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First of all it should be stressed that both French and English were heterogenous in their living conditions geographically and that the way colonialism was done changed across time. Colonies like Algeria and Senegal were nothing alike Acadia or Louisiana. The same could be said about the British Empire. A lot of people think it is some success story that somehow left something positive or whatever but don’t take into accounts colonies like Belize, etc. The same could be said for newer French colonies : infrastructures were indeed left behind. Yeah, so what ? It cannot be stressed enough colonialism was done trough a day-to-day basis adapted to the local conditions and was not uniform across the world and across times.Now, you wanted to discuss Canada… I am not familiar with English colonies that were contemporary with French colonies, so I can only compare 18th century New France with 19th century British North America, but then I introduce a temporal bias, so that should be stressed. I’ll set up a few themes to compare.Territorial framingCanada in a French meaning is absolutely not the same thing as Canada in an English meaning.Canada was one of the colonies of New France, that included the Saint-Lawrence and the Great Lake. The borders were unclear : for all the duration of New France, it was unclear if the Pays des Illinois was attributed to Canada or to Louisiana. It was the English that decided it would be to Louisiana.When people in Louisiana think their Acadians ancestors were in “Canada”, it makes me laugh. Acadia was not part of Canada, it was a different colony.Sometimes the term Canada was used as a synonym for all New France, and then if we consider Louisiana, then the French playground included the current United States, so the US-Canada border is meaningless. It would also be meaningless regarding English colonies : Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, contemporary of New France, had the same nature as the so-called Thirteen colonies. The idea of thirteen colonies is retroactive. There was more than 13 actually, especially when Québec, Saint John island, Eastern Florida and Western Florida would be added.In 1867, with the creation of the Federation, the word Canada started to include non-Canadian colonies like the Maritime colonies, the Pacific colonies, the Prairies… None of those would have been “Canada” from a French perspective. Only the current Ontarians would have some grounds to use the word for themselves.Administrative systemThe French body for colonies was the Ministry of Marine, whereas it was the Colonial Office for the English.It was common for English colonies to have an elected assembly (tax-based male first-past-the-post voting system). Nothing as such existed in New France colonies. Inhabitants never have known any parliamentary system at all before 1791 and did not expect any. In France, the equivalent to the English Parliament, the États généraux, gave up its powers long ago.It would however be a racist cliché to just say that somehow it was the English that civilized the French by introducing parliamentarism. Participative politics existed in French colonies trough the form of Conseils de Fabriques in parishes : proeminent parishioners took collegial decisions in agreement with the priest for local matters. In the book Habitants et Patriotes regarding 19th century Lower Canada, the historian Allan Greer argued that contrary to a common opinion held in English circles, the French population had some concept of democracy due to these Conseils de Fabriques.It was common for English colonies to be private colonies, ran by private corporations. New France was like that before 1663, but after 1663 it became a royal colony with a government apparatus. I think the New England colonies followed a similar trend : many became royal over time.However, a colony belonging to a single person is not a thing that I heared of in French colonies.Since French colonies had no parliamentary bodies (no more than France), they were ruled after 1663 by a Sovereign Council (Louis XIV) / Superior Council (Louis XV), which also existed in other French provinces. Among the members, there was the governor, the intendant and the bishop, and some other councilors.The governor was a military and diplomatic representative of the King. He was in charge of the defense and it was him that dealt with the indigenous nations. A good example of the military role would be Frontenac, when he defended Québec city against the English. A good example of the diplomatic function would be the governor of Callière, that participated to the Montréal Conference leading of the 1701 Great Peace of Montréal with many indigenous nations. The English governor would have a similar role. In British North America, the British governor was sometimes asked to settle indigenous/colonists disputes or indigenous/indigenous disputes.The intendant’s formal title was « intendant de police, de justice et de finance ».Police : Meaning to police behaviours. He ensured good civil order.Justice : He settled petty civil disputes. Interestingly, he was also the representative of the King for the feudal foi et hommage so it was to him lords would bow down and express their allegiance to the King. Jean Talon is famous for having enacted a law to increase the natality. He also created the first beer brewery.Finance : He was in charge of the budget, so to speak.The Sovereign/Superior Council was also a sort of “Supreme Court”, as we will see.I was surprised to realize this organization was very similar to a late Roman one : a magister militum, a praefactus praetorio and a bishop. I wonder if it was intended.Legal/judiciary systemIn those times in New France people were maniac of notaries. Every single petty contract or act would end up in front of a notary. Therefore it is often used as evidence in disputes.If you had a dispute, you went to one of the three judiciary districts : the prévôté of Montréal, Trois-Rivières or Québec. There you had a trial.You could appeal to the judgement by summoning the Superior Council.Sometimes people would also write to the King to counter a decision they didn’t like. I am thinking here of François-Marie Bouat that was jailed, that wrote to the King and that was eventually released.The law in New France after 1663 was the Custom of Paris, augmented with the Edicts of Marly and the Code noir.For British colonies, it was of course the Common Law, the Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, and so on.I don’t know in all ways these laws differ, but one thing the English did not like about French law was the treatment of women in general.A standard marriage in New France created a “community” of assets, so the properties of women were not simply transferred entirely to the husband. The woman kept some rights on her own belongings and she was entitled to half of the shared belongings.Women were guaranteed a “douaire”, a share of the belongings of the diseased husband that inheritors could not take away, so she would have some money to live with. Inheritance was not free. For commoners, it was shared equally among children. For lords, fiefdoms could not be split at will between inheritors, they had to ask the King. The general idea with fiefdoms is that they ought not to be divided so it changed the inheritance regime. The English hated all of that, they wanted to give whatever they wanted to whoever they wanted with no obligation of any kind, not even to the widows.In English colonies, there would also be judiciary districts, and a King’s Bench Court. If there was still a disagreement, the Privy Council in London could settle it. There was no “Canadian Supreme Court” until the very end of the 19th century.French seemed to prefer English criminal law. Apparently it was more gentle. However, that doesn’t mean death penalty did not exist. The Italian Enlightement did not yet had its effects on the laws.Lower Canada/Québec would of course we a strange different case since it had a dual legal system. The Custom of Paris remained in some of its parts the law.Social institutionsNew France colonies were Ancien Régime and among them Canada and Acadia had a manorial system. The stereotype about this is that it is a land tenure, but it’s much more than that. This was entirely absent from English colonies, save perhaps New York that kept for some time New Netherlands’ system. An exception would fo course be Lower Canada…Canada and Acadia had lords (seigneurs), which doesn’t mean the same at all as what people mean by that in England. A lord could be individual or collective (a religious order, masculine or feminine). A lord could be noble or commoner. A lord could also be a woman in a third of the cases, as a widow of course. In the unique case of Sillery, a lord could be an indigenous nation. (Thomas Gage would also make of Sault-Saint-Louis’ Kanien:kehá:ka the lords of the place, but that is not in our time frame)Lords were due taxes in nature or money (rentes) or in work (corvée). Lords were entitled to have their own judiciary system if they wanted (cour banale), but it was uncommon in the colonies. Lords had a monopoly on the mills and the ovens and so taxed them. Lords had a droit de quint and lods et ventes when people sold the lands they were attributed, including in cities, to the great annoyance of the future English merchants. Lords were formally the proprietaries of all lands in their fiefdoms : those they directly used were their domaine and those they attributed to colonists were called mouvance. They could also create new lords by given lands as fiefdoms to whoever they wanted, so it created a fiefdom inside the fiefdom. This is the feudal aspect of the system. In the extreme of the Orléans island (comté de Saint-Laurent), you had something like 40 levels of feudality.This was completely different from the township system, in which the territory was cut into squares, with no consideration for water, and in which some squares were attributed to the Anglican church. Land in the French system was much less of a merchandise than in the English system : it was also a family herloom. The nature of the French system was much less capitalist.Many popular social customs were observed in relation to Ancien Régime. It was common to salute the lord and his wife when they strolled. It was common to have a celebration in front of