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Q. In World War II, was there any battle that occurred on American soil?U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service Published on May 18, 2018Attu, Alaska's most distant island in the Aleutian chain, is both a National Wildlife Refuge and the site of the only land battle of World War II fought on North American soil. In May of 2018, we commemorate the 75th anniversary of the Battle.Thousands of Japanese fought in a bloody World War II battle for the Aleutians. Only 28 survived (washingtonpost.com) History UncoveredFrom June 1942 until August 1943, Allied forces fought the Aleutian Islands campaign against invading Japanese forces. Japan had occupied sovereign United States soil of two Alaskan islands, the only time during World War 2 where that occurred. The main battle of Attu that took place during May 1943 was the only time during World War 2 where a land battle took place on incorporated United States territory. Japan was completely defeated by August 1943 and the campaign in Alaska was over. The entire campaign was remembered as the "Forgotten Battle" as other events of the time overshadowed it.By Alex HortonThe williwaw gusts swirled thick fog among transport ships off Attu Island, and the waiting infantrymen nervously mulled the name of their landing site: Massacre Bay.Native Unangans were slaughtered there by Russian traders in the 18th century, and few who had survived disease were left when Japanese troops captured the island in June 1942. Nearly a year later, 2,000 U.S. troops waded onto the icy shore, bracing for the dreaded shriek of artillery on the westernmost edge of the Aleutian Islands chain.Weeks before it would become one of the deadliest battles in the war, capped by a barrage of suicidal, grenade-wielding Japanese, Americans there found eerie quiet as they marched on the boggy soil on May 11, 1943.A lone raven cawed and fluttered away. U.S. scouts took an abandoned hillside artillery position long after the Japanese defenders, 2,600 in all, fell back into the island’s interior and to the high ground among the treeless, snow-capped ridges.But hours later, frostbitten, starved Japanese troops began attacking the U.S. assault force in what became the only World War II ground battle fought on American territory, capped by the “banzai” rush attack and mass suicide of Japanese soldiers on May 29.The brutal coda — with hundreds of Japanese in the final charge killed while wielding samurai swords, grenades and even bayonets tied to sticks — left only 28 survivors taken as prisoners. U.S. troops buried 2,351 Japanese soldiers in mass graves when the fighting ended May 30.That was 75 years ago Wednesday, and calls have been renewed from the families of the dead for the Japanese government to secure their remains.Of 12,500 U.S. troops on the ground, 549 were killed, and more than 1,100 were wounded.As a percentage of forces involved, it was the second-deadliest battle in the Pacific. Only Iwo Jima was more costly.U.S. Forces Blast Japanese from Attu US National ArchivesPublished on Jul 30, 2015‘The weirdest war ever waged’Historians have long debated the Japanese strategy to capture a string of islands in the western Aleutians in June 1942.One theory is that Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto, commander of Japan’s navy, attacked the undefended islands to divert U.S. ships from the Battle of Midway and thereby crush the depleted force that remained.That never happened, and U.S. forces prevailed in the massive June carrier battle, considered the turning point of the war in the Pacific Theater.[Listen to a first-person account on the “Letters From War” podcast]Brian Garfield, in his 1969 history “Thousand-Mile War: World War II in Alaska and the Aleutians,” also suggested that Japanese war planners did not know that the Doolittle bombing raid over Tokyo that April originated from an aircraft carrier.Some among the Japanese staff suggested that the islands may have been the point of origin for the flights and must be taken to blunt future raids.But what is known is that the Aleutian Islands are among the world’s most remote and difficult-to-reach areas. Attu, at the far end of a whip of islands in the Bering Sea, is about as close to Tokyo as it is to Juneau.Soldiers carry a wounded man on Attu. (National Park Service)And yet — despite its extreme location, its Arctic conditions and its claim to fame as the site of the first horrific banzai charge of the war — the Aleutian campaign has been relegated by history to a footnote amid bigger conflicts in the Pacific, Garfield wrote.A B-24 pilot who flew raids over nearby Kiska Island said the campaign was “the weirdest war ever waged,” history professor Terrence Cole wrote in Garfield’s foreword.Most of the campaign’s oddities, command failures, and tragedies emerged from the extreme weather — an unofficial belligerent in the conflict. A low-pressure storm permanently churns over the Aleutians, channeling thick fog, torrential rain, and 100-mph winds.Members of the 32nd Infantry Regiment, a unit within the 7th Infantry Division, had trained for desert warfare and were unprepared for the harsh conditions when they arrived at Attu. They trudged through waist-deep snow in leather boots unsuitable for the soggy marsh. Sweat on their feet crystallized, causing crippling frostbite, Garfield wrote.U.S. warplanes crashed into uncharted peaks cloaked by fog. One bomber commander turned back after flying eight hours over the Attu battleground without seeing a single patch of ground. The planes were often grounded during the Attu battle, undercutting a key strategic component.“Despite all human courage and mechanical genius, the forces of nature in the Aleutians could always call the turns,” Garfield wrote. “No general or admiral was as powerful as the weather.”The marshy tundra on Attu was the second enemy that U.S. troops encountered. The thick muskeg swallowed boots and mired vehicles and artillery pieces. Ammunition and food took days to make it ashore as the Japanese intensified their attack in Massacre Valley and elsewhere.Soldiers famously march on their stomachs, but one platoon cut off early in the battle “traveled on sheer guts,” Garfield wrote. The soldiers vomited green bile after going days without food.Others were more cold than hungry. When they encountered dead enemy troops, U.S. soldiers would sometimes take their superior boots and coats — an act that risked friendly fire from other soldiers mistaking them for Japanese.Assaulting troops crawled to stay warm from movement, when walking upright was a deadly risk with snipers and machine gun positions embedded into the high ground throughout Attu.The defending Japanese called out to the U.S. troops, dying by gunfire and grenade explosions and exposure.“Damn American dogs, we massacre you!” they shouted through megaphones, Garfield wrote.Every inch of frozen soil captured by U.S. troops was a reckoning. Author Dashiell Hammett served in the Aleutians and wrote an Army history of the campaign in 1944.“We would have to learn as we went along, how to live and fight and win in this new land, the least-known part of our America,” he said.A bugler sounds taps during a memorial service while a group of GIs visits the graves of comrades who fell in the reconquest of Attu Island in August 1943. (Associated Press)A brutal endDuring the 19-day battle, violence percolated through the occasional lifting of the blanketing fog. On many occasions, the opposing forces searched in vain for each other. U.S. warships launched depth charges on suspected Japanese submarines while battleships fired salvos when they veered into range.American troops suffered heavy losses but had the advantage of reinforcements. Their blockade meant that no Japanese forces could arrive to evacuate wounded or provide fresh soldiers and ammunition.Attu battle map. (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service)The U.S. troops, in a pincer movement from two positions, pushed the remaining Japanese toward Chichagof Harbor on the northeastern side.The Japanese commander on Attu, Col. Yasuyo Yamazaki, counted about 800 fighting men left on May 29 and ordered a last-ditch counterattack — a raid on Engineer Hill to capture artillery and replenish supplies.Any troops still able to walk were ordered to make the final assault. Other patients who could not, Japanese medical officer Nebu Tatsuguri wrote in his diary, were killed by various methods, including morphine injections.“The last assault is to be carried out. All patients were made to commit suicide … only thirty-three of living and I am to die: I have no regrets,” he wrote on May 29, the day he was killed.The raid startled rear-echelon troops as starved Japanese raided medical tents and killed the wounded. In brutal, point-blank fighting with bayonets, grenades and bare fists, U.S. forces beat back the raid short of the artillery guns on Engineer Hill. Yamazaki was killed, samurai sword in hand, by machine gun fire.In the closing moments of battle ending May 30, hundreds would die with grenades clutched tightly to their chests in a violent display of gyokusai, or honorable suicide in combat. Their torn bodies lay on top of one another like stacks of firewood blown over by a strong wind.“They were a tenacious group,” engineer soldier Joe Sasser told the Anchorage Daily News in 2013. “I was surprised. It was a dishonor for them to be captured and an honor to be killed.”That moment, and other violent encounters, still haunt Attu veterans.“I wake up in the middle of the night and I can’t go back to sleep,” communications soldier Allen Seroll told KTVA. “That’s what this has done to me. That’s how much it affected me and still does.American soldiers and equipment at Massacre Bay on Attu. (U.S. Navy, via AP)The families rememberSeventy-five years later, the families of the dead have not forgotten the battle of Attu.Nobuyuki Yamazaki, grandson of the Japanese commander, spoke at an Anchorage commemoration May 17 and delivered a petition for the Japanese government to repatriate the remains of soldiers still buried in the sub-Arctic soil there.“We war-bereaved families wish to take all the remains back to our homeland,” he said, adding that it was the third request through the Japanese government.The petition had nearly 4,000 signatures, KTVA reported.“Japanese people find great comfort when the remains of the Japanese are buried in our homeland,” Yamazaki said.Nobuyuki Yamazaki and Japanese descendants. (Lisa Hupp/U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service)The State Department did not respond to a request for comment on its role in negotiating the return of the 2,351 remains, plus more than 200 more unaccounted for, likely buried by artillery barrages or by the Japanese themselves.Recovering and repatriating those remains would be a logistically and ecologically difficult task on Attu, a nature preserve since 1913 that has been uninhabited for years, said Steve Delehanty, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service manager who oversees the island.Husks of destroyed planes and vehicles and snaking pipelines have damaged Attu, and thickets of unexploded ordnance make traversing the land a difficult proposition.Wooden markers outlining the graves have rotted away, Delehanty told The Washington Post, but surviving maps point to their rough locations. But his role is limited to protecting the environment as diplomats huddle to work out a plan. Talks years ago did not lead to a solution, he said.Wildlife, including tufted and horned puffins and thick-billed and common murre, flourishes on the abandoned island. Delehanty said the Aleutian tern, which has faced endangerment, breeds on Attu.But other life has yet to return after the war. The few dozen Unangans captured by the Japanese in 1942 were sent to prison camps, where many died.Nearly 900 from other Aleutian islands were evacuated by the U.S. government and confined in internment camps. Many of them died, as well. That prompted an apology last year from the federal government.Those who lived later returned to home islands, but not natives from Attu. The military built depots there, and it became off-limits. The war-weary natives had to settle elsewhere.Seventy-five years after the battle ended, only the birds and the bodies remain.Alex Horton is a general assignment reporter for The Washington Post. He previously covered the military and national security for Stars and Stripes, and served in Iraq as an Army infantryman.

