Form 944 For 20 : Employer'S Annual Federal Tax Return: Fill & Download for Free

The idea that the wealthy don’t contribute enough is a complete fallacy. But let me answer the question first.According to Giving USA, in 2016, charitable donations in the USA amounted to $390.05 billion[1][1][1][1] of which $286.61 billion came from individual donors. Open Impact surveyed 50 ultra-high net worth individuals and found that they give anywhere from $100 000 to $10 000 000 per year[2][2][2][2] . So, the answer to the question is that the average billionaire likely gives around $5 500 000 per year.Of the Forbes 400 (Richest Individuals),36 gave more than $1 billion to charity in 2017[3][3][3][3] but in 2018 donations by the wealthiest was about 50% of the previous year, mostly because in 2017 charitable donations were particularly large[4][4][4][4] .There seems to be a popular idea that the super wealthy are greedy bastards that have so much money they don’t know what to do with it, while millions are suffering.At face value, this seems to be the case. There are a few statistics that explain how a small minority holds trillions in wealth.But this just shows a) how little people know of the math behind wealth and b) how easy it is to ignore the larger impact of what the wealthy bring to the economies of the world.Tangible and liquid assets for ultra high net worth individuals may top out at around 20% - 30% which means that the vast majority of their wealth is tied up in intangible assets - better known as shareholding in one, or often multiple, successful businesses.The value of their shares in their companies fluctuates according to the value of the company, which in turn is valued on the basis of how much investors are willing to pay for shares. This depends on a rather complex set of valuation methodologies that nobody really agrees on. This means that the “wealth” that these individuals hold is highly manipulated and essentially without tangible value until it gets sold. If it gets sold.This brings me to the second point - wealthy people generate excessive value in the form of economic value - they create jobs as well as secondary entrepreneurial opportunities, and through that act as the driving force behind the next generation’s ability to take part in the economy.Let’s just look at four of the top 10 billionaires - Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates, Larry Ellison and Mark Zuckerberg:Amazon employs 647 500 people (full and part-time)Microsoft employs 134 944 peopleOracle employs 137 000 peopleFacebook employs 35 587 peopleJust these four individuals are, in a major way, responsible for the creation of 955 031 jobs in 2018. Let that sink in - on average, if we are talking about averages here, these four people are responsible for the continued livelihoods of 238 758 people each.With 2 754 billionaires in the world that would come to 657 538 844 people which is nearly 9% of the global population. According to the ILO[5][5][5][5] the total workforce globally consists of about 3.4 billion people of which 192.7 million are currently unemployed. This means that the billionaires may be responsible for more than 20% of total employment globally.If we then bring in the taxes their companies pay, the income tax that passes through their employees to governments, and the secondary opportunities for people who rely on their products and services, we start to realize that, without these billionaires, we would all be where we were before the capitalist global economy started. In caves or as slaves.So for every person pointing a finger at a billionaire, I say this: learn math, then take responsibility for your own life. Blaming the wealthy for doing their job is a fruitless waste of time.Footnotes[1] Giving USA 2017: Total Charitable Donations Rise to New High of $390.05 Billion[1] Giving USA 2017: Total Charitable Donations Rise to New High of $390.05 Billion[1] Giving USA 2017: Total Charitable Donations Rise to New High of $390.05 Billion[1] Giving USA 2017: Total Charitable Donations Rise to New High of $390.05 Billion[2] The Giving Journey — Open Impact[2] The Giving Journey — Open Impact[2] The Giving Journey — Open Impact[2] The Giving Journey — Open Impact[3] The New Forbes 400 Philanthropy Score: Measuring Billionaires' Generosity[3] The New Forbes 400 Philanthropy Score: Measuring Billionaires' Generosity[3] The New Forbes 400 Philanthropy Score: Measuring Billionaires' Generosity[3] The New Forbes 400 Philanthropy Score: Measuring Billionaires' Generosity[4] America’s most generous billionaires gave half as much to charity in 2018 as in the previous year[4] America’s most generous billionaires gave half as much to charity in 2018 as in the previous year[4] America’s most generous billionaires gave half as much to charity in 2018 as in the previous year[4] America’s most generous billionaires gave half as much to charity in 2018 as in the previous year[5] https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_615594.pdf[5] https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_615594.pdf[5] https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_615594.pdf[5] https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---dcomm/---publ/documents/publication/wcms_615594.pdf