his house every May : a leafless tree was planted in front of his house, it was called le mai. The 11th of November was the time taxes were due to the lord, and they were collected in front of his house.For the special case of Lower Canada/Québec, things like that would exist until… 1940 !Since the society was catholic, there was nothing of the weird protestant stuff. Christmas was never banned as a “pagan celebration”. Presbyterians “general assemblies” did not exist. Hedonism was not really frowned upon. Churches were not as austere. Religion was therefore more collective, more social, and less individualistic. The mass was in Latin. The cult of the virgin Mary was also common since it’s a very catholic thing. The type of puritan prudishness did not exist. People would even be nude outside (priests complained about that). This is maybe why nowadays Anglos pretend Francos have “joie de vivre”.There was no religious diversity in New France : protestants were banned from going there. Anyway, Louis XIV repressed them in France trough the abandon of the Edict of Nantes and the dragonnades.It was possible to “immigrate” in New France. I know the case of Timothy O’Sullivan, Irish doctor, that got naturalization letters, and became known as Timothée Sylvain.EducationEducation was much easier to access in English colonies. There was no University in New France. The closest thing to it was the Seminary of Québec, which would be the ancestor of the current Laval University.In villages, it was the priest that did the education of children. So there is no schooling system.That doesn’t mean the population was completely ignorant either. A lot of visitors were impressed by the common sense and politeness of peasants.The Swedish visitor Pehr Kalm said that nobles in New France were much more interested in litterature, culture, etc. than their English counterparts in the colonies, that apparently only cared about business : “Nobles from here are more interested and take greater pleasure in Natural history and knowledge than English colonists in general. Most of those exile themselves to get rich and fill their pockets and only consider knowledge as a distraction…”.IndigenousA vast topic. I refer you to this :Thomas de La Marnierre (トマ・サレ)'s answer to Were the French more friendly than the English to the Native Americans while colonizing America?MilitaryUnlike British colony, New France colonies heavily depended on indigenous allies for their defense. They did a lot of the work. This was underplayed for a long time, so this ought to be stressed. Some battles were exclusively conducted by indigenous people, and the French were almost never alone in a battlefield.New France had a militas, just like the English with their colonial troops, but I guess New France’s militia had more combat experience as they did raids in the frontiers of New England along with indigenous allies, as they were heavily featured in the defense of the colony. One would need to wait a long time to see English starting to integrate indigenous tactics to their warfare : it happened with the creation of the Ranger corps. In New France, this type of warfare was already two centuries old and it was even governor’s Vaudreuil policy.Some troops of the Royal Army were present in New France, but it was rather the Free Marine Companies that were the regulars defending it. There was no regiments, it was companies that took the name of their commander. The commanders were New France nobles. It was guaranteed military commands for them, so they did not compete with France for commands in the Royal Army.

It would definitely be a complicated network of transnational drug trafficking and smuggling, money laundering, corruption, and legitimate businesses.In order to organize something like this, you need the cooperation of hundreds of local crime bosses across at least a dozen countries, each with at least a few dozen people in their organization that help them commit crimes, who are complicit in the crimes. You do not need a large singular organization in order to exert enormous amounts of power and influence over a large area.In this particular case, I’m referring to the Balkan drug route.The Balkan drug routeThe story behind the Balkan drug route is that of four organized crime power blocs:The former Soviet UnionThe Balkan peninsulaThe Italian peninsulaThe Middle EastAll of these four organized crime power blocs come to fuel this very profitable drug route.The Albanian mafia alone is said to be the number 1 smugglers in the world in terms of heroin and cannabis, and number 3 in cocaine, and they are only the 4th place in terms of power, strength and capital on the Balkan peninsula - after the Russian, Bulgarian and Serbian mafias, respectively.When the former Soviet Union collapsed, trillions of dollars worth of natural resources, military hardware, factories, and businesses were privatized among hundreds of thousands of gangsters who had the money to buy them.During this period, 4 million Russians were killed or committed suicide, and that was in Russia alone. Similar things happened, albeit on a smaller scale, across the former Soviet Union, but also across the former Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania.Gangsters with AK47’s dressed in tactical gear, former special forces, would walk in and take over entire factory complexes, forcing their CEO’s to sign them over to their new owners.In addition to this, around 10 million people were released from the Gulags. The vori v zakone mixed with former KGB and Spetsnaz. It was utter chaos. Everybody was carving up territory.Vori v zakone, or thieves in lawThe former Communist countries in the Balkans(all of them other than Greece and Turkey), all based their criminal organizations and practices similar to the former Soviet Union, as they were taught the same techniques and procedures taught to the KGB, and much of this was mimicked.Since the former USSR was 22 million squared kilometers, more than the size of the US and Canada combined, or about the size of the entire US, Canada and EU combined, and almost the size of the US, Canada, UK and Australia combined, there was tons of money and manpower to go around.It is estimated in the 1990’s, over $500 billion of Soviet money was laundered through Bulgarian banks alone.Where the mafia in Russia was worth around $250–400 billion per year, and controlled tens of thousands of companies, roughly 40 percent of the Russian economy, in Bulgaria hundreds of front companies from Los Angeles to Tokyo set up by Bulgarian secret services(allied with the USSR) were handed over to Bulgarian criminals.The Russians undoubtedly had the upper hand. I’m not sure who organized it, or when it started, and who was approached first, but the Russians moved into the Balkans during the early 1990’s and began to work with local groups.In the 1980’s prior to that, Turkish intelligence was involved in drug smuggling, in particular heroin. Yugoslav authorities used to give passports to criminals with fake identities in order to go commit crimes in places like France, Switzerland, Belgium and so fourth.Susurluk scandal - WikipediaThe Susurluk scandal, which the most watched Turkish TV series - Valley of the Wolves - is inspired bySomething here happened - my research points to Balkan governments got together with former USSR governments and Middle Eastern governments, in particular countries like Russia, Turkey, Bulgaria, Serbia and Macedonia, and together with their criminal classes, in order to take over this lucrative market.I’m not going to delve much into conspiracy theories, but this shift was cut off when the Serbs were replaced by the Albanians as the dominant international group from the Balkans that was to take over the drug markets in Western Europe.This happened after the Kosovo War in 1998, and when the US put up Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, this shift changed. Before this, the Serbs had over 10,000 gangsters in Scandinavia alone! This fate was ultimately sealed with the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001 after the Macedonia insurgency, perpetrated by Albanian UCK rebels armed by the US military in Camp Bondsteel, trained by the CIA and the UK SAS.The Kosovo Liberation ArmyThe National Liberation Army (KLA in Macedonia)Captured NLA commander Agim Krasniqi in court, provocatively smiling at Macedonian police officers whose colleagues his unit kidnapped and beat during their occupation of Kondovo in 2004–2005, and threatened to shell the capital, Skopje, with artilleryShtabi i AKSH-së ULTIMATUM: Të gjithë politikajve shqiptar nga të gjitha trojet /Ndëgjone dhe Shperndaje - video dailymotionThe KLA film an ultimatum video that vows terrorist and military action if Serbia, Greece and Macedonia do not cede Albanian majority areas to Albania/Kosovo, in order to create a “Greater Albania”While the Bulgarians were fighting internally, there was a politicized quarrel between Albanian, Serbian and Macedonian groups. The Albanians had UCK/KLA, a 45,000 strong(more than the current active army of Canada) paramilitary force, the Serbs had Arkan’s Tigers, a 10,000 strong paramilitary force which was disbanded in 1996, and the Macedonians had the 2,000 strong special forces/paramilitary force called the Lions, which was disbanded in 2004.Arkan’s Tigers never really engaged the KLA in Kosovo in 1998, but some former Arkan’s Tigers personnel went to fight them there, together with around 4,000 Russian volunteers - ex Spetsnaz.Russian Spetsnaz GRU(Russian special forces intelligence)Comparatively, Arkan’s Tigers would’ve destroyed the KLA despite the KLA being 4.5x it’s size, and the Lions massacred the NLA(UCK/KLA) in Macedonia, even though it was 7,000 strong.Arkan, back then the wealthiest man in the Balkans, with his paramilitaryArkan with captured Bosnian Muslim army soldiers in BosniaThe Lions were to Macedonia’s armed forces what the US Navy SEALS are to America’s. The Scorpions were more like Delta Force, a larger, more generalist, less elite force.The Macedonian LionsThe most controversial incidents include an unreported, undocumented massacre of high level Saudi officials - sheikhs - meeting with high level members of UCK in Macedonia in 2001 by the Scorpions, and the subsequent prevented/attempted massacre of 320 KLA in the village of Arachinovo, when NATO came with buses, blocked off Macedonian forces and took