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The history of Shri Narendra Modi is well described by his varions talks by himself and his known relatives and friends.His history is summarised as below.Narendra Modi is the current Prime Minister of India. He represents Varanasi constituency in the Lok Sabha. He is the most prominent leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). He is considered a master strategist for his party. He has been the Chief Minister of Gujarat for four consecutive terms.Family and Personal Background of Narendra ModiNarendra Damodardas Modi was born to a family of grocers in a town called Vadnagar in Mehsana district of Gujarat. He was born on 17 September, 1950 to Damodardas Mulchand Modi and Heeraben Modi. The couple had six children among which Narendra Modi was the third eldest.Modi completed his studies against all odds. His saga of struggle began when as a teenager, he, along with his brother, used to run a tea stall near a railway station in Ahmedabad. He did his schooling from Vadnagar and obtained a master's degree in Political Science from Gujarat University. One of his school teachers described him as an average student but a brilliant debater. During his college days, he worked as a 'pracharak' (promoter) of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). He left home at the age of 17 years and travelled across the country for the next two years.At a later stage, during the 1990s, when Modi served as the official spokesperson of the BJP in New Delhi, he completed a three-month long course in the US on public relations and image management.One of his brothers, Somabhai, is a retired health officer who now runs an old age home in the city of Ahmedabad. Another of his brothers Prahlad, an activist on behalf of fair-price shop owners, has his own fair-price shop in Ahmedabad. His third brother Pankaj is employed with the Information Department in Gandhinagar.Political Career of Narendra ModiNarendra Modi always had the utmost zeal and enthusiasm to serve and help the people in need. As a young boy, Narendra Modi offered his services voluntarily to the soldiers at the railway stations during the Indo-Pak war in 1965. He also served affected people during the 1967 Gujarat floods. Modi started working in the Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation’s staff canteen. Eventually from there he became a full-time proponent and campaigner, commonly called a 'pracharak', of the RSS. Modi later underwent training at the RSS camp in Nagpur. It is a prerequisite for any RSS member to take up the training course for holding any official position in the Sangh Parivar. Narendra Modi was given charge of the student wing, which is better known as Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP). His contribution to the Anti-emergency movement impressed senior political leaders. As a result of this, he was eventually appointed the regional organiser of the newly-formed Bharatiya Janata Party in Gujarat.Narendra Modi was an efficient organiser from a very young age. During the Emergency, he arranged for covert circulation of RSS pamphlets and also organised protests against the Emergency rule. During his RSS days, he met the two Jan Sangh leaders, Vasant Gajendragadkar and Nathalal Jaghda, who later founded the state unit of BJP in Gujarat. In 1987, the RSS deputed Narendra Modi to politics by recommending his candidature in the BJP. Modi’s efficiency was recognised and he rose to prominence after managing the Ekta Yatra for Murli Manohar Joshi.Political Journey of Narendra ModiBecame the General Secretary of the BJP's Gujarat unit in 1988.Recognised as a key strategist for being instrumental in successfully campaigning for the party in the 1995 and 1998 Gujarat Assembly elections, which made the BJP the ruling party in Gujarat.Successfully organised two challenging events on national level: the Somnath to Ayodhya Rath Yatra, which was a long march by L. K. Advani and a march from Kanyakumari (southern tip of India) to Kashmir (the northern tip) undertaken by Murli Manohar Joshi. These two events are considered to have contributed in bringing the BJP to power in 1998.In 1995, Narendra Modi was appointed as the Secretary of the BJP's national unit.Narendra Modi was credited for having successfully carried out the responsibility of revamping the party organisation in different states.In 1998, Narendra Modi was promoted as General Secretary and held the position till October 2001.Narendra Modi became the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat for the first time in October 2001 when his predecessor Keshubhai Patel resigned from the post following the defeat of BJP in by-elections.After winning the Gujarat Assembly elections three consecutive times and holding the position of the state's chief minister, Modi contested the 2014 Lok Sabha elections for the first time. He won the elections by a grand margin and became the Prime Minister of India following the win.Schemes Launched by Prime Minister Narendra ModiPradhan Mantri Jan Dhan Yojana (for financial inclusion)Swachch Bharat Mission (for clean public places and better sanitation facilities)Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana (provision of LPG to families living BPL)Pradhan Mantri Krishi Sinchai Yojana (efficiency in irrigation)Pradhan Mantri Fasal Bima Yojana (insurance against crop failure)Pahal (LPG subsidy)Mudra Bank Yojana (banking services for Medium and Small Enterprises)Pradhan Mantri Kaushal Vikas Yojana (to provide skill training to the young workforce)Sansad Adarsh Gram Yojana (to strengthen rural infrastructure)Make in India (to boost the manufacturing sector)Garib Kalyan Yojana (address welfare needs of the poor)E-basta (online learning forum)Sukanya Samriddhi Yojana (financial empowerment of the girl child)Padhe Bharat Badhe Bharat (to enhance children's reading, writing and mathematical skills)DDU-Grameen Kaushalya Yojana (vocational training to the rural youth as part of 'Skill India' mission)Nayi Manzil Yojana (skills based training to Madrasa students)Stand Up India (support to women and SC/ST entrepreneurs)Atal Pension Scheme (pension scheme for unorganised sector employees)Pradhan Mantri Suraksha Bima Yojana (insurance against accident)Jeevan Jyoti Bima Yojana (life insurance)Sagar Mala Project (for developing port infrastructure)Smart Cities Project (building urban infrastructure)Rurban Mission (modern facilities in villages)Pradhan Mantri Awaas Yojana (affordable housing for all)Jan Aushadhi Scheme (provision for affordable medicines)Digital India (for a digitally equipped nation and economy)Digilocker (securing documents online)School Nursery Yojana (afforestation program by and for young citizens)Gold Monetisation Scheme (involve gold stocks lying idle in households in the economy)Narendra Modi Elections Result2014VaranasiUttar PradeshWon2014VadodaraGujaratWonNarendra Modi's International ToursFour-nation African tour covering Mozambique, South Africa, Tanzania and Kenya to strengthen ties in trade, energy, defence and maritime cooperation. (July, 2016)First Prime-Ministerial visit to Mexico in three decades to enhance bilateral relations. (June, 2016)Visit to the US to strengthen ties and enhance cooperation between the two countries. (June, 2016)Meeting with top business leaders in Qatar to deepen industry and trade relations between both countries. (June, 2016)Bilateral meet with Switzerland President Johann Schneider Ammann who supported India’s bid for NSG membership. Also met the country's business leaders to deepen industry and trade ties between India and Switzerland. (June, 2016)Visit to Afghanistan and jointly inaugurated the Afghan- India Friendship Dam with President Ashraf Ghani. (June, 2016)Visit to Iran to enhance trade, investments, energy partnership, connectivity, culture and people to people relations. The historic Chahbahar Agreement was sealed during this visit. (May, 2016)Visit to Saudi Arabia for deepening bilateral relations and strengthening business ties between the two countries. (April, 2016)Visited Russia to attend the 16th Annual India-Russia summit. As many as 16 important agreements were signed between the two countries. (December, 2015)Visit to Singapore marking fifty years of India-Singapore relations. The Prime Minister met a number of top investors and invited them to ‘Make in India.’ (November, 2015)Visited Malaysia to attend the ASEAN-India Summit. Prime Minister Modi met his Malaysian counterpart Najib Razak to discuss bilateral ties with him. He also met his Chinese and Japanese counterparts Li Keqiang and Shinzo Abe on the sidelines of the summit. (November, 2015)Historic visit to the UK, the first in over a decade, to strengthen business and cultural ties between the two countries. The UK Prime Minister David Cameron expressed support for India's permanent candidature of a reformed UNSC. (November, 2015)First Prime Ministerial visit to United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 34 years. Visit strengthened economic ties and security cooperation. (August, 2015)Tour of Central Asia covering Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Historic and special visit in which significant effort was made to expand India’s cooperation with the Central Asian nations. (July, 2015)Visit to Bangladesh included talks with Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina and signing of a number of MOUs. The historic Land Boundary Agreement was signed during this visit. (June, 2015)Visit to the Republic of Korea strengthened many aspects of India-Korea cooperation. (May, 2015)Historic visit to Mongolia that opened up broad avenues of partnership and cooperation between the two nations. (May, 2015)Three-day China visit augmented bilateral partnership and economic cooperation between India and China and enhanced friendship among the two of the oldest civilizations of the world. (May, 2015)Visit to Canada was first exclusively bilateral visit by an Indian Prime Minister in more than four decades to deepen ties between the two nations. (April, 2015)Visit to Germany to hold extensive talks with German Chancellor Angela Merkel and prominent business leaders and promote the Indian government's ‘Make in India’ initiative. (April, 2015)Visit to France for extensive discussions to strengthen India-France ties. Modi met several French leaders and business executives and discussed ways to strengthen economic co-operation. (April, 2015)Undertook a successful 3-nation tour to Seychelles, Mauritius and Sri Lanka to strengthen India’s ties with these friendly nations. (March, 2015)Visted Brazil to attend the BRICS Summit in Fortaleza. A wide range of global issues were discussed during the Summit where it was decided to set up a BRICS bank and the first head of the Bank was to be from India. Three MoUs were signed between Brazil and India. (December, 2014)Visit to Nepal to attend the 18th SAARC Summit. (November, 2014)First bilateral visit to Fiji by an Indian Prime Minister in 33 years. Modi attended a 'Forum for India-Pacific Island cooperation' where he interacted with leaders from various Pacific islands nations. (November, 2014)First bilateral visit by an Indian Prime Minister in 28 years. Modi attended the G-20 Summit in Brisbane which was followed by a state visit to Australia. (November, 2014)Attended two important multilateral summits, the ASEAN & East Asia Summits in Myanmar. (November, 2014)Undertook a successful visit to Japan during which he held extensive discussions with the top leadership of Japan to strengthen ties between the two countries in several spheres. The visit resulted in a number of agreements. (August, 2014)Embarked on his first ever foreign visit after assuming charge to Bhutan indicating the importance India attaches to ties with Bhutan. (June, 2014)Narendra Modi's Tenure as Chief Minister of GujaratAs the chief minister of Gujarat, Modi had promoted the state as 'Vibrant Gujarat' claiming that it had made rapid progress in terms of infrastructural development and economic growth. However, some critics also point out poverty, malnutrition and lack of proper education in the state. As per the statistics, the state ranked 14th in terms of poverty as on September, 2013 and 18th in terms of literacy rate in 2014. On the other hand, the state officials claim that the state outperformed other states in terms of women's education. Moreover, the school drop-out rates and the maternal mortality rates declined. Gujarat is also one of the states that does not suffer from the problem of land mafia.Contrary to the claims made by the state officials, Christophe Jaffrelot, a political scientist said that the development in the state was limited only to the urban middle class. The rural people and those belonging to the lower castes were neglected by the government. According to Jaffrelot, under Modi's governance there had been an increase in the number of people living below poverty line. At the same time, the tribal and the Dalit communities were treated as subalterns. Other critics, including noted economist Amartya Sen, are also of the same view.First Term (2001 to 2002)On 7 October 2001, Narendra Modi was appointed as the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat.He was given the responsibility of preparing the party for December 2002 elections.As Chief Minister, Modi laid emphasis on privatisation of small governmental institutions.2002 Gujarat violence:27 February saw a major incident of communal violence, resulting in the slaughter of 58 people, when a train carrying hundreds of passengers, mostly Hindu pilgrims, was set ablaze near Godhra. This incident resulted in anti-Muslim violence, which engulfed almost the entire Gujarat within no time. The estimated death toll ranged between 900 and 2,000. The Gujarat government led by Narendra Modi imposed curfews in several cities of the state to prevent escalation of violence. Human rights organisations, media and opposition parties accused the Modi government of taking inappropriate and insufficient steps to curb the violence. A Special Investigation Team (SIT) was appointed by the Supreme Court in April 2009 to inquire into the role played by the government and Modi. The SIT submitted a report to the court in December, 2010 stating that it did not find any evidence against Modi. However, the SIT was accused of concealing evidence in July, 2013.Consequently, pressure mounted on the BJP with different opposition parties and allies demanding resignation of Modi from the CM’s post. But the subsequent elections resulted in BJP winning complete majority by clinching 127 out of 182 seats.Second Term (2002 to 2007)Modi laid stress on economic development of Gujarat, which resulted in the state emerging as an investment destination.He instituted technology and financial parks in the state.The Vibrant Gujarat Summit in 2007 saw real estate investment deals worth Rs 6,600 billion signed in Gujarat.In July 2007, Modi completed 2,063 consecutive days as Chief Minister of Gujarat, creating a record of holding the post of CM of Gujarat for most number of days.Third Term (2007 to 2012)In later years, the