Women play a very crucial role in the development of society. Although women are not considered equal to men and often face gender discrimination in all field whether it is workplace or family, that’s why the concept of ‘women development’ comes in the picture. This concept also works on the concept of who gets what in terms of resources. The position and status of women all over the world has risen incredibly in the 20th century. We find that it has been very low in 18th and 19th centuries in India and elsewhere when they were treated like ‘objects’ that can be bought and sold. For a long time, women in India remained within the four walls of their household. Their dependence on menfolk was total. As a developing country like India, we need a development which is bidirectional or we can say development should not comprise only in males but it should consider females as well. For upliftment of women in economic development and women’s empowerment defined as improving the ability of women to access the constituents of development—in particular health, education, earning opportunities, rights, and political participation. In one direction, development alone can play a major role in driving down inequality between men and women; in the other direction, continuing discrimination against women can hinder development. Empowerment can, in other words, accelerate development. When women are educated and empowered the next generation can be improved as learning starts from home. By empowering women in terms of education, health, and finance we can contribute to the development of a country as a whole in terms of GDP, literacy and gender ratio.Status of women in societyPopulation· As per Census 2011, India’s population was 121.06 Cr and the females constituted 48.5% of it.· In 2011, the sex ratio (number of females per 1000 males) at all India level was 943 and the same for rural and urban areas are 949 and 929 respectively. The sex ratio for 0 - 19 age group was 908 while that of 60+ age group was 1033. The sex ratio in the economically active age group (15 - 59 years) was 944.· Sex ratio in the age group 0 - 6 years has increased in rural from 906 in 2001 to 923 in 2011. However, the ratio has a decline in urban area in the same period.· The SRS 2014 showed that, the women’s mean age at marriage at all India level was 22.3 years and the same in rural and urban areas are 21.8 years and 23.2 years respectively.· As per National Sample Survey (July 2011 - June 2012), 11.5% households in rural areas and 12.4 % households in urban areas are female headed households.Health· The SRS 2014 estimates showed a Crude Birth Rate (CBR) of 21 and General Fertility Rate (GFR) of 77.6 at all India level.· In 2014, the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) was 2.3. TFR was high for illiterate women both in rural and urban areas, higher among rural illiterate women and statistics reveal that improvement in educational level lowers the TFR.· The SRS 2014 reported that the age - specific fertility rate was highest (174.9) in the age group 20 - 24 years followed by the age group 25 - 29 years (143.7) and 30 - 34 years (76.6).· The mortality rate among females across all ages was 6.2 and that among males was 7.1 in 2014.· The Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) has declined from 301 in 2001 - 03 to 167 in 2011 - 13.· In 2014, the Infant Mortality (IMR) of females was 40 while that of males was 37. The rate of decline in the IMR of females was faster than that of IMR among males.· In 2014, urban mothers received 1.27 times more medical attention at the time of delivery as compared to rural mothers (urban:93.2%, rural:73.2%).· The life expectancy for females was 69.6 years and for males was 66.4 years during the period 2010 - 2014, depicting higher life expectancy of females as compared to males.Literacy and education· As per Census 2011, the literacy rate at all India level was 72.98% and the literacy rate for females and males are 64.63% and 80.9% respectively. During the last decade, the highest improvement in literacy rate was observed for rural females (24%).· At all India level, the adult (15 + years) literacy rate was 76% and that among males was 78.8% and females was 59.3%. Rural – Urban gap existed in Adult literacy rate for both females and males. The adult literacy rate for females in rural areas was 50.6% vis-a- vis 76.9% in urban areas whereas for males the same in rural areas was 74.1% vis-a-vis 88.3% in urban areas.· During 2014-15, the Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) at Primary level for females and males are 101.4 and 98.9 respectively; at middle class level the corresponding figures are 95.3 and 87.7; at higher secondary level, the status was at 65.8 and 63.8 respectively.· In 2014 - 15, there are 93 girls per 100 boys in primary class, 95 in middle class, 91 in secondary class and 90 in senior secondary class.· In 2014 - 15, among the total foreign students attaining higher education in India, 34% are females.· The number of females per 100 males in University education in major disciplines was highest in Medicine (90.9), followed by Arts (86), science (72.7), commerce (67.3) and Engineering & technical (40.3).Participation In Economy· In 2011, the Workforce Participation Rate at all India level was 25.51% for female and 53.26% for males. While there was no rural – urban gap for males (53%), there was considerable rural – urban gap for females (rural - 30%, urban - 15.4 % ).· As per NSS 2011 - 12, 59.3% of the female workers in rural India are self employed while in urban areas the corresponding figure was 42.8%. Among the male workers, 54.5% in rural areas and 41.7% in urban areas are self employed. In rural areas the share of regular wage/ salaried employees was less for both females (5.6%) and males (10%) compared to urban areas (42.8% - females, 43.4 - males).· In 2015 - 16 (5th Annual Employment – Unemployment Survey conducted by Labour Bureau), the unemployment rate for persons aged 15 +years was 3.7 at all India level. For females (15+ years) , the unemployment rate was 5.8, while for the males (15+ years) the same was 3.0. There was considerable rural–urban gap in unemployment rate of females (rural - 4.7, urban - 10.9).· The 6th Economic Census (2013-14) showed that, 21.49% of the total establishments are owned by females and 18.29% of the workers employed in establishments are females.Participation in Decision Making· As in 2016, women ministers constituted 12% in Central Council of Ministers (9 out of 75).· In the 16th Lok Sabha, 12% of the total members are women (64 out of 534).· In 2015, the share of women judges in Supreme Court was 4% (1 out of 26) and it was 10% (54 out of 517) considering all High Courts in India.