Students Must Comply With The School Dress Code Policy: Fill & Download for Free

This is a tough question.Let’s talk about dress codes a little, shall we?I think the biggest issue with dress codes is that they require enforcement, and that enforcement can’t happen before the student gets into the classroom. Even if a teacher stands vigilantly outside of their classroom looking for offenders, they’re always going to miss the girl in short shorts crowded by her friends or the guy in the hat racing down the hallways.So enforcement, more often than not, has to happen once the student is already in the learning environment, which is problematic for a few reasons.Kids are attention-seekers.If there’s anything I’ve learned from parents on Quora, it’s that the worst thing to do when a kid is throwing a tantrum is to give them attention. That’s what they’re asking for, right? They know that screaming makes people pay attention to them, so when you give them that attention, you’re teaching them that anytime they want attention, they should scream.This concept is sorely lost on most dress code enforcement plans.To some kids, bad attention is better than no attention at all, so if they know that all it takes to get the teacher to stop class and look at them is to wear ripped jeans or leggings without a dress, why wouldn’t they do it? It’s an easy way to get the teacher to look at you. If that’s what you want, it’s an easy way to get it.It’s a self-perpetuating system. That’s problem number one.Common enforcement methodsMost commonly, dress codes function as follows:A kid enters the classroom in something that can be interpreted as violating the dress code.The teacher is required to stop class and enforce the dress code in one of a few ways:Send the kid to the office and/or call the office.Ask the student to cover/change the offending item.(What my high school did) Have the teacher send the office an email, then send the student to the office to be dress coded.Which is all fine and dandy. Rule = enforced, right?Except, no.Sure, the offending student has been removed from the learning environment, but the teacher has just wasted upwards of ten minutes on one student, for the gains of none. The vast majority of dress code violations don’t impact other students. Students are sitting down in desks—that pair of booty shorts or those saggy jeans aren’t really much of an issue.And that one student is now sitting in the office, where they’ll either be told to change, wait for a parent to bring new clothes, or be sent home. Now the teacher just bought themselves some extra work catching that student up, even though the student is in the building and was in the classroom only moments before.It’s not the teacher’s fault. I know my school implemented a policy saying that if a dress code violation wasn’t caught by a teacher who had the student in class, the teacher could face repercussions.It’s not teachers. It’s a structural problem.We’ve designed a system that punishes students for actions that don’t impact other students, and because they don’t impact other students, teachers refuse to waste their precious education time enforcing these rules, which means we have to punish teachers who don’t punish students for doing things that aren’t bothering anyone anyway.That’s a bizarre system. You’d think, if it was really bothering teachers, they’d enforce it more. In my experience, though, teachers only enforce the stuff that is:Easily fixedActually distractingEntirely objectiveLike hats. Teachers constantly asked students to remove their hats when we were in high school, because it takes two seconds to say “Can you please take off your hat?” and because hats are readily visible when a student walks into class.There’s also no argument over what is or is not a hat. It’s a pretty clear policy.But when your dress code policy says “Shorts must go below the tip of the longest finger”, that’s a little more problematic.1. Is it easily fixable?No. Students have to be sent to change.2. Is it actually distracting?Most of the time, no. Kids are sitting, so no one really has to see it. This one’s up to interpretation.3. Is this entirely objective?That depends. Every teacher executes it differently. Some measure really closely. Some require you stand up straight. Some take it at a glance.So this rule pretty well fails, because it’s hard to enforce and it’s hard to fix.Okay, but… what should the punishment be?This is where I get stuck.College has no dress codes, and it really isn’t a big deal. People wear clothes. Some are more revealing than others. Most people dress in extremely normal ways.I know—college isn’t high school. Hormones and stuff. I get it.But high school dress codes aren’t realistic anymore. For many people, they don’t make clothes that fit in the rules. Shorts are getting shorter. Tank top straps are getting thinner. Sometimes bellies show. If you have a dress code that restricts all of that, you’re forcing teens, especially girls, to work harder to find something to wear.I dress conservatively, but even I had that feeling in high school. It’s hard.So I tend to err on the side of “we shouldn’t really