The Quest For Lasting Stability -- Chapters 3 4 Global: Fill & Download for Free

A Pakistani political cartoonist, Sabir Nazar, made this during the whole Trump debacle and i think it captures the current situation pretty accurately:(Pakistan’s PM on the left)A lot of Pakistan’s strategic thinking around Afghanistan seems to reflect that we think the Afghan military mission in the War on Terror is about anything BUT the war on terror. The primary reason the US is parking so much troops, hardware and money in Afghanistan is a geopolitical ploy aimed at China in specific and the larger Eurasian economic integration involving China, Russia, Iran, Pakistan, Central Asia and so on in general. Or so the Pakistani viewpoint goes.A cursory view of American geopolitical thinking makes it clear that their interests in this region have long been defined by one, clear goal: To prevent the rise of a geographically large, Eurasian power with access to enough energy and raw material resources to challenge Western hegemony.>Origins of the Eurasian doctrineIt’s pretty strange to read world war 2 and pre-world war 2 era literature on American strategic thinking and see how it different it was from today’s Imperial paradigm.While American thinkers were quite clear that they wanted America to be the dominant power in the North American hemisphere (as demonstrated by the war with the Spanish), there was a strong element of restraint in their expansionary tendencies. This was partly due to the initial strategic leaders of America wanting to keep America a white majority nation, a goal that could be compromised by taking over too many territories with colored folk in them. And partly due to isolationism being a strong element in early American strategic thinking.It was around the time of the second world war, under Roosevelt that you can see the firm grounding of interventionism within American political belief:“There comes a time in the affairs of men,” he said, “when they must prepare to defend, not their homes alone, but the tenets of faith and humanity on which their churches, their governments, and their very civilization are founded. The defense of religion, of democracy, and of good faith among nations is all the same fight. To save one we must now make up our minds to save all.”-FDR Annual Address to Congress 1939Japan’s pearl harbor attack, solidified this belief into practice:The events of 1941 forced a fundamental reassessment not only of America’s global strategy but also of how to define America’s interests. Even as they waged the struggle against Germany and Japan, Roosevelt and his advisers during the war began thinking of how the postwar world ought to be shaped, and they took as their guide what they considered the lessons of the previous two decades.The first had to do with security. The Japanese attack had proved that vast oceans and even a strong navy no longer provided adequate defense against attack. More broadly, there was the realization—or rather the rediscovery—of an old understanding: that the rise of a hostile hegemonic power on the Eurasian landmass could eventually threaten America’s core security interests as well as its economic well-being. As a corollary, there was the “lesson of Munich”: would-be aggressors in Eurasia had to be deterred before they became too strong to be stopped short of all-out war.Superpowers Don’t Get to RetirePearl Harbour and the American experience in World War 2 were the genesis of a line of thinking in American circles that rising Eurasian powers must be dealt with pre-emptively before they become a threat to the United States or are in position to challenge it’s hegemony.As Roosevelt put it, to “end future wars by stepping on their necks before they grow up.”The role of the world economy and quest for control of strategic raw material resources like Oil by Eurasian emerging powers, economic crashes and military tension was also permanently imprinted on American psyche. Before, the US could rely on a fairly internalized economic system involving tolls, local resources etc and thus had little interest in shaping the world economy. Post WW2 however, the concept of enforcing a kind of stability on the world market (that favored the US of course) to prevent the rise of revisionist, warmongering demagogues came into mainstay.The economic philosophy would be that the developing world “specialize” in producing raw materials only while the core technical expertise and finished product capability remain solely under the 1st world nations in the capitalist market system. Unexpected successes like Japan, Singapore and South Korea were met with irritation is some US quarters initially but ultimately accepted as products of the Western, Capitalist systems superiority. There was also the fact that these tiny nations were satellites of the US during the cold war and presented no threat to their regional role, and hence were accepted as economic powerhouses.Evolution under Mackinder, Brzezinski and other thinkersIt’s important for us Pakistanis to dip a little into the vast and complex world of American strategic thinkers to get some more insight into what shapes US policy in Afghanistan. I’ve often found the works of Mackinder and Brzezinski (among others) to be quite illustrative of what exactly the US is trying to achieve in Asia at large, and the Afghan/Central Asian region in particular.Brzezinski is one of the most notable writers in this regard and his book, the Grand Chessboard almost seems like a playbook for US policy in the region.Eurasia is the world's axial super continent. A power that dominated Eurasia would exercise decisive influence over two of the world's three most economically productive regions, Western Europe and East Asia. A glance at the map also suggests that a country dominant in Eurasia would almost automatically control the Middle East and Africa. With Eurasia now serving as the decisive geopolitical chessboard, it no longer suffices to fashion one policy for Europe and another for Asia. What happens with the distribution of power on the Eurasian landmass will be of decisive importance to America's global primacy and historical legacy.Z. Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Importance (Basic Books: New York 1997) p. 223.Mackinder's main concern was to warn his compatriots about the declining naval power of the United Kingdom, which had been the dominant naval power since the age of the revolutionary maritime discoveries of the fifteenth century. He proceeded to expand on the possibility of consolidated land-based power that could allow a nation to control the Eurasian landmass between Germany and Central Siberia. If well served and supported by industry and by modern means of communication, a consolidated land power controlling the Heartland could exploit the region's rich natural resources and eventually ascend to global hegemony. Mackinder summed up his ideas with the following words: “Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland: Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island (Europe, Arab Peninsula, Africa, South and East Asia), who rules the World-Island commands the World.”Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality(London: Constable and Company 1919) p. 113.Mackinder’s treatise was further developed by other strategic thinkers as well who redefined some of the regions of interest that the US would need to control in order to prevent or contain the rise of such a Eurasian power but kept the central concept of preventing the rise of said power the same:Nicholas Spykman was among the most influential American political scientists in the 1940s. Spykman's Rimlands thesis was developed on the basis of Mackinder's Heartland concept. In contrast to Mackinder's emphasis on the Eurasian Heartland, Spykman offered the Rimlands of Eurasia – that is, Western Europe, the Pacific Rim and the Middle East. According to him, whoever controlled these regions would contain any emerging Heartland power.Brian W. Blouet, ‘Halford Mackinder and the Pivotal Heartland’, in Brian W. Blouet (Ed.), Global Geostrategy: Mackinder and the Defence of the West (London: Frank Cass Publishers 2005) p. 6.The core thinking of strategic thinkers like Mackinder would be reflected in the thinking of Cold War era strategists as they shaped US policy towards the containment and ultimate disintegration of the USSR. One of the most notable among these was Brzezinski, whose views can be found in his illuminating book The Grand Chessboard:That Eurasian “megacontinent,” Brzezinski observed, “is just too large, too populous, culturally too varied, and composed of too many historically ambitious and politically energetic states to be compliant toward even the most economically successful and politically preeminent global power.” Washington, he predicted, could continue its half-century dominion over the “oddly shaped Eurasian chessboard -- extending from Lisbon to Vladivostok” only as long as it could preserve its unchallenged “perch on the Western periphery,” while the vast “middle space” does not become “an assertive single entity," and the Eastern end of the world continent did not unify itself in a way that might lead to “the expulsion of America from its offshore bases.” Should any of these critical conditions change, Brzezinski warned prophetically, “a potential rival to America might at some point arise.”Chapter 2, The Grand Chessboard (Eurasia) by Zbigniew BrzezinskiThe Modern EraAfter the collapse of the USSR, the US enjoyed the role of being the sole superpower on the planet. Victorious, their goals shifted more towards the role of maintaining the new Western lead, neo-liberal world order of globalization, free trade, democracy, human rights and western ideals that were expected to sweep across the planet in the absence of any viable challenge to their adoption. After all, Communism had failed to withstand the test of time. The cold war had ended decisively in the US’s favor. And so the focus shifted more towards ensuring and maintaining a globalized system that would nurture the spread and adoption of western ideals of capitalism, free trade and democracy. US foreign interventionism, rather than ending, took on a different shape in areas like Kosovo, Somalia and so on.We ended up in a curious state where a Globalist bi-partisan platform for foreign interventions was forged: The Neo-liberal order wanted foreign interventions to spread Western ideals across the goal through regime change, covert operations and even military action. The Neo-Conservative order wanted foreign interventions to remove hostile regimes (mostly ex-USSR aligned satellite states), continue the US effort to control vital energy and trade routes in order to deny them to hostile powers and pursue the traditional course of ensuring no large Eurasian entity emerged that could challenge the US writ across the planet. But the Globalist platform agreed that US interventionism across the planet to ensure it’s “stability” was a must. Which is why we have seen the Democratic party under President Obama pursue the same regime change policies as their previous Bush administration, only with different methods, in Libya and Syria. The US “Deep state” establishment of strategic advisers, military officials and Pentagon bureaucrats who subscribe to roughly the same strategic mindset and advice elected officials on US foreign policy have largely ensured that US foreign engagements and activities subscribe to the same long term plan regardless of who gets elected. With some notable exceptions such as Obama’s push back against the generals leading his war effort and Steve Cannon's ultimately unsuccessful isolationist push against Imperial ambitions.As the only superpower remaining after the dismantling of the Soviet bloc, the United States is inserting itself into the strategic regions of Eurasia and anchoring US geopolitical influence in these areas to prevent all real and potential competitions from challenging its global hegemony. The ultimate goal of US strategy is to establish new spheres of influence and hence achieve a much firmer system of security and control that can eliminate any obstacles that stand in the way of protecting its imperial power. The intensified drive to use US military dominance to fortify and expand Washington's political and economic power over much of the world has required the reintegration of the post-Soviet space into the US-controlled world economy. The vast oil and natural gas resources of Eurasia are the fuel that is feeding this powerful drive, which may lead to new military operations by the United States and its allies against local opponents as well as major regional powers such as China and RussiaV. K. Fouskas and B.Gökay, The New American Imperialism: Bush's War on Terror and Blood for Oil(Westport, CT: Praeger Security International 2005) p. 29.The first historical dimension of our strategy … is the conviction that the United States' most basic national security interests would be endangered if a hostile state or group of states were to dominate the Eurasian landmass – that part of the globe often referred to as the world's heartland … since 1945, we have sought to prevent the Soviet Union from capitalizing on its geostrategic advantage to dominate its neighbors in Western Europe, Asia, and the Middle East, and thereby fundamentally alter the global balance of power to our disadvantage.National Security Strategy of the United States (April 1988)US Grand Strategy had the task of achieving nothing less than the shaping of new political and economic arrangements and linkages across the whole Eurasia. The goal was to ensure that every single major political centre in Eurasia understood that its relationship with the United States was more important than its relationship with any other political centre in Eurasia. If that could be achieved, each such centre would be attached separately by a spoke to the American hub: primacy would be securedPeter Gowan, ‘The New American Century?’, in Ken Coates (ed.), The Spokesman: The New American Century(Nottingham: Spokesman Publisher 2002) p. 13.And of course: the infamous pre-emptive doctrine. Signalling that the US would not wait to be attacked,nor would it await for a rival to rise against it.The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufficient threat to our national security … the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, even if uncertainty remains as the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: The White House Sept. 2002) p.15.The role of the Afghan war in geopolitical maneuvering against China’s OBOR and other Chinese-lead Eurasian economic integration projectsThe United State’s opinion of OBOR and China’s grand Eurasian Economic integration project has been dim at best.The political objective of the US government is to prevent energy transport unification among the industrial zones of Japan, Korea, China, Russia, and the EU in the Eurasian landmass and ensure the flow of regional energy resources to US-led international oil markets without any interruptions.The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First