Avenida 82 No: Fill & Download for Free

Eu (I)Você (You)Querer - To have (Eu quero - I’ll have used to ask what you would like to eat (to make an order at a place that sells food). It also means “to want - Eu quero vê-la novamente - I want to see her again.Ir (to go)Vir (to come)Ver (to see)Falar (to speak)Conversar (to talk)Dizer - to tell (dizer a verdade - tell the truth)10. Comprar ( to buy)11. Vender (to sell)12. Estudar (to study)13. Namorar (to date)14. Construir (to build)15. Ligar (to call, to telephone, to switch on)16. Fazer (to do, to make)17. Cozinhar (to cook)18. Entregar (to deliver)19. Pedir (to ask)20. Ter (to have, have got)21. Permitir (to allow, to let, to permit)22. Precisar (to need)23. Chegar (to come)24. Tomar (to take)25. Cortar (to cut)26. Casar (to marry, to get married)27. Morrer (to die)28. Votar (to vote)29. Assistir (to watch)30. Deitar (to lay)31. Levantar (to raise, to lift)32. Cheirar (to smell)33. Gastar (to spend)34. Pensar (to think)35. Imaginar (to imagine)36. Chorar (to cry, to weep)37. Sorrir (to smile)38. Levar (to take)39. Trazer (to bring)40. Ele (he)41. Ela (she)42. Nós (we)43. Eles (they)44. Dar (to give)45. Comer (to eat)46. Trabalhar (to work)47. Entrar (to enter, to get in)48. Sair (to get out)49. Dirigir (to drive)50. Odiar (to hate)51. Amar (to love)52. Matar (to kill)53. Assassinar (to murder)54. Pagar (to pay)55. Sacar (to withdraw)56. Abrir (to open)57. Fechar (to shut)58. Pôr (to put)59. Colocar (to place)60. Virar (to turn)61. Recepcionar (to welcome)62. Derramar (to spill)63. Trem (train)64. Metrô (subway, underground)65. Cidade (city)66. País (country)67. Eleição (election)68. Presidente (president)69. Prefeito (mayor)70. Polícia (the police)71. Rua (street, road)72. Avenida (avenue)73. Rodovia74. Estação (station)75. Mercado (market)76. Supermercado (supermaket)77. Restaurante (restaurant)78. Faculdade (college (university))79. Escola (school)80. Parque (park)81. Teatro (theatre, theater)82. Cinema (cinema, movie theatre, movie house)83. Viagem (travel)84. Viajar (to travel)85. Filho (son)86. Filha (daughter)87. Filhos (children)88. Pais (parents)89. Parentes (relatives)90. Família (family)91. Igreja (church)92. Centro de compras (shopping center, mall)93. God (Deus)94. Pai (father)95. Mãe (mother)96. Andar (to walk)97. Correr (to run)98. Voar (to fly)99. Vôo (flight)100. Avião (plane

“Option 13": the British secret plan to bomb Buenos Aires during the Falklands warThe secret document of the British Ministry of Defense with the plan of operations for the Vulcano planes, chosen to bomb Buenos Aires and other targets on the continentGiven the imminence of an Argentine military action on the Falkland Islands, alerted by the intelligence services of the United States, in a meeting at the British Ministry of Defense in Whitehall, it was assumed that nothing could be done in the short term to prevent it. At that time, the Argentine landing fleet was still sailing towards its final objective: the recovery of the Falklands Islands.It was 2:00 pm on March 31, 1982, in Room 5301 of the Ministry of Defense building, when the study of sanctions and reprisals began in the event that the threat materialized. In the minutes of that meeting, it was included as possible retaliation against Argentina, that the Royal Air Force carried out air attacks "on Argentine cities or on ships at sea, which would have to be launched from Ascensión Island. Without the support of tanker planes. Due to the distance involved in the approach, the aircraft would have to land to complete the mission on the South American continent, possibly Montevideo or Santiago. Consequently, in the probable case of refusal to use airfields in South America, the attacks on Argentine whites are not feasible ".By then, Defense Minister John Nott had already ordered the departure of a nuclear submarine to the South Atlantic, and the enlistment of two more. The Royal Navy dusted off contingency plans for the Falklands and placed the fleet on alert, while the Royal Air Force (RAF) hostily prepared a plan to bomb targets in Argentina.At the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff of the British armed forces on April 2 at 3:10 p.m. London (+3 compared to Buenos Aires), the "possibility of obtaining assistance from potential allies, particularly Chile, and to a lesser extent, was discussed. Brazil measure ", for the use of air bases in South America, and the Foreign Office was entrusted to" obtain authorization for the use of aerodromes in Chile, if an attempt is made to deploy RAF aircraft within the operational range of the Falkland Islands " .At 9 am on April 3, a new meeting of Chiefs of Staff was held to assess the events that had occurred since the previous day. During its course, it was reported that Chile had received an Argentine request not to resupply ships and aircraft from the United Kingdom en route to the Malvinas Islands, and that Brazil would not provide facilities or assistance to British forces engaged in operations against the Argentines.Despite the intense British diplomatic deployment, on April 4, the Foreign Office had to inform the military