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(Written long ago)EDIT >May I ask “WHY would Tibetans still want to leave China?”LATEST is Tibet lifts out of poverty! Now, all 74 poverty-stricken areas in Tibet have left behind poverty.Previous Write>Tibet again? We must have read both sides for the longest time.I have seen enough of writeups, answers and comments of many tourists.Yes, Tibet has developed with huge improvements. Given its geography, how many inside Tibet really think independence useful?By the way, if you trust the Dalai Lama, then he has said, “ Tibet does not want independence from China”.Dalai Lama: Tibet wants to stay with China, says Dalai Lama | India News - Times of IndiaWell, the Dalai Lama has changed his tune before, from independence, he then asked for autonomy and the latest only “for more development”.Perhaps because he knew few Tibet are asking for independence in reality. In fact a decade ago, his secret polls showed 20%, and with positive change, it would be even less today. Those who are descendents of serfs/ slaves won’t, nor those modernised and doing well."Under the given circumstances, I have been saying for some time now that there is a need to focus on preservation of Tibetan culture, religion and identity. It is no longer a struggle for political independence," Dalai Lama now said.Tibetan issue no longer struggle for political independence: Dalai LamaWell, the history of Tibet is complicated. If not for the British Opium wars that so disrupted China, and then the exploitation by foreign powers, then perhaps the mess over Tibet, Xinjiang and Hong Kong won’t even have happened.The reality is that the world has accepted Tibet is part of China and looking at what we can see, most Tibetans see themselves as part of China today and lives have never been this good ever before. You can find lots of videos showing Tibetans are doing just fine in China.History > If you are serious about knowing Tibet problems, then watch this critically > https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4sko0oEKoHk–A good detail documentary video on Tibet History and why the events happened.Foreign Smearing Campaign: An aggressive campaign lasting for decades. We also know British, then India and the USA have tried to influence events and continue to do so, especially the CIA and media. And the various ‘Free Tibet’ movements from India to Europe to USA.Well, why did the Dalai Lama run away in 1959 when he had the agreement and support of the CCP? Why was Lhasa seduced by the CIA? Why didn’t he agree to abolish serfdom as agreed? Why did US arm the separatists? Why didn’t he stay back, and with all the political support of Beijing improve Tibet - including the preservation of Tibetan culture, religion and identity? Perhaps time is running out for the enlightened one.US: After rapprochement, US agreed to stop its covert operations in Tibet. The goal of the CIA/DOD program was "to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among several foreign nations". Intent is to destabilise China at a low cost. CIA Tibetan program - Wikipedia. Just as they would do with Taiwan, Xinjiang or HK.India: With British trickery, India and China got into a string of disputes over territories; still a thorny core issue and supported Dalai Lama. India then had designs on increasing its influence over Tibet. Today India remains ambivalent with its Tibet card, but has officially recognised Tibet as part of China.Europe: Tibet is usually seen as a settled matter of limited strategic interest. UK Foreign Office simply said: “Tibet is China’s and that is that”.Go visit Tibet if you really care.Old Tibetan Culture - was no Shangri-La as romanticized by the West. A medieval Theocratic culture with a unique brand of Buddhism that absorbed primitive Bon religion practices, a caste system where 20% privileged had absolute control over their serfs and slaves, with religious relics made of human parts and skin. A harsh culture seemingly cruel yet ultra religious. Marx would say religion is the opium of the poor (or oppressed).From the China side, Tibetans were grateful to be freed from a cruel form of feudalistic serfdom, as also found in Nepal before being banned. Tibet was backwards and poor. The oppressed and poor majority benefited the most when communism came - almost every poor from Russia to China to Vietnam did. Would the poor majority mind being liberated as a serf or slave, given free land and new plows? Who would complain?THE GUARDIAN: What We Don’t Hear About TibetAfter 1959, (China) abolished slavery, serfdom and unfair taxes. Creating jobs through new infrastructure projects and development, first hospitals, schools in every major village, universities, and bringing free education (12 years). Clean water was pumped into the main towns and villages and the average life expectancy has almost doubled since 1950, to 60. (the Guardian)Independence for National pride” was quoted? Is this from the privileged landed and the cruel slave owners who lost the most and/ or fled? The idealists who want separatism, and provoke unrest as happened in 2008? ‘Free Tibet’ by the Tibetan exiles of the privileged classes? The CIA? The Dalai Lama and his monks?Dalai Lama said “Tibet does not want independence” from China.Well, the DL has changed his tune about independence, asked for autonomy and latest only for more development. Perhaps because he knew few inside Tibet are asking for independence in reality.Dalai Lama: Tibet wants to stay with China, says Dalai Lama | India News - Times of IndiaThe New Tibet?Have you seen their city, their vibrant culture and music, dances and festivals. Tibet has found a new vibrancy with tourism, dance, and singing. Famous singers on TV singing Tibetan songs, as well as movies. One even won the nation wide competition.Women perhaps like the rest of China are probably far more liberated than their ancestors too.They even host strange international events like this one; must be cold:Tibet is slowly modernising as is the whole of China. It is not backwards and desperately poor any more. A scene from modern Lhasa which is connected by rail to the rest of China, as well as air.And most practical, is whether things have changed for the lives of millions of poor farmers on their hostile land? What do the people look like today?Education? Instead of 9 free years, Tibetans have 12 free! Many young Tibetans are given a better chance that they can ever imagine, with three universities.Economics? Their GDP is 3 to 6 times those of its neighbors. Life expectancy has doubled, and they eat well today.Tibet Today? Well, imagine they eat vegetables everyday today, when many generations cannot unless of privileged castes. How many Tibetans today really want their old ways? I am not a Tibetan, but perhaps I am just more pragmatic. If you care about Tibet, go visit and contribute to their important tourist industry. Tibet is in my bucket list.EXTRATibet is harsh place: extracted some useful information from Quoran, Janus:Location 4: Lhasa, Tibet, China (29°41'52.3"N 91°09'18.6"E)Greenhouses in Tibet. Use your Google Earth, you will find greenhouses in any town.Massive amount of greenhouses on the Tibetan plateau. So Tibetans have less time to pray at temples, instead, they have to work more now.Average vegetable price has reduced by 90% over a decade, with no need to import expensive vegetables anymore.Tibetans historically only eat yak meat, milk, cheese, and bread. As place is harsh, only elite and monks could eat vegetables. Today Tibetans can anything, including watermelons.Development spread across Tibet, same as for poor Xinjiang, Gansu and Ning xia, too, with huge amount of investments, transportation, agriculture based on water-scarce techniques, and abundance of energy from solar panels, wind and dams.NOTES:User-12132127169141895779's answer to If China has improved Tibet so much, then why do Tibetans still want independence?Tibet's 2018 GDP has reached $22 billion -- about 191 times 1959 figure.In the 1960s, the CIA provided the Tibetan exile movement with $1.7 million a year for operations against China, including an annual subsidy of $180,000 for the Dalai Lama.In his 1990 autobiography, "Freedom in Exile," the Dalai Lama explained that his two brothers made contact with the CIA during a trip to India in 1956. The CIA agreed to help, "not because they cared about Tibetan independence, but as part of their worldwide efforts to destabilize all Communist governments," the Dalai Lama wrote. The Dalai Lama also wrote regretfully in his book that the CIA had trained and equipped Tibetan guerrillas who conducted raids into Tibet from a base camp in Nepal.Even so, in 2001 the Dalai Lama said: "Tibet, materially, is very, very backward. Spiritually it is quite rich. But spirituality can't fill our stomachs."CIA Tibetan programLA Times: CIA Gave Aid to Dalai Lama in '60s, Files ShowX Yang's answer to Why has China taken such drastic and repressive actions against the tiny country of Tibet?Greenhouse vegetable planting in TibetChina Installs World's Highest Wind Farm in the Mountains Of Tibet

