A Study Into Communication Services And Infrastructure Across The: Fill & Download for Free

You’ve hit upon the question I spend most of my time thinking about.As an economist, I spend much of my waking hours musing about how my discipline can be used for the betterment of humankind. Regional disparities within my own country are top of the list of problems I’d like to solve.Economists tend to think markets provide the answers. If something’s not working, their eye is drawn to why the market isn’t delivering and what can be done to help it along. Large regional inequalities arise from lack of investment, which itself can result from a lack of skill (of the right sort), lack of infrastructure, unhelpful taxes and regulations, and so on. Economists tend to believe in things like workers’ rights, but if badly drafted regulation guarantees a cushy life for the few but misery and deprivation for the many, they’re all ears.First, a bit of personal context. I’m South East England born and bred. Born in Surrey, moved to Sussex after 8 years and now live in Berkshire. Professionally, I’ve always been part of the London economy (except for the two years I lived in Hong Kong 2009–2011). I don’t live in London but all the places I’ve lived are satellites in orbit around our global megacity, part of its economy and subject to its gravitational forces.The pace of life is reasonably fast where I am. People are quite affluent with a plentiful supply of good jobs in the region’s booming technology economy. There’s spring in their step, a purpose to their stride and a light in their eyes. You get the impression that people know why they’re here on planet earth and are setting about their life with a sense of purpose.I spend a lot of my time in other parts. I’m married to a woman from Northern England (South Yorkshire) and my daughter studies in the North East (Durham University). I venture up North quite a lot. Last year I took my son to visit various Northern universities and we spent some time in Manchester.The economic condition of the North troubles me. It is not poor by any absolute global standards, but much of it strikes me as sad, slow and ramshackle. Many of the people seem unhealthy. Overweight adults and children eating chips in the street, hanging around the betting shops in post-industrial town centres, are a common sight.Manchester city centre is characterful, smart and stylish but 10 minutes’ drive can take you to parts that appear altogether different. Slum-like is hardly an exaggeration.Dewsbury, West Yorkshire, became famous a few years ago for a scandal involving a faked kidnapping. A BBC docu-drama painted an impression of a community of inter-generational unemployment, unstable relationships with women having children from different fathers (one next door, another across the road), and fathers spending any spare cash on gambling, alcohol and tobacco, sitting in front of their Playstation all day, can of Special Brew perched precariously on the sofa.England is not a big country. Some of the places I referenced above are only 150 miles apart. Durham is a 250 mile drive from Reading. You can drive there and back on a tank of fuel.What is the divide all about? It is economic but it is much more than that. The regions in our country are divided not only by affluence but much more fundamentally, they are divided by hope. London and the South East has been a boom economy for about 40 years and enjoys global leadership in many sectors (mostly services), such as finance, communications, media, technology and indeed, financial technology. How must it feel to an inter-generationally unemployed family casting their eye, a mere 100–200 miles south? The bitterness and resentment is all too understandable.What’s going on and what can we do to solve these problems? The issues are about as old as I am. They had their roots in the 1970s and the chickens came to roost in the 1980s. Global and technological shifts ripped the Northern economy’s heart out and it’s never been replaced.Coal mining was replaced by cheaper and cleaner energy technologies. Textiles and ship building all migrated to Asia and will never come back. Only vehicle manufacturing has made any meaningful return.The issues are deep-rooted and there is no single solution. However, here are a few ideas that could be explored, some of which I offer as follows.Transport and infrastructure. The South East is rich because it is basically part of the London economy and connected to it with extensive infrastructure. But the London economy’s geographic reach fizzles out somewhere in the South Midlands.So let’s expand it. Bring other parts within its orbit. If, wherever you are in England, you can get to London and back quickly, you’ve expanded the sphere of its gravitational influence. Invest in road and rail links, specifically to make getting to and from London, faster. Invest as an exercise in regional policy, even when the economic case doesn’t add up.Housing. Huge parts of the metropolitan North, despite land and property being relatively cheap, are simply unfit for human habitation. The quality of the housing is appalling. Is it any wonder people living there have no hope? This sounds a bit Orwellian and care must clearly be taken, but… it needs to be knocked down.Government housing policy should have an explicit objective to improve the quality of housing in the North. Some imaginative deals can probably be done here: the government can offer postcode-by-postcode franchises to the private sector. It can invite bids to:build new, modern, good quality housing sufficient to accommodate all current residents in a given postcodemove existing residentsknock down existing housing (and good riddance!)redevelop it and the surrounding infrastructure. (If you’ve done all the above, the land you’ve recovered is yours to redevelop and sell for whatever price you want)The housing policies should not be focused solely on the North. It should also aim to increase supply and reduce prices in the South. The resentment at Southern affluence is fuelled by the fact that if you’re not from the area, you’re frozen out because of the high price of property. Making the UK one big jobs market would reduce inter-regional enmities by improving mobility between them.Training and skills. The UK as a whole has very low unemployment, and employment is growing all the time. That’s great. The trouble is, not all of them are good jobs. Many are low skill/low pay.So let’s invest in training in vocational skills, particularly in the North. No rocket science here. Part of our program to transform our country’s economy involves radically updating our housing stock and for that, we need builders. So let’s invest in training people and start now. High skill, decent pay. Good, manual work for people who can’t stand the idea of sitting in a poncy office.Regional policy. One intriguing idea that’s been doing the rounds is to use the UK’s exit from the EU as an opportunity to set up a series of free economic zones around Britain’s northern ports. These are allowed within WTO rules, for regions with special economic interests.This could be used as part of a drive to turn Britain into the product-assembly capital of Europe. Free economic zones are a customs no-man’s-land. Goods enter and exit free of tariffs and other restrictions. Large assembly plants for everything from consumer goods to industrial machinery, dotted around our Northern coastlines near the Tyne, Tees, Humber and Mersey would provide semi-skilled, moderately well-paying manual work.A related thing that’s a bit controversial: Northern England has massive shale energy reserves. Technology has moved to the point that it can be extracted economically. It’s cleaner than coal and, combined with a development of Britain’s already world-leading expertise in carbon capture and storage, could be part of a drive towards full energy independence.Politics. Our politics is hopelessly centralised. The cultural identity of our regions is not reflected in our politics. Following the UK’s exit from the European Union, we must have a fundamental rethink of how politics is done in this country. One of the benefits of our unwritten constitution is that — in theory at least — it allows flexibility. We should use that to our advantage.In addition to rethinking the role of the upper house, we should also think hard about how to devolve power to the regions, to give them more control over their destiny and empower them to develop their own solutions to their own problems. The objective here is to give people more of a sense of involvement in their own outcomes and to break the vicious cycle of disempowerment breeding disengagement and disillusion.Scotland. I’ve answered this mainly about England, simply because I know it better. But the same sort of thinking set out above may also apply to Scotland. In Edinburgh and Glasgow, it has two commercial centres of international standing.Transport and infrastructure investment can bring a greater proportion of the country within their orbit. Far-Northern English cities like Newcastle-upon-Tyne and Carlisle can also be brought within the orbit of those two great Scottish cities. Today, the infrastructure linking Northern England with Scotland, is crap. It seems (to me) much better once you cross the border, but much more could be done to integrate the Northern English and Scottish economies.I could go on forever here but this is a Quora answer, not a book. I am convinced that this time of great upheaval in our political-economy, now is the time for a reboot.There’s a country out there, desperate for old ways to be refreshed. The time is ripe for some genuinely ambitious and imaginative thinking on how to remodel our nation as a whole, its global role, its economy, its society and in particular, its regions.I’m convinced that the last part is the most important. With such massive disparities, not necessarily of outcome but opportunity, we will never be a happy or harmonious society. Now is the time for a big, bold offer, for national renewal.Thanks for A2A Michael Burrows

How Israel nearly lost the Yom-Kippur War.We have all heard the expression do not underestimate your enemy, yet that has happened so many times in Military history. Israel’s relatively easy victory over Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq during the 1967 Six Day War led to Israel doing just that, an underestimation that very nearly came close to losing them the Yom Kippur War of 1973.(Egyptian vehicles cross the Suez Canal on the 7th October 1973. The Israelis had boasted that their defensives along the canal were impregnable but the Egyptians broke through the Bar-Lev Line with surprising ease and speed, taking the Israelis completely by surprise. {Public Domain, Soerfm --- Guide only, due to copywrite.