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Centralized Admission Process (CAP)IMPORTANT NOTE:The admission process has been revised from the year academic year 2016-17 and numerous changes have been listed out below. The revised process has also been given below that.Related Topics:CAP Round Admission Notifications 2014 List of Minority Colleges Previous Year MHT CET CutOffsYou will have to fill the options only once before round 1.Number of CAP Rounds have been changed to 4 i.e. 3 online and one spot counselling.Candidates will now apply through their merit number (based on MH-CET score).For students who are out of the CAP Rounds and still wish to pursue engineering in Mumbai or Pune the only options left are:Mukesh Patel School of Technology Management & Engineering, Mumbai (if you’ve appeared for NMAT)Symbiosis Institute of Technology, PuneBharati Vidyapeeth College of Engineering, Pune (if you've appeared for BVCET)Army Institute of Technology, Pune (if you're eligible)EligibilityThe ProcessThe Process:The DTE's site mentions the dates for each of the procedures given in the following steps:Stage 1: Puchase of Application Kit from the ARCAll aspiring MS & OMS Candidates are required to procure/purchase the Application Kit form any nearest ARC against the payment of Rs.800/‐ for General Category Maharashtra State, Outside Maharashtra State (OMS) candidate which is to be paid in CASH at ARC. A List of ARCs is given below.Rs. 500/‐ for Reserved Category & Physically Handicapped Candidates belonging to Maharashtra State only which is to be paid in CASH at ARC(Application form Receipt Centre)The Application Kit consists of Application ID and Password as well as important instructions/guidelines and various stages for CAP Admission. The candidate can submit theapplication form withthe help of the Application ID and password.No other mode of payment is applicable.Stage 2: Online filling of application formCandidates will be able to fill in the Online Application Form through any computer connected to internet either from home/ cyber café or at any of the ARCs.Candidates are required to enter his/her details as per instructions given for online Application Form.Candidates aspiring for All India Seats are required to enter the details of JEE main 2016 in the Application form.The candidate should take the printout of his/her application form. It will display the list of the documents required by the candidate to substantiate the claims made on the application form.The candidate can update the data himself/herself before confirmation of the application form at any ARC through his/her login. Once the application is confirmed at ARC, the information can’t be changed/ edited.Stage 3: Confirmation of form at ARCAll the MS candidates who have filled the Online Application Form should report to any convenient ARC in person along with printout of online filled application form, attested copies of the required documents. The candidate should also carry the required original documents for verification.The ARC officer shall verify the information and required original documents and collect the duly signed application along with attested copies of the required documents.The ARC officer shall confirm candidate’s application through online system and issue him/her the Acknowledge‐cum‐ Receipt letter, which will have the particulars of the candidate’s profile, important instructions etc.Stage 4: Display of Provisional Merit ListProvisional Merit List of eligible Maharashtra candidates, TFWS Candidates, All India candidates and J&K Migrant candidates will be displayed onwww.dtemaharashtra.gov.in and at the ARCs as per the schedule.Final merit lists will be displayed on the http://www.dtemaharashtra.gov.in/fe2014 and at ARCs as per the Schedule.NOTE: The merit list gives relative position of the candidate and it does not guarantee admission to any courseStage 5: Online option forms for CAP RoundsIn order to participate in the Centralized Admission Process (subject to fulfillment of the eligibility criterion of respective CAP round), it is MANDATORY to fill the Online Option Form for respective CAP Round.Candidates will be able to fill in the online option form through their login on website.It is mandatory for all candidates to confirm the online option form by him/ her.The candidate will not be able to change the Options once it is confirmed.Every course has been allotted a 9‐digit choice code.The serial number of block in the option form indicates preference of choice. Thus the choice code of the institute filled by the candidate in block No. 1 will be his/her first preference.The candidate can fill minimum 1 and maximum 300 options. The candidate has to fill the institute choice code against the option number in the online option form.Candidate has to confirm the submitted on‐line Option Form himself/herself by re‐entering Application ID and Password.The candidate can take the printout of the confirmed Option form for future reference.Stage 6: Allotment and confirmation of seatsThe allotment of eligible candidates for respective rounds will be displayed on the website.The candidate should to take a printout of the displayed allotment.No separate allotment letter will be issued to the candidate.The candidate will report to the allotted institute and confirm the admission at the respective Institute along with the necessary original documents as specified in the information brochure and pay full fees.The respective Institute will carry out “Online Update” of the confirmation of the candidate’s admission on website through their Institute login, at the time when the candidate is being admitted at the Institute.The system shall automatically generate letter of confirmation of the admission as an acknowledgement.The institute is required to take a printout of the acknowledgement and then the status of candidate will change to ‘Reported Candidate’.If the candidate (to whom it is Mandatory to report after allotment) fails to report to and confirm the admission at the Institute, on or before the last date of reporting at the Institute then the candidate shall lose claim on the allotted seat.Such seats will be treated as vacant seat for subsequent rounds of CAP.The candidates will be able to know the status of reporting, his/her eligibility for next round through login.CAP Round I/II/III Direct Allotment:-Allotment for seats for HU/OHU/SL that coming under