Podemos (Spanish political party) - WikipediaI get the impression that it is a work in progress (a Google translation):1National Energy Transition Plan2Repeal of Royal Decree 900/2015, of October 9, and approval of a regulation that allows the development of self consumption3Impulse and development of green infrastructures4Progressive adoption of 100% renewable energy in all departments of the Public Administration5Public commitment not to authorize fracking installations6Conduct a cost audit of the entire electrical system7Modification of the regulatory framework so that all energy sources receive a reasonable remuneration based on actual production costsReferring to Fig.Establishment of effective controls to prevent oligopolistic practices in the electrical systemReferring to Fig.Protagonism of renewable energies in the planning of the electrical system10Recovery of hydroelectric power plants by the StateelevenGuarantee by law of access to a minimum supply12Design of an alternative proposal to the Energy Strategy of the European Commission13Identification of the transition costs of the competition14Citizen participation and audit for the execution of large infrastructuresfifteenBicycles as the basis for sustainable urban mobility16Guarantee of access to public transport17National Pact for Productive Economics18Support for clusters to reverse the deindustrialization process19Increase in industrial diversification and commitment to the development of advanced servicestwentyCreation of sectoral strategic committeestwenty-oneImpulse of an industrial policy focused on the development of specific competences22Bets on social clauses and public procurement as tools for generating social value2. 3Implementation of publicly-funded sovereign investment funds24Reinforcement of competition in strategic sectors25Modernization of telecommunications services26Reorienting investment in public infrastructures27Development of intermodality by improving the rail connections of ports28Reorientation of the construction sector29Distribution of agricultural income and adaptation of agricultural and fisheries sector regulations30National Program of Introduction to Research31Approaching science to society: Centers for Citizen Innovation32Redefinition of the research career33Online Research Portal3. 4Bets on researchers and senior researchers35Guarantee of access to scientific culture36Recovery of young talent: call Margarita Comas37State Pact for Science and Innovation38Promotion of innovative activity in the business fabric39Encouraging the return of scientific emigre talent40Investment in science and responsible R & D41Democratization of OPIS42Creation of an observatory for the defense of transparency in access and management of research and university institutions43Flexible and autonomous research and teaching44Comprehensive plan to combat fraudFour. FiveExtension to ten years of the statute of limitation of fiscal crimes46IRPF Reform47Recovery of the effective tax on the estate tax and inheritance and gift tax48A simpler and more transparent corporate tax49We will modify indirect taxation, in particular value added tax (VAT), to contribute to the improvement of social welfare.fiftyEstablishment of true green taxation51Coordination of the environmental taxes of the Autonomous Communities52"Solidarity tax" to private financial institutions with extraordinary character53Advance towards the financial transaction tax54Agreement for territorial financing55Improving the regulation of the financial system56Elimination of privileged bank secrecy of tax havens57Creation of a European independent and public rating agency58Constitution of a powerful and effective public bank from the nationalized entities Bankia and Banco Mare Nostrum59Conversion of the Sareb into a management tool for a public rental housing park60Repeal of the reform of Article 135 of the Spanish Constitution61Implementation of a debt audit at the parliamentary seat62Restructuring of public debt63Restructuring of the mortgage debt of households64Limitation of fiscal incentives to corporate debt65Real and effective sanctions for those who violate the delinquency law66Reinforcement of support for small businesses between the activities of the ICO and future public banks67Fair quotas for the self-employed68Incorporation of the voice of the social economy and the self-employed into social dialogue69Study of the development of the figure of the autonomous limited liability70Development of a true Second Chance Law, also in the field of SMEs and the self-employed71Introduction of the cash VAT criterion as universal and mandatory72Promoting social economy73Empowering an economy of the common good74Support to the collaborative economy75Promotion of entrepreneurship in innovative sectors76Fair and responsible fishing quotas77Stable agricultural work78Allocation of 15,000 million euros per year for a Social Welfare and Economic Modernization Plan that will include a guaranteed income, the salary improvement and the reversal of the cuts suffered since 201079Increase of between 30,000 and 40,000 million euros of income over GDP80Modification of the current calendar of reduction of the public deficit81Abandonment of wage devaluation policy as a way to promote an improvement in competitiveness82Promoting a substantial reform of the Stability and Growth Pact and the Fiscal Pact83Ensuring an adequate level of public investment84Promotion of the reform of the statutes of the European Central Bank85Impulse of a reform of the European institutions that democratizes political and economic decision-making in the eurozone86Call for a European debt conference to discuss the coordinated restructuring of public debts within the euro area87Immediate adoption of a crash plan to eradicate poverty and child exclusion throughout Europe88Development of common unemployment insurance complementing national systems and, in the event of a crisis, acting as an automatic stabilizer89Creation of a «Social Eurogroup»90Priority of the right to work and job creation91Gradual increase of the interprofessional minimum wage up to 14 payments of 800 euros per month in January 201892Full compliance with labor regulations93Rebalancing collective bargaining94New Labor Framework95Impulse of a regulation of overtime to prevent them from becoming an instrument of irregular distribution of the day96Reform of dismissal97Impulse of internal flexibility mechanisms in companies98Towards gender equality in the labor market: reform of the birth or adoption system99Increase in the participation of workers in the management of companies100Reform or regularization of labor relations at work101Guaranteed Rent102Complementary Income Program103Complementary measures to deal with situations of social urgency104Reversal of cuts in the financing of health, education and care of people, so that in March 2018 pre-crisis levels are restored105Universalization of the right for public services to care for dependency to provide full functional autonomy106Elimination of all incentives to part-time employment and progress towards the progressive implementation of a maximum working time of 35 hours per week, with weekly computation107Combating the gender pay gap108Retirement at age 65 and fight against the loss of purchasing power109Commitment to guarantee the sustainability of the pension system with the progressive introduction of financing through taxation110Review and progressive abolition of special contribution schemes for new affiliations111Promotion of collective provision of public versus individual112Increase in non-contributory pensions113Elimination of the ceiling on the highest wages114Universal access to the health card115Increase in public health budget by € 8800 million116Expansion of the portfolio of medicines financed117Responsible prescription of drugs: a model that dispenses doses and not boxes118Universalization of electronic prescriptions: savings in the time of professionals and in the money of all119Foods without contaminants: ban on the use of bisphenol A120Law for the Free Disposition of the Own Life121Medications: R & D and transparency122ICTs at the service of health: creation of a state digital platform for access to medical records123Health: a cross-cutting approach to all public policies124R & D & I: empowerment of research and action on gender and health125RedETS: evaluation of the programs that bring more health to the people126A unique regime for all: Social Security127Law of Transparency of the Sanitary System128Adoption of a "Celiac Act"129End of evictions and decriminalization of the use of empty and abandoned housing130Right to payment131Guaranteed access to basic supplies132Stable and Affordable Rental133Defense and Probation Guarantees in Foreclosure Proceedings134Reform of the Law 18/2007, of December 28, on the right to housing135Constitutional guarantee of social rights136EUR 13.7 billion for public education: free and local school places for all boys and girls137A new Education Law, born of the debate and participation of the entire educational community138National Plan for Inclusive Education139Right to an education carried out in the co-official languages140Integrated Learning Plan for Foreign Languages141Standardization of participatory methodologies142Generalization of the integrated centers of teachings of general and special regime of music and dance143Emotional intelligence144Provision of increased competences to school councils145New system of access to the public educational function146Decrease in pupil ratio per classroom147Support Plan for School Facilities and Equipment148Free and universal child education from 0 to 6 years149Professional training really free at all levels150New University Law151College fees accessible to all152Lifelong learning: adult education153Participatory university reform154University Consortium for the management of expenses155End of the precariousness of university faculty156Reform of the National Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation (ANECA)157For a childhood without homework158Urgent measures against child poverty and social exclusion159Law on Comprehensive Protection against Violence against Children and Adolescents160Girls, children and adolescents: priority of institutions161The sports recipe: more sports and less ambulatory162Social Fund for Sport: the sport of all163Plan to support high level athletes164Law of Regulation of the Professions of the Sport165More sports in schools: three hours of weekly Physical Education and incorporation of the subject of Physical Education to the second year high school curriculum166Sports Patronage and Patronage Law167Strategic Plan for Adapted Sport168Creation of the Observatory for the Integrity of Sport against Fraud, Minors of Matches and Sporting Results169Creation of a State Guaranteed Social Services Portfolio170A center of social services for every twenty thousand inhabitants171State funding of 85 million euros for the Concerted Plan for Basic Social Services Benefits in municipal corporations172Adequacy of human and material resources of public social services to existing real demand173Creation of the Institute of Innovation and Research in Social Services174Creation of a state fund for universal accessibility175Public, free, universal and quality early care / intervention176Law of Autonomy and Dignity of dependents, their assistants and their families177Plan of shock for the dignity of people in a situation of dependency and their families178Principles and values ​​of the International Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities179Extension of the right to vote to persons with functional diversity180Law of Labor Inclusion of People with Functional Diversity181Permanent Citizenship Forum on Dependency and Functional Diversity182Financing of third sector organizations dedicated to the care of people with functional diversity or dependence183Free rehabilitation and physiotherapy for people in situations of dependency or functional diversity184Increase and streamlining of benefits for ortho-prosthetic material185Constitutional recognition of Spanish sign languages ​​as co-official languages186Implementation of the gender perspective in the