})The Israeli victory in the Six Day War was made possible only by overwhelming superiority in air power. Aware of this, Egypt brought in thousands of SAMs (Surface to air missiles) from the Soviet Union and large numbers of T-62 tanks. Although not as sophisticated as their western counterparts the T-62 proved to be a rugged and tough machine and the large numbers destroyed by the Israeli Defense Force was more a reflection of the bad tactics and usage of the Arab forces rather than of the quality of the tank itself. Egypt had also invested in thousands of AT-Sagger wire-guided anti-tank missiles, which were to inflict heavy casualties on the Israeli armour.The Egyptian president Muhammed Anwar El Sadat (25th December 1918 – 6thOctober 1981) was determined that Egypt should inflict a humiliation on the Israelis similar to that suffered by his own country in the Six Day War. To this end he recruited a substantial reserve made up of Civil Defense Volunteers. The Egyptian army was put through a tough training schedule and exercises.The Arab countries came together for the assault on Israel with Egypt providing the largest number of men and machines having 650,000 to 800,000 men with up to 1,700 tanks, 2,400 armoured personnel carriers (APCs) 1,120 guns, 400 and 140 helicopters and 150 Sam batteries. Syria could field 150,000, 1,200 tanks, 800 to 900 armoured personnel carriers and 600 guns, Syria had an Expeditionary force of 100,000, 500 to 670 tanks, and 700 APCs. Other countries gave token forces, these with Cuba with 1,500 to 4,000 troops, Kuwait, 3,000 troops, Morocco, 5,500 troops, 30 tanks and 52 aircraft, North Korea 20 pilots and another 19 non-combat personnel, Saudi Arabia 3,000 troops and Tunisia with 1,000 to 2,000 troops, Iraq and Jordan also sent unspecified numbers. Ranged against this Israel could field 375,000 troops, with 1,700 tanks and 3,000 APCs, 945 guns and 440 aircraft.On Israel’s refusal of Sadat’s peace proposal that would have seen Israel withdrawing from the Sinai, the Egyptian leader declared that he was prepared to sacrifice a million soldiers to regain lost Egyptian territory.The Egyptians studied the layout of the Israeli defenses across the Suez Canal thoroughly and by the time that they launched their attack, they knew the general layout of the Israeli defenses. The Arabs had begun planning for their next war with Israel soon after the end of the 1967 conflict and they revised their plans often over the years. . The Egyptian command were aware of three main problems that they had to overcome. These were, first the defenses of the Bar-Lev line on the canal, second the need to gain surprise and to make sure that the defenses of the Sinai were not fully manned and third was the need to neutralize the powerful Israeli air force and tank forces. Gradually the Egyptians built up their forces.The Syrians were planning for their attack on the Golan Heights; they too had required large numbers of AT-3 Saggers and SAMs but they failed to appreciate how effective small groups of infantry armed with light anti-tank weapons could be in the broken terrain of the Golan Heights. The Egyptians would be attacking through the Sinai and would be taking on Israeli armour on ground that was perfect for armoured operations but the risk was deemed worthwhile, as it would split the IDF forces, forcing them to fight on two fronts. Like the Egyptians, the Syrians were hoping to take the Israelis by surprise. Over a period of several years, they had held regular exercises. The Israelis had noticed these and at first, they had accordingly alerted their forces. In 1971 and 1972, the IDF increased their front line forces in response to Arab mobilization, by December 1972 the Israelis noticed as many as 20 occasions when the Egyptians had called up and then released their reserves. Yet by 1973 the signs of a major Arab attack were obvious but when would it come the Israelis had no idea; when it did come it was on the Jewish festival of Yom Kippur of 1973.The first thing the Egyptians would have to overcome was the formidable Bar-Lev Line; this was a chain of strong points and observation posts linked by trenches and an intensive infrastructure. The Israelis had constructed two roads that ran along the north south axis to the east of the canal. The first of these was known as the artillery road, this hold a series of gun positions called toazims. The road allowed self-propelled guns and towed artillery to move rapidly between firing points. The first units of tanks and half-tracks were also kept on this line, ready to be deployed into specially prepared ramps into a fire position. The second road, 10 km to 30 km (6 to 20 miles respectively) from the first the armoured reserves and allowed supplies to be delivered to combat units.(A section of the Bar-Lev Line. The Israelis constructed this along the east bank of the Suez Canal and boasted that it was impregnable, yet the Egyptians broke through the defenses in several places with surprising ease and with only 208 casualties. {Public Domain, Sherif9282 --- Guide only, due to copywrite})The line was named after the then Israeli Chief of Staff General Haim Bar-Lev (1th November 1924 – 7thMay 1994) one of Israel’s greatest soldiers.Work on the Bar-Lev Line was finished in March 1969 and would give great service to Israel during what became known as the War of Attrition which was fought over the next 15 months. However, in 1973 it proved unequal to the well-planned Egyptian assault. Some people have argued that the construction of the line led the Israelis into a trap of believing that static fortifications and defense was the answer to security, the Bar-Lev Line nearly fell victim to a lack of Israeli intelligence who failed to detect the build up of Egyptian forces. Also the fault was that the Division commander, Major –General Avraham ‘Albert,’ Mandler (3rd May 1929 -13 October 1973) who failed to activate the armoured vehicles which were supposed to give the line its armoured support.The Egyptian attack (codenamed Operation Badr) started with an artillery when at 1400 hours on 6th October, 2000 Egyptian guns backed by numerous heavy mortars and Katyusha multiple rocket launchers and Frog surface-to-surface missile batteries opened fire on the Bar-Lev Line. Tanks climbed into previously prepared positions to engage targets with their cannons. During the first, minute as many as 10,500 landed in and around the Israeli positions. At the same tire than 200 Egyptian aircraft began simultaneous strikes against three air bases, Hawk missiles batteries, three command centres, artillery positions, and radar installations. Under the cover of this bombardment the first wave of assaulting Egyptian infantry moved forward, at the forefront were elite commandos.Egypt was desperate to redeem their honour after their defeat in the 6 Day War; they were prepared for up to 30,000 casualties whilst crossing the Canal, in an effect to reduce casualties they crossed in areas where the Israeli observation points were wildly separated. The Israelis put down a considerable amount of fire that caused some confusion and a few casualties, however most of the Egyptian troops were across the Suez Canal within the first 6 minutes of the start of the Egyptian bombardment.Egyptian troops used flexible ladders to scale the high ramparts of the Israeli defenses, whilst the Commandos surrounded and then neutralized the Israeli strong points of the Bar-Lev Line. Just 12 minutes into the assault the second echelon companies of the attacking battalions left the west bank of the Canal. They were followed 12 minutes later by the battalion’s heavy weapons. Within just three to four hours within the start of the offensive each assaulting battalion had established a beachhead up to 7 km (4 miles) wide and work was underway creating gaps through the sand ramparts big enough to allow tanks through. To the North of the Great Bitter Lakes the Egyptians employed high-pressure hoses (Imported from Britain and East Germany) to wash the sand away. These walls raising 59 foot (18 metres) threatened to be a major obstacle to the Egyptian advance, yet the hoses did the trick, easily creating the gaps needed, however to the south this did not work. Here the ramparts were made of a clay base and the water created a mixture of mud and slurry, which proved to be impassable, so here the Egyptians employed the alternative method, which involved explosives and bulldozers.The Soviets had supplied the Egyptians with large numbers of amphibious and bridge equipment, included with these 50-tonne motorized rafts, each one capable of carrying four main battle tanks or up to 10 lorries with four guns and trailers in tow or up to 16 jeeps. There was also several 96-tonnes motorized rafts, which could carry twice the amount than the 50-tonne rafts. However, the most important equipment at the Egyptians disposal for the crossing was the PMP pontoon bridges which could be put together in the space of half-an-hour and which being built in sections could be rapidly repaired if the bridge should sustain any damage. The Egyptians had planned the operation so thoroughly that they even had a dummy bridge constructed, which was designed to absorb some of the expected Israeli shelling and air strikes.(The attack across the Suez by the Egyptian army stunned the Israelis who were forced to retreat. For a moment, it looked like the Israelis would be driven from the Sinai altogether. The Israelis had previously viewed the Egyptians with little regard but after their amazing success in crossing, the Suez and capturing the Bar-Lev Line Israel would never underestimate Egypt’s military again. The Egyptian soldier proved to be both skilled and brave and was certainly no easy push over. {Pinterest --- Guide only, due to copywrite})All this careful planning proved dividends when within seven to ten hours of the start of the offensive the tanks were crossing followed an hour later by the towed artillery.On the southern front, south of the Great Bitter Lakes down to the Gulf of Suez the attack was made by the Third Army, under the command of Major-General Abd al Muneim Wassel. (Died ?1th? May 2002) The Third Army crossed with the 19th and 7th Infantry Divisions leading with the way and with the 22nd and 25th Armoured Brigades following on the morning of the 7th October, after these came the 4th and 5th Mechanized Divisions. in the North from the Great bitter Lakes up to El Cap from where the canal went northwards to Port Said through an area of difficult marshland., Major General Saad Manourn’s (14th May 1922 – 28th October 2000) Second Army crossed. Leading the way were the 16th, 2nd and 18th Infantry Divisions with the 14th, 24th and 15th Armoured Brigades and the 21st Armoured and 23rd Mechanized Divisions following. Eight bridges were slung over the water and by the evening of the second day the Egyptians had five infantry divisions and 1,000 tanks across the canal.Smaller operations were launched simultaneously with the main campaign; these included an advance eastward along the coastal road from Port Fuad by the 135th Infantry Brigade, which in conjunction with seaborne Commando attacks would assault the Israeli fortifications known as Budapest. Another attack was launched across the Great Bitter Lake when PT-76 Amphibious tanks of the 130thMarine Brigade made their way to the Israeli-held shore. However, this attack failed in its main objective, which was to link up with command-paratroopers whom had been dropped by helicopter in the area of the Mitla and Gidi Passes. On the route the commandos had been attacked by Israeli jets, fourteen of the helicopters were shot down, whilst those forces who managed to land intact were quickly engaged, neutralized, and then rounded up; the Egyptians could not achieve their objective which was to close the passes to Israeli reinforcements.Overall, however the Egyptian crossing met with success, the Egyptian planners had estimated that it would cost them 30,000 casualties crossing the canal but in fact, they had suffered only 208. Everywhere the Israelis were caught off guard and stunned by the Egyptian preparedness and professionalism. General Ahmed Ismail Ali, (14th October 1917 – 26th December 1974) the Egyptian Minister the of War and Major-General Saad el Din Shazil, (1st April 1922 – 10th February 2011) Egyptian Chief of Staff were as surprised as the Israelis about their level of success. Shazil had believed that the Israeli air force would have damaged his bridges so often that few tanks would have been able to cross, to compensate for this he had supplied his infantry divisions with 470 anti-tank weapons, including 314 RPG-7s and 48 portable Sagger ATGWs (Anti-tank weapon) missiles.The Egyptians also met with stunning success in the air, when 200 Egyptian aircraft carried out raids across the Sinai, the airfields at Refidim and Bir Tamada were temporarily put out of action, and a Hawk battery at Ophir was damaged. But it did not all go Egypt’s way on that first day, as the Egyptians lost 18 aircraft. (Egypt admitted to the loss of 5) On one occasion two Israeli F-4E attacked 27 Migs over Sharm el-Sheikh and shot down 7 to 8 of them with no loss within half-an-hour. Among the Egyptian aviator killed was Captain Atif Sadat, half-brother to the Egyptian’s President. Kelt missiles were fired at Israeli targets in the Sinai from 14 Egyptian Tupolev TU-16s. Two more Tu-16s fired a Kelt each at a radar installation one of which was shot down by an Israeli fighter whilst the other fell into the sea. This attack was an attempt to warn Israel that Egypt could retaliate if the Israelis attacked targets deep inside Egypt. Author McGregor claimed that the success of the first strike led to the Egyptians in believing that a second planned strike was not necessary.