The Number Crew 2 Programme 4 The Place For Treats: Fill & Download for Free

Q: Is there any proof of immunity to the coronavirus for the Chief scientist to the British government to be saying that 60% of the British public need infecting with the virus in order to create a herd immunity?1 Answer Unfortunately Sir Patrick Vallance FRS FMedSci FRCP does not appear to know what he is talking about. Let’s look at the evidence.2 The Only Evidence We’ve Got: The Percentage of Immune and Infected on the Diamond Princess Cruise ShipOn the 3,800 people confined within the “Petri Dish” of the Diamond Princess cruise liner, the observed percentages of immunity, infect-ability and mortality were 82%, 18% and 0.018%.3 The 95% error limits of these percentagesIf we assume thatthe 3,800 people on that cruise liner were a random genetic sample of American and European descent,except that there were no cruisers in the three most-at-risk groups of very young children, pregnant women within the 13 week to 37 week pregnant reduced immunity 26-week period, or elderly people with compromised immune systems.By adjusting the percentage of deaths from the COVID-19 infection upwards from the very low observed 0.18% to China’s 3.24%, we can calculate that mortality is normally about 0.6% of the population.We can then apply the usual calculation [of SE= ((p*100-p)/n)^0.5] to derive the standard error of these percentage estimates and arrive at a 95% probability range of these estimates. The above table shows:that the observed immunity of 82% is 95% likely to lie in the range of 80.76% to 83.24% of the populationthat the observed 18% percentage of infected is 95% likely to lie in the range of 16.76% to 19.24% of the populationthat the observed 0.6% percentage of deaths is 95% likely to lie in the range of 0.35% to 0.85% of the populationI accept that the passengers on the Diamond Princess were probably mainly white, American and rich. But I think that the rich are probably genetically similar to the rest of us, only richer.4 Why does Sir Patrick Vallance imagine that over 60% immunity confers a “herd immunity?”I think Sir Patrick may be assuming a much less infectious virus. Vaccination against the highly infective measles requires a 95% inoculation rate to confer herd immunity. SeeWhat is herd immunity for measles?where it says“To stop the spread of measles, around 92 to 95 percent of a population needs to be vaccinated to preserve its herd immunity, meaning that there are enough vaccinated people that the pathogen runs out of new people to infect and transmission stops. 29 Apr 2019”COVID-19 is as at least as infective as the measles, so Sir Patrick’s 60% “herd immunity” figure is woefully incorrect. There is no observable “herd immunity” at that percentage, and even the 82% observed immunity of Diamond Princess cruisers and staff did not prevent the other 18% from being infected.So unfortunately Sir Patrick’s estimate that 60% immunity protects the British herd is arrant nonsense.4 Why does Sir Patrick Vallance imagine that COVID-19 crowd infections have a tolerable mortality rate.I think Sir Patrick may be imagining that the COVID-19 coronavirus is like a once-only infection of a low-level flu with a 0.01% mortality rate of the infected. (As Wikipedia observes, children can catch a cold up to six times a year, while adults tend to average 2–3 times a year).But the COVID-19 coronavirus has an observed mortality rate ranging from 3.24% of the infected up to about 4.1% of the infected, so it may be between 324 times to 410 times more deadly than once-caught flu.If the COVID-19 coronavirus only had mortality rate of only 0.01% and 12.24 million people become infected (18% of the UK population of 68 millions) that’s about 1,224 dead. But the COVID-19 coronavirus has a death rate averaging 3.75% of the infected, so it is likely that 459,000 will die, as the following table calculates:While 1,224 British dead might be politically acceptable, I very much doubt that half a million UK dead will be. I think deaths will be even higher than I've calculated because the NHS is still reeling from the £250bn Austerity cuts and it will be difficult for most of the extremely ill to get hospital beds and expert medical attention.The UK is now 10th in the list of case numbers and seventh in the list of numbers of deaths but both of these are rapidly increasing.5 Sir Patrick’s Estimate of 20,000 British Deaths From An Isolation Policy is indefensibleOnly a Chinese-style total lock-down works, ending the corona virus within four months at a cost of less than 3,500 dead and minus up to 1% of GDP plus the loss of about a year’s exports. Otherwise, the British will apply the self-isolation guidelines in the way the Diamond Princess passengers and crew did, with similar infective and deadly results.Sir Patrick has described his estimate of 20,000 British dead as ”terrible” but implied the reality could be much worse than that level of death The likely reality of the home isolation policies he and Boris Johnson have introduced are likely to become centres of infection