· In 2016, at all India level 46% of the elected representatives in Panchayati Raj Institutions are women.Obstacles in Women empowermentMainstream thinkingIn india women are considered as homemaker rather than business women. They are meant to raise children, look after household chores, and taking care of their families. This society presuure make them feel inferior.Dependency on menWomen are depemdent on men for any kind of work. They are confine to live their life in four walls. They are not allow to take their decisions as their wish.Early marriageAs soon as women hit puberty they are forced for marriages. Due to less knowledge about puberty and malnourishment their health compromise the most. In rural areas the household chores start from early morning and ends at night it includes working on fields, preparing food, taking care of cattle.Gender discriminationIn India boys are preferred over girls. They worship all Devi’s but don’t want girl child as a result they terminate of girl child in mother’s womb. She is poorly nourished, as she and her mother have to be satisfied with the restricted leftover food from the men/boys. This affects her health and causes malnutrition and other diseases. Early marriage, pregnancy and other family responsibilities cause her health to further deteriorate. No proper education causes her not to understand the illnesses. All such discrimination has continued in society for years.Lack of educationWomen are not allow to educate they are raised to got married and have children. More amount of money is spend on male child. In many caste women are not allowed to educate more as they will not find a suitable match for marriage and her parent have to spend more on dowry .Crimes against womenCrimes against women includes rape, sexual harassment at work place, eve teasing, domestic violence, dowry cases. Many cases remain unrecorded due to fear of social stigma on family name and honour. According to a research crime against women reported every two minutes in india.Government initiatives for empowering womenFor sustainable development of the country one should take care about the development that development should be take place at each and every sector and gender of the country. For sake of development of India as a whole government of India launched series of schemes and programmes which support gender equality, health awareness, employment and dependency.These programmes and schemes includes:Social initiatives·National Mission for Empowerment of Women·Aim: It is an initiative of the Government of India for empowering women holistically.· Launched: 15 August 2011Objective:To strengthen the conceptual and programmatic basis of women-centric schemes implemented. Training & Capacity Building to enhance and strengthen understanding of gender issues, build a Resource Pool (trainers) at the National and State level to bridge gaps between knowledge and practice will be the other focus area of NMEW.· Rajiv Gandhi Scheme for Empowerment of Adolescent Girls.Aim: the scheme is funded by the Central government. Adolescent girls in the age group of 11-18 years are eligible for the schemeLaunched: april 1,2011Objectives:· Enable the Adolescent girls for self-development and empowerment· Improve their nutrition and health status.· Promote awareness about health, hygiene, nutrition, adolescent reproductive and sexual health (ARSH) and family and child care.· Upgrade home-based skills, life skills and integrate with the National Skill Development Program (NSDP) for vocational skills.· Mainstream out of school adolescent girls into formal/non formal education.· Provide information/guidance about existing public services such as PHC, CHC, Post Office, Bank, Police Station, etc.· Pradhan mantri ujjawala yojnaaim: To provide clean fuel to women who are below poverty line who generally use unclean cooking fuels that does more harm than good and replace the same with LPG.Launched: In March 2016Objective:o Protecting the health of women and empowering themo Curbing health issues that result from using fossil fuels and other fuels for cookingo Reducing casualties that occur as a result of unclean fuels used for cookingo Controlling respiratory issues that occur due to indoor pollution as a result of using fossil fuel that does not burn cleanly.· Nirbhaya FundAim: with the focus on implementing the initiatives aimed at improving the security and safety of women in India.Launched: Post-2012, Nirbhaya Gang rape case, a dedicated fund was set up in 2013.Objective:· The government’s contribution towards the non-lapsable corpus fund was Rs. 1000 crores.Department of Economic Affairs under the Ministry of Finance is responsible for the administration of the fund. While the ministry of Women and Child Development is the nodal ministry involved in appraising, reviewing, and monitoring the progress of those schemes sanctioned under the Nirbhaya Fund.Considering the need to have a schematic intervention and a complete mechanism for providing support to the women in distress, three schemes are being implemented by the Ministry of Women and Child Development under the Nirbhaya Fund.Keeping in mind the need to have schematic interventions and a proper mechanism for handholding of women in distress, 3 schemes have been implemented by the Ministry of Women and Child Development‘One Stop Centre’‘Universalisation of Women Helpline’‘Mahila Police Volunteer’·Beti Bachao-Beti Padhaoaim: To generate awareness and improve the efficiency of welfare services meant for girlsLaunched on: 22 January 2015Initial Funding: 100 croreObjectives:o To prevent sex-selective abortiono To ensure survival and protection of a girl childo To ensure the education of the girl child·Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005Aim: the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005 is an Act of the Parliament of India enacted to protect women from domestic violence.Launched : 26 October 2006.Objectives-The Act provides for the first time in Indian law a definition of "domestic violence", with this definition being broad and including not only physical violence, but also other forms of violence such as emotional/verbal, sexual, and economic abuse. It is a civil law meant primarily for protection orders and not for meant to be enforced criminally.