK OF 1857, MILITARY LAW REVIEW OF JULY 1964, letters of Robert E. Lee.This information proves that Cadets and union Officers who Resigned, and either joined Southern States Militias and Regiments or the CSA were not Traitors.This further proves that State Sovereignty was still recognized before July 2 1862.The Oaths they took were to the States (Plurally) and to the Constitution. Meaning their Homes States and since their home States believed that their COMPACT (Constitution) with the Federal Government had been abused and broken by the Federal Government Secession followed to ensure State Sovereignty.The Cadets and Officers that resigned to Join Southern Units of their Home States. Were never accused of being Traitors nor were anyone arrested for treason. They were allowed to Leave peacefully and without incident. Thats because of the Oaths they had taken before the Law changed in 1862. Robert E. Lee was among the many men that also chose their Home States.Lincoln's Government did this to ensure State Sovereignty and Oaths to the Sovereign States were done away with, thus changing the Vision and the Course of the Constitutional Republic that our Forefathers envisioned of a union of Sovereign States with unlimited and unenumerated vast power's and a small Federal Government, With few and limited enumerated powers.The Seceded Southern Sovereign States created a union of States called the Confederate States of America, they also used the Constitution of the U.S. as a template and upgraded it to a version that their Forefathers who created the the first Constitution would have been proud and heralded as a masterpiece of Upgraded Freedom and Liberty.Lincoln controlled the narrative and direction of the U.S. Government while the Sovereign States that Seceded had no representation or say so in the United States.Changing forever the (THESE UNITED STATES), a union of Sovereign States to becoming (THE UNITED STATES), a single Nation.That's definitely not how the United States of America were created, nor the States and People of the South wanted to exist.The way the law changed in July 2 1862.All the Soldiers and Cadets and Officers that resigned and joined the Confederacy would have been traitors and put in jail.The implications of that new Oath , that became a law on July 2 1862. Is far greater than just proving That those men werent traitors, that they gave alliegance to the States of the Union Plurally and meaning their Homes States, and proving that until July 2 1862. The Federal Government recognized State Sovereignty.According to the Federal Government after JULY 2 1862. It now was illegal and treasonous to give your loyalty to anyone, your Family, your Home State. This ensured that the Federal Govt now took the place of State Sovereignty.This was the beginning, the first recorded instance.Now the implications are mind blowing. Just think the United States changed after this.All laws of the United States changed while the South was in the CSA. Lincoln and the Northern Legislators were able to make laws against the notion of Sovereign States in a union as it was created by the founders.Also during Reconstruction Northern Legislators and the Northern installed Puppet Government's of the Southern States made 3 Constitutional Amendments and many other laws without the Representation of the true People of the South.As States were allowed back into the Union, everything they had knew about the Government's role in their affairs had changed. The Constitution and newly created laws changed the course of the America they had known. The Southern States didnt recognize the Union, it went from THESE UNITED STATES to becoming THE UNITED STATES, A SINGLE NATION.It's the greatest Tragedy against the Constitution and the America People, Perpetrated by Lincoln and his Radical Government, in the guise of "Perserving the Union" LEST WE FORGET!!!"An Officers Oath""July 2, 1862, when Congress enacted the now famous “test or iron-clad oath” which was applicable to every person elected or appointed to any office under the Federal Constitution. This enactment which may be found in Chapter 128 of the Laws of 1862reads :That hereafter every person elected or appointed to any office of honor or profit under the government of the United States, either in the civil, military or naval departments of the public service, . . . shall, before entering upon the duties of such office, and before being entitled to any of the salary or other emoluments thereof, take and subscribe the following oath or affirmation :I, A.B. do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have never voluntarily borne arms against the United States since I have been a citizen thereof; that I have voluntarily given no aid, countenance, counsel, or encouragement to persons engaged in armed hostility thereto ; that I have neither sought nor accepted nor attempted to exercise the functions of any office whatever, under any authority or pre￾tended authority in hostility to the United States; that I have not yielded a voluntary support to any pretended government, authority, power or constitution within the United States, hostile or inimical thereto. And I do further swear (or affirm) that, to the best of my knowledge and ability, I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States, against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter, so help me God; which said oath, so taken and signed, shall be preserved among the files of the . . . Department to which the said office may pertain. And any person who shall falsely take the said oath shall be guilty of perjury, and on conviction, in addition to the penalties now prescribed for that offense, shall be deprived of his office and rendered incapable forever after of holding any office or place under the United StatesIn retrospect the provisions of this “test oath” are of the general tenor that the one taking the oath had to say: I have never been loyal to the Confederate States of America or in any way disloyal to the United States of America. This raised the question of past loyalties; and if an individual could not properly answer the question posed, he was barred from office despite his current alle￾giance or loyalty. It has long been questioned whether such an oath unlawfully punished persons unable to take the oath or whether the requirement was a valid disqualification of the indi￾vidual from holding ofice, based on the lawful exercise of govern￾mental power. In answer to this question it may be stated that it has long been held in law that if an individual is unable to take the oath solely because of past conduct at a time prior to