with death rates about 23 times worse than that, at about 460,000 people. Sir Patrick’s fears are more realistic than his opinions.6 The Mistaken British Government Preference For Using Existing NHS Hospitals rather than Funding New FacilitiesThe British PM and Sir Patrick Vallance have given the COVID-19 the stern instruction that because their computer model indicates a peak of only 20,000 infections that’s what will happen. That must occur in the British Government’s view because only 30,000 beds have been made available in the NHS to cope with the COVID-19 infected in Britain. There are several problems with that penny-pinching Austerity-maintaining Conservative policy.First, NHS facilities are not negative pressure chambers. Doctors and nurses are likely to be infected in these out-of-date facilities. See the discussion of these in George Tait Edwards's answer to What does it mean to "shelter in place" during the coronavirus pandemic? and see Robin Daverman's answer to How can China build a 1,000 bed hospital in 10 days (BBC News) whereas in the UK it takes years?Second, these British hospital wards have been set up to be centres of infection. Medical staff and visitors are very likely to be infected. There are almost no negative pressure chambers in these existing facilities, so cures are unlikely and infections can and will spread explosively.Third, the numbers of British COVID-19 infected is likely to climb from the under-reported 2,625 to about 12,240,000. How these are going to fit into 30,000 beds is not clear. That growth by a factor of about 466 in the number of British infected is likely to take two to three years. Yesterday according to a report in “The Waugh Zone” Boris Johnson suggested a timescale for the defeat of the coronavirus as twelve weeks. That report comments:“In his effort to offer some reassurance that the disruption would not be endless, Johnson also came up with that first ever estimate of a timeline. He wanted to say something “about how I see the timescale of this campaign”. “I do think, looking at it all, that we can turn the tide within the next 12 weeks and I’m absolutely confident that we can send coronavirus packing in this country.”‌”The jocular tone of sending a deadly virus ‘packing’ (just imagine if he’d used that phrase about AIDS in the 1980s?) was one thing. But what immediately rang alarm bells was that repeated use of the word ‘I’. Was the PM suddenly qualified to make this huge assessment on his own? Why weren’t the chief medical officer and chief scientific adviser the ones to make such a major announcement?”Neither man supported BoJo’s timescale claim and their silence was deafening.The duration of the British COVID-19 corona virus crisis is likely to take two to three years, or about eight to twelve times longer than Boris Johnson’s/BoJo’s hopeful estimate of twelve weeks. BoJo’s behaviour in claiming he can hold back the waves of the corona virus recalls the alleged behaviour of a previous English King. BoJo is behaving like a bit of a King Cnut, and no, that’s not a misprint.7 Actions “Abroad” in Mainland EuropeFrance has ordered citizens to stay at home except for essential reasons, mirroring the “Total Lockdown” measures against the new coronavirus already taken in neighbouring Italy. See : https://bit.ly/2nobVgF Nine News.Above: One beautiful deserted Italian street affected by the totaI Italian lockdown.Portugal has also began a programme of total lockdown.All three of these European countries are receiving Chinese advice through the usual UN/WHO supportive diplomatic channels8 Conclusions8.1 Boris Trump’s Jocular Attitude: When the one-year shorter British life expectancy produced by Austerity and NHS cuts was pointed out to Boris Trump in the House of Commons, he said he was going to fix that with a jocular smile. Even the reference to excellent report by Michael Marmot on the linkage between the Conservative policies of Austerity and NHS underfunding in producing an over one-year reduction in UK lifespan was not acknowledged by BoJo but the smile persisted.BoJo’s most recent TV performances involve no smiling. The magnitude of the challenge he is facing is now reflected on his face. His policies cannot work, only the adoption of a policy of Chinese lockdown will shorten the duration and reduce the number of deaths and the extent of economic collapse. At some level of BoJo’s inadequate mind, this seems to have been realised.8.2 There is another similarity between Boris Johnson and his friend across the Atlantic pond, Donald Trump: Both men are utter failures to grasp the enormous scale and the death-dealing nature and economic collapse inherent in the COVID-19 coronavirus. In both countries the inept policy of home isolation, summed up by an American broadcaster as ”Go home and infect your family” has been added to by the advice “our driven-by-profit health service/the NHS does not have adequate facilities to treat you or cure you, so stay home and die.” Both men are towering giants of political, social and economic incompetence, who are producing the