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How long did it take to train a regiment in the 18th and 19th centuries?Short answer: Three weeks to three months to a lifetime. Target practice was not a priority. Cavalrymen drilled with their sabers, both on foot and horseback, while artillerymen drilled with their cannons limbered up to the team of horses and unlimbered, ready to fire.Oddly enough, marksmanship on a rifle range did not take precedence over other drill the soldiers learned for several reasons — basically the military believed that each man would shoot accurately when told to and the war departments did not wish to waste ammunition fired on random targets. American were (and are) more familiar with the use of firearms than the soldiers of many other nations.American regiments (of the Revolution and Civil War) had to learn to fight on the battlefield, but they learned to drill in camp. The training of regiments was lacking and consisted mainly of the manual of arms, little target practice, company and regimental drills in basic maneuvers and brigade drill and skirmishing tactics. Division drill or mock combat was a rare occurrence. Soldier life consisted of having to drill everyday, most of a soldier’s time in camp was spent on drilling. Veterans often remarked how they could recite the steps of loading and priming for many years after the war, thanks to the continual drill.Von Steuben drilling the American army at Valley Forge (Winter 1777-1778). The Baron trained a cadre of NCOs who, in turn, trained their men in a novel and abbreviated form of European drill. His training regimen became the basis for Regulations for the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States. The guide better known as, simply, the "Blue Book" would serve the US Army through the War of 1812.The story of the military institutions of the American colonies is an account of efforts to keep as much of the population as possible armed and prepared to fight on short notice. Citizen militias of the 18th century — the foundation of American individualism and liberty — should not be confused with provincial forces, which were organized, financed, and commanded by government officials. It has been said of militias, “Border warfare was the only school in which the yeomanry had been trained up, and as soon as the exigency was over they returned to their farms or workshops.”[i]There remains in America the cherished romantic concept of the militia as "minutemen," a mythical army of self-trained and self-armed warriors springing from the colonial soil in times of trouble. While this may seem a natural and sensible means of having, near at hand, contingents of men familiar with the use of weapons, the reality of relying on such a makeshift system for defense could prove a disastrous illusion.The earliest colonial settlers were seldom effectively organized for warfare when simply formed in hastily assembled and informally constructed groups. It was found that only with training was the colonial soldiery effective. Therefore, periodic training days were instituted, and a cadre of elected or appointed officers was formed. A local stockpile of gunpowder and a few artillery pieces were provided along with armor, pikes, and other items not commonly available to the settlers. These improvements became characteristic of most militia systems.[ii]Soldiers firing rifles or the long range Minié bullet from a rifled musket had to learn how to judge distances more accurately and to set the sights correctly. This skill had not been required when they fired the short-range smoothbore Brown Bess in volley. The skill of American riflemen of the Revolution was clearly a product of a lifetime of hunting and ranging. Many Civil War soldiers might have been excellent shots when hunting back home, but in battle when the balls and shell are flying, many were just loading and firing as fast as they could without taking much aim. During that period the infantry tactic remained the same -- use the weapon to provide rolling volleys, fired by formations in close order; either companies, platoons or files. This tactic was designed to break up the enemy’s formations.Even with the advance of the rifle musket, the weapons were still muzzle loaders and officers believed that the old-fashioned drill formations were still useful to insure a massing of continuous firepower that the individual soldier could not sustain. This is where marksmanship training rather than marching and deploying in