have dress codes and if we do, we shouldn’t really be punishing for them”.I know.But to me, it comes down to the fact that we’re taking kids out of the classroom to enforce rules that don’t seem to have much of an impact anyway. It’s hard enough to get kids to come to class; it seems downright cruel to tell a kid “Hey, I know you came all the way here and everything, but you have to leave because you wore shorts”.And before someone says “Well, it prepares them for the real world. If you have a job and you don’t dress correctly, you get in trouble,” I’ll remind you that:Jobs are voluntary. You don’t like the rules? You can leave.That’s not how school works.If I don’t like the dress code, I don’t have the option to go somewhere else. When I was in high school, the only choice I would’ve had to get out of my district and bypass the dress code rules would’ve been several hours away.I didn’t have a choice. If I didn’t like the rules, I was stuck.And before you say that “If you don’t like the rules, you should try to change them instead of complaining!”I did.Meet The Teen Leading The Charge For Dress Code Reform In Her School DistrictAnd you know what it got us?Absolutely nothing. No change at all. I think we got a pat on the head for “speaking out” and “being active”.So kids are stuck with these rules, like it or not.Jordan. Answer the question.I’m getting there.Honestly?If you’re going to do a dress code, I think the best way to handle it would be something like:Student violates dress code.Teacher quietly and unobtrusively has a few words with them about it. If the offense can be fixed then and there, it should be fixed. If not, and the offense isn’t totally wrecking the classroom, the student should be allowed to stay in class for the day.The student should either have to change at lunch, or during another break in the day. It should be considered on a case-by-case basis.Is that perfect? No. This is just me, at 2 in the morning, throwing out a few ideas. I think it’s crucial that students aren’t drawn attention to for a violation and that the student isn’t denied the chance to learn just because of a minor violation. Ripping them out of class for wearing leggings is like sending someone to jail for going 5 over the speed limit. It’s a little much, considering the offense.I don’t know the best way to handle a dress code violation. I think punishment is the wrong way to go about it.I think the biggest thing should be, how can we make sure the student complies with the dress code without disrupting the learning environment?I think the “punishment” should be that the student has to change whatever they’re doing to comply with the dress code. I don’t know when that should happen or how it should be executed—I just know that how many schools do it is an awful way to approach it.

In Indonesia, private schools are also regulated by the state. They can make their own rules or policies, but they have to follow the policies made by the state which apply to all schools. All private schools in Indonesia can’t allow their students to show up to school with casual outfits but they have to comply with national dress code policy for students regulated by the state, in this case the Ministry of Education. Private schools also must hold flag ceremony on every Monday and they are not allowed to skip it no matter what.Private schools can add specific curriculum which won’t be found on any regular public schools but they have to follow and implement the general curriculum and set of rules regulated by the Ministry of Education. In Indonesia there are many private schools like faith based schools. Even for those schools, they are also regulated by the state and can’t make their own regulations that favor them only.Picture above shows flag ceremony being held on Monday morning at one of Islamic private school in Indonesia. That’s one of examples of even faith based school is also regulated by the state.

At first I didn’t, or was undecided, but now I do.If you are a PRC patriot, or are uncomfortable with speculation and insinuations, please stop reading now. It’s for your own good.Let’s examine the source in question. Who was this “ex-diplomat”?Bilahari Kausikan was former Permanent Secretary of our Ministry of Foreign AffairsHe has substantial experience in the foreign policy arena. I assume he might be privy to classified information which is withheld from our public.He is no longer a civil servant; he is a pensioner. As such, his views do NOT officially reflect those of the Singapore government.Despite this, his views hold substantial weight and are frequently published in the Straits Times (which, although not under direct govt control, toes the official line and operates under some form of para-state oversight)He has not been outright repudiated by other foreign policy elites (as was the case with Kishore Mahbubani). From this we may infer that his views resonate somewhat with the establishment, or our foreign policy orthodoxyThere are some things which our government cannot publicly/officially state, out of prudence…by which I mean, complicating our relationships with certain powersIt is possible