institutions of the General State Administration to eliminate discrimination and make equality between men and women effective187Women in the Armed Forces and in the State Security Bodies and Forces188Faced with the machista violence, the independence of women189Law Against Discrimination for Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation190Comprehensive Law against Trafficking in Persons191Elaboration of the new Gender Identity Law192Strategic Plan for the Reconciliation of Work and Family Life193Protection of single-parent families194Support plan for mothers and young parents195Recognition of all family realities196Right to free and decisive motherhood197Respect for determination about one's own pregnancy, childbirth and postpartum198HIV prevention plan: information, prevention and care199Housing guarantee for victims of sexist violence200Protect the right to decide for all women201Urgent ratification of Convention 189 of the International Labor Organization202Single-family families: for an independent and safe motherhood203Ministry of Culture and Communication204Pact for Culture and specific laws for the cultural sector205Law of Superior Artistic Studies206Reform of the General Law of Audiovisual Communication207Assembly of Cultural Professionals and Citizen's Observatory of Culture208Measures for the responsible and effective exercise of the Public Cultural Administration209Directorate General of Digital Culture and Public Platform for Open Culture210Reduced cultural VAT211New Patronage and Patronage Law and Social Fund of Culture212Statute of the Artist and of the Professional of the Culture213Statute of Information214New Intellectual Property Law215Operational Plan to Promote Dissemination and Access to Digital Culture216Operative Plan for Access and Enjoyment of Culture217Operational Plan for Reading Citizenship218School of Spectators219Campaign for an Active Hearing220Operative Plan for the Promotion of Cultural Diversity221Operative Plan for Culture for Equality and Equality in Culture222Operational Plan for Social Inclusion in Cultural Matters223Operational Plan for the Internationalization of Culture Produced in Spain224Patrimonial Destination Network225Revocation for breach of electoral program226Revocation of public offices, Popular Legislative Initiative, Popular Veto Initiative and Popular Deliberative Process Initiative: Democracy227Parliamentary regulations for the democratic debate of all and all228Political equality: reform of the electoral system229New territorial model based on five conceptual axes230Legal obligation to present to primaries on the part of all those candidates to preside executive organs of the political parties231Repeal of the requested vote and creation of an electoral law that facilitates the exercise of the right to vote of the Spaniards abroad232Depoliticization of the Constitutional Court233Elimination of privileges of elected officials2. 3. 4Law of Professionalization of the Public Administration235Reduction in the number of senior positions236Recovery of labor rights in the public sector237Extension of the Transparency Law238Regulation of incompatibilities in public office239Crystal Walls Law240Reformulation of the Law on Public Sector Contracts241Monitoring budget implementation242Citizen Observatory for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Accountability243Open and accessible administrative contracts244National Plan against Corruption and for Institutional Transparency245Judicial police and experts for their functional assignment to the courts246Introduction of the criminal figure of unjust or unjust enrichment247New Law on Financing of Political Parties248Creation of the Asset Recovery Department249Redefinition of tax offense250Strengthening of systems of legislative evaluation in matters of corruption and criminal policy251Public participation in public management252Real Free Justice253Direct election of the General Council of the Judiciary254Public audit of the judicial system255Comprehensive reform of the Office of the Prosecutor256Elimination of procedural privileges257Repeal of the Organic Law amending the Criminal Procedure Law258Fines and administrative penalties proportional to the income of persons259Repeal of the gag law260Creation of the Government Human Rights Office261Memory, truth and justice: pillars of the culture of human rights262Creation of the State Agency for the Protection of Consumers263Right to compensation of consumers who are victims of abuse264Decriminalization of cannabis265Free software for open, secure and accessible Administration266Simplification of administrative procedures267Direct management in Public Administration and optimization of professional performance268Regular audits of public bodies269Homologation of the working days of the Armed Forces to those of the rest of the Public Administration270Redefinition of the military career of all professional military personnel271Military: citizens and workers272Transparency and Democratic Control for Defense273Civilian personnel in charge of administrative tasks in the Armed Forces274Freedom of association for members of the Civil Guard275Improvement of coordination between the Civil Guard and the National Police276New system of promotion in the State Security Forces277Right to decide278Reform of the Senate279Review of the financing model280Stoppage of the Montoro law281Plan of Social Use of the Earth282New Water Law283Polluter pays284Protection of the marine environment and its environment285Sustainable Cities286Promotion of the circular economy: Objective Residue ZERO287Ecological rescue: saving our biodiversity288Combating climate change289Comprehensive Environmental Participation and Education Strategy290Vice-Presidency of Sustainability291Water a human right292Safe environment as a fundamental right293Cancellation of Concordat294New Freedom of Conscience Act295A lively and sustainable rural world296Take care of our mountains297Guarantee of access to public transport298Vertebrate the territory and boost the economy from the railroad299Objective ZERO in traffic accidents300New Land Use Law301New Landscape Protection Law302Plan for Effective Coastal Protection303Animal Welfare Law304Universal health coverage305Office of Emigration306Regulations for the teaching of the Spanish language and culture abroad307Development of measures to guarantee decent pensions for Spanish migrants and returnees308Establishment of mechanisms and agencies that enable the return of Spanish emigrants309Right to vote and political participation of the foreign population resident in our country310Elimination of the nationality test and reductions in the periods to obtain nationality311Creation of the Secretariat of State for Migration Policies312Legal and safe routes of entry into Spain and relaxation of the processes of family reunification313"Law 14" for equality of treatment and for the promotion of coexistence314Closing of the Internment Centers for Foreigners315Guarantee of the right of asylum: legal access routes, common asylum system and resettlement programs316Restoration of the legality of border crossings: respect for human rights on the southern border317Adoption of an international legal framework for the restructuring of sovereign debt318Prohibition of highly speculative financial products319Reform of the voting systems of the G-20 and the International Monetary Fund320Against tax evasion: "Tobin tax" and global tax on wealth321Establishment of a black list of tax havens322Opposition to TTIP323Towards the abolition of the veto right in the UN Security Council324Impulse of the election of a woman as the next secretary general of the UN325Submission to citizen consultation of the participation of the Armed Forces in international military operations326Audit and revision of the agreement with the United States on the permanent military base in Morón327Greater autonomy of Spain and Europe in NATO328Rights for round-trip migration between Spain and Latin America329Commitment to self-determination of Western Sahara and grant of Spanish nationality to the Saharawi population residing in Spain330Recognition of the Palestinian State331New Africa Plan332Scientific and cultural cooperation with the United States to prevent brain drain333Reduction of sumptuary expenses of the foreign service and more attention to Spanish emigrants334Transformation of the Spain Brand and the Cervantes Institute to reflect the diversity and plurinationality of our country335Approval of a Global Justice Pact and an International Solidarity and Cooperation Law336Increase in the budget for Official Development Assistance337Creation of the Ministry of Equality and Solidarity338Liberalization of the AP-4 (Sevilla-Jerez)339Inmatriculations of the Catholic Church340Regulation of hydraulic exploitation of the sub-basins of the rivers Genil, Fardes and Guadiana Minor341Decontamination of land previously used by industry342Improvement and creation of new sections in the road network343Construction of a second dam in the Concepción dam344Improvement of the railway network for the vertebration of Andalusia3. 4. 