CAP is carried out as per the logic explained in the stages:Stage I: For All CandidatesAll candidates of all the categories shall be considered for allotment as per their inter se merit.Reserved category candidates shall be considered in open category seat by virtue of their merit or in their respective reserved category if open category seats are not available at their merit.SBC category candidates shall be considered in open category seat by virtue of their merit or in their respective original category if open category seats are not available at their merit.Persons with Disability shall be considered for the seats reserved for them by virtue of their merit or in open category if no seats are available in the reserved category of Person with Disability.Defence category candidates shall be considered for the seats reserved for them by virtue of their merit or in open category if no seats are available in the reserved Defence category.For female candidates, the availability of seats will be checked as seats reserved for females in open category, general seats in open category, seats reserved for females in respective caste category as applicable, general seats in their respective caste category as applicable.Stage II: For respective Backward Class CandidatesOn completion of Stage I, if any of the backward class categories do not get the required number of female candidates, then the vacant seats shall be considered for male candidates of the respective Backward Category.Stage III: For Special Backward Class (SBC) CandidatesOn completion of Stage II, if any of the backward class category mentioned above, do not get the required number of candidates, the the vacant seats shall be considered for allotment to all candidates belonging to SBC category, as per their merit, limited to the extent of two percent seats of Maharashtra State seats which come under Competent Authority of the course.Stage IV: For respective groups of Backward Class category candidatesAll the backward class candidates will be considered for allotment in this stage in groups mentioned below:Group 1: SC, ST.Group 2: (VJ/DT) NT(A), NT-AGroup 3: NT-C, NT-D, OBCStage V: For all Backward Class category candidatesThe seats remaining vacant of Backward Class category after the completion of Stage IV, shall be considered for allotment to candidates of all the reserved categories together, on basis of their merit.Stage VI: For persons with Disability Candidate:The seats remaining vacant of DisabilityCandidate category after the completion of Stage V, shall be considered for allotment to candidates of Persons of Disability candidates on the basis of their combined iner se merit.Stage VII: For All Candidates (without SL/HU and OHU Seat Tag)The seats remaining vacant after completon of Stage I, II, IV, V and VI, shall be considered for allotment to candidates without SL, HU, OHU Seat Tag on basis of inter se merit.Stage VIII: For All CandidatesThe seats remaining vacant after the completion of stage VII, shall be considered for allotment to all candidates based on their inter se merit.Seats remaining vacant due to non-allotment and non-reporting will be available for admission through counselling of CAP Round-III.Stage 7: CAP Round IV - counselling roundCAP Round IV counselling will be conduced only for eligible Maharashtra State candidates whose names have appeared in Maharashtra State Merit List. During this round of admission all the seats will be considered GENERAL seats and shall be alloted soley on the basis of inter se merit of eligible MS candidate without any refrence to any reserved category whatsoever or to which the category of the vacant seat belongs to and also the All India Seats shall be considered as GENERAL seats and will be offered to MS candidates from Maharashtra State Merit L

The first thing to note is that the original plan for Overlord by Frederick Morgan was revised by Montgomery, like the original plan for the invasion of Sicily. Both would have led to complete disaster before Monty’s revision. This is something a lot of people don’t seem to be aware of and may have been responsible for some of the confusion as Monty’s plan, stated before D-Day and stuck to throughout, wasn’t primarily concerned with taking territory but for the British to shield US forces and for the US forces (Bradley’s First US Army) to build up their resources and then break-out.“That the COSSAC plan for a 3-divisional assault in ‘Overlord’ was a recipe for disaster now seems undeniable. Had Alexander been appointed to command the land forces in the invasion, would Morgan’s COSSAC plan have been enacted? Monty was not alone in recognizing its flaws, as will be seen, but he was alone in having the courage and conviction to see that it was thrown out and a better plan adopted. He had done so at Alam Halfa, he had done so gain over ‘Husky’ and whatever mud was slung at him, he was determined that he would do so over ‘Overlord’. For Morgan’s ‘Overlord’ plan, the result of one and a half years of research and discussions, had no prospect of succeeding, as Morgan’s planners themselves confessed….…….Morgan’s original COSSAC plan had envisaged a primary British-Canadian break-out to the Seine from the Caen lodgement area, and this may have added fuel to his vision of Allied failure, for which Monty was to be the scapegoat.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944.Montgomery presented his alternative strategy for Normandy at St Paul's school on 7th April and 15th May 1944. Omar Bradley was there and wrote:“The British and Canadian armies were to decoy the enemy reserves and draw them into their front on the extreme eastern edge of the Allied beachhead. Thus while Monty taunted the enemy at Caen we were to make our break on the long roundabout road to a Paris. When reckoned in terms of national pride this British decoy mission became a sacrificial one, for which while we trampled around the outside flank, the British were to sit in place and pin down the Germans.Yet strategically it fitted into a logical division of labors, for it was towards Caen that enemy reserves would race once the alarm was sounded.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944.Order No. 1 was issued on April 21, I Corps Operation Order No. 1, WO 171/258.