line was sorely missing. Studies done during the Crimean War suggested that a soldier firing at appropriate targets all day took out his opposite number in 60 shots. The number of casualties (wounded and KIA) at Gettysburg (approximately 47k to 51K) divided by the 3 million rounds fired comes very close to this number.Each British company deployed to Crimea in the 1850s had been issued 200 Minié balls and allotted range time on the way out so that they might be fully equipped and better familiarized with the new weapons. (Yes, 200 rounds for a company!) “At short ranges, volleys could be devastating as the bullet could go through several men in a column of Russian troops …. However, the greatest advantage of the Minié was that, in the hands of a marksman, it could be used for sniping or sharp shooting at ranges of 250 to 400 yards, and even at ranges up to 800 yards, and above, at individual targets, such as enemy officers and artillerymen.” It is estimated that the accuracy of experienced shots firing at a standard target at 400 yards was 75 %, at 600 yards 60 %, and at 800 yards 25 % [W.S. Curtis, Past Chairman Crimean War Research Society, War Correspondent Vol. 14 No 1-April 1996]. Unable to witness a major field battle, the American commissioners sent to the theater of war as neutral observers could not observe the power of rifled weaponry in the hands of a well-drilled infantry. More than two decades after the war in Crimea the British were still setting out range markers on the battlefield before an encounter. [iii]Military education in America was a well considered alternative to academia for the sons of southern families in the decades before the Civil War (1861–1865), and many distrusted private northern institutions with their “reformist” and “liberal” faculties. The importance of southern military schools was in the zeal that their graduates exhibited and the excellent public relations that they excited. The Arsenal at Columbia and the Citadel at Charleston pioneered the use of Cadet Drill Instructors, also known as "Drillmasters," to train militia units under Major Richard W. Colcock, Superintendent of The Citadel (West Point class of 1826) and a former Instructor of Military Tactics at West Point. One VMI cadet wrote in 1860, “We don't do anything at all but study tactics and drill ... There is a cavalry company out in front of barracks … nearly nine o’clock at night. That looks like War!” [iv]The 96th Pennsylvania conducting drills during the Civil War, c. 1861. The 96th Pennsylvania was composed of over 1100 volunteers from Schuylkill, Berks, and Dauphin County.The great difference between Billy Yank and Johnny Reb seems to have been in their style of fighting — a characteristic noted by many observers. "Three points I noted with regard to our opponents," observed federal captain John W. De Forest. "They aimed better than our men; they covered themselves (in case of need) more carefully and effectively; they could move in a swarm, without much care for alignment and touching elbows. In short, they fought more like [Indians], or like hunters, than we. The result was that they lost fewer men, though they were far inferior in numbers." [v]Union soldiers were trained using Hardee’s Infantry Tactics. It was an easy system to for soldiers to learn. Each day consisted of drilling in the school of the soldier, school of the company, skirmish drill, and dress parade. The next day drilling resumed. The drill was important for the infantry for they used tactics that had changed little since the time of the American Revolution or the age of Napoleon. After preliminary training had ended soldiers were sent from their camps and joined the main armies in the field. Since many regiments were recruited from local communities and served together throughout the war, some regiments went into combat only three weeks after being organized — others after several months of awaiting the campaign season.[i] Samuel Adams Drake, The Border Wars of New England, Commonly Called King William's and Queen Anne's Wars (Williamstown, MA: Corner House, 1973), 15.[ii] John K. Mahon, "Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794," The Mississippi Valley Historical Review 45 (1958), 254.[iii] Springman, Michael. Sharpshooter in the Crimea: The Letters of the Captain Gerald Goodlake VC 1854-56 (Kindle Locations 252-253). Pen and Sword. Kindle Edition.[iv] James M. Volo, Dorothy A. Volo, Daily Life in Civil War America (1998, 2009)[v] Croushore, 190. De Forest.