state substantially improved its agricultural output, mainly due to projects related to improvement of supply of groundwater in places like Kachchh, Saurashtra and other northern parts of the state. Efforts were also made to increase the use of micro-irrigation and providing farms with efficient power supply.Development projects in the field of infrastructure saw construction of 5,00,000 structures in 2008, out of which 1,13,738 were check dams. In 2010, 60 out of the 112 tehsils regained normal groundwater level. This resulted in increased production of genetically modified Bt cotton. The agriculture growth rate in Gujarat increased to 9.6 per cent during 2001- 2007 and Compound Annual Growth Rate in Gujarat for the decade 2001- 2010 reached 10.97 per cent, which was highest among all states of India.A radical change in the system of power supply to rural areas helped flourish agriculture.Sadbhavana Mission or Goodwill Mission was organised by Modi in late 2011 and early 2012 to reach out to the Muslim community in the state. Modi observed a series of fasts and believed that this step would "further strengthen Gujarat’s environment of peace, unity and harmony."Fourth Term (2012 to 2014)Modi got elected from the constituency of Maninagar after winning by a huge margin.Awards WonOn the centenary celebration of Shri Poona Gujarati Bandhu Samaj, Narendra Modi was conferred with the Gujarat Ratna award at the Ganesh Kala Krida Manch.The computer society of India bestowed him the e-Ratna awardIn 2009, the FDI magazine honoured him as the Asian Winner of the FDi Personality of the Year Award.RecognitionIn 2006, India Today conducted a nationwide survey that declared him as the Best Chief Minister in India.In March 2012, the Time magazine featured him on the cover page of its Asian edition. He is one of the very few politicians of India to be featured on the cover of Time.In 2014, Modi was featured in 'Time 100' list of most influential people in the world.Modi became the most followed 'Asian leader' on Twitter in 2014."Forbes" rated Modi as the '15th Most Powerful Person' in the world in 2014.Books on Narendra ModiNarendra Modi- A Political BiographyNarendra Modi- A Political Biography' by Andy Marino attempts to provide a clear picture of Narendra Modi, the man and his politics. It enables the readers to get a better understanding of Modi's ways of governance. The book analyses the contrasting perspectives on the Gujarat model of governance. Andy Marino takes us through Modi's journey of life from childhood to a young man who went on to become India's Prime Minister.Centrestage: Inside the Narendra Modi Model of GovernanceUday Mahurkar’s ‘Centrestage: Inside the Narendra Modi Model of Governance’ gives a balanced and impersonal judgment of Modi’s mantra of governance. Mahurkar not only talks about Modi's visionary schemes but also talks about issues on which Modi could have paid more attention and performed better. The book explains how Modi transformed Gujarat during his tenure and analyses the salient features of the Modi model of governance.Modi: Making of a Prime Minister: Leadership, Governance and PerformanceThe book by Vivian Fernandez is a peak into the political scenario of Gujarat and the way of Modi's governance from a viewpoint of a liberal Indian. In other words, the book does not take any stand or gives any judgment. Vivian describes the ways in which Modi utilised the opportunity to improve the economic conditions of the people of Gujarat.The Man of the Moment - Narendra Modi'The Man of the Moment: Narendra Modi' authored by M V Kamath and Kalindi Randeri uncovers the life and the development of a perfect politician who has expanded the boundaries of politics in India. The book unravels the motivations and the astonishing stamina of Narendra Modi to remain firm in the face of criticism.The NaMo Story: A Political Life'The NaMo Story: A Political Life' by Kingshuk Nag gives a brilliant portrayal of an exceptional politician, Narendra Modi, depicting his journey from a tea vendor's son to the Chief Minister of Gujarat. The book begins with a short history of the political situation and reforms of the 1990s. It goes on to describe how Modi utilised his administrative skills to build up the Hindutva agenda for the BJP.Narendra Modi: The GamechangerSudesh Verma's 'Narendra Modi - The Gamechanger' shows Narendra Modi as a game changer who knows how to impress and influence people with his work and turn the tables on his opponents. The book is based on all-inclusive interviews of Modi and his close associates about the things and incidents that shaped his thoughts and actions and the way Modi evolved as a man. An average man can find a reflection of his own struggle in the life of Modi.Books written by Narendra ModiJyotipunj'Jyotipunj' gives a description of all the people who Narendra Modi believes inspired him and had a strong influence on his work. Modi was associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) initially as a worker and then as a ‘pracharak’. He gives a detailed insight into the life of the people who inspired him. The book also contains a reflection of thoughts of these people.Abode of Love‘Abode of Love’ is a compendium of eight short stories written by Narendra Modi. It was written by Modi at a very young age. These stories reveal the sensitive and affectionate aspect of his character. Modi believes that the love of a mother is the source of all love and it is the greatest love. Whatever be the kind of love – of lovers, of friends etc – all are the reflections of a mother's love. The book unravels the layers of human relationships in a beautiful way.Premtirth'Premtirth' is a collection of short stories written by Narendrabhai Modi. In this book, he draws a soulful portrayal of motherly feelings in a very simple and yet impressive language.Kelve Te Kelavani‘Kelave te Kelavani’ means ‘education is that which nurtures’. The book is a compilation of words of wisdom by Narendra Modi, India's Prime Minister. The book brings forth his thoughts and his vision to bring about a knowledge revolution in Gujarat. It shows his love for education.Sakshibhav'Sakshibhav' consists of a series of letters addressed to Jagat Janani Maa. It describes the journey of inner-self of Narendra Modi and his feelings. The book brings forth the emotional thoughts of Modi at the time of his struggle when he was a worker with RSS.Samajik Samarasata‘Samajik Samarasata’ is a compilation of Narendra Modi's articles and lectures. The phrase, “Express your views not just through words but through actions too”, aptly fits this book. The book reflects Modi's views on social harmony with no discrimination on the basis of castes and unravels many incidents of his interactions with dalits. The life incidents of many social reformers are also narrated.Convenient Action: Gujarat's Response to Challenges of Climate Change'Convenient Action: Gujarat’s Response to Challenges of Climate Change' is Modi's first book in English. The book talks about the changes of climate in the state of Gujarat and how the people of the state respond to it. Under the leadership of Modi, people of the state found the ways to take up such challenges.Summary of Modi GovernmentWhen Prime Minister Narendra Modi took charge on May 26, 2014, the world looked at him with high expectations. His manifesto had laid stress on bringing down inflation, renewing the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and retrieving black money from abroad, among other initiatives. As the government completes 100 days, one thing that emerges is that Modi walked the talk. During these days, the government has been busy picking up tasks from the manifesto and ticking them. However, all their actions are not without criticism. Few initiatives that received thumbs up from everywhere:-- Bilateral relations via SAARC; BRICS;-- The WTO stand-- Budget was a big hit-- FDI Policy-- Reform bills-- Cleanliness campaign-- Digital India initiativeThe govt. has also received criticism for violence and security issue, over LOP seat, transfer of governors, the black money problem and the inflationWe can also describe him by his international recognition.Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken India’s global standing to newer heights with the world applauding his transformational leadership. He has been conferred several highest awards by many nations and organisations.Order of St Andrew the Apostle: April 2019Recently, PM Narendra Modi received the highest order of the Russian Federation “for exceptional services in promoting special and privileged strategic partnership between Russia and India and friendly relations between the Russian and Indian peoples."Order of Zayed Award: April 2019PM Narendra Modi was conferred the highest civil award of the U.A.E. in April 209 for providing exceptional leadership in forging a new strategic relationship between India and UAE.The award acknowledges that PM Modi is working for everyone in a diverse country having people with different religions, languages and cultures.Seoul Peace Prize 2018 - October 2018For contributions to the growth of the Indian and global economies, PM Narendra Modi received the Seoul Peace Prize in October 2018.The Seoul Peace Prize committee lauded Modinomics for reducing social and economic disparity between the rich and the poor. It also praised PM Modi's initiatives to make the government cleaner through anti-corruption measures.It credited the Prime Minister for his contribution towards regional and global peace under the 'Modi Doctrine' and the 'Act East Policy'.Prime Minister Modi received the award in person during his visit to Republic of South Korea in February 2019.Seoul Peace Prize 2018 - October 2018UNEP Champions of the Earth Award - September 2018United Nations' highest environmental honour, the UNEP Champions of the Earth Award is bestowed on the world's greatest change agents.For his pioneering work in championing the International Solar Alliance and his unprecedented pledge to eliminate all single-use plastic in India by 2022, PM Narendra Modi was conferred with the UNEP Champions of the Earth Award in September last year.Grand Collar of the State of Palestine - February 2018The Grand Collar of the State of Palestine is the highest order of Palestine given to foreign dignitaries.In recognition of PM Modi’s wise leadership and his lofty national and international stature, and in appreciation of his efforts to promote the historic relations between the State of Palestine and the Republic of India, he was conferred with the award during his visit to Palestine in February last year.Amir Amanullah Khan Award - June 2016The highest civilian honour of Afghanistan, the Amir Amanullah Khan Award was bestowed on PM Narendra Modi by the Afghanistan government in June 2016.PM Narendra Modi was awarded the honour following the inauguration of the landmark Afghan-India Friendship Dam.King Abdulaziz Sash Award - April 2016In a special gesture, PM Narendra Modi was conferred the King Abdulaziz Sash Award in April 2016. This is Saudi Arabia's highest civilian honour.Named after Abdulaziz Al Saud, the founder of the modern Saudi state, the Prime Minister was conferred the prestigious award by King Salman bin Abdulaziz.So we can learn and inspired by him to be honest and responsible person.Thanks.

For those who aren’t fond of long answers, the short answer is:The impact of modernization on human and economic developmentChanges in relationships to religious authorityPersonal valuesFamily formation and dynamicsPersonal choiceReligious pluralismThere are a number of reasons as to why so many Christians are leaving Christianity. We can look at some of them based on academic research, but first, some important preliminary notes and observations:On the one hand, “nonreligious” ≠ atheistOn the other hand, the processes or factors that drive or constitute the rise of atheism are overlapping or co-occurring with the same for the decline of Christianity.In other words, concepts like…spiritual strugglereligious disaffiliationdoubt…are involved in the ultimate exit of some people from “the religious field” [1], and in the switching from one religious identity to another “religious” or “spiritual” identity [2], or none at all (but still not atheism)First, since we do not have the OP’s data reference, we will need to establish the reality of Christian decline. Then we’ll take a look at five items related to explaining why so many Christians are leaving Christianity.Establishing the Decline of ChristianityThe table below shows the decline of % Christian and increase in % Nonreligious, from 1945 to 2010 in 5-year increments, in the top 15 developed nations in the world, as of 2014. As you can see, Singapore and South Korea are exceptions—I have no specific expertise for those countries, but, my instinct would be to examine missionary work that has been performed there. Also, there is an extremely radical jump between 1980 and 1985 in South Korea, on which I am not competent to comment. However, even in Singapore, we can see that the % Nonreligious did increase over the last few decades, and that it is still higher than it ever previously was.Source(s): United Nations Human Development Index 2014 [3]; Association of Religion Data Archives World Religion Dataset [4].Next, Grant [5] graphed an aggregate trend line for 17 different indicators of religiosity in the United States, starting from 1952 and going to 2005.When it comes to these sorts of discussions, America is usually thought of as an outlier, being both a highly developed and prosperous but also highly religious nation. This notion has recently been contested by sociologists of religion David Voas and Mark Chaves [6]:Virtually every discussion of secularization asserts that high levels of religiosity in the United States make it a decisive counterexample to the claim that modern societies are prone to secularization. Focusing on trends rather than levels, we maintain that, for two straightforward empirical reasons, the U.S. should no longer be considered a counterexample. First, it has recently become clear that American religiosity has been declining for decades. Second, this decline has been produced by the generational patterns underlying religious decline elsewhere in the West: each successive cohort is less religious than the preceding one. The United States is not an exception. These findings change the theoretical import of the U.S. for debates about secularization.Suffice it to say that, like other modernized countries around the world, the United States has seen its share of decline in various indicators of religious vitality. Next we turn to why this may be happening.Processes and Factors Contributing to the Decline of ChristianityHere are the five categories that we’ll review below:[1] Human and Economic Development[2] Demographic effects[3] Changes in Values[4] Personal choice[5] Religious Pluralism and Alternative Worldviews[1] Human and Economic DevelopmentThe most prominent existing explanation for the decline of Christianity, from a global and societal standpoint, is referred to as the existential security