‘The task of 3 British Division is to capture CAEN and secure a bridgehead over the R ORNE at that place........Should the enemy forestall us at CAEN and the defenses prove to be strongly organized thus causing us to fail to capture it on D-Day, further direct frontal assaults which may prove costly will not be undertaken without reference to I Corps. In such an event 3 British Division will contain the enemy in CAEN and retain the bulk of it’s forces disposed for mobile operations inside the covering position. CAEN will be subjected to heavy air bombardment to limit it’s usefulness and to make it’s retention a costly business.’——————————————————————————————————————————————On 12th June 1944 the British had no room to sidestep any German divisions before Caen because the Germans totally blocked them. This is why a wide hook on Caen was attempted. To the south of Panzer Lehr’s sector in the vicinity of Viller’s Bocage there was thought to be an area devoid of German forces, so this wide right hook was attempted on the morning of 13 June (any wider and it would have overrun into the American lines). Unfortunately, unknown to the British, Schwere SS Panzer Abteilung turned up into this area on the night of the 12th/13th June and blocked this right hook with their Tigers and closed the door on Caen.There was no other room to manoeuvre onto Caen. All attempts had to go right through the German Panzer divisions through the rest of June and early July, with the Germans having excellent defensive country (fields broken up by hedgerows everywhere) with which to utilize their advantage.The Germans had over 1,500 tanks in the British/Canadian sector, including Tigers and Panthers. Even the King Tiger and Jagdpanther made their WW2 combat debuts around Caen in July.Caen had more German tanks per mile than Kursk. In just a few miles 8 Panzer divisions in a very small area of front. Caen had the highest concentration density of German tanks ever seen in WW2. These were pitted against British armour. At Kursk the Panzer divisions were spread out over a much wider area and were not concentrated as densely as around Caen. At Kursk the Germans were attacking over a near 50 mile front.*There were EIGHT Panzer Divisors in the Caen area by the end of June 1944 and FIVE lines of anti tank-guns. The Germans kept sending more and more Panzer divisions around the Caen area as June went on and into July. These were the Panzer divisions deployed to the Caen area:♦ 21st Panzer Division (117 Panzer IVs)♦ Panzer Lehr Division (101 Panzer IVs, 89 Panthers)♦ 2nd Panzer Division (89 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers)♦ 116th Panzer Division (73 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers). In reserve just behind the front♦ 1st SS Panzer Division (98 Panzer IVs, 79 panthers)♦ 9th SS Panzer Division (40 Stugs, 46 Panzer IVs, 79 Panthers)♦ 10th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 29 Panzer IVs)♦ 12th SS Panzer Division (38 Stugs, 29 Panzer IVs)♦ Tiger Battalion SS101 (45 Tigers)♦ Tiger Battalion SS102 (45 Tigers)♦ Tiger Battalion 503 (45 Tigers)Source: Bernages Panzers and the Battle for Normandy and Zetterling’s Normandy 1944: German Military Organization, Combat Power and Organizational Effectiveness.The Americans who were not equipped or experienced to face massed German armour,were given primarily an infantry role by Montgomery- the Americans met very little armour in WW2. The US forces didn’t face any German armour until June 13th, and that was only a mere battalion of assault guns. The British destroyed about 90% of German armour in the west.Meanwhile June storms meant that the loss of the US Mulberry harbour had forced Bradley to close down his southern offensive at the same time of the advance on Cherbourg. This meant that, for a month, Dempsey had to keep up his costly feint on the eastern flank, and Bradley take the heavy casualties necessitated by a belated St Lo offensive.Despite the ‘real tragedy in delaying build up and deployment of your forces’ as Brooke had called it in June, Montgomery was nevertheless determined to stick to his strategy.*And at Kursk there were still battalions of Panzer IIIs with 50mm guns in the Panzer divisions. In Normandy all the tanks, tanks destroyers and assault guns all had at least 75mm L/48 guns. Only two battalions of Panthers at Kursk.———————————————————————————————————————————-Yet Eisenhower now became impatient and concerned by the seeming lack of progress.“If Eisenhower had criticisms of the way his Ground Forces Commander was directing the battle, Brooke therefore stated, he should go to Normandy and put them to Monty, not cavil behind his back. The suggestion was even made that Brooke accompany Eisenhower; but as General Simpson later recalled, the notion ‘was a little worrying to Ike. He knew jolly well that if he went to Monty, Monty would run circles round him with a clear exposition of his strategy and tactic.’ No visit was thus arranged.Brooke, however, was worried that he had not completely stopped the rot, and the next morning penned a long letter to Monty warning him of Eisenhower’s ‘mischief-making’:‘My dear MontyThe trouble between you and the P.M. has been satisfactorily settled for the present, but the other trouble I spoke to you about is looming large still and wants watching very carefully.Ike lunched with P.M. again this week and as a result I was sent for by P.M. and told that Ike was worried at the outlook taken by the American Press that the British were not taking their share of the fighting and of the casualties. There seems to be more in it than that and Ike himself seemed to consider that the British Army could and should be more offensive. The P.M. asked me to meet Ike at dinner with him which I did last night, Bedel was there also.It is quite clear that Ike considers that Dempsey should be doing more than he does; it is equally clear that Ike has the very vaguest conception of war!I drew attention to what your basic strategy had been, i.e. to hold with your left and draw the Germans onto the flank while you pushed with your right. I explained how in my mind this conception was being carried out, that the bulk of the Armour had continuously been kept against the British.He could not refute these arguments, and then asked whether I did not consider that we were in a position to launch major offensives on each Army front simultaneously. I told him that in view of the fact that the German density in Normandy is 2 ½ times that on the Russian front, whilst our superiority in strength was only in the nature of some 25% as compared to 300% on the Russian superiority on the Eastern front, I did not consider that we were in a position to launch an all out offensive along the whole front. Such a procedure would definitely not fit in with our strategy of opening up Brest by swinging forward Western Flank.’”