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Caution: This is going to be an extremely long answer so proceed at your own risk.Entry: IMA-144, via Combined Defence Services exam - I, 2017.Centre: Selection Centre Central, Bhopal.Date: 21 September, 2017 - 25 September 2017.Board: 22 SSBDay 0 - 20 September 2017I reached the candidates’ rallying point at the railway station. Unlike Allahabad, we weren’t assembled outside the Movement Control Office. Whilst we were waiting for the bus, we indulged in small-talk. A few were freshers, judging by their nervous demeanour and bulky luggage, while others, including me, were repeaters. The army bus came and we boarded it. There were around 50 candidates and two buses had arrived for us, so everyone got a seat. While it was sunny and hot at the railway station, by the time we entered Sultania Infantry Lines, rain clouds had cloaked the sun and a cool breeze rejuvenated us. If my memory serves me right, we saw a pair of decommissioned T17E1 Staghound Armored Cars standing guard outside the Selection Centre like lifeless sentinels in their eternal vigil.[Edit: Apparently my memory doesn’t serve me right; I had mistakenly mentioned Vijayant tanks earlier, which are not there. For the life of me I cannot remember where I had seen the two Vijayants. The one in Selection Centre East is T-55 I can say for sure, and the one near the lake in Bhopal is also T-55. I must have seen the Vijayants somewhere else I suppose.]We alighted from the bus, hauled our luggage, listened to an introductory speech and received instructions from our CHM sir (Company Havildar Major, equivalent to Company Sergeant Major in the Western armies) and went to our designated rooms. I was assigned a room on the third floor of the Naval building along with another candidate from Rajasthan. We were given some time to rest and freshen up after which we were instructed to report outside the Manekshaw Hall at 1600 hours for document verification and for filling some forms. I chatted with my roommate a bit and then rested for a while.We were told to wait in an open shed covered on top, on the terrace of the building. By then, the sky was dark with clouds and a cool pleasant wind was blowing, and it blew away the heat and our fatigue. Then a fine drizzle started which soon progressed to a heavy downpour, which was nothing short of icing on a cake to me. We totally enjoyed our evening hearing the sound of the rain pattering against the roof of the shed and a cool wind caressing our faces while we waited for the elusive officers who would do our document verification.The documents check and the other formalities went pretty much uneventfully and we retired to our rooms. By 2100 hours we were famished so we went to the mess and had dinner. After that we returned to our rooms and chatted until we felt sleepy. Then I shaved and went to bed. The weather had turned cold so I unfolded the blanket and saw multiple bird droppings staining the vibrant purple acrylic fur of the blanket. Damn it, I thought, I should have brought my own blanket. Never mind, I decided. I was better off without that, but at night the cold became unbearable so I had no choice but to flip the blanket and cover myself with it. It turned out that being warm and dirty was better than being cold and clean.Day 1 - 21 September 2017We were instructed to report to the Manekshaw Hall and wait outside in the covered shed beside the hall. The Officer Intelligence Rating (OIR) test was easy as usual, and the Picture Perception and Description/Discussion Test (PPDT) was uneventful too. I made a lame-ass story based on the life of Dr. Sanduk Ruit and narrated the same during narration. However, in the end I froze and the assessor called out to the next candidate to begin his narration. The only saving grace was I had narrated my complete story and hadn’t frozen in the beginning or during the narration. Still, I was flustered and my concentration was broken. Nevertheless I listened carefully to the other candidates. One candidate was speaking so fast that I almost burst into laughter. I controlled myself, but my mood had lightened considerably due to that, so I decided to participate in the group discussion (GD) wholeheartedly. As soon as the GD started, it turned into a fish market, so the assessor split us into two groups of 8 candidates each. I raised two strong points and then fell silent. After a while, the GD ended and we were asked to leave.I walked out and saw it was raining heavily outside, so I ran to the canteen to have some snacks. Thoroughly drenched and shivering now, I got into a queue and ordered a plate of samosas. Now, the samosas were taking too long, and when my turn came, there were only two samosas left which the vendor gave to the guy standing behind me. Already in a bad mood due to my supposedly poor performance in the narration, and being cold, wet and hungry pushed me off the edge. I shouted savagely at the vendor and promptly went to the tables where other candidates were having their snacks. I asked for a samosa from a candidate I had talked to earlier in the morning, ate it and then left. It was still raining heavily but I was so pissed off that I didn’t care.After a while we reassembled outside the Manekshaw hall in the shed and waited for the results. Eventually we were called in and an extremely attractive lady officer came in to announce the results. From her uniform, we learnt that she was a Major of Army Service Corps. (Edit: This happened later; at that time she was in a civil dress). Anyway, she began with the customary speech and all that and then declared that the time to announce the results of Stage I had come. Now she began teasing the candidates, enjoying our suspense. She kept asking, “Should I tell you the results ? Are you ready for it ? Should I tell you now or later ? Are you sure you want the results now ?” It was meant to defuse the tension and inject conviviality in us, but unfortunately it had the opposite effect on me given that I was already in a foul mood. Shivering with cold, and starving, I thought, “God damn it, don’t torment us, just say the damn results so that we can leave, dry ourselves and eat something.” Nearly everyone was drenched. At last she opened the file and started calling out the chest numbers of the selected candidates. “Chest number 24” she announced. I didn’t believe my ears ! I was sure that I was going back after my unsatisfactory performance during the narration, but the very first chest number called out by her was mine. I shouted my UPSC roll number and date of birth and stood where the CHM sir told me to. She kept announcing chest numbers and they all assembled in line where I was standing.All in all, seventeen of us were screened in. The rest of the candidates were told to leave and we were handed out forms. Our phones were deposited in a suitcase, which was then locked. I obtained permission from the officer to retain my Kindle Paperwhite and the power bank with me however. After that, another officer came and started instructing us on how to fill the forms. It felt a bit weird because in my experience I had never seen an officer instructing the candidates on how to fill the forms in the SSB for Army; typically this was done by the NCOs, usually the CHM sir. Anyway, the officer was in a good mood and so were we, and he was jesting with us and we were rather enjoying it. When he came to the Employment section, he said:“जो लोग जॉब कर रहे हैं, वो एम्प्लोयेड लिखेंगे और जो लोग घर में बैठ के अपने पापा की कमाई हुई रोटी तोड़ रहे हैं वो लोग अनेम्प्लोयेड लिखेंगे”[Translation: Those who have a job will write down Employed while those who stay in their home eating the bread earned by their father, they will write down Unemployed.]Now, my chest number was 1, and since we were sitting as per our chest numbers, I was in the front row. At his remark, I couldn’t help but grin. The officer noticed me grinning.Officer: “क्यों जेंटलमैन, जॉब करते हो या घर में बैठ के रोटी तोड़ते हो ?”Me: “सर केवल रोटी ही नहीं, बिस्तर भी तोड़ता हूँ”[Translation:Officer: So gentleman, do you have a job, or do you stay at home and break bread (earned by your father) ?Me: Sir, not only bread, I also break my bed.]The candidates started sniggering. The officer gave a grudging smile and we proceeded to fill up the form. After that, we went out of the hall where there were snacks waiting for us. We gobbled them up and the vendor noted our chest numbers so that he could exact payment from us on the last day. A few candidates decided to go to the ante room for some recreation. They invited me but I politely declined; I desperately needed to go to the toilet and I couldn’t wait anymore. Ten more minutes and I would’ve probably shat my pants. So I hobbled to my room to attend the nature’s call.I found chest number 2 and 3 to be my new roommates and we were assigned a room in the same building as on the previous day but on the ground floor. We chatted till 0200 hours, then shaved and went to bed. I tried to sleep but couldn’t, so I read a book on my Kindle until it was 0400 hours, at which I woke up my roommates, shaved again and freshened up.Day 2 - 22 September 2017After having freshened up and dressed, we had breakfast and then we reported to the Manekshaw Hall at around 0630 hours. Our CHM sir instructed us to wait outside and await further instructions. So we waited and a few of us initiated small-talk which soon progressed to a hearty conversation involving all sorts of funny incidents being recounted by the repeaters from their previous experiences at the SSBs. That considerably lightened our mood and eliminated our nervousness. Then a photographer arrived to take our photo.I am Chest No. 1.Soon the psychological tests started and I didn’t realize how quickly time passed. It was pretty uneventful and I was tired by the end due to lack of sleep. The tests were over by 1200 hours and we (my roommates and I) proceeded to have lunch and returned to our room after