leaders that most of the South American countries had expressed their support for Argentina. But the British embassy in Santiago de Chile had communicated that "there was the possibility of Chilean support" (Telegram No. 66 of April 3, 82), so it was decided that efforts should continue to determine the possibility of using aerodromes in that area. country.The RAF would call on the old Avro Vulcan bombers, whose phasing out of service was half complete when the crisis broke out. Despite so many years spent on low-level nuclear strike operations within NATO, with its long range and ability to carry a significant load of conventional bombs, it was ideal for the task.Since the beginning of the 1970s, they had not exercised their conventional bombing capacity or refueling in flight, so it was essential to train the crews and capabilities of the aircraft, prior to their deployment to Ascension Island.The distances to targets in Argentina were more than the plane could achieve, so –in addition to successive refueling in flight-, it was vital to obtain overflight permits and eventual landing in South American countries for the bombing to be effective.Avro Vulcan B.2 aircraft used by the Royal Air Force to carry out operations in the South Atlantic. This aircraft, registration XM597, carried out missions over the Malvinas with North American anti-radar "Shrike" missiles.The Foreign Office was entrusted to obtain these permits to fly over Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay, and thus ensure the air approach to enter over Argentine territory. The Foreign Ministries of these countries immediately denied permits to the British.The option to operate from Chile was still open. Hours passed and planning began to contemplate sending Vulcan aircraft to operate from trans-Andean bases, for which they would have to trace a flight route from their base in Great Britain to Santiago / Punta Arenas. Given the refusals to fly over South America, a route had to be outlined that involved crossing the North Atlantic, flying over the United States, and reaching Chile from the Pacific.With these premises, on April 8 the first draft entitled "Vulcan Operations against Argentina since Ascension" was issued to use these bombers against targets in Argentina. The concept of the operation would be the following:1. Vulcans at high altitudes, particularly in daylight, would be extremely vulnerable to known defense forces. It is recommended that operations should be contemplated only at night and at low altitude. The bombardment would be carried out by radar, and consequently, the targets should be area rather than spot in nature; towns, airfields and port facilities would be the best option.2. The extreme distance from Ascension, even to Buenos Aires returning to Ascension, would require the support of 7 Victor tankers for a single Vulcan carrying only 7 1,000 pound bombs. Missions from Ascension to targets in or around Buenos Aires and recovery to the nearest Vulcan-capable base in Chile, which is Santiago, would still be considerably more cost-effective. The tank requirement would be xx Victor for each Vulcan; the last refueling would be carried out just before the last lights at high altitude with a penetration of the Argentine airspace carried out in the dark and at low level.3. Once in Santiago, the Vulcans will provide a very vulnerable target for offensive support missions. Anyway, from this base, conventional low-level attacks could be carried out, and without recourse to AAR (Air Refueling). However, substantial ground support in terms of men and equipment would be required to support sustained operations.The report concluded that "One deployment to Ascension and a single operation for each aircraft from Ascension is a feasible proposal. The maximum capacity of 561,000-pound bombs is, however, of little real significance, but the rapid and open deployment of The Vulcan to Ascension with visible resupply probes, Victor Cisterna parked alongside and announcing that each Vulcan is capable of carrying 211,000 pound bombs, must pose a real and significant threat to Argentina - if they believe we have the will to employ them ".First draft of April 8, 1982. "Vulcan operations against Argentina since Ascension"An informal consultation between aeronautical officials from Great Britain and Chile, resulted in John Heath, British ambassador in Santiago de Chile, reporting, by Secret Telegram No. 89 of April 9, that "General López, Chief of Operations of the Force Air of Chile (FACH), has passed the message via Griffin to express that the FACH is anxious to help us and expectant of having to receive British aircraft in emergency, for example, damaged in combat. "But, foreseeing an Argentine retaliation on the Chilean aerodromes, the aid would have its conditions, so the message continued: "Due to the weakness of the air defense in the southern aerodromes, especially Punta Arenas and Balmaceda, the FACH urgently needs the following, in anticipation of a possible Argentine attack: a) 4 or 5 Bofors 40/70 mobile antiaircraft units (used); b) 2 Bloodhound units ".The urgency turned out to be such that Heath