Force Xxi: Fill & Download for Free

I have said this many times. I wish combat arms units (the ones that we rely on to go bang bang) would focus less on IT. There are a number of benefits to having a technological edge. But I think there is a danger in our over reliance upon it. In an asymmetrical war like Iraq and Afghanistan or other such missions around the world this is good, and the disadvantages are negligible.But when it comes to conventional war I believe it hinders units at the battalion level and lower. We have to lug around extra generator sets that require fuel, we have to set up lots of cables, extra antennas, a satellite dish, and mountains of computers.Here is a list of the individual different computers you would find at just the Battalion level, keeping in mind the personnel needed to operate, set up, maintain, and the logistical burden;Command Post of the Future (CPOF)Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below (FBCB2)Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS)Tactical Operation Center Network (TOCNET) to include the user CAU’s (A desktop mini computer you can select different radio freqs, phone lines, etc to communicate over)Every Staff Section has at least 1 laptop, usually more. Battalion level leadership likely have their own computers too.The Battalion Aid Station has stuff too. Medical Communications for Combat Casualty Care (MC4) has one laptop that is a server and then usually 2–3 laptops for documenting care. Additionally the Aid Station itself is a Chemical Biological shelter with an integrated computer system that monitors the environment and will go into a protective mode if anything is detected.I guarantee there are more computers I’m not aware of.All of this takes time to set up, it takes manpower and extra vehicle space to move or even store, it makes us not just a larger physical target that is easier to see, it makes us a larger target for near peer adversaries that can detect electromagnetic signatures.In my humble estimation, the first 72–96 hours of conventional warfare would see our IT capabilities for front-line units (Battalion and lower) essentially destroyed or rendered useless. Whether going on the offense or the defense, we are always jumping, moving, and fighting. It’s a strain on our abilities to maintain all of this and expect these assets to not be among the first targets for enemy air or fire support to attempt to take out.Although I will say it puts us in a better position. We are able to fight without it. But take the Chinese for comparison. Their Battalions barely have what we have. Let’s even compare Infantry Companies. Our Infantry Companies will typically have a laptop, a radio to monitor higher headquarters/battlespace, an internal radio for their company, and then each of the platoons have at least one radio. The Chinese have 2 radios, one of which is solely reserved for the political officer, their platoons have none.So even though I’m griping about all the computers we have, it’s better to have it and lose it, than not even have it in the first place.

We'll skip over the myriad of conceptual, tank-like designs that have come up over the centuries and start this discussion with the Mark I, the first tank to see combat:The concept and design of the tank - in some contemporary, official circles called "landships" - was pretty straightforward. Put a tracked, metal cage around an engine, put some guys inside with a couple of guns to drive it forward, and send the infantry in behind to exploit the breach. It was a low-riding, 28 ton behemoth that did not take well to soft ground, which is a problem when fighting across muddy, shelled terrain.The tank's engine did not have its own compartment, meaning the eight-man crew had to suffer with the engine's exhaust and noise on top of being relentlessly shot at - a consequence of being the biggest, most obvious target on the battlefield. This meant that the conditions inside the tank were miserable to put it politely.Being inside one of these monsters looked a bit like this:Source: BBCIt took four crewmen to drive the Mark I - the driver (duh), the commander, and one "gearsman" for each track. The other four crew members operated the two converted naval guns that had no way to be accurately aimed unless the tank was absolutely still (which is not an ideal situation on a battlefield where, again, you're the biggest target and prone to becoming mired in the mud) and a few light machine guns (also not stabilized in any fashion).To elaborate on being a bullet magnet: the Mark I had armor less than an inch thick and could travel at a break-neck speed of 5 miles per hour (a light jogging pace). In combination with a tendency to break down and get stuck, or have to remain still to fire with any effect, if the tank came under an intense artillery barrage, it (and its crew) was screwed.I should also mention that there was no artificial lighting inside the tank - and yes, they were deployed in night combat or other operations. The tank's commander would walk in front of the tank with a lit cigarette on his back as much to guide the driver as to avoid being run over.By the end of WWI, the tank's designers took some of the lessons learned from the Mark I's operational problems and fielded the Mark V, which was, well, basically the same, except it had a better engine, transmission (it could reverse) and only required two people to drive.So let's jump forward 100 years to one of the world's best, combat-tested tanks, the M1 Abrams:Selecting the best awesome picture was difficult.In service since 1980, the most current, fielded variant of the Abrams, the M1A2 System Enhancement Package (SEP) might be best described as a moving