This Time Report Must Be Signed By Both The Employee And The: Fill & Download for Free

Yes! This is one of my favorite stories, even though it angers me.I had one boss call me in to do overtime on a day I really didn’t physically feel like working, in order to go over my monthly performance review before the end of the month that was two days away. The company had a policy that anytime you worked overtime, it had to be a minimum of four hours, as well as the policy that all monthly performance reviews must be delivered directly to the employee before the last calendar day of the month, with the employee present, unless they are out sick, FMLA, etc.So, I went in and within an hour to an hour-and-a-half of me being there, I checked my computer and discovered that my slimeball of a manager had signed off on my performance review without me present and left for the day! I was beyond pissed. I wanted to literally feed Captain Hook (his last name was actually Hook, and even shared the same first name as the fictional character) to Ticktock the alligator! After the end of my shift, I took what he did straight to his boss, who brushed me off. Bad move, Birdbrain (no offense to any birds who may be reading this).I then quite literally limped on down to Human Resources after the end of my shift, and reported both of them! I emphatically demanded to file an official complaint against my immediate manager for being rude, un-professional, and having me come in when I legitimately did not feel well. I also said the operations manager I went to didn’t want to do anything about my manager, was dismissive, so I wanted him included in my complaint or a separate one just for him. I was having well documented issues with my back at that time (even had signed up for intermittent FMLA), and the day he called me in was a bad back day to say the least, and would’ve been a needed day off for me. Because of this, I also demanded the HR rep file a complaint against my manager for engaging in discriminatory practices against someone with a documented disability(ies). This got the message across loud and clear, and I was promised that something would be done.What ended up happening, was my immediate manager was fired the next day he came in (a day I was off and I’m glad I was, as he was rumored to have an underlying anger issue), and the operations manager eventually received enough complaints that resulted in him being demoted. He and I avoided each other as a result, until he eventually resigned a year later.Moral of the story? Don’t mess with a disabled person who's in a lot of pain (and deals with chronic pain - see some of my other questions and answers), or make them come in on a day they really need to rest.THANK YOU FOR THE UPVOTES!

I’m going to walk you through the Resolution[1] section by section, paragraph by paragraph.Resolved, That the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Financial Services, Foreign Affairs, the Judiciary, Oversight and Reform, and Ways and Means, are directed to continue their ongoing investigations as part of the existing House of Representatives inquiry into whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its Constitutional power to impeach Donald John Trump, President of the United States of America.This Section gives official sanction to the myriad of impeachment-related investigations already underway[2] . That might seem like a bit of a throw away, but it will become very relevant later in the Resolution.SEC. 2. OPEN AND TRANSPARENT INVESTIGATIVE PROCEEDINGS BY THE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE.For the purpose of continuing the investigation described in the first section of this resolution, the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (referred to in this resolution as the “Permanent Select Committee”) is authorized to conduct proceedings pursuant to this resolution as follows:(1) The chair of the Permanent Select Committee shall designate an open hearing or hearings pursuant to this section.Right now, as has been well described, the impeachment hearings have so far been conducted in executive session[3] . This has been to allow the committees to take full depositions that may or may not include sensitive national security information or otherwise compromise the rights of the witnesses (or other persons) by having potentially incriminating information aired publicly[4] .This section now requires the Intelligence Committee to hold at least one open hearing, which becomes relevant in the next paragraph.(2) Notwithstanding clause 2(j)(2) of rule XI of the Rules of the House of Representatives, upon recognition by the chair for such purpose under this paragraph during any hearing designated pursuant to paragraph (1), the chair and ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee shall be permitted to question witnesses for equal specified periods of longer than five minutes, as determined by the chair. The time available for each period of questioning under this paragraph shall be equal for the chair and the ranking minority member. The chair may confer recognition for multiple periods of such questioning, but each period of questioning shall not exceed 90 minutes in the aggregate. Only the chair and ranking minority member, or a Permanent Select Committee employee if yielded to by the chair or ranking minority member, may question witnesses during such periods of questioning. At the conclusion of questioning pursuant to this