Horse Lease Agreement: Fill & Download for Free

The expert on this subject, Soviet Marshall Giorgiy Zhukov said that they could not.He said the most important were the 400,000 heavy trucks that moved Soviet troops and supplies to the front(s).The Germans used 3 million horses.

First, your linked article talks about the Gwadar port in Pakistan with an 13% interest rate. That appears to be a lie. From the horses mouth, the Pakistani government:“Noor Ahmed, secretary of the Economic Affairs Division of Pakistan, told Xinhua that the country‘s total foreign debt is about $106 billion and Chinese loan accounts for a mere 10 to 11 per cent of the total foreign debt, whereas the remaining 89-90 per cent is from other sources IMF, Paris Club, and other western organisations.“CPEC-related government loans have an interest rate of only 2 per cent and a repayment period of 20-25 years, and repayment of debt will begin in 2021. CPEC is not imposing any immediate burden with respect to loans repayment and energy sector outflows. All debt-related outflows will be outweighed by the resultant benefits of the investments to the Pakistan economy,” the statement read.Referring to China’s developmental project, the statement added that the infrastructure sector is being developed through interest-free or government concessional loans. Gwadar Port is a grant-based investment, which means the Government of Pakistan does not have to pay back the investment amount for the development of the port.Not only local, but foreign rating and economic organizations also see CPEC is a great benefit for Pakistan, rather than a debt trap. World’s leading rating agency Moody’s said that ongoing implementation of CPEC projects is likely to contribute 9 to 10 percent of Pakistan‘s GDP in the fiscal year 2018-2019.Another international audit, consulting, advisory, and tax services agency Deloitte said that CPEC would add up to 2.5 percentage points to the country’s growth rate. Xinhua”https://invest.gov.pk/node/678From what I have read, this is typical of BRI financing. Remember also, all financing for BRI does not come from just Chinese sources. There are 62 countries participating and as part of their participation, they have to invest funds to be used for development loans across the BRI. Many of these projects are considered high risk by the IMF and World Bank, both controlled by the US. It is not in the interest of the US to make the BRI a success.Most western media point to Sri Lanka as the poster child of how bad the BRI is and that the BRI was a debt trap. Sri Lanka’s problem was because it borrowed heavily and had a national cash-flow problem and bet big on its Hambantota port that went sour and on its own failed economy.“The Sri Lankan government is still obliged to pay off five loans obtained from the Exim Bank of China to construct the Hambantota port and the agreements pertaining to those loans have not been amended. The loans were not defaulted and the loan agreements remain unchanged. In that sense, the port lease cannot be interpreted as a debt-equity swap, which refers to a cancellation of debt in exchange for the equity of an asset. In this case there was no cancellation of the debt.Instead, a 70 percent stake of the port was leased to China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited (CM Port) for 99 years for $1.12 billion. This $1.12 billion, however, was not used to pay off the debt obtained to construct the port. This significant dollar inflow was used to strengthen the country’s foreign reserves and make some short-term foreign debt repayments. To be precise, it is fair to say that the money earned from the Hambantota port deal was largely used to cover balance of payment (BOP) issues resulting largely from the soaring debt servicing cost while Sri Lanka’s export and FDI inflow growth remain sluggish.In August 2017, Sri Lanka’s cabinet of ministers took a decision to sign a concession agreement with CM Port to operate the Hambantota Port as a Private Public Partnership (PPP) project under which a 70 percent stake of the port is leased to CM Port. The remaining 30 percent of the stake is owned by the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) and the commercial operations of the port are handled by the CM Port and the SLPA jointly while the government of Sri Lanka still owns the port. At the time of entering into the lease agreement, Hambantota Port was valued at $1.4 billion and CM Port invested $1.12 billion as per the terms of the agreement.A common and popular myth is that Sri Lanka was unable to pay off the loan obtained to construct the port, thus it was handed over to China. However, by the time the Sri Lankan government entered into the agreement with CM Port to lease Hambantota port, the debt servicing cost pertaining to the loans obtained from China Exim bank to construct the port did not amount to much. Those loan installments (including interest) amounted to less than 5 percent of Sri Lanka’s total foreign debt repayments. Furthermore, loan repayments pertaining to the second phase of the Hambantota port project were yet to start at the time. A more serious concern pertaining to foreign debt servicing cost was the maturity of sovereign bonds, which amounted to more than 40 percent of the total debt servicing payments in 2019.There were five loans (excluding loans obtained for a bunkering facility project) obtained from 2007 to 2014 to construct the port under the government led by Mahinda Rajapaksa, who now holds the office of prime minister. Some of the loans were obtained at interest rates as high as 6 percent while some were concessionary loans. The total sum of these loans amounted to $1.263 billion. Out of these five loans, just two loans, collectively worth $357 million, were obtained at commercial rates, indicating that the majority of the loans for the Hambantota port project were concessionary. However, the loan payback period was not long, which resulted in higher loan installments subsequent to the completion of the grace period.In that context, it is incorrect to claim that China acquired Hambantota port because Sri Lanka failed to pay off the debt obtained to construct the port. The often quoted “port deal” was actually a lease agreement clearly separate from the loans obtained for the purpose of constructing the port and the money obtained from the lease was used to strengthen the foreign reserves of the country, not to repay China. There was no cancellation of debt, although the port was leased to China for 99 years. There has been no change in ownership. However, as per the lease agreement, a significant portion of the operations in the port will be handled by China Merchant Port company, thus a large portion of the profit, if any, will be earned by CM Port.Leasing out Hambantota port is not evidence of the Chinese debt trap. Instead, it is more of a reflection of the external sector crisis Sri Lanka is facing. It is indeed more alarming and concerning than a Chinese debt trap and reflects a far bigger crisis stemming from the reduction of trade, persistent twin deficits (trade deficit and budget deficit), and the middle income trap.”The Hambantota Port Deal: Myths and RealitiesChina took over the port with an additional investment of $1 billion to upgrade the port and make it a viable working port, for that, it took a 70% stake of a 99 year lease to recover its investment. Why is that a bad deal? If the west thought it was so bad, it could have come to Sri Lanka’s rescue and be a hero. It did not so what does that say about the western criticism?There is no one place to find the information you seek because the loans are from government and corporate sources. Countries like Japan that are investing in the BRI provide their own funding for their projects. It is also amazing that the ‘Business Insider’ now says the BRI is a $4 to 8 trillion dollar project. My recollection is that the estimates before were in the $2 trillion range so is the BRI getting bigger in scope or is that inflation?So the west demonizes China’s BRI as a debt trap when in reality most developing countries are in debt to the IMF and World Bank, American creations for debt by developing countries.