thesis (EST) [7]. The table above which compares Human Development Index scores with % Nonreligious is a key example of what the EST attempts to explain. We can see the decline occurring, but why is it happening?The table shows that high levels of human and economic development tend to go with the decline in identification with mainstream or organized religion in a variety of countries over time. However, because the analysis in that table is limited in the sense that it does not show a relationship between (a) changing levels of HDI over time and (b) changing levels of nonreligiosity over time, we cannot say that development causes religious decline; we can only suspect that they are related in some way.Despite this, there are a number of other studies which demonstrate support for the EST. The authors of the EST, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, describe what is at the heart of EST which links societal-level changes in human and economic development with individual-level objective and subjective religious outcomes (considered, however, in the aggregate for each country):Virtually all of the world’s major religious cultures provide reassurance that, even though the individual alone can’t understand or predict what lies ahead, a higher power will ensure that things work out. Both religion and secular ideologies assure people that the universe follows a plan, which guarantees that if you follow the rules, everything will turn out well, in this world or the next. This belief reduces stress, enabling people to shut out anxiety and focus on coping with their immediate problems. Without such a belief system, extreme stress tends to produce withdrawal reactions. Under conditions of insecurity, people have a powerful need to see authority as both strong and benevolent – even in the face of evidence to the contrary.Individuals experiencing stress have a need for rigid, predictable rules. They need to be sure of what is going to happen because they are in danger – their margin for error is slender and they need maximum predictability. Conversely, people raised under conditions of relative security can tolerate more ambiguity and have less need for the absolute and rigidly predictable rules that religious sanctions provide. People with relatively high levels of existential security can more readily accept deviations from familiar patterns than people who feel anxiety concerning their basic existential needs. In economically secure industrial societies, with an established basic safety net safeguarding against the risks of absolute poverty and a relatively egalitarian distribution of household incomes, an increasing sense of safety brings a diminishing need for absolute rules, which contributes to the decline of traditional religious norms.They go on to state:We hypothesize that the emergence of high levels of existential security tends to diminish anxiety and stress, promoting feelings of psychological well-being – which, in turn, reduces the importance of religious values in people’s lives. Although this hypothesis has been controversial, we argue that virtually all of the world’s major transcendent religions provide reassurance that, even though the individual alone can’t understand or predict what lies ahead, a higher power will ensure that things work out. This belief reduces stress and anxiety, enabling people to focus on coping with their immediate problems. Under conditions of insecurity, people have a powerful need to see authority as both strong and benevolent – even in the face of evidence to the contrary. Through strengthening feelings of security, the processes of societal modernization have significant consequences for religiosity; the conditions of growing security that usually accompany the transition from agrarian to industrial societies, and then into postindustrial societies, tends to reduce the salience of religion in people’s lives. These effects operate at both a societal level (socio-tropic) and a personal level (ego-tropic), although we suspect that the former is more important. The greater social protection, longevity, and health found in wealthy postindustrial societies and welfare states mean that fewer people in these societies regard traditional spiritual values as vital to their lives, or to the lives of their community. This does not mean that all forms of religion necessarily disappear as societies develop; residual and symbolic elements often remain, such as formal adherence to religious identities and rituals, even when their substantive meaning has faded away.[2] Demographic EffectsIt is important to understand how various facets and measurements of religion are structured differentially according to age, race, gender, social class, education, generational continuities and differences, fertility, family formation, marriage, immigration, and so forth [8].A few key examples here will suffice to draw out the impact of demographics on religious identity. First, African Americans have their own unique religious identities as a result of their ethnic heritage and a rather bleak history in the United States. Second, women tend to be nearly universally more religious than men. Third, aging often co-occurs with increasing religiosity. Fourth, we tend to find higher fertility rates in regions and countries that also have higher levels of religiosity. Fifth, immigration has a complex relationship with religion [9, 28], and religion performs various functions for those making the move to a new country, not to mention the reciprocal impact of migration and immigration on religion.In short, there are consequences for religious identity and religiosity, depending on, for example, where you are at in life, the kinds of “normal” activities that take place (such as moving to a different country or region within-country, having a family, or getting older), and what kinds of social categories you are born into. These effects must be taken into account during efforts to explain broad religious change.In her answer to the main question here, Jenny Hawkins cited what is usually referred to as a life cycle effect (also known as a type of age effect), where we witness a reengagement on the part of young people with organized religious institutions (i.e. “renewed or increased church-going”) upon the advent of marriage and especially child-bearing [10, 11; 12, this source is also a great example of the unique interaction of demographic categories in producing certain outcomes related to religion]. This is a legitimate occurrence, yet, we can speculate that this effect may or may not hold as we move into an uncertain and potentially unstable religious landscape; it could become a dynamic that was part of a legacy that is passing. At least, my prediction is that this effect will weaken.It is also worth repeating from a different post, that, in 2016, Conrad Hackett, from Pew Research Center, and his colleagues estimated that Muslims will grow in the next 35 years or so to become an equal share of the world's population with Christians, whereas the percentage of world Christians will remain stable. See The Future of World Religions: Population Growth Projections, 2010-2050. They pinpoint five factors that will drive this change: Fertility; Life Expectancy; Age Structure; Religious Switching; and Migration.So, much to the chagrin of all partisanship, we can note that such long-range and global-scale changes largely center upon demographic factors. Hackett's report also notes: "In the United States, Christians will decline from more than three-quarters of the population in 2010 to