(A PT-76, these amphibious tanks proved useful to the Egyptians when they stormed across the Suez Canal on the 6th October 1973. The 130th Marine Brigade crossed the Great Bitter Lake in these in a failed attempt to link up with the commando-paratroopers and block the Mitla and Gidi Passes. It was armed with a 76.2 D 56 T rifled gun and a 7.62 mm SGMT co-axial machine-gun. This particular example is in the Israeli Yad-la-Shiryon Museum. {Public domain, Bukvoed --- Guide only, due to copywrite.})The Israelis had indeed been taken completely by surprise. Early in the morning of the 6th October, the IDF (Israeli Defense Force) was alerted to full war status, as it was clear that a major conflict was coming. At 0920 hours, the IDF received orders for full mobilization and a little later Plan Shovach Yonim, the code named for the defense of the Sinai was put into operation. In charge of the Israeli Southern Command was Major-General Shmael Gonen. (1930 – 30th September 1991) His Reaction Force was made up of the 252nd Armoured Division, which consisted of three armoured brigades, under the command of Major-General Avraham Mandler, which could muster 280 tanks however 100 of these tanks were strung out along the Bar-Lev Line. The intention of stringing the tanks out along the line was that they should move forward into prepared firing positions as soon as hostilities began. Once mobilization was under way, Gonen’s were to be reinforced by two reserve armoured divisions, the 143rd under Major-general Ariel Sharon (26th February 1928 – 11th January 2011) and the 162nd under Major-General Avraham (Bren) Adan (5October 1926 – 28th September 2012) but they would not be ready for action as a complete unit until the 8th of October, instead reinforcements were sent into the fighting personnel.Since the creation of the IDF, its fighters and especially those whom had been wounded were not permitted to be allowed to fall into enemy hands alive. Thus when several of the Israeli strongpoints along the Bar-Lev Line became surrounded and their cries for help and for the evacuation of their wounded were heard this brought even more pressure on the Israeli Command to go to their aid.(Two destroyed Israeli M60 Patton tanks. Israel badly underestimated Egyptian and Syrian capabilities in 1973 and this very nearly cost them the Yom Kippur War, IDF casualties in the first few days were alarmingly high. {Public Domain, vicimanno --- Guide only, due to copywrite})From the viewpoint of the Israelis, the story of the 1st few days of the war was one of small numbers of tanks, lacking artillery air support trying to break through to beleaguered strong points and suffering heavy casualties in these attempts that mostly failed. Though a few like the Budapest strong points were eventually relieved after bitter fighting, others were to breakout and others were overrun with the defenders going down fighting, fought like the Quay which had been constructed on a breakwater of Port Tewfik harbour fought heroically for several days before surrendering.Though the Israeli airforce was very active it was unable to slow the Egyptian advance. They did attack and damage some of the bridges over the canal but these were quickly repaired and the flow of Egyptian supplies was hardly slowed.The Golan Heights.At the beginning of 1973 the Israeli Northern Command under Major-General Yitzhak Hofi (25th January 1927 ---) became greatly alarmed by signs of troop movements on the Syrian side of the border on the Golan Heights. Hofi told General Moshe Dayan, (20th May 1915 – 16th October 1981) the Israeli Minister of Defense of his concerns.The Israelis had stationed on the Golan Heights a regular army formation, the 188th(Barak) Armoured Brigade commanded by Colonel Yitzhak-Ben-Shoham, however Hofi was convinced that the huge numbers of Syrian troops and armour would simply swamp a single brigade. Dayan, acting on Hofi’s advice released the 7thArmoured Brigade commanded by Colonel Avigdor Ben-Gal from the reserves and sent it to the Golan Heights. The two brigades could field 170 tanks, mostly Centurions and M-60 Pattons; they were placed under the command of Major-general Rafael Eitan (11th January 1929 -23rd November 2003) who had located his divisional headquarters at Nafekh.Unlike the Sinai, Golan Heights had no natural defensive features, which could be used to slow down a Syrian attack, though the east sloped down providing the defenders of a good view of Syrian movements. The main obstacles the Syrians would have to overcome were the Israeli minefields and a partly flooded anti-tank ditch 16 feet deep (5 metres) which ran along the front of the Israeli lines. Behind the ditch and minefield the Israelis had built 17 fortified posts, each were defended by 20 men and three tanks. The Israelis based their main defensive strength of the Heights on a series of carefully firing ramps for their tanks, which enabled the tanks to engage the Syrians from a hull down position.Like on the Bar-Lev Line the Syrian assault started with a massive artillery bombardment and with numerous air strikes, it was timed to coincide with the Egyptian offensive at 01400 hours on the 6th October. The bombardment lasted 50 minutes, it just so happened that at the very moment of the Syrian attack the Israeli commanders were attending an Orders Group at Nafekh which was itself coming under fire. However, no casualties were inflicted on the commanders and as they rushed to join their units at the front, their radios confirmed that their junior commanders had already activated the contingency plan and that the Pattons and Centurions were already crawling onto the firing ramps.Trained to a very high standard the Israeli tank crews were very quickly in action, training their guns on the gaps in the mine-fields where the armour was now massing, inflicting high losses on them. But the Syrians, just like the Egyptians were well-motivated and just as ready to accept the casualties just so long as it brought them victory. Their assault comprised the 7th, 9th and 5th with the 1st and 3rd reserves divisions, backing them were 188 artillery batteries and 100 aircraft. The forward Syrian brigades bypassed the UN observation posts, covered by mobile anti-aircraft batteries and accompanied by bulldozers to fill in the anti-tank ditch bridge-layers to overcome obstacles and mine clearing vehicles and just the Egyptian attack the Syrian assault was well planned and organised. Once they had got through the minefield the Syrians headed for the anti-tank ditch, they correctly assumed that the Israeli would have turned all the possible crossing points into killing zones. The MTU bridge layers now became priority targets for the Israeli tanks and artillery; one after another, they were hit together with their escorting T-55 and T-62 tanks. All along the Golan Heights, the smoke of burning Syrian armoured vehicles was now spiraling into the sky, however, undaunted the Syrians pressed on. One particular killing ground was the area between Tel Hermonit and ‘Booster,’ Hill, the carnage here was such that even the Israelis called it ‘The Valley of Tears.’ Yet such was the bravery of the assaulting Syrians that on occasion infantry equipped with simple spades succeeded where the bridge layers had failed as they built causeways over the ditch, working under heavy fire with their casualties mounting with every passing minute.At the start of the battle, 3,000 Israeli troops, 180 tanks and 60 artillery pieces squared off against 28,000 Syrian troops 800 and 600 artillery pieces, it was clear that unless the Israelis were reinforced or withdrawn then they would be overrun.The conflict had now become a race against time for both sides; the Israelis knew that if they could not hold long enough for their reserves to arrive then the whole of northern Galilee would be lost. The Syrians knew that the thin line of tanks that confronted them was all the Israelis had standing between them and victory but they also knew that the situation could change if they were unable to brush the resistance aside before the Israeli reserves arrived. By the afternoon, the Israelis received deeply depressing news, the Syrian commandos from the 82nd Commando Battalion had been dropped by helicopter and had captured the important Israeli strong hold on Mount Hermon, which contained a variety of surveillance equipment. An Israeli counter-attack aimed at recapturing the position was halted by a Syrian ambush. Throughout the first days of the battle the Israeli air forces sacrifices were vital in slowing down the Syrian drive, though losses to SAMs and tacked multiple anti-aircraft guns like the ZSU-32-4 ‘Shilka,’ were high.(ZSU-23-4 Shilka in the Israeli Yad-La-Shiryon museum. Both the Egyptians and the Syrians used these machines, they were effective against low flying aircraft and some ground targets. {Public domain, Bukvoed --- guide only, due to copywrite})The Syrian capture of Mount Hermon.The outpost on Mount Hermon was of huge tactical importance for a number of reasons; it could be used as an early warning post and to gather information, as an electronic warfare centre (EW) against ground and air attack and as an artillery spotting post.At the time of the Syrian attack, the Israelis had around sixty men garrisoned at the outpost, at the start of the fighting the fortifications were still under construction and many of the planned trenches had not been dug. However, the Israeli command believed that Mount Hermon was not on an axis of advance and would not therefore be subjected to a major attack.The Syrian commandos of the 82nd battalion under Ahmed Rifal al-Joju had departed Damascus about four Soviet built Mi-8s at 1300 and headed south towards the Israeli outpost of Mount Hermon. At 13.45 hours, an Israeli officer noticed that the Syrians were taking the camouflage netting off their artillery positions and at 15.00 hours, an Israeli team of soldiers on the upper sky lift spotted the helicopters and fired at them until they flew out of sight.The Syrian artillery opened up on the outpost on Mount Hermon at 14.00 hours, then six Syrian Mig-17s attacked the position. Shortly after thee of the helicopters arrived from the west and two of them landed around thirty of their paratroop-commandos on ?2072?, the third helicopter crashed when one of its rotor blades hit the slope, with only three of its cargo of sixteen surviving to join their friends on the upper sky lift.While Joju’s troops took up position, the remaining men of the 82nd Brigade, comprising two companies that had been organized into eight platoons sizes units under the command of Captain Jassal al Salah and Mahmond Ma’alech on front from the Syrian lines.The Syrians engaged an Israeli half-track which carried on driving and then moved on the outpost as the Syrian artillery ceased their fire, they were soon engaged by the defenders with a machine-gun, (There were three located at the post but two were destroyed by artillery), small arms and grenades. The Syrians went to ground and returned fire, killing the machine-gunner, however the weapon was quickly taken over by a sergeant, and he continued to blaze away. The outpost commander, realizing that his men were critically short of ammunition contacted Zvi Barazani, and requested that the artillery should fire on his position. Colonel Barazani ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Aryeh Schwartz of the 334th Battalion to open fire Mount Hermon. Just before the Israeli shelling began Barazani ordered the defenders to shut themselves inside the outpost until the barrage was over and then try to break out on his command. However, due to a misunderstanding the defenders carried on manning their positions. The Syrians now charged into the positions’ outposts and some of the paratroopers managed to penetrate to the upper western opening leading to the top storey. They threw grenades and fired into the workrooms as they battled their way into the complex, they moved forward slowly, hesitantly, calling on the Israelis to surrender in Arabic and Hebrew. A group of Syrians went down the staircase leading down to the central hall and flung grenades into it but they did not enter, here the Syrians may have used a smoke generator but this has not been confirmed. Conditions inside this subterranean warren of tunnels for both sides was horrendous, the hall was now filled with a mixture of smoke and dust in which hand-grenades exploded causing some panic among some of the Israelis, mostly technicians and other non-combatant soldiers. Holding rags soaked in urine to their mouths the Israelis tried to fight back as best they could but it was no good the Syrians could not be stopped; around about this time the garrison lost contact with the outside world. The defenders withdraw deeper into the complex, trying to shelter in the tunnels, but they were forced to leave a few behind, frozen with terror and shock.At 1730, the garrison commander and a handful of soldiers decided to try and breakout through one of the tunnels and reach the upper sky lift but they encountered some Syrians and were forced to withdraw. Most of the men now concentrated in the same tunnel but a few others were scattered about the complex in the darkness. At 1900 hours, the Syrians gave up trying to clear the interior for the time being and became relatively quiet.