The Commonwealth Of Massachusetts Presented By: James J: Fill & Download for Free

Cornell Law SchoolHENNING JACOBSON, Plff. in Err., v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.Supreme Court197 U.S. 1125 S.Ct. 35849 L.Ed. 643HENNING JACOBSON, Plff. in Err.,v.COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.No. 70.Argued December 6, 1904.Decided February 20, 1905.This case involves the validity, under the Constitution of the United States, of certain provisions in the statutes of Massachusetts relating to vaccination.The Revised Laws of that commonwealth, chap. 75, § 137, provide that 'the board of health of a city or town, if, in its opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety, shall require and enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof, and shall provide them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit $5.'An exception is made in favor of 'children who present a certificate, signed by a registered physician, that they are unfit subjects for vaccination.' § 139.Proceeding under the above statutes, the board of health of the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the 27th day of February, 1902, adopted the following regulation: 'Whereas, smallpox has been prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge, and still continues to increase; and whereas, it is necessary for the speedy extermination of the disease that all persons not protected by vaccination should be vaccinated; and whereas, in the opinion of the board, the public health and safety require the vaccination or revaccination of all the inhabitants of Cambridge; be it ordered, that all the inhabitants habitants of the city who have not been successfully vaccinated since March 1st, 1897, be vaccinated or revaccinated.'Subsequently, the board adopted an additional regulation empowering a named physician to enforce the vaccination of persons as directed by the board at its special meeting of February 27th.The above regulations being in force, the plaintiff in error, Jacobson, was proceeded against by a criminal complaint in one of the inferior courts of Massachusetts. The complaint charged that on the 17th day of July, 1902, the board of health of Cambridge, being of the opinion that it was necessary for the public health and safety, required the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof who had not been successfully vaccinated since the 1st day of March, 1897, and provided them with the means of free vaccination; and that the defendant, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refused and neglected to comply with such requirement.The defendant, having been arraigned, pleaded not guilty. The government put in evidence the above regulations adopted by the board of health, and made proof tending to show that its chairman informed the defendant that, by refusing to be vaccinated, he would incur the penalty provided by the statute, and would be prosecuted therefor; that he offered to vaccinate the defendant without expense to him; and that the offer was declined, and defendant refused to be vaccinated.The prosecution having introduced no other evidence, the defendant made numerous offers of proof. But the trial court ruled that each and all of the facts offered to be proved by the defendant were immaterial, and excluded all proof of them.The defendant, standing upon his offers of proof, and introducing no evidence, asked numerous instructions to the jury, among which were the following:That § 137 of chapter 75 of the Revised Laws of Massachusetts was in derogation of the rights secured to the defendant by the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, and tended to subvert and defeat the purposes of the Constitution as declared in its preamble;That the section referred to was in derogation of the rights secured to the defendant by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and especially of the clauses of that amendment providing that no state shall make or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; andThat said section was opposed to the spirit of the Constitution.Each of defendant's prayers for instructions was rejected, and he duly excepted. The defendant requested the court, but the court refused, to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. And the court instructed structed the jury, in substance, that, if they believed the evidence introduced by the commonwealth, and were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged in the complaint, they would be warranted in finding a verdict of guilty. A verdict of guilty was thereupon returned.The case was then continued for the opinion of the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts. Santa F e Pacific Railroad Company, the exceptions, sustained the action of the trial court, and thereafter, pursuant to the verdict of the jury, he was sentenced by the court to pay a fine of $5. And the court ordered that he stand committed until the fine was paid.Messrs. George Fred Williams and James A. Halloran for plaintiff in error.HENNING JACOBSON, Plff. in Err., v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.Supreme Court197 U.S. 1125 S.Ct. 35849 L.Ed. 643HENNING JACOBSON, Plff. in Err.,v.COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS.No. 70.Argued December 6, 1904.Decided February 20, 1905.This case involves the validity, under the Constitution of the United States, of certain provisions in the statutes of Massachusetts relating to vaccination.The Revised Laws of that commonwealth, chap. 75, § 137, provide that 'the board of health of a city or town, if, in its opinion, it is necessary for the public health or safety, shall require and enforce the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof, and shall provide them with the means of free vaccination. Whoever, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refuses or neglects to comply with such requirement shall forfeit $5.'An exception is made in favor of 'children who present a certificate, signed by a registered physician, that they are unfit subjects for vaccination.' § 139.Proceeding under the above statutes, the board of health of the city of Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the 27th day of February, 1902, adopted the following regulation: 'Whereas, smallpox has been prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge, and still continues to increase; and whereas, it is necessary for the speedy extermination of the disease that all persons not protected by vaccination should be vaccinated; and whereas, in the opinion of the board, the public health and safety require the vaccination or revaccination of all the inhabitants of Cambridge; be it ordered, that all the inhabitants habitants of the city who have not been successfully vaccinated since March 1st, 1897, be vaccinated or revaccinated.'Subsequently, the board adopted an additional regulation empowering a named physician to enforce the vaccination of persons as directed by the board at its special meeting of February 27th.The above regulations being in force, the plaintiff in error, Jacobson, was proceeded against by a criminal complaint in one of the inferior courts of Massachusetts. The complaint charged that on the 17th day of July, 1902, the board of health of Cambridge, being of the opinion that it was necessary for the public health and safety, required the vaccination and revaccination of all the inhabitants thereof who had not been successfully vaccinated since the 1st day of March, 1897, and provided them with the means of free vaccination; and that the defendant, being over twenty-one years of age and not under guardianship, refused and neglected to comply with such requirement.The defendant, having been arraigned, pleaded not guilty. The government put in evidence the above regulations adopted by the board of health, and made proof tending to show that its chairman informed the defendant that, by refusing to be vaccinated, he would incur the penalty provided by the statute, and would be prosecuted therefor; that he offered to vaccinate the defendant without expense to him; and that the offer was declined, and defendant refused to be vaccinated.The prosecution having introduced no other evidence, the defendant made numerous offers of proof. But the trial court ruled that each and all of the facts offered to be proved by the defendant were immaterial, and excluded all proof of them.The defendant, standing upon his offers of proof, and introducing no evidence, asked numerous instructions to the jury, among which were the following:That § 137 of chapter 75 of the Revised Laws of Massachusetts was in derogation of the rights secured to the defendant by the preamble to the Constitution of the United States, and tended to subvert and defeat the purposes of the Constitution as declared in its preamble;That the section referred to was in derogation of the rights secured to the defendant by the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and especially of the clauses of that amendment providing that no state shall make or enforce any law abridging the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws; andThat said section was opposed to the spirit of the Constitution.Each of defendant's prayers for instructions was rejected, and he duly excepted. The defendant requested the court, but the court refused, to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty. And the court instructed structed the jury, in substance, that, if they believed the evidence introduced by the commonwealth, and were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of the offense charged in the complaint, they would be warranted in finding a verdict of guilty. A verdict of guilty was thereupon returned.The case was then continued for the opinion of the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts. Santa F e Pacific Railroad Company, the exceptions, sustained the action of the trial court, and thereafter, pursuant to the verdict of the jury, he was sentenced by the court to pay a fine of $5. And the court ordered that he stand committed until the fine was paid.Messrs. George Fred Williams and James A. Halloran for plaintiff in error.