them to Camp Bondsteel in Kosovo, even though this is not how it was reported.For this, the two leaders of the Lions at the time - Ljube Boskovski and Johan Tarculovski, were sent to the ICC in the Hague to be tried for war crimes that occurred in Ljuboten - that the Albanians allege Lions members killed civilians, while Macedonians allege the Albanians re-dressed killed KLA insurgents from their KLA uniforms to civilian clothing.Ljube Boskovski, head of the Macedonian Lions and former Minister of Interior(head of the ministry that governs the police/courts/etc), with his bodyguardsYou have to understand, even though the Lions functioned as a special police force, a sort of very militarized SWAT unit, most of it’s members were picked off the street, as during the war in 2001, there was still conscription in the Macedonian armed forces. Most of the Lions were essentially similar to DC’s Suicide Squad - a rag-tag team of former criminals, the worst of the worst in society, given elite military training, access to the best weapons available, and the legal right to commandeer any civilian vehicle, building, and even kill civilians with impunity. It’s kind of like if you took the population of the top 10 worst prisons on the planet, gave them access to futuristic military tech, had the biggest intelligence services and special forces train them, and told them to do whatever it takes to get the mission accomplished. You would create a fusion between Rainbow Six and Rostov’s prison army in the movie Invasion USA.The Kumanovo detachment of the LionsKumanovo Lions commander Mujo, gunned down in front of a nightclub with his girlfriend in downtown Kumanovo in 2005 by his underworld enemiesWhen the Vori v zakone partnered up with those ex military, and the educated and politically connected classes, who already knew people in high places, such as Semion MogilevichSemion Mogilevich, the wealthiest living gangster on the planet, worth $54 billion according to ForbesMogilevich has a masters degree in economics from the University of Kiev and could “multiply seven digit numbers in his head”.They took this money and invested heavily in the Balkans. Initially, Bulgaria was penetrated by the Russian groups first, as it was already part of the Warsaw Pact prior to that and the KGB exerted heavy influence there. The Black Sea resort cities of Varna, Sunny Beach, Burgas, Albena and Nessebar are places where one can find many Russian gangsters coming on vacation during the summer to this day.Then, it was Serbia and Montenegro, as the Serbs and the Russians are probably the closest allies to each other and have historical links. During this time, Serbian snipers were known worldwide for being the best snipers in the world, and were often called to assassinate people throughout Eurasia. The Pink Panthers, a Serbian jewelry thief gang, are the biggest jewel thieves in history, having stolen over $500 million worth of jewels in the past 3 decades, from the US to Japan, estimated to be around 200 people.The Bulgarians were to be the local liaison between the Russians and other Balkan groups. The Serbs were to be the muscle that would flood Western Europe and possibly North America with it’s manpower, as they were battle hardened thanks to the Yugoslav wars.This all changed in 1998, when the US military came to Kosovo. The US military and NATO bombed Serbia, and the Serbian mafia’s reign of crime around Western Europe was finished.The Serbian mafia documentary - See You in the Obituary - where former gangsters and secret police employees mention how gangsters were given passports near the end of the 1970’s to the beginning of the 1990’s, to go to Western Europe to commit crimes instead of locally. Only Kristijan Golubovic is the only gangster alive from this documentary today.In Paris, the Serbian mafia worked as bodyguards for people like Alain Delon as early as the 1960’s, and had violent confrontations with the French-Corsican mafia, as with the murder of Alain Delon’s bodyguard Stevan Markovic in 1968.Today, the role of the Serbian, Bulgarian and Macedonian mafias is mostly that of smugglers within the limits of their own country’s borders. The Albanians overtook the Serbs as the main distributors in Europe.From this, the CIA gets a hefty piece of the black fund, from the original hundreds of billions of dollars in Russian mafia funding.What I’ve seen is a sort of nexus - between organized crime, political parties, police, customs and the military, intelligence services, business, NGO’s and other organizations.Since political parties are not allowed to own businesses in these countries, local organized crime groups use political parties to legitimize their agenda. They use the police to order the arrest of competitors. They pay off heads of organized crime investigation departments a hefty sum and task forces are concentrated for investigating either opponents, or small local competitors who do not have international connections. This has worked perfectly well so far and the Balkan peninsula has managed to avoid the bloodshed associated with gangsterism in places like Colombia, Mexico, South Africa, the US and Russia.Russian sponsored Balkan organized crime uses a network of:Police detachmentsMilitary detachmentsIntelligence agenciesPrivate security firmsPolitical partiesCharitiesDiversified legitimate business portfolios - restaurants, nightclubs, factories, farms and agriculture, supermarkets, trades shops, logistics and trucking, real estate, auto dealerships, banks, medical clinics, etc.Customs detachments at certain border crossingsReligious organizationsThey employ front men for legitimate companies, so you will never know the true person pulling the strings behind the scenes who owns it all. One local boss will have an average of 40 small to medium sized companies across a dozen industries employing hundreds to thousands of people.There are hundreds of local bosses, based in each city, from Bulgaria to Bosnia.Through their Muslim connections, the Albanians buy large quantities of heroin, and through their Russian connections, the Serbs and Bulgarians buy large quantities of cocaine. The Bulgarians are also some of the largest producers of amphetamines and ecstasy on the planet.The heroin comes from Afghanistan, and Osama Bin Laden was said to live in Albania for 3 years. The heroin passes through Iran, where most of it is seized, and then into Turkey, where Turkish groups refine the raw opium into heroin.These Turkish groups have recently begun sending liaisons to places like Bulgaria, Macedonia and Albania, hiding behind religious organizations.The Turkish groups hand it over to the Bulgarians - by this point 110 tons of heroin are entering the Balkan peninsula. Of these, 80 tons enter Macedonia. Of those 80 tons, 25 tons go to Albania, and then over to Italy, to groups such as the Camorra and Ndrangheta. From Italy to Switzerland and beyond, there is no borders.In ports like Thessaloniki, Durres, Kotor and so fourth, cocaine directly comes into the Balkan peninsula and is then re-distributed towards Russia, Italy and the Middle East.The Canary Islands, which belong to Spain, are run by a joint Bulgarian-Russian alliance, and are the major importation point for South American cocaine into Europe.Albanian gangstersAlbanian gangster in London, UKDilaver Bojku, an Albanian gangster based in Macedonia who became the target of the US Drug Enforcement Agency, was called the “king of prostitution”, estimated to have sold over 3,000 girls and women into prostitution, gunned down in StrugaTop: Arkan’s Tigers and Ivan Bogdanov under arrest in Italy after an incident during a soccer match / Bottom: Serbian gangsters in the 1990’sGeorgi Iliev, a Bulgarian mafia boss, assassinated in 2005Bodyguards of Georgi Iliev during his funeralBulgarian mafiaThe wonder here is not just the fact that this is a very complicated scheme involving tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of people, across dozens of nations, and thousands of companies, and capital worth hundreds of billions of dollars being funneled and laundered around.The wonder here is the fact that Balkan groups have managed to accomplish what the Colombian, Italian and Mexican groups failed to do - which is take over their respective countries.One would say under Yeltsin crime was running rampant, but the fact of the matter is those who needed to take over the country took it over - that’s why even Putin is labeled as a gangster by Western media, and estimated to be the richest man on the planet, with over $200 billion. It was his group and his circle that managed to take over the country from thousands of other competitor groups, and legitimize themselves.They have reduced crime because they have essentially done what Balkan groups are currently doing - they are keeping a tight bottle cap on violent criminal confrontations. Macedonia has less than 30 murders per year. Albania, Bulgaria and Serbia similarly all have less than 100 murders per year, despite being some of the biggest mafia states on the planet.Compare that to Belize, a narco state in Central America that serves as a smuggling point for Colombian cocaine between Colombia and Mexico, and they get their cut for doing this. But look at the murder rate in that country over this very same trade.How they manage to stay under people’s radar is beyond me. I think there is some sort of conspiracy here - an intelligence triangle between Russia, the US and Turkey - and they all get their piece of the pie.Literally hundreds of billions of dollars in drugs, guns and human trafficking to be divided up between the Russian SVR, US CIA and Turkish MiT.I would extend the US side to other NATO countries - like the British MI6, the German BND, the Dutch MIVD and so fourth.Even if local Serbian, Bulgarian and Macedonian groups only take 10 percent of the value of the drugs each, for a total of 30 percent, that is still $1 billion per year minimum, per ethnicity, divided up between around 100 local bosses maximum - around $10 million a year each - assuming it was divided equally - to use their legitimate businesses and local connections to hide 80 tons of heroin every year, and 80 tons of heroin is worth $10 billion.That is from heroin alone. I’ve heard estimates from the low billions to tens of billions of dollars in heroin profits alone.Together with Russian financial backing and manpower protection(if needed, the local groups have enough local muscle to fend off even the Russian groups if they tried to send people to take over), and sitting around to do literally nothing, no need to actually distribute and deal with foreign police agencies, having complete immunity from foreign extradition and local prosecution…That is an amazingly sweet deal served on a platter, just for conveniently being geographically located where it all happens.This money has gone to build hundreds of thousands of new buildings and infrastructure objects around the entire peninsula. There are businesses propping up like crazy in particular in Albanian areas, who keep the majority of the profits for themselves.What I don’t know exactly is whether they buy it and sell it between each other as part of some deal to make the network sustainable and no going around each other’s backs and to keep the peace - or whether the money made locally in Western Europe and North America is sent back and then given to all the bosses - like how it is done with profits made by Mexican and Colombian cartels in the US.