Century, Emre İşeri 2009The US views China’s attempts to forge a continental economy in partnership with dozens of nations on 3 continents, partnership with key regional players like Russia, Iran and Turkey and development of Chinese lead international organizations like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (which is already supplanting the IMF in key financing projects in countries like Pakistan) and the SCO as nothing more than a geopolitical threat to American Hegemony across the planet.In a bid to realize Mackinder’s vision a century later, China has set out to unify Eurasia economically through massive construction financed by loans, foreign aid, and a new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank that has already attracted 57 members, including some of Washington’s staunchest allies. With $4 trillion in hard-currency reserves, China has invested $630 billion of it overseas in the last decade, mostly within this tri-continental world island.Tomgram: Alfred McCoy, Maintaining American Supremacy in the Twenty-First CenturyWe can go into the whole philosophy of great power politics and the complex interpretations of the Thucydides Trap of US-Chinese relations and how the established power will always fear a rising power, leading to tension and potential war between the two.But in short: The US views the large scale energy, transport and infrastructure investments of China and it’s increasing access to energy, raw materials and market resources across multiple continents and see the same “Large Eurasian hegemon” their Geo strategic doctrine warns them about. Their strategic doctrine advises them that if OBOR is completed successfully, China would become the large Eurasian power that has traditionally challenged Western hegemony by developing its control over the abundant resources of Eurasia. A re-incarnation of old Eurasian foes like the Imperial Japanese empire and the USSR.Borders have become increasingly ossified and not as prone to changing as they were before, so rather than seeing a singular geographical entity expand it’s borders across the planet, the US sees OBOR and SCO like large economic and strategic frameworks as the Eurasian level threat to it’s hegemony that it has traditionally guarded against.And it has guarded against such a threat through encirclement, denial of resources in Eurasia and fostering instability in it’s backyard.The Trump administration itself is quiet open about a lot of this citing China’s access to Afghan mineral wealth as a major irritant for US policy makers, almost echoing the Cheney era concern over Iraq’s oil and in whose hands it would end up if the US didn’t take action to control it.Oil and gas are not just commodities traded on international markets. Control over territory and its resources are strategic assets.M. P. Amineh and H. Houweling, ‘Caspian Energy: Oil and Gas Resources and the Global Market’, in M. P. Amineh and H. Housweling (eds.), Central Eurasia in Global Politics: Conflict, Security and Development (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers 2004) p. 82.As the figure below shows, the US has managed to set up a limited containment of China on the south and east using her own naval power as well as US allies or partners in the region. The TPP too was, as a trading agreement, designed to cut down the Chinese economic footprint in the region by offering up a bit of the US’s economic pie to regional companies (by more outsourcing of jobs and industry from the US to South East Asia via business middle men) until the then anti-globalist Trump gutted the agreement under the auspice of Economic Nationalism.Source: Are China and the US doomed to conflict? | Kevin Rudd, TEDThe problem for the US of course is the vast South Western frontiers of China that are open for OBOR energy and transport investments and are too inland to be impacted by US naval forces.At which point the US military presence in Afghanistan comes into play. Sure we’ll get the neo-liberal narrative about Nation building for the Afghans, emancipation of women and fighting terrorism etc. But if you think the US spends trillions of dollars in a war to teach Afghans the merits of democracy and to fight cave rebels in a land thousands of kms away from the US homeland…well, then we just have a different perspective of things.Afghanistan is the US’s only major military deployment in the Eurasian region closest to China’s western near-abroad. And this is a key element of the difference in perspective between how the Afghan war is presented to western audiences and how it’s perceived in Pakistan. On this side of the border, people have long stopped believing the Afghan war is anything about terrorism and nation building. It’s a geo-political ploy to deny space and stability to the rising Eurasian powers. It’s a straight up, power play to disrupt the energy, infrastructure and raw material linkages being forged across Eurasia under projects like OBOR and to the benefit of major regional players like China, Iran, Pakistan, Russia and Turkey.As Pepe Escobar notes, “The lexicon of the Bush doctrine of unilateral world domination is laid out in detail by the Project for a New American Century (PNAC), founded in Washington in 1997. The ideological, political, economic and military fundamentals of American foreign policy – and uncontested world hegemony – for the 21st century are there for all to see.” The official credo of PNAC is to convene “the resolve to shape a new century favorable to American principles and interests”. The origin of PNAC can be traced to a controversial defence policy paper drafted in February 1992 by then Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz and later softened by Vice President Dick Cheney which states that the US must be sure of “deterring any potential competitors from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role” without mentioning the European Union, Russia, and China. Nevertheless, the document Rebuilding America's Defenses: Strategies, Forces and Resources for a New Century released by PNAC gives a better understanding of the Bush administration's unilateral aggressive foreign policy and “this manifesto revolved around a geostrategy of US dominance – stating that no other nations will be allowed to ‘challenge’ US hegemony”.From this perspective, it can be assumed that American wartime (the US-led wars in Afghanistan ( The events of 11 September 2001 gave the US opportunity to impose its terms on Afghanistan to make oil business. The US acquired many things with its first strike of the war on terror to Afghanistan. It opened the way for an environment to build a ring of permanent US military bases from Uzbekistan to Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan, which are deep inside the post-Soviet space. Moreover, talks began between the US and Pakistan to build a north-south pipeline from the Caspian region to Pakistan's Arabia Sea through Afghanistan. A deal was quietly signed in early January 2003, with no international press fanfare - see W. Engdahl, A Century of War) and Iraq) and peacetime (political support for costly Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline project) strategies all serve the US grand strategy in the twenty-first century. A careful eye will detect that all of these strategies have a common purpose of enhancing American political control over the Eurasian landmass and its hydrocarbon resources.As Fouskas and Gökay have observed,“As the only superpower remaining after the dismantling of the Soviet bloc, the United States is inserting itself into the strategic regions of Eurasia and anchoring US geopolitical influence in these areas to prevent all real and potential competitions from challenging its global hegemony. The ultimate goal of US strategy is to establish new spheres of influence and hence achieve a much firmer system of security and control that can eliminate any obstacles that stand in the way of protecting its imperial power. The intensified drive to use US military dominance to fortify and expand Washington's political and economic power over much of the world has required the reintegration of the post-Soviet space into the US-controlled world economy. The vast oil and natural gas resources of Eurasia are the fuel that is feeding this powerful drive, which may lead to new military operations by the United States and its allies against local opponents as well as major regional powers such as China and Russia.”The US Grand Strategy and the Eurasian Heartland in the Twenty-First CenturyPakistan’s role in all of thisSo given this entire body of literature which seems to shed light on a completely different set of intentions on the part of the United states with regards to their objectives in Afghanistan, perhaps the question we Pakistanis need to ask is: “How do you REALLY feel, America?”When the Elephants lock horns in the jungle, the Fox has little say on that matter. At the moment, the US is locking horns with some extremely powerful countries like China and Russia over Afghanistan due to the larger power struggle taking place between the old, established power of the US and the rising power of China.Let’s eat some humble pie at this table and admit that Pakistan simply does not have the economic, military, diplomatic and political clout to affect the course of collision between these enormously powerful nations (And no, this isn’t the late 70s where we can pull off a geo-strategic coup like we did when we served as a gateway for a thaw between US-Chinese relations during the cold war).But what Pakistan can control in it’s limited capacity, and what would serve the most useful purpose in preventing cross border insurgent movement, is the fencing of the Afghan border:Army commences fencing Pak-Afghan border in trouble zonesPakistan Takes Unilateral Steps Toward Afghan Border SecurityBorder management: Pakistan starts fencing Afghan border to curb infiltration - The Express TribuneLeaving aside the buttload of military operations on our side of the border against the Taliban, Its almost funny how the world’s largest superpower, at the height of it’s 100,000 man deployment and all it’s technical wizardry for some reason decided NOT to secure the Afghan border with Pakistan using a fence, an action that would have gone a long way towards curbing cross border terrorism. It’s fallen on Pakistan to do so using her own limited resources. And the Afghans actually oppose this move diplomatically despite the clear cost it presents to Afghan and US forces in the region.It’s also curious how Pakistan offered to coordinate anti-terror operations like Zarb-e-Azb on their side of the border with Afghan and US forces on their side, they were met with refusal. The Paks wanted to form a vice around the terrorists factions with the Pakistan army pushing from the east and the Afghan/US waiting in the west to mop up fleeing rebels. The refusal of ISAF/Afghan forces to cooperate ended up with the result that when those groups were driven out of their hideouts in the tribal areas, they sought refuge in Afghanistan instead. And continued to attack targets in Afghanistan and Pakistan from there (some relocated to Syria as well).And of course, then we have the cases of Afghan intelligence palling around with some of the Taliban factions they deem as strategic assets to them.U.S. Disrupts Afghans’ Tack on MilitantsUS disrupts Afghan bid to court Pakistani militantsFar from convincing Pakistan to tackle militants, the US can’t even manage it’s own backyard and stop the Afghan’s nexus with militants. Some of whom are actively engaged in fighting American troops. With the ironic consequence that the US is trying to convince Pakistan to stop it’s support for the Afghan Taliban who are attacking the Afghan state while the Afghan state develops nexus with Taliban factions who are involved in attacks on Pakistan and US forces in Afghanistan…This had lead to the state of affairs where several in Pakistan not only doubt the US’s commitment to fighting terror in Afghanistan, but also to doubt whether the US wishes to have stability in the region in the first place. Their current military-focused mission has now introduced ISIS into the mix besides the Taliban and the insurgency is beginning to spread into Central Asia. It almost seems convenient how instability and violence would affect those very regions where China’s OBOR projects are being implemented.But Pakistan’s policy decision to ignore the Afghan Taliban and not tackle them directly in hopes of a long term political solution has its own problems.You see the same way the Pakistani Taliban factions have an allegiance to Afghan Taliban, the Afghan Taliban also have links to the Pakistani Taliban. There are limits to the level of cooperation one can expect from the Taliban. They have their own ideological and political goals that they have fought 16 years for against one of the most premier military powers on the planet. It’s doubtful they will compromise them for Pakistan, a fact that several ISI officers have admitted publicly: Pakistan has only limited control and leverage over the Taliban.Even the current “safe haven” doctrine that US officials love to throw at Pakistan is more of a “look the other way” doctrine. Pakistan, China, Russia, Iran are all stuck with the reality of the Taliban.If the US couldn’t defeat them with 100,000 troops and military hardware of an unparalleled scope, drone strikes across FATA (the very safe havens they claim unable to hit) and unparalleled covert intelligence capability cant bring them to the negotiating table, then what exactly are the rest of us supposed to do? Take up the US’s quagmire instead?Remember: The US can easily wrap up and walk away from the Afghan mission whenever they want. Look how many U-turns and doublespeak administrations engage in and how electoral cycles bring massive changes to US policy on a whim. And there’s precedent as well: The US walked away from Afghanistan after the first Afghan war ended in the late 80s, early 90s. Once the US public and US administration have lost interest or gained too much “fatigue” , they have a tendency to jump ship. The only thing keeping them in Afghanistan right now despite all the lost blood and treasure is their worry over the Eurasian level OBOR project and the growing economic and military nexus of countries like Pakistan, China, Russia and Iran under either economic cooperation frameworks or regional cooperation bodies like the SCO. Sure, they may talk about terrorism and nation building and Afghan women in miniskirts to sell the war back home. And to maybe get some neo-liberal votes on the Afghan mission and make it a bi-partisan effort. But the realist interpretation of the conflict is always about power and the attempts of nations to have more of it at the expense of others.The US has gone from one flawed strategy to the next in the Afghan war. Just as they grossly misread the situation in Iraq and insisted on de-Baathification and disbanding of the Iraqi military which sparked a civil war that cost hundreds of thousands of lives: the