(Syrian Mig-17. Both Syria and Egypt had large numbers of these aircraft during the Yom-Kippur War. They were useful but totally outclassed by the Israeli F-4E Phantoms and Mirage IIIs. Sox Mig-17s were used in the Syrian attack on the Israeli strong points of Mount Hermon. This one can be seen in the Israeli Heyr-ha-Avir museum at the Hatzerim airbase, Israel. {Public Domain, Bukvoed --- Guide only, due to copywrite})(The Mi-8 helicopter. It was helicopters of this type that carried the first Syrian commandos in to capture the Israeli outpost on Mount Hermon. {Public Domain, Stahikocher ---Guide only, due to copywrite})At 16.00 hours, the Israelis in the ‘Hedva,’ position near the Lebanese village of Shebaa were ordered to fall back through the upper ??sky-life?? to Masada with the armoured personnel carrier. (APC)At around 17.00 hours, the APC was hit by an RPG (Rocket propelled grenade) as the half-track along with an 81-mm mortar approached Wadi Si’on killing three Israeli soldiers. The Israeli vehicle came to a halt in the middle of the road as fire erupted from all around, the survivors, the rest now mostly wounded, took whatever cover they could find whilst the APC’s commander exposed in his position was hit in the back, however the driver managed to start the vehicle to speed off to safety. As the Israelis on Mount Hermon, either battled for survivors or tied to break out at Rosh Pina assembled a relief force under Colonel Amir Drori. This consisted of Drori’s command half-track, the 51st battalion’s command post and 15 half-tracks carrying companies A and B, another 8 half-tracks carried the men of the 69thReconnaissance Company and the Brigade’s Battalion Collecting station in an ambulance. Colonel Drori was ordered to halt, as the Israeli command feared a Syrian breakthrough in the Hadar-Masada sector. Drori was ordered to place his men in a blocking position around the bunkers, 103, 104, and 105 with the 13Battalion subordinated to the brigade. Drori objected to his orders, arguing that it was vital to strike at the Syrians as soon as possible so as to deny the enemy time to organize. However, he was not listened to and his force started to withdraw across the Sa’ar Brigade towards Masada. At 04:21 hours, Drori received order to organize a block and at 05:19 hours, his troops were deployed in that sector.As Drori’s detachment prepared to defend Masada, a convoy descended from the lower sky-lift after being ordered to do so by the commander of the 13th Battalion. The convoy commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Ze’ev Oren included a tank platoon from the 71st Battalion, the 13th Infantry platoon were still manning the lower sky lift in two BTR-152s APCs the half track of the observation officer and the 374th Communication Company in three vehicles, there were also five survivors from the outpost. Two Israeli soldiers who had been wounded in the battle were captured by the Syrians, however numbers of the defenders who managed to escape made their way down the mountainside where accompanied by three observation soldiers from the upper sky lift.The two Israeli soldiers who had been captured were questioned and then taken to a ravine. At about 0900 Hours the Israelis, sheltering in the tunnels heard shots coming from the courtyard. It is possible that the Syrians had fired some captured Israeli weapons but the troops in the tunnels had thought that it was their rescuers approaching. Four men had arrived from their hiding place to greet these and had noticed that they were Syrians only just in time; they quickly darted back into the tunnels, chased by the Syrians, throwing grenades as they went. the Syrians did not know where the surviving Israeli were hiding, they called on them through the generators’ gratings and by pointing flashlights, saying that any that did not come forth and surrender would be killed. At this point, some of the Israelis were thinking about giving up but the Golani Platoon sergeant forbade any surrender deciding that a breakout attempt through the northwest position was the better option than trusting to the mercy of the Syrians. At around 11:00 hours he decided to try this and led his men through the tunnels to the generators to the position. Most of the remaining Israelis now surrendered though during the process the leading technician was killed as he approached the Syrians waving a white flag. The last Israelis surrendered on Friday 12th October. On the 15th October, all 31 prisoners were taken to an olive grove and photographed; they were then taken off to a prison camp.(The first battle of Mount Hermon. {Public domain, Cropbot --- guide only, due to copywrite.})While the battle for Mount Hermon raged the 7th Israeli Armoured Brigade, fighting in the northern part of the front fought an epic battle. Colonel Avigdor ben-Gal, (born 1936) the 7th’s commander strived to build one reserve after another, committing these to the fight when they were most needed. At the outbreak of war, Ben-Gal’s brigade was the only Israeli ready for combat, because the 7th’s commander could foresee the Syrian attack coming, but he was regarded as a ‘madman,’ by the rest of the Israeli command. However, Ben-Shoham’s Barak Brigade, with just 57 tanks was battling against an estimated 600 Syrian machines and Ben-Gal was hampered by having to send the Barak Brigade reinforcements. The onset of night brought little relief for the embattled Israelis as the Syrians possessed plenty of infra-red night fighting equipment, their tanks were equipped with it for both driver and the gunner whereas surprisingly the Israelis lacked infra-red devices. The best the Israelis could do was to rely on their artillery’s limited supply of illuminating shells. These along with the light provided by scours of burning vehicles was all the Israeli tankers had to fight by yet the 7th Armoured was still holding its position on the morning of the 7th but the Barak Brigade had been utterly destroyed with 90% of its officers either killed or wounded.To the south, the Syrians had broken through and were advancing along the Tapline road, which ran along the pipeline leading to Nafekh where Ben-Shoham’s and Rafeal Eitan’s headquarters was located. As the Syrians draw nearer the headquarters staff moved out with their last surviving tanks in one last check of the enemy. The advance Syrian T-55 actually broke into the Israeli headquarters before it was destroyed by the last tank of a ??mixed??, which so distinguished itself that its commander, Lieutenant Zwicka Gringld was awarded the Order of Courage, Israeli’s highest decorations for bravery.The Syrians captured the village of Ramat Magshimm and neared the bridge of Bnot Ya’aqov, but now they made a mistake, they hesitated. The heroic stand of the 7th Armoured had gained just enough time for the Israeli to dispatch reinforcements to the area in the shape of the two reserve armoured divisions., Major-General Dan Laner’s and Major-General Moshe Peled’s divisions. As they deployed for action the Israeli air force was doing its best to aid the ground forces, losing 28 aircraft during the first three days, yet in spite of the losses, Israelis inflicted mounting casualties on the Syrians.By the afternoon of the 9th October, the 7th Armoured Brigade had only 7 tanks left and was critically short of ammunition and Ben-Gal ordered a retreat. However, Lieutenant-Colonel Naty Yossi whom had just returned from a honeymoon in the Himalayas had rushed straight to the workshops where he managed to salvage 13 tanks and their crews , some of whom were wounded.Now the Syrians how had so far fought with great determination and courage seemed to lose heart. The crews of the T-55s and T-62s were desperately tired and had witnessed the deaths of many of their comrades. To the Syrians Yossi’s scratch force looked like the advance-guard of Israeli reinforcements. Now, the Israeli strong points that the Syrians had bypassed reported that they could see the Syrians withdrawing back to the cease-fire line. It is clear here that Syrian reconnaissance and intelligence was sadly lacking. The 7th Armoured at this, along with the 13 tanks recovered from the workshops by Yossi had no more than 20 Centurions, if the Syrians had pressed home with their attacks they would have punched clean through the Israeli defences on the Golan Heights. The 7th Armoured was now free to reoccupy their pre-war positions, around them over 500 tanks and APCs lay wrecked, giving a clear indication of the scale of the fighting.But the fortunes of war had not only turned against Syria in the sector of the 7th Armoured, when the Syrian Colonel Twefiq Jehani achieved a breakthrough with his 1st Armoured Division it was celebrated as a great victory in Damascus yet by Monday morning it was no longer Jehani who was calling the shots but the Israelis. Laner had ordered Colonel Uri Orr, , whom commanded the 79th Brigade to move on down the Nafekh Road where in spite of bitter resistance by Eitan and his headquarters staff the Syrians captured half of the Israeli position. Orr’s tanks clashed with those of Colonel Shariq Fiyad’s Syrian 91st Armoured Brigade, badly mauling the Syrian armour. As Nafekh was being relieved more Israeli tanks, these of Laner’s 17th Brigade, commanded by Colonel Ran Sariq, which though it was made up of no more than 50 tanks, destroyed over 200 Syrian machines in a number of actions that clearly demonstrated the superior gunnery of the Israelis.