Is it ever justifiable to shoot criminals on sight? Is this a war? If it is, then who exactly is the enemy?I cannot think of any question that I have to consider more carefully, where my opinion, recommendation, advice or actions could have more tragic consequences if I am wrong.I have in the past had to make the decision during anti poaching operations of whether my actions would be legally and morally justifiable. However, I find myself now advising governments and other organizations and instructing men in the field, on when, how and if rangers, investigators and soldiers can or should shoot. I also undertake operations in the field with these men as part of the training, and am forced to make the same decisions alongside them.If I get any of this wrong, I am responsible for people's deaths or the loss of rare rhinos, elephants and other animals at a time when their continued survival hangs in the balance. The pressure is intense and I cannot afford to be anything less than crystal clear about what can and cannot be done in any given situation.Recent events in the United States, where the country is torn apart by the question of when it is acceptable to pull the trigger, should remind everybody of the importance of considering such questions extremely carefully. Flippant answers are irresponsible at the very least. Whether or not you as an individual agree or disagree is not the only issue. It is very important that the wider general public, including political and community leaders and authorities on ethics and morality, agree or disagree with such policy.The ongoing devastation of wildlife populations across Africa, in particular black and white rhinos, and African and forest elephants also means we desperately need the most effective policies and strategies for dealing with poaching. Those need to be both morally and legally justifiable as well as effective. They also need to be politically acceptable, something that is incredibly difficult to achieve.So, who are we going to kill?Here is a picture taken by a friend in Central African Republic last year. It shows three children removing meat from the carcass of a poached forest elephant. So, which poacher would you shoot first? The little girl sitting on the elephant carcass, or the boy doing the butchering? How about the little girl on the right? She is armed with a machete...Children butchering poached elephants at Dzanga Bai in Central African Republic.These children were locals from the area of Bayanga in Central African Republic who accompanied a group of Sudanese poachers who had traveled from Sudan across the CAR, an area twice the size of Texas, to massacre an entire herd of thirty six rare forest elephants. They were present at the killing and were given the meat by the Sudanese in return for showing them where to find the elephants. Therefore, according to the law, they are poachers. The same children will participate in killing animals if told to do so and will not hesitate. They are hungry, desperate and terrified of the men giving the orders.Such poaching groups rarely restrict their activities to killing elephants. They are frequently employed by the Séléka and other rebel groups as mercenaries. They also engage in large-scale banditry, blocking roads and then looting, raping, kidnapping and murdering. They have taken part in the atrocities in Darfur and are recognized as terrorists.​Sudanese Séléka mercenaries, typically equipped. When not hired by rebel groups and certain pariah governments they spend their leisure time poaching and raiding in Eastern and North-Eastern CAR.Obviously no one in their right mind is going to justify or approve of killing those children. However, how about the mercenaries? They are nothing less than land pirates, willing to use any means possible to enrich themselves, including recruiting and using children to do their dirty work.Are they "just poachers" or are they an enemy that needs to be destroyed? They often move in groups of up to one hundred and are mobile and well equipped, with vehicles and camels, and are armed with assault rifles, propelled grenades, heavy machine guns and even anti aircraft cannons and armoured vehicles at times. They are a small army. However, they are also poachers. When they encounter law enforcement officers or any perceived threat to their activities, they not only open fire, but will also aggressively pursue the law enforcement officers/rangers/soldiers and will even direct revenge attacks against any nearby civilian settlements. They address the local people as "slave", which gives a good idea of their mentality.A good friend, Jean-Baptiste Mamang-Kanga fought these groups for 15 years in the CAR. It was warfare, plain and simple.But, can we or should we define such people as poachers? Should they fall into a different category? They will certainly not surrender if approached by rangers. Once they begin shooting back in an area, should these groups not be classified as bandits or terrorists? Perhaps they should be defined by their worst crimes? Ethnic cleansing, murder and slavery. They are enemies of the country and therefore should they not be treated as such and fought as military invaders? I do honestly believe that it is fully justifiable to wipe such groups off the face of the earth.Yet we also have to be aware that they will be accompanied by others who, although engaged in criminal activities, may be coerced or bullied into participating. Any plans to deal with these groups have to have developed tactics for tackling the worst of these while protecting the innocents amongst them. That is a very difficult task and there are no clichés or blanket statements that will ever apply.We cannot lump all poachers into one bag and apply an extreme blanket policy to policing them as such"shoot on sight". Who poaches, what they poach, why they poach and what they are prepared to do to attain their goal varies enormously.In anti poaching and anti trafficking operations that I have participated in West, Central, East and Southern Africa, it is always different from country to country, area to area, and it varies within each area. There are poachers of every ethnic and religious group poaching every species of animal, plant and tree and using every means imaginable, from assault rifles, to steel traps to traditional cross bows. What they kill where and how also differs. In Malawi there is currently a problem with elephant being poached with home made steel gin traps, whilst in Guinea I have worked in an area where warthogs are hunted with AK47s. How do we differentiate. The poacher in Malawi killing elephants with gin traps will usually be moving about unarmed, whilst the Guinean poacher will be armed with an AK47 yet not hunting an endangered species. Who are we supposed to shoot on sight? How can we recognise who deserves shooting?There are certain obvious constants. Most important of which is the clear difference between poaching for commercial gain and subsistence poaching. All too often the poachers themselves are from similar backgrounds and very often motivated by poverty. The great difference though is that in the case of commercial poaching, whether for ivory or meat, there is always someone behind the scenes making buckets of cash out of the trade and it is these people who are the most culpable. When the poaching is an organized criminal activity the whole syndicate needs to be dismantled and broken up. Killing the poacher in the field is just cutting off one of the Hydra's heads. The beast itself must be destroyed.Subsistence poachers in poverty stricken areas just cannot be dealt with in the same way as commercial poaching gang members. A subsistence poacher is often both more desperate, driven by hunger, and less culpable as he has limited choices. If we are truly going to stop poaching, then we need to look as seriously at helping these people find other means of survival as at apprehending and punishing them. These people are also the most likely to be deterred by a shoot on sight policy. To shoot starving people would be an appalling crime.Here is another picture showing women and children we apprehended early this year being escorted out of the protected area. They were part of a group of over forty people poaching buffaloes by shooting into the air and shouting so as to herd them into long lines cable snares. All those who were unarmed were released immediately after interviewing them and taking statements. Sadly, there were both armed women and children in the group. This was a mixture of commercial and subsistence poachers. Commercial poachers came into the area and offered a share of the meat to villagers in return for participating. Should we have shot those women and children on sight?​Women and children apprehended as part of a large-scale poaching operation being carefully walked out of an area for release under guard after being apprehended amongst a group of armed poachers.Here is another scenario. I was prepared to shoot the man in the picture below. He was armed and was located in a position close to where we had just pursued a group of poachers. As you can see, he is not in any way dressed as a ranger. He is wearing a red T-shirt and shorts and is barefoot. My team and I were convinced that we had one of the poachers in our sights.