No.However, they do take care of a significant section of the city's area and population throgh a complicated lease agreement with the Government of Jharkhand (earstwhile Bihar). Below is an excerpt from a Livemint article which is very relevant to the question. The link for the entire article is given below:“A bit of history is necessary here: in 2004, Jusco was spun off into a separate enterprise from Tata Steel’s town services division, which had the mandate under a lease agreement with the state to build and maintain civic infrastructure in Jamshedpur. The arrangement is rooted in history dating back to 1904 when geologist P.N. Bose unearthed a storehouse of iron ore and coal in the close proximity of today’s Jamshedpur. From 1907, when Tata Iron and Steel Co. Ltd (Tisco) was incorporated, the region started to witness transformation. It wasn’t even a one-horse town when the factory at Jamshedpur started to produce ingots in 1912.By 1929, Tisco, later renamed Tata Steel, took under its ownership 15,449 acres from the provincial government under British rule, and along with it the responsibility to build the necessary ecosystem to support a large steel factory. By the early 1980s, restrictive laws on the ownership of land had been promulgated, forcing Tata Steel to grudgingly cede control of most of its landed property in Jamshedpur. The state government of Bihar eventually leased most of the town to Tisco in 1984, but only after a protracted legal battle.”Battle for the soul of Jamshedpur