·Women helpline schemeaim: Scheme for Universalization of Women Helpline is meant to provide 24 hours immediate and emergency response to women affected by violence.Launched on: 01 April 2015Objectives:o To provide toll-free 24-hours telecom service to women affected by violence seeking support and information.o To help crisis and non-crisis intervention through referral to the appropriate agencies such as police/Hospitals/Ambulance services/District Legal Service Authority (DLSA)/Protection Officer (PO).o To provide information about the appropriate support services, government schemes available to the woman affected by violenceCall to any of the following Women Helpline Nos.Call to Women's Helpline: 181 Toll freeCall to 1091- Police Helpline, 102 (hospital/Ambulance) & 108 (Emergency Response Services)Contact to One Stop Centre(OSC)Economic InitiativesThe various economic initiatives by the government are as follows :·Rashtriya Mahila KoshAim: To provide micro-credit to poor women for various livelihood support and income generating activities at concessional terms in a client-friendly procedure to bring about their socio-economic development.Launched: In March 1993Objective:To demonstrate and replicate participatory approaches in the organization of women’s groups for effective utilization of credit resources leading to self-reliance.To promote and support the expansion of entrepreneurship skills among women.To do all such lawful acts & things as may be necessary or conducive for furthering the objects of the Kosh.Bharatiya Mahila BankAim: to ensure greater banking outreach to women, the bank merged with State Bank of India.Launched : 1 April 2017.Objectives: The bank placed an emphasis on funding for skills developments to help in economic activity. Moreover, the products were designed in a manner to give a slight concession on loan rates to women.The bank also aimed to inspire people with entrepreneurial skills and, in conjunction with NGOs, planned to locally mobilise women to train them in vocations like toy-making or driving tractors or mobile repairs, according to Usha Ananthasubramanian (CMD).One of the other objectives of the bank was to promote asset ownership amongst women customers. Studies have shown that asset ownership amongst women reduces their risk of suffering from domestic violence.·Sukanya Samridhi YojanaAim: To encourage parents of a girl child order to create a fund for the future education and marriage expenses for their child.Launched: In January 2015Objective: To ensure the financial independence of women by encouraging them to invest in a savings scheme that would enable them to fulfil their long-term life goals and dreams like higher education, marriage, etc. and ensure financial stability.Health Sector InitiativesThe various health sector initiatives by government are as follows :·Janani Suraksha Yojanalaunched : April 2005 by modifying the National Maternity Benefit Scheme (NMBS). The NMBS came into effect in August 1995 as one of the components of the National Social Assistance Programme (NSAP).Objective:The scheme was transferred from the Ministry of Rural Development to the Department of Health & Family Welfare during the year 2001-02. The NMBS provides for financial assistance of Rs. 500/- per birth up to two live births to the pregnant women who have attained 19 years of age and belong to the below poverty line (BPL) households. When JSY was launched the financial assistance of Rs. 500/-, which was available uniformly throughout the country to BPL pregnant women under NMBS, was replaced by the graded scale of assistance based on the categorization of States as well as whether the beneficiary was from rural/urban areas. States were classified into the Low Performing States and High Performing States on the basis of institutional delivery rate i.e. states having institutional delivery 25% or less were termed as Low Performing States (LPS) and those which have institutional delivery rate more than 25% were classified as High Performing States (HPS). Accordingly, eight erstwhile EAG states namely Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Bihar, Jharkhand, Rajasthan, Odisha and the states of Assam & Jammu & Kashmir were classified as Low Performing States. The remaining States were grouped into the High Performing States.Now with everlasting efforts of government women's status has been increased with respect to previous years. We have come up with various success stories of women in rural and urban areas.Due to awareness many women are taking benefits of government schemes and are becoming self-reliant. Not only raising the standard of living of themselves but also providing employment to other ladies. The number of women entrepreneurs also increased. Empowerment of women in contributing to the overall development of country. It is contributing towards building a better society. Empowerment of women will enable greater happiness for women and for society at large.