​​The man was actually a ranger. He was part of a team in a boat positioned to cut off any attempt by the gang we were trying to outmanoevre, by cutting off any attempted retreat across a large river. The boat team had encountered the vessels used by the poachers to access the park. These poachers had laid fish nets before moving inland to poach big game. Their intention and past MO was to sell ivory, meat and illegal fish. They had large boats and were well equipped by a backer who expected to make good profit on all the different contraband. If they didn't get lucky with ivory or meat, they would at least return with four boats full of illegal fish. Our ranger had changed his shirt on encountering the nets as it is dangerous to have buttons when working with nets.He had swapped his uniform bush shirt and trouser for the soccer shirt and shorts and because he didn't want to get caught in a net and drown and he needed to wade through the water and mud to get to the bank where he and his comrades hoped to intercept the team we were driving towards. He had also removed his boots. The rangers are not equipped with radios and instead use their personal cell phones to communicate (and pay for the air time out of their own meagre salaries). Unfortunately this was a spot without cell coverage and he was unable to advise that he had changed clothing and position.We spotted him behind a large termite mound from a distance and prepared to shoot him if he raised his weapon to shoot at us. He had made a mistake. If there was a shoot on sight policy in place he would have been history as soon as he had been seen by our team. We shouted at him to drop his weapon.The ranger in question believed we were shouting at a poacher on our side of the termite mound that he could not see. Fortunately he did not raise his weapon and instead, realizing that we might not recognize him, backed away, raising his weapon above his head with two hands.We immediately saw from its outline that it was an M16, something the poachers do not have access to in that area, and lowered our own weapons.There is absolutely no doubt that ranger would have been riddled with bullets from the team if a shoot on sight policy existed. He would be dead dead dead. His children would be fatherless. The rangers would be demoralized. The poachers win. Their activities become easier.So aside from the extremes such as Sudanese mercenary/bandit/poacher type militarized units, where there is little other choice but to declare war on them, is a shoot on sight policy generally effective?The reality is that when you shoot dead a poacher you shoot dead your most important source of information. Any opportunity to find out who is behind the business is gone. Crucial information such as where he came from, how he traveled to and entered the area, who supplied the weapons and ammunition, who the other members of the gang are, where the contraband will be transported to, and, most importantly, who sent him, paid him or who will be buying from him.I am regularly berated by enthusiastic armchair generals for writing anti poaching doctrine that teaches apprehension and only shooting in self-defense. I have yet to be berated by any anti poaching ranger for this, once they understand and experience for themselves how many more links in the chain can be broken through professional, legal and intelligent interviewing and reactive investigation.To really stop poaching in an area it is necessary to cripple the whole illegal operation and take down the whole syndicate. Killing the poacher instead of questioning him destroys any chance of that. Poaching is a complex crime, requiring many participants and numerous steps. People have to fund the expedition. Someone has to supply weapons and ammunition. The poachers need to be transported, with all their kit to the area, sometimes guided in. Porters as well as poachers/shooters are needed to carry the ivory and meat. Officials, such as police officers, customs agents and even rangers have to be paid off. Different steps require different specialists, including shooters, buyers, smugglers, financiers and so on and on.To effectively cripple the whole industry, pressure has to be applied at all steps and to all the different individuals involved. A poacher is not going to poach if he has no ammunition for his weapon, cannot pay porters and has no one to supply and has his own ass in a jail. The only way to really shut down the poaching is to shut down the whole business. If no one in Asia and America (the second largest market for illegal ivory) purchase ivory then the poachers are not going to bother going after elephants. If it is very difficult to kill, transport and sell bushmeat, it will become a too expensive and difficult an undertaking.By shooting dead all the poachers instead of professionally and legally questioning them to find out details of who is doing what, where and when, the authorities play into the hands of the brains and money behind these crimes.A dead poacher means nothing to the people who sent him other than they may have to pay a few nickels out of their millions of profits to send another one... Killing poachers, rather than arresting them, benefits one group more than any other and that is the people who send them to poach. It also benefits the people who supply the weapons and the ammunition, and the equipment, the transport and so on. Instead of the whole criminal enterprise being brought down, the poorest and usually least educated of the criminals is silenced. He is easily replaced.There is also the question of whether shooting poachers in protected areas actually acts as a deterrent. Killing professional rhino and elephant poachers will certainly deter some. However, will it deter enough to drop the levels of those willing to take on the job enough to reduce poaching activity at all in an area? I'm afraid not. The people who really need to be deterred are the kingpins and they are not the ones who get killed. It may temporarily deter gangs from a particular area, in favour of easier pickings, but it has not worked as an effective deterrent against rhino poachers. They will keep coming because the kingpins have an inexhaustible supply of desperate ex-soldiers, rebel fighters, professional criminals and even unemployed rangers. In one small district in Zimbabwe where we were trying to put an end to the elephant poaching, we discovered that there were at the time 52 unemployed former rangers and scouts with firearms and anti poaching training. They had been laid off when the tourism that funded the conservation efforts in Zimbabwe dried up. It was only inevitable that we found that most of the poaching in the area was by men from those ranks. That said, many others volunteered to assist in anti poaching ops for no pay, even though they had no income to feed their families.The first country to issue order to shoot on sight and to indemnify rangers against prosecution or civil suits in the courts was Zimbabwe in 1989. Rangers had already killed 89 poachers in just one area of the country, in just a few years, before the shoot on sight order was given. After the go ahead was given, more poachers died and more and more came. It failed. It was clear that for every poacher who was killed another ten were ready to take his place.Most importantly, once a shoot on sight policy is implemented the stakes are raised dramatically and thereafter the poachers will also begin to use more aggressive tactics to ensure they are on the winning end of any encounter. More rangers are killed and wounded than before. Shooting dead subsistence poachers on sight is also completely unjustifiable and counterproductive. The community will take their revenge on both the wildlife and the rangers. And we can't even differentiate between subsistence and commercial poacher much of the time!It is popular to call this a war. Yet has a war ever been won by just killing the soldiers on the ground? No country fights a war purely tactically, a war is first planned and fought for strategic reasons. In this war, the greatest enemy is not the poacher, it is the crime lords and to win this war pressure needs to be applied to every link in the poaching, trafficking and selling process, from source to market, disrupting the trade at every step and making it simply too costly to undertake and the rewards to too low.Shooting in defense of human life is unquestionably justified. In the case of the Sudanese brutes I mentioned earlier, they need to be defeated militarily to protect the population and resources of the country. That is clearly justified warfare, in defense of the whole population's lives in the area they operate, as well as the lives of the rangers sent to stop them. That situation does not apply to a poacher working for a criminal organization. Both ethically and objectively it is important to capture him.The obvious question that follows is whether it is even possible to capture poachers. Yes, it is. The tactics necessary to shoot a poacher without putting the ranger's life at unnecessary risk are virtually the same as those necessary to apprehend a poacher. Poachers cannot be apprehended in pursuit, they have to be ambushed or surrounded and surprised. Rangers killed by poachers have usually invariably been trying to catch them or attack them in pursuit from the rear and have themselves been ambushed.In order to win, departments need to develop doctrine, methods, skills, tactics and strategies for safely investigating, locating and apprehending poachers and traffickers in the field. Officers need to be trained to use these methods as safely as possible and to use the information gathered from proactive and reactive investigation to then bring down whole syndicates. We have been successfully doing that. It is not a new concept and it works.Reducing demand and taking down the whole syndicates or networks driving the industry is the only way to bring the levels of poaching down.​Rangers arresting a syndicate leader. This man was arrested after three levels of arrests and interrogations. He led a large network in three countries yet to all appearances was a moderately wealthy man by local standards. He was popular in his home town for being very giving to others..Whilst it is crucial to bring down the demand and fight the illegal retailing and wholesaling of wildlife products, such as ivory in Asia and the US, and the sale of bushmeat in the cities of West and Central Africa, someone still needs to hold the fort in and around the protected areas and follow up on information from arrests made there.We have trained over 100 directors, instructors, investigators, unit leaders and rangers in the last year and have successfully taken down whole syndicates and entire networks as part of the in-operations part of our training. We have worked with organizations this year such as UNOPS, The European Union and different National wildlife and forest departments, military special forces and law enforcement units all over Africa. Feedback from the field pours in constantly. Where occasional arrests or contacts were had in the past, the men we have trained now regularly report whole syndicates including foreign nationals being arrested. The system works to effectively halt poaching and that is our goal.