Afghan mission too was filled with blunders from the get-go. The Pakhtun majority were sidelined in favor of the Northern Alliance allies who were composed mostly of Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras. This however could have been easily resolved with a more devolved system of government in Afghanistan which would have given each ethnic group enough autonomy to not be threatened by the other.Instead, the US in a bid to rush their agenda in Afghanistan, pushed for a strong central puppet government in Afghanistan , something Hamid Karzai himself was quite supportive of given his micromanaging tendencies (he even insisted on appointing school headmasters himself). This bypassed the Afghan custom of a tribal jirga where tribal elders would sit together, discuss and come to a consensus on issues.When the US committed the faux pass of yet another political blunder due to lack of understanding of Afghan customs and bypassed Jirgas for their centralized form of government in order to concentrate power in the hands of a puppet, you can bet the Taliban exploited it.And of course: Rather than acknowledging these blunders that have fed the Taliban, Imperial hubris demands that Pakistan be blamed instead.Which leads us to the most overlooked fact in this conflict: The Taliban enjoy some significant levels of support within the Afghan populace. You don’t end up in control of nearly 60% of the country side without help from the populace. This was due to the political, cultural and social blunders committed by the ISAF occupation. The same kind of blunders they committed in Iraq which set off a decade of insurgency, civil war and instability in the region that would later spread to neighboring countries.We’ve seen the limits of military approaches to these problems. The Iraqi, Afghan, Libyan and Syrian Quagmires have demonstrated that political resolutions are imperative to end conflicts like this before they drag on to the point that instability spreads from one nation into the entire region.There’s the problem of “Fragmentation” as well: The longer the US fights the Taliban, the more the group fragments from a structure political entity into a more fragmented, radicalized entity that consists of more extreme militants and more extreme ideologies like ISIS that make the political solution exceedingly difficult.The US missed an immense chance in their newly announced Afghan strategy when they failed to make ISIS the center piece of it and just announced more of the same old Afghan war with higher troop commitments and longer time tables (also signalling that the commitment might be open ended with no end date). Nearly every regional player in Afghanistan, including the Afghans and even the Taliban are opposed to the growing ISIS presence in Afghanistan. ISIS is a beast that cannot be negotiated with. The US would have opened a platform for a fresh round of regional dialogue on resolving the Afghan war if they had made countering Daesh the center piece of their new Afghan strategy. The handing over of major foreign policy issues to War Generals in his cabinet has also meant that President Trump has militarized nearly all key foreign policy subjects in his domain from North Korean, Syria to Afghanistan, further driving away all regional partners in Afghanistan who believe only a political solution is the way forward.The inner turmoil of the White house with new, nationalist elements like Bannon being ousted has also not gone unnoticed. Bannon opposed the Afghan war (similar to Trump during the campaign) and wanted to pull back America from it’s globalist Imperial domineering to a more nationalist narrative and was critical of the Globalists who were in favor of the Empire Americia narrative that wanted Americian involvement in Asia to prevent Eurasian economic integration under China. Bannon’s ouster has signaled Americas intentions clearly: The US will remain committed to it’s global hegemonic role and will actively pursue policies that hinder the rise of any power that challenges their writ across the planet.This new policy has meant only one thing: Rather than Pakistan, America is increasingly isolated in Afghanistan. Only India, which supports Afghan regime has signaled their support for it. Russia, China, Iran and Pakistan are all in talks with the Taliban and pushing for a political resolution of the conflict. 16 years of constant war has dimmed their opinion of anny military solution in Afghanistan. When Xi Jinping spoke at the multi nation OBOR conference, he highlighted stability above all else as the key to achieving success in OBOR. A political solution which involves the willful cessation of hostilities by all sides is the key to achieving such a stable equilibrium.The “sanctuaries” in Pakistan are actually just Pakistan not taking up arms against the major Afghan Taliban factions because it knows that’s the quickest way to burn the political resolution bridge. The Americans can pack up and leave but we’re the ones stuck with the Taliban. If we attack them now at the US’s behest and 3 years from now Trump gets booted and a new administration takes place and decides on a pullout….we’re screwed. And not only that, if the US can’t handle the Taliban with all their super power gadgetry, what can the Pakistan military do in their place?As mentioned earlier, it was mostly political blunders that allowed a Taliban insurgency to gain ground in Afghanistan. It’s only going to be political weaponry that defuses the conflict as well. We’re not stirring this nest at the US behest only for the US to in turn: turn tail, refuse the use of military force in favor of a political solution, refusal to address the concerns of regional actors. This is cold calculation: Nearly every regional actor is now in favor for a political resolution and is talking to the Taliban: the Chinese, Russians, Iranians and even Turkey for some reason. What will we have to gain from attacking the Afghan Taliban except for when one of their factions attack us?The US, whether out of imperial hubris or geo-strategic calculation, still refused to acknowledge this and intends on pursuing the military option with the result that ISIS is finding a growing foothold here and spreading it's influence to Central Asia, The south western hinterlands of Pakistan, Iran’s northern borders and Chinas western flanks.One must wonder whether US policy makers are still viewing Islamist rebels as a foreign policy tool to be wielded as pawns for disruption hostile powers in Eurasia. Because that’s the only end result of a continued military mission in Afghanistan.ConclusionCurrently the Taliban have refused to negotiate till the US presence is withdrawn from Afghanistan (something a lot of regional actors in the region would like to see as well).In light of this, There are some criticisms and realities that Pakistan needs to accept as well in the way forward:We cannot control the Taliban. Not as proxies nor as paid thugs. They are a political entity with it’s own life force that has support from the populace in certain regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. We should be wary of them.Pakistan must be aware that the ideology which lends support to to the Taliban has a presence in some segments of Pakistan’s society, political parties and even the armed forces.Just as we do not want the Taliban to rule over us, we cannot force the Afghans to live under their rule as well.We cannot make our Afghan strategy “Security centric” or “India centric”. Look around our own neighborhood. Every time a foreign power tries to dictate how it’s weaker neighbors forge relations with other powers: it ultimately ends up alienating it’s weaker neighbor and drives them into their hostile power’s arms. We cannot make the same mistake and must acknowledge that the Afghans are free to forge relations with who ever they want, including India.The Afghan war’s resolution is linked to the Indo-Pak peace process the same way it’s linked to larger regional struggles liike the one between US and Russia/China/Irann. Pursuit of the Indo-Pak peace process hastens the resolution of the Afghan war as well.A dysfunctional political system that does not respect regional autonomy breeds political violence. A political system that imposes centralization and non-democratic means of political representation opens the doors for dissent and armed rebellion.Socio-economic problems at the grassroots level form breeding grounds for extremism. While a political solution must be pushed for, it must be accompanied with some semblance of socio economic progress as the Taliban exploit political dysfunction, lack of democratic culture and poverty to further their agenda.With this in mind, Pakistan needs to adopt an approach that emphasizes compromise, give and take and resolution of disputes in Afghanistan. We must continue a cautious approach of guarding ourselves against the Taliban while acknowledging that continued military action against them has limited effectiveness in the face of Afghan proxy wars and ineffective military campaigns.We must continue to push for a political solution to the Afghan conflict and oppose the US’s continue militarized approach in the country which is fueling instability and spreading terrorism to Central Asia, Pakistan, Iran and China.We must also push for regional actors to resolve disputes among themselves. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group of US-China-Pakistan-Afghanistan was a good start along with the Gulf peace talks. It needs to be expanded and should now consist of US-China-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India-Russia and Iran. Turkey and Central Asian neighbors can also have observer status. And of course, the Taliban will have representatives as well. The US must commit to a ceasefire for the duration of talks.I cannot emphasis this enough: All regional actors must negotiate their issues in Afghanistan to put an end to the constant proxy conflict in the region and put an end to the Syranization of the war. One of the key problems prolonging the conflict are the different competing interests of regional powers in Afghanistan. We have the Pakistan-Indian proxy war, the Russian and Chinese wariness of a US presence in their backyard, the Iranian hostility to the US regime. Until and unless all of these regional players work out a binding agreement between them that satisfies them all, this whole venture will be for nothing.The US must commit to an end to the military mission and the Taliban must commit to disarmament, following which they will join the electoral process in Afghanistan as a political entity rather than a military one. Pakistan must insist on this disarmament and integration into electoral politics. The TTP factions in Pakistan broke several political pledges when they were left armed and thus the Afghan Taliban must commit to disarmament failing which they should be acted against by all regional partners.Pakistan needs to delink its relations with Afghanistan from India. Looking at Afghanistan from a security lens only must end. The military has insisted on controlling foreign policy due to which we cannot see Afghanistan from a non-security perspective at all. This needs to end and firm civilian control over the foreign ministry needs to be established. The military must be a stake holder, not the sole arbitrator. Our Afghan policies problems stem too much from our political leaders refusal to take up their role in decision making in foreign policy and terrorism related aspects as they remain engaged in domestic electoral contests and vote gathering rather than keeping an eye on regional issues as well. Civilian leaders have completely abandoned policy making on the Afghan front to the security establishment which has also hindered Pakistan from playing a more effective role in the resolution of the Afghan conflict as it views the issue too heavily through a security lens.The Indo-Pak peace process must be pursued and at the same time a clear framework for Indo-Pak interests in Afghanistan outlined to prevent suspicion and conflict. Similar frameworks should be worked out between other regional partners as well.If the US insists on staying and pursuing their military policy, that’s on them. There is a growing nationalist sentiment in the US which opposes the globalist war in Afghanistan and want to re-assert their America first narrative instead, take America back to the pre-WW2 isolationism (the fact that they consist of White supremacists and Neo-Nazis is America’s problem not ours). This movement is growing stronger day by day whether the US chooses to acknowledge this or not and the momentum is against the Americans domestically which is why they are issuing such statements about Afghanistan at the moment, to push their agenda fast. American attempts to drawn in foreign partners like India into their military foray also don’t seem to be bearing fruit as the Indians have decided not to commit troops and money to an open ended military mission in Afghanistan. The death of the TPP also signals the limits of American Imperial power: The US public is tired of the strategic entanglements of the US Globalists who have gutted the economy through high defense spending, trade agreements with nations more for containment of hostile powers than any real benefit back home and constant wars that have exhausted precious blood and treasure. Trump is just the tip of the iceberg of this domestic push back against the globalist narrative that pushes for US entanglements abroad. The clock and public opinions are against the US in this regard should they choose to prolong the Afghan war further.In the mean time, all regional partners are coalescing around a common position to reach a political settlement with the Taliban and Afghan government on the sidelines, perhaps without the US.A stable Afghan state with a ceasefire between a disarmed Taliban and the Afghan state with a functioning democracy that the Taliban choose to partake in and a regional framework agreement between Iran, India, Pakistan, China, Russia and Afghanistan that forms the basis of mutual cooperation and respect for each other’s interest is the best possible way forward.Sure, blowing stuff up with drones and the mother of bombs sounds way cooler to some. It just doesn’t work as 16 years have shown.A stable and peaceful Afghanistan has always been in the best interest of Pakistan which has long suffered from refugees, terrorism and illegal drugs and weapons flowing from across its western border. The stabilization of the Afghan state under a political framework that establishes peace with the Taliban and peace between competing regional interests sounds dull as hell but it might be our only path at this point.The only problem of course would be the US’s refusal at this point. Which could mean that either the rest of us have to work around the US (as the world is increasingly learning to do from environmental change, trade agreements and defense cooperation etc) or the rest of us have to leave the Afghan war in it’s current momentum as it continues to leave the US increasingly