(An Israeli Mirage III CJ 158 at the Israeli Air force Museum at Hatzerim. it bears 13 kill markings and the markings of the 10 squadron. The Mirage performed well during the Yom Kippur War but suffered heavily to Egyptian and Syrian SAMs along with the F 4 Phantom. {Public Domain, Oren Rozen --- guide only, due to copywrite})Then Syrians were mostly alarmed by the advance of Peled’s 20th armoured, which was moving down the El Al Road towards Rafid, by noon the Israeli tanks had reached Faris having fought against a bitter Syrian defense and were now threatening Jehani’s lines of communication. The Syrian 1st Armoured ?telephone? now found themselves surrounded and for the next 24 hours, they battled fiercely to break out. In the north sector, the Israeli 7th Armoured endured several desperate attacks, aimed at drawing the Israelis away from the battles being raged around Hushniya. By this time, the Israeli air force had improved in effectiveness and it was inflicting heavy casualties on the Syrians and was providing badly needed air support for the Israeli 14th and 19th brigades who had climbed the winding road from Ein Gay and were advancing across the plateau to relieve the pressure on the 20th Armoured Division. The Syrian 40th Mechanized Brigade, which was part of the 1st Armoured Division now, attacked the Israeli 19th Brigade but was beaten back as the Israeli ring around the 1st Armoured tightened. Next, the Syrians tried to break through to the 1st Armoured from outside, using the 15th Mechanized Brigade from the 3rd Armoured Division but this attack was also turned back.However, not everything was going Israel’s way at this time. On the morning of Wednesday the 10th, Peled advanced on Tel Kudne with three brigades where the Syrians had their forward headquarters, but the Israeli attack was halted with heavy casualties. Hofi now ordered Peled to stay in position and the defensive. This would then mean that the Syrians could possibly be crushed between Peled's troops and Laner’s men attacking from the south. Orr’s and Sarig’s armoured brigades were leading Laner’s advance, though the Syrians fought back hard by midday it was all over, two of the Syrian brigades were wiped out and now the area in and around the Hushniya was littered with smashed and burning Syrian vehicles and equipment, whilst the remainder of the Syrian army poured east in retreat, by the evening of the 10th October no Syrian units remained on Israeli soil.Sinai, the Israeli counter-attack is stopped.On the evening of the 7th October, the Israeli Southern Command held a conference, with the aim of drawing up plans for a counter-attack the next day on the Egyptian positions. Attending the meeting was David Elazar, (27th August 1925 – 15th April 1976) Chief of Staff of Israeli Defence Force, Major-General Shmuel Gonen, and GOC (General Officer Commanding) Southern Command and Major-General Avraham Adan, commander of the First Armoured Division and Major-General Avraham Mandler, whose armoured division had been in constant contact with the enemy for the past 36 hours. The Israeli commanders were strained and exhausted, Elazar was trying to conduct a desperate battle that was raging on the Golan Heights and Gonen and Mandler had spent two days trying to deal with the Egyptian breakthrough across the Suez Canal, already they had lost half their tanks. That very afternoon Adan had visited the front to see for himself the very nature of the fighting. Major-General Ariel Sharon had entered the Sinai with his reserve division but in his absence Elazar made the decision to continue.Gonen lacked needed intelligence and could only form a picture of the situation. Now that Israeli reserves had arrived, he came up with the idea that they should capture the Egyptian bridges across the canal and use them to facilitate their own crossing of the water-way. However, Adan and Mandler thought that his plan was as yet out of the capabilities of the IDF but Elazar believed that immediate bold action was what was needed if they were to prevent the situation worsening. He suggested that a counter-attack launched by Adan’s division be undertaken with the aim of advancing along El Qantara along the north south axis towards the Great Bitter Lake. This route was proposed, as it would drive a wedge deep into the flank of the Egyptian 2nd Army. It was pointed out that any movement of Sharon’s division was subject to Elazar’s personnel approval. Meanwhile Mandler’s division was to remain on the defensive.When Sharon finally arrived at the headquarters, the plan was approved. At this stage however, the Egyptians had no intention of breaking out into the Sinai and getting engaged in the sort of mobile warfare that the Israelis excelled in, in spite of them having deployed 600 tanks on the east bank of the Suez Canal. Instead, the Egyptians were content on defending their gains and on letting the IDF batter itself to pieces on the anti-tank weapons.Adan, though optimistic was aware that he had only two armoured brigades ready for the operation and he was worried that this force was wholly unsatisfactory. The two brigades were Colonel Gabi Amir’s 460th, which had a mere 50 tanks left after the battle the previous day and Colonel Natke Nir’s 600th with 70 tanks. The 3rd Armoured Brigade under the command of Colonel Arieh Keren was still moving down the coast road from El Arish while the division’s Sherman battalions had not left Israel whilst only a small amount of the divisional artillery had arrived. However, the most serious loss to Adan was his reconnaissance detachment whom had been sent to search for Egyptian commandos whom had been dropping behind the Israeli lines at the beginning of the conflict. Adan would be reduced to feeling his way forward without knowing what awaited his men or without any certain knowledge of where the enemy was at.Yet in spite of this Adan mobilized his forces ready for the attack. El Firdan had been assigned to Amir’s to capture while Nir was assigned the area around Ismailiya. The newly arrived Keren’s Brigade was to go straight into action and push further south towards the strongpoint of Metmed. One tank battalion, commanded by brigadier General Kalman Magen as being kept in reserve in order to protect the rear in case of an Egyptian counter-attack.(Egyptian tanks and mobile SAMs ready to cross the Suez Canal and advance into the on the eve of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The SAMs inflicted heavy losses on the Israeli air force during the first few days of the conflict. {ynetnews - Homepage --- Guide only, due to copywrite})Israel had been dealt a severe blow by one of the most masterful opening attacks in history; if they were to recover then Israel would have to act quickly and decisively. The Israelis got the attack under way at 0800 hours in the middle of much chaos and confusion. Some of Nir’s tanks were a victim of friendly fire, being hit by Israeli aircraft, when Adan’s air controllers tried to remonstrate they were informed that because of the Egyptian SAM threat all air support was being conducted from high headquarters. Egyptian jamming was also causing problems with the Egyptian communications to such an extent that at one stage Adan lost contact with his brigades. A third problem facing the Israelis was the fact that the advance would pass to the east of the Egyptian positions with little or no actual combat outside of the range of their artillery. This led to such a dangerous feeling of optimism at the Southern command that at 1030 hours, Elazar approved of Gonen orders for Sharon’s division to proceed with its drive southwards.Sharon was not happy with his assigned task, as he had just seen the whole operation fall apart in a dramatic fashion. The Israelis now drove into an inferno of fire; the Egyptians fought back fiercely, pouring ATGW, tank, and artillery fire into the Israelis while Adan, knowing that his route of advance was far to the east swung his units to the right. As a result of this Adan’s Brigades were finding themselves in a fruitless costly battle with stronger Egyptian deployments. One battalion of Amir’s Division lost 19 of its 26 tanks within minutes of the action starting.By 1100 hours, Gonen had realised the extent of the mistake and ordered Sharon recalled. Sharon had a long way to go and his forward units did not start entering into combat on the southern edge of the battle area until 1700 hours, their arrival took some of the heavy pressure away that was being brought to bear on Keren’s Brigade. However by this time another crises had developed. The Egyptian 24th Armoured and the 117th mechanised brigades of the 2nd Infantry Division launched a fierce counter-attack along with the 14th Armoured and the 3rd Mechanised Brigade of the 16th Infantry Division. The task of the Egyptian was to extend the beachhead, which was becoming heavily congested as more, and more units crossed the canal. The Israeli’s however were not aware of the reason for the Egyptian counter-attack and probably would not have cared if they had known; to them the attack was a strategic menace and in trying to contain it Adan’s brigades were badly battered and had the greatest difficulty holding their ground with the last hour of daylight being particularly hard as they fought with the setting sun in their eyes; however with the onset of darkness Adan disengaged.Adan’s Division had lost 70 of its 170 tanks but his recovery teams managed to retrieve 20 during the night, his attack had failed chiefly because it had been hastily planned and executed without proper intelligence. Also poor staff work and an unsatisfactory balance between arms contributed to the defeat. As for the Egyptians, they were at ease in which they had thrown back the Israeli attack, they had conducted a brilliant defence throughout the day and had even been able to develop their own plans further.By day’s end, the Egyptians still controlled an area 8 km (5 miles) east of the canal including several sections of the Artillery Road. However, the Israeli counter-attack had brought the IDF a valuable breathing space.The Air War.At the start of the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Air Force was in a better position than it had been in 1967. The gains during the earlier conflict had provided the Israelis with a useful buffer zone, and airbases especially in the Sinai. Also, Israel had taken delivery of large numbers of modern aircraft from the United States, these included McDonnell Douglas F-4E Phantoms, and Douglas(Top. A McDonnell Douglas F4, the victory marks credit this machine with 3 kills. The F4 was a very portent fighter and acquitted itself well during the Yom Kippur War. {Public domain, Rozen---- Guide only, due to copywrite} Bottom. Mikoyan-Gurevich Mig 21 formed the backbone of the Syrian and Egyptian air forces but it was outclassed for the most part by the latest Israeli aircraft. {Public Domain, Kaboldy --- guide only due to copywrite.} Left. Egyptian Mig-21 shooting down an Israeli mirage III during the Yom Kippur War. {Public Domain, Aaron shpigel --- guide only, due to copywrite.})A-4 Skyhawks, which helped to maintain Israel’s quality advantage over its opponents. Israel was fortunate that it had the full support of the United States, more so than it had from France during the Six Day War as a result the IAF was able to obtain spare and replacement aircraft during the Yom Kippur War. In addition to the American and French aircraft, Israel had a small but fast growing aircraft industry that was to make a significant contribution to the conflict but the IAf’s greatest asset was to be the superior training of its aircrews.The opposing Arab air forces had too benefited from the harsh lessons of the Six-Day War. Since the end of the war not only had the Syrian and Egyptian losses been made good but the Soviet Union had also supplied them with modern and numerous types of aircraft. The Syrian strength had risen from 142 in 1967 to 265 at the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. However, then expansion of the Egyptian air force was less dramatic, from 450 aircraft in 1967 to 480 in 1973, yet they had taken delivery of large numbers of Sukhoi Su-7s which operated alongside Mig-17s and early variants of Mig-21s. The Egyptians also took delivery of numerous later variants of Mig-21s, which were far more capable and better armed than the earlier variants of the aircraft.Though these new aircraft were still inferior to the Israeli F-4 Phantom and Mirage IIIs in a one on one combat they outnumbered the Israelis by 130 fighters. In the Six Day War, the Israelis had struck the Arab airfields in the first few hours, destroying many aircraft on the ground but by 1973 the Egyptians and Syrians had taken precautions to make sure that there would not be a repeat of that, they had built hardened shelters to house their aircraft in all their airfields and ringed them with SAMs and AA guns. Not only large numbers of Equipment was supplied to the Arab military forces but the Soviet Union also supplied technicians and combat advisers.Though the Soviet Union withdrew their advisers from Egypt in 1972, Soviet military doctrine prevailed amongst the Israeli air forces and armies. Most notably, the Syrians and Egyptians were to rely on ground based air defences (SAMs and AA guns) rather than fighter cover to protect their advancing forces.