[Argument of Counsel from pages 14-18 intentionally omitted] Messrs. Frederick H. Nash and Herbert Parker for defendant in error.[Argument of Counsel from pages 18-22 intentionally omitted]Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court:1We pass without extended discussion the suggestion that the particular section of the statute of Massachusetts now in question (§ 137, chap. 75) is in derogation of rights secured by the preamble of the Constitution of the United States. Although that preamble indicates the general purposes for which the people ordained and established the Constitution, it has never been regarded as the source of any substantive power conferred on the government of the United States, or on any of its departments. Such powers embrace only those expressly granted in the body of the Constitution, and such as may be implied from those so granted. Although, therefore, one of the declared objects of the Constitution was to secure the blessings of liberty to all under the sovereign jurisdiction and authority of the United States, no power can be exerted to that end by the United States, unless, apart from the preamble, it be found in some express delegation of power, or in some power to be properly implied therefrom. 1 Story, Const. § 462.2We also pass without discussion the suggestion that the above section of the statute is opposed to the spirit of the Constitution. Undoubtedly, as observed by Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the court in Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. 122, 202, 4 L. ed. 529, 550, 'the spirit of an instrument, especially of a constitution, is to be respected not less than its letter; yet the spirit is to be collected chiefly from its words.' We have no need in this case to go beyond the plain, obvious meaning of the words in those provisions of the Constitution which, it is contended, must control our decision.3What, according to the judgment of the state court, are the scope and effect of the statute? What results were intended to be accomplished by it? These questions must be answered.4The supreme judicial court of Massachusetts said in the present case: 'Let us consider the offer of evidence which was made by the defendant Jacobson. The ninth of the propositions which he offered to prove, as to what vaccination consists of, is nothing more than a fact of common knowledge, upon which the statute is founded, and proof of it was unnecessary and immaterial. The thirteenth and fourteenth involved matters depending upon his personal opinion, which could not be taken as correct, or given effect, merely because he made it a ground of refusal to comply with the requirement. Moreover, his views could not affect the validity of the statute, nor entitle him to be excepted from its provisions. Com. v. Connolly, 163 Mass. 539, 40 N. E. 862; Com. v. Has, 122 Mass. 40; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U. S. 145, 25 L. ed. 244; Reg. v. Downes, 13 Cox, C. C. 111. The other eleven propositions all relate to alleged injurious or dangerous effects of vaccination. The defendant 'offered to prove and show be competent evidence' these socalled facts. Each of them, in its nature, is such that it cannot be stated as a truth, otherwise than as a matter of opinion. The only 'competent evidence' that could be presented to the court to prove these propositions was the testimony of experts, giving their opinions. It would not have been competent to introduce the medical history of individual cases. Assuming that medical experts could have been found who would have testified in support of these propositions, and that it had become the duty of the judge, in accordance with the law as stated in Com. v. Anthes, 5 Gray, 185, to instruct the jury as to whether or not the statute is constitutional, he would have been obliged to consider the evidence in connection with facts of common knowledge, which the court will always regard in passing upon the constitutionality of a statute. He would have considered this testimony of experts in connection with the facts that for nearly a century most of the members of the medical profession have regarded vaccination, repeated after intervals, as a preventive of smallpox; that, while they have recognized the possibility of injury to an individual from carelessness in the performance of it, or even in a conceivable case without carelessness, they generally have considered the risk of such an injury too small to be seriously weighed as against the benefits coming from the discreet and proper use of the preventive; and that not only the medical profession and the people generally have for a long time entertained these opinions, but legislatures and courts have acted upon them with general unanimity. If the defendant had been permitted to introduce such expert testimony as he had in support of these several propositions, it could not have changed the result. It would not have justified the court in holding that the legislature had transcended its power in enacting this statute on their judgment of what the welfare of the people demands.' Com. v. Jacobson, 183 Mass. 242, 66 N. E. 719.5While the mere rejection of defendant's offers of proof does not strictly present a Federal question, we may properly regard the exclusion of evidence upon the ground of its incompetency or immateriality under the statute as showing what, in the opinion of the state court, are the scope and meaning of the statute. Taking the above observations of the state court as indicating the scope of the statute,—and such is our duty. Leffingwell v. Warren, 2 Black, 599, 603, 17 L. ed. 261. 262; Morley v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. 146 U. S. 162, 167, 36 L. ed. 925, 928, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 54; Tullis v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co. 175 U. S. 348, 44 L. ed. 192, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 136; W. W. Cargill Co. v. Minnesota, 180 U. S. 452, 466, 45 L. ed. 619, 625, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 423,—we assume, for the purposes of the present inquiry, that its provisions require, at least as a general rule, that adults not under the guardianship and remaining within the limits of the city of Cambridge must submit to the regulation adopted by the board of health. Is the statute, so construed, therefore, inconsistent with the liberty which the Constitution of the United States secures to every person against deprivation by the state?6The authority of the state to enact this statute is to be referred to what is commonly called the police power,—a power which the state did not surrender when becoming a member of the Union under the Constitution. Although this court has refrained frained from any attempt to define the limits of that power, yet it has distinctly recognized the authority of a state to enact quarantine laws and 'health laws of every description;' indeed, all laws that relate to matters completely within its territory and which do not by their necessary operation affect the people of other states. According to settled principles, the police power of a state must be held to embrace, at least, such reasonable regulations established directly by legislative enactment as will protect the public health and the public safety. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 203, 6 L. ed. 23, 71; Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 470, 24 L. ed. 527, 530; Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25, 24 L. ed. 989;New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. & Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 661, 29 L. ed. 516, 520, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; Lawson v. Stecle, 152 U. S. 133, 38 L. ed. 385, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 499. It is equally true that the state may invest local bodies called into existence for purposes of local administration with authority in some appropriate way to safeguard the public health and the public safety. The mode or manner in which those results are to be accomplished is within the discretion of the state, subject, of course, so far as Federal power is concerned, only to the condition that no rule prescribed by a state, nor any regulation adopted by a local governmental agency acting under the sanction of state legislation, shall contravene the Constitution of the United States, nor infringe any right granted or secured by that instrument. A local enactment or regulation, even if based on the acknowledged police powers of a state, must always yield in case of conflict with the exercise by the general government of any power it possesses under the Constitution, or with any right which that instrument gives or secures. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 210, 6 L. ed. 23, 73; Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227, 243, 16 L. ed. 243, 247; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 626, 42 L. ed. 878, 882, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488.7We come, then, to inquire whether any right given or secured by the Constitution is invaded by the statute as interpreted by the state court. The defendant insists that his liberty is invaded when the state subjects him to fine or imprisonment for neglecting or refusing to submit to vaccination; that a compulsory vaccination law is unreasonable, arbitrary, and oppressive, and, therefore, hostile to the inherent right of every freeman to care for his own body and health in such way as to him seems best; and that the execution of such a law against one who objects to vaccination, no matter for what reason, is nothing short of an assault upon his person. But the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States to every person within its jurisdiction does not import an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis organized society could not exist with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own, whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to others. This court has more than once recognized it as a fundamental principle that 'persons and property are subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state; of the perfect right of the legislature to do which no question ever was, or upon acknowledged general principles ever can be, made, so far as natural persons are concerned.' Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 471, 24 L. ed. 527, 530; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Haber, 169 U. S. 613, 628, 629, 42 L. ed. 878-883, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 488; Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. Co. 27 Vt. 148, 62 Am. Dec. 625. In Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 89, 34 L. ed. 620, 621, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 13, we said: 'The possession and enjoyment of all rights are subject to such reasonable conditions as may be deemed by the governing authority of the country essential to the safety, health, peace, good order, and morals of the community. Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to act according to one's own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment of the same right by others. It is, then, liberty regulated by law.' In the Constitution of Massachusetts adopted in 1780 it was laid down as a fundamental principle of the social compact that the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for 'the common good,' and that government is instituted 'for the common good, for the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness of the people, and not for the profit, honor, or private interests of any one man, family, or class of men.' The good and welfare of the commonwealth, of which the legislature is primarily the judge, is the basis on which the police power rests in Massachusetts. Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. 84.8Applying these principles to the present case, it is to be observed that the legislature of Massachusetts required the inhabitants of a city or town to be vaccinated only when, in the opinion of the board of health, that was necessary for the public health or the public safety. The authority to determine for all what ought to be done in such an emergency must have been lodged somewhere or in some body; and surely it was appropriate for the legislature to refer that question, in the first instance, to a board of health composed of persons residing in the locality affected, and appointed, presumably, because of their fitness to determine such questions. To invest such a body with authority over such matters was not an unusual, nor an unreasonable or arbitrary, requirement. Upon the principle of self-defense, of paramount necessity, a community has the right to protect itself against an epidemic of disease which threatens the safety of its members. It is to be observed that when the regulation in question was adopted smallpox, according to the recitals in the regulation adopted by the board of health, was prevalent to some extent in the city of Cambridge, and the disease was increasing. If such was the situation,—and nothing is asserted or appears in the record to the contrary,—if we are to attach, any value whatever to the knowledge which, it is safe to affirm, in common to all civilized peoples touching smallpox and the methods most usually employed to eradicate that disease, it cannot be adjudged that the present regulation of the board of health was not necessary in order to protect the public health and secure the public safety. Smallpox being prevalent and increasing at Cambridge, the court would usurp the functions of another branch of government if it adjudged, as matter of law, that the mode adopted under the sanction of the state, to protect the people at large was arbitrary, and not justified by the necessities of the case. We say necessities of the case, because it might be that an acknowledged power of a local community to protect itself against an epidemic threatening the safety of all might be exercised in particular circumstances and in reference to particular persons in such an arbitrary, unreasonable manner, or might go so far beyond what was reasonably required for the safety of the public, as to authorize or compel the courts to interfere for the protection of such persons. Wisconsin, M. & P. R. Co. v. Jacobson, 179 U. S. 287, 301, 45 L. ed. 194, 201, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. 4th ed. §§ 319-325, and authorities in notes; Freurid, Police Power, §§ 63 et seq. In Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465, 471-473, 24 L. ed. 527, 530, 531, this court recognized the right of a state to pass sanitary laws, laws for the protection of life, liberty, health, or property within its limits, laws to prevent persons and animals suffering under contagious or infectious diseases, or convicts, from coming within its borders. But, as the laws there involved went beyond the necessity of the case, and, under the guise of exerting a police power, invaded the domain of Federal authority, and violated rights secured by the Constitution, this court deemed it to be its duty to hold such laws invalid. If the mode adopted by the commonwealth of Massachusetts for the protection of its local communities against smallpox proved to be distressing, inconvenient, or objectionable to some,—if nothing more could be reasonably affirmed of the statute in question,—the answer is that it was the duty of the constituted authorities primarily to keep in view the welfare, comfort, and safety of the many, and not permit the interests of the many to be subordinated to the wishes or convenience of the few. There is, of course, a sphere within which the individual may assert the supremacy of his own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government, especially of any free government existing under a written constitution, to interfere with the exercise of that will. But it is equally true that in every well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the safety of its members the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint, to be enforced by reasonable regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand. An American citizen arriving at an American port on a vessel in which, during the voyage, there had been cases of yellow fever or Asiatic cholera, he, although apparently free from disease himself, may yet, in some circumstances, be held in quarantine against his will on board of such vessel or in a quarantine station, until it be ascertained by inspection, conducted with due diligence, that the danger of the spread of the disease among the community at large has disappeared. The liberty secured by the 14th Amendment, this court has said, consists, in part, in the right of a person 'to live and work where he will' (Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U. S. 578, 41 L. ed. 832, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427); and yet he may be compelled, by force if need be, against his will and without regard to his personal wishes or his pecuniary interests, or even his religious or political convictions, to take his place in the ranks of the army of his country, and risk the chance of being shot down in its defense. It is not, therefore, true that the power of the public to guard itself against imminent danger depends in every case involving the control of one's body upon his willingness to submit to reasonable regulations established by the constituted authorities, under the sanction of the state, for the purpose of protecting the public collectively against such danger.9It is said, however, that the statute, as interpreted by the state court, although making an exception in favor of children certified by a registered physician to be unfit subjects for vaccination, makes no exception in case of adults in like condition. But this cannot be deemed a denial of the equal protection of the laws to adults; for the statute is applicable equally to all in like condition, and there are obviously reasons why regulations may be appropriate for adults which could not be safely applied to persons of tender years.10Looking at the propositions embodied in the defendant's rejected offers of proof, it is clear that they are more formidable by their number than by their inherent value. Those offers in the main seem to have had no purpose except to state the general theory of those of the medical profession who attach little or no value to vaccination as a means of preventing the spread of smallpox, or who think that vaccination causes other diseases of the body. What everybody knows the court must know, and therefore the state court judicially knew, as this court knows, that an opposite theory accords with the common belief, and is maintained by high medical authority. We must assume that, when the statute in question was passed, the legislature of Massachusetts was not unaware of these opposing theories, and was compelled, of necessity, to choose between them. It was not compelled to commit a matter involving the public health and safety to the final decision of a court or jury. It is no part of the function of a court or a jury to determine which one of two modes was likely to be the most effective for the protection of the public against disease. That was for the legislative department to determine in the light of all the information it had or could obtain. It could not properly abdicate its function to guard the public health and safety. The state legislature proceeded upon the theory which recognized vaccination as at least an effective, if not the best-known, way in which to meet and suppress the evils of a smallpox epidemic that imperiled an entire population. Upon what sound principles as to the relations existing between the different departments of government can the court review this action of the legislature? If there is any such power in the judiciary to review legislative action in respect of a matter affecting the general welfare, it can only be when that which the legislature has done comes within the rule that, if a statute purporting to have been enacted to protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety, has no real or substantial relation to those objects, or is, beyond all question, a plain, palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give effect to the Constitution. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661, 31 L. ed. 205, 210, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313, 320, 34 L. ed. 455, 458, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 185, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 862; Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 207, 223, 48 L. ed. 148, 158, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 124.11Whatever may be thought of the expediency of this statute, it cannot be affirmed to be, beyond question, in palpable conflict with the Constitution. Nor, in view of the methods employed to stamp out the disease of smallpox, can anyone confidently assert that the means prescribed by the state to that end has no real or substantial relation to the protection of the public health and the public safety. Such an assertion would not be consistent with the experience of this and other countries whose authorities have dealt with the disease of smallpox. And the principle of vaccination as a means to prevent the spread of smallpox has been enforced in many states by statutes making the vaccination of children a condition of their right to enter or remain in public schools. Blue v. Beach, 155 Ind. 121, 50 L. R. A. 64, 80 Am. St. Rep. 195, 56 N. E. 89; Morris v. Columbus, 102 Ga. 792, 42 L. R. A. 175, 66 Am. St. Rep. 243, 30 S. E. 850; State v. Hay, 126 N. C. 999, 49 L. R. A. 588, 78 Am. St. Rep. 691, 35 S. E. 459; Abeel v. Clark, 84 Cal. 226, 24 Pac. 383; Bissell v. Davison, 65 Conn. 183, 29 L. R. A. 251, 32 Atl. 348; Hazen v. Strong, 2 Vt. 427; Duffield v. Williamsport School District, 162 Pa. 476, 25 L. R. A. 152, 29 Atl. 742.12The latest case upon the subject of which we are aware is Viemester v. White, decided very recently by the court of appeals of New York. That case involved the validity of a statute excluding from the public schools all children who had not been vacinated. One contention was that the statute and the regulation adopted in exercise of its provisions was inconsistent with the rights, privileges, and liberties of the citizen. The contention was overruled, the court saying, among other things: 'Smallpox is known of all to be a dangerous and contagious disease. If vaccination strongly tends to prevent the transmission or spread of this disease, it logically follows that children may be refused admission to the public schools until they have been vaccinated. The appellant claims that vaccination does not tend to prevent smallpox, but tends to bring about other diseases, and that it does much harm, with no good. It must be conceded that some laymen, both learned and unlearned, and some physicians of great skill and repute, do not believe that vaccination is a preventive of smallpox. The common belief, however, is that it has a decided tendency to prevent the spread of this fearful disease, and to render it less dangerous to those who contract it. While not accepted by all, it is accepted by the mass of the people, as well as by most members of the medical profession. It has been general in our state, and in most civilized nations for generations. It is generally accepted in theory, and generally applied in practice, both by the voluntary action of the people, and in obedience to the command of law. Nearly every state in the Union has statutes to encourage, or directly or indirectly to require, vaccination; and this is true of most nations of Europe. . . . A common belief, like common knowledge, does not require evidence to establish its existence, but may be acted upon without proof by the legislature and the courts.. . . The fact that the belief is not universal is not controlling, for there is scarcely any belief that is accepted by everyone. The possibility that the belief may be wrong, and that science may yet show it to be wrong, is not conclusive; for the legislature has the right to pass laws which, according to the common belief of the people, are adapted to prevent the spread of contagious diseases. In a free country, where the government is by the people, through their chosen representatives, practical legislation admits of no other standard of action, for what the people believe is for the common welfare must be accepted as tending to promote the common welfare, whether it does in fact or not. Any other basis would conflict with the spirit of the Constitution, and would sanction measures opposed to a Republican form of government. While we do not decide, and cannot decide, that vaccination is a preventive of smallpox, we take judicial notice of the fact that this is the common belief of the people of the state, and, with this fact as a foundation, we hold that the statute in question is a health law, enacted in a reasonable and proper exercise of the police power.' 179 N. Y. 235, 72 N. E. 97.13Since, then, vaccination, as a means of protecting a community against smallpox, finds strong support in the experience of this and other countries, no court, much less a jury, is justified in disregarding the action of the legislature simply because in its or their opinion that particular method was perhaps, or possibly—not the best either for children or adults.14Did the offers of proof made by the defendant present a case which entitled him, while remaining in Cambridge, to claim exemption from the operation of the statute and of the regulation adopted by the board of health? We have already said that his rejected offers, in the main, only set forth the theory of those who had no faith in vaccination as a means of preventing the spread of smallpox, or who thought that vaccination, without benefiting the public, put in peril the health of the person vaccinated. But there were some offers which it is contended embodied distinct facts that might properly have been considered. Let us see how this is.15The defendant offered to prove that vaccination 'quite often' caused serious and permanent injury to the health of the person vaccinated; that the operation 'occasionally' resulted in death; that it was 'impossible' to tell 'in any particular case' what the results of vaccination would be, or whether it would injure the health or result in death; that 'quite often' one's blood is in a certain condition of impurity when it is not prudent or safe to vaccinate him; that there is no practical test by which to determine 'with any degree of certainty' whether one's blood is in such condition of impurity as to render vaccination necessarily unsafe or dangerous; that vaccine matter is 'quite often' impure and dangerous to be used, but whether impure or not cannot be ascertained by any known practical test; that the defendant refused to submit to vaccination for the reason that he had, 'when a child,' been caused great and extreme suffering for a long period by a disease produced by vaccination; and that he had witnessed a similar result of vaccination, not only in the case of his son, but in the cases of others.16These offers, in effect, invited the court and jury to go over the whole ground gone over by the legislature when it enacted the statute in question. The legislature assumed that some children, by reason of their condition at the time, might not be fit subjects of vaccination; and it is suggested—and we will not say without reason—that such is the case with some adults. But the defendant did not offer to prove that, by reason of his then condition, he was in fact not a fit subject of vaccination at the time he was informed of the requirement of the regulation adopted by the board of health. It is entirely consistent with his offer of proof that, after reaching full age, he had become, so far as medical skill could discover, and when informed of the regulation of the board of health was, a fit subject of vaccination, and that the vaccine matter to be used in his case was such as any medical practitioner of good standing would regard as proper to be used. The matured opinions of medical men everywhere, and the experience of mankind, as all must know, negative the suggestion that it is not possible in any case to determine whether vaccination is safe. Was defendant exempted from the operation of the statute simply because of his dread of the same evil results experienced by him when a child, and which he had observed in the cases of his son and other children? Could he reasonably claim such an exemption because 'quite often,' or 'occasionally,' injury had resulted from vaccination, or because it was impossible, in the opinion of some, by any practical test, to determine with absolute certainty whether a particular person could be safely vaccinated?17It seems to the court that an affirmative answer to these questions would practically strip the legislative department of its function to care for the public health and the public safety when endangered by epidemics of disease. Such an answer would mean that compulsory vaccination could not, in any conceivable case, be legally enforced in a community, even at the command of the legislature, however widespread the epidemic of smallpox, and however deep and