paragraph, the committee shall proceed with questioning under the five-minute rule pursuant to clause 2(j)(2)(A) of rule XI.Now, this is a little complicated if you aren’t familiar with the Rules of the House[5] .Procedures for committee hearings are chiefly dictated by the Rules of the House (namely, Rule XI):The Rules of the House are the rules of its committees and subcommittees so far as applicable. (Rule XI, Clause 1(a)(1)(A))And…Each standing committee shall adopt written rules governing its procedure. Such rules . . . may not be inconsistent with the Rules of the House or with those provisions of law having the force and effect of Rules of the House. (Rule XI, Clause 2(a)(1)).The Rules of the House dictate such requirements as equal time for the majority and minority, quorums to do business, rights of witnesses, allowing for the public’s attendance, etc. So if you come across complaints that the Resolution doesn’t allow for this or that “like a normal hearing!” that’s because those Rules are already established and don’t need to be repeated.Normally, a hearing will proceed first with opening statements, followed by witness statements, followed by each Member - to include the chair and ranking member (ie, the senior-most member of the minority party) - getting five minutes to question witnesses.What this paragraph of the Resolution does is expand on the Rules to allow the chairman and ranking member to get up to 90 minutes (divided equally) of exclusive questioning (either by themselves or their staff) before the hearing(s) turns over to the usual procedures (ie, every Member getting five minutes).(3) To allow for full evaluation of minority witness requests, the ranking minority member may submit to the chair, in writing, any requests for witness testimony relevant to the investigation described in the first section of this resolution within 72 hours after notice is given for the first hearing designated pursuant to paragraph (1). Any such request shall be accompanied by a detailed written justification of the relevance of the testimony of each requested witness to the investigation described in the first section of this resolution.This paragraph is somewhat self-explanatory. It allows the ranking member, on behalf of the committee’s Republicans, to request that the chair call additional witnesses (with justification). The Rules of the House already allow for this:Whenever a hearing is conducted by a committee on a measure or matter, the minority members of the committee shall be entitled, upon request to the chair by a majority of them before the completion of the hearing, to call witnesses selected by the minority to testify with respect to that measure or matter during at least one day of hearing thereon. (Rule XI, Clause 2(j)(1))However, this Rule adds some procedural protections for the minority.The Rules of the House require that notice of hearings cannot be less than one week before the announced date of the hearing (Rule XI, Clause 2(g)(3)(A)(i)) unless both the chairman and ranking member agree to an earlier date (Rule XI, Clause 2(g)(3)(B)), so there is no chance that the committee could call a hearing in less than the time provided to the minority to request additional witness.(4) (A) The ranking minority member of the Permanent Select Committee is authorized, with the concurrence of the chair, to require, as deemed necessary to the investigation—(i) by subpoena or otherwise—(I) the attendance and testimony of any person (including at a taking of a deposition); and(II) the production of books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents; and(ii) by interrogatory, the furnishing of information.Again, another fairly self-explanatory paragraph. This gives the ranking member explicit subpoena authority, which is an expansion on the subpoena procedures outlined in the Rule of the House (which are chiefly in the hands of the majority and committee chairmen[6] ).(B) In the case that the chair declines to concur in a proposed action of the ranking minority member pursuant to subparagraph (A), the ranking minority member shall have the right to refer to the committee for decision the question whether such authority shall be so exercised and the chair shall convene the committee promptly to render that decision, subject to the notice procedures for a committee meeting under clause 2(g)(3)(A) and (B) of rule XI.Semi-obvious. This allows the chair to decline to allow a subpoena; but if they do so, then they must call a session of the committee to debate the matter. I’ve already mentioned the rule being referenced for hearings broadly, but for general meetings of the committee, the chair only has to give three days notice (excluding weekends and holidays) unless, as discussed, the ranking member agrees to an earlier date.(C) Subpoenas and interrogatories so authorized may be signed by the ranking minority member, and may be served by any person designated by the ranking minority member.Obvious.(5) The chair is authorized to make publicly available in electronic form the transcripts of depositions conducted by the Permanent Select Committee in furtherance of the investigation described in the first section of this resolution, with appropriate redactions for classified and other sensitive information.This paragraph gives the Intelligence Committee explicit authorization to release information it has so-far collected in depositions, with appropriate redactions. This, again, is one of those things that seems like a throwaway, but it actually allows the committee to bypass existing Rules of the House which would require it to hold a specific meeting for the purpose of releasing such information (Rule XI, Clause 2(k)(7))[7] .