death of hundreds of thousands of British people and millions of American dead due to their ineptitude. Their places in history as the worst possible leaders in a time of crisis is assured, as the greatest incompetents among a swathe of leaders where such behaviour is not unknown.8.3 None of Sir Patrick Vallance’s advice is relevant, useful or supported by factual evidence. As is usual in such highly-placed advisors, this is a massive tragedy for other people.8.4 The in-progress current and future economic decline of the USA is an all-American Trump production and Trump’s attempt to blame China for his incompetence in office does not affect the appalling US reality of the helplessness of the highly expensive but largely useless US not-universal “Health Service” to act adequately in the face of the corona virus. SeeGeorge Tait Edwards's answer to What is the economic effect of COVID-19 on the economies of the USA, the UK and the EU where a Diamond Princess policy of home isolation has been adopted?8.5 Even the American and UK and all the EU economies will ultimately be led by someone who recognises that only a Chinese policy of total lock down can quickly and effectively end the corona virus. There can be no hope of Trump, Boris Johnson or many current EU leaders making that essential policy change. But Iran, France, Spain and Portugal are leading that way with UN/WHO arranged Chinese help and the early defeat of the coronavirus in these countries will demonstrate the best way to progress.Meanwhile in the post-Spengler nations of the USA and UK, idiotic leadership continues to have its day.

You don't want to meet a MG 42 on the battlefield. This was a fearsome and deadly weapon in the hands of a fearsome army of professionals.Copyright, 2014, Nigel Askey 1 1/07/2014http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/blog/http://www.operationbarbarossa.net/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Equal-Inf-Sqds.pdfAll Infantry Squads are not Created EqualThe Effect of Squad Automatics on an Infantry Squad’s Overall FirepowerIt is still sometimes stated that the German army had better equipment (especially tanks and artillery) than the enemy armies it faced, particularly in the early years of WWII. In regards to most weapons (especially tanks and artillery) this statement is simply not true. However, in regard to light and medium machine guns it is true, and this situation remained essentially unchanged for the duration of the war. Ironically many German weapons are often touted as being potential war winners, or at least far ahead of anything fielded by the Western Allies or the USSR in WWII. These weapons include the famous (or infamous) King Tiger tanks, the V2 rocket, the type XXI U-boat and the Me 262 jet fighter-bomber. In the rush to marvel at these weapons, most historians have overlooked a weapon which inflicted far more casualties on the Wehrmacht’s enemies than all the so called ‘wonder weapons’ combined, and which took the Allies until the 1950s to produce a comparable weapon. This was the MG 34 machine gun, followed by the even more lethal MG 42 machine gun.The standard German machine gun in 1941 was the 7.92mm MG 34. The MG 34 was the world’s firstGeneral Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG), a term that is standard in today’s armies but was unknown in 1939. The MG 34 was the first true GPMG because it was used as the standard infantry squad automatic (on a bipod) as well as the platoon or company’s MMG-HMGs (on a tripod). It even had a respectable anti-aircraft (AA) capability due to its very high rate of fire (900 rounds per minute), accuracy and ammunition feed. The origins of the MG 34 go back to 1930 when the Swiss company of Solothurn produced a MG called the MG 30 which they offered to the German Army.1 The MG 30 was a very advanced design and was probably the first ‘straight line’ MG design.It incorporated a butt in prolongation with the barrel axis and an ingenious quick change barrel design, both features of the MG 34. However the German Army was not impressed with the weapon and asked Mauserwerke (Mauser) to improve on its design. Mauserwerke jettisoned the side feeding box magazine and designed a new belt feed mechanism which could also take the saddle drum magazine used on the MG 15. The bolt locking system, the recoil system, and the barrel changing system were also all redesigned.The resultant MG34 was immediately accepted by the German Army for two main reasons: it was technically the finest weapon in its class in the world, and more importantly it fit in with the German Army’s infantry squad tactics which had been continually developed during and after WWI.The most far reaching impact of the MG 34 was tactical rather than mechanical. To understand this very important fact, we need to digress slightly and examine in simple terms how infantry squads worked in combat during this period. The infantry squad was essentially the smallest self-contained manoeuvre unit on the battlefield. It was capable of independent action and had both the structure and morale