which we slept to make up for the loss of sleep the previous night. We woke up at around 1800 hours, freshened up and went to the cyber cafe. At night, after dinner we assembled in some other candidate’s room and chatted until 0200 hours, after that we returned to our room and chatted among ourselves until 0400 hours. My roommates eventually went to sleep and I went out and strolled alone. It was raining and everything was silent except for the comforting sound of rain and an occasional thunder shattering the peace and quiet of the night. I wished the moment would never end.Day 3 - 23 September 2017At 0430 hours, I shaved and freshened up. Every room had a speaker installed. A few speakers were also installed outside on poles at several places. In the morning, they would play radio so we were regaled by the melodious voice of Arijit Singh and Armaan Malik in our room while we were getting dressed for the Group Tasks. And if you went outside you could listen to the gentle sounds emanating from the speakers kept at low volume, which were located at multiple places so that it seemed like the whole atmosphere was imbibed with music. A surreal experience.We were told to report at the gate at 0630 hours sharp if we knew what was good for us, so we had our breakfast and reported to the required place at 0625 hours. During the roll call, we found that one of the candidates was missing, and that’s how the world’s biggest manhunt was launched to locate him. Some candidates were sent to the rooms, some to the toilets, some to the mess, some to the ante-room and told to find him out, but the candidate was nowhere to be found. After fifteen minutes, when the search parties returned empty-handed, we were beginning to think that perhaps we ought to involve CIA to find him, since he was clearly so adept at hiding that he would’ve given Osama Bin Laden a run for his money. Anyway, a second search party went with the instruction to scour every inch of the area and find him. As it turned out, our Osama was found masturbating in the bathroom of the third floor. We had a hearty laugh and CHM sir was spared the details of what he was doing in the bathroom and we proceeded to the GTO ground.Our GTO was Lieutenant Colonel Victor. He seemed so young that we referred to him as GTO bhaiya (Translation: elder brother) among ourselves. It was an inside joke based on an incident back in my SSB in Allahabad which I had explained to my roommates, with the result that among ourselves, we referred to the assessors as members of our family (uncle, brother etc). The attractive Major who had announced the Stage I results was also a GTO, we found out. I nicknamed her GTO bhabhi.Anyway the GTO started with a GD. It was a nearly perfect GD with no squabbling and utmost civility. As a repeater, I had experienced GDs in the SSBs earlier, which weren’t group discussions, instead they were either debate competitions or fish markets, so I knew how rare it was. Everyone put forth their views, everyone got a chance to counter each other’s views and we arrived at a consensus within the stipulated time.After GD, we had our Group Planning Exercise (GPE), which is among my most favorite tests, along with the Individual Obstacle Race (IOR) and the Group Obstacle Race, aka, Snake Race. During the GPE, the GTO bhaiya saw my sheet and noticed that I hadn’t written my batch number. I was trying to recollect my batch number and he sensed it immediately. He shouted loudly, “You don’t even remember your batch number gentleman ?” At that very moment I remembered it and shouted “ECSE 42403 SIR !!” at which the GTO looked like he was about to murder me; even the sunglasses failed to hide his expression. Anyway, chest number 3, aka my homie, wrapped up GPE and we proceeded to the next task.After that, we had our Progressive Group Task. That pretty much sucked for me since it had become a textbook example of the phrase ‘Too many cooks spoil the broth’. I rated my performance in PGT as horrible. Still, we managed to cover a few obstacles before we ran out of time. Suddenly I heard someone shout “Deepika Padukone” from far away. I was flabbergasted and wondered what the fuck was going on and who shouted Deepika Padukone’s name and why ? I was going to find out the next day.Lecturette was pretty decent but I concluded my lecturette too early. We were supposed to speak for 3 minutes, but I only spoke for 2 minutes. Although my content was very good, I had stopped too early so I graded my performance in the Lecurette as poor.Half Group Task was a bit better since there were fewer candidates in each group now. The first day of GTO was finally over and half of us were scheduled to have interview that day itself while the other half were to have their interview the next day.My interview was pretty decent and went on for around forty minutes. I was a bit worried since my Allahabad interview had gone for around an hour. Later I learnt that the interview duration of the other candidates ranged from half an hour to an hour, so I felt relieved. As soon as I returned to the ‘line’ (our lodging area), I was bombarded with questions from the other candidates. I told them that the Interview Officer (IO) uncle, who was a middle aged Colonel, had asked me about myself and current affairs, especially geopolitical issues pertaining to topics like Doklam, South China Sea, North Korea, Guam, OBOR, Chabahar port, Gwadar port, ISIS and G-20. I had pretty decent knowledge of all the topics except G-20, so I was relaxed.Eventually all candidates for the day had been interviewed and we assembled in a room and chatted till midnight, after which we returned to our room and chatted till 0200 hours. I read a novel in my Kindle until 0400 hours, then shaved and woke up my roommates, chest number 2 and 3, who had turned out to be my best friends in the SSB.Day 4 - 24 September 2017We freshened up, had breakfast and reported to the GTO ground at 0630 hours in time because Osama didn’t hide today. We had to run to the GTO ground and we were told to run to anywhere we had to go and walking was prohibited. Fuck you, I thought, when I was breathless from all the running. I’ll walk now, do whatever you can, I don’t care. I have to save my energy for the actual tasks. Looking back on it, it was a big mistake on my part. Why you ask ? Well, I’ll come to it.We started with IOR. We were told to assemble in a semi-circle while Victor bhaiya, our GTO briefed us. Then he inquired which of us had a girlfriend, and told those who had to raise their arms. My relationship status was a bit complicated at that time so I kept my hand down. The GTO observed us and then reprimanded us, “What kind of useless people are you, if you can’t get a girlfriend even after having been to a college ?” Yup, I thought, exactly what we needed right now, rubbing salt in our wounds. He then briefed us about the Commando Walk obstacle and told us that at the pinnacle, we had to shout the name of our girlfriend, and those who were single had to shout the name of their crush. Okay, I thought, that explains the random ‘Deepika Padukone’ shout I had heard yesterday. LMAO, I chuckled, this is going to be fun ! In the Allahabad SSB, we had to shout ‘Commando Chest No. <insert chest number of the candidate>’ at the pinnacle point of the Commando Walk, but this was clearly more fun.IOR was a breeze for me, not only I had dexterity, I actually enjoyed doing all the obstacles. It is the one thing I look forward to, a lot, when I appear for any SSB. In the commando walk, on reaching the pinnacle, I shouted “EMMA WATSON !!”. There was no way I was taking the name of my girl. As it turned out, I was right. My homie chest number 3 had shouted his girlfriend’s name and we roasted him relentlessly the whole day. Anyway, I was effortlessly crossing the obstacles like a pro when I screwed up my Tarzan Jump landing. Pain shot up in my right knee and it felt like someone had stabbed a screw into my knee. I limped to the next obstacle and somehow managed to complete it. Still, I rated my performance there as good. I realized that’s why we were told to keep running; it was warm-up for us, and it was necessary, and by not running, I had not warmed up properly, which had resulted in a tissue injury which took around six months to fully heal. I made a mental note to follow the CHM sir’s instructions from now on, no matter how unappealing they seemed.After that, we had our Command Task (CT). The Command Task starts with a micro-interview by the GTO. In my case, the GTO bhaiya asked me from where I had done my coaching. I have never done any coaching, I replied. I wasn’t lying. I really haven’t done any SSB coaching. He asked me a few other things like, “Why do you want to join the Indian Army”, and similar run-of-the-mill questions and then we proceeded to the CT ground. I had to call two candidates who would be my subordinates in the CT; I called out my roommates and homies Chest No. 2 and 3. I was given a bomb defusal task which seemed difficult to me, but GTO bhaiya kept pestering me that time was running out, which didn’t help. I struggled a bit but managed to defuse the bomb, though a vague hint given out by the GTO bhaiya did help. Additionally, I was called by three candidates (Chest No. 2, 3 & 4) to be their subordinate when their turn came to be the commander.After that we assembled for our Group Obstacle Race, also known as Snake Race. Four groups were present and we had to choose a war cry. Quickly I shouted ‘Jai Hind’; it was the war cry of my group back in Allahabad, and it was adopted as the war cry of our group. Other groups chose their own war cries like ‘Bharat Mata ki Jai’, ‘Vande Mataram’, and ‘Jai Mahakali, Aayo Gorkhali’ (The regimental war cry of Gurkha Regiment). We were told to keep screaming the war cry like a banshee throughout the duration of our race. It started of excitingly enough, energizing us, but soon we got tired of screaming. I felt thirsty and there were no clouds to help us