fortress built around a computer-operated cannon.The four-man crew benefits from the most modern technology available for a weapons platform (and only requires one person to drive). The Abrams has forward looking infrared optics that allow for thermal and night vision images. The tank's fire control system can select and track multiple targets, and then correct for the tank's movement in order to engage targets from up to 4,000 meters away with the 120 mm gun. The fire control system also operates the tank's three machine guns.The Abrams' primary defense (other than going on offense) is its composite armor is comparable to three feet of steel, which can be enhanced with reactive armour and guided-missile countermeasures. The Abrams' armor is so effective that even other Abrams have difficulty destroying it. This was discovered during an incident during Desert Storm where an M1 was irrecoverably bogged down, and so ordered abandoned and destroyed.The abandoned M1 shrugged off several rounds fired from other Abrams, until one finally penetrated the ammunition compartment. You might think that the detonation of the tank's ammunition would wreck the tank, but in fact the Abrams' fire suppression systems succeeded in preventing the detonation from getting out of control.Eventually, the bogged Abrams was recovered and revealed to be completely operational. As such, it was patched up and put back into service, because why waste a perfectly good tank?Oh, and it should be noted that while the crew was waiting to be extracted, it was engaged by three T-72s. The less-advanced tanks' rounds were unable to penetrate the Abrams' armor; and not only did the Abrams crew engage and destroy the enemy tanks, it destroyed one of them after it had hidden behind a berm. The crew used the Abrams' thermal imaging to hone in on the concealed tank's engine exhaust and pick out where it was hiding.And far from driving blind, the Abrams is integrated with the Army Common Operating Environment system (utilizing Force XXI communications) that gives the commander real-time information on the state of the battlefield, from the positions of other vehicles to contact reports and engagements.In short, the first tanks were lumbering gun platforms with limited range that were intended to support infantry attacks. They have since evolved into sophisticated fighting machines that are more than capable of conducting independent offensive operations; but when they are used as part of a combined arms offensive, they still lead the charge.

It wasn’t really the numbers that were the problem, after all no fewer than 119 type XXI U-boats were completed by the time of the German surrender in May 1945. For the type XXI U-boat to have been effective it would’ve had to have been ready for combat sooner, not for there merely to have been more of them.Also, I suppose the un-asked question is could be real type XXI U-boat have decisively altered the course of the war at sea in the second world war as opposed to the mythical type XXI U-boat? The difference being that the mythical type XXI U-boat is a wonder weapon with no obvious flaws. While the real type XXI U-boat, while advanced, without a doubt, had a number of very serious flaws that would’ve detrimentally affected its operational performance.Type XXI submarine - WikipediaSo what was good about the type XXI U-boat?She had a streamlined hull and a considerable battery capacity comprising a total of 372 cells. She could sprint submerged at about 16 kn for one hour, to put that into perspective previous U-boats and Allied submarines had a submerged sprint pace typically less than half of that. She could also cruise submerged on her batteries for very many more hours than any previous conventional type. She had a passive SONAR array which was capable of considerable discernment when it came to identifying targets and she had six bow torpedo tubes as opposed to the typical U-boat number of four and these tubes could be reloaded hydraulically in merely five minutes. She was also armed, at least potentially, with better torpedoes including a new pattern running type and a new GNAT, the T11 with an improved homing head to overcome allied noise-producing countermeasures.With a snorkel fitted as standard, it was believed that the type XXI U-boat could remain submerged effectively almost indefinitely. Dive times were assumed to be good and it was believed that the maximum diving depth of the type XXI was in the region [in imperial measurements] of 1200 feet. This was much deeper than allied equivalents and indeed was deep enough to make the type XXI all but immune to the standard depth charge, especially given her underwater speed and their rate of decent.So far so mythologically great.However, it would be a mistake to believe that the allies were sitting on their hands in terror. They were not. As early as the summer of 1944 the British were actively examining countermeasures to nullify this threat and one can assume that the USN were as well. By June 1944 the British began modifying the submarine HMS Seraph, streamlining the hull and massively increasing battery storage.From October of that year the modified Seraph was used extensively to hone capabilities of RN And RCN escort groups. Asdic, as sonar was still known by the British, had been designed for slow speed use. The rush of water past the asdic dome at about 15 kn was sufficient to drown out much of the echo. Since the type XXI was known to be faster than this clearly that was a problem that would require both high-speed domes and more powerful emitters.However, the trials were to show that at high-speed the submarine itself could be followed simply by listening to it. through the existing