clarified in the telegram that "the FACH would be ready to buy them immediately on a commercial contract and at normal price, and send a C-130 to the UK tomorrow if necessary to collect them. As they have no experience in units. Bloodhound in particular, the FACH would be ready to receive British experts dressed without insignia to operate the units, which will be normal for similar commercial contracts for new weaponry. "The British diplomat requested an immediate response on these possibilities and requirements in order to have information for the April 12 meeting, to which he had been summoned by the Commander in Chief of the FACH, General of the Air Fernando Matthei Aubel, in which "surely the issue will be raised. "The message was music to the ears of the British aeronautical officers. They would have a base a few hundred kilometers from the Argentine bases, and the feasibility of the option of bombing Buenos Aires was beginning to take shape.But General Augusto Pinochet made it clear to his Chiefs of Staff that he would not authorize the British to initiate military operations against Argentina from Chilean territory, for fear of provoking "an unstable neighbords." Despite this, there would be no problems in receiving British aircraft "in emergency" at Chilean aerodromes.Secret Telegram No. 89 of April 9, 1982 from the British Ambassador in Santiago de Chile. "The FACH is eager to help us and expecting to have to receive British aircraft in emergency, for example, damaged in combat"The Chief of Defense Staff, Admiral Terence Lewin, commissioned the preparation of a working document setting out the options for Operation Corporate. Following this instructions, and after consulting each of the armed forces, the Ministry of Defense, and the Foreign Office, a list of options was drawn up, which was divided between those that were in progress and those that would remain available for their future consideration. It was intended to formulate a ranking in ascending order according to the political-military impact of each one, based on eminently subjective appraisals, which would be reviewed and eventually modified as the situation evolved.Among the future options, under the title "Attack on selected targets in Continental Argentina" was "Option 13", under which the objective and the circumstances that were considered would operate in favor and against the initiative were set.Among the first, the obtaining of surprise was noted; the reduction of the effectiveness of the Argentine Air Force; the possibility of attaching the Argentine air defense remotely to the conflict area. The downsides would be international repercussions; the questioning of the legality of the attacks; the direct justification for retaliating against British expatriates in Argentina, among others.With new data and estimates, changes were made to the planning on April 10. It was concluded in the report that "a deployment to Ascension, and a single flight out of Ascension by each of the eight Vulcans in order to attack targets in and around Buenos Aires, is a feasible proposition. The capacity of 168 bombs out of 1,000 pounds is significant, despite the limited accuracy of Vulcans operating at night on a conventional mission. "They insisted on the psychological aspect that the maneuver could cause among the Argentines: "the rapid and open deployment of the Vulcans to Ascensión, with visible resupply probes, and the Víctor Cisterna parked next to them, will constitute a real and significant threat to Argentina. –If they are convinced that we have the will to use them ".In parallel, a report was drawn up with possible economic targets in Argentine territory, targeting mainly oil fields and refineries; deposits and gas pipeline systems, over nodes of the railway networks, and the road system, and their effects on the military effort and on the population.At the War Cabinet meeting at noon on Friday, April 16, chaired by Margaret Thatcher, the leak to the press about the reconditioning of the Vulcan planes and their ability to reach targets over the Argentine mainland was discussed.Ascension Island was in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, and far from Argentine eyes. The preparations for the bombing missions had to be disseminated, and the Argentine military commanders and public opinion should be made aware of them. But how would it be achieved?Following the directives of the British Cabinet, on April 11, 1982, the Special Projects Group was formed, under the direction of Colonel T.S. Sneyd, within the scope of the Ministry of Defense, for the preparation and enactment of deception and propaganda operations. His plans would be implemented by the Secret Intelligence Service and the Foreign Office.The art of deception or deception is as old as war itself. In conventional military operations, commanders must not only motivate their troops, but also seek to affect the enemy's. Propaganda, as a crucial element of psychological actions, must be based on information that is credible to the enemy.Just two days after the Argentine landings in the Malvinas, on April 4, the journalist Jon Connell, of the Sunday