Again, before the sermon I think it’s important to recommend that everyone read, read, and read more about the Civil War. I find it tragic that many Americans have little understanding of the War and that’s just not right. You have to approach the war as an historian, not a judge or a partisan. We’re going to look briefly at the life of a remarkable man who in many ways was the Real John Wayne. He was one of only two generals to rise from the rank of private during the Civil War. But he was also a controversial figure and it’s imperative to remain impartial.Nathan Bedford Forrest was the son of a blacksmith from North Carolina. After moving the family to Tennessee, his father died when Forrest was sixteen leaving many children and a widow. They would have been destitute except for Forrest’s care and business acumen.Forrest was unschooled but, much like Lincoln was self educated. He was polite and well spoken, normally cordial and genteel. However, at a time when the average man was between 5′6″ and 5′8″, Forrest was a giant at 6 feet two inches and 180 pounds and when angered became a formidable enemy. In a feud with members of the Matlock family following the killing of his uncle by them in 1845, the 24 year old Forrest killed two of the Matlock men with a two shot pistol and wounded two others when he took possession of a knife that they had thrown at him and fought back. He was a good and true friend but a furious and implacable enemy.He joined the Confederate army in Tennessee at the outbreak of hostilities as a private. At the time he was one of the wealthiest men in the South, with holdings valued at over one and a half million dollars. He was also formally exempt from military service and joined the army shortly before his fortieth birthday. Upon seeing how poorly equipped his regiment was, he offered to equip his own regiment at his own expense. He was allowed to do so by the governor and appointed lieutenant colonel. Though he had no formal military training at all, he had an incredible natural ability to not just lead men, but to predict an enemy’s movements and to see ground and immediately know how to use it to his command’s best advantage. He was a sage judge of men and a rigorous trainer and commander. He was involved in most of the western battles during the war. He led his command and many other men out of Fort Donelson and escaped the surrender to Grant. “I did not bring my command here to surrender.”He performed the rear guard duty at the end of the Battle of Shiloh and received the final shot of that battle, in an action called the “Battle of the Fallen Timbers.” He lead a charge into the Union troops and suddenly realized he was alone among a whole group of Union infantry. He fired his revolvers until they were empty then attacked the men with his saber. Cries of “Knock him down. Knock him off the god damn horse,” were surrounding him when a union soldier stuck a rifle into his side and fired, lifting Forrest off his saddle. He forced his horse to saw back and forth pushing the soldiers back away and got turned around. He reached down and grabbed a union soldier by the shirt and set him behind the saddle and galloped away, tossing the soldier off as he got out of range. The ball from the rifle lodged near his spine and was removed a week later without anesthesia.When Grant first headed south toward Vicksburg Forrest led over 2000 inexperienced and poorly armed troopers into western Tennessee and cut Grants lines of communication, stole tons of Union supplies and horses, cut railroads and telegraph lines and forced Grant to retreat. Though the famous quote, “You gotta git there fustus with tha mostus,” was never uttered by him (Bruce Catton points out that he just didn’t talk like that) it did embrace his philosophy of getting there first with the biggest force. Forrest was innovative in that he believed in and probably created the modern principles of an aggressively mobile army. He avoided contact with superior forces, only attacked when he knew he could win and was always aware of the topography and where the strongest points were. It was one of his crowning achievements. When he emerged from those fights his troops were hardened veterans with the best equipment and arms the Yankees could buy. And there were more of them!Under Braxton Braggs command Forrest was the cavalry commander at Chickamauga. When the battle was won, Forrest pursued the Union forces back toward the city but Bragg failed to follow up the victory, go after the Union army and re-take Chattanooga. When he heard of the decision, it is said that Forrest rode an injured horse up to Bragg’s headquarters, pulled a finger out of the horses wound and threatened Bragg for not being aggressive. “Sir, if we meet again, it will be at the risk of your life,” he was reported to have said. This episode is recorded in Shelby Foote’s Narrative History of the Civil War though it has since been challenged. Nevertheless Forrest was re-assigned to the west once again and went back to Kentucky where he attacked Paducah. Failing to take the Union fort there he assigned some of his forces to stay and sack the town. He moved on down the Mississippi to Fort Pillow, a former Confederate fort that the Union had captured to guard the river upstream from Memphis. A Confederate force was already there and Forrest demanded that the Union commander surrender. He refused and the Confederates began to over run the fort. About half of the nearly 600 