This Petro Caribe is not capitalist propaganda it is Madurocimo …. Propaganda ![The Exportation of Criminality, is what may actually drive this to collapse would be security issues. The violence on the streets of Venezuela’s cities today is at a level that this nation has never, ever seen. The penetration of transnational organized crime into Venezuela’s upper level of government as never seen anywhere before…]Venezuelan Turmoil Insinuates an Uncertain Future for ALBABecause Chavez’s “socialism of the 21st century” and lack of economic freedom [174th out of 179 ranked economies] is destroying the private sector, Venezuela increasingly depends on Chavez’s ability to keep PDVSA on a lucrative course. Yet his anti-American agenda, oil giveaway programmes, corruption, cronyism, and general mismanagement are badly hurting PDVSA’sperformance and drawing resources away to serve political ends.July 20, 2017 COHA ALBA, Mercosur, Sheldon Birkett, VenezuelaAgreements signed at Petrocaribe Summit in VenezuelaMarch 8, 2015[There is no indication as to which countries signed agreements, or the nature of the agreements, but it is understood that Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro urged member countries of Petrocaribe and ALBA to ignore US Vice President Joe Biden’s advice to reduce dependency on Venezuelan oil.]Among the matters discussed at the energy summit were the assessment of the Petrocaribe financing scheme in relation to penalty interest generated from the financing of the oil bill system, the extending of the Alba-Caribe Fund to leverage the social productive development in Caribbean countries and the designation of a high-level commission to establish a Petrocaribe Economic Zone within 60 days.PDVSA Curacao refineryPrime Minister Dr. Timothy Harris and energy minister Ian Liburd represented St. Kitts and Nevis at the summit, which was also used as an opportunity for a memorial service that commemorated the second anniversary of the death of former President Hugo Chavez.In a statement issued earlier, Prime Minister Dr. Harris stated, “It is a pleasure to share in two important events happening in Venezuela, one to memorialize the work and vision of former President Chavez, and secondly to participate in my first summit meeting of Petrocaribe.”PDVSA CuracaoHe further stated that meeting the energy consumption and demands in St. Kitts and Nevis is made possible through the Petrocaribe arrangement.The meeting brought together 17 delegations from member countries to boost the multilateral agenda and progress on integration, cooperation and socio-economic development in the region.Petrocaribe is an oil alliance of Caribbean states that purchase oil and petroleum products from Venezuela on conditions of preferential payment.The alliance was launched on 29th June 2005 in Puerto La Cruz, Venezuela. In 2013, Petrocaribe agreed to link with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Americas (ALBA) to go beyond oil and promote economic cooperation.Petrocaribe has 19 signatory countries, namely, Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.Jamaica Prime Minister Andrew Holness has stated that Jamaica is no longer getting +oil from Venezuela but has avoided saying whether his administration supports the economic isolation of the South American country in the international community. Questioned whether Jamaica would support the US position by boycotting Venezuelan oil, Holness responded that Jamaica does not now import the fuel from Venezuela and suggested the US could be a new source.Jamaica and other Caribbean countries were receiving oil from Venezuela under the PetroCaribe arrangement, but supplies from that country have been declining because of the instability there.Last April, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kamina Johnson Smith, said the programme remained in place but that Jamaica has been receiving significantly fewer barrels of oil per day. She said Jamaica's quota of 23,000 barrels per day had significantly declined to about 1,300 barrels.In September, Petrojam In the meantime, Holness said Jamaica and the US both agree that dialogue between the government and opposition in Venezuela is essential to restoring order in the South American country.$ (3) bilions USD missing funds in Petro Caribe Haiti. {Venezuela et Haïti vont réactiver le programme Petro-Caribe pour financer de nouveaux projets.]The basics are here. To recap, under the scheme, Venezuela sells Caribbean countries oil on credit. At current prices, receiving countries pay fron 40% to 70% up front;Petrocaribe accord required members to pay cash for just 40 percent of every shipment, and let them finance the rest for 25 years at low interest rates, or make in-kind payments with products ranging from rice to blue jeans. the rest they can pay off over 25 years at 1%. (Some of the new adherents to the agreement pay 2%.) In addition, the recipients can pay in kind, if they desire: Guyana has paid in rice and the Dominican Republic in beans. (Page 6.The Caribbean buyers have to establish state-owned entities to handle their end; the price difference, in effect becomes a long-term cheap loan to the entity, which uses it to finance development projects. That is how Nicaragua uses Venezuelan money to pay for the prep work on the Gran Canal.Occasionally the Venezuelans give an even bigger subsidy than that. In 2011, for example, Caracas decided that countries participating in its subsidized oil schemes would not be liable for the royalty payments that PDVSA owed the Venezuelan government. That effectively transferred $13.1 billion to Venezuela’s putative allies. (It is not well-known that Venezuela has extended this arrangement to non-Caribbean countries: frex, here is Uruguay’s. Here is Paraguay’s.) And what does Venezuela get?Not much. Caricom just declared that they support Guyana in its border dispute with Venezuela. (It is a big border dispute; Caracas claims half the country.PDVSA will continue to supply 45,600 b/d of refined products in June to Cuba’s Cubametales, including 95 octane gasoline, aviation fuel, diesel, LPG, and residual fuel. Cuba has been one of the countries that has most benefited from the PetroCaribe agreement, receiving average deliveries from PDVSA of 95,000 b/d of crude and refined products.Under the PetroCaribe agreement, Venezuela sells petroleum to Central American and Caribbean nations on favorable terms. Venezuela inaugurated the plan in 2005 with Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas , Belize, Cuba, Dominica, Granada, Guyana – which subsequently pulled out, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, St. Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Suriname.The original agreement contemplated a supply of up to 185,000 b/d of crude oil and products under preferential conditions. In 2017, Venezuelan shipments of petroleum via Petrocaribe dropped by 40%, or 54,400 b/d, from 136,000 b/d exported in 2015. The Oil Ministry report also said even though PDVSA does not have Mesa 30 crude available in June to supply Cuba, it is evaluating the possibility of buying light crude from third parties. In February, March, and April, PDVSA bought 4.2 million barrels of Urals crude for Cuba.PDVSA has been operating its refineries below capacity because of a shortage of crude feedstock and various unscheduled shutdowns. PDVSA this month plans to process 499,000 b/d through its refining system, or 31 percent of its 1.6 million b/d capacity.June’s expected throughput is down 144,000 b/d from the same month in 2017. PDVSA’s system is comprised of five refineries: Amuay, Cardon, El Palito, Puerto La Cruz, and Isla, which it operated in an agreement with the Curacao government.CITGO USAPDVSA on Friday, was operating Isla at just 29,000 b/d, or 8.7% of its capacity, as it was unable to obtain crude supply out of storage, according to a refinery official who spoke with Platts on the condition of anonymity.The suspension in some Petrocaribe shipments is the major second blow to Venezuela’s hobbled oil industry in the past week. A PDVSA official told Platts last week the company notified 11 international customers that it will not be able to meet its full crude supply commitments in June. The source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said PDVSA is contractually obligated to supply 1.495 million b/d to those customers in June, but only has 694,000 b/d available for export.Venezuela’s oil production has continued to shrink, plunging for the 10th straight month to 1.36 million b/d in May, according to a Platts survey. That is down 580,000 b/d from May 2017 and 910,000 b/d from May 2016.The drop in PDVSA deliveries may present an opportunity for US Gulf Coast refiners, who are increasingly exporting refined products throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.US refined products exports to PetroCaribe nations, including Venezuela, averaged 398,000 b/d in March, up from 256,000 b/d in March 2017, data from the US Energy Information Administration showed. The bulk of that increase has been going to Venezuela.The Bolivarian Alternative for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) and guided by the principles of solidarity and cooperation.Under the agreement, Venezuela accepts payment for hydrocarbons by various means, offering special prices