that the government prefers to use “unofficial” means (such as retired civil servants) to clarify or rebut certain narrativesNow let’s examine the substance of his argument.That China exercises influence, pressure and coercion on Singapore, is not surprising. What should be disturbing is the MEANS or the CHANNELS through which it deploys its influence. There are LEGITIMATE channels for interstate intercourse. These include diplomacy, state media, international aid etc. etc. It is entirely natural (whether it is fair or acceptable is a different debate) for Great Powers to leverage their superior political/economic/military resources to make smaller states comply with their wishes, whether through persuasion or coercion.But Bilahari Kausikan’s concern is with the ILLEGITIMATE channels: covert influence operations. These are violations of Singapore’s sovereignty, albeit under the cover of plausible deniability. Influence operations fall under the purview of covert action, which is different from espionage - and far more insidious. Espionage seeks simply to steal information. Covert action is intended to influence events (for example, domestic politics or foreign policy) within a target nation-state to one’s own benefitNow let me be clear: All Great Powers conduct influence operations and espionage. China is no exception. Neither is the US. And Singapore is not exempted from their attempts. Our response has been very even-handed.Examples of foreign interference in the course of history and in SingaporeAn American diplomat once tried to influence the 1988 Singapore General ElectionSingapore Protests U.S. 'Interference' After Diplomat WithdrawnRussia spy claims: US nabs Singapore centre research fellowBut this is not a valid excuse. People who employ this excuse are essentially saying “So what? everyone does it”. To quote the Chinese Ambassador’s response “I would say firstly that every country hopes to gain recognition and support for its development philosophy and foreign policies. In this sense, China is no different.” This is equivalent to arguing that wife-beating is acceptable, because many husbands beat their wives! The issue here is not that China or the US wants our support. The issue is the means by which they seek to procure our support.American influence operations seek to impose a liberal-democratic ideology on Singapore. They are mostly ineffective because American notions of liberalism do not find much resonance among our public political consciousness. Nonetheless, these operations should be exterminated/neutralized whenever and wherever they are detected.But Chinese influence operations are more dangerous and insidious because they seek to impose a CHINESE identity on multiracial Singapore. This is something much harder for our population to resist, particularly because our national identity is so young and malleable. The appeals of ethnicity and culture are primordial and enduring.SPECULATION ON CHINA’S 2016-2017 INFLUENCE CAMPAIGNIn August, Huang Jing was exposed for giving “supposedly "privileged information" to a senior member of the LKY School, so it could be passed on to the Singapore Government. The information was duly conveyed by that senior member of the LKYSPP to very senior public officials who were in a position to direct Singapore's foreign policy”.About 3 months later, LKYSPP Dean Kishore Mahbubani, who previously was a senior MFA diplomat (and presumably has contact with “very senior public officials who were in a position to direct Singapore’s foreign policy”), stepped down from his position. If you go on Youtube and watch the speeches and interviews he has been giving, he has become something of a hype-man advertising China’s rise.I think we can put two and two together.I do deeply respect Kishore Mahbubani. I think he is an intellectual worth reading and worth listening to. I have no doubt that he earnestly, sincerely believes in the views that he propounds. I definitely agree with many of his ideas about the rise of Asia and China. In fact, I will be buying his new book “Has China Won?”. But I also think some of his ideas regarding China lack nuance. Reality is often complex.When Lin Xieyi speculated that Huang Jing was a US agent, this was Kausikan’s comment: “This is the sort of stuff we must expect, intended to confuse the issue. Some of it will come from the seemingly neutral or well-meaning or the naive or from those whom Lenin used to call 'useful idiots'”Ambassador-at-large, Bilahari Kausikan, scoffs at Quora user questioning who Huang Jing is working forKausikan shared more details on the Chinese influence campaign in this lecture, which I encourage all of you to watch:If you don’t have time, I’ll summarize:When Singapore stood firm on its right to state its position on an issue of undoubted importance to us and to the region (South China Sea), the Chinese activated their influence apparatus and went into high gear to pressure the government - our government - to change position…Not all influence operations pose the same degree of risk. The uniqueness of Beijing’s influence operations stems from China’s triple identities. And this