two-thirds in 2050."Beyond pure demographics, we also come to a huge dynamic that is very often overlooked in public discussions about the vitality of religion: family and peer socio-religious dynamics [13, 14]. This would include:the quality of parent-child and peer-child relationshipsthe extent to which parents behaviorally model their own faith with fidelity to offspringthe extent to which parents and one’s peers engage in interaction and participation with their children/friends in a specifically religious context (e.g. family Bible study; private religious discussions)the density, quality, and style of one’s (religious) peer relationsIn line with this, in 2010, Bruce and Glendinning [15] argued that:Dating the decline of Christianity in Britain has a vital bearing on its explanation. Recent work by social historians has challenged the sociological view that secularization is due to long-term diffuse social processes by asserting that the churches remained stable and popular until the late 1950s and that the causes of decline lie in the social and cultural changes associated with the 1960s. We challenge this interpretation of the evidence. We also note that much of the decline of the churches is explained not by adult defection but by a failure to keep children in the faith. Given the importance of parental homogamy for the successful transmission of religious identity, the causes of decline in one generation may well lie in the experiences of the previous generation. We focus on the disruptive effects of the 1939–45 war on family formation and use survey data to argue for a staged model of decline that is compatible with the conventional gradual view of secularization.Their argument is consistent with other research which would show that mixed families (i.e. stepparents and stepsiblings), and families wherein the mother and father do not share the same religion (which is one thing they refer to when they say “parental homogamy”; see also 24, p. 12), reflect lower probabilities of successful faith transmission to their offspring. Notably, their argument would also challenge the contribution of changes in values to religious change, which we examine next.[3] Changes in ValuesThe values specific to a decline in Christianity are mainly:(a) gender equality(b) attitudes toward sexuality (e.g. homosexuality, premarital sex, etc.)(c) openness to experience(d) autonomy (as opposed to conformity)It should be noted that these in turn impact attitudes and behavioral realities concerning family formation, fertility, and childbearing.Norris and Inglehart, the authors of EST (see #1 above), suggest that a shift from agrarian to industrial to postindustrial societies is accompanied by a shift in value structure, from a “Traditional” value structure to a “Secular-Rational” value structure [see also 16]. Specifically:Modernization brings systematic, predictable changes in gender roles. The impact of modernization operates in two key phases:i. Industrialization brings women into the paid workforce and dramatically reduces fertility rates. Women attain literacy and educational opportunities. Women are enfranchised and begin to participate in representative government, but still have far less power than men.ii. The postindustrial phase brings a shift toward greater gender equality as women move into higher status economic roles in management and the professions, and gain political influence within elected and appointed bodies. Over half of the world has not yet entered this phase; only the more advanced industrial societies are currently moving on this trajectory.These two phases correspond to two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation: (i) A transition from traditional to secular-rational values; and (ii) a transition from survival to self-expression values. The decline of the traditional family is linked with the first dimension. The rise of gender equality is linked with the second. Cultural shifts in modern societies are not sufficient by themselves to guarantee women equality across all major dimensions of life; nevertheless, through underpinning structural reforms and women’s rights they greatly facilitate this process.Putnam and Campbell [17] assert that much change, and indeed polarization, in the American religious landscape can be understood with reference to three “shocks” (or one shock and two aftershocks) in American culture, beginning with “the sexually libertine 1960s”.The nation’s religious polarization has not been an inexorable process of smoothly unfolding change. Rather, it has resulted from three seismic societal shocks, the first of which was the sexually libertine 1960s. This tumultuous period then produced a prudish aftershock of growth in conservative religion, especially evangelicalism, and an even more pronounced cultural presence for American evangelicals, most noticeably in the political arena. As theological and political conservatism began to converge, religiously inflected issues emerged on the national political agenda, and “religion” became increasingly associated with the Republican Party. The first aftershock was followed by an opposite reaction, a second aftershock, which is still reverberating. A growing number of Americans, especially young people, have come to disavow religion. For many, their aversion to religion is rooted in unease with the association between religion and conservative politics. If religion equals Republican, then they have decided that religion is not for them. Religious polarization has consequences beyond the religious realm, because being at one pole or the other correlates strongly with one’s worldview, especially attitudes relating to such intimate matters as sex and the family. Given that American politics often centers on sex and family issues, this religious polarization has been especially visible in partisan politics. A “coalition of the religious” tends to vote one way, while Americans who are not religious vote another.They further note:We make no strong claims about causation here, and we do not believe that it was simply differences over public policy that weakened the ties of this generation to organized religion. Rather, we suggest, the dramatic contrast between a young generation increasingly liberal on certain moral and lifestyle issues (though still potentially open to religious feelings and ideals) and an older generation of religious leaders who seemed to them consumed by the political fight against gay marriage was one important source of the second aftershock. As we have seen, during the 1990s Americans of all ages became increasingly uneasy about mixing religion and politics. It is not surprising that younger Americans, still forming religious attachments, translated that uneasiness into a rejection of religion entirely. This group of young people came of age when “religion” was identified publicly with the Religious Right, and exactly at the time when the leaders of that movement put homosexuality and gay marriage at the top of their agenda. And yet this is the very generation in which the new tolerance of homosexuality has grown most rapidly. In short, just as the youngest cohort of Americans was zigging in one direction, many highly visible religious leaders zagged in the other. Given these patterns, it is not at all surprising that when the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life asked a large national sample of nones why they rejected religious identification, their objections were not theological or scientific. Instead the new nones reported that “they became unaffiliated, at least in