(Egyptian Mikoyan-Gurevich Mig-21s, during the Yom Kippur War this type of aircraft saw much combat. The Mig-21 was out glassed by the Israel F-4 Phantoms and Mirage IIIs but it remained a useful aircraft and a dangerous opponent in the hands of a skilled pilot and its later variants achieved a number of kills against Israeli fighters. {Egypt Daily News. Egyptian Air Force.})As the Israeli’s conscripts needed time to mobilize and deploy the IAF provided the countries first line of defence, Israeli troops had come to expect that they would be operating under an umbrella of fighter-bomber cover, which would disrupt enemy communications until the bulk of the Israeli forces could deploy. The F-4E was Israel’s most modern fighter, it was a multi-role aircraft, having both air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities, and in capable hands it was superior to any other type of aircraft supplied to the Arab air forces. Israel had 140 Phantoms, equipping six squadrons in 1973. The aircraft were mostly used in the ground-attack role however their Sparrow air-to-air missiles (AAMs) could outshoot anything in the Arabs’ arsenal.Yet in spite of the capabilities of the F-4E, the primary air-defence fighter of the IAF at the outbreak of the war was the Dassault Mirage IICJ. The French designed Mirage was powered by 6,000 kg (13,200lb) thrust Atar 9C turbojet engine and could reach a speed of over Mach 2 (around 1,500 mph/ 2,350 km/h) and had a range without fuel tanks added of 180 miles. (290 km) However, it was at most equal to the later models of the Mig-21 that had been provided by the Soviet Union, what proved to be a deciding factor was the level of training of the pilots. The third important aircraft of the IAF was the A-4 Skyhawk fighter-bomber. This was a reasonably small plane yet it could carry a heavy payload, although it is defensive armament was limited to its cannon, it was manoeuvrable enough to outperform the Mig-21 in a dogfight. Also making up part of the IAF’s strength were a number of older French built Dassault super-Mystere fighter-bomber and Sud Vautour long-range attack aircraft. Backing these combat were 38 Nord Noratlas transport aircraft. The Israeli helicopter force comprised one squadron of American built Sikorsky Ch-53s and French built Sud super Frelon heavy lift helicopters and up to 30, US supplied Bell Uh-1s.For the Egyptian and Syrian air forces, the most important plane was the Soviet built Mig-21, it was supplied in several variants and was primary an air superiority fighter that had a secondary role as a strike aircraft. Egypt had a total of 160 Mig 21 in its inventory in 1973 and Syria around 100. The most modern version of the plane flown in the Yom Kippur War was the Mig 21MF, its chief advantage in combat was its high manoeuvrability and small size which made it a difficult aircraft to spot.Also flown by the two Arab Countries was the Sukhoi Su-7 fighter bomber, this machine needed a longer range than a tactical fighter like the Mig-21 and was able to cover 900 miles (1450 kilometres) with two auxiliaries fuel tanks, but this was achieved with a small pay load of weapons, however the aircraft performed well at low levels. Egypt had 170 Su-7s whilst Syria operated 45. The Su-7 proved to be popular with its pilots who liked its ability to evade interception at low altitude and its steadiness as a weapons platform. The Arabs also had a number of older Mig-17s which was used mainly in the ground support role, with 110 being operated by the Egyptians and 120 by the Syrians. Egypt also had around 60 Mig-19s but though they were fast and manoeuvrable they carried a small payload.The Egyptians had 18 of the big Tupolev-16s in service, which would launch 25 missiles into Israeli territory. However as the Kelt is a very large subsonic missile, it proved to be an easy target for the Israeli fighters and air defences, which destroyed 20 of the Kelts, the remainder took out a supply depot in the Sinai and two Israeli radars. The Syrians, lacking any bombers resorted to using the FROG (free rocket over ground) artillery against Israeli towns and cities, which proved largely ineffective.Yet in spite of the new Soviet-supplied aircraft, both Syria and Egypt were pinning their hopes on their anti-aircraft defences. These consisted of large numbers of SA-2s, for medium height interception, SA-3s, and SA-6s for low level and medium altitudes and the handhold SA-7 and the radar directed ZSU 32-4 quadruple self-propelled anti-aircraft gun know as the Shilka for low level.The most effective of the SAMs was to prove to be the SA-6, which mounted on a tracked launcher vehicle made use of a continuous-wave radar guidance system.(Israeli Mirage engage a pair of Mig 21s. This aircraft is flown by Giora Epstein who has his 17 kills painted onto his aircraft. Painting by Roy Grinnell. {The Aviation Art of Roy Grinnell --- Guide only, due to copywrite})The Israeli’s at first encountered difficulties in finding ways to combat the SAMs and AA guns of their opponents, during the first week of the war the IAF lost as many as 80 aircraft most to SAMs to anti-aircraft guns while failing to do any significant damage to Egyptian targets like the bridges that they had slung across the Suez canal. The IAF would have found it impossible to sustain those kind of loses for much longer their system for dealing with the anti-aircraft defences, including the use of the terrain to mask their approach and the use of flares which were intended to lead infra-red guided SA-7s away from the aircraft’s jet pipe. They also deployed chaff, which were a series of metal strips, which were released in a cloud to blot out the radar; these were first employed by the RAF in World War Two. The Israelis could also call on more sophisticated electronic counter measures (ECM) by using jamming pods and ‘spoof’ techinnques to create a false image for the enemy radars. But the IAF were not familiar with the capabilities of the SA-6 and this caused the Israeli pilots major problems and mounting losses. The Israeli ECM was made up to counter threats from the old SA-2s but proved to be little value against the SA-6’s Straight Flush Fire Control Radar.However, the SA-6 did have a weakness and this was its slow rate of elevation and depression which the Israeli pilots learned to exploit by diving steeply onto their targets, making it impossible for the missile to track them, yet the Egyptian and Syrian air defences could be dealt with individually such tactics were of little use against several batteries working together.The IAF mainly concentrated against the Syrians on the Golan Heights during the first few days of the conflict. They knew of the Syrian air defences and were fully prepared to take heavy casualties in both men and aircraft as they saw the Syrian drive the more dangerous of the two Arab offensives, threatening as it did, to overrun the plains of northern Israel. Accordingly, the Israelis here fought with fanatical bravery.As early as the 7th October attacks by Israeli jets managed to silence the Syrian batteries for 24 hours, leaving the attack-aircraft free to do untold damage to the advancing Syrian ground forces, however the success of the IAF was only temporary for at the end of the 24 hours the SAMs were back in action, shooting down 28 Israeli planes. Not until the United States supplied Israeli with effective ECM, equipment was the IAF able to neutralise the threat posed by the SA-6. The US would also supply Israel with no less than 50’000 chaff packets; this gives the reader some idea of the intensity of the war in the air. The supply of the new ECM jamming equipment coupled with the growing expertise of the Israeli pilots helped immensely to reduce the losses of the Israeli air force. No doubt, the most important item supplied by the Americans during the Yom Kippur War was the AGM-45 Shrike anti-radar missile; these were capable of homing onto the omissions of the guidance radars of the SAMs. These also played an important part in reducing the IAF’s casualties, whilst on the ground, during the later part of the fighting the Israeli armoured and motorized divisions had managed to overrun several Egyptian SAM and AA batteries as they drove for the Suez Canal. This opened a corridor through the aircraft of the IAF were able to operate relatively safely.Unlike in the Six Day war the Israeli’s gained only a few successes over the Arab aircraft on the ground, however the epic struggle against the fighter-bombers of the IAF has tended over shadow the other aspects of the conflict. In spite of the heavy defences at the airfields, the Israelis continued attacking them in what many consider to have been an act of desperation. The runways were relatively easy targets as they could be cratered but they were easy to repair by the enemy who had prepared themselves for such attacks. On the Syrian front, for example, the IAF launched attacks on all eight Syrian airbases, these attacks on the 11th October resulted in only eight aircraft being lost on both fronts, the very next day the Syrian air force was up in strength.(The Sa-6 Gainful (NATO reporting name, Russian designation was 2KI2 ‘Kya’) was the most effective SAM deployed by the Egyptians and Syrians during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. This particular example is the 2P25 TEL and belongs to the East German armed forces. {Public domain, Yuriybrisk--- guide only, due to copywrite.})The Israelis had far more success in air-to-air combat than they did in dealing with the SAMs and anti-aircraft guns, which destroyed 100 Israeli planes, however in dogfights the Israelis claimed no fewer than 370 Arab aircraft shot down whilst losing only four of their own Aircraft. The Israelis own air defence was tiny compared to that of the Arabs; consisting of just 50 Hawk missile batteries which were mostly deployed around Tel Aviv and Israel’s nuclear plant at Dimona. The Israeli did deploy a few forward Hawk batteries against the Egyptians in the Sinai but were able to claim no more than 20 Egyptian aircraft. It was in the air, in the dogfights that the Israelis had their greatest success, with the excellent American supplied AIM-9 Sidewinder and the Israeli Shafrir coupled with superior training, the pilots of the IAF were able to score an impressive 200 shoot-downs. The Israeli’s were also blessed with the superb F-4E, that had the ability to strike at the Syrian and Egyptian aircraft from long distances, which out-ranged the capabilities of the Arab machines. The F-4E was greatly prized by the Israelis who used its long range shoot down ability frequently. The aircraft engaged beyond visual range, the Israelis had the AIM-7 Sparrow, of which there were several versions. Most of the air battles that were fought involved fighters and ground attack aircraft and their escorts, in these fights it was often impossible to use the medium range missiles and unless positive identification was possible at long range it was advised to close to visual contact before the shoot down.The Egyptians stated that as many as seven dogfights were witnessed during the first few days of the war, one of these fights saw as many as 7- Egyptian aircraft battling it out with their Israeli counter-parts as the war went on these air battles would become more frequent. As the new Israeli anti-SAM measures began to take account the Egyptians began to rely more and more on CAPs (Combat Air Patrol) by Mig-21s. In just seven days, the Israelis and Egyptians clashed 18 times in major air battles. In a single battle fought on the 18th October the Egyptians lost 11 aircraft.