universal was the belief of the community and of its medical advisers that a system of general vaccination was vital to the safety of all.18We are not prepared to hold that a minority, residing or remaining in any city or town where smallpox is prevalent, and enjoying the general protection afforded by an organized local government, may thus defy the will of its constituted authorities, acting in good faith for all, under the legislative sanction of the state. If such be the privilege of a minority, then a like privilege would belong to each individual of the community, and the spectacle would be presented of the welfare and safety of an entire population being subordinated to the notions of a single individual who chooses to remain a part of that population. We are unwilling to hold it to be an element in the liberty secured by the Constitution of the United States that one person, or a minority of persons, residing in any community and enjoying the benefits of its local government, should have the power thus to dominate the majority when supported in their action by the authority of the state. While this court should guard with firmness every right appertaining to life, liberty, or property as secured to the individual by the supreme law of the land, it is of the last importance that it should not invade the domain of local authority except when it is plainly necessary to do so in order to enforce that law. The safety and the health of the people of Massachusetts are, in the first instance, for that commonwealth to guard and protect. They are matters that do not ordinarily concern the national government. So far as they can be reached by any government, they depend, primarily, upon such action as the state, in its wisdom, may take; and we do not perceive that this legislation has invaded any right secured by the Federal Constitution.19Before closing this opinion we deem it appropriate, in order to prevent misapprehension as to our views, to observe—perhaps to repeat a thought already sufficiently expressed, namely—that the police power of a state, whether exercised directly by the legislature, or by a local body acting under its authority, may be exerted in such circumstances, or by regulations so arbitrary and oppressive in particular cases, as to justify the interference of the courts to prevent wrong and oppression. Extreme cases can be readily suggested. Ordinarily such cases are not safe guides in the administration of the law. It is easy, for instance, to suppose the case of an adult who is embraced by the mere words of the act, but yet to subject whom to vaccination in a particular condition of his health or body would be cruel and inhuman in the last degree. We are not to be understood as holding that the statute was intended to be applied to such a case, or, if it was so intended, that the judiciary would not be competent to interfere and protect the health and life of the individual concerned. 'All laws,' this court has said, 'should receive a sensible construction. General terms should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language which would avoid results of this character. The reason of the law in such cases should prevail over its letter.' United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482, 19 L. ed. 278; Lau Ow Bew v. United States, 144 U. S. 47, 58, 36 L. ed. 340, 344, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 517. Until otherwise informed by the highest court of Massachusetts, we are not inclined to hold that the statute establishes the absolute rule that an adult must be vaccinated if it be apparent or can be shown with reasonable certainty that he is not at the time a fit subject of vaccination, or that vaccination, by reason of his then condition, would seriously impair his health, or probably cause his death. No such case is here presented. It is the cause of an adult who, for aught that appears, was himself in perfect health and a fit subject of vaccination, and yet, while remaining in the community, refused to obey the statute and the regulation adopted in execution of its provisions for the protection of the public health and the public safety, confessedly endangered by the presence of a dangerous disease.20We now decide only that the statute covers the present case, and that nothing clearly appears that would justify this court in holding it to be unconstitutional and inoperative in its application to the plaintiff in error.21The judgment of the court below must be affirmed.22It is so ordered.

I’m heterosexual. Just chiming in to say that there would be a lot more answers here, except that those particular people who were discriminated against were murdered for being gay.They’re not here to tell their stories.Now, all the story I can find about these people are the stories told by their murderers, trying to use Gay Panic as a defense for their murderous behavior.Gay panic defense - WikipediaIn August 1954, William T. Simpson, a 27-year-old air steward for Eastern Air Lines, was murdered by Charles W. Lawrence and Lewis Richard Killen in a "lovers' lane" area of North Miami, Florida. For months, Lawrence had been posing as a hitchhiker on Biscayne Boulevard; after he was picked up, Killen would trail the car in a green Chevrolet and rob the driver who had picked up Lawrence. During the course of the investigation, Milt Sosin, a reporter for The Miami News, wrote that Lawrence and Killen had chosen the area deliberately to target homosexual victims. Lawrence confessed to shooting Simpson while "resisting his advances" and stated that "Simpson started to get nervous ... I didn't mean to shoot him. I mean[t] to fire through the windshield and frighten him and keep him there. I must have hit him."[34] Lawrence and Killen were convicted of manslaughter instead of first-degree murder, possibly due to negative local press coverage of homosexuality and the characterization of Simpson as "a pervert" during the trial.[35]Another early noted instance of the "gay panic defense" is when Joseph Rodriguez beat an old man to death with an improvised club on the evening of 26 September 1965.[36][31]During the trial, Rodriguez testified he was urinating in an alley when he was grabbed from behind; fearing the old man was trying to engage him in a homosexual act, Rodriguez commenced beating him with the club.[36] An expert witness for the defense testified Rodriguez "was acting as a result of an acute homosexual panic", but Rodriguez was convicted of second-degree murder despite the defense strategy.[36]"Chet" Jackson was murdered by John Stephan Parisie on 12 April 1968. Jackson, a local automobile dealer who had left a scout meeting earlier that evening, was found by a tow truck driver standing on a country road outside of the city of Springfield, Illinois at approximately 10:45 P.M.[37][38] The bloodied Jackson, who said he had been shot, asked to be taken to a hospital, where he died the next morning at approximately 10:30 A.M.[37][38] Parisie was found asleep in Jackson's car at 5:22 A.M. that same morning of 13 April, in possession of Jackson's wallet and wedding ring.[37] A jury convicted Parisie of murder, and he was sentenced to a term of 40 to 70 years' imprisonment on February 27, 1969.[38] On the stand, Parisie testified that he had shot Jackson with a stolen gun.[37] According to Parisie's testimony, Jackson had offered him a lift when he saw Parisie walking; Jackson then drove him out of town past the lake to a deserted gravel road, parked, turned off the lights, slid back the seat, and made a homosexual advance, saying that if "[Parisie] refused, he would have to walk."[37] However, prior to his death, Jackson told a state police trooper that he did not know who had shot him, and they had gone for a ride around the lake without parking.[37] A 1972 appellate court decision upholding the trial verdict ruled that the defense strategy was based upon "homosexual panic" leading to insanity as Parisie testified he just "blew up, went crazy" after being propositioned.[37] Prior to the trial and jury selection, a private attorney representing Jackson's widow and three children convinced the court to prohibit the defense counsel from mentioning the victim's sexual orientation[38] during jury selection, ruling the defense had failed to demonstrate relevancy.[37] The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit reversed, determining that Parisie's 6th Amendment rights had been violated by failing to allow him to show evidence that Jackson was homosexual.[38]James Bierley was stabbed to death by Robert James Thornton on January 8, 1970 in Columbia, Missouri. Bierley and Thornton were neighbors residing in the same apartment building; in a statement he gave four days later, Thornton said he had been drinking when Bierley invited him upstairs to his room to watch television. After watching for half an hour, in Thornton's statement, "[Bierley] started playing with me and put his arm around me ... he started kissing me on the jaw ... I told him three or four times to quit what he was doing and he just kept on like he didn't hear me." When Thornton attempted to leave, Bierley grabbed him and pulled him back into the room, where Thornton felt "that he was trying to queer me and I just blew up and started stabbing him. He had not made any threats to me."[39] The initial charge was first-degree murder, which the state dropped to manslaughter. Thornton was found guilty of manslaughter and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. In an appeal ruling, the Missouri Court of Appeals noted that since the victim was attempting to commit a felony upon Thornton (sodomy was a felony offense under § 563.230 RSMo 1969), homicide could be justifiable (under § 559.040 RSMo 1969), but instead, because Thornton tried to hide the knife and denied the crime when questioned by police on the evening of January 8, that indicated a consciousness of guilt rather than justifiable homicide. The Appeals Court rejected the defense that Thornton was in a state of "homosexual panic" as the pair had been sitting in a small room together with the door open, there were no signs of a physical struggle, Bierley had no weapon and according to Thornton's statement, had not made any threats, and no other residents reported unusual noises or shouts.