part, because they think of religious people as hypocritical, judgmental or insincere. Large numbers also say they became unaffiliated because they think that religious organizations focus too much on rules and not enough on spirituality.”Their views are echoed by Hout and Fischer’s 2014 analysis [18]:Twenty percent of American adults claimed no religious preference in 2012, compared to 7 percent twenty-five years earlier. Previous research identified a political backlash against the religious right and generational change as major factors in explaining the trend. That research found that religious beliefs had not changed, ruling out secularization as a cause. In this paper we employ new data and more powerful analytical tools to: (1) update the time series, (2) present further evidence of correlations between political backlash, generational succession, and religious identification, (3) show how valuing personal autonomy generally and autonomy in the sphere of sex and drugs specifically explain generational differences, and (4) use GSS panel data to show that the causal direction in the rise of the “Nones” likely runs from political identity as a liberal or conservative to religious identity, reversing a long-standing convention in social science research. Our new analysis joins the threads of earlier explanations into a general account of how political conflict over cultural issues spurred an increase in non-affiliation.Consistent with the EST view from above, Saroglou and colleagues surveyed 21 samples from 15 countries (total N = 8,551) [19], and found that the association between religiosity and values became tighter the more that the socioeconomic conditions of a given country decreased. Interestingly, they found that:religious people tend to favor values that promote conservation of social and individual order (Tradition, Conformity, and to a lesser extent, Security) and, conversely, to dislike values that promote openness to change and autonomy.These effects were found across different religions (Catholic, Muslim, Jew) and different countries. These authors also note that the “transmission of religion through socialization (especially within the family) may be considered as part of a more general transmission of values”.However, I should point out that Sanne Groen and Paul Vermeer [20] recently found that it was not a shift in values, from conformity to autonomy, that accounted for parents not passing lasting religious commitment on to their offspring (although such a shift was evidenced in their Dutch dataset covering two generations), but rather an adult offspring’s church attendance was best predicted by their parents’ church attendance during the offsprings’ childhood. This is consistent with findings from a number of other studies, most especially Jonathan Lanman’s work on credibility enhancing displays, although it is not universal. What this shows us is that changes in values, though detectable, may not be a driving factor in certain contexts. In the final analysis, we need to also keep in mind that there is evidence for changes in values as both cause and consequence of religious change. People who have certain types of value sets to begin with may be more or less drawn to varying religious ideologies.As far as openness to experience goes, psychologist Adam Fisher [2] recently proposed a conceptual model of "the processes involved in transitions to irreligion"; it begins with Questioning.As for what triggers this questioning, that is, why or how it begins, Fisher identifies examples such as (a) issues related to science and religion; (b) social concerns (i.e. politics and values); and (c) suffering in the world. Fisher also mentions that the experience of questioning is "often facilitated by interactions with other believers or through development of new worldviews", which is something that often happens during ages 18-25, college/university being a primary example of a context of questioning. In other words, the specific interaction of Questioning with a variable like Openness to Experience can be expected to produce trajectories to nonreligion (i.e. de-identification with Christianity). At the same time, we also need to keep in mind that there are plenty of theologically liberal and conservative Christians who are otherwise experientially open and comfortable in the solidity of their faith among a multitude of worldviews—in fact, interaction with others may enrich the depth and appreciation of one’s own faith. The proposed effect is simply probabilistic.Along more political lines, another study reported [21]: By far the most consistent finding is that liberals tend to score higher than conservatives on self-report measures of Openness to New Experiences (e.g., Barnea & Schwartz, 1998; Ekehammar, Akrami, & Gylje, 2004; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003; Jost et al., 2003a, 2007; McCrae, 1996; Riemann, Grubich, Hempel, Mergl, & Richter, 1993; Sidanius, 1978; Stenner, 2005; Trapnell, 1994; Van Hiel & Mervielde, 2004).Insofar as nonreligious individuals end up on the more liberal end of the spectrum (in America at least), this dovetails with the connection between political liberalism, openness to (new) experiences, and nonreligiosity. For example, at least some research has implied a relation between atheism and political liberalism, and there is a logical connection between the two of them in terms of the previous research, above, and also in terms of openness to experience.Gathering our thoughts on #3, we should note that there is a strong connection between changes in values and the next factor.[4] Personal ChoiceThis focus above on changes in personal values is important because other research implies that a values shift plays a role in parenting styles and dynamics [25], one dominant element of which is personal choice (along with cultivating autonomy and openness to experience in one’s own children, which is another link between #3 and #4, and which might be expected to co-occur with teaching individual choice to one’s children).In a sense, “personal choice” is itself a kind of value. Beyond even that, however, is the notion that personal choice operates not just in the context of how children are raised, but also factors back in to modern notions of self, identity, and the necessity of making certain choices.And this is where things become tricky.One consequence that modernity theorists [22, 23] have highlighted is what we might call self-reflexivity, or the increasing awareness and emphasis on one’s self (i.e. individuation), at the expense collectivism and a more concrete and predictable social order. We have today a certain understanding of a “self” which is itself, as a concept, an “invention of modernity”, and with it comes identity choices. Rather than live in taken-for-granted social contexts, we are increasingly in a position to have to make the very choices and create (or choose to inhabit) the very contexts that create who we are. Identity becomes more fluid (or in the words of Canadian philosopher of religion Charles Taylor, the self becomes “porous”).Canadian sociologist Joel Thiessen’s recent work [24, 25] points to the role of personal choice as a element of parenting styles that have shifted in a more liberal direction as a result of modernization (consistent with the EST implication that becoming a postindustrial nation induces a liberalization of gender and sex related values, and, speculatively, also autonomy and openness to experience).Specifically, one study [25] finds that:Among marginal affiliates (those who identify with a