(Remains of a Su-7 Sukhoi of the Egyptian air force. The aircraft was shot down on the 6th October 1973 whilst attacking the Israeli base of Um-Hashiba. Being hit by 200-cannon fire from the 881st anti-Aircraft Regiment. It can be viewed at the Israeli Air Force Museum at Hatzerim {Public domain, Rotatebot --- Guide only, due to copywrite})For the Syrians, the air war was not so intensive after the 13th October when the danger of a Syrian breakthrough receded. The Israelis were able to change targets, they now concentrated on attacking oil sites, power stations and port structures within Syria, which Israel claimed were mounted in reprisal for FROG rockets being fired at Israel, this unfortunately meant that both sides made little attempt to avoid civilian casualties. On raids on the Syrian capital of Damascus, for instance 100 civilians were killed or injured by Israeli bombing attacks.Much use was made of the helicopter by both sides in commando raids behind enemy lines. The Syrians opened the conflict by mounting such raids on Mount Hermon with Mi-8s. The Mil-Mi 8 could not only carry 28 fully equipped troops but was often armed with a 12.7 mm machine-gun and four rocket pods that each contained 17 57-mm rockets. This meant that after dropping off its cargo of commandos the Mi-8 could then provide them with a degree of fire support. the Egyptians used around 100 Mi-8s to ferry commandos across the Suez canal on the evening of the 6th October, however these raids did little damage and losses amongst the helicopters was heavy, with around 50 Mi-8s being lost.For the Israelis the major transport helicopter was the Sud Super Frelon which could carry 30 fully equipped troops and the Sikorsky Ch-53D which could carry 38 fully equipped troops. These were used by Israel to carry out a number of commando raids, chiefly against Syria.The great tank battles.Saad El Din Shazly (or Shazeli) had proposed to renew the Egyptian drive across the Sinai, intending to start the attack with three thrusts. The Third Army was to capture the Mitla and Gidi Passes while the Second Army took Tassa, next the two armies would advance inwards in a pincer movement and capture Bir Gifgafa, which was the biggest Israeli base in the Sinai. The third thrust was to be towards Baluza Junction, which was to be found at the northern end of the line.The attack was to end up being postponed for 24 hours; it began on the 14th October south of the Great Bitter Lakes. Shazil’s armour of the Third army, under Major-General Abd Muneim Wassel started its drive on the Gidi Passes at 0630 hours.(Israeli M60 tank destroyed in the Sinai in October 1973. {Public Domain, Sreebot --- guide only, only due to copywrite})(Israeli, British built Centurion moving up to the front in the Sinai {Public domain, courtesy of the Israeli Defence Forces, Cobatfor --- Guide only, due to copywrite})Wassel’s offensive main thrust was directed at the Mitla Pass, it was spearheaded by the 3rd Armoured Brigade of the 4th Armoured Division. Following on the 3rd’s heels was the 6th mechanised and the 19th Infantry Divisions, whilst the 22nd armoured brigade provided cover for the Southern flank. Confronting Wassel were the men and machines of Magen’s regular armoured division, which had taken very heavy casualties during the first two days of the war.Magen received information from his reconnaissance units and quickly moved to block the pass with Colonel Dan Shomron’s armoured brigade backed by a force of paratroopers. Shomron’s hold, allowed Wassel’s brigade to drive into a trap. In spite of receiving a terrible fire from Israeli artillery and tanks and in spite of being unable to reply to this fire effectively the Egyptians bravely pressed on with their attack. They called on reinforcements and more and more units were fed into the cauldron in the defile, but these only succeeded to add to the congestion and confusion as Egyptian vehicles milled about, trying to find a way through the traffic whilst all the time the Israeli shells rained down. The Egyptians tried a flank move by the 22nd Armoured on higher ground but it was easily halted by Magen’s armour and by the Israeli Air force, the result was carnage. The Egyptians fought back as best they could but by early afternoon they were forced into a retreat as they left, they left behind them 90 blazing tanks and APCs. In the north the Egyptian thrust aimed at the Gidi Pass made by the T-62s of the 25th Armoured Brigade and APCs of the 7th Infantry Division was halted and forced to retire.(Remains of an Israeli Skyhawk in an Egyptian Museum in Cairo. during the first few days of the Yom Kippur War the Israeli air force suffered terribly from Egyptian and Syrian SAMs and AA guns{Public domain, Hohum --- Guide only, due to copywrite.})(An abandoned Syrian t-55 tank on the Golan Heights. After some initial success the Syrian advance was halted as it, come up against Israeli reinforcements and bitter determined defence. {Public Domain, Matanya --- Guide only, due to copywrite})The Egyptian Second Army under Major-General Saad Mamoun, fighting to the north and south of the Great Bitter Lake was also taking a beating. In the most southern part of Mamoun’s sector, the Egyptian thrust towards Ismailiya-Tasa by the 21st Armoured and the 16th Infantry Divisions, they had been supplied with the support of up to 500 artillery pieces, which opened up a supporting barrage. However, as Mamoun’s men and vehicles advanced they were confronted by two armoured brigades belong to Sharon’s Divisions under the command of Colonels Chaim Erez and Colonel Ammon Reshef. The Israelis had dug their tanks into hull down positions along the ridges. They then seemed to open fire all at once, blasting great gaps into the ranks of the advancing Egyptians who pressed on bravely, ignoring their mounting casualties but the Israeli fire was so intense and accurate that by 0800 hours it was clear that the attack had failed. Yet in spite of their losses, the Egyptians gathered what remained of their forces and attacked once more, this time heading for Hamutal Hill and Hamadiya Junction, but badly shaken by their losses in the previous attack the Egyptian advance was badly uncoordinated and led and they received even more casualties as the Israelis poured fire into them. By midday, the Egyptian 21st Armoured Division had lost 110 tanks and the fighting in this sector draw to an end. As the battle in the south raged around Ismailiya, the Egyptian second army mounted another thrust towards Tassa from El Firdan. Taking part in this attack were the vehicles and men of the 23rd Mechanised Division and the 2nd Infantry Division, these two units were part of the 15th Armoured Brigade, which were assigned the task to cover the left flank. These units struck at Colonel Joe Cohen’s brigade which was using captured T-55 tanks and was deployed across Adan’s Divisional Front. The fighting was bitter and hard, at one stage, Cohen was blasted from the turret of his tank by a Sagger anti-tank missile, but he soon took over another tank. Colonel Ariel Keren was ordered up by Adan and his Centurions were able to help stabilize the front while the division’s second-in-command, Brigadier General Dov Tamari led a mobile battle-group and sealed off the few small penetrations that the Egyptians had made. Importantly the Israeli infantry had helped to keep the Israeli tank losses down as they engaged the Egyptian Sagger teams. At noon, the Egyptians finally gave up their attempts to breakthrough and withdraw, leaving 40 burning and mangled tanks behind and scores of dead and wounded.The important attack along the El-Qantara and Baluza axis in the northern end of the line was undertaken by the 15th Armoured Brigade and the 18th Infantry Division. Here the Egyptians made a huge tactical error, where speed should have been the method used they attacked Second World War style with a set piece infantry assault. They came on with the T-62s advancing at a walking pace, with one machine either side of the road and with the infantry following. It just so happened that the Israelis were weakest in this area, under the command of Brigadier Yzhak Sasoon, the first and main line of defence was provided by Colonel Fedale’s mechanised infantry brigade. This unit had been detached from Adan’s division and had a number of elderly Sherman tanks in its ranks. The Sherman battalion engaged the Egyptians at 1000 metres, (600 yards) the Egyptians coming slowly forward at a walking pace were easy targets, and they accordingly lost 34 out of their 60 tanks before calling off the attack at 0845 hours. An Egyptian commando attack, also ended in failure, they had been delivered by helicopter further to the east but were rounded up by Israeli mechanised forces.The Egyptians had suffered heavily; throughout the day they had lost 264 tanks, a large number of APCs and had suffered 1,000 casualties. Major-General Mamoun, overcome with stress and over-work suffered a heart-attack a short while after the assault on the Ismailiya sector and he was replaced as commander of the Second Army by Major-General Abd el Munem Halil the Suez Canal to the West Bank, but President Sadat would not have this and he demanded that the Egyptians stand and fight, even threatening to have Shazil court-martialed. Seeing disaster looming Shazil suggested pulling back all the Egyptian forces across the canal.In spite of the heavy losses inflicted on the Egyptians and of the intensity of the fighting on the 14 October, the Israelis admitted to losing only 10 tanks. The change of tactics among the Israelis and the neutralizing of the Sagger teams had reaped huge benefits for the defenders who now found that they had the initiative. The Israelis now started drawing up plans for their own assault across the Suez Canal. Sharon’s Division would be needed to press onto the Deversoir area. Here they would come across an area dubbed the ‘Yard,’ which had been constructed during the years since 1967. Here, the Yard, a straight road that had been code named the Tirtur Road had also been constructed with bridging equipment could be moved up. Another road adjacent to the Tirtur Road was code named the Akavish Road. The Israelis planned in dropping a paratroop brigade with the intention of seizing a beachhead on the west bank of the canal, later tanks would be rafted across the waterway. Next step was to put the bridge across so that Adan’s division would be able to make their way to the West Bank, the tanks and APCs would then swing south to take out the SAM network of defensives and surround the Egyptian Third Army. As this was going down Megan and Sasoon would undertake several holding actions.The Israeli attack, code named Operation Gazelle began early in the morning of the 15th October. The first brigade to move westwards towards the canal was Reshef’s, which was made up of four tanks and three mechanised infantry battalions. The brigade moved towards the shores of the Great Bitter Lake and then swung north to piece the flank of the Egyptian Army. Reshef’s men hit the congested assembly area of the 16th Infantry Division to which the 21st Armoured retreated to following the Egyptian disaster on the 14th October. The night was to witness a desperate close-quarter action that took place around a location known as the ‘Chinese Farm.’ The complex had actually been built by the Japanese as an experimental agriculture station before the Six Day War. The fighting here was bitter and would rage until first light with Sharon being forced to send more and more troops into the battle, included among these were his own paratroopers. the fighting that took place here became among the most famous actions of the Yom Kippur War and one of the conflict’s most hotly contested locations.