5Comprehensive plan for the protection of the olive grove and its industry346Plan of improvement and resizing of the public company incinerator REMESA347Reopening of the Canfranc-Olorón railway line on the 2020 horizon348Paradoxical works of the Yesa swamp349Improvement of the Cantabrian-Mediterranean railway corridor350Mining funds for the development of Asturias351Infrastructure plan352Impulse of a specific Balearic regime based on the economic and solidarity balance between the different territories of the Spanish State353Declaration of the public interest of inter-island and peninsular connections for the Balearic Islands and the Canary Islands354Recognition of the Canary Islands as Outermost Region (RUP) in the Spanish Constitution355Promotion of actions resulting from the investment reserve for the Canary Islands356Compliance with the main objectives and measures of the Special Options Programs for Distance and Insularity (POSEI) to guarantee the budgetary allocation357No to fracking in Cantabria358Economic recovery plan for the regions of Besaya and Reinosa359Complete shutdown of Villar de Cañas centralized temporary warehouse360Intermodal logistics platform and freight train for Toledo361Proposed draft law for the defense of local autonomy and recognition of the counties362Railway for Castilla y León363Expand and improve the system of Cercanías (Rodalies) of the metropolitan region of Barcelona364Compliance with the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia in relation to investments in infrastructure365Improvement of the rail network in mountain regions366Motorway Lleida-Pyrenees367Cross-border cooperation368Paralization of the A-57 to save the Galician hills369Sanitation of the Ria del Burgo370Recovery of the estuary of Pontevedra for citizenship371Provide more water (and better quality) to the Tagus river as it passes through Aranjuez372Resolution of the construction project for the Cercanías Móstoles-Navalcarnero train line373Elimination, burial or transfer of the two high voltage lines that currently cross from north to south the municipality of Arroyomolinos, above housing, green areas, children's areas and sports areas374Compliance with conservation and restoration measures for the Guadarrama river basin375Recovery of the project to extend the C4 train line from Cercanías to the municipalities of Torrejón de la Calzada and Torrejón de Velasco376Review of the underground railway project in the south of Madrid377Improvement of the rail network of the Region of Murcia378Plan of defense of the coast of Murcia379Dismantling of the firing range of the Bardenas Reales380Paralysis of the works of the high-speed train381Regeneration of the productive fabric of industrial zones382Opening of a dialogue process for the extension of powers transferred to the Basque Country383Urgent re-industrialization plan for La Rioja384Elimination of the requirement of not having debts with the public administrations to be able to access the funds of the social services385Comprehensive plan to improve transport and communications infrastructures386Increased state funding in support of entrepreneurship and SMEs387Support for agriculture, livestock and fisheries388Preservation of natural spaces389sustainable tourism390Unattachability of the first and only housing391Elimination of unfair terms392Observatory on the Right to Housing393Independent justice for the military394Public health care and a guaranteed right for all people, regardless of where they live

Yes ….1,000,000 % Hyperiflation = Oil is the Devil's excrement;Dr Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonzo Venezuelan, Founder of OPEC: saw it all coming. The infamous lines: "ten years from now, twenty years from now, you will see; oil will bring us ruin. Oil is the Devil's excrement ; 'The Devil's Excrement' - February 3, 2003The ultimate outcome seeing corruption, poverty, war, pollution and all this revolving around a grim speculation… Oil the Devil's excrement…the case all along was that we had never been in control of oil, it’s oil that’s been in control of us. A Spanish economist said of his homeland, "What makes her poor is her wealth"--a suitable lament for Venezuelans who have been waiting so long for their ship of money to come in.Money itself cannot obtain objectives. It must he used wisely with an eye to the future. A wave of money can destroy as well as create, and it often does. Will building the biggest and best‐looking schools create the best education?”“Because of the sharp rise in the price of oil, if Venezuela cut its production it would still be earning just as much money,” he said.“If we don't cut production we will have economic indigestion. We will have too much money that we will not be able to put to good use creating super high hyperinflation , corruption and the highest level of crime.”Financial collapse and hyperinflation make Venezuela an economic disaster zone.The crisis is no longer confined to one nation: refugees and migrants are streaming by the millions into neighbouring countries. |Venezuela epidemics and violent crime are spilling over all borders, endangering Colombia’s fragile peace process in the frontier regions.As Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro looks to cement his hold on power, his country is sinking into a trough of misery.Hyperinflation has compounded the scarcity of food and medicines. Epidemics of preventable diseases and a child malnutrition crisis are increasingly deadly. Violent crime has spiked.As seriously estimated over four million Venezuelans have emigrated, with hundreds of thousands crossing the border with Colombia each month in search of a new home. Venezuela’s neighbours, once bystanders to its domestic tensions, face a catastrophe on their doorsteps involved with international drug trafiking , extrosion, fraud, thief and murders.It’s the Oil, Stupid!!!“it’s the oil, stupid!” makes sense without being really true. Certainly, as the embodiment of immense wealth and energy, oil appears to be a force capable of defining the destiny of modern nations. Yet this appearance is deceptive. Oil conditions but does not determine the social life of these nations. To understand this, it is enough to observe that oil has radically different effects in different oil producing societies—for instance, the United States and Canada, on the one hand, and Nigeria and Venezuela, on the other. Given its exceptional power, it is necessary to remind ourselves of a true truism: oil does not do anything by itself, but as it is transformed and used by people under given cultural frameworks, specific historical situations and global economic contexts. For this reason, it would be truer to say, “It’s the society, stupid!”As an extraordinarily valuable commodity, it is hard for people to control it, particularly when it undergoes its most dramatic metamorphosis: when it becomes money.As money, oil tends to have similar effects in societies where it is in fact the main source of money. In effect, as the major source of foreign exchange of many oil exporting countries, oil money typically brings about an erosion of their industrial and agricultural production, leading to 70% expensive imports is the generalization of various forms of “corruption,” and the concentration of political power in their states.Venezuela's Inflation Rate: Causes and SolutionsVenezuelan has been suffering from high inflation rates for many years. The figure has been between 25 and 30 % per year. Inflation has continued to rage even though GDP growth has been negative in 2009 and 2010, and will likely be negative to neutral in 2011.The high inflation rate led the government to impose price controls. Controlled prices range from the price of foods to what a parking lot owner can charge per hour. In some cases, prices have been frozen for years, leading businesses into poor maintenance, causing the inability to hire more workers, and driving some to near or full bankrupcy.Price controls have also led to spot shortages. Fresh milk, for example, isn't easy to find - beacause its price is controlled. Long duration milk is found easily because its price isn't controlled. Powdered milk has been difficult to find this week. Sometimes the government tries to attack shortages by importing food. This means we have seen chicken shortages, but later we saw lots of chicken in the markets, some of it in poor condition. Hundreds of thousands of tons of food have been found rotting in import containers held by the state owned company PDVAL. This appears to be caused by a broken supply chain - they bought the food but didn't figure out how to set up the distribution system to get it to the markets. According to analysts, food inflation is largely due to the fact that supply does not meet demand, even though the financial system has dramatically increased loans to the agricultural sector.As long as the government is tossing around money to buy votes, or printing it to pay its bills, then there's going to be excess money floating around, and the price of just about anything they don't control by fiat is going to increase. Their response has been to increase their controls. They want to control housing rental prices. They of course control the salaries of government workers (who are now very underpaid and are starting to complain). Now there's even talk by the Chavez suppporters in the Assembly of controlling the salaries of workers in the private sector - they don't like to see private sector labor making more than government sector labor, so they're going to "equalize" everybody into poverty.The bottom line is inflation continues to rage, they think they can keep on printing their monopoly money forever, price controls are being extended, and the country continues to suffer from both inflation and recession. I know some of you like to gloss over reality, and seek comfort in all those nice statistics about how Venezuelans are such happy people under Chavez. But this is getting really ugly, and you don't do anybody any good pushing feel good propaganda when things are getting this bad. Please go tell somebody somewhere to talk some sense into the Chavistas, because nobody is going to win when the country collapses and people start to riot.The erosion of productive activities as a result of the massive inflow of energy money has been commonly called the “Dutch disease,” a syndrome baptized as such to refer to the negative effects of windfall profits coming from North Sea gas exploitation on manufacturing activities in the Netherlands. I have preferred to call it the “neocolonial disease” not only because these consequences are far more pervasive and pernicious in the narrowly diversified economies of postcolonial nations, but because they include the reproduction of relations of colonial dependence between these formally independent nations and metropolitan centers (as I argued in The Magical State: Nature, Money and Modernity in Venezuela, p. 7).In these nations, these effects also involve the proliferation of different forms of corruption, ranging from the imaginative creation of myriad paths for privately appropriating public wealth, to the less visible and more pernicious consolidation of political and economic relations that trap these nations as mono-exporters; despite projects that claim to diversify their economies, these countries typically remain, as in colonial times, primary commodity producers for the international market. In Venezuela, this has happened under very different political administration, where all imported product was the rule of quality.Clearly, maintaining this skewed international division of labor requires the collusion of politics and business, and thus the formation of a social system and political culture deeply implicated in legitimating and consolidating the vast set of formal and informal mechanisms through which oil is produced and oil money is appropriated. If in capitalist nations based on the generation of value through human labor the business of politics is business, in oil exporting societies based on the extraction of rents through the capture of natural riches, the business of business is politics. This explains why in Venezuelan public