Christian group but limit attendance to religious holidays and rites of passage) and the nonreligious (those who do not identify with any religion and never attend religious services), marginal affiliates did or planned to expose their children to religious belief and practice, while the nonreligious were inclined to defer to their children. However, marginal affiliates and nonreligious individuals jointly maintained that children should have choice in this matter. Parents did not or planned not to impose religious or secular views on children. Further, the parents’ own upbringing informed their use of child socialization strategies and tactics, which were in turn largely informed by prevailing Canadian cultural narratives [directed toward tolerant, liberal, and democratic notions of self-determination, autonomy, individualism, and the “privitization” of religion]Thiessen’s other study even provides us with a conceptual model [24]:His abstract reads [24]:The rise in the numbers of religious “nones” is an almost universal phenomenon across the Western world. The purpose of this study is to explore the extent to which religious nones are socialized to adopt a “no religion” position as children, as compared with disaffiliating during their teen or adult years. Related, among those religious nones who come from a religious background, we examine the timing and depth of a person's disaffiliation. This study sheds light on these issues by combining a quantitative analysis of religious nones samples in Alberta, Canada, America, and other international contexts with a qualitative analysis of 30 semistructured interviews with religious nones. Building on a stage of decline framework, we argue that while disaffiliation has been a lead catalyst for the growth among the religious none population—and we offer several observations of what fuels disaffiliation—moving forward we can and should expect irreligious socialization to gradually take the lead in explaining rising religious none figures.The family-religion research of Bengston, Putney, and Harris supports Thiessen’s findings on personal choice [26; see Chapter 8, on “The Nones: Families of Nonreligious Youth”].[5] Religious Pluralism and Alternative WorldviewsLastly, we turn to a rather longstanding issue in debates surrounding religious change: the notion of religious pluralism.In a manner of speaking, religious pluralism should not be conceived of as a direct mechanism impacting upon rates of religious participation, but as one characteristic of an environment that already favors openness to other views and likely encounters with the worldviews of others (i.e. openness to experience and personal choice). One result of this might be the relativization of one’s own view (e.g. the tolerant view that there are many paths to “truth” and salvation). Such aspects are given a typical characterization in Thiessen’s example above of Canada as a modern secularized, tolerant, liberally democratic nation. In this sense, there are disaffiliation-inducing characteristics that co-occur with a highly pluralistic environment. An environment such as this would be one that is favorable to immigration, and thus one that already favors a legal structure that protects the rights of all equally (in principle).We should be ready to note, however, that religious pluralism alone is hardly a direct or individual-level factor that we would expect to find invoked in personal deconversion narratives; it should be clear that there is a broader or more large-scale context in which religious pluralism exists—it is a facilitating characteristic, a thread in a larger social fabric or backdrop of the odds of religious disaffiliation.For example, Pablo Branas-Garza and his colleagues conducted a 32-country study of religious disaffiliation in 2013, with a sample size of 15,000 respondents [27]. They found that not only was disaffiliation strongly correlated with liberal beliefs and the religious characteristics of one’s parents and spouse, which supports the above conclusions, but that the level of religious diversity within a country increases the likelihood of disaffiliation. Specifically, they found the following variables to have a positive effect on the likelihood of disaffiliation:Country effects: Residence in a European country; Religious PluralismPersonal attributes: Orthodox (males); Academic education (males); Liberal views; Religious disbeliefsMarriage effects: Spouse has 'no religion'SummaryThis has not been an exhaustive analysis, and, in fact, I have left out social integration, density, and embeddedness factors, important as they are as contributing elements to the continuity of religious faith [29–32]. Part of this topic would also include degree of trust in social institutions. Modernization processes impact public relationships with and perceptions of authority (i.e. authority figures, authority structures such as religion); in the words of Richard Flory, religious authority structures have become “flattened”, i.e. less hierarchical or authoritative, and the weakening of religious authority can specifically be conceived as one type or level of secularization. Modernization processes also impact individual identity and processes of social affiliation, resulting in less homogenous social networks which potentially deprive belief systems of the greater support that integrated networks of solidarity provide.At any rate, I’d say more about social integration etc., but, this entry is already twice as long as it should be.It is difficult, if not impossible, to suggest a “beginning” to the modern era or processes of modernization, though we do understand certain technological and industrial developments as central elements. However, a few suggestive connections can be inferred with more confidence: all of these matters begin with modernization, difficult as it is to define and precisely contour the timing and exact details of the phenomenon.One aspect of modernization that we can pinpoint is increasing levels of human and economic development. To the extent that this increases the ability to take the continuity and relative comfort of life for granted, this should negatively impact fertility rates and positively impact value changes (gender roles; attitudes toward sexuality and sexual permissiveness; autonomy; and openness to change and new experiences). To the extent that existing religious structures, ideologies, and authorities impede, or are perceived to impede, these changing value formations, some individuals have seen fit to reject them and become nonreligious, no longer identifying as Christians. Modernization processes also invoke change and fluctuation in certain demographic processes, one of them being migration patterns, immigration, and thus, religious pluralism somewhere along the line.Most often this does not mean atheism, but more often a turn toward semi or un-organized spirituality [33, 34] and even “other” forms of Christian practice and identity [35, 36] outside the mainstream.Lastly, note Pew’s report from August 2016 on “why America’s nones left religion behind”; you’ll find at least a few of the same elements there as here.References[1] Streib, H. (2014). Deconversion. In The Oxford Handbook on Religious Conversion.[2] PsycNET[3] United Nations Human Development Index[4] Zeev Maoz and Errol A. Henderson. 2013. The World Religion Dataset, 1945-2010: Logic, Estimates, and Trends. International Interactions, 39(3).[5] Grant, J. T. (2008). Measuring aggregate religiosity in the United States, 1952–2005. 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