[39]William C. Dubbels was murdered by Robert J. Shelley early in the morning of September 3, 1975 in Franklin, Massachusetts.[40] Dubbels was the manager of an all-night grocery store which employed Shelley. Shelley visited Dubbels at his home with some friends near midnight on September 2 and after drinking and joking for several hours, the friends departed, leaving Shelley and Dubbels alone. At some point during the evening, Dubbels had expressed his physical attraction to Shelley, but it was not taken seriously in the joking context of the gathering; after they were alone, Dubbels suggested that Shelley spend the rest of the night to help him open the store in the morning. Shelley agreed, and after taking a shower, got into bed with Dubbels. Dubbels made sexual advances, but was rebuffed. Shelley, upset, went downstairs to retrieve a meat cleaver and roasting fork from the kitchen. After returning to the upstairs bedroom, Dubbels reportedly put his arm around Shelley, and Shelley responded by attacking and killing Dubbels. Shelley was arrested, found guilty of first-degree murder in 1976, and sentenced to life imprisonment.[40] At his trial, Shelley produced a psychiatrist as an expert witness, who testified that Shelley suffered a "dissociative reaction" brought on from a "homosexual panic;" an expert witness from the Commonwealth of Massachusetts agreed the dissociative reaction was brought on by homosexual panic, but stated the consumption of alcohol was a contributing factor.[40] The first trial was overturned for overaggressive prosecution, but Shelley was again convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in a second trial in 1978.[41]Ronald Landry was stabbed to death by William H. Doucette Jr. on 6 February 1979 in a motel in Malden, Massachusetts.[42] Upon questioning from police, Doucette stated that Landry had tried to rape him with a knife to his throat, but the autopsy of Landry's body showed sperm in his rectum, mouth and throat, with the sperm in his mouth being deposited no more than an hour or two prior.[42] Doucette was convicted of first-degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment.[42] In reviewing the case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts found Doucette's invocation of the "homosexual panic" defense unconvincing, as the term was used "merely [to describe] the defendant's version of the events which occurred in the motel room."[42]John Dunkin was shot and killed by Ronald Williamson the night of October 31, 1981 in Wasilla, Alaska.[43] The prosecution theory was that Dunkin and Williamson had left a local bar to go barhopping together, but Williamson convinced Dunkin to stop the car along the way, and in the course of robbing Dunkin, shot him. The defense instead asserted that Dunkin invited Williamson and a friend outside to "do some Quaaludes" and despite a warning from the bartender about Dunkin, Williamson left with Dunkin in Dunkin's car. When Williamson dropped his lighter, he felt a gun, and Dunkin proceeded to drive Williamson at gunpoint to a remote area where he attempted to force Williamson to perform fellatio, which Williamson resisted. During the course of the ensuing struggle, Williamson located another gun in the vehicle and shot Dunkin with it. Williamson was convicted of two counts of tampering with physical evidence and manslaughter and was sentenced to five years' imprisonment for each count of tampering and fifteen years for manslaughter.[43] However, an appeals court ruled that hearsay testimony from Williamson's co-defendant was improperly admitted and evidence of Dunkin's sexually aggressive behavior had been suppressed; on appeal, the conviction for manslaughter was set aside and a second trial was granted.[43]Thurman Anderson was shot and killed by Kenneth Burton Lang Jr. on August 18, 1983 in the Los Padres National Forest where Anderson had told his wife he would be hunting deer.[44] Anderson had picked up Lang while Lang was hitchhiking and the two men traveled to a campsite together in Anderson's motor home. According to Lang's testimony, Anderson said something about being afraid of catching venereal disease and having had sex with two men before, and as Lang was looking through a set of binoculars, Anderson grabbed Lang by the leg and attempted to kiss him. When Lang pushed him away angrily, Anderson turned his back on Lang and swung his rifle down from his shoulder; Lang was fearful that Anderson was loading the rifle, so he shot Anderson with a handgun he owned and was carrying.[44] During rebuttal, the prosecution presented testimony from Lang's former roommate, a known homosexual who had propositioned Lang without a violent reaction. Lang was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery with the special circumstance where the murder was committed in perpetration of the robbery, and he was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court of California, in upholding the verdict, found that remarks attributed to Anderson by Lang about venereal disease were characteristic of a certain subgroup of homosexuals who had very few sexual contacts with men and a morbid fear of venereal disease. Because this subgroup was not widely known, it was likely that Lang himself was part of that subgroup.[44]Mario Escamilla stabbed a man to death after being invited inside the victim's house on 3 July 1986 in Lincoln, Nebraska.[45] Escamilla entered the victim's house when he asked to use the telephone, which occurred after the victim called out to him on the street, asking if Escamilla was lost. While Escamilla was using the telephone, the victim came up behind him and tried to touch Escamilla's scrotum, causing Escamilla to react violently by picking up a kitchen knife and stabbing the man in his neck. On appeal, Lancaster County District Court set aside the conviction for first-degree murder, and after the State appealed that appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska determined "there was no scientific testimony offered by Escamilla which supported his claim of 'homosexual panic.'"[45]In 1987, Joseph Mitchell Parsons, who called himself the "Rainbow Warrior",[46] claimed that he killed Richard Lynn Ernest to defend against a homosexual advance, but was unable to present any evidence at trial to support this claim.[47] The victim's family and friends stated in court that Ernest was not gay or bisexual.[48] Prosecution witnesses testified of Parsons' homosexual activity in jail.[49] A forensic psychiatrist from the University of Utah stated that the descriptions of Parsons' sexual history indicated that he "may have been the one initiating the contact and became angry when [Ernest] turned him down."[50] Parsons was executed by lethal injection at Utah State Prison in October 1999.[46]Stephen Lamie picked up Timothy Schick while Schick was hitchhiking on the evening of August 6, 1988 in Lafayette, Indiana; Schick stated that when he asked Lamie if he knew where they could find girls for sex or if he knew where he could get a "blow job", Lamie replied "No, but I will", and the two stopped at a baseball field. Schick would later state that after exiting the car, Lamie pulled down his own shorts and underwear, and attempted to grab Schick's penis. Schick responded by beating Lamie until "he heard gurgling noises from Lamie's chest and throat", stealing money from Lamie's wallet, and running to a nearby friend's house for help. Schick was found guilty of theft, confinement resulting in serious bodily injury, and voluntary manslaughter; he was sentenced in 1989 to consecutive sentences totaling 28 years in prison,[51] but was released in 2001.[52]Victor Hempstead was beaten to death by Dennis D. Lowe on the evening of January 10, 1992 in the "Bums Hollow" area of Omaha, Nebraska. According to Lowe's testimony, he had fallen asleep in his truck, only to be awakened by Hempstead undoing Lowe's jeans and groping him.[53][54] Lowe testified he "freaked, got scared" and then "lost it mentally for a second or two."[53] The defense was predicated in part on demonstrating Hempstead's homosexuality leading to Lowe's panic, but in an appeal, the Supreme Court of Nebraska found the evidence presented of Hempstead's homosexuality unconvincing. Lowe was convicted of second-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony.[53] However, in another appeal, because the homicide did not demonstrate malice, the conviction for murder was set aside in 1995, paving the way for a second trial.[54] Lowe was granted parole in 2004.[55]In 1995, one of the highest-profile cases to make use of the gay panic defense was the Michigan trial of Jonathan Schmitz, who killed his friend Scott Amedure after learning, during a taping of The Jenny Jones Show, that Amedure was sexually attracted to him. Schmitz confessed to committing the crime but claimed that Amedure's homosexual overtures angered and humiliated him. In cases of legal provocation providing for diminished capacity, it is required that the provocation have an immediate response. As Schmitz did not act until three days after the incident, he was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to 25 to 50 years in prison.[33] Schmitz was incarcerated in the minimum-security Parnall Correctional Facility until he was paroled on 22 August 2017.