life politics occupies such a central space. Of course, politics everywhere entangles vital collective issues with private interests, but in Venezuela the state has become a particularly privileged path to status, power, and riches.Oil fortune has unfortunately helped make Venezuela a typical exemplar—or patient—of this “neocolonial disease. ” This fortune has also turned its state into an incarnation of charismatic powers that appear to be providential—a “magical state.”From the outset, Chávez was critical of PDVSA’s oil policy. Instead of maximizing production, he sought to increase prices and to strengthen OPEC. What’s your evaluation of this aspect of his energy policy? However, whilst in a very severe over supply situation, cutting back production to improve prices is the right practice, maximizing production should be the preferred policy of every oil producing country.This generates employment, increases demand for goods and services and has a multiplier effect on the Gross National Product requiring a high percentage ( 70%) of imports creating hyperinflation. Moreover, very high prices in recent years have not been a result of production cuts. Chávez has made a serious mistake in reducing investment in the oil industry, minimizing maintenance expenditures in a rapidly decaying infrastructure and allowing large production losses at a time when the market (especially the United States) could have absorbed a considerable increase in Venezuela’s production levels, without seriously affecting world oil prices.The so-called Bolivarian Revolution conveys the message that Venezuela dictates the level of worldwide oil prices. Venezuela has not the ability nor capability for disrupting the supply-demand equation at short notice and for a long time, nor has it the lower production costs and significant oil reserves of conventional crudes. Venezuela is a price-taker. Ricardo Hausmann: It is a fact that Venezuelan oil production is way below where it was supposed to be according to the strategic plans Chávez inherited.Today Venezuela should have been producing close to 6 million barrels a day, instead of the current 2.4 million. But under Chávez, the published strategic plans remained very similar. What has happened is a huge increase in the gap between plan and reality. In fact, PDVSA has been grossly overstating the actual level of production. So, it is hard to argue that the current oil production outcome is the result of deliberate policies rather than inability to achieve desired goals. With regards to the international price of oil, Venezuela’s oil output collapse has certainly been a small contributing factor, but commodity prices have been rising across the board, including mining and agriculture. Should Chávez be credited with those price increases as well? In any counterfactual scenario, oil prices would have been much higher now than in 1999.“Sowing the oil” has been the goal of the Venezuelan state since the 1940s. Oil has been treated as a source of foreign exchange to be invested in other areas of the economy. The energy sector itself has also been seen as a field of industrial diversification. Has Chávez managed to “sembrar el petróleo?Far from being a scientific approach to the optimal allocation of oil revenues, the long-time hidden debate on oil revenues flourished. It was first the issue of maximizing oil revenues either by increasing production (vs. decreasing prices) or by increasing prices (vs. decreasing production). A ridiculous trial and error exercise. However, the higher the oil revenues, the more the boasting about nationalism and anti-imperialism. Much ado about nothing. As in the past, but even worse than ever, the sowing of oil became a dictum with no real content….Worse than ever, Venezuela is witnessing hyperinflation, devaluation, production capacity eroded, unemployment, a two-tier exchange rate, poverty, dilapidation and corruption. The essence of the problem Venezuela has, and has had since the 40s, is the optimal allocation of oil revenues. The PDVSA meta-state is not the optimal model for allocating the oil rent nor is the PDVSA para-state. Far from being a scientific approach to the optimal allocation of oil revenues, the long-time hidden debate on oil revenues flourished.It was first the issue of maximizing oil revenues either by increasing production (vs. decreasing prices) or by increasing prices (vs. decreasing production). But it was as well the false debate on increasing the royalties and taxes. In 2001 the oil royalty was set up in 30% (16.6% since the 40s). Why not 31%? Why not 29%? A ridiculous trial and error exercise. However, the higher the oil revenues, the more the boasting about nationalism and anti-imperialism. Much ado about nothing. Ricardo Hausmann: Definitely not.While pre-Chávez policies lead to the creation of steel, aluminium and petrochemical industries, export concentration in oil is at a historic peak. Chávez has even made the export of products other than oil almost a crime. He used the fact that steel and cement companies exported part of their output to justify their recent nationalization. The exchange rate regime coupled with a highly protective trade policy is also antiother exports. There are no plans to create or promote other export industries. Non-oil production is geared to the domestic market and thus is completely dependent on oil as a source of foreign exchange. If the price of oil were to falter, Venezuela would have no alternative industries that could expand to take its role in generating foreign exchange as in 2014.Furthermore, PDVSA Agriculture will complement government activities to provide assistance to farmers and consequently food to the people. PDVSA Agriculture has already started sowing soy on land owned by the company and will soon start sowing sugar cane. This is done with the help of Argentine machinery. PDVSA’s new core business is the People of Venezuela and its new business model reflects this priority. With this new model, we have successfully challenged the existing paradigm of inefficient state owned companies, by demonstrating that while maintaining the status as one of the world’s largest integrated oil companies, PDVSA is also effectively contributing to the development of the Nation. When he became president, Chávez claimed that PDVSA had become “a state within the state”—an enterprise disconnected from the nation pursuing its own interests. Now critics claim that PDVSA has become a“meta-state”: a powerful instrument of the state unaccountable to society. The claim that PDVSA was a “state within the state” preceded the current regime. Chávez, however, placed the state within PDVSA, transforming the company into a “cash cow” to finance government plans not included in the annual national budget, such as 70% of import and distribution of foods, manufacture of consumer goods and government “misiones” (social plans). PDVSA also provides cash for acquiring private companies (Electricidad de Caracas, etc). The few audits of these new activities, more in the nature of a conglomerate than of a company, show inefficiency, mismanagement and financial malpractice.Currently, 18 countries are working with the Venezuelan Petroleum and Energy Ministry and PDVSA to develop the Orinoco Belt. It is well known that Venezuela has 130 billion barrels of proven reserves in this region and, after finishing the certification process trough the Orinoco Magna Reserve Project, our country will have the largest reserves worldwide.The destruction of the managerial capacity of the oil industry and the renegotiation of the contracts with foreign companies (with the departure of those that did not agree with the changes) has diminished the capacity of PDVSA to achieve any desired goal. Contrast this outcome with Petrobras, a company that is now expanding its production internationally, and deploying its proprietary technology abroad. In the meantime, Venezuelan experts are in exile, working for other countries and companies. You would need a very peculiar definition of nationalism to count this as an example of it.Some critics argue that the project of orimulsion was the perfect opportunity for Chávez to use Venezuela’s resources to promote an ecological and socially responsible energy plan—one favoring electricity for people rather than gas for cars.The Orimulsion projects were part of a technological quest to make the best use of the extra heavy crudes. Associating the price of these products with that of carbon resulted in enormous losses for Venezuela. Mixing lighter crudes to obtain, for example, Merey 16—as ExxonMobil did—allowed for great competitive advantages compared to mixing heavy crudes with water. The introduction of new technologies to improve and transform the extra heavy crudes resulted in a commercial breakthrough that has made these products quite competitive. In conclusion, Orimulsion has turned out to be no more than a good technology to transport heavy crudes as was originally conceived.Since recovering from the oil industry sabotage of 2002–2003, PDVSA has played an extremely important role in helping fund necessary social programs in Venezuela. In 2007, the company invested over $13 billion into such programs, which have helped lower poverty and address longstanding social needs. From 2003 to 2007, the poverty rate in Venezuela decreased from 55.1 percent to 27.5 percent, according to the National Institute of Statistics. Furthermore, these programs also helped nearly a million children from the poorest villages obtain free access to education. Secondary education has been made available to 250,000 children whose economic situation previously excluded them from enjoying this right. Adult literacy programs have taught 1.2 million adults how to read and write. These are just a few examples of the many successes we have experienced in Venezuela.On the other hand, Venezuela is a country with almost 100 years of oil production experience; paradoxically, we do not have a national industrial park to provide the goods and services demanded by the current production levels and even less for Venezuela’s oil and gas business plan, “Sowing the oil.”Dismantling the PVDSA irreplaceable machinery of a professional body of more than 10,000 geologists, petrophysicists, production and refinery engineers, researchers and planners. If assessed in the context of a zero-sum game, the loss for Venezuela is a gain for the world, quite a remarkable achievement. The lack of accountability regarding oil activities. Chávez disregarded the technical knowledge and professional expertise required to efficiently run an oil company. His belief that PDVSA is an inexhaustible