Times, carried out an analysis on the different military options to "recapture the Falklands", stating that "one possibility, of course, would be not attack the Falkland Islands but Argentina itself - its coastal military and naval bases. "The comparative tables of the forces of both countries showed a clear imbalance in favor of Argentina in the number of air resources. British public opinion was beginning to worry about the success of the task force.At the War Cabinet meeting at noon on Friday, April 16, chaired by Margaret Thatcher, the leak to the press about the reconditioning of the Vulcan planes and their ability to reach targets over the Argentine mainland was discussed.The news would be published next Sunday in the Sunday Express on the front page. Although the minutes of the meeting reflect the regret for not having been able to stop the leak, the attendees concluded that "although there is really no intention to attack the Argentine continent, there could be some military advantage if the Argentineans were afraid of it."That same Sunday, April 18, the cover of the Sunday Express titled "The Vulcan Ready to Hit Argentina." The note, signed by Michael Toner, recounted in detail the enlistment of the bombers and their deployment to the South Atlantic, and that although they would not be equipped with nuclear bombs, "they will have the capacity to destroy every Argentine airfield and naval port", and that "if the Vulcan were properly employed, the entire Argentine military structure could be destroyed."The journalist acknowledged in his note that the decision to use the Vulcan against Argentina "may be a result of the work of 'psychological operations'" within the Ministry of Defense. "A little known group of experts has been working overtime to discourage and destabilize military opinion in Argentina." Perhaps, by saying so, Toner implicitly acknowledged his involvement in the propaganda action. His note contained details similar to the planning for April 10, and which the Cabinet had now seen fit to reach Argentine ears.Toner concluded by describing the threat in no uncertain terms: "There is no doubt that the mere threat of Vulcan operations will terrify any expert in Argentina who knows what these aircraft can do. They can destroy virtually any target at will. Only with that fact, they will be It could practically guarantee immunity to the British fleet in the South Atlantic against Argentine air attacks. "Psychological action had already kicked off. The news, taken by international agencies, was widely replicated in the British and Argentine media during the following days. The "gunboat diplomacy" made a new demonstration of what it was capable to do."Why should we bomb Argentina", statements by Winston Churchill (grandson), in The Sun newspaper, April 23, 1982It was the spokesman for the Conservative Party, the parliamentarian Winston Churchill, grandson of the famous British prime minister, who, in a note published by The Sun newspaper on April 23, under the title "Why should we bomb Argentina", justified the actions on the continent in the face of the threat of Argentine aviation operating from its bases on the Atlantic coast against the British task force.Churchill stated: "An obvious additional factor, which until now may have been overlooked by the Board, is the ability of the RAF Vulcan bomber force to eliminate - if necessary - all key Argentine air bases in the region. continent with a single Israeli-style synchronized attack. From bases in the South Atlantic the Vulcans have the range and the ability to crater the runways with conventional bombs and destroy most of the Argentine Air Force on the ground with cluster bombs ... Eliminating the Argentine Air Force with a swift and devastating blow would guarantee victory for the Task Force, and ensure a minimum of British casualties. "Although the Argentine forces were taking the appropriate measures to defend the Argentine territory, its air bases and strategic facilities in the national territory, Civil Defense organizations and local delegations of the Argentine Red Cross also began to act.But the most picturesque reaction was that of the Tal Cual Weekly, in its April 23 edition, which outlined a series of questions and answers to "these moments of tension and uncertainty that the country is experiencing", with practical recommendations in the face of a bombing by the Buenos aires city.* If [the war] reaches the continent, will it reach Buenos Aires? - If it is an open war between the two countries, Buenos Aires, London or any city can be bombed.* If you arrive in Buenos Aires, will shelters be built? - Surely, since natural refuges (special basements, underground, etc.)* Should the city be evacuated? - This possibility will only be addressed if there is an attack with an invasion of Buenos Aires.* In case of bombing, what to do? - The members of the Civil Defense will instruct the population in due time, by all the information means available to them (radio, TV, etc.).