the enact￾ment of the requirement, and the oath prescribes a punishment, it is an unconstitutional requirement.21 However, in considering this generally accepted rule of law it must be noted that nowhere in the opinions of Mr. Justice Field, cited below, was it suggested that the enactment of the oath was in violation of Article VI,Clause 3, of the Constitution."Source and Citation:Military Law Review of July 1964, page 6,7 of the Article: An Officers Oath by Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Reese."Test or Iron Clad Oath" 12 Stat. 508 (1862)July 2 1862,Chapter 128 Laws of 1862."THESE UNITED STATES" QUOTESWe, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good PEOPLE of THESE COLONIES, solemnly publish and declare, THESE UNITED COLONIES are, and of Right ought to be FREE and INDEPENDENT STATES that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as FREE and INDEPENDENT STATES, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which INDEPENDENT STATES may of right do. — And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.Last paragraph of "The Declaration of Independence" July 4, 1776Written by THOMAS JEFFERSON“May the same wonder-working Deity, who long since delivering the Hebrews from their Egyptian Oppressors planted them in the promised land—whose Providential Agency has lately been conspicuous in establishing THESE UNITED STATES as an independent Nation—still continue to water them with the dews of Heaven and to make the inhabitants of every denomination participate in the temporal and spiritual blessings of that people whose God is Jehovah.”George Washington:—Letter to the Hebrew congregation of Savannah, GeorgiaPresident George Washington.GEORGE WASHINGTON, letter to Edward Carrington, May 1, 1796"I am sure the mass of citizens in THESE UNITED STATES mean well, and I firmly believe they will always act well whenever they can obtain a right understanding of matters; but in some parts of the Union, where the sentiments of their delegates and leaders are adverse to the government, and great pains are taken to inculcate a belief that their rights are assailed and their liberties endangered, it is not easy to accomplish this; especially, as is the case invariably, when the inventors and abettors of pernicious measures use infinite more industry in disseminating the poison than the well disposed part of the community to furnish the antidote.""From the earliest ages of history to the present day there have never been thirteen millions of people associated in one political body who enjoyed so much freedom and happiness as the people of THESE UNITED STATES. You have no longer any cause to fear dangers from abroad ... It is from within, among yourselves - from cupidity, from corruption, from disappointed ambition and inordinate thirst for power - that factions will be formed and liberty endangered ... " ~ Andrew Jackson""I think that slavery is wrong, morally, socially and politically. I desire that it should be no further spread in THESE UNITED STATES, and I should not object if it should gradually terminate in the whole Union."Abraham Lincoln."The people of THESE UNITED STATES are the rightful masters of both congresses and courts, not to overthrow the Constitution, but to overthrow the men who pervert that Constitution." — Abraham Lincoln, 16th U.S. PresidentI"Ido not look upon THESE UNITED STATES as a finished product. We are still in the making."Franklin D. Roosevelt."If THESE UNITED STATES can be called a body, then Kentucky can be called its heart."Jesse Stuart."The great truth that government was made for the people and not the people for government has already been established in the practice and by the example of THESE UNITED STATES, and we can do no other than contemplate its further exemplification by a sister republic with the deepest interest."President John Tyler."The constitutionality and propriety of the Federal Government assuming to enter into a novel and vast field of legislation, namely, that of providing for the care and support of all those … who by any form of calamity become fit objects of public philanthropy. ... I cannot find any authority in the Constitution for making the Federal Government the great almoner of public charity throughout the United States. To do so would, in my judgment, be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Constitution and subversive of the whole theory upon which the Union of THESE UNITED STATES is founded."President Franklin Pierce."Our country presents on every side the evidences of that continued favor under whose auspices it, has gradually risen from a few feeble and dependent colonies to a prosperous and powerful CONFEDERACY."President Martin van Buren."“What have I, or those I represent, to do with your national independence? This Fourth of July is yours, not mine…There is not a nation on the earth guilty of practices more shocking and bloody than are the people of THESE UNITED STATES at this very hour.” - Frederick DouglassTo the Honorable the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America, in Congress Assembled:Your memorialist, a free-born citizen of THESE UNITED STATES, respectfully showeth that from his infancy his soul has been filled with the most intense and philanthropic interest for the welfare of his native country; and being fired with an ardor which floods cannot quench, crowns cannot conquer, nor diplomatic intrigue corrupt, to see those principles which emanated from the bosoms of the fathers of seventy-six, and which cost the noblest talents and richest blood of the nation, maintained inviolate and perpetuated to future generations; and the proud eagle of American freedom soar triumphant over every party prejudice and local sinistry, and spread her golden pinions over every member of the human family, who shall stretch forth their hands for succor from the lion’s paw or the oppressor’s grasp; and firmly trusting in the God of liberty, that He has designed universal peace and goodwill, union, and brotherly love to all the great family of man, your memorialist asks your honorable body to pass the following… Ordinance for the Protection of the Citizens of the United States Emigrating to the Territories, and for the Extension of the Principles of Universal Liberty.( Source: History of the Church 6:275 )We should love the stars and stripes, and accept the constitution of THESE UNITED STATES, as divine. Don’t hesitate to stand on the right side.( Source: Stepping Stones to an Abundant Life 414 )Joseph Smith.below is the link to the U.S. NAVY HISTORY OF OATHS227 Years of Military Oaths to "Support and Defend the Constitution"