cash cow. Collaboration between producer and consumer countries is a key part of the solution, framed by changing the developing model of the so called industrialized countries. It challenges the paradigm of what “development” means for developing countries, offering an alternative way to generate social value.Venezuela’s oil policy was dominated by strong actors that led to the internationalization of the oil policy. They were leading the country towards a fully privatized oil industry that would have been controlled solely by these dominant actors. President Chávez managed to break PDVSA dominance, but he nearly lost his life in the 2002 coup attempt. country towards a fully privatized oil industry that would have been controlled solely by these dominant actors.Likewise, Venezuela maintains a tense relationship with its neighbor Colombia, which is closely allied with the United States. Colombia is the second major trading partner for Venezuela, and Venezuela is dependent on imported food from Colombia, especially as food shortages have arisen in Venezuela in 2008. Venezuela’s attempt to control soaring inflation through food price controls and foreign exchange controls, combined with soaring world food demand, led to serious shortages of milk, 5 6 R eVista • fall 2008 eggs, meat and rice. Venezuela also became involved, with the permission of the Colombian government, in negotiating a humanitarian hostage exchange with the FARC guerrillas. After securing the release of two hostages, Venezuela’s negotiating role was cut off by the Colombian government because of perceived intervention in Colombian domestic affairs. Future perspectives At the end of 2007—a year in which Chávez’s anti-US and anti-“capitalist” radicalism reached its zenith—the tide suddenly began to turn against him.Rising inflation, crime and corruption, scarcity of consumers’ goods, growing divisions within the chavista ranks, and the general inefficiency of the administration had begun to erode the prestige of El Lider.On December 2, 2007, he suffered his first electoral defeat, in a referendum on a series of radical constitutional reforms including the possibility of life-long presidential reelection. Later on, new restrictions on democratic rights within Venezuela, as well as the Colombian assertions of Venezuela’s support of the guerrillas, cost Chávez the sympathy of substantial sectors of an international democratic left that had until then granted him grudging support. The time has come for evaluations of the historical role of chavismo and for tentative drafts of what a democratic post Chávez Venezuela might look like. The forces opposing Chávez in Venezuela are united in the desire to restore democratic freedoms, but their differing political philosophies range all the way from conservatism to democratic socialism…..now comes Maduro !After Chávez, a Venezuelan right-wing government would probably cleanse the country’s foreign policy of “third-worldish” elements and go back to a modest diplomacy tending to repair and deepen the nation’s inter-dependence with its traditional foreign friends. Under such a government, Venezuela would concentrate on being a reliable provider and would totally cease to be a gadfly. On the other hand, a slightly more left-leaning democratic administration— supported not only by the present opposition but also by a portion of honest former chavistas— might try to combine the return to traditional friendships with the retention and improvement of some of Chávez’s more constructive impulses, such as: a wide scope of Venezuelan diplomatic presence, a drive to foster the unity of Latin America and a bi-regional dialogue within the Americas, an effort toward more North-South equity and more South-South cooperation, and an active wish to see a wider and better balanced distribution of power among the main regions of the world.Dr Pérez Alfonzo, leader of OPEC who died, aged 75, on 3 September 1979, was one of Venezuela’s greatest political thinkers of the 20th century. He was an eminent lawyer and professor of civil law at the Central University of Venezuela. “He wanted not only to increase the government’s share of the rents, but also to effect a transfer to the government, and away from the oil companies, of power and authority over production and marketing.“For the producing countries, oil was a national heritage, the benefits of which belonged to future generations, as well as to the present. Neither the resource, nor the wealth that flows from it, should be wasted. Instead the earnings should be used to develop the country more widely.Sovereign governments, rather than foreign corporations, should make the basic decisions about the production and the disposition of their petroleum. Human nature should not be allowed to squander the potential of this precious resource.”He was both a visionary and an achiever — a rare combination. The best proof of this can be found here and now, in the shape of OPEC! OPEC was his vision. But he played a big part in bringing this vision to reality.The Petroleum Pentagon, his book is now drawn.The first pillar is reasonable economic participation for the nation, as the owner of the natural resource. The second pillar is the creation of a government body to control the conservation of, and trade in, hydrocarbons. The third pillar is the creation of a state-owned company to handle oil activity directly, both upstream and downstream, as well as internally and externally, and which could simultaneously deal with existing private companies. The fourth pillar is a “moratorium on new concessions” to individuals and a complete review of the prevailing concessionary system which did not favour the host country. And the final pillar is OPEC, the Organization that establishes international cooperation as being indispensable for the effective implementation of the strategy.Today he seems a prophet. When it hit the jackpot in 1973 , Venezuela had a functioning democracy and the highest per-capita income on the continent. Now in 2018` it has a state of near-civil war and a per-capita income lower than its 1960 level. But the Midas myth dies hard.How could that be? For the same reason so many entertainers go bankrupt. Showered with sudden windfalls, governments start spending like rock stars, creating programs that are hard to undo when oil prices fall. And because nobody wants to pay taxes to a government that's swimming in petrodollars--"In Venezuela only the stupid pay taxes," a former President once said--the state finds itself living beyond its means….Hyperinflation: A cycle begins. The economy can't absorb the sudden influx of money, causing wages and prices to inflate and the nation's currency to appreciate (by an average of 50%, according to a World Bank economist's study). That makes it harder for local manufacturers to compete. Incentives, meanwhile, become wildly distorted. When free money is flowing out of the ground, people who might otherwise start a business or do something innovative instead busy themselves angling for a share of the spoils buying 70% imported products. Why slog it out in a low-margin industry when steering some oil business toward a contact could make you a millionaire?Venezuela’s economy will continue to be tied to the country’s great mineral wealth, fundamentally made up of its enormous oil resources. Among the mono-producing countries dependent on foreign trade, the case of Venezuela is typical of how dangerous this situation is for the normal life of a nation, a position that lacks the possibility of control of the events that can greatly affect its whole economy.“In addition to other unfavourable circumstances that mono-production implies, the fact that the predominant product, petroleum, is depletable is a serious aggravating factor.Thus a doubly deadly dynamic: a ballooning public sector, a withering private one "This is a country that can never, ever sustain itself on oil," Terry Lynn Karl, author of The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, says of Venezuela. "But everyone from the President to the poor believes it can." And therein lies the trap. President Hugo Chavez rode popular rage into office by focusing on corruption. But what neither he nor anyone else will face up to is this: Oil is not an economy. Creative economic activities have spillover effects that become self-sustaining. Oil spills only into a barrel--and from there usually into the hands of a favored few. That's the real reason Venezuela's productivity growth has been roughly half 52% of the Latin American average.http://cepr.net/images/videos/BBC_News_Channel-2018-08-18_02-12-36.mp4Venezuela crisis: Hyperinflation, mass migration, food shortage, increasing number of crimes: murders, kidnapping and grinding poverty has spiralled Venezuela with a total corruption into a deep turmoil.$ 1,583 Million USD for free housing ; Pdvsa reporta la inversión para el desarrollo socialVenezuela, once a rich oil reserve country, is now battering an unprecedented economic crisis. Many in Venezuela blame President Nicolas Maduro for the country’s current condition. Here is a look at the crisis unfolding in Venezuela and how it is now affecting its people…..Dr Juan Pérez Alfonso, Venezuelan, Regarded as Founder of OPEC“I may sadly be the father of OPEC, but now sometimes I feel like renouncing my off spring,” he said wistfully in an interview in 1976.Dr Juan Perez expressed great concern that the flood of money entering Venezuela after oil prices quadrupled in 1974 had undermined the population's commitment to hard work into a group contemplating laziness and made the nation dependent on 70%+ of foreign imports.However, protection within the market and the promise of unfettered wealth arising from Venezuela’s immense oil reserves were undone by what economists came to term the 'natural resource curse'; the sudden influx of money would cause the national currency to dramatically appreciate, wages are driven up, prices inflate, manufacturing significantly slowed ,reduced, requiring up to 70% imports and exports all slump reaction creating hyperinflation.Hyperinflation in VenezuelaThe plummeting oil prices since 2014 is one of the main reasons why Venezuela’s currency has weakened sharply. The country, which has rich oil reserves largely depended on it for its revenue. But when the oil price dropped drastically in 2014, Venezuela which received 96 per cent of its revenue from the oil exports, suffered a shortage of foreign currency. This made 70% of the import of basic essentials like food and medicines difficult.Food and medicine shortage in VenezuelaVenezuela’s cannot produce the majority, now any of the goods