(6) The Permanent Select Committee is directed to issue a report setting forth its findings and any recommendations and appending any information and materials the Permanent Select Committee may deem appropriate with respect to the investigation described in the first section of this resolution. The chair shall transmit such report and appendices, along with any supplemental, minority, additional, or dissenting views filed pursuant to clause 2(l) of rule XI, to the Committee on the Judiciary and make such report publicly available in electronic form, with appropriate redactions to protect classified and other sensitive information. The report required by this paragraph shall be prepared in consultation with the chairs of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Oversight and Reform.Mostly obvious, but this also has links to that first section of the Resolution. In giving official sanction to the on-going investigations, the Resolution now requires the Intelligence Committee to send its findings to the Judiciary Committee in furtherance of normal impeachment processes (ie, where the Judiciary Committee is the primary body for reporting Articles of Impeachment to the House). It also reiterates the existing Rule of the House that permits any member to attach dissenting views to any formal reports made by committees.SEC. 3. TRANSMISSION OF ADDITIONAL MATERIALS.The chair of the Permanent Select Committee or the chair of any other committee having custody of records or other materials relating to the inquiry referenced in the first section of this resolution is authorized, in consultation with the ranking minority member, to transfer such records or materials to the Committee on the Judiciary.So here’s where that first section of the Resolution becomes very relevant. It authorizes all the committees currently conducting impeachment-related inquiries to release materials they have gathered to the Judiciary Committee that they deem relevant to the main impeachment investigation. Basically, it widens the potential for Articles of Impeachment well beyond matters relating to the Zelensky call (eg, findings from the Mueller investigation, Emoluments Clause, stonewalling Congress generally[8] , etc.).SEC. 4. IMPEACHMENT INQUIRY PROCEDURES IN THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY.(a) The House authorizes the Committee on the Judiciary to conduct proceedings relating to the impeachment inquiry referenced in the first section of this resolution pursuant to the procedures submitted for printing in the Congressional Record by the chair of the Committee on Rules, including such procedures as to allow for the participation of the President and his counsel.So this is kind of the “money section” in which the House explicitly authorizes the Judiciary Committee to initiate an impeachment inquiry[9] . Its secondary importance – although a pretty major importance – is to explicitly authorize the Judiciary Committee to make rules to allow for the participation of the President and his counsel.Now, the Rules of the House already allow witnesses appearing before hearings to have counsel present to advise them of their rights ((Rule XI, Clause 2(k)(3)), but this Resolution would allow the Judiciary Committee to go beyond those rules (again, it can’t go less than those rules) if it so chooses.(b) The Committee on the Judiciary is authorized to promulgate additional procedures as it deems necessary for the fair and efficient conduct of committee hearings held pursuant to this resolution, provided that the additional procedures are not inconsistent with the procedures referenced in subsection (a), the Rules of the Committee, and the Rules of the House.As noted early in the answer, the Rules of the House also constitute the main rules for committee hearings. This paragraph allows the Judiciary Committee to make additional rules, but they can’t be inconsistent with the Rules of the House, which would otherwise need to be amended by a vote of the House.(c) (1) The ranking minority member of the Committee on the Judiciary is authorized, with the concurrence of the chair of the Committee on the Judiciary, to require, as deemed necessary to the investigation—(A) by subpoena or otherwise—(i) the attendance and testimony of any person (including at a taking of a deposition); and(ii) the production of books, records, correspondence, memoranda, papers, and documents; and(B) by interrogatory, the furnishing of information.(2) In the case that the chair declines to concur in a proposed action of the ranking minority member pursuant to paragraph (1), the ranking minority member shall have the right to refer to the committee for decision the question whether such authority shall be so exercised and the chair shall convene the committee promptly to render that decision, subject to the notice procedures for a committee meeting under clause 2(g)(3)(A) and (B) of rule XI.(3) Subpoenas and interrogatories so authorized may be signed by the ranking minority member, and may be served by any person designated by the ranking minority member.This paragraph just copies what we’ve already seen, but specific to the Judiciary Committee.