for different goods and services.As former Oil Minister Rafael Ramirez said: “We’re not talking about discounts… We’re talking about financial facilities, direct deliveries of products, infrastructure.”Under Petrocaribe, the short-term partial payment period for 60 percent of the Venezuelan oil bill increased from 30 to 90 days. The remaining 40 percent can be paid through a 17- to 25-year financing agreement with 1 percent interest if oil prices are above US$40 per barrel. Venezuela has successfully leveraged Petrocaribe to exert political influence throughout the region for the past nine years."Petrocaribe is slowly drying out," said Peter Schechter, director of the Adrienne Arsht Latin America Center. "Anybody who has traveled to any of the receiving countries in the past year has heard the concerns about the future of Petrocaribe from government and business. Everybody is seeing a consistent decline in Venezuela's oil production. Every day, these nations receive stricter credit terms, and this has serious implications for the region," he said. "This is a policy opportunity for the United States to step up and be a helpful partner," said Schechter."The United States has become the dominant supplier of petroleum products to the Caribbean, amid an incredible domestic shale oil boom," said David Goldwyn. "Now is the time for the administration to help the region transition from high carbon fuels to natural gas, by creating a fiscal safety net if Venezuelan support dries up, organizing financing mechanisms for small-scale gas liquefaction and power plant conversion, and by considering accelerating this transition with declaring the export of liquefied natural gas and crude oil, to be in our national interest," he said."A national interest declaration would provide a cost competitive, reliable and proximate source of alternate energy supply. These steps will facilitate private-sector efforts to market US supply to these nations, offering them a credible, viable alternative supply source, as well as a means to insure themselves against the shock of a Petrocaribe cut-off," said Goldwyn.In exchange for oil, Venezuela accepts payment in goods and services at lower price: Cuba pays part of its bill through medical, education and sport services, while Nicaragua pays with meat and milk, and the Dominican Republic sends black beans.Venezuela to Forgive Antigua and Barbuda DebtPrime Minister Gaston Browne said the PetroCaribe debt had reached E.C. $375 million (approximately USD $139 million).Antigua and Barbuda Prime Minister Gaston Browne announced that the Venezuelan government will write off 50 percent of its debt through their PetroCaribe oil deal.“I just spoke to a Venezuelan official who confirmed that a letter will be sent very shortly in which the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela will confirm the forgiveness of up to 50 percent of the PetroCaribe debt,” Browne told reporters. He said the Venezuelan government had made the commitment to forgive the debt during the pledging conference for hurricane-hit Caribbean countries, which occured in New York last November, according to The Daily Observer.This is only the latest failure in Venezuela’s attempt to buy influence. In 2009, the Caribbean countries politely told the Bolivarian Alliance that they were not interested in military integration, they would stick to their own Regional Security System, thank you. In 2010, when Nicaraguan troops blundered into territory claimed by Costa Rica, the West Indian nations backed Costa Rica rather than their fellow Bolivarian in Managua.Hey! St. Lucia is backing Caracas against U.S. sanctionsADDENDUM (March 15): No, not Security Council membership. In the 2014 UNSC election, Venezuela won its seat on a vote of 181-1 with no serious opposition; Caribbean support was entirely irrelevant.Jun 13, 2018Mexico to Caribbean:”You Don’t Need Venezuela”MEXICO CITY (Reuters) – Mexico’s foreign minister will travel to Jamaica, Grenada and Saint Lucia in March, a Mexican official said, as part of efforts to erode Venezuela’s oil-based influence in the Caribbean. His message will be “Venezuela is not the only country that can help the Caribbean,” the official said.St. Kitts and Nevis was one of several Organization of American States member to help defeat a bill against Venezuela at an OAS conference in June.Meanwhile, Cuban diplomats will visit Mexico in March to discuss the regional impact of the crisis in Venezuela, the official said.The Cuban embassy in Mexico City said the trip was not yet confirmed but that the two countries have regular bilateral meetings. Mexico was looking at the possibility of replacing Venezuela’s Petrocaribe programme that provided cheap loans for oil to Caribbean nations – and has helped Maduro retain diplomatic support in the region.However, the Mexican official said it was still not clear how Mexico could furnish Caribbean nations with cheap energy, given the country’s struggling domestic fuel production, and that Mexico relies on oil income for about a fifth of the government budget.The energy ministry remains unconvinced by the oil diplomacy plan…Still, there are no signs that Cuba, a steadfast ally of Caracas, is ready to turn its back on Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro.Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Videgaray’s planned trip follows a visit to Latin America and the Caribbean earlier this month by U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, who announced plans to study how possible oil sanctions against Venezuela could be mitigated in the Caribbean.The Mexican foreign minister’s trip represents the latest development in U.S.-led pressure on Maduro, who retains loyalty from some Caribbean nations that have long benefited from Caracas’ oil largess and have been unwilling to shun the country in regional diplomatic efforts.“The message is: Venezuela is not the only country that can help (Caribbean nations), that if there’s a crisis in Venezuela, they have more friends,” said the Mexican official, who was not authorized to speak publicly about the as-yet undisclosed trip.In a statement, Mexico’s foreign ministry said Videgaray was planning trips to the Caribbean.“The foreign ministry is eager for those trips to be arranged, and so possible dates are being sought,” it said, adding that several Caribbean countries had invited the minister for work visits since last year.Videgaray has led Mexico’s efforts to try and improve cooperation with its top trade partner on security, immigration, and foreign policy, hoping to convince the United States to take a softer stance on the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) that underpins the majority of Mexican exports.Petrocaribe Program Comes to an End, Belize’s Agreement with Venezuela Remains IntactA report in the Antigua Observer is causing shivers in some parts of the Caribbean. The report states that the island has received word that the largesse of the Petrocaribe is coming to an end. This, according to the report, is due largely to the deep fall in the production of crude oil from Venezuela. Last year in September, G.O.B. indicated it would suspend Petrocaribe because Venezuela was not able to supply fuel on time and that the South American country was in fact turning to other sources to buy crude to meet its commitment. But after a visit from PDVSA, things went back to normal. According to the recent reports, PDVSA is indefinitely suspending a combined thirty eight thousand barrels a day of refined products deliveries to Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines and Saint Kitts and Nevis. In the case of Belize, John Mencias of APBEL confirmed to News Five today that due to the corresponding bank issues and sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Venezuela, Belize has been unable to meet payments in US dollars as stipulated by the agreement. The programme has therefore been suspended but the agreement remains in place until a fix can be found. That, however, is not anticipated in the foreseeable future.Under the PetroCaribe program, Belize and the 22 other members received fuel from Venezuela through a special price arrangement….25 years to pay back . The program was also able to generate monies for the Government of Belize. However, the US sanctions against Venezuela has impacted the program. Financial Secretary, Joseph Waight explains.Belize owes $200 Million USDJoseph Waight – Financial Secretary: the problem with Petrocaribe is that there is although there may be a willingness on the part of the Government of Venezuela to PDV, to continue supplying. The problem is the sanctions have really taken effect, The U.S. sanctions and we unfortunately we just have to be collateral damage in that regard, sanctions mean that we cannot pay them. They have shut down the international banking system as far as Venezuela is concerned so we are unable to pay for any fuel we buy.Waight said that Belize owes Petrocaribe two hundred million US dollars.The declared exit of Venezuela from the Organization of American States (OAS), the suspension of Venezuela from MERCOSUR in 2016 for its failure to “conform” to the bloc’s “democratic principles,” and the unification of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) in defiance of a United States partisan resolution, raises the question whether the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) can be an alternative to the OAS as both a social and economic platform for Venezuelan dialogue. [i][ii]The OAS Permanent Council meeting on March 28, 2017, cited reasons to invoke the Inter-American Charter against Venezuela. The meeting revealed the demarcated political divide within the OAS; for instance, Saint Lucia voted yes to invoke the charter, whilst simultaneously benefiting from the Venezuelan Petrocaribe initiative under ALBA. [iii]The Canadian ambassador to the OAS, Jennifer May Loten, took one of the strongest stances to invoke the charter against Venezuela and called for a truth commission to be formed to “guide liberation of political prisoners [in Venezuela].”[v]It is unclear if the principles of solidarity, complementarity, justice, and cooperation of Bolivarian Alliance will persist amongst political dissidence. Foreign intervention in the relationship between Venezuela’s popular power and the state is signaling the beginning of the end for Bolivarian “participatory and protagonistic democracy”.