isolated in the region.We’ve already seen from history, several key lessons in the Afghan context. The Soviets security paranoia about Afghanistan that lead to assassinating Afghan leaders and leaving a political void that fueled an insurgency in Afghanistan. The Communists pushing too hard and fast on reforms without compromise that ended up unifying the opposition. The worsening of the crises in Egypt and Syria due to the leaderships role of violently suppressing moderate Islamic parties rather than politically accommodating them as valid representatives of conservative portions of society. Pakistan’s attempts to impose a military solution in East Pakistan and Baluchistan and its dismal failure. How the political settlement and democratic resolution of Baloch issues under the PPP government lead to rebels laying down arms and joining the political process.Like it or not, but the Taliban have proven that they might be here to stay. Their rise has more to do with political dysfunction in the Afghan state, ideological opposition to US forces in a Muslim nation and socio-economic backwardness in many Afghan areas. The Taliban will never go anywhere till foreign forces agree to withdraw from Afghanistan and a resolution of ethnic political conflict and lack of opportunities is formulated for Afghanistan. In turn, the Taliban must disarm and join the political process of the Afghan nation. It might be time to re-consider the Call of Duty approach to the Afghan conflict and start to take a serious look at what’s driving Afghans into the hands of the Taliban. Does the Jirga system need to be incorporated into the Afghan political system? Is the election system widely accepted as free and fair? Is aid money and development projects actually improving the lives of Afghans? Are ethnic tensions being reduced in the country? Are foreign powers sabotaging the peace process? Will resentment over the occupation decrease if foreign forces are withdrawn?The answers to those boring questions will go a longer way towards solving the Taliban insurgency problem that a thousand Mother of all Bombs. If anything, this process might atleast splinter the insurgent movement and allow us to siphon off factions that want to rejoin the political process while isolating hard core militants that reject all offers of peace and political settlement(thus making them the sole focus of military operations amidst an increasingly more pro-state population under the light of political resolution to conflicts).We cannot remain trapped to the whims of a power that sits 2 Oceans away from us and whose changing domestic politics lend an air of uncertainty to their aims. At the same time, we cannot let the wounds of Afghanistan fester due to continuous war. We must not get dragged into a second round of war with the Taliban on the US’s whims which leads to nowhere and must press for a political solution not just between the Taliban and Afghans, but between regional players as well. We must not think the Taliban our friends or proxies but must isolate them if they violate political solution. Disarmament, joining the political process and ensuring stability must be cornerstones of the Taliban peace deal. ISIS must remain uprooted from the region. Indo-Pak and Indo-Chinese and other regional competitions must be resolved to end proxy wars in Afghanistan.Edit #1 Update on the situation:http://www.atimes.com/article/pakistan-trumps-new-us-strategy-afghanistan/Edit # 2: BRICS 2017 Summit. It seems atleast one of the regional proxy tensions in the form of China-India might on a track towards resolution. Could fresh round of Indo-Pak peace talks or negotiations under the Chinese be possible?BRICS summit: LeT, JeM ‘threat to regional peace’ - The Express Tribune

China doesn’t have bad geography. On the contrary, it has quite a few geostrategic strengths: the floodplain of the Yellow River, and more broadly, the entirety of Eastern China, is incredibly suited to agriculture; China in its current geographic form is largely secure against overland invasion, thanks to its control over buffer regions in the northeast, north, west, and northwest; it has a wealth of natural resources; it has a 9000-mile long coastline conducive to maritime trade and the development of sea power etc. I would go as far as to say it has one of the best geographies in the world. But since you asked specifically about its geographic weaknesses:1.The IsohyetChina’s geography can be understood as consisting of a Han Core (“China Proper”) and a shell of buffer regions that encloses it from the north and west. The 15-inch Isohyet encompasses the area of China that receives 15 or more inches of rainfall per year, and is thus capable of supporting substantial agricultural activity and hence people.As illustrated, much of the population is concentrated in the regions south of the Isohyet — the orange and brown areas — because the climate is so conducive to growing crops. The Isohyet therefore delimits (as it has for centuries) China’s demographic core, and by extension, its political core. Historically, geographical barriers, inhospitable terrain, and most importantly the Isohyet have impeded the expansion of the Han core. No rain means no crops. No crops means an inability to sustain large populations. Hence the demographic and political reach of the core remains constrained to south of the Isohyet. This perhaps explains the preservation of the non-Han cultural and ethnic identities existing in the buffer regions beyond the core. It is not a coincidence that the Great Wall parallels the Isohyet: it was only fortifying what nature had created. The core can definitely project power and influence beyond the Isohyet, but for Chinese civilization to take root, to settle in the form of people and cities beyond this line — that is a real challenge.2. Buffer regionsAn array strategic buffers shield the core, consisting of Tibet in the west, Xinjiang in the northwest, Inner Mongolia in the north and Manchuria in the northeast.Retaining control of the buffer regions has been an eternal geostrategic imperative for China. The Han core was extremely vulnerable to nomadic raids and incursions from the plains and steppes of the north and northeast. Case in point, the Mongols and the Manchu conquered and ruled China. Flat terrain is practically an invitation for conquest by nomadic horsemen. In the west the Himalayas presented a formidable barrier, but northwestern China, the interface for the ancient Silk Road, was where the fringes of the empire met the kingdoms of Central Asia and the influence of the Islamic world. Tibet was still particularly irritating because it was easier for the Tibetans to ride down and raid the Chinese than for the Chinese to climb the mountains and conquer them. In modern times, if control of Tibet was lost, India could move across the Himalayas and establish a base of operations on the plateau.Chinese history was therefore expressed as cycles where a strong core, with its various instruments of national power (military, economic, cultural) systematically asserts and maintains control over the borderlands and thus secures the empire……or where a weak core is simply unable (yet) to impose its will on the buffers and so remains constrained to its own territory of “China Proper”.In any case, control over or influence of the buffers was a security imperative. It provided defensible borders and anchored the empire. Without the buffers, the core would be exposed, soft, vulnerable: dense, massed stationary populations of farmers ripe for plunder. Historically, Chinese dynasties sought to accommodate, influence, and assimilate (if they were unwilling on incapable of incorporating them) the buffer regions with complex diplomacy and tributary systems rather than forcibly control them (though they sometimes did so). They were considered semi-integrated and semi-autonomous. The objective was to ensure that these regions, their populations and polities did not threaten the security of the core, or foreign adversaries/invaders did not do so through them. The disposition of the borderland polities and peoples had a direct effect on national security. Now the PRC is strong and it formally controls the buffer regions, so this is not so much a weakness per se (on the contrary, it is a strength) as a potential weakness.3. Ethnic/cultural fault linesNotably, three of the four buffer regions mentioned above are categorized as Autonomous Regions. This is primarily due to their distinct ethnic, cultural and religious non-Han identity, which has been a source of tension for much of Chinese history.As illustrated above, the populations that inhabit (and have historically inhabited) the buffer regions are distinct from the Han population of the core, in their ethnicity, culture and the languages that they speak. In this sense they pose a challenge in terms of national cohesion and inter-ethnic/cultural relations. In more recent times, Beijing has encouraged the settlement of Han Chinese into the buffer regions to dilute their demographic/ethnic composition; this has become a source of friction between the central government in the core and the peoples of the Autonomous Regions. Demographic tensions between the core and periphery are exacerbated by the economic and developmental disparities and what might be perceived as economic exploitation of the regions’ natural resources.Xinjiang is a particularly uneasy borderland, unsurprising given that it has much in common in its cultural and religious makeup with Turkic Muslim Central Asia than with Han Chinese civilization. A volatile mix of radical Islamist ideology and localized ethnic separatism has manifested in localized terrorist acts and insurgencies that threaten the central government’s grip over the region, and also threatens national unity. Tibet has experienced its share of convulsions and unrest from time to time, albeit not at the level of Xinjiang. Beijing fears Pan-Turkic sentiments in Central Asia spreading into Xinjiang and Tibetan resistance movements overseas and specifically in India generating unrest at home.4. Tibet and water securityAside from its geostrategic value as a buffer, there is another, perhaps more important reason why China must control Tibet. This has to do with water security. The Tibetan plateau is the source of China’s major rivers. The whole agricultural productivity of the Han core stems from all the water that comes down from the highlands. Therefore, China’s food security is also dependent on its control of Tibet. Foreign control of the sources of the Yellow and Yangtze Rivers would be unacceptable — the occupying power would have its hand on the throat of the Chinese nation.5. The Korean PeninsulaThere was a German military adviser to Imperial Japan who described Korea as a “dagger pointed at the heart of Japan”. I think the same expression could be reliably applied with regard to Chinese security.The Peninsula served as an invasion route for Japanese forces as early as the 1590s (see: the Imjin War — the Ming emperor sent troops to beat back the samurai advancing up the Peninsula), and again later by Imperial Japan during the First Sino-Japanese War. The 1950–1953 Korean War served as another reminder of Korea’s crucial position as a potential springboard for foreign incursions: when US-led forces advanced toward the Yalu River, the PRC found them too close for comfort and intervened.In a sense, the Korean Peninsula is a mini-buffer of sorts, an extension of Manchuria jutting out into the East China Sea invitingly toward the southern tip of Japan — a bridgehead for the invasion of Machuria and the Chinese heartland by foreign forces. But while the Chinese were able to consolidate control over Manchuria, the Peninsula’s mountainous terrain (the Kaema Plateau and Hamkyong Mountains provide a strong barrier on the northern border) allowed Korean kingdoms to retain their nominal independence. Right now, this is made even messier by a nuclear North Korea and the legacy of postwar partition. There is also the issue of ethnic Koreans within China and their identity in relation to a unified Korean state, if it ever comes about.6. North vs SouthHistorically, Chinese civilizations developed along two axes: the Yellow and Yangtze River systems. As a result of distinct geographical and climate differences, there has tended to be a noticeable divergence in the cultural and political nature of the polities/states orbiting the two rivers.Northern Chinese civilizations arose within the North China Plain, the fertile alluvial plain formed by the yellow sediment deposited along the banks of the Yellow River. The Wei Valley in particular was the power base of many northern Chinese dynasties: the Zhou, Qin, Han, and Tang all entrenched their capitals here.In terms of climate, the plain is cold and arid; too harsh for rice cultivation. Instead, crops such as millet and wheat were grown. Geographically, the North China Plain, as the name suggests, is relatively flat: the terrain comprises grasslands and plains largely unobstructed by mountain ranges. Upon this land transport and communication by horse was rapid, and the dominance of the mounted cavalry warrior undisputed. By implication, these conditions made it extremely conducive to political centralization and efficient administration. In the north, the plain transitioned gradually to steppes and desert, from which nomadic conquerors often invaded. This meant that northern Chinese civilizations frequently had to test their mettle against these invaders, and were often reinvigorated from time to time by the influxes of culture, technology, skills, and blood from these militant nomadic tribes, giving rise to a more martial disposition overall. Throughout history, there are many instances of northern Chinese dynasties expanding south (I believe the Qin and Han did this first) or forcibly incorporating southern dynasties. Mao himself followed this paradigm, consolidating his power first in Manchuria and the north, then pushing south. In conclusion, Northern China is a political-military entity.In contrast, southern Chinese dynasties emerged along the Yangtze River Valley and especially the Yangtze River Delta (this became a major hub later, after maritime commerce became a thing). As early as the Spring and Autumn period states such as Wu and Yue coalesced around the Delta, and Chu took up residence along the river basin.The climate of the south was considerably rainier, warmer and wetter than the north. This enabled the cultivation of rice, which has an extremely high calorie per acre output compared to wheat (11 million compared to 4 million). Growing rice demanded different methods and modes of organizations than growing wheat or millet (as Kaiser Kuo explains in this fantastic post: What are the historical and cultural differences between north and south China?) and so a more cooperative socio-cultural mindset arose. The landscape of southern China is considerably more hilly and uneven than the north, encompassing river valleys and mountains. Cavalry, so mobile on the North China Plain, therefore had a much more