(d) The Committee on the Judiciary shall report to the House of Representatives such resolutions, articles of impeachment, or other recommendations as it deems proper.The end of the Resolution. Also seems like a throwaway, but note the use of the word “shall.” That means while paragraph (a) authorized an impeachment inquiry, this paragraph all but compels one, unless the Judiciary Committee were to decide it wasn’t “proper” to take any action or make recommendations. Moreover, per the first and third sections, it enables the Judiciary Committee to draw on the information it receives from other committees’ ongoing investigations to inform its recommendations, versus solely relying on whatever information it might gather in its own investigation and hearings.So there you go. Hope that helps.Footnotes[1] Text - H.Res.660 - 116th Congress (2019-2020): Directing certain committees to continue their ongoing investigations as part of the existing House of Representatives inquiry into whether sufficient grounds exist for the House of Representatives to exercise its Constitutional power to impeach Donald John Trump, President of the United States of America, and for other purposes.[2] Trump investigations: A list of ongoing battles with Congress[3] Carter Moore's answer to Why are Democrats keeping their impeachment inquiry hearings closed?[4] Carter Moore's answer to Did the GOP, when it controlled the House, hold closed hearings in an inquiry into the 2012 attack on the U.S. Embassy in Benghazi?[5] https://rules.house.gov/sites/democrats.rules.house.gov/files/documents/116-House-Rules-Clerk.pdf[6] Carter Moore's answer to Were any House Rules changed by the October 31, 2019 resolution on the impeachment inquiry?[7] Carter Moore's answer to Is Adam Schiff breaking House rules by withholding documents from House members?[8] Carter Moore's answer to Will President Trump be impeached?[9] Carter Moore's answer to Why are the Democrats afraid to formally vote for impeachment?

The actual mechanics of what happens are somewhat complicated, but the basic idea is simple economics: the price is set as the number which balances supply and demand. In more detail, here is what happened for Twitter:(Preface):Twitter decides to "go public" via an IPO. The reason for doing so is to raise money. How does this work? The mathematics of an IPO go as follows: before the IPO, Twitter is owned by the founders, the early employees, and some early investors (for example, venture capital firms and angel investors).Before the IPO, ownership of Twitter is partitioned into N equal shares, and each of the aforementioned people's stake in the company is determined by how many of these shares he owns. For example, N is around 475 million for Twitter. Twitter cofounder Evan Williams owns 57 million of these shares, so he owns 12 percent of Twitter.Now Twitter decides to go public. In other words, it decides to provide the public with the opportunity to share in the ownership of Twitter. Why would the Twitter founders want to give away part of their ownership in their company? Well, they are not giving it away; they are selling it. Whatever the public pays for partial ownership in Twitter goes straight into Twitter's bank account. For the founders of Twitter, the upside of this is that Twitter becomes a richer company, and they can use the new money to develop the company into an even better and profitable company. The downside is that their stake in this more valuable company goes down. How do the Twitter founders decide the optimal solution to this tradeoff? They need to choose two numbers: the number of new shares of Twitter to issue; and the price at which to sell these shares. If they decide to issue M new shares of Twitter and sell them for $x each, then Twitter adds $xM to its bank account, but everyone who already owns Twitter shares has their ownership in the company reduced to N / (N + M) of their original ownership. Twitter needs to choose M first, because what x should be depends on M: x needs to be a price that the public would be willing to pay to own 1 / (N + M) of Twitter. In the process outlined below, Twitter chooses M in step (1) and chooses x in step (5).Here we go:Twitter decides to offer 70 million shares on the public market. This means that current shareholders of Twitter have their stakes decreased by a factor of 475 / (475 + 70) = 13 percent, and that 13 percent of Twitter is up for grabs. How does Twitter come up with this number? Its executives know around how much money they want to raise, and how much of their ownership they are willing to give up. Based on the number 70 million, Evan Williams knows right now that after the IPO his stake in Twitter will decrease from 12 percent to 10 percent, but in his mind he thinks this sacrifice is well worth it. Twitter now advertises to institutional investors (via its underwriting banks, in particular Goldman Sachs) that 70 million shares of Twitter are on the table, and invites them to submit requests for how many shares they would like to buy (the investors have no official word on how much they will have to pay per share, but they can do their own analyses to come up with rough estimates).Rumors circulate that the offering price will be in the $17 to $20 range.Rumors circulate that the offering price will be in the $23 to $25 range.By November 5, 2013, institutional investors must submit their requests on how many shares they wish to buy. I call these "requests" and not "bids" because they can take many forms, ranging