prescribes three tracks on which China conducts its foreign policy and influence operations.First, the PRC is a state like any other state, operating within a still largely Westphalian international order… On this first track of state-to-state relations, there’s nothing particularly unusual about what Beijing does, except the unusually assertive assertive behaviour of some Chinese diplomats of late, in countries as far-ranging as Malaysia, the PNG and Sweden.Secondly, the PRC is not just any state, it’s also a Leninist state…and the characteristic modus operandi of a Leninist state is the United Front, which Mao Zedong called the CCP’s “magic weapon”… the main characteristic of a Leninist state is the total subordination of state and society to the interests of the Party, irrespective whether the Party’s interest is internal or external. And as such, the United Front represents a blurring of the distinction between domestic and foreign policies and a significant modification of the principle of non-interference that goes far beyond what is generally considered acceptable diplomatic practice.Thirdly, the PRC is also a civilizational state: the embodiment and exemplar of millennia of the Chinese nation’s history and culture, now rejuvenated…and this identity as a civilizational state finds expression in the work of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office… In plain language, overseas Chinese should identify their interests with China’s interests and work to advance China’s interests. And this represents a deliberate blurring of the distinction made between the 华人 (ethnic Chinese) and the 华侨 (overseas PRC citizens)…Now these 3 identities prescribe 3 tracks on which China conducts relationships. And taken holistically, they create a sophisticated and flexible instrument of influence that is far more effective than the conventional operations conducted by other countries. China’s influence operations are effective because the 3 tracks on which it operates makes it difficult to deal with or even grasp - even understand - in entirety.On the first track of state-to-state relations, the usual tactics of persuasion, inducement or coercion may be deployed as appropriate, whether overtly through diplomacy or covertly through intelligence organizations. But the United Front may simultaneously operate to, for example, emphasize coercion or inducement even as the first track stresses persuasion. And the third civilizational track may conveniently wrap everything up in appeals to ethnic pride…Now the tendency of all governments and in particular foreign ministries is to focus on the first track of state-to-state relations and to want to keep them on an even keel…But this can all to easily lead to Chinese activities on the other two tracks being overlooked or downplayed.[the narrative of China’s absolute rise and America’s inevitable decline] and others were propagated by various means: WeChat with Chinese-speaking populations, social and mainstream media, whispering campaigns, business, clan and cultural associations, as well as conventional agents of influence reporting to Chinese intelligence organizations who cultivate what Lenin called “useful idiots”.It was difficult to pin down the precise origin of such narratives, but the messaging was to consistent, and too insistent, to be coincidental…many Singaporeans did not realize they were being fed oversimplifications and swallowed them whole or played along for other reasons. Businessmen, academics, and others with interests in China were given broad hints that their interests might suffer unless Singapore was more accommodating and passed the messages to the government…Appeals to ethnic pride were made to others. The aim was to instil a fatalistic acceptance of the inevitability and desirability of a Chinese identity for multiracial Singapore and get Singaporeans to pressure the government to align Singapore’s interests with China’s interest.In any case and for whatever reason, the 2016–2017 Chinese influence operation was effective. The pressures on the government were great. It was very difficult to explain the somewhat abstract importance of UNCLOS or the nuances of our position on the South China Sea or the complications of our relationship with China to the general public, to whom the Chinese narratives were more easily understood. And it cannot be denied that ethnic appeals resonated strongly with a probably not insignificant section of our public.It’s clear enough for whom Huang Jing worked. I told you he had dual US-PRC citizenship. In case you don’t know, holding dual citizenship is forbidden in China. Huang Jing today holds a senior academic position in China, apparently without sanction for holding American citizenship.As the only majority ethnic Chinese sovereign state in the region, Singapore is a special case. A majority Chinese Singapore that nevertheless conducts an independent foreign policy may be something of an anomaly in Chinese eyes.This is not the ravings of some conspiracy theorist. This is our former Permanent Secretary of Foreign Affairs speaking.STRATEGIC NARRATIVESWhat is a strategic narrative? A weaponized story.In its influence campaigns against Singapore, the PRC advances a number of strategic narratives, all of which are, at best, questionable in their truthfulness. Sadly, some of our Singaporean Chinese compatriots sometimes buy into these narratives and even confidently echo them. Now, most of our population is only cursorily interested in foreign affairs and may find such superficial narratives plausible. This must change if they are to be immunized against these narratives.This is a war of narratives. China cannot officially pressure us to choose sides. But they can paint a certain picture through unofficial channels and try to box us into a corner. They can try to tell us “See, this is what you are doing! Stop it!”