to be sent into action unsupported.The typical infantry squad of 8-12 men and could be separated into four functional parts. These were: command section (the squad leader), communication section (radio if available, which they weren’t in the Red Army), heavy weapons section (LMGs, automatic rifles, heavy AT weapons) and assault section (rifles, SMGs, grenades, flamethrowers, light AT weapons). The assault section (also often called the rifle section) was usually the largest section in the squad, with the ‘command’ and ‘communication’ sections also part of this group when the situation required. In general terms the infantry squad operated as follows. In offensive situations the heavy weapons section was expected to cover and suppress the enemy’s firepower, enabling the assault section to close and neutralise the enemy position.In defence the heavy weapons section was expected to provide the bulk of the firepower needed to eliminate the enemy attack, with the assault section protecting the flanks of the main fulfil these requirements, the ideal squad MG had to be: light enough to be carried forward by one man to directly support an attack, able to be brought into action within less than a minute, easily concealed, operated by one or two men at most, have adequate firepower (rate of fire, ammunition feed and accuracy) to suppress and inflict damage on the enemy defences, and be able to maintain a sustained fire for a long period (i.e. have adequate barrel cooling and be reliable).Like many technical specifications, the squad MG was a trade-off between conflicting requirements. Traditionally in MG design, ‘adequate firepower’, ‘cooling’ and ‘sustained fire’ meant belt fed ammunition and some form of assisted cooling such as water. These in turn meant the weapon was very heavy (far too heavy to be carried forward), difficult to conceal and slow into action. In addition, the voracious appetite for ammunition of automatic weapons meant the squad MG required an ammunition system which other members of the squad could support; specifically they could carry some of the required ammunition forward in support of the MG team.The result was that every other army (except the German Army) opted for air cooled and magazine fed designs, which collectively became known as light machine guns (LMGs). It was felt that the LMG could still provide adequate firepower to ‘do the job’ and there was essentially no choice anyway. It was simply impractical to have anything but air cooled barrels and it was felt that having squad members festooned with ammunition belts was unworkable. Separate ammunition magazines (with 20-30 rounds each) could be carried by all squad members, and the resultant limitations on fire rate, coupled with a LMG designed to fire 400-600 rounds per minute, meant the cooling problem could be managed. The US army didn’t even opt for the LMG as the standard squad automatic in the interwar years. Instead they opted for the Browning automatic rifle (BAR) M1918A2.This was essentially a heavy automatic rifle with a bottom loading 20 round magazine (which is inconvenient to change in action) and an extremely violent action. At 10kg in weight, the BAR was as heavy as contemporary LMGs without the flexibility and firepower advantages of most current LMGs. Amazingly, the BAR remained the US army’s squad light automatic until after WWII.Unfortunately for the rest of the world, the LMG compromise did not satisfy the German Army’s tactical combat requirements in the interwar years. Ever since the development of ‘shock troop tactics’ by the German Army in WWI, the Germans (along with some other armies) had struggled to find a MG which could meet all the demands required of a modern squad MG.2 They decided to pursue the concept of the General Purpose Machine Gun (GPMG); a weapon capable of meeting the demands of the squad LMG and also powerful enough to equip the heavy MG platoons and companies. Firstly, they ignored the idea that having squad members festooned with ammunition belts was unworkable.As it turned out this was true, and I am often amused to see modern day infantry squads with belt ammunition draped over their shoulders on newsreels and photos! Secondly, the problem of cooling was solved by using a perforated air cooled barrel and more importantly, an ingenious and very rapid barrel changing system. Barrel changing was simplified by hinging the gun body to the rear end of the barrel casing; unlatching allowed the gun body to be swung sideways and the barrel pulled straight out of its bearings. In action, a good crew could change the barrel in 5-10 seconds! Finally, the Germans kept the MG 34 light enough to be carried and brought into action by one man. With a bipod attached to the barrel (standard in LMGs) the MG 34 weighed 12.2 kg.This is only marginally heavier than the outstanding British Bren LMG at 10.1 kg, the Red Army’s DP 1928 LMG at 9.3 kg, and the US Army’s BAR at 10 kg.3If the MG 34 was required to fulfil the role of MMG (Medium MG) or even HMG (Heavy MG), it was fitted to a small tripod (weighing 6.75 kg) or