from the simple ("I want to buy 1 million shares, no matter the price") to the complicated ("If the offering price is between a and b, I want to buy X shares; if the offering price is between b and c, I want to buy Y shares; but in the event that Z occurs I do not want to buy any shares"). Who are these institutional investors? They are the "important" clients of the underwriting banks: the top pension funds, mutual funds, hedge funds, high net worth individuals, and long standing clients. Why do these investors get first dibs on an IPO? Retail investors often complain this is not fair, but the (official) reason is stability: the argument goes that institutional investors (who are accredited, sophisticated, more experienced, and who have deeper pockets and capacity to take risk) create stability in the stock price by being the first to receive them. The alternative would be for Twitter to offer its shares to the entire world all at once on IPO day. While this seems more fair, experience shows that this creates havoc: Twitter is afraid that if it starts by offering its shares to Average Joe investors at the outset, the price will jump all over the place and the market will become anxious and confused. Moreover, the SEC fears that the "unsophisticated" Average Joes do not know how to deal with an IPO appropriately, and are likely to lose their life savings by purchasing the stock in this unstable environment.On November 6, 2013, around 4:00pm: Twitter sets its IPO price at $26. At this point, Twitter knows that it will raise exactly $26 x 70 million = $1.8 billion in cash from this offering. We say that this offering price values the company at $26 x (475 million + 70 million) = $14.2 billion (The only way you can say what a company is worth is by seeing how much someone else would pay for it, or at least how much he would pay for a share of it.)On November 7, 2013, around 8:30am: The IPO underwriters look at all the requests from (4) and decide how to allocate shares to the institutional investors. This is not as simple as giving each institutional investor what they requested if their conditions were met. First, the total number of shares requested by all institutional investors is likely much, much more than 70 million (and most institutional investors know that demand for shares greatly exceeds their supply, so they will tend to request a much higher number of shares than they actually want). Second, this is the only chance the offering company and the underwriters have to control what kind of shareholders have a stake in the company. They know the reputations/styles of the institutional investors, and they take this information into consideration when choosing how to allocate the available shares. The process is not "fair" in the sense that all of the institutional investors are on the same playing field. For example, the underwriters would be wary of granting a large number of shares to an investor who is likely to flip them (wait until the price spikes upon the opening trade and then immediately dump the position). The underwriters want an ideal balance of different types of investors: long term investors, short term investors, domestic investors, foreign investors, etc. Note that (essentially) all of the requests at this stage are "buy" requests; although in some cases an institutional investor can request to borrow shares (with the intent of creating a short position by selling them), this is very rare and (understandably) not very well received by the underwriters.On November 7, 2013, before market open: All of the 70 million shares are in the hands of the initial institutional investors, who now owe Twitter $26 for each share they were granted.On November 7, 2013, at market open (9:30am): Orders start coming to the NYSE from all over the world, from both retail investors and institutional investors (both the ones who were lucky enough to be part of the initial offering and the ones who were not). Each order is either a bid ("I want to buy TWTR") or an offer ("I want to sell TWTR"), with the latter presumably only coming from those institutional investors who already have the stock to sell. Each order includes both a price and a size: for example, "I am willing to pay $45 per share for 100 shares of TWTR" or simply "45 x 100".On November 7, 2013, after market open: The designated market maker (DMM) for Twitter (which is the bank Barclays) at the NYSE starts collecting all of the orders that are coming in. Taking a quick first look at the numbers they are seeing, Barclays reports that the prevailing price seems to be in the $40 to $45 range. This number is reported by the news media.On November 7, 2013, after market open: The DMM (Barclays) works on setting the opening price. The opening price is chosen so that supply and demand are balanced as well as possible. In other words, the opening price is the price that maximizes the number of trades that can be executed, based on all of the orders submitted thus far. This process is called price discovery, and is handled by humans at the NYSE (unlike Nasdaq, which handles price discovery electronically). Once the opening price is decided upon (for Twitter, $45.10), the DMM "freezes the book", or blocks any new orders from coming in. Next, the DMM enters all of the accepted orders into the system, matching buyers and sellers based on the prices and sizes they submitted. The process of price discovery usually takes around fifteen minutes for the