(Israeli armour {nearest is possibly an M48 Patton or an M60 the other is an M113 armoured Personnel carrier} destroyed in the Lexicon-Tur junction during the fighting for the Chinese Farm {Public Domain, Sherif9282 --- guide only, due to copywrite})The Egyptian fiercely counter-attacked and Reshef’s pulled back to the Chinese farm where a defensive line was formed by the 7th and 8th Battalions which were attacked determinedly by the Egyptian 4th Armoured Brigade throughout the night. As the fighting, raged both sides poured in reinforcements until by the morning the land around the complex was littered with smashed and burning tanks and vehicles of every type and dead bodies.However, the Israelis managed to establish a corridor, although this remained under fire, the paratroop brigade under the command of Colonel Danny Matt (10th December 1927 – 5th December 2013) which had been chosen to establish the beachhead had entered the yards followed by Eres’s tanks and ?unifoliate? rafts which was to follow the paratroops across the canal. By 0500 hours on the 16th October most the first wave was across the water-way and spreading out to create a beachhead 5 kilometers (3 miles) wide and were advancing to secure crossings over the Sweet Water Canal. By 0643 hours, the Israelis had the first of 28 tanks across the canal having been brought over on motorized rafts. Erez would break out of the beachhead with 21 tanks late in the morning by attacking and destroying the nearest SAM batteries; however, no more Israeli tanks would get across the Canal until another 37 hours had passed.The Egyptians for their part put Sharon’s corridor under continuous pressure, which mostly came from the Egyptian 21st Armoured Division and the 14th Armoured Brigade, just like, at the Chinese Farm, the fight was bitter as the Egyptians pressed on with their attacks with great courage. The major problem facing the Israelis was that of trying to bring up bridging equipment under heavy fire. Several times both the Tirtur and the Akavish routes were closed by Egyptian armour and Adan’s units were coming forward to commence their own crossing of the canal and were forced to launch counter-attacks to dislodge the Egyptians. The situation had improved considerably by the evening but no more tanks were able to cross the canal that night.On the morning of the next day, the Egyptian 25th Brigade was seen to be moving along the eastern shore of the Great Bitter Lake on its way to attack the Israeli beachhead from the north. Dan pulled his own tanks from out of the fighting and sent them to occupy ambush positions along the flank of the Egyptian advance whilst at the same he positioned blocking forces that were to prevent the enemy escaping. What occurred was nothing but a massacre, the Egyptians lost as many as 86 of their 96 T-62s and every single APCs and most of their transport whilst the Israelis lost only four tanks when they ran into a minefield as they chased after the Egyptian survivors.(Close up of an Israeli Centurion, the Centurion was the best tank to see combat by any side during the Yom Kippur War. A British design, the Centurion first entered service with the British Army in 1945 and is one of the world’s longest serving tanks, some still being in service with various armies today. This example is an improved Centurion and it can be seen in the Israeli Armoured Corps Museum at Latrun. The Centurion saw action in many wars from Korea to the Indo-Pakistan Wars to those of the Middle East and the Ogaden {Between Ethiopia and Somalia} {Public Domain, shot-Kal --- Guide only, due to copywrite})As the massacre of the Egyptian armour was taking place, the Israelis finally managed to clear the Tirtur and Akavish routes and they were soon slinging the first of their bridges across the Suez Canal. Adan immediately replenished his forces and during the hours of darkness, his men began crossing into Matt’s beachhead, which throughout the day had beaten off several Egyptian attempts to overrun their positions mounted by the 23rd Armoured Brigade and commandos.While Adan’s forces crossed into Matt’s beachhead, Sharon carried on with its desperate battle of attrition against the 21st Armoured and the 16th Infantry Division. Sharon’s Division lost a full quarter of their tanks but the casualties inflicted on their opponents had been far heavier. On the 18th October, the Chinese Farm fell, finally bringing the long costly fight for the corridor to an end. On the evening of the same day, the Israelis put a second bridge across the Canal.On the morning of the 18th Adan burst out of the beachhead and drove south on a two-brigade front, heading to secure the Geneifa Hills to eliminate the SAM position located there. The next, Magen’s division was pushed across the waterway to join the attack against the Third Army’s rear. Part of Sharon’s division now crossed the canal and they headed north to the suburbs of Ismailiya. Sharon would have liked to conduct a similar advance against the rear of the Egyptians however he was required to mop up any resistance on the canal’s east bank and until the war’s end, his division would provide security on both banks whilst operations in the south continued.The Egyptians were now fully aware on how precarious their position was, the danger looming to the Third Army was dire and a similar threat now confront the Second Army, even the alarming prospect of an Israeli push on Cairo could not be completely ruled out. There was little between the Israeli spearheads and the Egyptian capital at this time as most of the Egyptian Army was still on the east bank of the Suez Canal and there was not enough reserve to stop a determined Israeli advance. Shazil had done his best but he was just overwhelmed, he had worked himself so hard that he collapsed with nervous exhaustion and was replaced by General Abd el Ghani Gamsay. (9th September 1921 – 7th June 2003)Sadat now became desperate to achieve a ceasefire whilst he still had substantial forces east of the canal, thinking this would give him a good bargaining point in any negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union new agreed that it was time to end the hostilities; in an aim to try to achieve this the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger took a trip to Moscow for talks. This resulted with the Soviet Union setting the wheels in motion towards a ceasefire in the United Nations; this led to the resolution being passed which was to be implemented on the 22nd October at 1852 hours.As the talks for a ceasefire were underway, Israel also had their eyes fixed on post war negotiations and had sent Adan and Mega driving southwards. With the destruction of the SAM screen, the Israeli Air Force now dominated the air space over the battlefields. Though the Egyptians fought back hard, often with great courage it was clear that it was not going to be enough to halt the Israelis. The Egyptians threw in everything they had, including Kuwaiti and Palestinian detachments but it was useless. Shortly after midday on the 22nd October, Wassel told Ismail that his army had been cut-off and was now facing total destruction.Though the ceasefire came into effect on the army sector the Israelis continued their advance while troops and vehicles of the Egyptian Third Army still tried to break out of the trap that they now found themselves in. Adan and Megan pushed aside the resistance and reached Suez and Abadiah on the Gulf of Suez late on the 23rd October. On the 24th Adan attempted to enter Suez but his troops got ambushed in the streets and they had to battle their way out, suffering 80 killed.(Men like this Israeli paratrooper made Israel’s victory at the Mitla Pass possible. These men were very well trained and fought with the utmost courage and skill. {A. N. P. DZ. Defense ---- Guide only, due to copywrite.})(Knocked out Israeli M48 Patton tanks close to the Suez Canal. The M48 was the third US tank to be named after an American World War Two, General George S Patton. A number of M48s had been captured from Jordan during the Six Day War and were pressed into service by the Israelis. It was a good medium tank but as the picture shows it suffered losses against Syrian and Egyptian armour. {Public Domain, courtesy of US Navy, Cobatfor --- Guide only, due to copywrite})This battle was the last of the war’s engagements as the advancing Israeli army and the plight of the Egyptian Third Armour was threatening to bring a super-power confrontation. The United States concerned that the Soviet Union would intervene on the Egyptian side put a lot of pressure on Israel to respect the ceasefire and allow for the resupply of the Third Army. At one stage, the Americans even threatened to supply the Egyptians themselves if Israel did not comply. Comply the Israelis did, the fighting ending on the 25th October on the same day that the Israelis opened up a land corridor to the Egyptian Third Army.The loss of Equipment had been massive for both sides; loss of life too had been heavy. The casualties that Israel had taken were heavier than what the country had suffered in any of its previous wars, few families in Israeli would not be touched by the tragedy that was the Yom Kippur War. At the start of hostilities, the Israeli Defence Force had found itself tottering on the brink of defeat but it had recovered and won a splendid victory and acquired 2500sq Km (1000sq miles) on the west bank of the Suez Canal. For the Egyptians, they felt that they had regained their honour and still kept the gains moved by their Second Army.Sources.Magazines.1) War in Peace. Volume 7. Yom Kippur. The preparations. The build-up to the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. By Michael Orr. Orbis Publishing.2) War in Peace. Volume 7. New Perspectives. The Military lessons from the Arab-Israeli War. By Michael Orr. Orbis Publishing.3) War in Peace. Volume 7. The Bar-Lev Line. The Israeli defences along the Suez Canal. By Simon Innes. Orbis Publishing.4) War in Peace. Volume 7. Crossing the Canal. The Egyptian attack, 6th October 1973. By Bryan Perrett. Orbis Publishing.5) War in Peace. Volume 7. The Valley of Tears. Syrian assaults on the Golan. October 1973. By Bryan Perret. Orbis Publishing.6) War in Peace. Volume 7. Clearing the Golan. The Israeli counter-attack, October 1973. Bryan Perrett. Orbis Publishing.7) War in Peace. Volume 7. Drive to destruction. The defeat of the Israeli counter-attack in Sinai, October 1973. By Bryan Perret. Orbis Publishing.8) War in Peace. Volume 7. The Generals fall out. Dissension in the Israeli High command. Bryan Perret. Orbis Publishing.9) War in Peace. Volume 7. SAMs vs Phantoms. The struggle for aerial supremacy in the Yom Kippur War. Anthony Robinson. Orbis Publishing.10) War in Peace. Volume 7. Clash of the Titans. The decisive tank in Sinai, 1973. Bryan Perrett. Orbis Publishing.Web.1) Pinterest.2) ynetnews - Homepage.3) Egypt Daily News. Egyptian Air Force.4) The Aviation Art of Roy Grinnell.5) A. N. P DZ. Defense.6) Arab-Israeli war. By Michael Orr.7) The Yom Kippur. Wikipedia.8) Bar-Lev Line. Wikipedia.9) Haim Bar-Lev. Wikipedia.10) Anwar Sadat. Wikipedia.11) Albert Mandler. Wikipedia.12) Abd Muneim. Wikipedia.13) Saad Mamoun. Wikipedia.14) Ahmed Ismail Ali. Wikipedia.15) Saad el-Shazly. Wikipedia.16) Shmuel Gonen. Wikipedia.17) Avraham Adan. Wikipedia.18) Yitzhak Hofi. Wikipedia.19) Moshe Dayan Wikipedia.20) Rafeal Eitan. Wikipedia.21) ZSU 23-4, ‘Shilka.’ Wikipedia.22) First Battle of Mount Hermon. Wikipedia.23) Mil Mi 8. Wikipedia.24) Avigdor Ben-Gal. Wikipedia.25) David Elazar. Wikipedia.26) Mikoyan-Gurevich Mig-21. Wikipedia.27) Israeli Air Force. Wikipedia.28) Egyptian Air Force. Wikipedia.29) Yom Kippur War. Embattled Israel Beachhead at Chinese Farm. Weider History. HistoryNet. Live the history.30) Danny Matt. Wikipedia.31) Mohamed Abdel Chani-el- Gamsay. Wikipedia.32) M48 Patton. Wikipedia.33) Centurion tank. Wikipedia.34) T-62 tank. Wikipedia.35) M 60 tank. Wikipedia.

A recent study reveals that increasing enterprise and workforce mobility will be important factors leading global unified communications market to attain revenues of more than $75.50 billion by 2020. Rising penetration of smartphones will also augment demand for unified communication products. Many organizations, large and small, across the globe are encouraging practices such as Bring Your Own Device (BYOD), necessitating reliable unified communication solutions.Government, healthcare and education applications hold potential for growth of global unified communications industry. However, enterprise applications not only assumed leadership position in 2013 but are also expected to continue market dominance in the near future. Enterprises of all sizes are engaged in employment of infrastructure that will be able to support unified communication services.Leading players in the global unified communications market include Avaya, Inc., IBM, Cisco Systems, Verizon Communications, Alcatel Lucent, NEC, etc. Hexa Research found that Cisco enjoyed a dominant market position with solutions that ensure consistency across various devices. The unified communications industry is characterized by consolidation by way of alliances and acquisitions.Read more @ https://www.hexaresearch.com/research-report/unified-communication-industry/