[vi]ALBA is an intergovernmental organization focused on establishing social, economic, and political cooperation among its member states. ALBA is inspired by Simón Bolívar’s revolutionary ideal of greater solidarity and integration in Latin America. Bolivar believed in a unified South American nation ruled by one caudillo adherent to the opposition of foreign imperialist states.[vii]ALBA was initially established in 2004 between Venezuela and Cuba, under the leadership of both Hugo Chavez and Fidel Castro, to facilitate the exchange of Cuban medical services for Venezuelan petroleum. Today, ALBA consists of eleven member states — St. Vincent & Grenadines, Ecuador, Antigua & Barbuda, Dominica, Saint Lucia, Grenada, Saint Kitts & Nevis, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Venezuela and Cuba — and three observer states, Haiti, Iran, and Syria, with Suriname admitted as a guest member in 2012 [viii]The bloc’s monetary union showcases the autonomy of 21st century south-south cooperation from Washington’s political influence.[ix]The principal strength of ABLA is the SUCRE. The SUCRE is a regional unit of account, that allows the facilitation of regional trade without being dependent on the United States dollar. The central purpose of the SUCRE, as an international unit of account, is to stabilize current account transactions among member-states. Balanced national current account, and ergo capital account, transactions between countries are central to elevating unfair shifts in purchasing power due to unbalanced trade.PVDSA CURACAOIn effect, balanced current account transactions between ALBA member countries would increase domestic demand and direct investment, without having to be at the mercy of US currency speculation for importing and exporting goods and services. In addition to opening up room for domestic investment, through a balanced current account, member countries’ foreign debts are self-contained within ALBA. Central to the self-containment of the SUCRE, is the fact that member countries would not owe debts to foreign countries, instead they would owe credit or debit to ALBA’s monetary bloc. The endogenous structure of ALBA’s foreign currency exchange, through a regional currency, denominates the bloc as financially self-contained from U.S. currency manipulation.ALBA is also approaching monetary unity in partnership with socio-economic development initiatives.ALBA’s initiatives include, Cuba’s Sí, Se Puede, Nicaragua’s Programa Hambre Cero, and Venezuela’s PetroCaribe focusing on literacy, nutrition, communications, and fair economic cooperation.Perhaps the most significant of these initiatives has been PetroCaribe, a program that provides Caribbean states their energy needs at a fair and reasonable rate. Under Petrocaribe the state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), provides 100 percent of member countries’ energy needs at market price, with nearly 50 percent of consumption loans payable over 25 years at an interest rate of two percent.Venezuela’s PetroCaribe initiative is fiscally more competitive, and attractive, than other alternatives for the Caribbean community.Unlike the MERCOSUR trade bloc, ALBA promotes democratic trade agreements in which the autonomy of member states is of central importance (See Figure 1). ALBA was created in 2004 as an alternative to the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA), but has since developed into an ideological alliance.At the 14th ALBA summit on March 6, 2017, Venezuela President Maduro remarked “[the] great challenge of this generation and the coming generation will be to have the same capacity of achievement, construction, and success in building a productive model that will give us independence.”CITGO ARUBAMaduro outlined the need for greater south-south cooperation amongst Latin American countries, speaking against the harsh neoliberal policies instituted during the 1980’s, famously known as Latin America’s “lost decade.” ALBA’s autonomy is essential for member states to sustain progressive integration, and to maintain economic autonomy from countries that have a superior productivity advantage. However ALBA has to set-up its game, as Venezuela’s top three largest trading partners are the United States, China, and India, none of which are ALBA member states.Misguided US Sanctions on Venezuela: What Future for ALBA?The current challenges facing Venezuela come at a time when Latin America’s political climate is turning sour. The days of military interventions instituting “puppet” regimes with support of the United States have drawn to a close since the failed coup attempt against former President Hugo Chavez in 2003. Though, the United States still uses political and economic leverage against Venezuela to further degrade the country’s preferential access to its ubiquitous oil reserve. In May 2017, Goldman Sachs investment bank bought $2.8 billion worth of bonds from Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) for 31 cents on the dollar, Goldman Sachs only paid $865 million for the bonds.The oil bonds purchased by Goldman mature in 2022, therefore Goldman took advantage of Venezuela’s dire economic situation, and the value gained on the bonds could be used for political leverage over Venezuela if the country decides to buy back the PDVSA issued bonds. Furthermore, in January 2017, Obama renewed an executive order declaring Venezuela as a threat to U.S. national security.More recently, the Trump administration is considering imposing sanctions against the state owned Venezuelan oil company PDVSA.The United States can either place a blanket ban on all Venezuelan oil imports, or bar PDVSA from bidding on United States government contractsGiven the United States economic and political hegemony over the hemisphere, it is entirely possible that the United States could use its economic leverage over Venezuela to its own advantage. Unless other ALBA countries utilize the SUCRE as a means of balancing Venezuela’s trade deficit, the deflationary effect on the value (not price level) of the Bolivar fuerte will continue.Building on Hugo Chávez socialist Bolivarian ideals based on “solidarity, in fraternity, in love, in justice, in liberty, and [in] equality,”ALBA’s philosophy encapsulates progressive socialism for Latin America in the 21st century. ALBA’s trade initiatives, such as PetroCaribe, present preferential trade for energy with low interest financing….something they cannot find a way to supply 1 million barrel per day.Although ALBA’s trade initiatives can aid the Venezuelan economy, Venezuela’s fiscal and monetary policies fail to address export dependency as the root cause of Venezuela’s economic instability. On Venezuela’s fiscal policy, expenditures mainly consist of increases in public sector spending financed directly through PDVSA. Additionally, the National Development Fund and the joint China-Venezuela Fund provide additional financing for the country’s social programs.Taxation in Venezuela has increased on corporate and income tax from 2 percent of GDP in 1999 to 3.2 percent of GDP in 2006: Venezuela’s sales tax increased from 9 percent to 12 in 2009.State-run PDVSA financing and taxation reveals that Venezuela’s fiscal policy is cyclical in nature. After 2003, Venezuelan monetary policy has focused on increasing aggregate demand. Strategies have included reducing interest rates and instituting price controls on basic consumption items, which account for 30 percent of the 2009 Consumer Price Index (CPI) basket ensuring that low income households’ consumption needs will be provided. Stringent price controls have increased government subsidies, to mark-up the loss of producer surplus on price-controlled goods, which has further increased the inflation rate.Despite Venezuela’s heterodox fiscal and monetary policies, hyperinflation also arose because of a steep decline in the price of oil, illustrative of the fact that Venezuelan oil accounts for 95 percent of the country’s export earnings. In 2014 oil was over $100 USD per barrel, while in early 2016 it was as low as $33 USD per barrel.(Reuters) - Citgo Petroleum Corp [PDVSAC.UL], the U.S. subsidiary of Venezuelan state-run oil company PDVSA [PDVSA.UL], said on Wednesday that theUnited States had revoked the visa of its president and chief executive Asdrubal Chavez, cousin of Venezuela’s late president Hugo Chavez,ASDRUBAL CHAVEZ COUSIN OF HUGO CHAVEZ PRESIDENT CITGO USAAsdrúbal Chávez President and CEOMr. Chávez comes to CITGO with more than 30 years of industry experience. He began his career at the El Palito Refinery in the state of Carabobo, Venezuela, working in the areas of industrial services, distillation and specialties, conversion and treatment, crude and products movement, programming and economics and process engineering. After a one-year assignment with Union Pacific Oil in the United States, Chávez returned to the El Palito Refinery where he managed several expansion and organization projects throughout the 1990s.The rapid fall in the price of oil reduced the amount of foreign reserves available for Venezuela. This limited availability of foreign currency exchange for non-essential imports, resulted in a higher exchange rate for select imports.Additionally, the reduction in the availability of foreign currency reserves led to a budget shortfall, and the Venezuelan state had to fill in the budget gap by printing money. Inturn, this resulted in hyperinflation. Furthermore, the Venezuelan government nationalized monopolistic private enterprises to enforce price controls that are favorable towards increased aggregate demand, while simultaneously turning a blind eye towards the economic realities of hyperinflation eating away at domestic investment. In 2007 Venezuela nationalized four major oil projects in Orinoco crude belt, and in 2010 Venezuela nationalized nitrogen fertilizer producer Fertinitro. Currently Venezuela is seeking to nationalize and institute price controls on Empresas Polar, which is the largest private food producer in Venezuela.Though, simply nationalizing domestic industry will not tame the flight of capital because of preferential exchange rates abroad.In addition to the price control, the Venezuelan government fixed the exchange rate in February 2016 to 10 bolívar fuerte per U.S. dollar to control for inflation. The fixed exchange rate has only further exacerbated inflation, as