difficult time navigating the terrain further south. With the advent of seaborne trade (as opposed to overland trade) the south became more and more economically prosperous. After the Jurchen conquered the north, the Song Dynasty shifted south and brought with it the center of cultural, economic, and commercial activity. While northern Chinese states tended to be traditional land powers, Southern dynasties like the Song experimented more with navies and sea power. Southern China was therefore identified with trade, commerce, economics, and agriculture, instead of the militarism that defined the north.Throughout Chinese history, this North-South division has made itself apparent again and again, through the territorial configuration of dynasties along a North-South axis, as shown below during the Three Kingdoms period, the Sixteen Kingdoms period, the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period (note that the north remained united under one dynasty at a time, whereas the south was fragmented into numerous polities)Also note that the south is much more linguistically diverse than the Mandarin-speaking north, given that it continues to be home to a variety of Chinese dialectsThis ancient polarization of North and South is much less applicable today, given the existence of military, agricultural, communication and transportation technology capable of overcoming the tyranny of distance, geography and climate. Stereotypes of Northern and Southern people and culture remain but have largely been subsumed under a greater, all-encompassing modern Chinese nationalist identity.7. Interior vs CoastalThe more pertinent division right now pertains to economic disparities between inland and coastal provinces. The coast has historically been associated with great wealth and commerce due to maritime trade, beginning with the Southern Song Dynasty as mentioned. But from the dawn of the 20th century onwards and in particular the late 1970s after Deng’s reforms and globalization, this trend became ever more pronounced. As China began to trade more and more with the world, the coastal provinces became increasingly wealthy while the economies of the inland provinces remained poor and continued to rely on subsistence farming.In the early 20th century the divergent interests and sociopolitical orientations of the coastal and interior provinces began to make themselves apparent. The cosmopolitan coastal elite that profited from trade were affiliated with foreign European powers, and in time the influence of this alliance eclipsed the power of the central government in the coastal provinces. The Communists derided Shanghai, for instance, as the “whore of imperialism”. Eventually the country collapsed into chaos and civil war. Foreign imperialism and intrusion forced open China’s markets and led to prosperity, and this prosperity had destabilized the nation. No wonder the appeal of communist ideology was as strong as it was, especially inland: revolution arose from the interior. Mao’s solution was to raise a massive peasant army from the interior, liquidate the collaborators, expel the foreigners, and close China to the world. China lapsed into impoverished equality.When Deng reopened the economy to the world, he began with the coast, and in particular the south. The old problem re-emerged: massive economic tensions between the provinces and a disruptive impact on national unity. The coast is integrated into the global economy and prosperous; the interior is isolated and poor. The coast has the weight of international trade and commerce behind it; the interior has the mass of the Chinese population (900 million vs 400 million on the coast) . The interior wants the revenue generated by the coast transferred inland; the coast intends to continue enjoying its profits. The central government therefore has to balance the interests of the inland and coastal provinces, distributing the fruits of economic growth in an equitable way.The paradox is that China relies on its coast as an interface with global commerce. But in doing so the coastal provinces inevitably become incredibly wealthy, and this economic gap leads to political schisms within the country.8. Regionalism (Provinces vs Central government; Province vs Province)This brings us to another greater, enduring theme: that of regionalism within the Han core. The opening chapter of The Romance of the Three Kingdoms has a line that goes something like this: “It is a general truism of this world that anything long divided will surely unite, and anything long united will surely divide” (分久必合，合久必分 ). As mentioned, the geopolitical importance of a strong core cannot be understated. It is up to the central government to bridge the numerous aforementioned divisions (north-south, coastal-interior) and maintain the unity of the core. This struggle appears to be eternal.Throughout Chinese history there have been repeated instances where the Han core loses coherence, the central authority collapses in upon itself, and China fragments into a multiplicity of small local polities until after a while a strong central authority re-emerges and imposes its will on the core, uniting it once again. Rural revolts and peasant rebellions, regionalism and warlords are a recurring theme (e.g. Taiping Rebellion, An Lushan Rebellion, the Rebellion of the Seven States), as attempts to break away from the central authority or resist efforts at consolidation.This was most recently the case with the early 20th-century warlord era:But it happened as early as the late Zhou Dynasty, when the power of the Zhou court waned, and eventually China disintegrated into numerous independent fiefdoms. The Zhou kings wielded only nominal authority over these entities.Even in times where a strong central authority exists, the regions strain and chafe against the control of the central government, and often a firm hand is needed to bring them to heel and quell rebellious sentiments. Modern China is no exception. The Chinese saying “the mountains are high and the emperor is far away” (山高 皇帝远 ) applies even today. The dictates and edicts of the central authority are sometimes distorted, resisted or even ignored by the local bureaucracy, which tends to be preoccupied with managing local interests and issues. The center is distant and sometimes detached from the realities on the ground, and struggles to enforce its authority. Beijing is familiar with this challenge when it comes to implementing national economic policies across the provinces today.Furthermore, provincial identities are still extremely strong — identification with and by province is a pervasive phenomenon in Chinese society. There is fierce rivalry between and among provinces especially when it comes to economic growth and performance. They compete ferociously for resources and incentives/privileges dispensed by the central government and lobby for and against policies. Regional cliques are prevalent even among the highest echelons of Chinese politics, as the incumbent leader’s own province/region is often disproportionately represented in the top leadership. Under Mao, a large number of CCP leaders were peasants from central China, namely Hubei and Hunan provinces. Deng promoted his own fellow Sichuan officials to high positions. Jiang had his Shanghai Gang, and in both his and Hu’s administration, the eastern provinces and Jiangsu were strongly represented. In continuing with this trend, a new “Shaanxi clique” has begun to coalesce around President Xi.Beneath its visage of order and stability, modern China therefore still struggles with regionalist impulses, manifesting on two levels: one, tensions between the will of the central authority and the regional provinces; two, tensions among the provinces themselves. These latent centrifugal forces have the potential to destabilize the Han core with disastrous results.9. Dependence on maritime tradeWealth has always been the defining characteristic of Chinese civilizations, but historically this has been due to the vast profusion of natural resources the country has been blessed with. Emperor Qianlong of the last dynasty, the Qing, professed to a British envoy: “Our Celestial Empire possesses all things in prolific abundance and lacks no product within its borders. There is therefore no need to import the manufactures of outside barbarians in exchange for our own produce.” China was for most of its existence an incredibly self-sufficient economic entity and this accounted for much of its insular foreign policy. Trade was conducted to acquire luxury goods rather than necessities. Its interactions with the rest of East Asia mostly had to do with imperial tribute.Now, however, the modern Chinese nation-state is deeply integrated into the global economy and reliant on global commerce particularly for food and energy. Since the 1990s China has been a net importer of grain and oil and became a net importer of coal in 2008. It is set to become the world’s largest oil and gas importer, according to the International Energy Agency. By 2040 China will account for almost 30% of the oil being traded internationally and almost 25% of LNG traded over long distances. Never before has the prosperity of China been so inextricably bound up with international trade and so dependent on the fortunes and goodwill of other nations. China’s economic success has come at the cost of its self-sufficiency. As the 2008 crisis showed, the Chinese economy is vulnerable to contagion, and all the problems that being part of the global economy entails (note the dip in both imports and exports in the third graphic below).What’s more, much of this trade is conducted not overland, as has traditionally been the case, but across the oceans. As shown below, much of this trade transits the South China Sea and specifically the Strait of Malacca, through which about 25% of world trade passes.This is problematic for a country that has for much of its history been a land power that has displayed only periodic, cursory interest in the maritime realm. It does not have much enduring, established seafaring or naval traditions and expertise, and these take time to cultivate. Beijing understands that its supply chains and maritime lines of commerce and communication remain vulnerable. Expanded vital commercial interests overseas demand a commensurate naval capability to defend those interests, which China is still developing. Presently, as much as they deny it, the Chinese (and the rest of East Asia) have been relying on the US military presence in the Asia-Pacific to provide security for their maritime trade. China’s trade routes and access to international markets and resources could potentially be intercepted or disrupted by the US. This is the imperative that is therefore driving the PRC to develop a formidable navy, and to seek out alternative trade routes through its Belt and Road Initiative to diversify away from this single point of vulnerability — maritime trade.10. The Coastline and East/South China SeasBut modern China’s preoccupation with the sea goes beyond economic security; it is concerned also with the physical security of the core. The coastline and the adjacent seas themselves have proven to be dangerous geographical weaknesses in the past 200 years.Until now, China has always been a continental land power by nature. The state’s attention was largely focused inland, on maintaining control of the buffers, fighting off barbarian incursions, and holding the Han core together. Trade was conducted mostly overland (Silk Road trade routes leading into Central Asia and beyond to Persia and the West, the north-south Grand Canal). China had no need for navies. True, piracy in the East China Sea was an annoyance, and the Song Dynasty did develop an impressive navy for use against the Jin, but for the most part naval power was a curiosity, an indulgence. There was no major impulse to use its maritime power to engage with the rest of the world like the Europeans did. Navies were built in times of prosperity and then burned when they could no longer be maintained in times of strife. To the European powers, the maritime domain meant connectivity, possibility. To the Chinese, for much of their history, the East and South China Seas were for the most part just buffers rather than a medium for interaction; the coastline was a wall.The last two centuries showed the error of this assumption: European gunboats blasted their way into Chinese markets, seizing control of Qing ports; later, Imperial Japan destroyed the fledgling Chinese navy at sea and invaded across the East China Sea, seizing large swathes of the coastal provinces. China had learned through bitter experience that its coastline and the adjacent seas were no longer safe spaces.This physical, military threat to the security of the core has receded somewhat in recent decades. Invasion of the PRC, even by sea, is nearly unthinkable. But the memory of the Opium Wars and the Sino-Japanese Wars — where an enemy sea power wrested control of the adjacent East and South China Seas, attained a grip on its coastline, carved away huge chunks of coastal territory along with its precious ports, and proceeded inland to dismember the core and massacre the populace — still persists. Seen in this context, Chinese sensitivity to incursions and encroachment on its surrounding seas and coastline by foreign powers is therefore understandable from a national security viewpoint.11. BONUS: The Island ChainsIn Beijing’s quest to develop a naval capability it has run up against a natural barrier in the form of the First and Second Island Chains. The coast of China is encircled by a series of archipelagic bodies which serve to circumscribe the growth of Chinese sea power. From a purely geostrategic standpoint, these “island chains” could sustain a network of military bases from which an unfriendly foreign power (or powers) could project military force into the South and East China Seas — a maritime Great Wall around China’s periphery. To expand into the Indian and Pacific Oceans, Chinese sea power would have to first contend with these geographical barriers. For foreign powers seeking to contain Chinese naval power, the Island Chains are pre-built, permanent geostrategic outposts/fortifications enclosing the South and East China Seas, and the Western Pacific.Between the archipelagos there exist multiple narrow passages, or crucial maritime chokepoints, that in a time of confrontation could be blockaded by a foreign power, severing the vital arteries of Chinese maritime trade. These chokepoints include most notably the Strait of Malacca, but also the Korea Strait, the Sunda Strait, the Lombok Strait, the Karimata Strait, the Balabac Strait, and the Mindoro Strait. This geographical noose around the neck of the Chinese economy (see point 9 on dependence on maritime trade) has become a fixation of Chinese strategists.Currently, most of these states are allied to (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand are US allies) or on friendly terms with the US (America has strategic/security partnerships with Singapore and Taiwan, among others, and Vietnam is pivoting toward Washington), and fairly nervous about Chinese assertiveness in international waters. A few of them already host US military bases, though the US presence is more heavily concentrated permanently in Northeast Asia; in Southeast Asia its military presence is lighter and mostly on a rotational basis.Interestingly, this notion of “island chains” is a very recent one; it originated as a construct of the Cold War: the Acheson Line that delineated the US containment policy in Asia, as shown below.Acheson himself described it as such: “This defensive perimeter runs along the Aleutians to Japan and then goes to the Ryukyus. We hold important defense positions in the Ryukyu Islands, and those we will continue to hold…The defensive perimeter runs from Ryukyus to the Philippine Islands…So far as the military security of other areas in the Pacific is concerned, it must be clear that no person can guarantee these areas against military attack. But it must also be clear that such a guarantee is hardly sensible or necessary within the realm of practical relationship.”For most of the Cold War, China was preoccupied with its internal turmoil and the traditional land-power mentality held sway, with the central government’s attention focused on the interior. With the end of the Cold War and the resurgence of China as a modern Great Power and potential superpower, with its maritime commerce and increasingly forceful behavior at sea, this idea gained new credence and attention.Now Beijing seeks to disrupt the coherence of the US’ Asian alliances and so degrade the Island Chains, breaking out into the Indo-Pacific. Washington may seek to proceed with its policy of “congagement” (containment+engagement), while rebalancing its military, economic, and diplomatic resources and assets to the Asia-Pacific. The states that comprise the Island Chains will be central to this strategic interplay.Thanks for reading! I really enjoyed writing this piece. But why did the question have to be “top ten” though…