[56]In the 1998 murder of university student Matthew Shepard, the defendants claimed in court that the young man's homosexual proposition enraged them to the point of murder. However, Judge Barton Voigt barred this strategy, saying that it was "in effect, either a temporary insanity defense or a diminished capacity defense, such as irresistible impulse, which are not allowed in Wyoming, because they do not fit within the statutory insanity defense construct." After their conviction, Shepard's attackers recanted their story in a 20/20 interview with Elizabeth Vargas, saying that the murder was a robbery attempt gone awry under the influence of drugs. This claim was denied by the defendants' girlfriends.Billy Jack Gaither was murdered by Steven Eric Mullins and Charles Monroe Butler Jr. and his body was set on fire on February 19, 1999.[57] The two were accused of planning his death for two weeks after being angered over what they said was a sexual advance.[58][59] Gaither was living in Sylacauga, Alabama with his parents; although he had not come out to his parents, he was known to other gay residents of Sylacauga.[60] In a later interview, Butler said, "Billy Jack started talking about some gay issues ... wanting to have a threesome, or whatever [with Butler and Mullins]. Tempers flared up. Steve jumped on him, and cut his throat there ..." and later claimed Gaither was being disrespectful since Butler wasn't "some gay tramp out there, waiting to be corn-holed by some prick" despite Butler having frequented gay bars in Birmingham with friends.[61] Friends of Gaither stated that it was unlikely that Gaither had propositioned the duo, as he was characterized as shy.[62] At the time, Mullins and Butler were not charged with a hate crime because Alabama's hate crime statute did not cover crimes based on sexual orientation;[60] the pair were convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole.[63]Larry King, a 15-year-old student, was murdered by fellow 14-year-old classmate Brandon McInerney on February 12, 2008. McInerney was charged as an adult. The first trial ended in a mistrial (hung jury) after defense lawyers claimed their client had "reached an emotional breaking point in response to King's advances"[64] and that he felt threatened by King, who had "returned taunts from [McInerney] and other boys with sexual overtures and declarations of love."[65] In 2011, McInerney pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and use of a gun to avoid a second trial, and was sentenced to 21 years' imprisonment.[64]In 2010, Vincent James McGee was charged with capital murder for stabbing and killing Richard Barrett in Mississippi.[66] McGee claimed Barrett had dropped his pants and asked McGee to perform a sexual act on him, sending McGee into a panic.[67] McGee pleaded guilty to manslaughter, arson, and burglary on 28 July 2011. He was sentenced to 20 years on the manslaughter charge, 20 years on the arson charge, and 25 years on the burglary charge; 65 years in total.[68]Marco McMillian, an openly gay candidate for the mayor of Clarksdale, Mississippi, was murdered by Lawrence Reed on 26 February 2013. Reed's defense relied on his claim that he killed McMillian in self-defense after an attempted rape. Reed, who was taken into custody after crashing McMillian's automobile, had earlier confessed to the deputy guarding him while he was being treated for crash-related injuries. Reed was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment.[69]James Miller of Austin, Texas used the gay panic defense in the killing of his neighbor, Daniel Spencer. In April 2018, a jury found him guilty of criminally negligent homicide and not guilty of manslaughter and murder.[70]Trans panicA transgender variation of the gay panic defense was also used in 2004–2005 in California by the three defendants in the Gwen Araujo homicide case, who claimed that they were enraged by the discovery that Araujo, a transgender teenager with whom they had engaged in sex, had male genitalia. Following their initial suspicions about her biological sex, Araujo was "subjected to forced genital exposure in the bathroom, after which it was announced that she was 'really a man'".[71] The defendants claimed that Araujo's failure to disclose her biological sex was tantamount to deception, and that the subsequent revelation of her biological sex "had provoked the violent response to what Thorman represented as a sexual violation 'so deep it's almost primal'".[71] The first trial resulted in a jury deadlock; in the second, defendants Mike Magidson and Jose Merél were convicted of second-degree murder, while the jury again deadlocked in the case of Jason Cazares. Cazares later entered a plea of no contest to charges of voluntary manslaughter. The jury did not return the requested hate crime additions to the convictions for the defendants.[72]Islan Nettles was beaten to death in Harlem just after midnight on August 17, 2013.[73] The killer, James Dixon, was not indicted until March 2015, despite turning himself in three days after the attack and confessing that he had flown into "a blind fury" when he realized that Nettles was a transgender woman.[74] Dixon pleaded not guilty to first-degree manslaughter at his indictment.[75] Dixon was not charged with murder, which would have required proof of intent, nor was he charged with a hate crime.[75] During his confession, Dixon said that his friends had mocked him for flirting with Nettles, not realizing that she was transgender, and furthermore, in an incident a few days prior to the beating, his friends had teased him after he flirted with two transgender women while he was doing pull-ups on a scaffolding at 138th Street and Eighth Avenue.[74] Dixon pleaded guilty and received a sentence of 12 years' imprisonment, a sentence that Nettles' mother felt was too lenient.[76]So there were living, breathing people who are now dead, and can’t tell their stories. Stories that should have been about their lives, and not their deaths.I didn’t get a chance to meet them or hear their stories.These are fellow human beings who were discriminated against in the worst way.In the Holocaust, they were targeted too. And before then. And after then.Maybe it’s long past time this kind of crap stops.

Deborah Samson Gannett, from Plymouth, Massachusetts, Deborah Sampson - Wikipedia was one of the first American woman soldiers. In 1782, she enlisted under the name of her deceased brother, Robert Shurtleff Samson. For 17 months, Samson served in the Continental Army during the Revolutionary War.On May 23, 1983 Governor Michael J. Dukakis signed a proclamation which declared that Deborah Samson was the Official Heroine of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Deborah Sampson | History of American Women Two news services stated this was the first time in the history of the United States that any state had proclaimed anyone as the official hero or heroine. It was another first for Deborah Samson.Who was Deborah Samson? Deborah Sampson: Woman Warrior of the American Revolution Why was she designated the Official State Heroine? And why, in 1985 did the prestigious United States Capitol Historical Society issue a commemorative medal in her honor? Schoolmarm Deborah Samson was never mentioned among the beauties of her day when the topic of female pulchritude arose in the decorous social circles of Plympton and Middleborough, Massachusetts in the 1770's; but Private Robert Shurtliff was always mentioned in glowing terms as being one of the toughest, strongest, and most patriotic soldiers in the Massachusetts Fourth Regiment at the 1782 and 1783 campfires and taprooms of what is now known as West Point, New York. Shurtliff's physical endurance was legendary. What no one suspected for quite a while, except possibly a tactful clergyman in Bellingham, Massachusetts, was that Deborah and Robert were one and the same person. And what a gal she was!When Jonathan Samson, Jr. and Deborah Bradford Sample text for Library of Congress control number 2003047549 were married on October 17, 1751, it was a union between a couple who were direct Mayflower descendants. In fact, Governor William Bradford was the great grandfather of the blushing bride; and the blond six foot groom had among his ancestors the famed but bashful Captain Myles Standish and his first wife Barbara Thorne; and the love birds John Alden and Priscilla Mullens of the "speak for yourself, John" legend when the then widowed Standish asked the much younger Alden to plead his suit with the fair Priscilla. Things looked pretty good for Jonathan and Deborah when they were first married, but Jonathan sadly lacked the business acumen and willingness to work hard of his prosperous father, and the couple were soon living in poverty. Deborah Sampson Facts At least seven children were born to the couple, Jonathan III, Hannah, Elisha, Ephraim, Deborah, Nehemiah, and Sylvia, who was born when it was believed her father had been lost at sea off the coast of England in 1766. Deborah was not quite six at the time. However, recent research has proved that Jonathan was not lost at sea, he had abandoned his family and moved to Maine where he continued to live in poverty and where he died in 1811 and was buried in the paupers lot in a Fayette cemetery. He died on 2 April 1811 (aged 81) Fayette, Kennebec County, Maine, USA Burial: Sampson Cemetery West Gardiner, Kennebec County, Maine, USA plot: Section: A, Lot: No. 3.Deborah Bradford Samson simply could not provide for her brood and it became necessary for her to "bound out" some of the children. Deborah, aged five, was taken by a spinster and she was then sent to work in the home of the elderly widow of the Reverend Peter Thatcher. Some months later, Deborah was taken to the daughterless home of a Middleborough farmer, Deacon Jeremiah Thomas, the proud father of no less than ten sons. There Deborah spent about ten years, growing to be almost five foot eight inches tall, almost a foot taller than the average woman of her day, and taller than the average man. Hours of strenuous farm work broadened