man garrison was black. Many of the men ran to the river expecting to be picked up by a Union gunboat but a steady Rebel fire kept that boat buttoned up and off shore. What began next has come to be known as the Fort Pillow Massacre. Union soldiers tried to surrender and were shot down. The black soldiers were witnessed trying to surrender, begging for their lives and were simply murdered. When the killing ended and the remaining captives were marched away, only about 20% of the black soldiers survived while about 60% of the whites had. Forrest himself bragged that the river ran red with blood for more than 200 yards. A Sargent from Tennessee in Forrest’s command wrote home to his sisters, “The slaughter was awful. Words cannot describe the scene. The poor negroes would run up to our men fall upon their knees and with uplifted hands scream for mercy but they were ordered to their feet and then shot down. White men fared little better. The fort turned out to be a great slaughter pen. Blood, human blood stood about in pools and brains could have been gathered up in quantity.” That is the testimony of a Confederate!Forrest would go on to win other victories and became a great hero in the South. Following a serious defeat at Selma, Al. in April 1865 he got word that Lee had surrendered. He followed suite and admonished his troops in a farewell address to follow the law and obey the powers that be. During the war he had 30 horses shot from under him and had killed 31 men in hand to hand combat.After the war he tried his hand at railroads and contracted to hand dig a notch through the formation in Arkansas known as Crowley’s Ridge for the Memphis/Little Rock line. He organized it like a military campaign and completed the task, after which the town on the western flank of the Ridge was named in his honor. Forrest City is there today just about 50 miles west of Memphis right off I-40. His railroad ventures soon took a down turn and he ended up in bankruptcy. He also joined the Ku Klux Klan and became its’ “Grand Wizard”; its first national leader. The title was given to him because he was known as “The Wizard of the saddle” during the war. However when the Klan became too violent, he abandoned it and ordered it to disband only two years later. It refused and became even more violent.He ended up farming an island in the Mississippi river between Arkansas and Mississippi with convict labor, living in a log cabin. A number of years ago on a press trip through that section of Arkansas we drove through some land that the tour leader told us was part of that property, now no longer an island. He died, probably from complications of diabetes in his brother’s house in Memphis at age 57.Was he the South’s greatest general? William Tecumseh Sherman thought so, as did many of his adversaries during the war. Though no person can fully be judged by their worst moment or their best for that matter, Forrest, for all his “Wizardry” and military genius will always be known as the author of the Fort Pillow massacre.

Picture from atop the left center of Little Round Top, looking west. Devils Den is out of frame to the left. Plum Run passes right to left in the glacially cut and boulder strewn gap. Houck Ridge is beyond the run. The Wheatfield is beyond the tree line. The Stoney Hill is beyond that. There is a clearing, with open ground until you get to the Peach Orchard and the apex of the Emmitsburg Pike ridge. (From the Round Top you can look west to where there are light green traces between a darker background: those are what can be made out of the Pike ridge from the highest ground on the Union side.This is a picture of the view Lafayette McLaws Division would get when they reached open ground facing the Emmitsburg Pike and the landmark Peach Orchard were he was supposed to make final assembly for the attack.Daniel Sickles is a nefarious personality whose mischievous character lived large over the second half of the 19th Century. His narcissism, manipulation of women, amoral self serving character, overwhelms the good he did in service to the country.Sickles put his abilities at the call for a national army in 1861, because the Keys incident had damaged his Legislative standing. Sickles did not receive a lollipop general officer commission, although Lincoln did find it useful to sign up war Democrats. Sickles made no claim to military knowledge. But he was a commissioned militia Major in the 12th NY Militia. He assisted in the raising of what would become the NY Excelsior Brigade and was made regimental commander of the 70th NY Infantry. He was commissioned a Brigadier General in Sept 61 and took over the Brigade. However, Congress refused to approve his nomination. Sickles used his connections to backdoor the approval so he resumed his post in time for the Peninsula Campaign.Rejoining the Army of the Potomac, Sickles found out his Division chief was Joe Hooker. Both had a seedy side that made the association work. Besides which, Sickles proved to be cold bloodily aggressive on the field. November 1862 Sickles made Major General and commander of Division, when Hooker took command of 3d Corps. Hooker’s advancement to replace Burnside as commander of the Army of tthe Potomac made Sickles 3d Corps commander.At Chancellorsville Sickles took some heat for pursuing what turned to be the tail of Jackson’s Corps, thus exposing 11th Corps to the full weight of the Confederate attack. Next day Sickles opposed abandoning Hazel Grove as it