more commonly a large tripod (weighing 23.6 kg).The large tripod incorporated a sprung cradle to reduce the recoil and vibration, and the facility for telescopic gun sights and remote firing capability on a fixed arc. On the large tripod, the MG 34 was effective out to 2 500-3 000 metres. Coupled with the much higher rate of fire, this meant that the MG 34 also outperformed most contemporary WWII HMGs. The only real weakness of the MG 34 was that it was too good! The quality of design and workmanship meant long and precise manufacturing processes, and the weapon was very expensive for a squad weapon. As WWII progressed MG 34 production could not match demand.This led directly to the even more formidable, cheaper and easier to manufacture MG 42. The MG42 is considered by many experts to be one of the finest MGs ever made and matched by few rivals even today. The post-war US M60 LMG and British L7A1 GPMG unashamedly copied the best features of the MG 42. When the German Bundeswehr was reconstituted in the 1950s they considered the MG 42 better than anything then on offer! The result was the MG 42 was placed back into production by Rheinmetall (in 7.62 NATO calibre) as the MG 1, and later the MG 3. Considering all the above it is not unreasonable to ask; was the German Army’s advantage in GPMGs significant in the overall scheme of a modern war like the Eastern Front during WWII? Applying the methodology detailed in Part II (The Structure of the 1941 Soviet and Axis Resource Database) to the various MGs from WWII enables us to gain an insight into this question.Table Ger Res Database 1 reveals that the MG 34 in LMG mode had an OCPC (Overall Combat Power Coefficient) value of 8.56, while in the HMG mode the OCPC was 11.96. The corresponding tables from the Soviet FILARM model reveal the DP 1928 (squad LMG) had an OCPC value of 5.37, while the comparatively heavy and cumbersome Maxim 1910 MMG had an OCPC value of 8.63. This means that on average German infantry squads had around 1.6 times more direct irepower than the best equipped Soviet rifle squads.It also means that a German infantry squad had similar firepower to an enemy MMG, and was able to rapidly move this firepower forward to immediately support any attack or defence. This is before we even consider factors such as:•Around half the rifle squads fielded by the Red Army in 1941 had no LMG at all (due to shortages of LMGs relative to the massive mobilisation programme).•German infantry squads were also better equipped in other areas, particularly in terms of numbers and types of available hand and rifle grenades.•German motorised infantry squads (Schuetzen) operating with panzer and motorised divisions had 2 MG 34 GPMGs per squad; giving these troops exceptional firepower.When one considers that there were tens of thousands of infantry and rifle squads fighting each other every day during Operation Barbarossa, the German advantage in GPMGs in every squad becomes very significant in terms of affecting the overall course of the war. It also goes some way to explain the difference in casualty rates sustained by the respective sides at the tactical level. There is little doubt that the MG 34 was the finest weapon of its generation. It remained unmatched by any equivalent Allied or Soviet weapon in WWII and was only superseded by the MG 42.The impact of the MG 34 GPMG on infantry combat in WWII, and the advantage it bestowed upon German infantry at the tactical level, is difficult to overstate. Interestingly, the superior firepower of the MG34 (and the later MG 42) is very carefully simulated in most tactical or tactical-operational level military simulations today. However for some mysterious reason this same superiority is ignored (or at least totally underestimated) in most current operational level simulations of WWII battles and campaigns.In many of these simulations, both side’s infantry squads are treated as generic units with similar combat attributes. This is a mistake and will severely diminish the simulation’s value.If there are two things the reader should take away from this discussion on GPMGs, it is that all infantry and rifle squads are not equal, and that the impact of having tens of thousands of superiorly armed squads is very significant in any military campaign.Motorised Infantry Squads (Schuetzen) (aka Panzergrenadiere)In the period 1939-41, the German schuetzen or motorised infantry squads were the forerunners of the more famously titled panzergrenadiers. It wasn’t until 1942 that the schuetzen regiments in the panzer divisions were renamed panzergrenadier regiments in recognition of their ‘elite’ status. During Operation Barbarossa they were still most commonly referred to as motorised infantry.The schuetzen or motorised infantry regiments formed the infantry support element of German panzer and motorised divisions, which in turn formed the spearhead of any panzer or motorised corps. As such, German motorised infantry squads were better trained and more heavily armed than normal infantry squads. If mounted in trucks, the motorised infantry squad