. When they do that, we MUST push back by painting our own narratives and showing them that “no, actually we’re not doing that. We’re doing THIS”.MYTH 1. Surely as a “Chinese country”, Singapore should “explain” China’s position (on the South China Sea and other issues) to the rest of Southeast AsiaMYTH 2. China is rising and US is declining; therefore we should bandwagon with China. You should get on the right side of history!MYTH 3. If you are not with China, then you are against China! You are an American puppet/proxy, or, if you are ethnic Chinese, even worse - a race traitor!MYTH 4. Singapore has no claims in the South China Sea, and purports to be a neutral/non-aligned country so why is it “taking sides” with the US against China by agreeing with the PCA ruling and hosting US naval assets?MYTH 5. Unlike Lee Kuan Yew, the current PAP leadership under Lee Hsien Loong doesn’t know how to deal with China. Relations were sooooo much better under LKY.Let me proceed to puncture each of these myths in turn, with great pleasure.MYTH 1: We are NOT a “Chinese country”. We are a country that happens to have a majority ethnic-Chinese population that organizes itself on the basis of multiracialism/multiculturalism. This has been fundamental to Singapore’s identity since the days of Lee Kuan Yew, and this is something we must always remember, no matter how many times we are accused of being “race traitors” by our mainland friends. When the PRC tries to impose a “Chinese” identity on multiracial Singapore, we MUST resist.Yes, we share ties with mainland Chinese on the basis of blood and culture. This ethnocultural kinship should be celebrated, not denied (as in the case of some HKers). Our similar cultural programming allows us to understand the Chinese mindset in some respects, to “empathize” with it.But it does not mean we should unreservedly parrot China’s claims to the rest of Southeast Asia. As country coordinator for ASEAN-China relations, our job is to uphold ASEAN centrality; to represent the interests of ASEAN, of our REGION, in dealing with China. It is not to represent China’s interests in dealings with ASEAN. We have no obligation, moral or otherwise, to advocate or support China’s interests. Understanding them is one matter. Supporting them is another. The two are not mutually irreconcilable, but they must be distinguished.MYTH 2: This myth, like many other myths, has a grain of truth to it. It is very ably represented by the speeches and works of Professor Kishore Mahbubani, our former ambassador and an intellectual whom I admire very much. Unfortunately, it is also extremely oversimplified and ignores many problematic nuances.Indeed, China is rising and has been for quite a while. You would have to be blind to deny that. But China’s rise is not going to be linear; it is going to be a long, winding, and fluctuating road. China has many internal structural problems of its own to deal with. From the way some people talk about China in juxtaposition to the West, it makes it sound like the Chinese are strategic masterminds while the Westerners are a bunch of bumbling idiots. Like I said, grain of truth, but grossly oversimplistic. It ignores many of the US’ intrinsic strengths and some of China’s structural challenges.China is rising, but America is NOT in decline, except in relative terms. Militarily it is still pre-eminent in the Asia-Pacific. Its military dominance is receding and will continue to recede in time, as the PLA Navy becomes stronger. China is becoming more and more economically central to our region and the world; depending on which index of measurement you use (GDP PPP, GDP per capita, absolute GDP) it may have already eclipsed the US economy. China is pushing the frontiers of cutting-edge technology like 5G. This process is inevitable.But what is not inevitable is the outcome of China displacing the US as regional or global superpower. This is an outcome that is FAR from certain. It is still too early to tell. The only thing we can say for now is that the regional strategic equation will become more and more symmetrical over time. As with buying new stocks/shares on the financial market, it is too early to count our chickens before they are hatched. Some views on China’s rise (Mahbubani’s included) tend to take the Whig view of history - “up and up and on and on”The Chinese never tire of reminding us that China’s presence in Asia is a