​Officers learning how to age tracks so as to ensure no approaching poachers are too close from the rear.The key is the adoption and use of a complete and comprehensive doctrine, including all the strategies, methods and skills necessary to investigate, analyse, plan and execute effective operations at all parts of the illegal process so as to put pressure on all parts of the networks. We teach those involved not only how to coordinate tracking, observation and ambush teams to apprehend poaching gangs in the field, (and if necessary how to correctly and effectively return fire), but also how to positively engage with the community to educate and sensitize them and build up relationships that everyone benefits from, and which provides the necessary information to go after the people behind the commercial poaching. The most important asset in the fight against commercial poaching is the assistance of the community. They provide information on movements into and out of the area and other illegal activities.​Officers meeting with community elders in Guinea.During in-operations training officers visit villages surrounding the protected areas and meet with community and religious leaders, hunting brotherhoods, political groups, officers from other authorities and many more.Not only are the meetings invariably successful in terms of teaching the communities why the protected areas are important and how they can benefit from protecting them, but the same communities provide the information on all the commercial poaching operations in the area and allow us to plan arrest operations.The interviews of those arrested, along with information from other sources, give us all the vital information needed to apprehend the criminals those suspects work with. Further arrests lead to even more arrests and so on and on. The same applies to arrests of poachers in the protected areas. One arrest leads to more arrests and so on and on.​Officers in Malawi applying information from interviews and other sources to determine poacher movements and especially choke points so as to be able to mount effective apprehensions.In conclusion, shooting someone dead creates a very final "dead end" and, if the aim is to gather information so as to bring down the whole network, it is therefore not only a tragic but a stupid action.Only in exceptional circumstances and with a clear legal mandate, can a shoot to kill policy ever be used.To stop and deter poaching the syndicates and networks need to be torn apart. That requires an intelligent, necessarily complex and thorough doctrine that addresses the problem in its entirety. Shooting poachers in the field does not tear apart the networks, it simply protects them from discovery.The devastation of Africa's wildlife can be stopped and stopped a lot more easily and for a lot less cost than most people imagine. Chengeta Wildlife is one organization that is proving that on the ground in the front line and in the communities in West, Central and East Africa. It can be done and we are showing the world how. Our in-operations training and advice to anti poaching units and National wildlife and forestry departments as a whole, is having an impact far beyond the small donations we have received in order to do our work. Every penny has gone into the field. We are proud of our achievements so far and are confident and determined to escalate our work exponentially.If you would like to learn more about the Chengeta Wildlife organization or become part of the team, or just see a video of the action, then please visit this website http://ChengetaWildlife.com .Sorry for the horrific and sad pictures. I often need to take a break from all of this and just remind myself why we have to win this. I will leave you with an image of how it can be..​​How can we allow such scenes to be replaced with rotting carcasses on barren ground?

Q. Overall, were the Admirals of the Imperial Japanese Navy not as good as their American opponents or were they simply dealing with a very bad card in the Pacific War?A. Many good answers so far regarding military doctrine and tactics. Battle of Midway used here to analyze the leadership of Imperial Japanese Navy commanders and United States Navy commanders after intro.Battle of the Coral Sea - WikipediaAllied aircraft carrier USS Lexington explodes on 8 May 1942, several hours after being damaged by a Japanese carrier air attack.Midway Atoll, midway between the U.S. and Japan, was the site of an air-sea battle that changed the course of the war in the Pacific.Beginning on June 4, 1942, the U.S. fleet, under the command of Admiral Chester Nimitz, defended Midway from Imperial Japanese forces, while launching a withering attack upon the Japanese fleet - a monumental turnaround just six months after the devastating attack on Pearl Harbor.Battle of Midway - WikipediaThe Battle of Midway | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans1942: The Battle of Midway (CBS.com pictures)The Battle of Midway 1942 US Navy; John Ford; World War II; TechnicolorBattle of Midway - World War II - HISTORY.comUSS Arizona goes down in Pearl Harbor, Dec. 7, 1941Six months after Pearl Harbor, the United States defeated Japan in one of the most decisive naval battles of World War II. Thanks in part to major advances in code breaking, the United States was able to preempt and counter Japan’s planned ambush of its few remaining aircraft carriers, inflicting permanent damage on the Japanese Navy. An important turning point, the victory allowed the United States and its allies to move into an offensive position.American cryptographers broke Japanese codes in early 1942, and were alerted to planned attack against location designated "AF." By sending out false message U.S. base on Midway Atoll (located about 1,300 miles northwest of Pearl Harbor, Hawaii) was short of fresh water, Japanese signal mentioned AF short of fresh water. U.S. knew where and when Japanese intended to attack, and prepared. CREDIT: National ArchivesCypher code machine JN-25 (Japanese naval code) How Did the U.S. Break Japanese Military Codes Before the Battle of Midway?This fleet engagement between U.S. and Japanese navies in the north-central Pacific Ocean resulted from Japan’s desire to sink the American aircraft carriers that had escaped destruction at Pearl Harbor. Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Japanese fleet commander, chose to invade a target relatively close to Pearl Harbor to draw out the American fleet, calculating when United States began counterattack, Japanese prepared to crush them. Instead, American intelligence breakthrough– solving Japanese fleet codes–enabled Pacific Fleet commander Admiral Chester W. Nimitz to understand exact Japanese plans. Nimitz placed available U.S. carriers in position to surprise the Japanese moving up for their preparatory air strikes on Midway Island itself.Yorktown: The aircraft carrier USS Yorktown, damaged during the Battle of the Coral Sea, is pictured in dry dock at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, May 29, 1942. She left Hawaii the following day to regroup with other American ships off Midway. CREDIT: National ArchivesDid You Know? Six months before the Battle of Midway, the islands were attacked on December 7, 1941, less than two hours after Pearl Harbor.The Code War (New York Times)The intelligence interplay would be critical to the outcome of the battle and began many weeks before the clash of arms. American radio nets in the Pacific picked up various orders Yamamoto had dispatched to prepare his forces for the operation. As early as May 2, messages that were intercepted began to indicate some forthcoming operation, and a key fact, the planned day-of-battle position of the Japanese carriers, would be divulged in a notice sent on May 16. By the time Nimitz had to make final decisions, the Japanese plans and order of battle had been reconstructed in considerable detail.American combat forces took over where intelligence efforts left off. Scouts found the Japanese early in the morning of June 4. Although initial strikes by Midway-based planes were not successful, American carrier-based planes turned the tide. Torpedo bombers became separated from the American dive-bombers and were slaughtered (36 of 42 shot down), but they diverted Japanese defenses just in time for the dive-bombers to arrive; some of them had become lost, and now by luck they found the Japanese. The Japanese carriers were caught while refueling and rearming their planes, making them especially vulnerable. The Americans sank four fleet carriers–the entire strength of the task force– Akagi, Kaga, Sōryū, and Hiryū, with 322 aircraft and over five thousand sailors. The Japanese also lost the heavy cruiser Mikuma. American losses included 147 aircraft and more than three hundred seamen.Analysts often point to Japanese aircraft losses at Midway as eliminating the power of the Imperial Navy’s air arm, but in fact about two-thirds of air crews survived. More devastating was the loss of trained mechanics and aircraft ground crews who went down with the ships. Some historians see Midway as the turning point in the Pacific theater of the war, after which Americans rode straight to Tokyo; others view it as a cusp in the war, after which initiative hung in the balance, to swing toward the Allies in the Guadalcanal campaign. Either way, Midway ranks as a truly decisive battle.JOHN PRADOSThe Reader’s Companion to Military History. Edited by Robert Cowley and Geoffrey Parker. Copyright © 1996 by Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company. All rights reserved.Grading Midway's CommandersWhich side received higher leadership marks on its Battle of Midway report card is no surprise, but the illuminating ‘why’ behind the grades reflects crucial differences between the U.S. Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy.The extent of Japanese military expansion in the Pacific, April 1942The time was 1020, 4 June 1942. The location: a nondescript patch of the Pacific Ocean about 150 nautical miles northwest of Midway Atoll. Overhead, puffy cumulus clouds formed a spotty white quilt over the dappled waves. They also were a coverlet that shrouded danger, for at this very moment, 50 SBD Dauntless dive bombers began pitching into near-vertical dives. Ten thousand feet below, oblivious to the presence of the U.S. aircraft, steamed four Japanese aircraft carriers, their flank-speed wakes snaking white through the dark blue waves.Just five minutes later, three of those carriers—the Akagi, Kaga, and Sury—were wrecked beyond redemption, set ablaze by bombs exploding in their hangars, oily black smoke boiling up through the gaping holes rent in their flight decks. The bloody remains of sailors were scattered about in hangars below—a grim down payment on the 3,057 Japanese who would ultimately die this day. Though the final outcome had yet to be revealed to either side, the United States had just won the Battle of Midway.Fixating on the tactical level of Midway is easy because the battle was so dramatic and so human. The stories of the pilots and sailors on both sides still naturally resonate; we easily can imagine ourselves in their shoes. Yet we should also remember their leaders, who underwent their own special trials. On their shoulders rested the heavy responsibility for the outcome of the battle, and yet their direct control over that outcome was practically nonexistent. Once their orders were issued, in most cases they could only wait—devoid of real input, often painfully lacking meaningful information—until some battered aircraft returned or a garbled radio signal announced the outcome of their directives. It is to the most important six of these leaders—and an assessment of their leadership at Midway—that we now turn.