PREFACEThe world is seeing the rise of a new world order with economic interdependence and cooperation amongst different nations at a level unmatched at any other instance in history. The changing dynamics have not left the Asian Continent untouched, with new, increasingly complex and multilateral relations being formed between the nations every day. The last two decades have seen the spectacular rise of China as an economic powerhouse and, in a post-Cold War world, the emergence of a new geopolitical climate.China’s engagement with all of the neighbouring countries with respect to power projections and foreign policy is well known. Be it in the form of hostilities for pending unresolved ‘issues’, state-sponsored and private economic investments, indirect proxy wars and trying to install governments which are under her direct/indirect control.Over the last decade, there has been a marked increase in these activities and trying to wrest control over specific nations which China has identified as strategically important. These countries overtly represent the trade routes, oil supply and sea lines of communication but covertly also enable viable replenishment and supply base for her Military especially for the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy [1]). Through the direct and indirect investment of money, power, politics and military aid, China has created an astonishingly beautiful encirclement of India at various levels.This analysis is meant to understand this encirclement (chakravyuh) and how India can fight this out. The views and opinion in this analysis are based on open sources and connecting the dots to build and analyse. Qualitatively looking at the chief issues and possible solutions let us to firmly believe that all is not lost in this big geopolitical game. The whole encirclement can be broken and restricted to what can be either a mutual benefit to India or to a position which will not threaten India over coming decades.IntroductionChina has been making direct and indirect investments in Asia and African region from the early 2000s. However, in last 5 years, there has been marked an increase in its initiatives to make all these outward reaches into strategic geopolitical tools. The chief tool is shown in the picture belowFigure 1 – OBOR or One Belt, One Road initiative connecting Land (red) and Maritime Silk roads (blue) [2]OBOR has been represented as an economic tool [3]. It has been defined in many circles as the blueprint connecting over 60 countries accounting for 60% of the world’s population. Its collective GDP equivalent is approximated to be over one-third of the world’s wealth. The economic corridors OBOR proposes are as under1. New Eurasian Land Bridge2. China – Mongolia – Russia Corridor3. China – Central Asia – West Asia Corridor4. China – Indochina Peninsula Corridor5. China – Pakistan Corridor6. Bangladesh – China – India – Myanmar CorridorThese economic corridors effectively constitute the framework of the OBOR initiative beyond China’s bordersThe location and structure of the corridors are shown in the map below, which also outlines the route of 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.Figure 2 – The six economic corridors proposed under OBOROwing to Indian reservations and non-commitment, the whole initiative has not been fully successful. But the foundation of this whole initiative as a concept and realisation has progressed with multiple overt and covert investments in various domains.The extent of Chinese investments has been well documented and in various fields especially infrastructure. The Figure below depicts such forecasted investments in our area of interest over next 5 years. Strikingly Beijing has been pushing its soft power status as much as possible opening up new routes of communication, access to markets and also enabling power play into the domestic political setup in most of these places.Figure 3 Chinese Investments in 2017-21 [4]With the above figure, the adjoining commentary [4] statedIn 14th May 2017, this year, Mr Xi pledged an additional $124 billion towards his $900 billion “Belt and Road” initiative, a global trade and infrastructure drive that he is promoting as a long-term “win-win” campaign for the 65 nations that have signed up to it. Most western leaders stayed away from a two-day summit highlighting Chinese ambition to secure greater influence, but the 28 heads of state present at what Mr Xi called “a gathering of great minds” included President Putin of Russia and President Erdogan of Turkey.If the OBOR was just the threat owing to economic aid and strengthening China’s position by accessing more markets at reduced cost and secured lines, few analysts went ahead and declared another stratagem called String of Pearls [5]In an article in The Washington Times dated January 17, 2005 [6], it was disclosed that“China is building strategic relationships along the sea lanes from the Middle East to the South China Sea in ways that suggest defensive and offensive positioning to protect China’s energy interests, but also to serve broad security objectives,” said the report sponsored by the director, Net Assessment, who heads Mr. Rumsfeld’s office on future-oriented strategies.In spite of this disclosure, officially China never uses this terminology but its recent spate of actions indicate this stratagem being used from the South China Sea to Djibouti and in between CPEC project and Gwadar development, Hambantota development in Sri Lanka, Port construction in Myanmar, Container facility in Bangladesh and even overtures to open a path to Nepal. The map below gives an accurate idea of this aspectFigure 4 – China’s String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean. (Map Courtesy CIMSEC)The “string of pearls” concept is often viewed a military initiative, with the aim of providing China’s navy access to a series of ports stretching from the South China Sea to the Arabian Sea. This has caused some consternation, particularly in India, which sees itself as being encircled. [7]On July 12, 2017, when Chinese troops started moving into Djibouti for deployment into the 1st overseas base, this encirclement more or less became prominent. China’s Military and assets being deployed to secure their strategic investments causes a big headache for India from Political, Economic, Military and strategic perspectives. The game is set for a great rivalry between India and China with China already making the first move and entwining India into this chakravyuh.THE STRING OF PEARLSFirst, what is String of Pearls? The earliest definition that emerged is from July 2006 [7]Each “pearl” in the “String of Pearls” is a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence. An upgraded airstrip on Woody Island, located in the Paracel archipelago 300 nautical miles east of Vietnam, is a “pearl.” A container shipping facility in Chittagong, Bangladesh, is a “pearl.” Construction of a deepwater port in Sittwe, Myanmar, is a “pearl,” as is the construction of a navy base in Gwadar, Pakistan.Port and airfield construction projects, diplomatic ties, and force modernization form the essence of China’s “String of Pearls.” The “pearls” extend from the coast of mainland China through the littorals of the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca, across the Indian Ocean, and on to the littorals of the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf. China is building strategic relationships and developing a capability to establish a forward presence along the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) that connect China to the Middle EastFigure – 5 – Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) for ChinaThe whole ruse of economic development for friendly nation followed by protecting such investments via Military deployment is the outcome of this strategy. The overt need of finding market accessibility, the resolute case of demonstrating growing financial might and increasing the geopolitical influences seems to be the key motivating factors for the peaceful nature of these pearl formations. The pretext got further strengthened by the Somali pirates causing harm to the SLOCs.Figure 6 – Somalian Piracy – Threat map – 2005-2010 [8]Connecting the figure 6 with figure 4 now reveals how the anti-piracy and protecting the SLOCs became paramount to the military aspect of the strategy. Unfortunately, the dual use aspect of the infrastructure build-up may enable China to use her men, planes, ships and submarines with vital capabilities to choke the whole of Indian SLOCs as well.The resulted base in Djibouti, Gwadar and many more places where a submarine can berth for supply replenishment is not just for anti-piracy measures but rather increasing the militarization aspect and controlling the rivals whom China considers as a threat for herself. These SLOCs common to both India and China also houses the largest route of Oil supply for the major part of the world. Busiest to the core, this corridor serves as nationally important aspect for multiple nations and this provide China with additional ammunition to either gain more geopolitical respect or to create choke points which can create issues and even cripple the adversaries. The usage of proxy elements as pirates to continuously harass a group of particular shipping lanes and countries dependent on it can become a big tool as well. Especially with the fact that China shares the highest number of border disputes and it has maintained an aggressive posture in claiming such disputed lands as their own and even going to the extent of putting military assets to protect the same.INDIAS GEOPOLITICAL ISSUES WITH STRING OF PEARLSRear Admiral K Raja Menon (Retd) has summed it up as the following areas of geopolitical concern for India wrt the string of pearls [9]Figure 7 – Areas of geopolitical concernIf we see this figure, it is easier to understand that both India and China basically square off and have no advantage over the whole area of concern. For India one side its the high mountains in the East, Planes in the West and Sea in the South. Each of the places with distinct advantages and disadvantages. For China, the whole of IOR is a long distance away from mainland requiring a formidable Blue Water Fleet to actually protect it. The Tibetan region dispute is well known for both India and China and thus it remains a status quo. The movement if it happens deep inside Myanmar literally will also stretch their supply line. The Myanmar government in spite of Chinese overtures also wishes to be in good books with India for the road and connecting infrastructure enabling it to have land transit routes too. Thus all types of chess games as of now basically point to a draw status.The change in the strategic strength happens via fundamental instability of Pakistan and China’s huge investment in CPEC or China Pakistan Economic Corridor. [10] Over the last few years slowly the Chinese investments and buying of Stakes in Pakistani State Enterprise mean there is a dramatic increase in controlling form over Pakistan. With the further extent of military cooperation, assets being supplied with long-term loans and establishment of proxies to control state machinery, China’s control and changeover of Pakistan into its own province or vassal state is almost complete. The issue of proxy elements is already well known with the usage of terror proxies and aiding them with arms and financial aid in North East India. With the radicalised religion based proxies in Chinese hands, there seems a greater stability-instability paradox. On the side it keeps India engaged with constant de-stabilisation aspects and on the other side, the same radicalised elements can also cause a religion based extremism elemental increase in Chinese provinces closer to Pakistan. The extent of the fallout from such a situation is a worrisome factor and coupled with mainstreaming the terror elements into the political front to gain legitimacy and recognition points to a grave concern. On one side the Chinese investments and underlying security make its investments very much secured yet they further went ahead and ensured the income generated via this whole project, trade increase and even transport plus transit benefit China far greater than Pakistan. This implies over time, there will be a deep grudge built up which can be exploited by radicals and can unite all under the name of one religion to fight against this oppressive stance of China. This will throw the whole Western Border of India and the adjoining geopolitical concern into chaos and possibly lead to Syria 2.0 scenario all over again.The other area of concern is the Middle East. The house of almost all problems exists as of today in spite of Oil being the largest resource allowing them to manipulate the whole world economy as per their whims. Yet there is Saudi Arabia Qatar issue, Iran hotbed, Syria- ISIS, Turkey NATO to and fro stances, Israel-Palestine, Hizbollah-Hamas, Nuclear Weapon and continuous quest for an Islamic Bomb under their control – the list is pretty long. The illegal trading and proliferation of Oil and