and must import over 75% of required goods confirming that imports are down 50% from a year ago, according to Ecoanalitica, a national research firm, CNN reported. Venezuela’s minimum wage is now about the equivalent of $1 a month, making basics unaffordable for many. With a shortage of the import goods, the black market has got a free hand in the country. Prices have been doubling every 26 days on average, according to a report in BBC. According to an Al Jazeera report, many Venezuelans sift through the rubbish and bins in search for food.A survey from February this year found that almost 90% of Venezuelans live in poverty and more than 60% surveyed said that they had woken up hungry because they did not have enough money to buy food, reported Reuters. Apart from food, the country is also facing medicine shortage. The economic crisis has also hit the public health system, making medicine and equipment inaccessible to its peoples.New currency of VenezuelaAmid the growing crisis, the government issued new currency — with new clour notes and denomination — to keep up with the projected inflation. While earlier, Maduro had decided to remove three zeros from the bolivar currency, he later dropped off five zeros. The new currency will be released next month and overhaul would tie the bolivar to the recently launched state-backed cryptocurrency called the petro, Maduro said in a televised broadcast. The new “Bolivar Soberano” currency is worth 100,000 “old” Bolivares.Cryptocurrency experts have said the petro suffers from a lack of credibility because of a lack of confidence in Maduro’s government and the mismanagement of the country’s existing national currency.[PDVSA.USA], said on Wednesday that the United States had revoked the visa of its President chief executive Mr Asdrubal Chavez, cousin of Venezuela’s late president Hugo Chavez,Mass MigrationAngered by the economic crisis in the country, many Venezuelans have started leaving the country. Of the 4.3 million Venezuelans living abroad, more than 1.6 million have fled the country since the crisis began in 2015, according to the UN. The pace of departures has accelerated in recent days, sparking a warning from the UN. The majority have crossed into neighbouring Colombia and then to Panama, Ecuador, Peru and Chile. Others have gone south to Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina.The mass influx of people from Venezuela has triggered a strong response from Ecuador and Peru, Panama. According to news agency AFP, Colombia had criticised its two southern neighbours for implementing travel restrictions, warning it wouldn’t stop migration. Ecuador — where close to half a million people have fled this year alone — then lifted its week-long requirement for Venezuelans to produce a passport, all the while helping those migrants reach Peru. Peru’s citizens largely supported the move, though, worried about the impact that the 400,000 Venezuelans already in the country would have. In Brazil, rioters burning camps ans shelter this month drove over one thousand two hundreds back over the border, to Venezuela; reported Reuters.A man gets off the bridge as people queue to try to cross the Venezuela-Colombia border through Simon Bolivar international bridge in San Antonio del Tachira, Venezuela (Reuters)Colombia says it has already given temporary residence to 870,000 Venezuelans but it can barely cope. In Peru, record 5,100 people entered the country in a single day earlier this month. Colombia has pleaded with its southern neighbours to agree to a combined migration strategy, while Ecuador has called a meeting of 13 Latin American countries next month to discuss the crisis. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres will set up a special UN team to ensure a coordinated regional response.Increasing crime rate in VenezuelaAs the country slips into poverty, many are turning towards crime to make money. There were almost 27,000 violent deaths in the country last year, with Venezuela having the second highest murder rate in the world after El Salvador, according to the Venezuelan Observatory of Violence, a local crime monitoring group. Many Caracas residents refuse to go out at night due to security fears, and wealthier Venezuelans often travel in bullet-proof cars with bodyguards. A recent Gallup study placed Venezuela at the bottom of its 2018 Law and Order index, with 42 per cent of surveyed Venezuelans reporting they had been robbed the previous year and one-quarter saying they had been assaulted, reportedWilson Ramos: Inside KidnappedKIDNAPPING SCENEGetting Kidnapped (And Shot At) In Caracas, VenezuelaThe kidnapping in Venezuela started when I walked off the plane, this wasn’t the Venezuela I remembered. The second I walked through customs there were several individuals that walked up to me to exchange money. Of course I said! Who wouldn’t like to exchange money with a non official random person in a back alley of the airport in the most dangerous city in South America?Oil, & PDVSA State oil Company: Petro Caribbe stocks drainedVenezuela cancelled Oil delivery to 11 International customers in June 2018 incapable to pump 1,5 million barrels per day.Legal actions against PDVSA by U.S. producer ConocoPhillips aimed to satisfy a $2 billion arbitration award also have recently worsened the bottleneck as the Venezuelan firm is no longer fully using its Caribbean terminals to store and export.But an increase in production of diluted crude oil, or DCO, formulated by PDVSA by blending naphtha and extra heavy oils while its crude upgraders are out of service, and shipments from Aruba and Curacao ahead of seizure attempts by Conoco helped PDVSA and its joint ventures deliver more barrels to the United States in June.PDVSA exports have declined in recent months due to a stubborn tanker backlog around Venezuela’s main ports and its fast-declining crude output, which has stopped the firm from complying with supply contracts to almost all of its customers.A U.S. district court judge in Houston last week ruled Conoco can depose Citgo as preparation for a court case against PDVSA and others over alleged asset transfers in the Caribbean that Conoco claims were designed to frustrate its efforts to obtain payment under the arbitration award.Venezuela has begun testing sea-borne oil transfers to ease a severe backlog of crude deliveries from its main terminals, according to sources and data, as chronic delays and production declines could temporarily halt state-run PDVSA’s supply contracts if they are not cleared soon.Venezuela suspends oil delivery to Antigua and Barbuda and othersJune 12, 2018 OBSERVER media Antigua and Barbuda is among countries to be affected as Venezuela’s PDVSA says it is suspending petroleum deliveries to about half of the Caribbean countries in its Petrocaribe agreement.The move comes due to falling crude production and low refinery utilisation, according to a Venezuelan Oil Ministry report quoted on the online news agency Platts.PDVSA, according to the Platts report, is indefinitely suspending a combined 38,000 b/d of refined products deliveries to eight of the 17 countries that make up Petrocaribe: Antigua and Barbuda, Belize, Dominica, El Salvador, Haiti, Nicaragua, St. Vincent & the Grenadines and St. Kitts & Nevis.However, the report added that PDVSA will continue to supply 45,600 b/d of refined products in June to Cuba’s Cubametales, including 95 octane gasoline, aviation fuel, diesel, LPG, and residual fuel. Cuba has been one of the countries that has most benefited from the PetroCaribe agreement, receiving average deliveries from PDVSA of 95,000 b/d of crude and refined products.Under the Petro Caribe agreement, Venezuela sells petroleum to Central American and Caribbean nations on favorable terms….They pay 50 or 60% and the balance is financed up to 25 years .Venezuela inaugurated the plan in 2005 with Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas , Belize, Cuba Cienfuegos Refinery, Dominica, Granada, Guyana – which subsequently pulled out, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica Petrojam refinery, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic Refinery , St. Kitts & Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, and Suriname.The original agreement contemplated a supply of up to 185,000 b/d of crude oil and products under preferential conditions…50% / 60 days up to 25years financing. In 2017, Venezuelan shipments of petroleum via Petrocaribe dropped by 40%, or 54,400 b/d, from 136,000 b/d exported in 2015. The Oil Ministry report also said even though PDVSA does not have Mesa 30 crude available in June to supply Cuba, it is evaluating the possibility of buying light crude from third parties. In February, March, and April, PDVSA bought 4.2 million barrels at world wide price of Urals crude for Cuba.PDVSA has been operating its refineries below capacity because of a shortage of crude feedstock and various unscheduled shutdowns. PDVSA this month plans to process 499,000 b/d through its refining system, or 31 percent of its 1.6 million b/d capacity.Russian oil bought by PDVSA for Cuba discharges in the Caribbean -dataJune 25, 2018, 02:09:00 PM EDT By ReutersPDVSA has been unable to fully use its refining and storage facilities in the region, diverting cargoes that have contributed to export delays.Aframax tanker Advante Atom originally was to discharge Russian Urals crude in mid-May at PDVSA's Bullenbay terminal in Curacao, where it would be re-exported to Cuba, one of several such cargoes since January.PDVSA exported 765,000 barrels per day of crude and refined products to customers in the first two weeks of June, a 32 percent decline compared with May, excluding shipments by two of the company's joint ventures, which export separately.Manuel Quevedo, Venezuela's oil minister and the state-run firm's president, last week said the country expects to recover a portion of its lost crude output this year. But there are no early signs of a reversal in the declining trend. The number of active rigs fell to 28 in May versus 54 in the same month of 2017.Secondary sources quoted in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' monthly report estimated Venezuela's oil production fell to 1.392 million bpd last month, the lowest since the 1950s.The lack of Venezuelan crude supply has forced the 335,000-bpd Isla refinery, owned by the Curacao government, to seek a temporary operator to replace PDVSA, which has not sent oil to the facility since late April.June’s expected throughput is down 144,000 b/d from the same month in 2017. PDVSA’s system is comprised of five refineries: Amuay, Cardon, El Palito, Puerto La Cruz, and Isla