‘We . . . Must Take the Offensive’Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, Commander-in-Chief of Japan’s Combined Fleet, was the architect of Midway and arguably the chief author of its failure. He was 57 years old, the adopted son of a former samurai family. An inveterate gambler, accomplished bureaucratic infighter, and air-power advocate, he was also an outspoken opponent of the Axis alliance with which Japan had entered the war. Yet the outbreak of the conflict he feared had been coincident with his most spectacular achievement: the attack on Pearl Harbor. Now, just a few months later, Yamamoto was trying to end the war he had begun. Midway was intended to be the decisive battle that would destroy the U.S. Pacific Fleet’s remaining aircraft carriers, break the United States’ morale, and bring the enemy to the bargaining table.American historians have noted the hubris of Yamamoto’s aims at Midway. But we often forget he was driven by fear. Having lived and traveled extensively in the United States, Yamamoto was intimately familiar with the country’s industrial might and the ingenuity and drive of its citizens. After months of easy victories during the opening phase of the Pacific war, others within Japanese Emperor Hirohito’s military might have been pooh-poohing U.S. martial prowess. Yamamoto was not.He remarked in April 1942 that “the Combined Fleet cannot assume a long, drawn out defensive; on the contrary we . . . absolutely must take the offensive.” He continued, “The enemy’s power in military armaments is 5 to 10 times ours; against this we must increase the intensity of our attacks, hitting the enemy’s vital places, one after the other!” 1One can detect Yamamoto’s undertone of urgency. This war needed to be won, and won quickly. If the United States could not be beaten in the first year of conflict, it probably could not be beaten at all.TIME Magazine Cover: Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto -- Dec. 22, 1941Sadly for Japan, Yamamoto’s Midway battle plan was fundamentally flawed and based on a fatal misreading of the moral character of the enemy. His primary goal was simple enough: pick a fight close enough to Hawaii to draw out the U.S. carriers. At the same time, the battle site had to be far enough from Oahu’s formidable air power that Japanese carriers would not have to fear its intervention.Yamamoto selected the tiny atoll of Midway—less than two square miles of real estate, located at the very tip of the Hawaiian island chain, about 1,100 nautical miles from Pearl Harbor. The initial goals of his operation were to hit Midway with Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo’s Mobile Striking Force (known as the Kidō Butai or 1st Air Fleet (Imperial Japanese Navy), destroy the U.S. air group there, and then invade the atoll and turn it into an advance base. What was supposed to come next was more complex.Yamamoto’s plan ultimately encompassed a dozen different formations of warships operating in support of Nagumo but spread across about 2.5 million square miles of ocean. The reason for such dispersion? Deception. Yamamoto was convinced that after the U.S. Navy’s early war defeats, its morale was so low that its carriers would have to be lured to their doom. One of the Japanese formations—the invasion Support Force with two fast battleships—was to serve as bait. The other major units were to stay out of sight—Yamamoto didn’t want to tip his hand too soon and spook his prey.After the U.S. warships had sallied forth to attack the Support Force, Yamamoto’s heavy-gunned Main Body, along with other battleship and carrier forces drawn down from operations in the Aleutians, would converge on them. 2Nagumo’s carriers would destroy their opposite numbers, after which Yamamoto’s battleship formations would destroy the U.S. battleships that the Japanese (wrongly) presumed would be tagging along. The result would mimic Japan’s seminal victory against the Russians at Battle of Tsushima in 1905—a decisive, annihilating victory that basically won the war at a stroke. Thereafter, Hawaii would be successfully invaded. Surely these defeats would bring the United States to its senses, and to the bargaining table.Russian battleship Oslyabya, the first warship sunk in the Battle of TsushimaIn retrospect, the notion of U.S. forces needing to be lured into battle seems ludicrous. In fact, Yamamoto’s opposite number, Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, was itching for a fight. And in Yamamoto’s eagerness to shroud his intentions, he forfeited one of his key advantages: mass. The Imperial Japanese Navy outnumbered the U.S. Navy’s Pacific forces in every major warship category. In terms of offensive assets, Nimitz was down to four carriers (the Japanese thought the number was two or three) and his fleet’s submarines with which to wage war. The massive U.S. shipbuilding program would not really begin bearing fruit until mid-1943. Nimitz had to hang on until then. If ever the occasion warranted using a sledgehammer against a weakened foe, this was it. But Yamamoto squandered that advantage by preferring stealth to mass.Following the Battle of the Coral Sea, Japan's Pacific fleet was dispersed into four groups, one of which was spotted about 500 nautical miles west-southwest of Midway.But another group was further north, off the Aleutian Islands, working in support of the Japanese army's invasion of Attu and Kiska. Japan's attack on the Aleutians was a diversionary tactic in support of the fleet's engagement at Midway, about 1,600 miles to the south.Aleutians: Oil storage tanks burn at the Dutch Harbor Naval Operating Base, on Amaknak Island in the Aleutians, June 4, 1942. CREDIT: National ArchivesIn addition, his plan dissipated his forces still further by employing many warships on secondary operations in the Aleutians, which were to be attacked simultaneously. The net effect was to leave Nagumo, at the tip of the spear, with only 20 warships to carry out his mission. Likewise, Yamamoto did little in the way of contingency planning. What was Nagumo to do if the U.S. carriers showed up? At that point was his primary objective capturing Midway or destroying the U.S. carriers? Could the invasion of Midway be pushed back? Nobody had any clear idea.‘Governed by the Principle of Calculated Risk’Nimitz had his own problems, namely, how to turn around what was a complete train wreck of a war. But despite the Navy’s early reverses, he remained confident in the training and skill of his men. Nimitz also held a trump card of his own—the U.S. Navy had broken the Japanese Navy’s operational code, JN-25b. Once Pacific Fleet’s intelligence services began making noises about the likelihood of a forthcoming battle at Midway, he wasted no time formulating his own battle plan and scrambling to assemble the needed assets to implement it.TIME Magazine Cover: Adm. Chester NimitzThe plan was simple enough. Nimitz reasoned that if he could beef up Midway’s organic air power and get sufficient submarines into the area, he might be able to whittle down the Japanese carriers (which he thought might number as many as five) before his own carriers attacked. He would mass his flight decks northeast of Midway, so positioned that their aircraft could hopefully ambush the Japanese. If Midway’s long-range PBY-5 and-5A Catalina patrol bombers found the Japanese force first, the U.S. carriers could hit it before the enemy even knew they were there.Three US Navy PBY-5A Catalina aircraft of VP-52 in flight in the southwest PacificMidway order of battle - WikipediaNimitz skillfully positioned his outnumbered assets. However, his masterstroke lay in the orders he issued to his two task force commanders, Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher (overall commander, in Task Force 17), and his subordinate, Rear Admiral Raymond Spruance (in Task Force 16).Nimitz ordered them to use “strong attrition tactics” to chip away at the enemy and then attack. However, this was not to be a fight to the finish—far from it. Nimitz directed that their actions must “be governed by the principle of calculated risk which you shall interpret to mean the avoidance of exposure of your forces to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy.” 3In other words, Fletcher and Spruance were to “fight smart.” If they found themselves in a sticky situation, and Midway had to be left to defend itself, so be it. Nimitz wanted judicious combat, not misplaced histrionics.TIME Magazine Cover: Admiral Spruance -- June 26, 1944All in all, if one had to hand out grades for strategic leadership, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that Nimitz deserved a solid “A” and Yamamoto a “C–” (or worse). Yamamoto’s plan was overly complex, too scripted, rigid, and based on a faulty reading of the enemy’s temperament and intentions. Nimitz’s plan made the most of what he had. Crucially, too, Nimitz gave his subordinates crystal clear orders on how they were to fight. Advantage: U.S. Navy.Losing Sight of the ‘Big Picture’When we examine task force leadership, the same general pattern repeats itself. Vice Admiral Chūichi Nagumo, commander of the Kido Butai, traditionally has taken a heavy share of the blame for the disaster at Midway. And it is true that he was hardly an inspiring leader. At 55 years old, Nagumo lacked much of the fire that had marked his younger years. Nor was he really an air-power expert, having been a surface officer for virtually his entire career. As such, he’s an easy target. But right up until the climactic attack at 1020, he played his cards about as well as possible.Nagumo was plagued by bad weather that hid the U.S. task forces. One of his scout aircraft took off late, and another apparently flew its route incorrectly, failing to detect the U.S. carriers at about 0615. Once these scouting arrangements fell apart, the Americans had basically wrested the initiative away from him, though neither party knew it at the time. Nagumo’s morning attack against Midway was good, as far as it went. But as he had expected, a single blow did not put the island out of business.Attack On June 4, 1942, four Japanese aircraft carriers launched torpedo and dive bombers, accompanied by Zero fighter escorts, against Midway. Despite heavy bombardment, the airfield was still usable, and anti-aircraft defenses were still operational. CREDIT: National ArchivesWith no U.S. warships reported in the neighborhood, Nagumo ordered his reserve aircraft rearmed to strike the island yet again—which was a perfectly reasonable course of action based on the information at hand. Just half an hour into replacing torpedoes with land-attack bombs, though, his tardy scout plane finally glimpsed a U.S. task force to the northeast. Now Nagumo was wrong-footed, with no armed bombers ready to go. From that point forward, his force was hampered by a constant stream of U.S. air attacks that prevented him from spotting his flight decks to strike the enemy. Indeed, when the climactic 1020 attack smashed three of his carriers, those attack planes were still in the hangars. 