today. The crisp tropical sunshine beat on us and most of the candidates stopped shouting their war cry after a while. I faltered too until the GTO bhaiya noticed us and shouted, “Keep shouting the war cry gentlemen, or your group will be penalized.” I resumed shouting. My throat was parched and I wanted to drink a whole dam, but I kept on shouting. Meanwhile on the double wall, I was on the forward side and I was holding the ‘snake’ (a rolled up tent) and I was waiting for the rest of my group since the rule was that at least three candidates had to hold the ‘snake’ at any point of time. So I took the time to admire the beauty of our GTO bhabhi, who looked absolutely dashing in jeans and T-shirt and her aviator sunglasses. I can’t seem to recollect her name. Too bad she was the GTO of the other group, I thought; we would’ve been much happier if she was the GTO of our group. I learnt later that I wasn’t alone in my thinking. But the candidates of her group later told us to thank our stars that we didn’t get her, because legend has it that she is even stricter than our Victor bhaiya. Meh, I thought, it doesn’t matter. Anyway, we won the Snake Race.After that, we had the Final Group Task (FGT) which is practically Round 2 of PGT. It wasn’t that memorable. Most of us were too tired to do much. Still we managed to cross a few obstacles before the time ran out. After that the GTO bhaiya gave a customary speech and asked if we had any doubts or something, after which he thanked us and wished us luck. The second day of the GTO was over.There is a different atmosphere after 1300 hours on Day 4, no matter where you’re having your SSB, no matter how excellent or hopeless was your performance. Everyone is happy and relaxed and the mood is festive. Even though we know that most of us would return disappointed the next day, the mere fact that all tests are over cheers everyone up !We discussed the GTO tests and races, retold each other jokes, laughed and generally had lots of fun. We decided to visit the zoo beside the lake. So we hopped on to a Tata Magic, had a soldier in uniform accompany us and went to the zoo. There, we rented bicycles and cycled throughout the stretch, where on one side we had a vast lake and on the other side, there were animal enclosures over a large area. It was so beautiful that I even forgot my pain for the time being (the pain due to my knee injury during the botched Tarzan Jump landing had got aggravated due to the movement of my knees while pedalling my bicycle). My bicycle had faulty brakes, I found out the hard way later. I was cycling at my full speed when another candidate suddenly came in front of me. I applied brakes and found that although they worked a bit, they weren’t particularly effective. I rammed my cycle into the candidate. We didn’t fall though. Coincidentally, a pretty girl in a yellow dress passed us on a bicycle from the opposite side a the same time. Naturally, my batch-mates decided that I had rammed the other candidate because my attention was on that yellow-attired pretty girl coming from the opposite side, so they began roasting me with gusto which mercifully ended when we went to the Indian Army memorial (Shaurya Smarak) in Bhopal. We observed the exhibits and the scale models of equipment. There was a Siachen exhibit which was in a room so cold, we started shivering. To our dismay both the doors were closed from the outside. We remained there for a few minutes wondering if we would turn into popsicles, before a family opened the door and we rushed out. Then we returned to the Selection Centre and chatted until it was time for dinner. After dinner, we were too tired to do anything, so we slept like babies.Day 5 - 25 September 2017A crisp sunshine greeted us in the morning. We were asked to wait at the same place where we had done our document verification. After a while, I was called for the conference. Standard questions like, ‘How was your stay here, how was the food and accommodation? Any advice or complaint’ etc. were asked and then I walked out and waited in the shed.Eventually, all candidates were processed and then we were called to the Manekshaw hall for the results. Another lady officer came in to announce the results. She was also a Major of ASC. She gave a customary speech, recounted her SSB experience to us and announced the results.Unfortunately, I wasn’t selected. It was an unpleasant surprise for me, since I had rated my overall performance as good. Anyway, three candidates were recommended. I will respect their privacy and won’t reveal them, but I will recount their backstory:Candidate Alpha had cleared NDA and was injured during the training. Even after relegation he couldn’t heal in time so he was given two options:Take medical retirement and get pension and retirement benefits, but he could not apply for the Indian armed forces again.Submit the total cost of his training until his injury, drop out of NDA and try again after graduation.Needless to say, Alpha chose the second option and cleared the SSB.Candidate Bravo had cleared AFCAT, AFSB and the medical tests but was merited out. He is a good friend of mine and he is currently training in the Indian Military Academy (IMA) Dehradun.Candidate Charlie was a repeater who cleared his SSB in his twelfth attempt. Charlie refused to take life seriously and had lots of fun, but he also had a heart of gold and a jovial nature. Also, Charlie was the candidate who was found wanking in the bathroom. Yeah, our Osama got recommended !It was the [Edit: second] best SSB of my life so far and even though I didn’t get recommended, I’ll cherish the memories forever. I request anyone who hasn’t appeared in an SSB interview to experience it at least once; it is an indescribable experience. Thank you for reading.Edit:Quora doesn't let me post two separate answers for the same question, so you can find my other answer here: Rohan Singh's answer to How was your SSB interview experience at 22 SSB, Bhopal?

Robert Clouse cited a great case, but here's a few others that should explain that the government - DBA the military and police you so highly laud - is NOT the entity responsible for our protection as ordinary citizens. I've included the Court Reporter references in case there's a doubt as to the legitimacy of the citation.South v. Maryland 59 U.S. (How.) 396, 15 L.Ed.433 (1856)Robinson, a resident of Washington County, owed a judgment debt to Pottle, a resident of Massachusetts. When Pottle and a party consisting of his attorney and a deputy sheriff attempted to assert a levy upon Robinson's property, they were surrounded by a group of workmen armed with stones and other weapons. The workmen threatened violence should any attempt be made to assert the levy. After Pottle and his party took refuge in a nearby house, the workmen (described in the case as "rioters") maintained an armed guard around it. The deputy sheriff left Pottle and his attorney imprisoned in the house and went to consult with the High Sheriff, South. When South returned with the deputy, Pottle demanded that he be protected from the armed workmen, but South refused to do so. Pottle and his attorney were released, after four days of imprisonment, when they paid the workmen $2,500, a sum apparently equal to the amount of back wages owed them by Robinson.After the federal Circuit Court for the District of Maryland found for the plaintiff Pottle in a civil suit for damages against the sheriff, South appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, in reversing the lower court, found no cause of action under Maryland common law. The Court held that a sheriff, as a public officer, was liable personally only for misfeasance or nonfeasance of ministerial acts, where the sheriff is bound to an individual for a fee or salary, but not for a breach of his public duty.Cocking v Wade 87 Md. 529 (1898)Following indictment by a grand jury for the murder of his wife and her sister, Cocking was taken into the custody of the sheriff of Charles County, Wade. The sheriff placed Cocking in "an old, dilapidated building" in Port Tobacco that was used as a jail and under the care of "an aged and infirm negro," leaving the prisoner "wholly unprotected." That night a mob, in the presence of the sheriff, proceeded to lynch Cocking. Despite some evidence that the sheriff was told of the possibility of lynching and had been urged to either move the prisoner to Baltimore or to a newer jail, the Court of Appeals upheld the judgment of the trial court in a civil action brought by the family of the hanged man in finding no liability on the part of the sheriff.Riss v. City of New York 22 N.Y.2d 579, 293 NYS2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (N.Y. Ct. of Ap. 1958);Ms. Riss was being harassed by a former boyfriend, in a familiar pattern of increasingly violent threats. She went to the police for help many times, but was always rebuffed. Desperate because she could not get police protection, she applied for a gun permit, but was refused that as well. On the eve of her engagement party she and her mother went to the police one last time pleading for protection against what they were certain was a serious and dangerous threat. And one last time the police refused. As she was leaving the party, a thug hired by her former boyfriend threw acid in her face, blinding and permanently disfiguring her.Her case against the City of New York for failing to protect her was, not surprisingly, unsuccessful. The lone dissenting justice of New York's high court wrote in his opinion: "What makes the City's position [denying any obligation to protect the woman] particularly difficult to understand is that, in conformity to the dictates of the law [she] did not carry any weapon for self-defense. Thus, by a rather bitter irony she was required to rely for protection on the City of New York which now denies all responsibility to her."Ne Casek v. City of Los Angeles 233 Cal.App.2d 131, 43 Cal.Rptr. 294 (1965)Kathryne Ne Casek was