[Emphasis mine]To Brooke, Monty’s strategy was so clear that he could not understand Eisenhower’s apparent obsession with side issues, such as accusations in the American press that the British were leaving all the fighting up to the Americans:‘The strategy of the Normandy landing is quite straight-forward. The British (on the left) must hold and draw Germans on to themselves off the western flank whilst Americans swing up to open Brest peninsular,’Brooke noted in his diary.-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944.It seems that Eisenhower’s criticisms and impatience were due to the fact that he didn’t understand Montgomery’s plan in Normandy.——————————————————————————————————————————————Montgomery in the planning gave the end time of Normandy, the bits between were put in by his planners, who needed something to fill in. Monty allowed them to put some in. Caen was strategically unimportant, one of those bits between.“the timings, when all this was going to happen. The answer is again found in the strategic plan, which states that the Allied armies would have driven the Germans back to the Seine on or about D plus 90, say September 1. Various intermediate targets -phase lines- were introduced into the plan but these were largely, as stated above, for administrative reasons, to give the logistical planners some time frame. Indeed when Lt Colonel C.P. Dawnay, Monty’s military assistant, was helping his chief prepare for the first presentation of plans on April 7, 8 weeks before D-Day, he asked Montgomery where the phase lines should be drawn between D-day and D plus 90.Monty replied, ‘Well, it doesn’t matter, Kit - draw them where you like.’‘Shall I draw them equally, Sir?’, asked Dawnay.‘Yes, that’ll do’, replied Montgomery.’Montgomery knew that whatever was intended two months before the landing would be altered the minute the troops went ashore. Even so, two other points need explaining. The First is that changes in the plan in the course of the battle were only to be expected - and hardly matter if the overall aim of the campaign is kept broadly on track…..……The ground force plan for Overlord had been drawn up by Montgomery - and approved by Eisenhower and the Combined Chiefs-of-Staff - and in that plan the city of Caen was to be taken - or effectively masked- on D-day.”-Neillands, Robin. The Battle of Normandy 1944.This is also stated in Nigel Hamilton’s three volume biography of Montgomery:”To help illustrate his presentation Monty had asked his MA - Lt Colonel Dawnay, to ink colluded phases onto the maps - as Dawnay later remembered:’I had the maps prepared and drew on them the D-Day targets for the troops along the invasion front. And the dropping zones of the paratroopers. And the after consulting with Monty I drew the D plus 90 line - showing where he felt we should get by D plus 90 - which included Paris and a line back along the Loire.And I asked Monty how I should draw the lines in between. And he said , ‘Well it doesn’t matter Kit, draw them as you like.’ ‘So I said, ‘ Shall I draw them equally, sir?’ And he said ‘Yes, that’ll do.’In his opinion it was not of any importance where he would be groundwise between D plus 1 and D plus 90, because he felt sure he could capture the line D plus 90 by the end of 3 months, and he was not going to capture ground, he was going to destroy enemy forces.Using Monty’s presentation notes, Dawnay drew in the arbitrary lines, never dreaming that they would be used in evidence against Monty when the campaign did not go ‘according to plan’…….In his later memoirs, Tedder reported the same Eisenhower allegation that would so infuriate Monty: ‘When a week had passed since D-Day without the capture of Caen it became clear to us at SHAEF that the hopes of a road breakthrough on the left were now remote.’Yet Monty had never suggested or intended a break-through on the left; only a battle around Caen that would permit him to establish and extend the shield behind which Bradley could take Cherbourg and breakout via St Lo and Avranches to Brittany.Some of the misunderstanding was undoubtedly caused by Monty himself, as his MA, Lt Colonel Dawnay, later recognised:I think he had given the RAF a totally false impression, at St Paul’s and elsewhere, as to when he was going to get the airfields, south of Caen - a totally false impression. Because when we got there [to Normandy] we realized quite quickly that he didn’t care a damn about those airfields, as long as he could draw all the German armour on to the [eastern] side and give a chance for his right swing to break out!”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.“As he explained in a letter that evening to Major-General Simpson at the war Office, Caen was only a name; he did not want to waste British and Canadians lives a la Stalingrad:The Germans are doing everything they can to hold on to CAEN. I have decided not to have a lot of casualties by butting up against the place; so I have ordered Second Army to keep up a good pressure at CAEN, and to make its main effort towards VILLERS BOCAGE and EVRECY and thence S.E. towards FALAISE.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.But this had been stated in an address he had given before D-Day.