4USS Hornet (CV-8) American fighter planes, launched from the U.S. ships parked to the east, set off to attack the Japanese carriers. Pictured: F-4 Wildcat fighters and Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bombers on the flight deck of the USS Hornet, off Midway, June 4, 1942. CREDIT: National ArchivesAt this point things became really interesting and the true nature of Japanese task-force leadership was revealed. Nagumo had one carrier left—the Hiryū, under the command of Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi . Nagumo changed his flag from the Akagi to the light cruiser Nagara, gathered what few heavy warships he had, and began closing on the U.S. force. He hoped to bring about a surface engagement. It was a desperate long shot but the only thing Nagumo could reasonably do to turn things around.Aichi D3A Val dive-bomber taking off from the Akagi.Akagi The Japanese aircraft carrier Akagi, flagship of Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo. Attacked by high-altitude Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers, the ship was able to evade direct hits, and 15 American torpedo bombers were all shot down before they could inflect damage. One U.S. airman, George Gay, survived, and watched the ensuing battle from the water, as dive bombers from the Enterprise ripped the Akagi. Fires raged throughout, forcing the crew to evacuate, and the ship to be scuttled. The Japanese carriers Kaga and Soryu were also sunk. CREDIT: National ArchivesBoeing B-17E in flight.USS Enterprise (CV-6)USS Enterprise (CV-6) Douglas TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bombers are prepared for launch, June 4, 1942. CREDIT: National Archives Battle of MidwayDouglas TBD-1 Devastator torpedo bomberBut what of the Hiryū? It was imperative that the Japanese counterattack with her, of course, and Yamaguchi wasted no time in launching a first strike at 1100. But now the question became how to maneuver. If any moment during the battle called for the prudent employment of a truly precious flight deck, this was it. The Hiryū’s aircraft had all the range they needed to hit the U.S. carriers, but at some point, her depleted air group was bound to go into a downward spiral. When that moment came, it would behoove the Hiryū to be in a position to break contact with the enemy. Yet throughout the afternoon, Yamaguchi basically tagged along behind Nagumo’s ragtag surface force, thereby closing the range.The USS Yorktown is hit on the port side by a torpedo launched from a plane off the Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu during the Battle of Midway on June 4, 1942. (Image: National Archives and Records Administration, 80-G-414423.)This was madness. But the evidence seems to suggest that at this point in the battle, Yamaguchi (and Nagumo as well) lost sight of the “big picture.” Japanese society very much values trying one’s hardest. Winning is optional; trying your hardest is not, even when the task at hand is patently hopeless. These cultural considerations apparently began to dominate. It is equally clear that Nagumo and Yamaguchi’s outlooks were becoming mono-dimensional and limited to a sphere of combat that was primarily tactical, personal, and visual. Neither man was capable of placing his tactical decisions within the larger context of the nation’s war-waging. Yet even now, with the odds against them, they still had the very real possibility of extracting some measure of revenge while simultaneously preserving Hiryū for future battles. And no matter whose societal math you used . . . bringing at least one of Kidō Butai’s carriers home was a damned sight better than losing all four. 5USS Hornet (CV-8) shortly after completionF4F-3 in non-reflective blue-gray over light gray schemeU.S. Navy Grumman F4F Wildcat fighters of fighting squadron VF-8 launching from the aircraft carrier USS Hornet (CV-8)Hiryū The Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryū maneuvers to avoid bombs dropped by high-altitude USAF bombers at the Battle of Midway, June 4, 1942. The Hiryū, unscathed, launched planes to attack the Yorktown. CREDIT: National ArchivesIn the end, almost inevitably, U.S. scouting aircraft sighted the Hiryū later in the afternoon. It didn’t take long for the two remaining operational U.S. carriers—the USS Enterprise (CV-6) and USS Hornet (CV-8) —to send 60 aircraft her way. Just around supper time, as the Hiryū was preparing what was hoped to be an evening strike, she was caught and smashed just like her compatriots. The battle was over.Pacific TheaterOr was it? Throughout the afternoon, tidings of woe had been trickling back to Yamamoto’s Main Body, some 300 nautical miles behind Nagumo. Yamamoto, like his subordinate commander, was desperate to pull the fat out of the fire somehow, and he ordered Nagumo’s surface forces to continue their efforts to close the Americans during the night. He also ordered Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō’s fast battleship force to charge east and support their efforts.Keeping Their Eyes on the PrizeNakajima B5N Torpedo bomberBomber A Japanese Nakajima B5N Torpedo bomber is shot down during its attack on the USS Yorktown (CV-5). CREDIT: National ArchivesOn board the U.S. carriers at dusk, the tactical situation was far from clear. Rear Admiral Fletcher, having adroitly placed his and Spruance’s forces in position to hit the Japanese during the morning, had then watched as his flagship, the USS Yorktown (CV-5), was crippled by the Hiryū’s initial counterattack around noon. Thereafter he was occupied with trying to save her, until she had to be abandoned after another Hiryu strike during the afternoon. When Spruance radioed Fletcher for instructions at about 1600, Fletcher graciously turned over tactical command to his subordinate. It was up to him to figure out what to do for the rest of the night.Dive Bombers Japanese bombers attack the USS Yorktown (CV-5). CREDIT: National ArchivesSpruance basically had two options: head west to be in position the following morning to continue harrying his beaten enemy, or head east, away from any potential nighttime entanglements. Spruance opted for the latter course, knowing full well that it might rob him of the opportunity to attack effectively the following morning. He had no idea if the Japanese might be gunning for him this evening. But keeping Nimitz’s orders in mind, he reasoned that nothing he could accomplish that night was worth risking his two remaining carriers. As such, he decided that after recovering the aircraft that had just wrecked the Hiryū, he would turn east. In so doing, he cemented his and Fletcher’s signal victory.An SBD-3 dive bomber of Bombing Squadron Six, on the deck of USS Yorktown (CV-5)Yorktown The Yorktown's crew battles a fire on its deck. CREDIT: National ArchivesYorktown The USS Yorktown, dead in the water, June 4, 1942. CREDIT: National ArchivesThus, at the task force level, too, the Americans clearly enjoyed a decided advantage. Fletcher and Spruance maneuvered cleverly, fought bravely, but also kept their eyes on the prize. Fletcher was big enough to swallow his pride and turn over command to Spruance when required; Spruance did not squander what was entrusted to him. For their parts, Nagumo and Yamaguchi oversaw a disaster. Worse, they did not save the Hiryū, the one consolation prize they might have yanked from the fires of utter calamity. All in all, at the task force level, the U.S. admirals each receive a well-deserved “A”; their Japanese counterparts “Cs” or “Ds.” Advantage: U.S. Navy.U.S. Navy Douglas SBD-3 "Dauntless" dive bombers scouting squadron VS-8 USS Hornet (CV-8) approaching burning heavy cruiser Mikuma third set of attacks. Earlier strikes from Hornet and USS Enterprise(CV-6). Note bombs hung beneath the SBDs.Japanese cruiser Mikuma, shortly before sinking, June 6, 1942. CREDIT: National ArchivesOf course, U.S. leadership alone guaranteed nothing. Twists and turns and plenty of sheer dumb luck were ingredients in this battle’s recipe. Men had to fight. And inevitably men had to die. At the tactical level, too, the Japanese demonstrated that they were every bit as skilled and brave as their foes. Thus, the battle rested on a knife’s edge for hours before the climactic 1020 dive-bomber attack finally tilted the scales decisively in the United States’ favor. But it can likewise be fairly stated that without solid planning and execution at the highest levels of leadership, the valor of the individual U.S. aviators and sailors would likely have availed them nothing. Superior leadership was truly the wellspring of this seminal U.S. victory at Midway.Hiryu The Enterprise and Hornet launched another strike (incorporating some of the Yorktown's planes that were dispatched to other carriers) upon the Hiryu and her escort ships. Uncontainable fires forced the Hiryu's crew to abandon ship, hundreds went down. CREDIT: National ArchivesHiryu Thirty-nine Japanese sailors from Hiryu (drifted at sea 2 weeks aboard a cutter) rescued by the USS Ballard. CREDIT: National ArchivesHammann The destroyer USS Hammann provided cover for the disabled Yorktown, undergoing salvage operations, until a Japanese submarine broke through defenses on June 6 and launched four torpedoes, striking both the Yorktown and the Hammann. The destroyer sank in a matter of minutes. Eighty lives were lost. CREDIT: National ArchivesYorktown The destroyer Balch guards the Yorktown as the carrier's crew abandons ship. The carrier would capsize and sink by the following day, June 7. In all, 141 crewmembers from the Yorktown died.On June 6 Commander Isoroku Yamamoto ended the planned invasion of Midway, ordering his ships to retreat. Altogether, the Japanese lost four aircraft carriers, a cruiser, and nearly 300 planes. Japanese casualties numbered approximately 2,500, including hundreds of pilots. CREDIT: National ArchivesPensacola: Marine reinforcements disembark the cruiser USS Pensacola at Sand Island Pier at Midway, June 25, 1942. The ship's crew shot down four enemy torpedo bombers during the Battle of Midway.While the U.S. lost the Yorktown and the Hammann, approximately 145 aircraft, and more than 300 dead at Midway, their decisive victory set the stage for the Americans' island-hopping counter-offensive across the Pacific, pushing back the Japanese for the rest of the war.Belle Geddes Midway Dioramas - Flight JournalThe Battle of Midway: the US Navy’s Greatest Victory“The most stunning and decisive blow in the history of naval warfare”— John Keegan, Miltary Historian“They had no right to win. Yet they did, and in doing so they changed the course of a war. More than that, they added a new name – Midway – to that small list that inspires men by example, like Marathon, the Armada, the Marne.Even against the greatest odds, there is something in the human spirit – a magic blend of skill, faith and valor – that can lift men from certain defeat to incredible victory.”