many of Venezuela’s essential food imports have been sold to Colombia through the black market or private exchange markets. The export of essential food imports from Venezuela is occurring because the black-market exchange rate is close to 4,000 bolívars per U.S. dollar.Therefore, it is more lucrative to export goods outside the Venezuelan state.inflation led to an Increased Pressure on Public PoliciesThe increased pressure on debt-service payments, fixed exchange rate, price controls, and declining foreign currency reserves has led Venezuela to consider paying its creditors at the expense of funding public services. The Venezuelan state is also considering buying back government issued bonds and selling them at a discount price to service its debt, such as how Goldman Sachs bought Venezuelan bonds at a discount of 31 cents on the dollar. It is projected that the Venezuelan state can raise between $5 USD billion and $6 USD billion by reselling government bonds at a discount.It is likely that the Venezuelan government will buy back these bonds as “Venezuela has gone to extraordinary lengths to keep servicing its debt.”Mismanagement of the Venezuelan economy is now diminishing the availability of domestic credit. In the early 2000’s the National Assembly favored lower interest rates to increase the availability of domestic credit for those on the lower end of the income scale.Now it seems Venezuela’s policy of low interest rates to “kick start” the economy has been sabotaged by hyperinflation, eroding the purchasing power of each bolívar.Although ALBA was conceived as a progressive left-wing intergovernmental initiative to help balance trade inequalities in the bolivarian economies, it has failed the Venezuelan economy. Venezuela is far too dependent on oil exports. In response to this dependency the Venezuelan government adopted a two-tiered exchange rate system as an effort to protect critical imports while stabilizing foreign exchange.Despite Venezuelan policymakers best efforts, the country has experienced severe stagflation, with an excess contraction of more than 10 percent in output.The contraction in the Venezuelan economy has resulted in a current account deficit of $5.1 USD billion as of 2015 from a current account surplus of $5.7 USD billion a year earlier.In addition to its current account deficit, high inflation, rising unemployment, and volatile exchange rate; the value of Venezuela’s primary export, oil, is less than half that is required to finance their fiscal account spendingDue to price controls, restrictions on imports, and the falling price of oil, the country is experiencing a hyperinflation rate of over 481 percent coupled with a 17 percent unemployment rate.In addition the government roughly owes $7 billion USD on a debt of $30 billion USD to China.Though exact statistics are disputed, it is evident that the Venezuelan economy is facing a dire situation. Given Venezuela’s stark economic reality, Maduro’s options are increasingly limited. Either Maduro can default on the government debt, or reduce price controls and import limitations in an effort to regain investor confidence in the bolívar.But the predicament may not be as bad as it appears. Despite the critical economic situation, it is important to remember that Venezuela owes no external debt to the International Monetary Fund and sits on the world’s largest oil reservesTherefore, by collaborating with ALBA member countries, restructuring its import regime, and reselling its foreign debt through open market operations (e.g. Ecuador’s 2009 repurchase of defaulted foreign bonds),it is possible that Venezuela would be able to escape its current economic predicament.Political Uncertainty ContinuesIn addition to the choices made by Venezuelan policymakers, the country’s economic fate is contingent on the political situation it is now facing. On July 16, 2017 roughly 7.186 million Venezuelans protested President Maduro’s constituent assembly election on July 30th, many protestors are in favor of the current constituent assembly.This followed from Maduro’s call in April for a “constituent assembly” to write a new constitution, after opposition protests resulted in 35 deaths.Maduro’s call to reevaluate the constitution comes at a critical time when progressive dialogue is needed within the nation’s political system. With approval ratings below 30 percent, the political future of Maduro and his party, the PSUV, is far from certain.But all is not lost for Venezuela. One bastion of hope is ALBA, whose past policy initiatives demonstrate that it is possible for countries in Latin America to cooperate on progressive economic policy. Given the evolving political and economic situation in Venezuela, it is imperative for the Maduro administration to reevaluate regional economic cooperation among the Bolivarian nations. Though, implementing effective economic policy may be easier said than done, as former president Hugo Chávez expressed “only by way of socialism [can we improve the situation] little by little. The terrible inequality created during 100 years of capitalism will not be removed in one year or in ten. [It will not take] as much as 100 years, but at least several decades [will be necessary ]Chávez’s Daughter Is Filthy Rich, and That Shouldn’t Be a SurpriseEspañol The alleged fortune of María Gabriela Chávez, daughter of the late Hugo Chávez, has recently stirred up controversy in Venezuela. Media reports suggest that Chávez’s daughter has US$4.2 billion stored in bank accounts in the United States and Andorra, which might make her the wealthiest person in Venezuela.María Gabriela Chávez’s alleged wealth, and other inequalities present in Venezuela, are not anomalies, or symptoms of a “poorly implemented” socialist system. They are, in fact, the inevitable consequences of socialism.That is a lesson Latin America has yet to learn. while the entire country is hungry……she is now Ambassador…!US arrests Venezuelan president's godson, nephew on drug chargesVenezuela remains a major transit country for cocaine shipments via aerial, terrestrial, and maritime routes. Most flights suspected of trafficking narcotics depart from Venezuelan states bordering Colombia. Trafficking by maritime conveyance includes the use of large cargo containers, fishing vessels, and “go-fast” boats.The Maduro government has now Drug associated 126 identified military officers some seniors involved in extra large drug shipments including out of the Simon Bolivar Caracas airport; and all Venezuelaharbor,Air France 1,4 Tons of cocaine loaded with passengers : Venezuelan Miguel Rodriguez, the country’s justice and interior minister, said that intelligence agents had detained a “first lieutenant from the anti-drug unit of the Bolivarian National Guard” along with two sergeants.The Venezuelan authorities have now arrested 22 people in connection to a massive cocaine haul found on an Air France flight from Caracas .The sentence comes after nearly three years when a ton and a half of cocaine was seized in France after departing from Venezuela's Simón Bolívar International Airport.to Paris.The Bolivarian National Guard members were respectively in charge of a drug-sniffing canine, of operating an x-ray machine and of counting inventory. The other seven sentenced were airport personnel with duties including security and supervision. Eight members of the National Guard and nine Air France and airport staff have been detained on drug charges.The guards were in charge of security at Caracas airport, where 31 suitcases were smuggled on to the Air France plane.About 1.3 tonnes of cocaine were seized at Paris Charles de Gaulle airport earlier this month.The members of the National Guard and nine of the civilians were charged by a court of conspiracy and "aggravated illicit trafficking of narcotic substances."French police seize 1.3 tonnes of cocaine off Air France flight from Venezuela, Caracas La Maquetia Simon Bolivar airport.(31) suitcases loaded on to the plane in the Venezuelan capital, La Maquetia Caracas, an airport tightly controlled by the country’s military. The discovery is a major embarrassment not only for the French airline but for the Venezuelan government.The suitcases came from Caracas aboard an Air France flight to Paris, but did not match any of the passengers on board,Venezuela has indicated that the traffickers must have had assistance from people working within Air France's operation at Caracas airport. According to Rodriguez, it is "nearly evident" that there were accomplices working with the airline and the government Bolivarian army."How can 1,4 ton of cocaine shipment reach France and it gets taken out without drug control going through the normal controls?" he asked.Agents are scrutinizing footage taken from security cameras at the Simon Bolivar International Airport and interrogate personnel that work in the airport luggage area, he said.French police have seized a record haul of 1.3 tonnes of pure cocaine found on board an Air France passenger plane.