permanent geographic fact, while America’s presence is the product of a political calculation. This implies both enhanced threat and opportunity for the rest of East Asia (be nice to us, because you have to live with us for the rest of eternity). And that is true - what is our Plan B if America withdraws from the region? Without America, the balance of power in Asia cannot be maintained. But again, this myth is too simplistic. America’s presence in Asia is not as fragile as the Chinese would like us to think.Asia is burgeoning with growth. In the next few decades the economic center of gravity is going to shift toward the Asia-Pacific. America has an interest in retaining access to this region, in economic and military terms. I do agree that China cannot be contained - it is so interdependent with America that America might as well try to contain itself as to contain China. But we should not underestimate the degree to which America has integrated and committed itself to the Asia-Pacific.MYTH 3: This one I find the most ludicrous and at the same time the most hilarious. Just because I disagree with China’s stance on a SPECIFIC, SINGLE issue means that I must have been brainwashed by western media into being an anti-China dog? Hahahaha.This is what is known as a false dichotomy. It is powerful because these dichotomies do exist, but they are a spectrum rather than a binary choice of A or B. China posits an illusory binary between itself and the West, and forces you to choose between them. If you are not A, then you must be B and ONLY B and nothing else. Substitute A and B with pro-China and pro-US, pro-CCP and pro-democracy, blah blah blah. You get the idea. This ignores all the nuances in between.This myth is also the most insidious and dangerous one because it denies the existence of AGENCY on the part of small states. It denies that small states can ever act autonomously -that anything that we do must be driven by the hidden hand of Great Power competition.Singapore’s policy can be characterized as strategic hedging. I will admit we lean slightly toward low-intensity “soft” balancing against China, but it is still more nuanced than “hard” balancing against China and “hard” bandwagoning with the US.By the way, Singapore is not the only country practicing a hedging strategy. Duterte has recently taken to flirting with China; I don’t blame him, I think it’s a smart move. But he has also increased cooperation with Japan, and he has not abolished the alliance Treaty which formally commits the US to defend the Philippines in wartime. Thailand has grown closer toward China as well, buying Chinese tanks, but it is still a US ally. Even Myanmar: when Myanmar realized in the 2000s and early 2010s that it was growing more and more dependent on Chinese investment, infrastructure etc., what did it do? It initiated a rapprochement with the Obama Administration. Malaysia under Mahathir began to reassess a number of Chinese infrastructure projects in light of its indebtedness to China. The American 7th Fleet still calls at Malaysian ports. Vietnam is probably leaning even further toward the Balancing end of the spectrum than Singapore - the very existence of Vietnam as an independent entity is predicated on thousands of years of resisting subordination to China.So, fellow Singaporeans, do not believe that we are alone in playing this delicate game of power-balancing. That is what China wants you to believe: that we are acting alone and inadvertently as a US proxy, when in reality we are making calculated choices to minimize risk and maximize gain.MYTH 4: Yes, Singapore is a non-claimant state. We have no territorial claims in the South China Sea and we take no position on the claims of Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, China etc. But what we do have is an interest in FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION in the South China Sea (enshrined in international law, namely UNCLOS). We want our merchant ships carrying our imports and exports to be able to transition the South China Sea freely. Trade is the lifeblood of our free and open economy.Now, some mainland Chinese might argue that China has not explicitly threatened the right of freedom of navigation in the area. They are right. China has not demanded we pay a toll or tariff for passing through the area, not yet anyway. Hopefully it never does. But China’s behavior of creating and militarizing artificial islands in the South China Sea has not exactly inspired confidence on the part of Southeast Asian states regarding its future behavior.And in case you think our statement on the PCA’s verdict was somehow “extreme” or “new”, let me read out the statement to you:Singapore has taken note of the Award made by the Arbitral Tribunal convened under Annex VII to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos) on 12 July 2016 on the case between the Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of China. We are studying the Award and its implications on Singapore and the wider region.Singapore is not a claimant state and we do not take sides on the competing territorial claims. However, we support