“Monty’s actual address, never published before, makes it quite clear that, with the exception of ports, the battle for Normandy would not be conducted with object of capturing towns, but of step by step building up of men and resources until the moment when the Americans would be strong enough to drive south into Brittany and to the Loire. It was a strategy that Monty unfolded with absolute conviction, two months before the new date set for the invasion: the first full moon in June. As in the address to senior officers before Alamein the calm authority with which Monty outlined his plan, the likely enemy response, and the phases through which the battle would go, was almost incredible to those present who did not already know Montgomery.At no point in this military lecture to Brooke, Churchill and Smuts, did Monty ever suggest that Dempsey was to do more than bring the German forces to battle around Caen, however - and when after the war, Eisenhower wrote that ‘in the east we had been unable to break out towards the Seine’, Monty was furious, for this was a complete travesty of the facts. To Churchill Monty had made it quite clear that there was no question of wild break-outs. How could there be when the Allies had only fourteen divisions ashore, many of which, particularly the parachute and first assault divisions, were inevitably running out of steam? As Churchill pointed out to Stalin the battle for Normandy would be a slow and deliberate one: ‘I should think it quite likely that we should work up to a battle of about a million a side, lasting throughout June and July. We plan to have about two million there by mid-August.Eisenhower’s unfortunate obfuscation has coloured the military accounts ever since, polarizing chroniclers into nationalistic camps. This was, Monty felt, a tragedy in view of the fact that the battle for Normandy was, at all stages, an Allied battle, in which Allied soldiers gave their lives, conforming to an Allied plan to defeat the German armies in the West - not to ‘break out towards the Seine’ in some mythical Lancelot charge...Dempsey’s brief then was not to ‘break out towards Seine’, but to play his part in a truly Allied undertaking, bringing to battle the mobile German forces that would otherwise - as Rommel wished - destroy the American assault on Cherbourg.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944.———————————————————————————————————————————————Montgomery wasn’t concerned with taking territory but with grinding up and destroying German armour. His plan was for US forces to take territory. He specifically stated this in an interview after the war with Edward R Murrow. Transcript:”The acquisition of territory on the eastern flank of the beachhead in the Caen sector was not really important. What was important there was to draw the maximum number of German divisions, and especially the armour, into that flank. The acquisition of territory was important on the western flank [the US sector].... an accusation drawn at me, that I ought to have taken Caen in the programme on D-day! And we didn’t. I didn’t mind about that because.....The air force would get very het up because I didn’t go further down towards Falaise and get the ground suitable for airfields. I didn’t bother about that, it would have meant enormous casualties in doing it and it wasn’t necessary.“I could reply to that criticism that on the American line from which the breakout was finally launched was a line the St Lo-Periers road should have been captured in the initial plan by the American 1st Army on D-day plus 5, that was the 11th June. But they didn’t actually capture it until the 18th July. But I have never returned the charge with that accusation.... until now.”*“I have never understood why Ike said in his dispatches, that when the British failed to break out towards Paris on the eastern flank. The Americans were able [to break out], because of our flexibility, to take it on, on our western flank. I have always thought that was an unfair criticism of Dempsey and the 2nd British Army.”*For a moment on July 10, Bradley confessed that he seemed to have failed. It was at this juncture, with Dempsey offering to try to mount an alternative breakout towards Falaise on the eastern flank, that Monty showed his caliber as a great field commander. As Dempsey related to the official American historian, “Monty quietly replied: ‘Never mind. Take all the time you need, Brad.’ Then he went on to say: ‘If I were you I think I should concentrate my forces a little more’ - putting two fingers together on the map in his characteristic way. Then he turned to me and said: ‘ Go on hitting: drawing the German strength, especially some of the armour, onto yourself - so as to ease the way for Brad.Hamilton, Nigel. Montgomery D-Day Commander.The video is here:Bradley also later confirmed Montgomery's plan and that the capture of Caen was only incidental to his mission, not critical.“While Collins was hoisting his VII Corps flag over Cherbourg, Montgomery was spending his reputation in a bitter siege against the old university city of Caen. For three weeks he had rammed his troops against those panzer divisions he had deliberately drawn towards that city as part of our Allied strategy of diversion in the Normandy Campaign. Although Caen contained an important road junction that Montgomery would eventually need, for the moment the capture of that city was only incidental to his mission. For Monty's primary task was to attract German troops to the British front that we might more easily secure Cherbourg and get into position for the breakout.In this diversionary mission Monty was more than successful, for the harder he hammered towards Caen, the more German troops he drew into that sector. Too many correspondents however had overrated the importance of Caen itself, and when Monty failed to take it, they blamed him for the delay. But had we attempted to exonerate Montgomery by explaining how successfully he had hoodwinked the Germans by diverting him toward Caen from Cotentin, we would also have given our strategy away. We desperately wanted the German to believe this attack on Caen was the main Allied effort.While this diversion of Monty's was brilliantly achieved, he nevertheless left himself open to criticism by overemphasizing the importance of his thrust toward Caen. Had he limited himself simply to the containment without making Caen a symbol of it, he would have been credited with success instead of being charged, as he was, with failure. For Monty’s success should have been measured in the Panzer divisions the enemy rushes against whilst Collins sped on towards Cherbourg. Instead, the Allied newspaper readers clamoured for a place named Caen which Monty had once promised but failed to win for them.The containment mission that had been assigned Monty in the OVERLORD plan was not calculated to burnish British pride in the accomplishments of their troops. For in the minds of most people, success in battle is measured in the rate and length of advance. They found it difficult to realize that the more successful Monty was in stirring up German resistance, the less likely he was to advance. For another four weeks it fell to the British to pin down superior enemy forces in that sector while we manoeuvred into position for the US breakout. With the Allied World crying for blitzkrieg the first week after we landed, the British endured their passive role with patience and forebearing.