— Walter LordMIDWAY: June 1942 ACTION in the Pacific (Part 1, 720p)For more info:Battle of MidwayThe Battle of Midway (National WWII Museum)World War II DatabaseThe Battle of Midway: Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge and Battle of Midway National Memorial (U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service)War in the Pacific National Historical Park(NPS.gov Homepage (U.S. National Park Service))Battle of Midway (U.S. Navy & American Navy Recruiting - Navy.com)CREDIT: National ArchivesMidway: "Battle of Midway Analysis" (1950) US Navy Training Film; World War II in the Pacific1. RADM Edwin Layton, “2nd Operation K,” unpublished, 1. Monograph of selected translations from Bo?eicho? Bo?eikenshu¯jo? Senshibu, Senshi So?sho (War history) series, Shimbunsha Asagumo, Midowei Kaisen (Midway Naval Battle), vol. 43, 1971, author’s collection. Research materials of Dallas Isom, Archives of the National Museum of the Pacific War, Fredericksburg, TX.2. Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005), 48–57.3. John Lundstrom, Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway, and Guadalcanal (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2006), 228.4. Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword, 229–31.5. Ibid., 271.Mr. Parshall is the co-author, with Anthony Tully, of Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway. Widely published on World War II Pacific naval history, he has been featured on the History Channel and Discovery Channel, and is an adjunct lecturer for the U.S. Naval War College. Mr. Parshall is the founder of the “Imperial Japanese Navy Homepage,” at www.combinedfleet.com , which has been in continuous operation since 1995. He is currently working on a new history of the year 1942. Mr. Parshall works in information technology and lives in Minneapolis, MN.Great Blunders Battle of MidwayWW2 Death of the Imperial Japanese NavyU.S. Naval Institute Comment PolicyCAPT Mongo • This is an excellent analysis. I particularly appreciate the positive treatment of Admiral Fletcher, who has been --unfairly in my opinion--maligned by other accounts. Not to take anything away from Spruance, one of my personal heroes.mark feldman • Hornet CV-8 air group was poorly led by Commander Ring. Only VT-8 managed to attack the Kido Butai because Waldron told Ring he was going in the wrong direction and headed off on his own. Spruance's after action report was critical of Mitscher's (Hornets Capt.) AAR for trying to gloss over the air groups mistakes. On the 2nd strike Enterprises Dive bombers crippled Hiryu. So Hornets went after the escort ships. Effectively only 2 Air groups did in the Japanese strike fleet.Papasan Pauly • Great article with equally good thoughts in reading the posts here. All I'll add is blind dumb luck could have just as easily turned Midway in IJN's favor exactly like it turned it in our's. It's easy for us to analyze and interpret yet quite another to be the guys actually fighting it out with all the uncertainties at the time facing us. War is what it is. Bravo Zulu to all Hands for a job very well done.James Bowen Papasan Pauly • That is a really good point. Something just about always goes wrong in military campaigns, and considering that the Japanese really didn't make all that many mistakes at Midway. It's just that the ones they did make are what serendipitously led to the American victory there.Papasan Pauly James Bowen • Agreed. Many times it's the intangibles and Murphy's Law that spells victory or defeat.1James Bowen • I think this article is a bit too hard on Yamamoto. The strategic reasoning for the Midway campaign was sound, including the diversionary attack on the Aleutian Islands. It was known that Americans took very seriously the threat of a Japanese drive against North America through the Aleutians. The main flaw in the Midway campaign strategy was the division of far superior forces into numerous smaller detachments, which allowed a vastly inferior but concentrated American fleet to be on more even terms with the principle strike force of Yamamoto's fleet. The other was the insecurity/complacency of Japanese Navy radio communications. This made the American victory at Midway possible in the first place. It was the tactical actions by Nagumo's task force, along with several remarkable coincidences, that sealed the American victory at Midway. Even with the forewarning provided by the U.S. Navy code breakers, Yamamoto's division of the Japanese fleet, and the superb decisions by Nimitz and Spruance, the odds were still very much against the U.S. Navy at Midway. I would give Yamamoto a grade of B for his command leadership in this battle.Desertmole James Bowen • I would disagree with saying that the article was too hard on Yamamoto. Yamamoto liked to run roughshod over the Naval General Staff (NGS), and did so repeatedly prior to Pearl Harbor and again in the lead-up to Midway. For starters, the Aleutian Islands Campaign was NOT a diversion. As a sop to the NGS for getting his way about the Midway operation, Yamamoto bowed to their suggestion to conduct the Aleutians operation simultaneously. It was a completely separate operation, not a diversion! Tully and Parshall, using Japanese sources pretty much proved that. Yamamoto allowed the additional forces to be taken away. Granted, this was the "second team," and most of it was not missed, but sending two carriers North, well beyond their capability to support the Kido Butai if needed was truly a waste. Granted they were both smaller and had scratch air groups, but having more fighters and strike aircraft could have counted at Midway. For example, Nagumo could have sent their air groups, along with either CARDIV1 or CARDIV2' s air groups to strike Midway, while retaining the other carrier division solely for dealing with approaching US units. This could have prevented, or mitigated to some extent the tragedy of the day. Yamamoto had a penchant for developing very detailed, complex plans when conducting major operations. He demonstrated this throughout the Guadalcanal campaign as well. Midway was a fine example of an overly complex operation which placed too many burdens on Kido Butai, dealing with both land based strikes and being prepared for enemy fleet units. The plan was predicated on the idea that the USN would maneuver its ships in only one fashion, with Carriers coming in Northeast of Midway while the battleships approached from the Southeast. It was as though it was writ in stone that the Americans would do exactly this and he placed his forces accordingly. It is no wonder that it came apart when the Americans got inside the Japanese planning and decision cycle. He plainly forgot the enemy gets its own vote. He deserved the C- or worse.James Bowen Desertmole • The Aleutian Islands Campaign was not a diversion in the sense that they had every intention of establishing permanent bases there. However, whether Yamamoto originally intended to conduct this operation simultaneously or not, he ended up attempting to use this as a diversion. You are correct that it did take strength away from their Midway force. It is easy to say in retrospect that that hurt the Japanese at Midway, but it is much harder to say whether or not it was worth it in the planning stages. Yamamoto's strategic reasoning behind the Midway operation was sound. The major flaw in the planning was division of his forces into numerous smaller groups, which made them more vulnerable by having a negating effect on their numerical advantage, but certainly did not guarantee defeat. Strategic planning was Yamamoto's major contribution to this battle. This is why I give him a B. What cost the Japanese the Battle of Midway was far more attributable to flawed execution than poor planning, and Yamamoto had little direct involvement in the execution. One thing I did not previously mention where I disagree with the author was Nagumo's decision to treat Midway as the more severe threat than the U.S. carriers after their strike against Midway. That decision, more than anything else, is what set off the series of events leading to the fatal strikes by U.S. carrier-based dive bombers against the Japanese carriers. Having no up to date intelligence, Nagumo was rightly concerned about the possible presence of U.S. carriers. However, following the completion of most but not all of his search plane flights, he took a gamble and decided to prioritize another strike on Midway. That gamble is what led to the battle having the outcome that it did. Finally, let's not pat ourselves on the back too much. Yes, the efforts of LCDR Joseph Rochefort's cryptoanalyst team SIGINT (Signals intelligence in modern history) , the command decisions of Admirals Nimitz and Spruance, and the hard-fighting and selfless actions of American aviators/sailors at Midway were exemplary. However, we most certainly did not have the superior training, skills, numbers, and (with the exception of radar) equipment in this battle. From an overall position of weakness, we were making what was effectively a final stand in the Pacific. In the end, and perhaps more than anything else, we were just darned lucky, and we should be honest about that.Joseph Rochefort’s contributions and those of his team in the United States Navy's cryptographic and intelligence operations from 1925 to 1946, particularly in the Battle of Midway, were pivotal to victory in the Pacific War.Lt. Commander C. Wade McClusky Jr., a South Park High graduate, led his squad from the USS Enterprise to victory in the Battle of Midway. By Lou MichelThe Story of Lt. Cmdr. Wade McClusky Jr., and The Battle of MidwayIsoroku Yamamoto - WikipediaIsoroku Yamamoto (山本 五十六 Yamamoto Isoroku, April 4, 1884 – April 18, 1943) was a Japanese Marshal Admiral of the Navy and the commander-in-chief of the Combined Fleet during World War II until his death.Yamamoto held several important posts in the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN), and undertook many of its changes and reorganizations, especially its development of naval aviation. He was the commander-in-chief during the decisive early years of the Pacific War and therefore responsible for major battles, such as Pearl Harbor and Midway. He died when American code breakers identified his flight plans and his plane was shot down.Isoroku Yamamoto with United States Secretary of the Navy Curtis D. Wilbur.His death was a major blow to Japanese military morale during World War II. He also opposed war against the United States partly because of his studies at Harvard University (1919–1921) and his two postings as a naval attaché in Washington, D.C., where he learned to speak fluent English. Yamamoto traveled extensively in the United States during his tour of duty there, where he studied American customs and business practices.Battle of Midway, June 1942Yamamoto's plan for Midway Island was an extension of his efforts to knock the US Pacific Fleet out of action long enough for Japan to fortify its defensive perimeter in the Pacific island chains. Yamamoto felt it necessary to seek an early, offensive decisive battle.This plan was long believed to have been to draw American attention—and possibly carrier forces—north from Pearl Harbor by sending his Fifth Fleet (two light carriers, five cruisers, 13 destroyers, and four transports) against the Aleutians, raiding Dutch Harbor on Unalaska Island and invading the more distant islands of Kiska and Attu.While Fifth Fleet attacked the Aleutians, First Mobile Force (four carriers, two