asdic apparatus An early indication of the later switch from active sonar systems to passive ones. The trials also showed that the clean lines of the modified Seraph made her a difficult target at angles of high obliquity for active sonar. It was all too easy for a single hunter to lose her. Postwar USN trials with actual type XXI U-boats revealed that it could take up to seven hunters to be sure of maintaining contact.But the Seraph trials did show that the type XXI U-boat was not invisible, it could still be detected and it could still be tracked even whilst submerged.Weapons systems would also have to be considered very carefully. It seemed apparent that the age of the depth charge was coming to an end. Greater reliance would have to be placed upon ahead throwing weapons such as Hedgehog and Squid. Since they could be used when the target was still fixed and being actively tracked. However, the allies had already fielded a homing torpedo of their own, the innocuously named “Mark 24 mine”. While, at only 12 kn, FIDO was too slow for typical use against a submerged type XXI, at least if the U-boat had been alerted, it was still fast enough to catch an unalerted boat. It is also to be supposed that if the type XXI appeared in numbers then an enhanced version of FIDO with greater speed would also be deployed.Mark 24 mine - WikipediaThe allies also considered using many more passive sonar buoys than hitherto. Again the idea being to fix the target so that Hunter groups could destroy it.Now on to the problems with the real type XXI U-boat.Modular construction have been decided upon with prefabricated sections built in different areas by many different firms, many of which had never been involved in any form of shipbuilding before. These prefabricated sections were then transported, typically by canal given their size, to specialist yards that fitted them together. On many occasions the prefabricated sections did not really fit. Also weakness in welds resulted in an actual maximum dive depth that was only about two thirds of the specified depth. In addition these welds and their weaknesses made the type XXI vulnerable to the shock of exploding depth charges and, one supposes especially, the projectiles fired by squid. Perhaps the era of the depth charge wasn’t quite finished after all.The diesel engines fitted to the type XXI required superchargers to achieve their rated power output and the superchargers never performed satisfactorily. This halved the available power which both reduced surface speed and/or increased the time required to charge the batteries. Similarly, the snorkel installation was found to be shoddy, it was found that even in moderate seas the mast frequently became submerged and the float which was supposed to seal it often failed so that saltwater poured into the boat. The only way to get it out again was to use the bilge pumps and these were noisy. Which is a real problem when you have an opponent who is switching to passive sound detection methods and intends to deploy large numbers of sonar buoys.The other problem with the snorkel continuously submerging was that it caused the diesels to suck air from the engine compartment and thus from the interior of the boat. This could cause wild pressure fluctuations, which was unpleasant but could also cause a buildup of carbon monoxide within the boat which was deadly. Snorkeling the type XXI was not considered an experience to be prolonged.In addition, Allied centimetric radar was already capable, if the sea conditions were favorable, to detect a snorkeling U-boat. Once detected attack would follow almost immediately.Finally, the majority of the delicate hydraulic systems upon which the type XXI relied were routed outside of the pressure hull where they could not be maintained or fixed outside of a port. They were thus liable to corrosion and very vulnerable to shock damage.So could the type XXI have decisively altered the course of the war at sea?I would say not.They might well open the war up again, they might even, potentially, usher in a third “happy time”. They might cause the mass obsolescence of many of the anti-submarine warships that had been built in such numbers and at such expense from 1939 onward. Indeed, this was an event that the type XXI achieved anyway, just by its promise, not by its actual capabilities. But there were faster, ASW designs already available and these could, if necessary, be rushed into production. Meanwhile, American construction of standardized merchant hulls was already far greater than almost any U-boat offensive imaginable could put a dent in.The Allies had by 1944 proved that, technologically, they were far in advance of Nazi Germany [except in one or two specialized fields such as rocketry]. The advanced type XXI U-boat could be defeated, if only barely, by existing technology. It is unlikely that the allies would not have responded to this renewed threat with a new wave of faster, better-armed escorts with better sensors and weapons.The other factor which has to be considered is the relative state of training and experience of the two sides. By 1944/45 the Ubootwaffe had become a green and mostly untried force, the aces were all long since dead, captured or were transferred onshore, leaving the newly trained to conduct war patrols. By comparison, the Allied ASW forces were honed to a keen edge. They were better trained and far more experienced. They knew how to get the most out of their commands while the same cannot be said for their opponents even if they were given newer and better weapons.No, considering all the potential factors I do not believe the course of the Battle of the Atlantic would’ve been changed to any major degree.