“-The American LIFE Magazine 1951.————————————————————————————————————————————Monty’s strategy now began to bear fruit.”The sudden ripening of Monty’s Normandy strategy had transformed the moment. At last the doubters, belly-achers, grumblers and men of faint heart were silenced, and those armchair strategists who wanted ‘gains’ could mark up their atlases once more. Von Kluge was mesmerised, and in his weekly report on 31 July believed that the Canadian diversionary attacks from the area of Caen had been the primary Allied break-out attempt. ‘After hard fighting and counter-attacks, 1st SS armoured corps gained a complete defensive victory,’ he claimed. Not only had Monty thus succeeded in keeping the German ‘Armoured Group West’ away from the American breakout, but he had kept it east of Noyers. When on 30 July Dempsey launched the start of his full-scale armoured attack from Caumont, von Kluge was therefore doubly mispositioned. He was still certain that Monty would make directly for Paris, expecting Montgomery first to enlarge the bridgehead and then to ‘make the thrust towards Paris’ from the British sector.Like Rommel, von Kluge was playing straight into Montgomery’s hands. Within hours of the 30 July kick-off, Dempsey had a British armoured division nearing Le Beny Bocage, thus shielding the left flank of Bradley’s new salient - which in turn had reached Avranches, at the base of the Cherbourg peninsula.…..There was something moving about this long-awaited moment.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942–1944Operation Cobra and the American breakout, which American historians have tried to appropriate the credit to US generals like Patton and Bradley, had been planned by Monty some time before.“The plan upon which the Americans were to uncurl and deliver their great thrust southwards towards Brittany and the Loire was set out before Brooke and General Simpson (the DMO, to whom a copy was sent), in simple, clear English, a month and a half before it was enacted. ‘The First US Army,’ Monty declared under the heading: ‘Para 14. Future intentions’, was:e) To hold on firmly to Caumont; to recapture CARENTAN and to hold it firmly.f) To capture ST LO and then COUTANCEg) To thrust southwards from CAUMONT towards VIRE and MORTAIN; and from ST LO towards VILLEDIEU and AVRANCHESh) All the time to exert pressure towards LA HAYE DU PUITS and VOLOGNES, and to capture CHERBOURG.A glance at the map will show that this was, town for town, the layout of Operation ‘Cobra’- the great American offensive that paved the way for Patton to be unleashed into Brittany and the Loire in August 1944.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.”PLAN IN OUTLINETo hold the maximum number of enemy divisions on our eastern flank between CAEN and VILLERS BOCAGE, and to swing the [American] western or right flank of the Army Group southwards and eastwards in a wide sweep so as to threaten the line of withdrawal of such enemy divisions to the south of PARIS.Later historians, particularly the American Official Historian Dr Martin Blumenson, would try to appropriate the credit for this plan for their heroes General Patton and to a lesser extent, General Bradley. In his edition of Patton’s papers, Dr Blumenson quoted Patton’s diary entry of 2 July 1944, in which Patton noted his own new ‘Schlieffen’ plan for a ‘rear attack on the Germans confronting the First U.S. Army, and then driving on to the line Alençon-Argentan, and thereafter on on Evreux or Chartres, depending on circumstances, we will really pull a coup’. Commenting, Blumenson remarked on Patton’s ‘remarkable’ intuition and stated that some weeks later ‘Bradley would come up with an interesting idea’ for such a coup, ‘an operation called Cobra’.That ‘Cobra’ was in fact the plan given out by Montgomery at his headquarters on 30 June 1944 was to become a fact which some American historians hated to credit, preferring to take at face value Patton’s misrepresentation, penned in frustration in his English headquarters, that the Allies were merely pursuing ‘phase lines’ and that ‘we will die of old age before we finish’. However unpalatable to such writers, the fact remains that Bradley, Dempsey and Crerar all attended Monty’s conference on 30 June, all concurred in Monty’s strategy, and that Eisenhower, Brooke, the War Office and Main Headquarters of 21st Army Group at Portsmouth all had copies of Monty’s plan. Nor was it some vague notion, for Monty laid down at the conference how he wished the plan to be executed in the coming weeks. Originally, in England before D-Day, he had intended to push the British Second Army south of Caen to secure space for airfields and provide the shield he needed for Bradley’s southern thrust to Brittany. Rommel’s fierce reaction at Caen had, however, made this unnecessary. Indeed a British thrust too far from it’s present sector would open up Second Army to a German counter-thrust by extending the front to be defended, whereas although it was greatly congested, the British front was currently almost impregnable.……..Bradley’s break-out via Brittany had originally been conceived in England before D-Day, and throughout the long bitter weeks of fighting in June and July, Dempsey had been instructed to lock in combat the main enemy formations. Six thousand British and Canadian soldiers had fallen, even before ‘Goodwood’, to make possible the expansion of the American sector behind them, first to Cherbourg, and now towards Brittany.”-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.————————————————————————————————————————————Montgomery had envisioned a 90 day battle with all forces reaching the Seine. He emphasized Cherbourg, making it clear that the British would hold as many German divisions as possible in Caen or it’s outskirts while the Americans take Cherbourg and go south to break the front without any German Panzer divisions nearby.Result?Exactly that. It happened ahead of schedule and with 22% less casualties than predicted.Not even Stalingrad could match the strategic scale of the German defeat in Normandy…….