changing the small guidelines to hurt Import dependent economy like India is a big risk. The challenge for India is that each side will insist on a mutually beneficial relationship with India but also insist on differentiating between their own friendly and enemy nations wrt to India’s relationship. As India is dependent on ME for Oil, our stance and our strategies have to be very careful of this aspect.Other potential areas of concern include the identifying more such Pearls inBangladesh: A container port facility at Chittagong is coupled with extensive Naval and Commercial Access. Bangladesh reliance on Chinese military assets like submarines via soft loans is a step in that direction. In total for over 34 projects, a sum of USD 25 Billion has been committed by China. [11] The challenge for a growing economy like Bangladesh is soft loans help in creating less stress over any commercial loans which may have stringent terms and a higher rate of interest. Smartly, China has been trying to convert such loans into commercial loans and trying to make Bangladesh default like in the case of Sri Lanka, it wishes to use the secured assets as a way of consolidating its hold once the default occurs. Dhaka has been resisting this attempt knowing well the fate of Hambantota port and China taking it fully for failing to repay the debt and thereby buying it to square that loan off from its books.Nepal: The India-Nepal relationship has seen several ups and downs but last few years have seen possibly multiple bottoms. With the sharing of culture and majority religion same like India, the differences emanating between Kathmandu and New Delhi are very surprising. Chiefly these issues have been taken advantage by lack of communication and strategic compromises to find a middle path to solve the challenging issues. China had made several in-roads into Nepal by taking advantage of these discomforts and had fuelled up the anti-India stance even more. The last few issues of rights of Madhesi people, access to fuel & Oil and basic transport routes, the communication and internet access for local Nepalese people had only created a bigger divide which China took full advantage by providing quick telecommunication and broadband coverage, maintaining neutral stance for ethnic group’s rights and even trying to open a new path for transport via Friendship Highway. This coupled with quick rehabilitation and aid when the earthquake struck Nepal helped China consolidate its position in the minds and heart of Nepalese people.Figure 8 – Map of the Friendship Highway – Kathmandu to Lhasa [12]With China in Nov 2017 taking the cross-border railway plan very seriously [13], this implies Nepal will rely greater on China and any adverse relationship impact is easily offset by Nepal Chinese communication and accessibility. Nepal thus gains a route via OBOR easily and looks at OBOR for its own survival and directly plays into the hands of the waiting China who will use Nepal then easily to open another front wrt India. In Nepal investment summit 2017 held in Kathmandu, India committed USD 317 million while China proposed to invest USD 8.3 billion. Such is the stark difference in the financial aid that Indian strategy in Nepal needs urgent attention and smart play to maintain some control and protect India’s interest.Bhutan: India and Bhutan share a special relationship over decades. Here also China has attempted to try its level best to meddle in some manner. With the redrafted 2007 India-Bhutan friendship treaty, Bhutan has slowly got the right to follow an independent foreign policy. China has tried to showcase its economic muscle here also with an open carrot of a huge economic package in case Bhutan agrees to settle all disputes bilaterally with China and not involve India with whom Bhutan is committed via Friendship treaty. The recent Doklam crisis was a tussle due to these overtures only with China-Bhutan border disputes in 3 different pockets out of which Doklam is strategically most important from India’s perspective. China has offered to relinquish its claim over two pockets in northern Bhutan in exchange for the Doklam pocket in the western Bhutan, where Indian and Chinese armies were engaged in eyeball encounter. India is the security provider for Bhutan had to step in to safeguard both Bhutan’s sovereignty and India’s security. The flared up issue had been solved by the peaceful climb down from both China and India but this dispute, in reality, is far from being solved. This will be a potential point of crisis over time and will need adequate attention from India’s perspective.Myanmar: India-Myanmar relationship has been healthy for a long time but the government has always been closer to China than India. In spite of turning democratic, the elections have not been fair and elected candidates always are by the support of China overtly or covertly. Primarily a commodity resource-rich country, China has invested huge sums in Myanmar in infrastructure and mining in last 3 decades. One of the controversial projects is the port development of Kyauk Pyu port in Bay of Bengal with an estimated Chinese investment of USD 7.3 billion. With China having, by all means, a controlling stake of over 75%, this is a very big threat to India. With Chinese arms and military assets, Myanmar is dependent completely on China for its survival. This port will see subsequently berthing of Chinese nuclear submarines and with electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca, this makes it a grave risk for India.Sri Lanka: The island nation had been in a stable relationship with India until the IPKF movement and subsequent Tamil Eelam issues which ate up almost decades of time and gave an opportunity for outside nations to use Sri Lanka as a political tool to counter India. Sri Lanka owes almost USD 8 bn to China and that is estimated to be approximately 12%+ of its overall debt. These loans are commercial in nature and hence attract a significant rate of interest. These loan based projects and the port opened for commercial purpose 7 years ago had generated limited revenues and hence Sri Lanka has struggled to repay its due. In 2016, Sri made a deal to sell an 80 percent stake in the port to the state-controlled China Merchants Port Holdings. With vociferous protests from all sides, in July 2017, the deal was amended to give Chinese company 70 percent stake in a joint venture with Sri Lanka Ports Authority owned by Sri Lankan government.Figure 9 – Hambantota location on a mapThis December Sri Lanka has formally handed over its southern port of Hambantota to China on a 99-year lease, which government critics have denounced as an erosion of the country’s sovereignty. [14] The Sri Lankan government has given assurances that the port will not be used for military ends. Despite Sri Lankan assurances, Indian observers express concerns that Beijing could operationalize Hambantota as a resupply node for the People’s Liberation Army-Navy in the future. [15]Maldives: India-Maldives shared a healthy relationship for a good amount of time till there was a change in regime which is very much pro-China. China via way of economic subsidies for tourism market has controlled the local government’s major source of revenue. With the cancellation of GMR building the infrastructure project and giving it out finally to a Chinese company, the shift was more or less made public. Last year, China acquired an uninhabited island near Maldives capital Male on a 50-year-lease at the cost of USD 4 million. Some reports claimed that Chinese will build a military infrastructure there and an air force base will be built up. Airstrips under construction are now seen in satellite images.Figure 10a – Road bridge, 2nd runway and reclamationFigure 10b – New runway under works and reclamation [16]In addition to all this Beijing has made important inroads in the Maldives, which concluded a free trade agreement with Beijing at the end of November, last month.With a military base in Djibouti, troops stationed in CPEC, Maldives airstrip opens up another area of concern for India.Some smaller notable mentionsCambodia: China signed a military agreement in November 2003 to provide training and equipment. China has funded close to USD 2Bn since then with loans for Cambodia and about 70 % of roads and bridges are built with these funds only. [17]South China Sea: China has built up considerable infrastructure in man-made islands. In 2017, China built underground storage areas, administrative structures and “large radar and sensor arrays, according to the Washington-based research group named Asia Maritime Transparency Institute of the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The construction covered about 290,000 square meters “of new real estate.” Beijing built most actively at Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys including work to finish tunnels that are likely for ammunition storage. High-frequency radar gear also appeared on the reef, China has enough installations to land fighter jets, refuel, rearm and let crews rest, according to Collin Koh, maritime security research fellow at Nanyang Technological University in Singapore. [18]Thailand: Thailand is deeply dependent on Chinese capital for its economic growth. recently it has also purchased 3 Chinese submarines for almost USD 1.2 Bn as well deepening its military times. High-speed railways, power projects, Eastern Economic Corridor and OBOR are the main themes of the present-day government of Thailand and China. [19]As seen the geopolitical concerns are at multiple levels with many entities. In the next chapters, we further analyse and present what could be inferred and we can explore the possible solutions to this issue.A MARITIME PERSPECTIVE OF THIS CHAKRAVYUHFrom a baseline perspective, we have seen the following based on previous chaptersEnhanced Economic outreachesFocus on geopolitical tradeSecuring Energy routes at any cost for all situationsFocussed on maritime aspect and SLOCsOvert usage of economic-political willpowerCovert usage of economic-political-military aspects of decision makingIt is clear that the economic prosperity scope is dependent on maritime nature of the whole mix of sea lanes of communication, strategic shipping/merchant lanes, secured trade routes to access newer markets at reduced logistical costs and protecting all via a dominant military back up to support its security.It is pertinent to note that all this is primarily showcasing an increased need and thrust in maritime power projection and usage of naval assets to ensure safety, security, the order of sea lanes and force towards the dominance of power projection. A simple breakdown from different perspectives makes it easier to understand the interdependencyPolitical and Diplomacy PerspectivesBuilding deeper relationship with nations in Asia and AfricaRecognising different nations for direct and indirect cohesionGreater recognition in global arenaRecognition as a powerful nation in a multipolar worldChallenge the old leadership and dominance of World powersEconomic PerspectivesInfrastructure Buildup in the trade route in supporting nationsInvestment in overt and covert form to have firm controlIdentifying strategically good locations where income generation is limited but the project is made to show a huge cash flow generation in future for annexing.Initiate the relationship with soft loans and changing the debt to commercial rate of interestsCommanding a greater sum of profit.Management control over the whole invested and linking complexFocussing on Energy Security aspectFocus on providing engineering and technology solutions for basic modes of transport infrastructure as a whole.Using technology to infiltrate into the lives of common citizens and creating a dependencyThe whole economy of the supporting nation indirectly depends on mainland China’s economic policies and overtures.Controlling commodity at resource excavation/mining to transport to storage aspects.Military PerspectivesCreation of military outposts across the IORUpgrading the intelligence gathering perspectives with reliance on Electronic, communication, satellite imagery-based intelligence and use of Space-based assetsCreation of berthing places for surface ships and pens for docking submarines without raising any suspicionStocking of supply, replenishments and weapon based assetsMilitary personnel training and rotation on different platforms for operational deploymentNeutralise any threat to China and its investment placesLinking up Military sales to local Chinese Military Industrial Complex via ways of soft loans, training and even support services creationEstablishment of local repair depotsCreation of Satellite Tracking and Imaging centreEstablishment of VLF Submarine communication setupsAccess to Beidou GPS SystemsEstablishing dual use communication medium, ground-based and space-based assets.Cultural PerspectivesPromoting Chinese culture and Chinese way of lifePushing significant expatriates into supporting nations in order to create a local population over time which is more China favouring and leaning in ideologies.Soft power creation and projectionEnhancing Tourism connectionsIncreasing the citizen to citizen contact and exchange programEnhancing education exchange program and scholarships to boost image among new generationsTaking over or buying controlling stakes or covertly manipulating local media and newspapers to follow mainland China news media viewpoints, in turn, making mainland China media a globally acceptable name.Using ancient Chinese medicines and treatments for humanitarian assistanceOpening up Confucius institute in different nations. These institutes are affiliated with Ministry of EducationUse sports, movies, art, music, films to push Chinese perspectives.The above perspectives provide a deep insight to understand the nuances of China’s actionable. If we consider now string of pearls and China’s possible encirclement of India, the whole picture looks like this belowFigure 11 – The possible ships and submarine berthing places in China’s string of PearlsIt is important to understand that China in its quest for the string of Pearls had basically ensured that South China Sea stance of hers is shown as a template of power projection and determination.In doing so, it has rubbed Vietnam hard and forced Vietnam to spend a considerable amount in Military wares and assets to safeguard its security.Philippines which has been a pro-USA country and USA protection owing to a weak Navy succumbed to a plethora of economic deals signed over last 12 months. China won her by the means of economic deals softening her strict resistance to the SCS dispute and diluting the whole root cause further to her own benefit.Malaysia is another commodity-based economy which has been struggling for some time. In Spite of assets which it has, most are aged and needs replacements. To safeguard its own strategic needs, Malaysia will be forced to spend money to buy out new military wares.Taiwan is facing an impending situation of almost many missiles targeting Taiwan and simulations related to its annexation. It