the peaceful resolution of disputes among claimants in accordance with universally recognised principles of international law, including Unclos, without resorting to the threat or use of force. As a small state, we strongly support the maintenance of a rules-based order that upholds and protects the rights and privileges of all states.Singapore values our long-standing and friendly relations with all parties, bilaterally and in the context of Asean. We urge all parties to fully respect legal and diplomatic processes, exercise self-restraint and avoid conducting any activities that may raise tensions in the region.Singapore supports the full and effective implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and the expeditious conclusion of a legally binding Code of Conduct in the South China SeaIn other words, we did NOT even explicitly SUPPORT the ruling of the PCA in favor of the Philippines. We simply positively acknowledged the ruling and said that international law is important and we should all respect it. Can that be any less provocative? How could this be construed in any way as “taking sides”? Are the Chinese really so thin-skinned that they object to us even SPEAKING about the SCS issue?Let me remind you that the PCA was the same court that ruled in favor of our dispute with Malaysia over Pedra Branca. So what would the implication be if we supported the PCA ruling for ourselves, but turned a blind eye to its ruling over the SCS? International law for me, but not for thee?Note also that Singapore was not alone: Vietnam, Myanmar, and Malaysia also positively acknowledged or outright supported the ruling of the PCA. Why did we deserve to be singled out for coercion?Non-alignment/neutrality is a PREFERENCE. It is not a solution. Singapore cannot prosper and be secure simply by pursuing a “hiding” strategy of laying low and hoping not to be noticed. I will be happy to elaborate if you disagree. We host the US military because we consider it productive to our security interests (and that of regional security) for America to maintain a regional presence. This is to provide a counterweight to China and give us strategic space to maneuver. It is NOT to contain China or obstruct its rise.And while we are on the subject, we should note that the US military only maintains a purely rotational presence in Singapore. There are NO permanent US military bases or assets stationed here. The naval base which their aircraft carrier uses belongs to us. We should also further note that Singapore has NO formal treaty of alliance with America. In fact it is rumored that in 2003 America offered us the status of a major non-NATO ally - a formal security commitment from the US to defend Singapore…and we rejected them. Now, is that how we would behave if we were really American proxies?“I am non-aligned in the sense that I do not want to be involved in power blocs…but when my security, Singapore’s survival, Singapore’s prosperity is threatened, I cannot be neutral” - Lee Kuan Yew“Singapore has to take the world as it is, it is too small to change it. But we can try to maximise the space we have to maneuver among the big ‘trees’ in the region” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013MYTH 5: Kishore claimed that “now that LKY is no longer with us, we should change our behaviour significantly…we should be very restrained in commenting on matters involving Great Powers”. I agree with him that we should be circumspect, pragmatic, even cold-blooded, when it comes to dealing with Great Powers. We must tread carefully.But has there been any fundamental change in Singapore’s policy toward China post-LKY? No. Our relationship with the US goes back to the 1990s. Likewise with China we have always (and I emphasize, we CONTINUE to) promote the engagement of China with the region and the world. China must come to terms with the world order, just as the world order must accommodate China.The Chinese like to grumble about the good old days of LKY and how well he got along with them. Again, they are not wrong. But this is a form of historical cherry-picking, of selective memory. Remember that LKY was one of the only Asian leaders to go up against a CCP-backed communist united front and win. Remember also that Mao’s China issued frequent propaganda proclamations labelling him a “running dog” of the West.Lee Kuan Yew’s views on China were not one-dimensional. They were complex and nuanced. They were tactful, yes, but honest and direct. He did not shy away from political incorrectness.