…….By containing the bulk of the enemy armour and best infantry opposite Dempsey, and giving Bradley time and space to bring the greater numerical strength of the American divisions into battle on the western flank, Monty had out-generalled von Rundstedt, Rommel, Hausser and von Kluge who, limited by the edicts of Hitler, had insufficient strength to defend British, American and Pas de Calais sectors in equal strength. Compared with Hitler’s conduct, the impatience of Eisenhower, Tedder and Churchill had proved merely tiresome to the Ground Forces Commander, and had not affected the course of the battle. Montgomery’s victory was, without doubt in even Hitler’s mind, the decisive battle of the war: ‘the worst day of my life,’ as Hitler remarked on 15 August 1944 as the true dimensions of the catastrophe in Normandy became apparent.-Hamilton, Nigel. Monty, Master of the Battlefield 1942-1944.D-Day plus 90 was 4 September 1944.Monty said Paris would be liberated on D-day plus 90. It was liberated on D-Day plus 80.Dempsey took Brussels, 183 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 89.Dempsey took Antwerp, 253 miles from Caen, on D-Day plus 90.In the words of an American author, Ike & Monty: Generals at War, 1994, Norman Gelb:“By holding on the left and breaking out on the right, Montgomery had produced a triumph.“

No, it is actually a valid argument by AAP and Arvind Kejriwal against "the Gasfather".The First Information Report or FIR filed by the Aam Aadmi Party against Reliance Industries and ministers in the UPA government on allegations that they jointly rigged the prices of gas, has brought into headlines a long-running dispute.Since Reliance struck gas in the KG-D6 block in the Krishna Godavari basin in 2002 - seen as a validation of allowing private players into gas and oil - controversy has never been far.The FIR, based on a complaint by a former bureaucrat, begins by referring to the first controversy that broke out in 2007, during the tenure of Murli Deora as Oil Minister, accused of colluding with Reliance to try and push up the price of gas.The reality is more complex, linked to the confused nature of gas pricing in India. Gas, unlike petrol, is not meant to be priced by the government. As per the rules, the supplier - in this case Reliance - is meant to discover the price in the market by inviting bids from buyers, but at an arms' length. The government can step in only if it feels the price is not fair.The first price of KG-D6 gas was 'discovered' in 2004, when Reliance bid and won a tender to supply gas to the public sector National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) for $2.34 per mmbtu (million metric British thermal units), for a period 17 years.Around the same time, the Ambani bothers split. One of the terms of the split was Reliance (Mukesh Ambani) agreeing to supply gas to the power plants of Anil Ambani, at the same terms - $2.34 per mmbtu for 17 years.But Reliance refused to supply gas to both and they separately took it to court. This, Reliance's critics say, was proof that it wanted a higher price.Reliance, however, told NDTV that they broke off the deal with NTPC because of an unfair liability clause in the agreement.They also said when they asked the government to clear the deal with Anil Ambani, the government refused. Reliance has, in its possession, a 2007 letter from the Oil Ministry, which said the $2.34 amount is not market discovered, since Reliance was bidding low to get the NTPC contract. Reliance says that they then approached more than a dozen customers in the power and fertilizer sector, and came back with a price of over $4.3 to $4.9 per mmbtu.The matter was referred to an Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM), headed by Pranab Mukherjee, which settled on a rate of $4.2 mmbtu, on the logic that a higher price leads to greater revenue for the government.This decision raised strong protests at that time, now being repeated by the AAP, that the government was doing favours to Reliance in the guise of protecting its own interests.As proof, AAP cites the view taken by a committee, headed by then Cabinet Secretary KM Chandrashekhar, which strongly objected to the hike, saying "the gas pricing formula submitted by RIL suffers from several infirmities in respect of both, the formula employed and the bidding process", implying that the buyers from whom Reliance got the quotes were not truly representative.Strong objections were also raised by Surya Sethi, who was Principal Advisor, Power and Energy, to the Government of India. He told NDTV that $2.34 per mmbtu was already a discovered market price at which Reliance was making a profit, and there was no need to hike it to $4.32.As for the argument made by the Oil Ministry that the higher the price of gas, the faster Reliance can recover its costs and the quicker the government can share in its profits, Mr Sethi said the government is not in the business of making profits alone. He said the highprice of gas, a limited commodity, has a cascading impact on the price of power and fertilisers, which impact the common man.The allegations of collusion are also based on the premise that the Oil Minister at the time was Murli Deora, who is seen as close to Reliance. Mr Deora, who is named in the FIR, rubbished that charge, saying he simply went on the EGoM's recommendations.But the AAP claims a subsequent letter Reliance wrote to the Oil Ministry in 2009, in which Reliance seems to say that wellhead price of gas - in other words, their cost of production - is under one dollar, is further proof that there was no reason to inflate the price from over $2 to over $4. To quote from the letter, Reliance says, "The wellhead cost per/unit (mmbtu) of Natural Gas in accordance to the above notification works out to US $ 0.8945 per mmbtu and the wellhead value for the purpose of payment of Royalty works out to US $ 3.3105 per mmbtu."Reliance has denied this, saying the letter was simply a calculation of royalty, and that their cost of production in 2007 was between $3-4 per mmbtu.But the FIR says Reliance continued to receive unfair benefits, with the second gas price hike last year recommended by the Rangarajan Committee, set up to come up with a formula for gas pricing.The Committee considered the average of the import price of gas, as well as the price of gas at major gas trading hubs like the US, UK and Japan, and came up with a figure of $8.4 per mmbtu.Surya Sethi has criticised this, saying the "Rangarajan committee's formula makes no sense whatsoever. The reason it makes no sense is because ostensibly, they say that this is