“How can the cocaine shipment reach France and it gets taken out without going through the normal controls?” he asked.But opponents of Venezuela’s leftist government raised the same question of the military personnel directing security at Caracas Maiquetia airport, and suggested the three officers detained were mere scapegoats. “Proof positive that the National Guard runs drugs out of Maiquetia”, blared the headline of , Caracas Chronicles.The drugs, seized on September 11, had been packed into 31 suitcases, interior minister Manuel Valls told a news conference in Nanterre, outside Paris. Some 900kg of the drugs were seized in the Paris airport while the remainder was taken from a lorry en route to Luxembourg, according to Le Monde.It was the biggest-ever haul in metropolitan France, he added.A source close to the investigation said the flight had originated in the Venezuelan capital Caracas, Simon Bolivar La Maquetia airport, adding that the cocaine had a street value of some 200 million euros($287 million).The vast majority of illicit narcotics that transited Venezuela in 2015 were destined for the Caribbean, Central America, the United States, West Africa, and Europe. Colombian drug-trafficking organizations – including multiple criminal bands, or “BACRIM” groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) – facilitate the transshipment of narcotics through Venezuela. According to media reports, Mexican drug-trafficking organizations also operate in Venezuela, including the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas.Drugs seized on Maduro family members luxury boat in Dominican Republic.Maduro godson and nephew family members arrested on 800 Kilos of cocaine heading for NY. (18 years in jail.)U.S. law enforcement officials arrested the godson and a nephew of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, traveling on diplomatic passports charging them with conspiring to transport 800 kilos of cocaine to U.S. territory, Campo Flores, 29, who identified himself to the DEA agents as Maduro's godson, was raised by the wife of the Venezuelan leader, Cilia Flores, who is the aunt of Flores de Freitas. Two nephews of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro were found guilty of conspiring to traffic 800 kilograms of cocaine into the U.S., in a politically fraught case that links the country’s ruling family to the corruption plaguing its economy.Venezuelan President’s Nephews Found Guilty in Cocaine CaseThe arrests come amid several investigations being undertaken by the United States into alleged drug trafficking and money laundering activities being carried out by the top Venezuelan military leadership, the police , military and government officials.The Journal says that Maduro's two relatives got in contact with an undercover DEA informant in Honduras in October and asked for help in smuggling 800 kg of coke to the United States via the Honduran island of Roatan.In subsequent meetings in Venezuela, which were recorded by DEA agents, the two Venezuelans brought a kilo of cocaine to the contact to show him the quality of the promised drug, which was going to be sold in New York.NEW YORK: Two nephews of Venezuela's first lady should serve at least 18 years in prison for their convictions in the United States on drug trafficking charges, U.S. prosecutors said on Monday.They said in a filing in federal court in Manhattan that the two men, Franqui Francisco Flores de Freitas and Efrain Antonio Campo Flores, tried to make US$20 million through drug trafficking so as to keep their family in power and to "enrich themselves while their countrymen starved in the streets."US seeks at least 30 years for nephews of Venezuela's first ladyReferences:EFE Washington 12 Nov 2015By Sheldon Birkett, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric AffairsFeatured Image: Venezuela Protests Flag Taken From: WikimediaPatricio Zamorano, “The OAS and the Crisis in Venezuela: Luis Almagro and his Labyrinth”, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, April 28, 2017, http://www.coha.org/the-oas-and-the-crisis-in-venezuela-luis-almagro-and-his-labyrinth/.“Caracas To ‘Vexit’ From OAS – But Where Do CARICOM and OECS Stand?” The Voice, April 29, 2017, http://thevoiceslu.com/2017/04/caracas-vexit-oas-caricom-oecs-stand/.Mercedes Hoffay, & Karen Mustiga, “OAS and Venezuela: Another Contested Vot nut with Recommendations,” Latin America Goes GLOBAL, March 29, 2017, http://latinamericagoesglobal.org/2017/03/oas-venezuela-another-contested-vote-recommendations/Jeanette Charles, “OAS Fails to Reach Consensus on Venezuela Suspension in Latest Extraordinary Session,” Venezuela News, Views, and Analysis, March 28, 2017, https://venezuelanalysis.com/news/13009.Joel Hirst, “A Guide to ALBA”, Americas Quarterly, http://www.americasquarterly.org/HIRST/ARTICLE.ALBA Monetary Bloc: ALBA has an independent bank in Caracas and its own currency, the SUCRE, pegged to $1.25 USDMartin Riese, “Reforming the Global Financial Architecture A Comparison of Different Proposals -6.2 John M. Keynes: Proposal for an International Currency Union,” Johannes Kepler Universitat Linz, October 2008,http://www.econ.jku.at/members%5CLandesmann%5Cfiles%5CWS08%5C239339%5CDiplomarbeit_Klaffenboeck_zentrale_kapitel.pdf.Shawn Hattingh, “ALBA: Creating a Regional Alternative to Neo-liberalism?,” Monthly Review, February 8, 2008, https://mronline.org/2008/02/07/alba-creating-a-regional-alternative-to-neo-liberalism/.Joel Hirst, “A Guide to ALBA”, Americas Quarterly, http://www.americasquarterly.org/HIRST/ARTICLEAlejandro Bendaña, “Alternative financing for development: Venezuela and ALBA,” CADTM, May 22, 2008, http://www.cadtm.org/spip.php?page=imprimer&id_article=3390Joel Hirst, “A Guide to ALBA”, Americas Quarterly, http://www.americasquarterly.org/HIRST/ARTICLE.“ALBA: An example of successful South-South Cooperation,” New Delhi Times, May 15, 2017, https://www.newdelhitimes.com/alba-an-example-of-successful-south-south-cooperation123/.“Goldman Sachs makes an irresponsible deal with the corrupt Venezuela regime,” The Washington Post, June 4, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/goldman-sachs-makes-an-irresponsible-deal-with-the-corrupt-venezuela-regime/2017/06/04/f3e3994c-47a8-11e7-bcde-624ad94170ab_story.html?utm_term=.7b9e88138e42.Tom Buerkle, “In Venezuela, Goldman Sachs Found a Hot Deal and a Moral Mess,” The New York Times, May 30, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/business/dealbook/venezuela-bonds-goldman-sachs.html.“Obama Declares Cuba and Venezuela National Security Threats,” Telesur, January 13, 2017, Obama Declares Cuba and Venezuela National Security Threats.Girish Gupta, & Matt Spetalnick, “Exclusive: U.S. Considers possible sanctions against Venezuela oil sector – officials,” Reuters, June 4, 2017, Exclusive: U.S. considers possible sanctions against Venezuela oil...Girish Gupta, & Matt Spetalnick, “Exclusive: U.S. Considers possible sanctions against Venezuela oil sector – officials,” Reuters, June 4, 2017, Exclusive: U.S. considers possible sanctions against Venezuela oil...Ozgur Orhangazi, “Contours of Alternative Policy Making in Venezuela,” Review of Radical Political Economics 46, no. 2 (2014): 230.Ludwig Von Mises, “Inflation and Price Control,” Mises Institute, May 27, 2005, https://mises.org/library/inflation-and-price-controlTheodore Cangero, “Venezuela: Socialism, Hyperinflation, and Economic Collapse,” American Institute For Economic Research, March 1, 2017, https://www.aier.org/research/venezuela-socialism-hyperinflation-and-economic-collapse. [xxviii] Ibid, 226“Factbox: Venezuela’s nationalizations under Chavez,” Reuters, October 7, 2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election-nationalizations-idUSBRE89701X20121008 .Theodore Cangero, “Venezuela: Socialism, Hyperinflation, and Economic Collapse,” American Institute For Economic Research, March 1, 2017, https://www.aier.org/research/venezuela-socialism-hyperinflation-and-economic-collapse.Julie Wernau, & Kejal Vyas, “Venezuela Poses Investor Dilemma,” The Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2017Ozgur Orhangazi, “Contours of Alternative Policy Making in Venezuela,” Review of Radical Political Economics 46, no. 2 (2014):226.Current Account: exports minus imports plus net factor income and net transfers“Venezuela Current Account,” Trading Economics, Venezuela Current Account | 1990-2018 | Data | Chart | Calendar | Forecast.“Venezuela,” The World Bank Group, May 2, 2017, Overview“Venezuela’s worst economic crisis: What went wrong?,” Aljazeera, May 3, 2017, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/05/venezuela-worst-economic-crisis-wrong-170501063130120.html.Robert Khan, “Global Economics Monthly: May 2016,” Council on Foreign Relations, May 4, 2016, https://www.cfr.org/report/global-economics-monthly-may-2016.Ozgur Orhangazi, “Contours of Alternative Policy Making in Venezuela,” Review of Radical Political Economics 46, no. 2 (2014): 226.“Ecuador’s winning strategy,” The Economist, June 17, 2009, Ecuador's winning strategy“Over 7 million Venezuelans tell Maduro ‘no’,” Latin News, July 17, 2017.Nathan Crooks & Fabiola Zerpa, “Why Venezuela May Change Its Constitution for the 27Time,” Bloomberg, May 9, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-05-09/why-venezuela-may-get-its-27th-constitution-quicktake-q-a.“Political Crisis in Venezuela,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 30, 2015, https://www.cfr.org/report/political-crisis-venezuela.Ozgur Orhangazi, “Contours of Alternative Policy Making in Venezuela,” Review of Radical Political Economics 46, no. 2 (2014): 237.Chávez's Daughter Is Filthy Rich, and That Shouldn't Be a SurprisePetrocaribe Program Comes to an End, Belize’s Agreement with Venezuela Remains IntactUS weighs effects of Venezuela oil sanctionsFears over Venezuela’s Petrocaribe grow in Caribbean and Central AmericaAgreements signed at Petrocaribe Summit in VenezuelaPetrocaribe: What is it good for?JAMAICA | Tillerson-Holness May discuss PetroCaribe ArrangementsUncertain Energy: The Caribbean's Gamble with VenezuelaHaiti - FLASH : No more oil from Venezuela for Haiti because of Trump -HaitiLibre.com : Haiti news 7/7French police seize 1.3 tonnes of cocaine off Venezuela flightVenezuela sentences 10 people to 22 years for cocaine on Air France flightTwo Britons charged over Air France cocaine busthttp://notesreport.net/attention-mr-nnd-your-family/Filha de Chávez tem US$ 4 bi e é a mulher mais rica da Venezuela #boato[https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/news/122120.pdf ][This excellent analysis from Princeton University explains how Venezuela prepared the downfall…from Hugo Chavez in 1998 up to Nicola Maduro in 2018.] Noam Lupu Princeton UniversityCONCLUSIONS The conventional wisdom about leaders like Chávez is that their electoral successes depend on class voting, particularly the support of poor voters disenchanted with the old political establishment, corruption within traditional parties, and the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus. There are, however, intuitive reasons to doubt this interpretation, including Chávez’s conflicts with organized labor, potential middle class benefi ts from some of his economic policies and redistributive programs, and the scholarly contention that Latin American populist leaders generally rely on multiclass bases of support. My results show that this intuitive skepticism is indeed warranted; Chávez’s electoral base is not, in fact, disproportionately poor. That is, I find no evidence of a monotonic class vote outside the election of 1998.]Maria Gabriela Chavez manda a decir q sigan votando x la robolucion pq el imperio es muy bueno y yo no quiere volver pic.twitter.com/4PizJQzE1H— Inger Gonzalez (@inger39) December 4, 2015