“The Chinese may make a miscalculation…they may become assertive and pushy, which is contrary to their long-term interest, which is to win over the smaller countries in the south to their side” - Lee Kuan Yew, 2011“[My uncle-in-law] had this romantic idea that, you know, [China] is a land of my forefathers. I have no doubts that the land of my forefathers would have brought me down in the world…They (the Chinese) wanted me to contribute [to my uncle-in-law’s manor house which the Chinese refurbished and made into a historic tourist site]. I said no, no, I’m not Chinese, I’m Singaporean, I’m not going to visit the place…I have no romantic view about where I sprang from. I’m very grateful that my great grandmother who was born here decided she’s not going to go back (to China) with her husband because she doesn’t know China…I’m a lucky fellow. Yes, we are all lucky fellows. But the older generation has this romantic idea…I discovered when I was a student in England, that I had more in common with the Singaporeans and Malaysians of other races than with the Chinese from China because they are completely different. Their dress, their manners, their language. They are a different lot, that’s all. They come from a different society. Of course, at the end of the day they are Chinese.” -Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 2011“That romantic idea of going back to the bosom of your motherland is a delusion. We have become different, that’s all. You can go back to China, you’re still different…If you go to China, I don’t think you will belong. They’ll say okay, we’ll accept you. But look at even the Malayan communist cadres who sent their families and children there…- nevertheless, they were treated differently…You think you’re Chinese , and that you will blend in, but you will not. You are already different. We are already different. Just like the American and the British people, or for that matter, the South African whites, Australians, New Zealanders and the British. The Taiwanese mainlanders and Chinese mainlanders, who have not stayed in Taiwan, yes, they are same stock, same heritage, but had different exposure, different standpoints, different views of the world. Are we Chinese? Yes, ethnically. Can we sit down with the Chinese and really feel part of them? Not possible. Because you speak Chinese? No. Your major premises are in your mind” - Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 2011“[The Chinese] expect us to be more respectful - you must respect me. They tell us countries big or small are equal, we’re not a hegemon, 不称霸. But when we do something they don’t like, they say you have made 1.3 billion people unhappy … So please know your place” - Lee Kuan Yew, Hard Truths, 2011“I do not see Singapore surviving on the Chinese economy. If we spoke only Chinese, we would not be today’s Singapore. What is the difference if China is ten times stronger? It will make us ten times stronger? No. Our prosperity comes from linkages with the world…the future is the same. We are not Hainan Island. We are not Hong Kong, where they have no choice. We are in the centre of an archipelago of great diversity, with rich natural resources, and the world will come here” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013“How can [the Chinese object to the American logistics hub here]? That is crude. If they ask us to stop the logistics base, our answer would be: you can use the logistics base and store your equipment here (so we would host both the Chinese and Americans” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013“Singapore is quite comfortable with the Americans being present. We do not know how brash or assertive China will become. When I said in 2009 that we must balance China, they translated the word in Chinese into ‘conscribe’, and there was a big uproar among their netizens, who asked how dare I say that when I am Chinese. They are hypersensistive” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013“You have to accept the fact that they (China) are the biggest boy in the neighbourhood. They will not be the biggest in the Pacific because the US will always be there to counterbalance them. But increasingly, they would be able to keep the US away from the coastal regions. That’s a development we have to accept. No more [uncomfortable for Singapore] than for the other countries…It’s even more tricky for Vietnam. We have no conflict of interest with China…we have no such overlapping claims with them.” - Lee Kuan Yew, One Man’s View of the World, 2013CONCLUSIONLet me emphasize again: I see the rise of China as a good thing in the long-term. It is not an ABSOLUTE good, but it is good. China is a FRIEND, even if friends can be pushy at times and we do not always agree with our friends about everything all the time. Singapore and China have no fundamental clash of core interests. Indeed, I think it is possible for our core interests to align with China. Not only with China, but also with the US, India, Japan, etc. Whether or not it aligns with China to a greater degree than with other powers is to be seen, and in large part decided, by China’s own behaviour.But in any case if there is alignment, our lodestar must always be our NATIONAL INTEREST - Singapore’s own national interest - determined by Singaporeans’ own choices ALONE and no one else’s, undiluted by the manipulation of ANY foreign entity. And in case you think I’m only referring to China, go look at our handling of the 1988 Hendrickson Affair.Huang Jing was only one manifestation of this. Foreign powers will continue to attempt to influence our policy. When they stick their fingers into our sovereign discursive space, we must continue to quietly, tactfully, but ruthlessly slice those fingers off.防人之心 不可无