knocked down on a sidewalk by two suspects who had been arrested by the officers, the Court of Appeal held the amount of force or method used by a police officer in attempting to keep an arrested person or persons in custody is a discretionary act for purpose of application of doctrine of immunity of government officials from civil liability for their discretionary acts, and therefore Ms. Ne Casek (who was injured by two escaped suspects who had been handcuffed together) could not maintain an action against the arresting officers based on the officer's alleged negligence in using insufficient force to keep the prisoners in custody.)Keane v. City of Chicago 98 Ill. App.2d 460, 240 N.E.2d 321 (1968);A Chicago public school teacher was killed while on the premises of the school to which she had been assigned was killed by a student enrolled at the school. The plaintiff alleged that the City was negligent in failing to assign police protection to the school, although it knew or should have known that failure to provide this protection would result in harm to persons lawfully on the premises in the removal of police protection from the school prior to the event, although it knew or should have known of the dangerous condition then existing at the school and in permitting a dangerous condition to exist at the school. The court dismissed the case because of the existing state law granting tort immunity with no proof the City had ever affirmatively assumed a "special duty”.Susman v. City of Los Angeles, et al. 269 Cal.App.2d 803, 75 Cal.Rptr. 240 (1969)Action was brought by several landowners against the City of Los Angeles and the State pleading eleven separate causes of action for damages arising out of the ‘Watts’ Riots’ of 1965. The Court of Appeal held that none of the allegations presented was sufficient to show any duty owed by any of the officials named as defendants to act to prevent or avoid the harm suffered by the plaintiffs.Silver v. City of Minneapolis 170 N.W.2d 206 (S.Ct. Minn. 1969)A riot occurred in the Plymouth Avenue North area of Minneapolis in July, 1967. Plaintiffs owned real estate located at 1709-1711 Plymouth Avenue North. On July 19, 1967, a riot occurred in that area during which looting occurred and a number of business and commercial properties along Plymouth Avenue were damaged or destroyed. The windows in the plaintiff’s store were broken in plaintiffs' store by rioters; this was investigated by the Minneapolis Police Department. According to plaintiffs, they received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage in riots that might follow.According to plaintiffs, after they had received indications that their building and store were being threatened by further damage they boarded up the windows and doors and contacted the police concerning the threats. A representative from MPD stated “we know about it and we are going to have some extra police to guard Plymouth Avenue, but we haven't got enough police, you know, to watch every business place on Plymouth. He says we are going to keep an eye on your place, but we cannot give you special protection."Following this conversation, Silver went home about 7 p. m., informing the police of his intention to leave at that hour and told them that he had boarded up his doors and windows. During the night of July 20-21, plaintiffs' building and store were burned by rioters throwing "Molotov cocktails" against the building. They sought recovery from the city for the damage to the building and store, alleging the city of Minneapolis was negligent in failing to provide police and fire protection to their building after it had been requested by plaintiffs, or to take reasonable measures to prevent the riot.The court was satisfied that under the facts of the present case the city was exercising discretion in determining how to best cope with impending trouble by deploying its police and fire manpower so as to protect the property of as many people as was possible within its limited resources, and as such fell under the existing Tort Immunity of state law.Evett v. City of Inverness, 224 So.2d 365, 366-67 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1969).The plaintiff's husband was killed when an automobile operated by him on U.S. Highway 41 was struck on its own side of the road by an automobile negligently operated by an intoxicated driver.A short time before the collision, a police officer of the City of Inverness had stopped the intoxicated driver for speeding on the same highway within the municipal limits of the City of Inverness. The plaintiffs alleged that the officer “knew or should have known that the operator was intoxicated to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired and that his continued operation of the vehicle would injure persons or property upon the public highways”, and that the officer negligently permitted him to continue driving upon the public highways, resulting in the crash.The court rejected the idea that the duty owed to the plaintiff's deceased husband was different from that owed to any other member of the public, and as such rejected the suit.Massengill v. Yuma County, 104 Ariz. 518, 456 P.2d 376 (1969);This case involved an automobile collision in which plaintiffs' decedents were killed. The plaintiffs argued that it resulted from a deputy sheriff's failure to apprehend and arrest intoxicated motorists observed driving in a reckless manner immediately prior to the accident. The court disagreed:"The general rule pertaining to governmental agencies and public officers is that `... if the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public, not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution.”Simpson's Food Fair v. Evansville 272 N.E. 2d 871 (Ind.Ct. of Ap.) 1971;The plaintiff-appellant alleged that the City of Evansville knew or should have known of the high incidence of criminal activity in the plaintiff's neighborhood. He held that it refused to assign extra police to patrol the area or to request outside police assistance from the State, that a duty to protect the plaintiff and to prevent crime was breached, and that such breach proximately caused the plaintiff to lose customers and merchandise and ultimately to cease business operation. The court held that in this case, a general public duty was involved, and that no special duty had been undertaken.Antique Arts Corp. v. City of Torrence 39 Cal.App.3d 588, 114 Cal.Rptr. 332 (1974)A silent burglar alarm installed on the premises of the store operated by the plaintiff was, during the course of a robbery by two armed men, activated at 3:32 p.m. and the alert message was relayed to the police department.The dispatch message to the units in the field was at 3:43 p.m., and a police unit arrived at the scene of the robbery at 3:44 p.m. The delay in the transmission of the dispatch enabled the robbers to complete the robbery and escape with jewelry and merchandise in the amount of $49,000. The Court of Appeal held that Govt. Code section 846 provides for immunity if no police protection is provided; or, if police protection is provided, but that protection is not sufficient.Hartzler v. City of San Jose 46 Cal.App.3d 6, 120 Cal.Rptr. 5 (1975)Plaintiff's decedent, Ruth Bunnell, telephoned the main office of the San Jose Police Department and reported that her estranged husband, Mack Bunnell, had called her, saying that he was coming to her residence to kill her. She requested immediate police aid; the department refused to come to her aid at that time, and asked that she call the department again when Mack Bunnell had arrived.Approximately 45 minutes later, Mack Bunnell arrived at her home and stabbed her to death. The police did not arrive until 3 a.m., in response to a call of a neighbor. By this time Mrs. Bunnell was dead.Appellant has failed to plead facts supporting an assumption that a special relationship existed between decedent and the San Jose Police Department. The allegation that the police had responded 20 times to her calls and had arrested her husband once does not indicate that the department had assumed a duty toward decedent greater than the duty owed to another member of the public. The police may have responded repeatedly to her calls, only to discover that she was not in danger. Absent an indication that the police had induced decedent's reliance on a promise, express or implied, that they would provide her with protection, it must be concluded that no special relationship existed and that appellant has not stated a cause of action.Walters v. Hampton, 14 Wash. App. 548, 543 P.2d 648 (1975);Robert Walters was shot with a rifle by Gordon A. Hampton, while visiting in the latter's home in Port Orchard. Walters presented police records which showed that on three occasions in 1968 and two occasions in 1970 Gordon Hampton's wife complained to the police that her husband, while drunk, had threatened to kill her. On the three 1968 occasions Mrs. Hampton reported that Hampton had aimed a gun at her. Twice the police investigated her complaints and talked to Hampton. In June 1970 and September 1970 Mrs. Hampton again complained Hampton was beating her and had threatened to kill her. In the September incident Mrs. Hampton told the police Hampton had fired a gun at her. She also asked the police to remove a woman Hampton had allegedly brought to the home. The police officers observed no other woman in the house, but took Hampton's gun to the police station. It should be noted Hampton denied firing the gun. The firearm was returned to Hampton 2 days later. On almost all these occasions, the investigating officers found both Mr. and Mrs. Hampton either to have been drinking or drunk. Between the time Hampton retrieved his gun in September 1970 and when Walters was shot the police had no contact with either Mr. or Mrs. Hampton.Plaintiff's principal theory was that the chief of police had a mandatory statutory duty to prosecute Hampton for violation of city ordinances prohibiting