Curacao, which it operated in an agreement with the Curacao government.With the new tankers, Venezuela's fleet stands at 81 ships, up from 12 oil tankers in 2002.Next month PDVSA expects the Boyacá tanker to arrive, followed by the Carabobo tanker and the Junín tanker in April 2014, the release said.PDVSA on Friday, was operating Isla Curacao at just 29,000 b/d, or 8.7% of its capacity, as it was unable to obtain crude supply out of storage, according to a refinery official who spoke with Platts on the condition of anonymity.The alleged suspension in some Petrocaribe shipments is the major second blow to Venezuela’s hobbled oil industry in the past week. A PDVSA official told Platts last week the company notified 11 international customers that it will not be able to meet its full crude supply commitments in June. The source, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said PDVSA is contractually obligated to supply 1.495 million b/d to those customers in June, but only has 694,000 b/d available for export. PDVSA cannot supply 800,000 barels per day sold and paid for by international long time customers.Venezuela’s oil production has continued to shrink, plunging for the 10th straight month to 1.36 million b/d in May, according to a Platts survey. That is down 580,000 b/d from May 2017 and 910,000 b/d from May 2016.The drop in PDVSA deliveries may present an opportunity for US Gulf Coast refiners, who are increasingly exporting refined products throughout Latin America and the Caribbean.US refined products exports to PetroCaribe nations, including Venezuela, averaged 398,000 b/d in March, up from 256,000 b/d in March 2017, data from the US Energy Information Administration showed. The bulk of that increase has been going to Venezuela.Venezuela must import and depends on semi refined light oil for mixing heavy crude from the USA.[ CONCLUSIONS The conventional wisdom about leaders like Chávez is that their electoral successes depend on class voting, particularly the support of poor voters disenchanted with the old political establishment, corruption within traditional parties, and the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus. There are, however, intuitive reasons to doubt this interpretation, including Chávez’s conflicts with organized labor, potential middle class benefi ts from some of his economic policies and redistributive programs, and the scholarly contention that Latin American populist leaders generally rely on multiclass bases of support. My results show that this intuitive skepticism is indeed warranted; Chávez’s electoral base is not, in fact, disproportionately poor. That is, I find no evidence of a monotonic class vote outside the election of 1998.]This oligarchy, made up of Chavez's political heirs, is the third major component of the real power in Venezuela. Of course, Maduro; his wife, Cilia Flores; and many of his relatives and associates are part of that oligarchy. In this elite there are different “families,” “cartels,” and groups that compete for influence on government decisions, for political appointments, and for the control of illicit markets—ranging from human trafficking to money laundering. The smuggling and selling of food, medicines, and all kinds of products are just a few of the many other corrupt activities that enrich the Maduro oligarchy as well as the Cubans, the military, and their civilian accomplices.Getting rid of Maduro is necessary. But it's not enough as long as three criminal cartels—who are intermingled in business, corruption, and the exercise of power—continue to control Venezuela.Oil is the Devil's excrement".U.S. Drug Smuggling Trial of Venezuelan Leader Nicolás Maduro'sDrug Trafficking Within the Venezuelan Regime: The 'Cartel of the Suns'Venezuela's National Guard Commander Gen. Nestor Reverol (pictured in Caracas) is named in an indictment in federal court in New York City that accuses him of tipping off cocaine traffickers of incoming raidsNestor Reverol, the former head of Venezuela’s anti-narcotics agency and a long-time ally of late socialist leader Hugo Chavez, is named in a sealed indictment pending in federal court in Brooklyn, New York, according to the people.He would be one of the highest-ranking Venezuelan officials - and the only one currently in office - to face U.S. drug charges.Reverol, who leads the branch of Venezuela’s armed forces that controls the country’s borders, could not be reached for comment by Reuters.INTERNATIONAL COCAINE CORRIDOR VENEZUELA“The National Guard has been key to opening up the doors into Venezuela for Colombian drug trafficking organizations and subversive groups,” he said. “They have transformed Venezuela into a massive pipeline for cocaine into the United States and Europe.”US government sanctions on Venezuela vice president for drug chargesNicolas Maduro Doesn't Really Control VenezuelaMaduro doesn’t really matter. He is simply a useful idiot, the puppet of those who really control Venezuela: the Cubans, the drug traffickers, and Hugo Chavez’s political heirs. Those three groups effectively function as criminal cartels, and have co-opted the armed forces into their service; this is how it is possible that every day we see men in uniform willing to massacre their own people in order to keep Venezuela’s criminal oligarchy in power.Another important player in today’s Venezuela is the drug traffickers, whose power is also a constraint on Maduro. Venezuela is one of the main drug routes to the U.S. , Europe and Africa. This status is worth billions of dollars, and the country is home to a vast network of people and organizations that control the illicit trade and the enormous amount of money it generates. According to U.S. officials, one such person is Vice President Tareck El Aissami, and so are a large number of military officers and other relatives and members of the ruling oligarchy.Reuters (With inputs from agencies)Venezuela: The Chávez Effect (Fall 2008)( 96p history data )Venezuela’s economy collapses: All your questions answeredVenezuela's Inflation Rate: Causes and Solutionshttps://antiguaobserver.com/venezuela-suspends-oil-delivery-to-antigua-and-barbuda-and-others/Russian oil bought by PDVSA for Cuba discharges in the Caribbean -dataThe launch of the book "The Petroleum Pentagon"Poverty Reduction in VenezuelaThe Economics, Culture, and Politics of Oil in VenezuelaJuan Pérez Alfonso, Venezuelan, Regarded as Founder of OPEBiografía Juan Pablo Perez AlfonsoChina-made oil tankers arrive in Venezuela - BNamericasOil is the devil's excrementVenezuela's first lady says her nephews were kidnapped by U.S.https://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/news/122120.pdfNicolas Maduro Doesn't Really Control Venezuela[1] Tugwell, Franklin (1975) The Politics of Oil in Venezuela. Stanford University Press, p.182[2] For example, while Venezuelan individual income taxes during the 70’s made up only 4.1% of total tax income and corporate taxes made up 70.3%, in neighboring Colombia, the tax burden is distributed much more evenly among different sources, so that individual income tax makes up 11% and corporate tax 12.8% of total tax income. (Source: Terry Lynn Karl, 1997, The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro States, University of California Press, p.89)[3] Source: OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2001[4] Chávez’ visits to Saddam Hussein and Muammar Qaddafi would come to haunt him over and over again, as his opponents would site these visits as reasons for their dislike of Chávez.[5] As was the case of Dutch gas, which is where the name for the problem comes from.[6] World Development Report 2000/2001, p.297[7] Average annual inflation was over 50% between 1988 and 1998.[8] Terry Lynn Karl, p.235. This was a fate suffered by only 19 countries in the world in 1996.[9] Terry Lynn Karl (1997), p.184[10] Fernando Coronil (1997) The Magical State: Nature, Money, and Modernity in Venezuela. University of Chicago Press. p.4[11] [Source?][12] To list a few name changes: Shell became Maraven, Exxon became Lagoven, Mobil became Corpoven , Gulf became Menoven (sp?).[13] An oil industry expert, who briefly served on the PDVSA board of directors in the days leading to the April 11, 2002 coup attempt.[14] Bernard Mommer (2001) “Venezuelan Oil Politics at the Crossroads.” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, Monthly Commentary.[15] www.americaeconomia.com[16] PDVSA ranks #24 in terms of return on assets, #49 in terms of return on sales, and #50 in terms of return on fixed assets.[17] Source: Mark Weisbrot and Simone Baribeau (2003), “What happened to Profits?: The Record of Venezuela’s Oil Industry,” Center for Economic Policy Research paper: www.cepr.net/what_happened_to_profits.htm (their figures are based on SEC filings).[18] Carlos Rossi, “PDVSA’s Labor Problems,” The Daily Journal, April 18, 2002.[19] See: El Nacional, “Cuentas Crudas, Precios Refinados”, November 17, 1998[20] For 2001 outsourced oil fields cost $10.94 per barrel of oil equivalent produced, while non-outsourced oil fields cost only $2.03 per barrel of oil equivalent (in 1997 dollars). Source: CEPR Research Paper, “What Happened to Profits?”[21] See: www.soberania.info/tercerizacion_portada.htm The excess costs averaged about $90 million per year for 1998 to 2000.[22] See: Alexander Foster and Tulio Monsalve, “Quien Maneja las Computadoras de PDVSA?” Venezuela Analitica, December 17, 2002 www.analitica.com/bitbiblioteca/tulio_monsalve/computadoras_pdvsa.asp[23] Alí Rodríguez, the former president of OPEC and current president of PDVSA provides a good summary of the policy in: “La Reforma Petrolera Venezolana de 2001” in Revista Venezolana de Economía y Ciencias Sociales, No. 2/2002, May/August 2002.[24] Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Article 303.[25] Ibid.[26] Article 5 of the “Ley Organica de Hidrocarburos.”[27] Alí Rodríguez (2002), p.204[28] Chávez’ visits to Iraq—the first of any head of state since the Gulf War—and to Libya, both members of OPEC, would later be used repeatedly by his opponents at home and in the U.S. as proof for his unreliability and dangerous tendencies.[29] President Caldera had named the son of his chancellor to the board and Chávez’ first appointment to the PDVSA presidency, Hector Ciavaldini came from a lower management position. No protests were voiced against these appointments at the time.[30] Carlos Rossi, “PDVSA’s Labor Problems,” The Daily Journal, April 18, 2002. According to Rossi, PDVSA employees referred to the Caracas headquarters as “Hollywood” because every employee had at least one double that performed the same functions within the company.