Here’s an excellent and footnoted discussion on the idea of martial law. If you read through the whole thing, you will see that the courts’ view of the legality of martial law is reflected by what the state of the union was at the time. But let it speak for itself. If you’d rather read it online at the source, it is Martial Law and Constitutional Limitations“Two theories of martial law are reflected in decisions of the Supreme Court. The first, which stems from the Petition of Right, 1628, provides that the common law knows no such thing as martial law;223 that is to say, martial law is not established by official authority of any sort, but arises from the nature of things, being the law of paramount necessity, leaving the civil courts to be the final judges of necessity.224 By the second theory, martial law can be validly and constitutionally established by supreme political authority in wartime. In the early years of the Supreme Court, the American judiciary embraced the latter theory as it held in Luther v. Borden225 that state declarations of martial law were conclusive and therefore not subject to judicial review.226 In this case, the Court found that the Rhode Island legislature had been within its rights in resorting to the rights and usages of war in combating insurrection in that state. The decision in the Prize Cases,227 although not dealing directly with the subject of martial law, gave national scope to the same general principle in 1863.The Civil War being safely over, however, a divided Court, in the elaborately argued Milligan case,228 reverting to the older doctrine, pronounced President Lincoln’s action void, following his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in September, 1863, in ordering the trial by military commission of persons held in custody as “spies” and “abettors of the enemy.” The salient passage of the Court’s opinion bearing on this point is the following: “If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theater of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war.”229 Four Justices, speaking by Chief Justice Chase, while holding Milligan’s trial to have been void because it violated the Act of March 3, 1863, governing the custody and trial of persons who had been deprived of the habeas corpus privilege, declared their belief that Congress could have authorized Milligan’s trial. The Chief Justice wrote: “Congress has the power not only to raise and support and govern armies but to declare war. It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war. This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the prosecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power and duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief. Both these powers are derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined by that instrument. Their extent must be determined by their nature, and by the principles of our institutions. . . .”“We by no means assert that Congress can establish and apply the laws of war where no war has been declared or exists.”“Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. What we do maintain is, that when the nation is involved in war, and some portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to invasion, it is within the power of Congress to determine in what states or districts such great and imminent public danger exists as justifies the authorization of military tribunals for the trial of crimes and offences against the discipline or security of the army or against the public safety.”230 In short, only Congress can authorize the substitution of military tribunals for civil tribunals for the trial of offenses; and Congress can do so only in wartime.Early in the 20th century, however, the Court appeared to retreat from its stand in Milligan insofar as it held in Moyer v. Peabody231 that “the Governor’s declaration that a state of insurrection existed is conclusive of that fact. . . . [T]he plaintiff ’s position is that he has been deprived of his liberty without due process of law. But it is familiar that what is due process of law depends on circumstances. . . . So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that he had not reasonable ground for his belief.”232 The “good faith” test of Moyer, however, was superseded by the “direct relation” test of Sterling v. Constantin,233 where the Court made it very clear that “[i]t does not follow . . . that every sort of action the Governor may take, no matter how justified by the exigency or subversive of private right and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise available, is conclusively supported by mere executive fiat. . . . What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.”234Martial Law in Hawaii.The question of the constitutional status of martial law was raised again in World War II by the proclamation of Governor Poindexter of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, suspending the writ of habeas corpus and conferring on the local commanding General of the Army all his own powers as governor and also “all of the powers normally exercised by the judicial officers . . . of this territory . . . during the present emergency and until the danger of invasion is removed.” Two days later the Governor’s action was approved by President Roosevelt. The regime which the proclamation set up continued with certain abatements until October 24, 1944.By section 67 of the Organic Act of April 30, 1900,235 the Territorial Governor was authorized “in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, [to] suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Territory, or any part thereof, under martial law until communication can be had with the President and his decision thereon made known.” By section 5 of the Organic Act, “the Constitution . . . shall have the same force and effect within the said Territory as elsewhere in the United States.” In a brace of cases which reached it in February 1945, but which it contrived to postpone deciding till February 1946,236 the Court, speaking by Justice Black, held that the term “martial law” as employed in the Organic Act, “while intended to authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an orderly civil government and for the defense of the Islands against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.”237The Court relied on the majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan. Chief Justice Stone concurred in the result. “I assume also,” he said, “that there could be circumstances in which the public safety requires, and the Constitution permits, substitution of trials by military tribunals for trials in the civil courts,”238 but added that the military authorities themselves had failed to show justifying