the aiming or discharging of firearms, or to initiate criminal prosecution for assault. Plaintiff's apparent contention is that had Hampton been prosecuted, the gun could have been confiscated in 1968 or 1970 and plaintiff would not have been injured in 1972. Second, plaintiff contends the police had a mandatory and nondiscretionary duty to protect him against the harm which in fact befell him.The court held that the plaintiff's entire argument is based upon the false premise that arrest and the criminal process is the exclusive method available to the police in dealing with the variety of behavioral or social problems they confront; additionally, given that the only complaints received by the police prior to the shooting related to the Hampton's marital disputes (and the last contact the police had with the Hamptons prior to the shooting in February 1972 was in September 1970). In the absence of any allegation that the police knew Hampton posed a danger to the plaintiff, that the plaintiff required protection from Hampton, or that plaintiff was in some particular danger, these facts are inadequate to establish a specific duty owed by the City to plaintiff.Henderson v. St. Petersburg, 247 So.2d 23 (Fla. Ct. App. 1971);On May 9, 1969, Matthew Henderson came to the City of St. Petersburg, Florida, for the purpose of making business deliveries, which he has done on prior occasions. Because of prior criminal attacks previously made on him, he went to the Police Department, and alleged he made “specific arrangements with the officers, agents and employees of the defendant City acting within the scope of their employment” (a desk sergeant on duty at the precinct) created “a privity for specific police protection” while he was making his deliveries.He later proceeded to the area where he claims he was “assured officers would be there to protect him”. However, arriving at the above address, he was accosted by unknown assailants, who shot him. He sued for injury, damages and loss of future income, alleging that they were the result of the carelessness and negligence of the City, through “it's Police Department, officers and agents, in failing to properly protect the plaintiff as they had specifically undertaken through the direct contact..."The court held that the plaintiff did not make causal connection between the alleged negligence of the City and the injuries, prove that the presence of the police officers would have prevented the injuries, and did not show that the City owed Henderson a "special duty."Evers v. Westerberg, (1972)38 A.D.2d 751, 329 N.Y.S. 615;On December 4, 1966, at about 1:50 A.M., an automobile accident occurred in Valley Stream, NY, when an automobile driven by defendant Thomas Westerberg and owned by defendant Celeste Westerberg collided with a vehicle driven by John Evers, in which his wife (plaintiff) was a passenger, causing Evers' death. About 20 minutes earlier, the Westerberg vehicle had been involved in a rear-end collision with another automobile in the Village of Lynbrook.Mrs. Evers sued the Westerbergs and the Village of Lynbrook, charging them with negligence through the officers, for having failed to take Westerberg into custody on the ground of intoxication and/or impounding his damaged vehicle to prevent him from driving it away from the scene.They also complained that the village failed to provide Mr. and Mrs. Evers with adequate police protection insofar as it permitted Westerberg to drive away from the scene of the first accident. The court disagreed:“It is well settled that a municipality, acting in its governmental capacity for the protection of the general public, cannot be cast in damages for a mere failure to furnish adequate protection to a particular individual to whom it has assumed no special duty.”Huey v. Cicero, 41 Ill.2d 361, 243 N.E.2d 214 (1968);This action arose from the fatal beating of Jerome Huey, a black man, by four white youths armed with baseball bats. The attack occurred at about 10:00 P.M. on May 25, 1966, near the intersection of 25th Place and Laramie Avenue in Cicero, Illinois, while decedent was en route to an employment office. The complaint recited these facts and alleged that the defendants knew or would have known by the exercise of ordinary care that a large number of blacks entered and departed the confines of Cicero daily in pursuit of employment at various factories and that "The (city) however, or one or more of them so wantonly and wilfully neglected to use ordinary care for the protection and safety due to dark-skinned persons… that as a direct and proximate result, JEROME HUEY, was assaulted and severe injuries were inflicted from which he died."Plaintiffs charged that the defendants were under a duty to “warn, advise, or otherwise give notice to dark-skinned persons of the unusual and extraordinary hazards and perils to such persons as existed” in the town of Cicero and that they willfully and wantonly failed to exercise ordinary care to so advise, warn or otherwise give notice”The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove any special relationship that would exempt the city from the Tort Immunity statute, could not prove that the City knew of the presence of Mr. Huey in the town, that he had requested police protection, that he was in some peculiar danger, and did not actually allege any specific acts or omissions by the City or any causal connection between such conduct or lack of conduct and the fatal injury.Trautman v. City of Stamford, (1975 Super. Ct.)32 Conn. Sup. 258, 350 A.2d 782Trautman, injured after being struck by an automobile while standing on a public sidewalk in the city of Stamford, filed a suit against the City and two police officers individually, claiming that they “allowed automobile drag racing to occur in their presence for a substantial period of time on the street adjacent to the sidewalk on which he stood… when they knew or should have known that such activity could cause injury”. He also claimed that they failed to stop such drag racing when they knew that such activity in public was a violation of ordinance and statute, they “failed to disperse the persons congregating on the public sidewalk or to arrest the participants of the drag races when they had the authority and the duty to do so”; he also claimed that they “failed to warn the public lawfully using the sidewalk of the danger involved; and failed to properly and adequately to control and supervise the street in accordance with their duties as police officers”.The court held that because that alleged breach of duty was one owed not to the plaintiff individually but to the public generally the patrolmen and the city could not be held liable to the plaintiff in a negligence case.Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. City of Wichita, 217 Kan. 44, 536 P.2d 54 (1975);After having a business in the area suffer firebombings, a detective performed a stake-out on a business that had received specific threats. He observed two vehicles slow through the area then turn a corner, after which four males came from around that corner. Three went into an L-shaped recess where the shop was, while one stayed on the sidewalk. They were not carrying anything the detective could see, but as he attempted to request another unit to the scene via radio, he “saw a bright red flare” and as he neared he saw a front window in the area was burning, and saw the 4 males run away. Shortly thereafter as he was looking for them he saw one of the vehicles he had seen earlier flee the scene. He gave chase, and after a twenty to thirty block chase was able to apprehend four of the five occupants. During interviews, three young men told of being at a party earlier that evening in Wichita, and the idea came up to set fire to several businesses with Molotov cocktails.The insurance company alleged that the police failed to enforce the “mob action” statute and thus prevent the fire. They also argue that the detective breached his duty under state law to order the dispersal of the four boys in front of the Gentry Shop, and that such a breach of a statutory duty made him personally liable for the ensuing damage.The court held that “The statute amounts to a codification of the common law duty of a peace officer to preserve the peace. The duty owed is to the public at large, and not to any particular individual. For the breach of such duty an officer is answerable only to the public acting through its official representatives, and not to any particular individual.”Sapp v. City of Tallahassee 348 So.2d 363 (Fla. Ct. of Ap. 1977);Ms. Sapp's complaint alleged Tallahassee Police Department officers, on the evening of September 4, 1974, were on special assignment at the Tallahassee round Holiday Inn. One of the officers observed two males in the rear parking area and radioed a suspicious persons report to another officer on stake-out within the hotel. The officers observed the men loiter at opposite ends of the sidewalk near the rear entrance of the hotel for about ten minutes. Ms. Sapp, a temporary employee of the Inn, was then observed leaving the rear entrance, and looking for her ride before reentering the hotel. The officer on stake-out saw the two males follow her into the hotel about a minute later. Other than reporting in, the officer took no action. Twenty minutes later he saw the males running from the hotel after severely beating and robbing Ms. Sapp inside the hotel near the rear entrance. The complaint alleged the officers owed appellant a special duty to protect her from physical assaults and were negligent in failing to properly investigate the behavior of the men.The court held that there was no showing of a violation of statutory procedures by the Tallahassee police — nor a showing of a direct and personal contact with Ms. Sapp, and while the police were conducting surveillance at the time the incident took place, it was not a situation where police authorities undertook a responsibility to particular