the market price, but first of all there is no market for natural gas in the world. The only market that exists is in North America, the true market, where gas on gas competition is there and the market must follow certain characteristics, the market where demand and supply are fairly well balanced, the market is fully-fungible, and there is no such market anywhere in the world other than North America. And the price of North American gas is under $4, while here it has been priced at $8."Reliance, however, says their current cost of production is close to $7 per mmbtu, so the $8.4 price is fair.But even critics of the Committee's decision agree that there is little doubt over Dr Rangarajan's integrity.But, as in the case of the earlier price hike, there is suspicion over political collusion, since the decision was taken under the watch of Veerappa Moily as Oil Minister.Mr Moily replaced Jaipal Reddy who was Oil Minister between January 2011 and October 2012.Under Mr Reddy's tenure, Reliance was penalised over US$ 1 billion for falling output from its KG Basin gas fields. The matter is now in arbitration between the government and Reliance.Reliance had argued that this was because they had overestimated the reserves in the fields, an argument rejected by Mr Reddy, who ordered the imposition of the penalty.Mr Reddy was replaced shortly afterwards by Mr Moily. In an exclusive interview to NDTV, Mr Reddy denied any agendas at work behind his removal, saying he was simply doing his job.Mr Moily has earlier claimed he was not favouring Reliance, and that a higher gas price mainly benefits the public sector Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC), which is the biggest producer of natural gas in India.Some say that the argument - that a convergence in the interests of government and Reliance doesn't amount to collusion - would be taken in better faith if there was greater arms' length between Reliance and the oil and gas policy establishment, specifically the practice of a large number of bureaucrats from the Oil Ministry becoming associated with the company after leaving service.One of the members of the Rangarajan Committee, for instance, is JM Mauskar, a former bureaucrat and now a part of the Observer Research Foundation, a Reliance-funded think tank in New Delhi.Similarly, Sunjoy Joshi, another member of the Observer Research Foundation and who spoke in defence of the price revisions, was earlier Joint Secretary, Exploration in the Oil Ministry.The other allegation in the FIR is over whether Reliance is deliberately escalating its costs. In 2004, when Mani Shankar Aiyar was Oil Minister, the ministry approved Reliance's plan to develop KG-D6 at $2.39 billion to produce 40 mmscmd of gas. Just two years later, in 2006, with Murli Deora in the saddle, the Oil Ministry approved an amended plan by Reliance that it needs to spend four times that amount, $8.8 billion, to produce only double, 80 mmscmd of gas.The FIR suggests Reliance had a motive to pad its expenses: as per its contract with the government, Reliance first needs to recover its costs, before sharing profits with the government. So the higher the costs it declared, the longer it can delay sharing profits. The FIR says that was one of the reasons Mani Shankar Aiyar was replaced, a suggestion he laughs off.Reliance claims the jump from $2 to $8 billion was spurred by massive increase in oil prices in those years, which in turn pushed up the cost of drilling equipment which rose by 540% in the same period.Mr Deora told NDTV that he has no recollection of sanctioning the amended, $8 billion plan, saying as minister, he couldn't recall every detail.The AAP has rejected these claims, saying a report by the Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) on Reliance's expenses has found evidence of gold plating. The CAG report doesn't say that in so many words. It does, however, raise questions on how Reliance chose its vendors, saying "several instances, where multiple vendors were pre-qualified. However, when technical bids were received, all vendors (except one) were rejected and the contract was finally awarded on a single financial bid."Reliance has rubbished these charges, producing three independent audits from global agencies which found no evidence of padding expenses. Moreover, they argue that simply padding costs has no long-term benefits.But Prashant Bhushan, one of the petitioners in the gas pricing issue in the Supreme Court, has alleged that Reliance brought back money from its inflated expenses through front companies.The petition has annexed a letter by the Indian High Commission in Singapore dated August 31, 2011. The probe found that a Singapore-based company, Bio Metrix Marketing, had invested Rs. 6,500 crore in a number of Reliance companies, including Rs. 3,000 crore in Reliance's gas pipeline company.But the report finds that the director of the company, Atul Kumar Dayal, has been an old advisor of the Reliance Group and has been the Director in almost 30 Reliance Group companies.The report says that it is "highly probable that the amounts have come from mostly tax havens to form a circuitous route. And the source needs to be ascertained."But those familiar with the development say "Atul Dayal is Reliance's counsel. Investments by Bio Metrix were open, transparent and perfectly legitimate transactions. These investments were made out of loans raised from ICICI bank, Singapore branch. ICICI has confirmed this fact to regulators. Regulators have investigated the matter and found no substance in allegations."With claims and counterclaims piling up, the only point on which there seems to be agreement is that India needs a less confusing, more consistent gas pricing policy. While on one hand, the existing Production Sharing Contract mandates market pricing, on both occasions - in 2007 and 2013 - it is the government which has stepped in to quasi-administer the price. Surya Sethi argues that the Indian market is not mature enough to throw up a gas price, and so perhaps there is a need to do away with the pretense of a market-determined price, and have government-administered pricing based on giving the producer a reasonable rate of return.The complexity of these debates only underlines the need for a detailed independent probe, devoid of political colour, to ascertain the charges of political collusion. With election season looming, that seems unlikely.