plans to increase investments in military wares and assets as well to safeguard its interests. Being a close ally of USA, the China vs USA confrontation is a starked realitySo all the parties in the SCS dispute had been dealt with in some ways and resultant action only showcases that taking on China alone may not be the best course of action overtly or covertly. If we look at figure 11, simple facts come to light based on previous chapters. To make things, even more, clearly let us look at another pictorial [20].Figure 12 Comparison of ports in IORGiven above is the list of all ports which are shown on the map and also the disputes which India has with Chi-Pak axisIf we draw a parallel between the east side of the string of pearls resolution or SCS resolution within the future west side or IOR region outcome, few points become very clear.China is creating a dual-use civilian infrastructure of commercial nature which can be used for the military purpose as well.Wrt to an aggressive stance in SCS, the same aggression should be applicable when the right amount of manpower and assets under deployment and rotation are available.The neighbouring countries especially India should be very cautious. As the time goes by, Threat index will see a marked upswing and there will be potential eye to eye confrontation in multiple exchange pointsThe strategy in IOR is clearly followingBuild-upConsolidate access pointsCreate a direct competition with IndiaUse A2/AD or Anti Access /Area Denial in order to isolate India and ensure no external help can reach IndiaPropping up Pakistan based proxies covertly and overtly using its forces to keep India engaged all the timeAnother distracting scenario will be created to ensure the friendly country to many of these nations and IORs greatest security provider – the USA is kept occupied and its supply line always stretched.With USA engaged stance, its geographical concentration is weakened allowing scattering of assets favourable to China limited naval presence.Over time with such bases and full staff/support/ assets, China will be in a position to launch multiple front attacks simultaneously thereby defeating potential adversaries like India within the conventional realm easily.In the end, the military perspective is to create an uncertainty and uneasiness aspect to keep India thinking forever. With propping up multiple issues in these Strings, India remains engaged and China will keep on weaving a net to tighten our geopolitical manoeuvres further.REMEDIAL MEASURES TO BREAK THIS CHAKRAVYUHThe remedial measures to break the chakravyuh is basically two prong.Economic and diplomatic InitiativesSecurity InitiativesEconomic and Diplomatic initiativesThere have been 3 major points under this initiative [21]India has long been the dominant power in South AsiaAs Beijing invests millions in the region, New Delhi is looking to defend its sphere of influenceIndia must play to its strengths instead of attempting to match Chinese capitalIt is important to understand that China has an economic might, a banking industry to back its strategically important projects and financial capital for high-risk projects. To offset this, following solutions may be exploredIndian agrarian economy and food security can aspects can be replicated to ensure adequate self-sufficiency can be created or a group can be created to look after that for all members. Monsoon plays a pivotal role as well and hence an integrated weather forecast and management will greatly aid all supporting nations.From manufacturing aspects, India should look at creating a major global manufacturing hub in India and allow a part of the supply chain of less complex work involving the low end of technology matrix but highly manpower intensive to be in the supporting nation. In a way instead of a single industrial complex, India should try to create a hub in the homeland and spoke based industrial reach in multiple support nations. With the dependency of trade and manpower being employed, this creates a much better scope of cooperation without straining Indian monetary aspect too much.This can be further enhanced by a collective nation signing a free trade agreement among themselves which will help boost economic cooperation further.To boost connecting the east to west corridors, there should be an accelerated creation of a tax-free zone in A&N islands. The aim is to create a gateway region replicating Mauritius – gateway to Africa, Singapore – gateway to Southeast Asia, Dubai – gateway to ME perspective. A&N can become the gateway to India and its associated nation group thereby making it a very attractive economic proposition. A Free Trade Zone and Free Economic Zone with full exemptions/concessions to the investor would attract a large amount of foreign capital flow, boost exports and in turn boost precious foreign exchange improving our overall financial health further. This coupled with skilled job creation will help us use our young population adequately.Opening up interbank cooperation with the extent of allowing Domestic Systemically Important Banks (D-SIB) to open up branches with full services in support nations. Now the idea is to allow support nation credit requirements to be availed via these D-SIBs. Since the industry may be a spoke to Indian hub, access to credit should not be a big issue with recourse via payments routed through these D-SIBs. On top, such industries in foreign support nations should be given either a priority status or an interest subvention scheme in order to facilitate further growth in aiding many industries. Indian Rupee acceptance and Indian Rupee structured loans will make this proposition even more attractive. Indian Rupee may be identified as a common currency yet keep domestic currencies as well. This will free the forex fluctuation effects and help the economies of all further.India should champion the cause of renewable energy and should use Solar Energy and low-cost solar cells as an effective tool to help supporting nations ease through the energy crisis. India’s brainchild International Solar Alliance should be used to good effect to push this noble cause. Striving for a greener planet will help create a better image of responsible India and allowing support nation to accessing affordable Solar tech will enhance India’s economic and technological mightIn terms of the population, India and the supporting group in IOR will house a huge number of population of different age groups. The standard of living will be a big challenge and basic amenities, nutrition and sanitation should be the key challenge. Right to education and responsibility to provide a quality life and alleviate poverty will be welcome steps in that direction.India should also look at allowing companies in the telecom industry to aid in providing low-cost communication access and broadband. In this Reliance-Jio with its Voice over LTE technology will be in the forefront by establishing network infrastructure and providing like India ultra cheap call rates and data packs.India should also harvest its Medical tourism industry by tying up medical aid and ease in visa procedures. The supporting nations may be given Visa on Arrival and also expedited clearance for medical reasons to support this further up.Subsidised Airfares to and fro can also be envisioned for patient and dependent. The D-SIBs can be further supported by Medical insurers which can cover all such potential people and help them settle the medical bills via such Insurances. An AIIMS institute and education college can also be opened up in each supporting nation with full capex and opex cost to be borne by India. The training imparted can help build a generation of future medical professionals in this field.Collaboration and the opening of quality institutes like IIT, IIM and IISc in supporting nations in order to impart quality education. Such campuses will help in strengthening the education system overall of the whole region overall and will provide similar skill sets to youth for working in industries. This will further cause the soft power increase for IndiaUsage of Culture, sports, movies, film and music to create a bonhomie and united aspect of all countries together. These are important mediums to share and impart information to all.Creation of a one media entity for print, audio and video media for all type of news dissemination. Like vernacular editions, such a media house will help reach every corner of the supporting nation and let news reach and shared among all.A common APP tool for all aspects of payments to all important notifications. Aadhar and biometric database creation can be done for all support countries to allow easier access and transaction of various services. This coupled with APP can help in creating a digital economy in a big waySecurity InitiativesIndia must spend on a rapid modernisation plan with the focus on two and half front war aspect. This will mean India need a considerable investment. The extra half front is being kept for emergency purposes when supporting nations may be needing our help or one of the nations can be entangled in Chi-Pak mix and open a new front against India as well. The modernisation must be tangible in the timeframe, use a mix of indigenous public and private sector and also suitably make maximum assets under a make in India campaign. Since the war theatres are multi-dimensional, the formation of a joint command with the appointment of Chief of Defence services and smooth transition into a network-centric battlefield is essential. India should also formally recognise and appoint important resources in Cyberwarfare and invest heavily to protect its military installations and the dual-use ones as well.India must showcase its power by covertly planning and disposing of the present Maldives government. maldives is an important piece of this jigsaw puzzle and we must act now in order to salvage what is an extremely precarious situation. We can take the aid of multiple world power like the backing of USA and usage of the agency like CIA for this joint ops as well.India should try and get closer to ME countries like Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar etc. In these places, we should try to have a strong relationship to the extent of covertly and overtly supporting a more favourable regime to India.This is important from the perspective of Energy like OIL and sovereign fund investments to aid our development. In return, we can look at installing satellite tracking and receiver station, a specific ME satellite and letting them access GAGAN GPS systemBuild a full-fledged Naval (with air wing) and Army base (Converting Southern Command into an Amphibious command) in Seychelles for neutralising Djibouti completely. Important to have a space-based asset constellation overlooking it 24×7. Need also to deploy unmanned maritime patrol aircrafts. In future, if we have a considerable number of aircraft carriers (as a result of point 1), we should look at permanently placing a CBG base in Seychelles.Signing a contract with France, to allow Indian ships to deploy in Reunion Island. This will create a further a further base zone till Seychelles based comes online. By putting considerable security apparatus there and letting France in turn access to Seychelles base, we create a better power projection and security enhancer for the region.Raising a Brahmos AShM regiment and placing in A&N in order to secure the whole region completely. The militarization of A&N command should be further augmented with specific amphibious assets along with naval and Airpower placement. Assets like LHDs, NMRH helicopters, ASW ships, ISR assets need permanent housing and deployment to ensure the entry to IOR is properly kept in check all the time 24×7.Owing to a small but significant stake in Hambantota port (where Sri Lanka government ahs 30%) and ensuring all decision making is transparent. By appointing our own person there for the stake and our eyes on the ground, we can ensure there is no chance of any security lapse and full compliance of that project is for civilian purposes only.Upgrading Indian Oman relationship from naval berthing rights and anti-piracy operations to full scope of military deployment. With the need of border fencing from Yemen side and listening post already there, this relationship upgrade will help us deploy troops more easily. Such a position will help us checkmate Gwadar and CPEC permanently.Concretising India Singapore relationship into a military pact. As of now its a logistic sharing pact signed last month under India-Singapore Bilateral Agreement for Navy Cooperation. We have also the Air Force Bilateral Agreement in place from 2007 and renewed on the sidelines of the 11th Singapore-India Defense Policy Dialogue in January this year, while the Army Bilateral Agreement was also already in place in 2008 and is expected to be renewed next year. Indian Navy’s greater access to Changi Naval base and possible deployment of assets would greatly enhance our security perspective. The placement of the Singapore and proximity to SCS implies the Chinese assets has to pass this point which enables us also to counteract and protect our interests.Over time we should explore on Lostical sharing agreement followed by a military pact and a base access in Vietnam, Philippines, South Korea and Japan. Each of these points represents a further strengthening and encirclement of India’s interest in protecting its shipping and trade lines.ConclusionWith this, it should be also noted that many of the solutions are not immediate in nature and may require at least 2-3 decades to fructify. what must be noted that this Chakravyuh can be broken with a mix of actionable on India’s part. What is paramountly needed is the resolute political decision-making ability at highest levels to change the status quo and often found slow reactive stance which has plagued us for multiple decades.The whole analysis had shown how China has employed the economic might coupled with dual-use infra creation for military aspects and how it has gone ahead to create the string of pearls. It was explained from an Indian maritime perspective as well followed by possible recommended solutions. The recommended solutions instead of sticking to either economic-diplomatic actionable or only security initiatives, rather a 360-degree view was attempted to showcase how both are also interdependent.As seen over the course of this paper, the analysis had thrown light to important geopolitical developments and had raised two important aspects. First is the identification of the Chakravyuh, which will need much more than mere words and saying that India will protect its geopolitical interests. The identification must be backed by solutions which are reviewed, amended based on the feedback of time, resource and situation to maintain relevance.India can surely break this chakravyuh and take China over its own game. At far less investment of time, money and resources. The relevant question next is when will India begin? To this small baby steps have been taken. 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