members of the public, exposing them, without adequate protection, to risks which then materialize into actual injury.Jamison v. Chicago, 48 Ill. App. 3d 567 (1st Dist. 1977)James O'Malley shot and killed John Jamison. For three days prior to the shooting, O'Malley's son had warned the Chicago police that his father had been acting in a violent manner and requested that the police arrest him. The police refused to do so and the shooting occurred. Plaintiff, administratrix of Jamison's estate, filed a wrongful death action against the city of Chicago and the individual police officers, alleging, inter alia, that the individual officers were guilty of willful and wanton negligence in refusing to arrest O'Malley.After appeal, the court held that the existing tort immunity legislation provided “blanket immunity in the area of police discretion over arrests”, as well as “any failure to prevent the commission of crimes, the failure to apprehend criminals, and the failure to make an arrest” unless such act or omission constituted willful and wanton negligence.Weutrich v. Delia 155 N.J. Super 324, 326, 382 A.2d 929, 930 (1978);The plaintiff alleged that on several occasions during the afternoon and evening of February 9, 1974 notification was given to the police department of the township that defendant John Delia was menacing with a firearm certain persons within a short distance of the Berkeley Heights police headquarters. The police department made no response to these warnings. Less than 12 hours later, in the early morning of February 10, 1974, John Delia in that same area shot John Weuthrich in the head with a gun, killing him instantly, leaving as survivors his wife and three infant children.The complaint alleged that decedent's death was caused not only by the wrongful act of defendant Delia but also by the neglect, failure and default of the township police department to carry out its duty (1) to "apprehend and disarm" defendant after receiving warning of his armed threats of imminent personal harm, and (2) to take "appropriate action to disarm [defendant]…file a Complaint against him or otherwise confiscate the firearms in his possession."The City replied that state law provided immunity for public entities and officers for adopting or failing to adopt or enforce (any) law, failing to provide police protection and failing to make arrests or retain persons so placed in custody.The court agreed, holding “While it is true that police officers have a duty to investigate information from citizens concerning unlawful or criminal activity, (cite), the failure of the police to make an arrest as a consequence does not subject the municipality to tort liability…Municipalities are expressly immunized from tort liability for the failure to provide police protection or the failure to provide sufficient police protection.”DeHoney v. Hernandez, 122 Ariz. 367, 372, 595 P.2d 159, 164 (1979)After consulting informally with several officers, DeHoney, the owner of a jewelry store, installed a silent alarm sytem. On the evening of 30 June 1975, the silent alarm for the Showcase was activated at the police station at 2:11 a.m. The dispatcher immediately radioed the officers in the field, and at 2:13 a.m. Sgt. Hernandez and Officer Hill simultaneously arrived in front of the Showcase and Officer Hovis arrived at the rear. The front and back doors were secure; the police saw no indications of disturbance. Sgt. Hernandez then instructed Edwards to telephone DeHoney and also directed Officer Hovis to remain in the general vicinity. Officers Hill and Hernandez left the area for other duties, not realizing a burglar had entered through the roof and remained inside, exiting thorough a back door once the officer left the rear of the building.The dispatcher had some difficulty in locating DeHoney’s phone number and reached him approximately 30 minutes later. He arrived on scene at 2:45 and entered the building with Officer Hovitz to discover the theft.DeHoney alleged the police were negligent in their delay in notifying him and their failure to remain at the building until the owner arrived. The court disagreed, stating “…there was no specific promise or representation that the owner would always be immediately notified, or that the officers would remain on the premises pending the owner's arrival in every instance... Certainly there are many situations where emergencies confronting the police in the discharge of their duties to the public generally would make it impossible to immediately notify the owner and await his arrival. There was, then, no narrowing of the general public duty to a special duty to prevent harm to plaintiffs' property.”Trujillo v. City of Albuquerque, 93 N.M. 564, 569, 603 P.2d 303 (1979)On June 22, 1975, plaintiff's decedent, Ernest Trujillo, along with a group of friends, was in Roosevelt Park, a park established and maintained by the City of Albuquerque. Earlier in the day, a rock concert had been held but Ernest and his friends went to the park after the concert was over. They were sitting on the grass when they were approached by, and had some kind of altercation with, another person who then left the park. Shortly thereafter, a second person approached Ernest and his group, accusing them of having "picked on" his brother, and drew a gun, firing it once or twice. Ernest and his friends then chased this person to the top of a knoll where a third person, Wilbert Miles, stood and fired a shotgun "into the ground", hitting and killing Ernest.Her complaint alleged that the City maintained the park; that the maintenance of the park was a proprietary function of the City; that the City allowed the rock concert to be held in the park without proper police and security arrangements; that the City had a duty to secure the park and protect citizens using it, particularly a duty to protect Ernest's well-being; and that the City breached its duty and was therefore liable in damages.The court held that “lacking proof of a direct relationship or contact between the victim and the police creating a special duty, there is no liability on the part of the police and municipality… Failing to establish that a special duty existed between the victim and the police, there is no liability.” The court also stated “To hold a municipality liable for the conduct of third persons, such as is alleged in the complaint before us, would, in our opinion, be contrary to sound public policy and create policing requirements difficult of fulfillment.”Crouch v. Hall, 406 N.E.2d 303, 304 (Ind.App.1980);Mildred Crouch brought suit against three police officers, individually and in their capacity as officers, for failure to properly investigate a rape of a third person by one Anthony Wayne Hall and to detect and apprehend Hall, who one week later raped and murdered Mildred Crouch's daughter Jeanne Crouch. The officers moved for summary judgment based on immunity under the Tort Claims Act.Upon appeal, the court agreed that while “there is no factual dispute… the police owed no special duty to the victim. The duty owed in the investigation of the rape was to the general public.”Porter v. Urbana, 88 Ill.App.3d 443, 445, 43 Ill.Dec. 610, 612, 410 N.E.2d 610, 612 (1980)The plaintiff's complaint alleges that Clarence King, Jr., invaded her home December 3, 1976, and beat and raped her, and that the Urbana Police Department and Gordon knew of six other rapes committed by King in Urbana beginning March 22, 1976, and claimed they were negligent for failing to investigate, question, or arrest the man that was known to them (having eyewitness descriptions of King, his fingerprints, and his name connecting him with the series of rapes) in time to prevent her assault.The Court disagreed, citing the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, which reads “Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for failure to provide adequate police protection or service, failure to prevent the commission of crimes and failure to apprehend criminals”.Stone v. State 106 Cal.App.3d 924, 165 Cal Rep. 339 (1980)The plaintiffs, together with some friends, attended the Cal Expo fairgrounds on September 9, 1975. They agreed to meet at the main gate prior to returning home. Near the gate the plaintiffs were overrun by a gang of youths who were shouting and hitting persons. During the melee Joyce Stone was attacked, her purse was taken and the plaintiffs were beaten and injured.In their complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the state “negligently owned, maintained, controlled, managed and operated” the premises, and negligently failed to provide adequate security measures, exposing persons on the premises to danger and injury. They also alleged that the State Of California, in making a policy decision not to use State Police for security but to use private security, assumed a duty to provide security, and that the persons hired by the State failed to use normal care while exercising their functions.The court found that the limited exception to tort immunity in cases involving discretionary acts in which a special relationship between the plaintiff and the public employee exist had not been proven, and given the existing law immunizing the government for failure to establish a police department, provide police protection or to provide sufficient police protection service, no liability existed for such failure.Warren v. District of Columbia (444 A.2d 1, 1981)Two women were upstairs in a townhouse when they heard their roommate, a third woman, being attacked downstairs by intruders. They phoned the police several times and were assured that officers were on the way. After about 30 minutes, when their roommate's screams had stopped, they assumed the police had finally arrived. When the two women went downstairs they saw that in fact the police never came, but the intruders were still there. As the Warren court graphically states in the opinion: "For the next fourteen hours the women were held captive, raped, robbed, beaten, forced to commit sexual acts upon each other, and made to submit to the sexual demands of their attackers."The three women sued the District of Columbia for failing to protect them, but D.C.'s highest court exonerated the District and its police, saying that it is a "fundamental principle of American law that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services, such as police protection, to any individual citizen."Chapman v. City of Philadelphia, 434 A.2d 753 (Sup.Ct. Penn. 1981);William F. Chapman, died on August 14, 1978 as a result of injuries he sustained on August 11, 1978 when he was attacked and robbed by three men on the platform of the Wayne Junction Railroad Station. The complaint alleges that the City of Philadelphia negligently breached its duty to plaintiff's decedent by failing to maintain law and order, protect the citizens and prevent unsafe conditions from existing.The court held that “the duty of the City of Philadelphia to provide police protection is a public one which may not be claimed by an individual unless a special relationship exists between the city and the individual” and that the plaintiff had failed to “set forth any facts from which it would be possible to infer that a special relationship existed between William F. Chapman and the City of Philadelphia”.Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 61 (7th Cir. 1982).Thomas Vanda, was convicted of aggravated battery with a knife, and while being evaluated was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Less than a year later was charged in using a knife to murder of a woman. He was found “not guilty by reason of insanity” and was committed to a psychiatric facility. Five years later he was released and subsequently killed Marguerite Anne Bowers with a knife.The complaint alleged that the defendants knew that Vanda was dangerous when they released him, and acted recklessly in doing so, but the court held that “there is no constitutional right to be protected by the state against being murdered by criminals or madmen. It is monstrous if the state fails to protect its residents against such predators but it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or, we suppose, any other provision of the Constitution.”Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 C.3d 197, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894 (S.Ct. Cal. 1982);Yolanda Davidson was stabbed four times by Jack Blackmun while in a public laundromat. On three earlier occasions women had been stabbed at the same or nearby laundromats. The evening before Yolanda's stabbing, two police officers had the laundromat under surveillance when another stabbing occurred; the police chased the suspect but failed to catch him. The next evening the officers had the laundromat under surveillance for the purpose of preventing assaults and apprehending the felon. The officers were aware of Yolanda's presence in the laundromat throughout the surveillance. After about an hour of surveillance, they saw a man on the premises who closely resembled the attacker of the previous evening and, while watching him for 15 minutes, identified him as the likely perpetrator of that assault. As the officers watched, the suspect entered and left the laundromat "several times." The officers did not warn Yolanda. Eventually she was stabbed.Shore v. Town of Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, ___, 444 A.2d 1379, 1381 (1982);On January 14, 1980 at approximately 10:40 p.m., Lieutenant Edward Sylvia, a police officer of the town of Stonington, was engaged in the performance of his duties as a shift supervisor. As Sylvia proceeded east on Route One in Stonington, he observed a green Pontiac automobile on the same highway heading in a westerly direction at a fast rate of speed. Sylvia turned his cruiser around and proceeded to follow the Pontiac. He observed the vehicle cross the center line of the highway a few times and then pull into the parking lot of the defendant Veterans of Foreign Wars, Harley P. Chase Post 1265 (hereinafter V.F.W.).Sylvia followed the vehicle into the lot, got out of his cruiser, and approached the driver, later identified as Mark Cugini. When the officer asked Cugini where he was going in such a hurry, Cugini replied that he was there to pick up his girlfriend at the V.F.W. Sylvia informed him that if he wanted to keep his driver's license, he had better slow down and should let his girlfriend drive. The officer departed for other duties. Cugini entered the V.F.W. The evidence concerning his condition of sobriety as he entered the V.F.W., considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, could reasonably lead to a conclusion that he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs. Cugini did not drink at the V.F.W. After a short conversation with one of its patrons, he left and drove away in the green Pontiac.Subsequently that evening at about 11:30 p.m., Cugini, driving along Route 78 in Westerly, Rhode Island at a high rate of speed, struck a vehicle being operated by the plaintiff's decedent, Sherry Shore. Mrs. Shore died from the injuries suffered as a result of the collision.The plaintiff, whose decedent was killed by a drunk driver who had been stopped but not arrested by a town police officer, has a cause of action in negligence against the officer and the town for failure to enforce Connecticut General Statutes. The trial court granted the defendant town's motion for summary judgment, finding that the police officer owed no specific duty to the plaintiff's decedent to enforce the motor vehicle laws of the state, and the CT Supreme Court agreed.Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C. Ct. of Ap. 1983);Over a three month period, Garnett Morgan had contacted her husband’s employer, the District of Columbia PD, and related that he had beaten and threatened her. She eventually moved, not informing her husband of her whereabouts and maintaining an unlisted telephone number.Three months later, Officer Morgan arrived at his wife's apartment, choked her into unconsciousness, and forced her into his car. Threatening to kill her if she objected, he drove to her parents' home, took their two children and left. Garnett Morgan then called the police. Along with two other officers, Lieutenant John R. Bowles, Jr. responded to the call and she told him what had happened, including the beating in July and the August gun threat. Lieutenant Bowles contacted Officer Morgan and directed him to report to the precinct. Morgan said that he would do so after he brought the children to the Pinkney house. When Morgan arrived, he was met by the Lieutenant, but rather than proceed with him to the precinct, Morgan carried the youngest child, with the older child beside him, toward the house. Lieutenant Bowles walked behind them. Officer Morgan walked into the house, said to his wife, "I told you so," then took out his revolver and shot at her twice; one of the bullets wounded her and the other hit John Keith, his son. Morgan then turned and shot Lieutenant Bowles, shot and killed Elton Pinkney, and surrendered to the police“Absent a special relationship between police department and victim, liability for failure to protect individual citizens from crime does not generally lie against police officials, who occupy positions necessarily fraught with discretion in the administration of justice. Appellants do not fall within the narrow exception to this longstanding rule. Furthermore, the facts of this case, as a matter of law, cannot support a finding of negligence by the city.”Morris v. Musser, 478 A.2d 937 (1984);On June 28, 1980 four assailants invaded plaintiffs' Gulf Service Station, viciously beat Mr. Morris, who suffered multiple injuries including a fractured jaw, and struck and terrorized Mrs. Morris, who vainly attempted to shield her unconscious husband from further punishment. Although on duty and apprised of the attack, Officer Musser did not intervene in sufficient time to prevent or reduce plaintiffs' injuries. The plaintiffs also alleged that in a prior incident, Officer Musser had refused to assist crime victims in jeopardy. They sued, contending that Officer Musser's “negligent, willful, reckless or intentional delay in furnishing assistance, after being notified of the assault in progress, proximately caused or aggravated their injuries”, and also sued because he continued to be employed by the Township after such behavior.The court, reviewing the state tort immunity law, concluded that “York Township is the only defendant cloaked with immunity…. The Township's conduct — failure to remove officer Musser from active duty and furnish adequate police protection to plaintiffs — does not fit within any of the eight types of negligent activity for which immunity is waived.”