* What are the shelters for bombing? - The natural ones, the reinforced concrete constructions that are under the surface. Undergrounds, underground garages, basements of large buildings (the Barolo on Avenida de Mayo at 1300, has an anti-bombing basement).In Buenos Aires the war still seemed very distant, and a peaceful solution to the conflict was hoped for. There was no need to seek shelter or heed prevention. On the other hand, in the main cities of southern Argentina, where the movements of troops and weapons were incessant, the authorities and the population had become fully aware of the eventuality of an attack, carrying out blackout exercises and evacuation drills to shelters and measures protection against bombing.On the evening of April 30, the Argentine commanders received notice of the takeoff of Vulcan and Víctor cisternas planes from Ascension Island, showing that they would be destined for the continental coastline.The Soviets had deployed a "scientific" ship to sail in the vicinity of the island, so presumably it was the one who gave the alert to such a movement of aircraft. However, the course taken by the attackers would be the Malvinas.At 4:40 a.m. on May 1, the Vulcan threat became effective, dropping 21 1,000-pound bombs on the airport runway, of which only one had an effective impact, quickly repairing the damage. Thus began the missions called "Black Buck" by the British.With the development of military operations, and access to more intelligence information, "Option 13" continued to be reformulated. On May 4, 1982, the destroyer HMS Sheffield was hit by one of the two Exocet missiles launched by a pair of Super Etendard aircraft operating from the Rio Grande Naval Air Base in Tierra del Fuego.The option of bombing Buenos Aires was diluted from the planning, which now concentrated mainly on the Military Air Bases in the south of the continent. Every time the British fleet received a certain blow from the Argentine aviation, the plans were adjusted in the face of parliamentary pressure and public opinion.However, the idea of ​​bombing Buenos Aires, which had arisen even before April 2 and discarded as operations evolved, regained force on May 13, but for a new psychological action.Clipping of the newspaper "Daily Express" of April 19, 1982, with speculation of possible targets in the Argentine mainland.Prior to the British landings at San Carlos, on Soledad Island, Argentine land-based aviation was considered the main threat to the establishment of a safe beachhead.The Special Projects Group made a proposal to "spread the word by discrete, non-attributable means that daytime attacks with Vulcan bombers are being planned against targets to the north on the mainland, prior to any major landings in the Falkland Islands." This would try to reduce the number of attacking aircraft in the Malvinas area of ​​operations, withdrawing some elements to the airfields in the north.In any case, to be effective, the rumor had to be credible and attractive to Argentine commanders. The Group considered that "if it were reported that the attacks are being changed to daylight hours, this could motivate the Argentine Air Force to actively seek the showdown in order to achieve a prestigious victory by shooting down a Vulcan. Indicating that the attacks will be carried out against a large fuel installation near Buenos Aires, a credible option, is expected to attract some fighters to the north. "Colonel T.S. Sneyd, ends his report stating: "It is recommended that authorization be granted to use discreet and non-attributable means to inform the Argentine authorities that Vulcan planes are going to attack fuel facilities in the Buenos Aires area in the light of day in the future. It will be emphasized that the change to bombardment in daylight hours is in order to achieve greater precision and thus reduce civilian casualties. "The political consequences of a British action on the continent conditioned any attack of these characteristics. Argentina found support within the Organization of American States, and the possibility of regionalizing the conflict was always latent. It was a risk that Britain did not intend to take. It had justified its military reaction on the principle of legitimate defense of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and in Resolution 502 of the Security Council, so that an open attack on the continent seemed unnecessary, and this would endanger legality of your actions.There was always the possibility that Britain could fail in its primary military objective in the Falkland Islands, and that the Task Force would be humiliated. It was thus that, until the end of the conflict, the idea of ​​these attacks on the continent was never discarded, nor were planning suspended.The option would be reserved for when the military operational needs so required, provided that the means employed justified and international condemnation was supported. "Option 13", from "Attacks on selected targets in Continental Argentina", was always on the planning table, waiting to obtain the green light in the War Cabinet.The bombing of the city of Buenos Aires remained in force in the minds of British planners as well as in the design of psychological warfare actions.

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