had an additional MG34 LMG available for increased firepower.The trucks enabled the much heavier ammunition load required for two MG34s to be readily carried. If mounted in the Sd Kfz 251 armoured halftrack, the motorised infantry squad became a true ‘armoured infantry squad’. In this mode the entire 10 man squad was carried in the Sd Kfz 251 and usually possessed two MG 34 MGs (including one with heavy tripod mount), eight Kar 98K rifles and two MP 38/30 SMGs.5 One of the MG 34s could also be mounted on a special long range mount on the front of the Sd Kfz 251.In this configuration one of the squad’s MGs effectively became a mobile supporting HMG with an armoured shield, which supported the squad when it dismounted from the Sd Kfz 251 and went into action. The Sd Kfz 251 represented the world’s first true APC (armoured personnel carrier) and in 1940-41 the Sd Kfz 251-infantry combination represented the only modern armoured infantry force in the world. It wasn’t until the US started mass producing the M3 armoured halftrack, and giving them to the UK and USSR in large numbers, that the rest of the world caught.In order to simulate the German motorised and armoured infantry squads in the Barbarossa simulation, the four main components required are separated in the Barbarossa simulation’s resource database. Thus (in the TOE of panzer and motorised divisions) the complete motorised infantry squad will include a ‘Heavy Rifle Squad’, an additional ‘LMG’ and a ‘truck’. Similarly, the complete armoured infantry squad will include a ‘Heavy Rifle Squad’, an additional ‘LMG’ and a ‘Sd Kfz 251 APC’. In the latter case the Sd Kfz 251 is treated as an armoured fighting vehicle (AFV) with a MG34 as its main weapon.Combat Engineer Squads (Pioniere)The second German squad type that needs special mention here is the pionier or combat engineer squad (listed as an ‘Eng Sqd’ in the tables above). To a large extent this unit was even more dangerous than the motorised infantry squad. The more commonly used term for this type of unit in other armies is ‘sappers’ or ‘army-engineers’. However, in western armies and the Red Army in 1941, the terms sappers or army-engineers doesn’t adequately encompass the full idea behind the German pionier squad. This is because German pionierunits were relatively elite troops who were especially trained and equipped for close assault and close combat. They were trained and equipped for combat to a much higher degree than their British, US or Red Army counterparts.As such, pionier troops were extremely dangerous troops to face, especially where the defender was forced to defend fixed positions. It is likely that the German pionier units in WWII owe their combat oriented pedigree to the development of stosstrupptakik (shock troop tactics) by the German Army in WWI. The German stosstrupptakik essentially involved the use of heavily armed troops attacking in small groups, and using infiltration tactics and close assault to destroy the enemy position. In the case of WWII pionier troops, ‘heavily armed’ includes MG34 GPMGs, MP38/40 SMGs, lots of grenades and grenade bundles, flame throwers, satchel charges, hollow charge explosives and various types of mines (refer below).In addition, the pionier battalions were designed to fulfil the more traditional battlefield engineer roles more commonly associated with sappers or army engineer units. The first noticeable thing about the pionier squad is that it contained an MG34 GPMG and MG section. If the unit’s prime role was battlefield construction etc this would have been a complete waste of resources. However in the German pionier squad it was needed to provide covering fire while the squad moved forward in combat. A similar analysis of weapons such as flame throwers and anti-tank (AT) rifles reveals that German pioniers normally had three flamethrower sections and three AT sections per pioniercompany (nine flamethrower and nine AT sections per battalion).6This means pionier squads had dedicated flamethrower teams (or sections) and AT rifles immediately on call if required. By way of comparison, the Red Army and all the German allied armies involved in Operation Barbarossa (the Finnish, Slovakian, Hungarian, Rumanian and Italian armies) had engineer squads without an integrated MG section. Similarly, contemporary western army’s sapper squads needed heavy MG support from additional units if they were going to be used as close assault troops. In similar fashion, support from flame throwers was provided by separate flame thrower squads (eg in the Red Army’s 5th April 1941 TOE Rifle Division).In 1941 the AT rifle used by pioniertroops was usually the Panzerbuchse 39 (covered in the nextsection). The flame throwers most commonly used were the Flammenwerfer 35 or Flammenwerfer 40. The Flammenwerfer 35 weighed 37 kg when filled and could project a flame 25 to 30 metres. Up to 35 bursts of flame (each of approximately 4-5 seconds) could be achieved with one filling. The lighter and easier to handle Flammenwerfer 40 (introduced in 1941) weighed 22 kg when filled.It could project