her shoulders and hardened her muscles. While doing these chores she dressed in male clothing. As customary with farm girls of the era in her circumstances, she received no formal schooling. Being an intelligent, spirited person who refused to accept second class citizenship she obtained an education by having the Thomas boys review their studies with her each evening after they returned from school, and the laborious farm chores were done for the night.When Deborah became eighteen, she secured a job, of all things, as a school teacher! The one room school house in which she taught is still existent today, part of a neat Cape codder in Middleboro. She supplemented her income by spinning and weaving at various homes and at Sproats Tavern, a gathering place for the men who discussed the battles of the Revolutionary War and the heroic exploits of some local young men, including Ebenezer Sproat, the six foot, six inch giant son of the tavern owner, Ebenezer well on his way to become a Colonel in the Second Massachusetts Regiment.Patriotism and the love of adventure finally got the best of the tall schoolmarm, and there is inconclusive evidence that she disguised herself as a man and signed Muster Master Israel Wood's sheets as "Timothy Thayer of Carver" but changed her mind overnight and did not report for duty the following day. A scandal of sorts ensued, and the pious Deacons of the third Baptist Church which Deborah had joined sometime before, interrogated her but she would not admit to the 'scandalous' behavior. Things got a bit warmer for Deborah, and a short time later she donned male apparel and walked to Bellingham, Massachusetts where her distant cousin, the Reverend Noah Alden, who had served Deborah's congregation in Middleboro, now had a parish. His parsonage was diagonally across the street from a tavern where recruits from the area were mustered in. There, on Monday, May 20, 1782, Muster Master Noah Taft looked up from his table into the cold blue eyes of a tall rangy blond young man with a firm jutting jaw and a prominent nose, who identified himself as Robert Shurtliff and stated he wanted to join the army for the balance of the war. Taft paid the youth sixty pounds bounty money, after first deducting his fee, and as Shurtliff signed, Taft may have noticed that he was left-handed and unable to bend the index finger of his left hand due to an old injury. The signature was bold, legible and still exists in Massachusetts records. Three days later at Worcester, Captain Eliphalet Thorp mustered Shurtliff and forty-nine other recruits into Captain George Webb's Company. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Deborah-SampsonSergeant Gamble marched the volunteers to West Point where the men were given their uniforms and equipment. No such thing as a Physical examination in those days! Although the last major battle of the Revolution had been fought the previous October when Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown, a desperate guerilla warfare was still being savagely fought in some areas by determined Tories who refused to give up. The British still occupied New York City and other strongholds. One of the Tory units was a feared and specially trained band led by Colonel James DeLancy, and several merciless hand to hand struggles took place. In these wild skirmishes Shurtliff demonstrated his courage, strength, loyalty and fighting skill over and over again. Once when his group were ambushed near Tarrytown, Shurtliff suffered a forehead wound from a sabers slash and then was felled by a musket ball in the upper left front thigh. Just before the hapless Americans were annihilated, Colonel Ebenezer Sproat and his soldiers arrived and drove off the DeLancy attackers.Sproat, who had often seen Deborah Samson spinning in his fathers tavern in distant Middleboro, in the excitement of the rescue did not recognize the bloodstained and bleeding soldier as the prim schoolmarm Deborah Samson. At a field hospital a French doctor bound up the head wound, but was not advised of the thigh injury. When the doctor began to attend another wounded soldier, Deborah limped out of the hospital, and later, with iron nerve, using her knife, managed to extract the musket ball in her thigh. She was some time recovering from her wounds until she was able to rejoin her company. There is a pleasant legend that "Robert Shurtliff" was among the commando type warriors selected to defend Congress in Philadelphia from disgruntled unpaid soldiers; and while there, became ill, unconscious, and a Dr. Barnabas Binney found that the almost dead soldier boy was in reality an almost dead soldier girl.Binney reportedly had the unconscious soldier carried to his home without reporting his discovery, and there his wife and a nurse named "Mrs. Parker" took care of the soldier until she regained consciousness. It is highly doubtful that Robert Shurtliff was ever in Philadelphia. Whatever happened, it was discovered that Robert Shurtliff was in reality a woman, and because of 'his' heroic services, an Honorable Discharge was awarded to Robert Shurtliff on October 23, 1783. Deborah returned to her mother in Plympton, but Mrs. Samson was quite critical of her daughter's army exploits, so Deborah journeyed to the Stoughton home of her aunt, Alice Waters, the wife of farmer Zebulon Waters. Reportedly, she was dressed as a man when she arrived at the Waters farm and Aunt Alice had the impression the visitor was Ephraim Samson, one of Deborah's brothers. Some time later when 'Ephraim' met Sharon farmer Benjamin Gannett, Deborah decided to discard her male garb and become a female again as she and Benjamin soon became engaged and were married on April 7, 1785.The marriage was for the most part cursed with poverty, but blessed with three fine children. Son Earl became a Captain in the Militia and a successful business man; daughter Mary married Judson Gilbert and daughter Patience married Seth Gay. Early in their marriage, in spite of their own lack of material things, Deborah and Benjamin adopted an orphan, Susanna Baker Shepard, Deborah no doubt recalling her own unfortunate childhood. Benjamin Gannett was one of the unfortunate men who try to work hard and efficiently, but never manage to earn enough money to properly provide for their families. The Gannetts lived in a small three room structure opposite the corner of the present East and Billings Streets in Sharon. Money was a constant problem, and there are letters still existing in which Deborah mentions small sums of money she had borrowed from friends. The famous night rider, Paul Revere, now a prosperous man with a foundry and a home in nearby Canton, learned of the financial plight of Deborah. In fact she later borrowed ten dollars from him. Paul felt sorry for Deborah, and felt that she should be given a pension for her services in the war.He was a practical man with excellent connections, and as a result of his efforts, on January 19, 1792, the legislature granted Deborah thirty-four pounds with interest from October 23, 1783, the document bearing a well known signature, John Hancock, who was the Governor at the time. In a letter dated February 20, 1804 to Congressman William Eustis concerning Deborah's pension, Revere refers to Benjamin Gannett thus: "Her husband is a good sort of man, though of small force in business. They have a few acres of poor land, which they cultivate, but they are really poor." In 1797 Herman Mann, an imaginative hack writer from Dedham, wrote a far from factual biography of Deborah titled: "The Female Review; Or, Memoirs of An American Lady." The book contained innumerable falsehoods and inaccuracies, Mann even succeeded in misspelling her surname. He unintentionally did one services for posterity. He commissioned Joseph Stone of Framingham (1774-1818) to paint a portrait of Deborah for the frontispiece of the book.The picture, oil paint on paper, about fifteen inches by ten, pasted on wood, is in the John Brown Museum in Providence, Rhode Island. The portrait is far from flattering; Stone was equally as far from being an accomplished artist. But one does get the impression of a woman with calm level blue eyes, rather blonde hair, a prominent nose and a pugilistic chin. At the time the first known to serve disguised as a man in the war, Deborah scored another first when she became the first professional woman lecturer, billed as "The American Heroine" and according to the March 2, 1802 bill at the Federal Theatre in Boston, "Equipt in complete uniform will go through the manual exercises".Her tour took her to Providence, New York State, various Massachusetts cities, and eased the financial burden at her home. Things brightened up for Deborah in 1813. Her son Earl married Mary Clark and built a beautiful mansion which still stands at 300 East Street in Sharon. There Deborah made her home in her final years. Sunday, April 29, 1827 Deborah Samson Gannett died in the upper left bedroom at 300 East Street. She was buried in the nearby Rock Ridge Cemetery, her gravestone located a short distance from the hill on which her grandson George Washington Gay erected a monument to her and the Civil War veterans many years later.To recount all the myths, misstatements and outright falsehoods about Deborah would take pages. Her true name was Samson, but due to Mann, even plaques and monuments show her name as Sampson, and careless writers and 'historians' have repeated Mann's spelling and foolishness over the years.Recently, proper research by such scholars as Professor Emil F. Guba and Plympton historian Charles H. Bricknell, has replaced the myths with facts; and historian John Lundvall of Mendon, Massachusetts has deduced why Deborah journeyed to Bellingham to enlist. One translation of the Samson coat of arms is: "Disgrace Is Worse Than Death."It is not known if Deborah was aware of this motto. But she surely lived up to it!