NYSE, but since Twitter is such a high profile stock with a great deal of anticipation and demand, the process takes over an hour.On November 7, 2013, at 10:50am: Bam, Twitter begins trading at $45.10. In particular, the public is willing to pay $45.10 per share of Twitter, and we say this opening price values the company at $45.10 x (475 million + 70 million) = $24.6 billion. Twitter instantaneously increases in value by $10 billion.On November 7, 2013, at market close (4:00pm): Twitter closes at $44.90.The success of an IPO is measured by how smoothly steps (10) and (11) go. If the price during discovery falls below the initial offering price ($26 for Twitter), this looks embarrassing and the underwriters will shore up demand by purchasing shares. Similarly, if the price goes berserk once trading begins, the DMM is blamed for not setting the price appropriately. The fact that the closing price ($44.90) is close to the opening price ($45.10) in this case is a sign of stability, and that the underwriters and the DMM performed their job well.Note that for Twitter as a company, the exciting day was November 6, not November 7. On November 6, Twitter set the offering price, and thus knew it would raise $26 x 70 million = $1.8 billion in cash. The opening price ($45.10) is irrelevant here. But for the employees of Twitter, especially the founders and early employees, the exciting day was November 7: they already owned shares before any of the IPO process happened, whether they obtained these shares as founders or in the form of employee compensation. But they were in limbo regarding just how much this intangible stake in the company was worth until 10:50am, at which time they gleefully realized they now had $45.10 x n in their pockets, where n is the number of shares they owned.So who profited from the surge from the offering price of $26 to the opening price of $45.10? Not Twitter. Instead, its employees and the institutional investors from (4) just received a huge return. Considering this, was $26 too low of an offering price? Perhaps. If Twitter had instead set the opening price at $45, and assuming that demand from investors was the same, Twitter could have raised nearly twice as much money for themselves. However, the goal of an IPO is not just to make as much money as possible; it is also to build a foundation of happy shareholders, and a shareholder is happy if he gets a nice return from his IPO investment. Normally companies try to set the offering price so that the initial investors earn something like 10 percent on IPO day, so in that regard the 73 percent return the initial investors received is on the high side.As a concluding aside, let us consider what happened to Facebook, now infamous for its botched IPO. The initial offering price (offered to institutional investors) was $38 per share. After price discovery, the opening price on the NASDAQ exchange was $42.05 (an 11 percent spike, compared to 73 percent for Twitter). After trading began, the stock started to drop back down toward $38. It very well would have gone below $38 were it not for the embarrassed underwriters who provided support by purchasing shares at $38. The closing price on IPO day was $38.23. Needless to say, the institutional investors who received first dibs on Facebook were not pleased. Nor were they when a week after its IPO, Facebook closed at $26.81. What went wrong? Numerous things:Two days before the IPO Facebook changed its mind about M (the number of shares it would offer). Though the mathematics is simple, this meant that all the major players who had planned on purchasing shares on IPO day had to recompute everything and update their plans.Many of the initial institutional investors reported in the days before IPO day that they intended to sell some of the shares they would receive.Facebook's initial offering price was much closer to the expected market price than Twitter's; as a result, the initial institutional investors in Facebook stood to gain much less on IPO day than the institutional investors in Twitter.The period of price discovery took exceptionally long (trading opened at 11:30am) and the process was marred by technical difficulties before and after the start of trading: orders did not come through, and investors were confused about whether or not their orders had been executed or even received.Extremely high volume (because of unprecedented excitement about Facebook) overwhelmed the NASDAQ servers, exacerbating the technical difficulties.The excitement was not only unprecedented but also excessive: many retail investors wanted to purchase shares of Facebook because they were convinced it was the next big thing (for many young people, purchasing Facebook shares was their first foray into the financial markets), but the reality was that the prices at which it was trading were ridiculously high compared to its profitability. When "virgin" retail investors (who had been promised that the stock price might increase by as much as 50 percent on IPO day) saw prices dropping, they grew anxious and sold their positions, exacerbating the selloff.Because of the Facebook debacle, everything about the Twitter IPO was much more conservative (lower initial offering price, conducting a dry run of the IPO over the weekend to test all of the systems, using humans instead of electronics to handle price discovery, listing on the NYSE instead of the NASDAQ), and it seems this caution paid off, at least as of day one.