. They further held that while the Officer might be individually liable if his behavior was as alleged, the plaintiffs needed to prove that a special relationship existed, “those who are imperiled because they have aided law enforcement as informers or witnesses” or when the police “expressly promise to protect specific individuals from precise harm”. In this case, since “plaintiffs were neither allied with the police in a law enforcement project nor were they individually promised police protection from delineated harm. Further, an emergency aid request communicated to the police does not create a special duty owing to crime victims; thus, the police are not liable to crime victims for failing to furnish prompt and efficient aid upon request.” The court also dismissed a claim concerning Constitutional protection, stating “Since the defendants had no federal constitutional duty to protect plaintiffs from criminal assault, the inadequate provision of police protection services is not actionable under Section 1983 or the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”Thurman v. City of Torrington 595 F.Supp.1521 (D.Conn. 1984)A woman and her son were harassed, threatened and assaulted by her estranged husband, all in violation of his probation and a restraining order. Despite numerous requests for police protection, the police did nothing because "the police department used an administrative classification that resulted in police protection being fully provided to persons abused by someone with whom the victim has no domestic relationship, but less protection when the victim is either: 1) a woman abused or assaulted by a spouse or boyfriend, or 2) a child abused by a father or stepfather."Westbrooks v. State, 173 Cal.App.3d 1203, 219 Cal.Rtr. 674 (1985)The widow and sons of a motorist who drove into the void where a collapsed bridge had been, brought action against the State, county, and county deputy sheriff. The California Department of Transportation (Cal Trans) was aware that a violent storm with heavy rains had caused a bridge on State route 118 to collapse. A county deputy sheriff had observed the beginning of the collapse, reported it and requested assistance from Cal Trans. A jury award of $1,300,000 was reversed in part by the Court of Appeal which held: (1) the county deputy sheriff had no duty to warn drivers that the state highway bridge had collapsed during the storm, and his efforts to warn drivers did not in any way increase the risk of harm to users of the highway, and therefore the county was not liable to motorist's wife and children; and (2) the judgment was upheld against the state because the Cal Trans was notified at 1:52 a.m. and at 2:35 a.m., but no Cal Trans personnel nor CHP officer appeared at the scene until 5:45 a.m., and that such delay was unreasonable.)Calogrides v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 560 (S.Ct. A;a. 1985);John M. Calogrides attended a fireworks display sponsored in part by the City of Mobile at Ladd Memorial Stadium on July 3, 1982. After he arrived and as he was walking up the stadium ramp to find a seat, he was assaulted by a group of five or six teenage males. He was stabbed a number of times. Calogrides claimed the City was negligent in making its decision to deploy only eighty-two police officers to Ladd Stadium on the occasion of his injury. The Court held that liability cannot be predicated on that basis.DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1989 (1989)Injured party was a boy who was beaten and permanently injured by his father. He claimed a special relationship existed because local officials knew he was being abused, indeed they had "specifically proclaimed by word and deed [their] intention to protect him against that danger," [7] but failed to remove him from his father's custody.The Court in DeShaney held that no duty arose because of a "special relationship," concluding that Constitutional duties of care and protection only exist as to certain individuals, such as incarcerated prisoners, involuntarily committed mental patients and others restrained against their will and therefore unable to protect themselves. "The affirmative duty to protect arises not from the State's knowledge of the individual's predicament or from its expressions of intent to help him, but from the limitation which it has imposed on his freedom to act on his own behalf."Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Department, 901 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1990).Ms. Balistreri, beaten and harassed by her estranged husband, alleged a "special relationship" existed between her and the Pacifica Police Department, to wit, they were duty-bound to protect her because there was a restraining order against her husband. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that DeShaney limited the circumstances that would give rise to a "special relationship" to instances of custody. Because no such custody existed in Balistreri, the Pacifica Police had no duty to protect her, so when they failed to do so and she was injured they were not liable.McKee v. City of Rockwall, Texas, 877 F.2d409 (5th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct.727 (1990).Plaintiff claimed she was injured because the police refused to make an arrest following a domestic violence call. She claimed their refusal to arrest was due to a city policy of gender- based discrimination. In that case the U. S. District Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that "no constitutional violation [occurred] when the most that can be said of the police is that they stood by and did nothing..."Castle Rock v. Gonzales (04-278) 545 U.S. 748 (2005)The Supreme Court ruled that the police did not have a constitutional duty to protect a person from harm, even a woman who had obtained a court-issued protective order against a violent husband making an arrest mandatory for a violation.The decision, with an opinion by Justice Antonin Scalia and dissents from Justices John Paul Stevens and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, overturned a ruling by a federal appeals court in Colorado. The appeals court had permitted a lawsuitto proceed against a Colorado town, Castle Rock, for the failure of the police to respond to a woman's pleas for help after her estranged husband violated a protective order by kidnapping their three young daughters, whomhe eventually killed.

This will depend on who you ask and where the home is built. I am sure there are regional differences by state or by customary business practices.In the Chicago area where I managed the construction of about 1,000 homes, condos, or townhouses, each builder that I worked with sorta did similar things with regards to providing documents.All appliance documentation including furnace, water heater.EVERY kitchen appliance including the garbage disposal.Most would collect and provide the literature that came with Smoke Detectors, Carbon Monoxide Detectors and even the doorbell. Light fixtures and most other electrical devices such as GFCI (Ground Fault Circuit Interrupters) and AFCI (Arc Fault Circuit Interrupters) very often have something worth including.Sump pumps, ejector pumps. Well pumps and tanks if applicable.Gas log lighters for wood burning fireplaces. Any prefab fireplaces and associated controls and special valves or remote controls.Kitchen and Bathroom cabinetry from each manufacturer that was supplied.All plumbing fixtures such as toilets, sinks, faucets tubs and showers or shower bases. Any plumbing fixtures that I have not already mentioned such as fiberglass tubs and shower modules.Shower doors. Countertops that may require special care like a cultures marble vanity top or granite surface.Exhaust fans for bathrooms and utility rooms.Door hardware such as entry locks (keyed locks) , passage locks, and privacy locks. Basement windows such as escape windows.All other windows and the patio door. Patio door screens. (Yes screens have instructions if the tradesman did not thrown them away.)Overhead door openers and remote controls.Central vacuum systems.Circuit breakers and the electrical panels.Security systems.Every flooring type such as ceramic, carpet, hardwood, sheet goods, vinyl tile, slate, terracotta. In some cases, the manufacturers or installers do not provide much useful information for these products, so builders provide a home owners “manual” to guide you with the use and care instructions for flooring and ceramic wall tile.The siding.The roofing (shingles).A copy of the CO (The Certificate of Occupancy issued by the city or county inspection department.)Something from the health department such as an inspection certificate if you are in an area where the home has a well and septic.A copy of your walk-through sheet.Contact phone numbers for each of the utilities such as the City Water Department, City Sewer Department if different that the water department. Trash collection company or service. Natural Gas Company or fuel supplier(s) for that area. Cable TV and Internet provider. Post office literature showing the specifications for where your mail box should be installed. (The builder has no control over this because it is controlled by the USPS.) And finally the phone number for the electric company. Try to get all of those before the move-in so that you can make contact before the day you close on the house. (Some people call that “Settlement” but around here we call it the “Closing” at the Title Company.The plat of survey. It is often called the “Mortgage Survey or the “Updated Survey” or both. Check the date on it. It has to be fresh. In other words, not more than XX days old. This will be delivered to the title company because they check it as a part of their title search. The exact name of that document may vary depending on who you ask. Surveyors use very specific terms which they print on the face of each different survey document.OPTIONAL STUFF TO ASK FOR: A copy of the building permit. Receipts for all paid fees from all of the taxing jurisdictions such as Fire Protection Districts, Libraries, Schools, Sewer Connection fees, Water Tap-on fees. There may be other fees you should ask for receipts such as the electric, telephone, and gas service fees. This is to pay for the installation of the service lines to the house. They will all be different jurisdictions depending on the political boundaries. Many towns collect all these fees (except the Gas, Electric, and Telephone) before they issue a building permit. In other jurisdictions the builder must pay each fee separately and then provide the paid receipts to the city before the building permit is issues and construction can begin. So he may not actually think you want them because he could never build the house without all those fees paid. All variations of the above has happened to me. ~~ note: Your title company SHOULD track all of this receipt stuff.Ask for a copy of the blueprints (The Plans). Most builders will not give them to you but a few will if you ask. If you had a custom home built for you, your architect should provide you with a set of these plans rather than the builder.