a flame 20 to 25 metres and approximately 12 bursts of flame could be achieved with one filling.7With their training in infiltration tactics and close assault, and a formidable array of available weapons, the German pionier squads had an Overall Combat Power Coefficient (OCPC) comparable to, or higher than, any infantry type squad in the world in 1941.In fact, when the Germans were struggling to deal with the T-34 and KV tanks in 1941, the use of pioniersquads in close assault became one of the preferred methods to destroy them. For many German infantry divisions equipped with only light 37mm AT guns in 1941, pioniersquads and precious medium to heavy artillery were the only really effective means of dealing with T34 and KV tanks. In order to simulate the additional flamethrowers, mines and assault charges available to pioniersquads in the German FILARM model, the WCPC (Weapon Combat Power Coefficient) value of Eng Sqds is increased by 40%.This is shown by the higher WCPC value for Eng Sqds in table Ger Res Database 1. The high WCPC value also results in a high Overall Combat Power Coefficient (OCPC) value; despite the fact that pioniersquads had a lower Tactical Responsiveness Factor (TRF) and a lower Concealment and Protection Factor (CPF) than comparable pure infantry squads.

Yes.How BBC man scooped invasion newsWalk down London's Portland Place, heading south from Regent's Park towards Regent Street,and you come to a kink in the wide road.Immediately ahead of you is the plush Langham Hotel, very expensive and also one of the most haunted buildings in London.To your left, BBC Radio's headquarters at Broadcasting House. This busy location, on the northern edge of London's West End, was the focus of the way the story of the Falklands invasion unfolded exactly 25 years ago.Back in 1982 I was a BBC journalist and also an amateur radio operator - I still am. That means I have a call-sign - G3UML - and some expertise in long-distance short-wave communications.At the very end of March, 1982, I was working on the Golan Heights, hearing on the BBC World Service a bizarre story about Argentine scrap metal merchants taking over the British dependency of South Georgia.Invasion claimI returned to London on the morning on 2 April, and went into Broadcasting House to work on a documentary. I was met by scenes of near panic in the radio newsroom.The Argentines were claiming to have invaded and taken over the Falkland Islands, the 2,000-strong British colony off the south-eastern tip of South America.Argentine soldiers took control after a few hours' resistanceThe newsroom had Argentine claims, but nothing else apart from a laconic message from the Cable and Wireless station on the Falklands - "we have a lot of new friends".At that time the Langham Hotel was a dreary BBC office block and, in a dusty, junk-filled attic room - number 701 - the BBC's own amateur radio club had a shortwave transceiver. With a big aerial on the roof, it worked pretty well.My senior editors wondered if there was any way I could contact the Falklands through amateur radio. Nothing else was working. It seemed a possibility. The remote nature of the islands meant that radio was important, and for the small population there were a lot of radio amateurs down there.'A true scoop'So I took up a vigil in room 701, listening carefully across the 14, 21 and 28 megahertz bands for anything from VP8 - the international call-sign prefix for the islands.And about six hours later, I struck gold. On 21.205 megahertz at 1600 London time, that rather distinctive accent, a bit West Country - a Falkland Islander.And what a story he had to tell - a true scoop, an exclusive of the greatest magnitude.The voice was that of Bob McLeod, and he lived in the settlement of Goose Green on East Falkland. His call-sign, I realised, was VP8LP but he was anxious that it shouldn't be used. I have much of what he said that day recorded on an old-fashioned audio cassette."We have now been taken over. The British government still denies it but they have no contact I believe with the Falklands, and this is probably why they are still denying it."But we have been taken over. There is an aircraft carrier and I believe four other boats - I don't have the details on them - but they do have heavy armoured vehicles in Stanley, details I don't know, and quite a number of personnel."They landed approx 0930 GMT this morning in landing craft and stormed the capital Port Stanley and have taken over the government office, they landed with heavy armoured vehicles."We're now under their control. They are broadcasting that all local people will be treated as normal. Fairly peaceful in Stanley at present time."Foreign Office callThe Argentines had still to reach Goose Green and so Bob was able to transmit his bombshell.He was getting information from local radio, which broadcast a commentary as the invasion developed early that morning, and then carried on, under Argentine control, transmitting messages of reassurance. The islands' VHF radio network was also buzzing with the story as it developed.The