facts in this instance. Justice Burton, speaking for himself and Justice Frankfurter, dissented. He stressed the importance of Hawaii as a military outpost and its constant exposure to the danger of fresh invasion. He warned that “courts must guard themselves with special care against judging past military action too closely by the inapplicable standards of judicial, or even military, hindsight.”239Articles of War: The Nazi Saboteurs.In 1942 eight youths, seven Germans and one an American, all of whom had received training in sabotage in Berlin, were brought to this country aboard two German submarines and put ashore, one group on the Florida coast, the other on Long Island, with the idea that they would proceed forthwith to practice their art on American factories, military equipment, and installations. Making their way inland, the saboteurs were soon picked up by the FBI, some in New York, others in Chicago, and turned over to the Provost Marshal of the District of Columbia. On July 2, the President appointed a military commission to try them for violation of the laws of war, to wit: for not wearing fixed emblems to indicate their combatant status. In the midst of the trial, the accused petitioned the Supreme Court and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia for leave to bring habeas corpus proceedings. Their argument embraced the contentions: (1) that the offense charged against them was not known to the laws of the United States; (2) that it was not one arising in the land and naval forces; and (3) that the tribunal trying them had not been constituted in accordance with the requirements of the Articles of War.The first argument the Court met as follows: The act of Congress in providing for the trial before military tribunals of offenses against the law of war is sufficiently definite, although Congress has not undertaken to codify or mark the precise boundaries of the law of war, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which that law condemns. “. . . [T]hose who during time of war pass surreptitiously from enemy territory into . . . [that of the United States], discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of unlawful combatants punishable as such by military commission.”240 The second argument it disposed of by showing that petitioners’ case was of a kind that was never deemed to be within the terms of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, citing in confirmation of this position the trial of Major Andre.241 The third contention the Court overruled by declining to draw the line between the powers of Congress and the President in the premises,242 thereby, in effect, attributing to the President the right to amend the Articles of War in a case of the kind before the Court ad libitum.The decision might well have rested on the ground that the Constitution is without restrictive force in wartime in a situation of this sort. The saboteurs were invaders; their penetration of the boundary of the country, projected from units of a hostile fleet, was essentially a military operation, their capture was a continuation of that operation. Punishment of the saboteurs was therefore within the President’s purely martial powers as Commander in Chief. Moreover, seven of the petitioners were enemy aliens, and so, strictly speaking, without constitutional status. Even had they been civilians properly domiciled in the United States at the outbreak of the war, they would have been subject under the statutes to restraint and other disciplinary action by the President without appeals to the courts. In any event, the Court rejected the jurisdictional challenge by one of the saboteurs on the basis of his claim to U.S. citizenship, finding U.S. citizenship wholly irrelevant to the determination of whether a wartime captive is an “enemy belligerent” within the meaning of the law of war.243Articles of War: World War II Crimes.As a matter of fact, in General Yamashita’s case,244 which was brought after the termination of hostilities for alleged “war crimes,” the Court abandoned its restrictive conception altogether. In the words of Justice Rutledge’s dissenting opinion in this case: “The difference between the Court’s view of this proceeding and my own comes down in the end to the view, on the one hand, that there is no law restrictive upon these proceedings other than whatever rules and regulations may be prescribed for their government by the executive authority or the military and, on the other hand, that the provisions of the Articles of War, of the Geneva Convention and the Fifth Amendment apply.”245 And the adherence of the United States to the Charter of London in August 1945, under which the Nazi leaders were brought to trial, is explicable by the same theory. These individuals were charged with the crime of instigating aggressive war, which at the time of its commission was not a crime either under international law or under the laws of the prosecuting governments. It must be presumed that the President is not in his capacity as Supreme Commander bound by the prohibition in the Constitution of ex post facto laws, nor does international law forbid ex post facto laws.246Articles of War: Response to the Attacks of September 11, 2001.In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C., Congress passed the “Authorization for Use of Military Force,”247 which provided that the President may use “all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks [or] harbored such organizations or persons.” During a military action in Afghanistan pursuant to this authorization, a United States citizen, Yaser Hamdi, was taken prisoner. The Executive Branch argued that it had plenary authority under Article II to hold such an “enemy combatant” for the duration of hostilities, and to deny him meaningful recourse to the federal courts. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court agreed that the President was authorized to detain a United States citizen seized in Afghanistan, although a majority of the Court appeared to reject the notion that such power was inherent in the Presidency, relying instead on statutory grounds.248 However, the Court did find that the government may not detain the petitioner indefinitely for purposes of interrogation, and must afford him the opportunity to offer evidence that he is not an enemy combatant.249In Rasul v. Bush,250 the Court rejected an Executive Branch argument that foreign prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay were outside of federal court jurisdiction. The Court distinguished earlier case law arising during World War II that denied habeas corpus petitions from German citizens who had been captured and tried overseas by United States military tribunals.251 In Rasul, the Court noted that the Guantanamo petitioners were not citizens of a country at war with the United States,252 had not been afforded any form of tribunal, and were being held in a territory over which the United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction and control.253 In addition, the Court found that statutory grounds existed for the extension of habeas corpus to these prisoners.254In response to Rasul, Congress amended the habeas statute to eliminate all federal habeas jurisdiction over detainees, whether its basis was statutory or constitutional.255 This amendment was challenged in Boumediene v. Bush,256 as a violation of the Suspension Clause.257 Although the historical record did not contain significant common-law applications of the writ to foreign nationals who were apprehended and detained overseas, the Court did not find this conclusive in evaluating whether habeas applied in this case.258 Emphasizing a “functional” approach to the issue,259 the Court considered (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made; (2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and detention took place; and (3) any practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ. As in Rasul, the Court distinguished previous case law, noting that the instant detainees disputed their enemy status, that their ability to dispute their status had been limited, that they were held in a location (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba) under the de facto jurisdiction of the United States, and that complying with the demands of habeas petitions would not interfere with the government’s military mission. Thus, the Court concluded that the Suspension Clause was in full effect regarding these detainees.Martial Law and Domestic Disorder.President Washing- ton himself took command of state militia called into federal service to quell the Whiskey Rebellion, but there were not too many occasions subsequently in which federal troops or state militia called into federal service were required.260 Since World War II, however, the President, by virtue of his own powers and the authority vested in him by Congress,261 has used federal troops on a number of occasions, five of them involving resistance to desegregation decrees in the South.262 In 1957, Governor Faubus employed the Arkansas National Guard to resist court-ordered desegregation in Little Rock, and President Eisenhower dispatched federal soldiers and brought the Guard under federal authority.263 In 1962, President Kennedy dispatched federal troops to Oxford, Mississippi, when federal marshals were unable to control with rioting that broke out upon the admission of an African American student to the University of Mississippi.264 In June and September of 1964, President Johnson sent troops into Alabama to enforce court decrees opening schools to blacks.265 And, in 1965, the President used federal troops and federalized local Guardsmen to protect participants in a civil rights march. The President justified his action on the ground that there was a substantial likelihood of domestic violence because state authorities were refusing to protect the marchers.266Footnotes223C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 20–22 (1930); A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 283, 290 (5th ed. 1923).224Id. at 539–44.22548 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See also Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32–33 (1827).22648 U.S. (7 How.) at 45.22767 U.S. (2 Bl.) 635 (1863).228Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).22971 U.S. at 127.23071 U.S. at 139–40. In Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864), the Court had held, while war was still flagrant, that it had no power to review by certiorari the proceedings of a military commission ordered by a general officer of the Army, commanding a military department.231212 U.S. 78 (1909).232212 U.S. at 83–85.233287 U.S. 378 (1932). “The nature of the power also necessarily implies that there is a permitted range of honest judgment as to the measures to be taken in meeting force with force, in suppressing violence and restoring order, for without such liberty to make immediate decision, the power itself would be useless. Such measures, conceived in good faith, in the face of the emergency and directly related to the quelling of the disorder or the prevention of its continuance, fall within the discretion of the Executive in the exercise of his authority to maintain peace.” Id. at 399–400.234287 U.S. at 400–01. This holding has been ignored by states on numerous occasions. E.g., Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P.2d 1054 (1935); Hearon v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935); and Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512 (W.D. Tenn. 1939).23531 Stat. 141, 153 (1900).236Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).237327 U.S. at 324.238327 U.S. at 336.239327 U.S. at 343.240Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29–30, 35 (1942).241317 U.S. at 41–42.242317 U.S. at 28–29.243Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942) (“Citizens who associate themselves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”). See also Colepaugh v. Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1014 (1957) (“[T]he petitioner’s citizenship in the United States does not . . . confer upon him any constitutional rights not accorded any other belligerent under the laws of war.”).244In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).245327 U.S. at 81.246See Gross, The Criminality of Aggressive War, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 205 (1947).247Pub. L. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).248542 U.S. 507 (2004). There was no opinion of the Court. Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, avoided ruling on the Executive Branch argument that such detentions could be authorized by its Article II powers alone, and relied instead on the “Authorization for Use of Military Force” passed by Congress. Justice Thomas also found that the Executive Branch had the power to detain the petitioner, although his dissenting opinion found that such detentions were authorized by Article II. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg, rejected the argument that the Congress had authorized such detentions, while Justice Scalia, joined with Justice Stevens, denied that such congressional authorization was possible without a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.249At a minimum, the petitioner must be given notice of the asserted factual basis for holding him, must be given a fair chance to rebut that evidence before a neutral decisionmaker, and must be allowed to consult an attorney. 542 U.S. at 533, 539.250542 U.S. 466 (2004).251Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).252The petitioners were Australians and Kuwaitis.253Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. at 467.254The Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which had previously been construed to require the presence of a petitioner in a district court’s jurisdiction, was now satisfied by the presence of a jailor-custodian. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Another “enemy combatant” case, this one involving an American citizen arrested on American soil, was remanded after the Court found that a federal court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was limited to jurisdiction over the immediate custodian of a petitioner. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (federal court’s jurisdiction over Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld not sufficient to satisfy presence requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). In Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), the Court held that the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, applied to American citizens held by the Multinational Force—Iraq, an international coalition force operating in Iraq and composed of 26 different nations, including the United States. The Court concluded that the habeas statute extends to American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an American chain of command, even when those forces are acting as part of a multinational coalition.255Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–148, § 1005(e)(1) (providing that “no court . . . shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by . . . an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay”). After the Court decided, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), that this language of the Detainee Treatment Act did not apply to detainees whose cases were pending at the time of enactment, the language was amended by the Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–366, to also apply to pending cases where a detainee had been determined to be an enemy combatant.256553 U.S. 723 (2008).257U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” In Boumediene, the government argued only that the Suspension Clause did not apply to the detainees; it did not argue that Congress had acted to suspend habeas.258“[G]iven the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and the particular dangers of terrorism in the modern age, the common-law courts simply may not have confronted cases with close parallels to this one. We decline, therefore, to infer too much, one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on this point.” 553 U.S. at 752.259553 U.S. at 764. “[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical concerns, not formalism.” Id.260United States Adjutant-General, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787–1903, S. Doc. No. 209, 57th Congress, 2d sess. (1903); Pollitt, Presidential Use of Troops to Enforce Federal Laws: A Brief History, 36 N.C. L. REV. 117 (1958). United States Marshals were also used on approximately 30 occasions. United States Commission on Civil Rights, Law Enforcement: A Report on Equal Protection in the South (Washington: 1965), 155–159.26110 U.S.C. §§ 331–334, 3500, 8500, deriving from laws of 1795, 1 Stat. 424; 1861, 12 Stat. 281; and 1871, 17 Stat. 14.262The other instances were in domestic disturbances at the request of state governors.263Proc. No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957); E.O. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628. See 41 Ops. Atty. Gen. 313 (1957); see also, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Aaron v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff’d sub nom Faubus v. Aaron, 361 U.S. 197 (1959); Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 829 (1958).264Proc. No. 3497, 27 Fed. Reg. 9681 (1962); E.O. 11053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9693 (1962). See United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965).265Proc. 3542, 28 Fed. Reg. 5707 (1963); E.O. 11111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5709 (1963); Proc. No. 3554, 28 Fed. Reg. 9861; E.O. 11118, 28 Fed. Reg. 9863 (1963). See Alabama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963).266Proc. No. 3645, 30 Fed. Reg. 3739 (1965); E.O. 11207, 30 Fed. Reg. 2743 (1965). See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).