battleships, three cruisers, and 12 destroyers) would raid Midway and destroy its air force. Once this was neutralized, Second Fleet (one light carrier, two battleships, 10 cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 11 transports) would land 5,000 troops to seize the atoll from the US Marines.The seizure of Midway was expected to draw the US carriers west into a trap where the First Mobile Force would engage and destroy them. Afterwards, First Fleet (one light carrier, seven battleships, three cruisers and 13 destroyers), in conjunction with elements of Second Fleet, would mop up remaining US surface forces and complete the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet.To guard against failure, Yamamoto initiated two security measures. The first was an aerial reconnaissance mission (Operation K) over Pearl Harbor to ascertain if the US carriers were there. The second was a picket line of submarines to detect the movement of US carriers toward Midway in time for First Mobile Force, First Fleet, and Second Fleet to combine against it. In the event, the first measure was aborted and the second delayed until after US carriers had already sortied.The plan was a compromise and hastily prepared, apparently so it could be launched in time for the anniversary of Tsushima, but appeared well thought out, well organized, and finely timed when viewed from a Japanese viewpoint. Against four carriers, two light carriers, 11 battleships, 16 cruisers and 46 destroyers likely to be in the area of the main battle the US could field only three carriers, eight cruisers, and 15 destroyers. The disparity appeared crushing. Only in numbers of carrier decks, available aircraft, and submarines was there near parity between the two sides. Despite various mishaps developed in the execution, it appeared that—barring something unforeseen—Yamamoto held all the cards.Miracle Men of MidwayAmerican victory at Midway had more to do with bold leaders than lucky breaks. Admirals Nimitz and SpruanceUnbeknownst to Admiral Yamamoto, the US had learned of Japanese plans thanks to the code breaking of Japanese naval code D (known to the US as JN-25.) As a result, Admiral Chester Nimitz, the Pacific Fleet commander, was able to circumvent both of Yamamoto's security measures and place his outnumbered forces in a position to conduct an ambush. By Nimitz's calculation, his three available carrier decks, plus Midway, gave him rough parity with Nagumo's First Mobile Force.Following a nuisance raid by Japanese flying boats in May, Nimitz dispatched a minesweeper to guard the intended refueling point for Operation K near French Frigate Shoals, causing the reconnaissance mission to be aborted and leaving Yamamoto ignorant of whether Pacific Fleet carriers were still at Pearl Harbor. It remains unclear why Yamamoto permitted the earlier attack, and why his submarines did not sortie sooner, as reconnaissance was essential to success at Midway. Nimitz also dispatched his carriers toward Midway early, and they passed the intended picket line force of submarines en route to their station, negating Yamamoto's back-up security measure. Nimitz's carriers positioned themselves to ambush the Kido Butai (striking force) when it struck Midway. A token cruiser and destroyer force was sent toward the Aleutians, but otherwise Nimitz ignored them. On June 4, 1942, days before Yamamoto expected them to interfere in the Midway operation, US carrier-based aircraft destroyed the four carriers of the Kido Butai, catching the Japanese carriers at an especially vulnerable moment.With his air power destroyed and his forces not yet concentrated for a fleet battle, Yamamoto maneuvered his remaining forces, still strong on paper, to trap the US forces. He was unable to do so because his initial dispositions had placed his surface combatants too far from Midway, and because Admiral Raymond Spruance prudently withdrew to the east in a position to further defend Midway Island, believing (based on a mistaken submarine report) the Japanese still intended to invade. Not knowing several battleships, including the powerful Yamato, were on the Japanese order of battle, he did not comprehend the severe risk of a night surface battle, in which his carriers and cruisers would be at a disadvantage. However, his move to the east did avoid the possibility of such a battle taking place. Correctly perceiving he had lost and could not bring surface forces into action, Yamamoto aborted the invasion of Midway and withdrew. The defeat marked the high tide of Japanese expansion.Yamamoto's plan for Midway Island has been the subject of much criticism. Some historians state it violated the principle of concentration of force, and was overly complex. Others point to similarly complex Allied operations, such as Operation MB8, that were successful, and note the extent to which the US intelligence coup derailed the operation before it began. Had Yamamoto's dispositions not denied Nagumo adequate pre-attack reconnaissance assets, both the American cryptanalytic success and the unexpected appearance of Fletcher's carriers would have been irrelevant.The Akutan Zero: How a Captured Japanese Fighter Plane Helped Win World War IINaval Air 1942Battle of Midway Really a Turning Point?by Bill Doughty (navyreads.blogspot.com)Capt. Tameichi Hara, author of “Japanese Destroyer Captain,” says a series of mistakes by senior leaders in the Imperial Japanese Navy -- including ignorance or misuse of intelligence reports -- brought about catastrophic failures after the Battle of Midway (the first week of June, 1942), and especially as the war moved across the Pacific to Truk and Guadalcanal.Hara writes with great candor about Admirals Nagumo, Yamamoto, Nagano, Ijuin, and others in his book, subtitled, “Pearl Harbor, Guadalcanal, Midway -- The Great Naval Battles as Seen Through Japanese Eyes.”“The Midway Battle is termed the point at which the tide of the Pacific War turned in favor of the United States. Nagumo suffered a crushing defeat at Midway, to be sure, but that did not mean the entire collapse of the Navy. Yamamoto’s Combined Fleet was intact, and Japan still had at least four carriers to match those of the U.S. Navy.What really spelled the downfall of the Imperial Navy, in my estimation, was the series of strategic and tactical blunders by Yamamoto after Midway...”Published by the U.S. Naval Institute Press, the book is a classic and no-holds-barred memoir by the so-called unsinkable Captain. It is a reprint, originally published in Japan in 1961, of his account of events, battles and life at sea from the early 1900s till after the war.The book includes a first-person account of the sinking of John F. Kennedy’s PT-109, although there was no awareness at the time of that event’s significance.Not as comprehensive or technical as another Japanese perspective on the Battle of Midway, “Shattered Sword,” by Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, “Japanese Destroyer Captain” nevertheless offers in-depth and invaluable context to plans, battles and consequences of war.Loyal to his mentor and friend Adm. Chuichi Nagumo, who led the attack on Pearl Harbor but who was defeated at Midway, Hara also writes poignantly about Nagumo’s bushido-like suicide in the face of surrender at the Battle of Saipan, July 6, 1944.Japanese delegation on USS Portland to surrender Truk, 1945According to Hara, Yamamoto deserves the blame for key Japanese naval defeats. Hara calls some of the strategies and plans by Imperial Japan’s military “stupid blunders.” Writing about mistakes at Guadalcanal, Hara says, “the real blame must rest with Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto who held his Combined Fleet in home waters.”Pearl Harbor’s Combat Intelligence Unit Station Hypo’s then-Ensign, now retired Rear Adm. Donald “Mac” Showers, said the biggest mistake by Imperial Japan, was that “senior officers, including Admiral Nagumo, in many cases ignored intelligence. They thought they could outwit us.”Yamamoto's death. (USAF painting.)Operational intelligence literally proved to be the death of Yamamoto. U.S. military intelligence -- codebreakers, analysts and linguists -- pinpointed his location, and his plane was shot down April 18, 1943.As to whether the Battle of Midway was a turning point in the war -- and in world history, as Showers contends, the reader can imagine “what if.”What if Imperial Japan had succeeded in winning a toehold at Midway, a foot wedged in the door to a corridor to Oahu? The Combined Fleet had failed to deliver a knockout punch six months earlier, but their sights were still set on the islands. Hawaii could have been the next to fall, to serve as Imperial Japan’s own “gateway” -- eastward to California.The United States Navy indeed turned the tide at Midway.“There would not have been a victory at Guadalcanal without victory at Midway. The Battle of Midway was the turning point,” Showers said at Pearl Harbor this past weekend (see the following Navy Reads post for his in-depth perspective.)A sacred tea ceremony aboard USS Arizona Memorial for peace July 19, 2011. (U.S. Navy photo by MC2(SW) Mark Logico)Perhaps the most important legacy of the Battle of Midway and the outcome of World War II is that today, more than seventy years after the start of the war, the United States now has a strong ally and friend in former enemy Japan, cooperating together, committed to freedom and peace. Posted by Bill Doughty at 9:53 AMComment:Michael C/CWO3-USN_RET/7441:I look forward to reading this book, but I feel that the politics and many of the limitations affecting decisions made can be viewed in other books. I especially recommend, 'At Dawn We Slept' for insight into many attitudes and relationships between the Admirals in the Japanese Imperial Navy. To provide overall context and include more details of that 1941-1942 timeframe I recommend add, 'Pacific Crucible', 'Neptunis Inferno', 'Nimitz', and 'The Pacific War, 1941-1945'. After going through these books, I believe they present a very good insight into many of the personalities, and decisions made during those battles. Once you have read these you get a real understanding of the significance of announcing that the author was in the Nagumo camp. It reminds me of the moment in, 'Guns of August' when the Kaiser wanted to cancel the invasion of France and concentrate all actions directly against the Russians. He of course was told by his Generals that all the plans have been laid out, time tables set, supplies in place that there was no stopping the invasion. The attack at Midway had been scheduled and planned in a time table that included the invasion of Port Moresby, and the impact of the Doolittle cannot be under stated. The Japanese were as locked into their time tables and plans as the Germans had been in WWI. The United States did what they could when they could; the Army and the Brits pressuring for all Europe first. Admiral King needed offensive actions and pushed the Doolittle Raid, and pressed for action that led directly to the Coral Sea actions. If they didn't happen Marshall and Churchill would have stolen all supplies and manpower for Europe. Very interesting set of events indeed.June 3, 2012 at 11:33 PM