resulting conflict cost hundreds of livesBy then my dusty attic was busy with BBC TV crews and newspaper people who'd been told it might be a good place to be.I went onto the Radio 4 PM programme at 1700 London time with an account of what I'd been told. A few minutes later I was rung by the Foreign Office, who understood I'd been in touch with the Falklands and wondered what they were saying. I gave them a bit more of Bob."Damage we don't know, shooting around a very rough guess approx two hours. Three deaths of Argentineans [sic] in the Falklands, one believed to be very senior."The English marines and local defence forces - we have no information. Took over Government House, and then taken over all of Port Stanley. And I believe they shot up the Cable and Wireless transmitting station."Helicopters flying around Stanley. 500 personnel in Stanley, and aircraft carrier believed to be carrying 1,500. Flying Hercules aircraft, one has come in."It clearly made an impression. Within an hour the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, was on his feet in the House of Lords confirming a massive British humiliation.ICQPodcasts Chris Howard (M0TCH) speaks to BBC New Reporter Laurie Margolis (G3UML) about breaking the news of the 1982 Falklands Invasion using Amateur RadioFalklands War | WikiwandWord of the invasion first reached the UK from Argentine sources.A Ministry of Defenceoperative in London had a short telex conversation with Governor Hunt's telex operator, who confirmed that Argentines were on the island and in control.Later that day, BBC journalist Laurie Margolis spoke with an islander at Goose Green via amateur radio, who confirmed the presence of a large Argentine fleet and that Argentine forces had taken control of the island.British military operations in the Falklands War were given the codename Operation Corporate, and the commander of the task force was Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse. Operations lasted from 1 April 1982 to 20 June 1982Press Conference at the UNQuestionFrom what you have said so far I have the impression that the UK intends to stay in the Malvinas Islands and probably to build there a base. My question is this: Do you believe, really believe that after the courageous and highly effective fight of the Argentinians against the combined military power of the United States of America and Great Britain and after the treacherous destruction of the General Belgrano outside the 200-mile war zone, Argentina could possibly give away to your country, or to any other country, an integral part of its national territory, namely the Malvinas Islands and its dependencies?The Prime MinisterWell of course it is not an integral part of the Argentine's territory and never has been. I might just give one or two analogies. Trinidad and Tobago are a lot nearer to Venezuela than the Falklands are to the Argentine. Cuba is nearer to the United States than the Falklands are to the Argentine. The Canary Islands are nearer to Morocco than they are to Spain. The Falkland Islands have never been an integral part of the Argentine. [end p15] There are people on the Falkland Islands, some of them have been there for seven generations, far longer than some of the people from Spain and Italy have been in the Argentine. The same reasons which those from Spain and Italy lay claim to the Argentine are the self-same reasons why some of the British who were there before them on the Falklands lay claim to the Falklands. What we are after is self-determination of the population of the Falkland Islands, only some thirty are from Argentine and they have not been there for long, only in pursuit of the 1971 Communications Agreement. So the supposition, that the Falkland Islands are a long way away from the Argentine or part of the Argentine, is wrong. We therefore look at it as the will of the people there. That is what matters in a democracy. And may I just again point out there was peace between Britain and the Falklands and the Argentines. We did not break that peace. It was broken by an invasion by force against us. We tried a resolution here. We tried negotiation so that the Argentine would leave the Islands and that we would not in fact have further hostilities. The Argentines did not withdraw. Not the combined force of the United Kingdom and the United States. They were only our people sent 8,000 miles away to recover our possessions. Certainly we had some help in what is called material support, for which we are profoundly grateful, from the United States. But we had to fight a battle bobbing around on ships on the ocean 8,000 miles away because our people could look to no one but Britain for their defence. But I hope I have made it clear, there are many, many islands in the world who would tremble for their future if the view that was taken was because the nearest coast—the nearest territory—was another country—would tremble if that adjacent country demanded [end p16] that that territory belonged to them. And many of them are now members of the United Nations, brought to independence by us.