was a danger to the federal line if it was used as an artillery platform. Sickles was right. It was and the Confederates did.30 Jun/1 Jul 1863: 3d Corps was assigned to John Reynold’s Left column of the Army now commanded by George Meade. Sickles was ordered up to the Federal positions at Emmitsburg while Reynolds and Howard advanced towards Gettysburg. By mid afternoon a battle raged in Gettysburg. Sickles, with no sign of Confederate units in his area. He left 1/3d of his troops behind and marched to Gettysburg. Sickles troops went in reserve behind John Geary’s Division.2 July: Geary pulled out and returned to the 12th Corps in the morning twilight. Sickles received orders to take up Geary’s position, but Geary was gone without liaison or interface.Sickles looked over his position. He was vexed by the lack of points in which to deploy his artillery. He looked at the Emmitsburg Pike flatland approaches and really wanted to use that ground. He complained to Meade. Meade was preoccupied with his right flank, which he considered the most probably threatened point. He sent his ADC, son, George Meade to repeat that Sickles was to hold the left using Geary’s line as appropriate. Sickles wanted Meade to come see the ground, or Henry Hunt the artillery chief.Meade sent Hunt. Hunt’s visit had unfortunate consequences. Meade gave Hunt the tour and Hunt cautiously agreed that the pike position would be best for artillery play. But Hunt also warned Sickles that, that opinion did not over rule Meade’s orders. Hunt suggested that Sickles find out what was in front of him before he talked to Meade. Sickles would send a battalion of 2d US Sharpshooters, who found the flank of Anderson’s Division, well North of Sickles line.Sickles at that point took personal responsibility of the Corps redeployment and ordered Birney’s Division to extend a line from Houck Ridge to the Peach Orchard. One of Humphries Brigades was placed under Birney’s control and used to bolster his line. Humphries formed his other 2 Brigades to cover the right of the line. There was now a 2/3ds of a mile gap between the 2d and 3d Corps.While Sickles was busy building a new line, Meade called a commanders conference at his command post. Sickles was summoned 3 times before he trotted off to the meeting. He was met outside by Meade. Before Meade could chew him out the ominous beginnings of shell play welled up from the South. Meade told Sickles not to dismount, but rejoin his command; Meade would meet him on the field. Meade summoned his horse while he found 5th Corps commander George Sykes and told him to move to support Sickles and take command of the left.Meade met Sickles and told him he obviously couldn’t hold his position on his own and his right was dangerously exposed. Sickles apologized and said he would retreat. Meade said no, too late for that. Hold. Help is coming.From 1500–2000 all hell broke loose. Longstreet only had 8 brigades. By dark, Meade would throw 24 brigades at Longstreet. Lee’s plan of attack failed. Daniel Sickles did not see the end of that fight. He lost a leg to a cannon ball and was evacuated off the field. Sickles played the hero, crediting himself with the move that ruined Lee’s battle. Meade felt otherwise and blocked Sickles return to duty. Sickles vindictively went back to Congress and turned the Committee on the Conduct of the War on Meade, who successfully argued down attacks of his actions at Gettysburg.History has tended to condemn Sickles for his decision on 2 July. Sickles befriended another CW outcast after they developed a comradeship in an 1893 Gettysburg meeting. Sickles invited him to come to another ceremony in 1902 to join a commemoration of a statue to John Slocum. The receiver had to decline, but his letter is interesting:Department of the Interior WashingtonSeptember 19, 1902My Dear General Sickles:My plan and desire was to meet you at Gettysburg on the interesting ceremony attending the unveiling of the Slocum monument; but today I find myself in no condition to keep the promise made you when last we were together. Please express my sincere regrets to the noble Army of the Potomac, and to accept them, especially for yourself.On that field, you made your mark that will place you prominently before the world as one of the leading figures of the most important battle of the civil war. As a northern veteran once remarked to me: "General Sickles can well afford to leave a leg on that field."I believe it is now conceded that the advanced position at the peach orchard, taken by your corps and under your orders, saved that battlefield (Gettysburg) to the Union cause. It was the sorest and saddest reflection of my life for many years; but today I can say, with sincerest emotion, that it was and is the best that could have come to us all, North and South; and I hope that the nation, reunited, may always enjoy the honor and glory brought to it by that grand work.Please offer my kindest salutations to your fellow-comrades of the Army of the Potomac.Always, yours, sincerely,James LongstreetLieut. Gen. Confederate ArmySo where are we?Did Sickles disobey orders?Actually No. Neither George Meade or Henry Hunt elaborated specific orders regarding position. Literally Sickles did not understand Meade’s intent.Did he jeopardize the Army by his actions? No. He certainly took a risk. If Longstreet had blown thru his line and swept across the Union front, in the intended echelon attack, that would have been very dangerous; perhaps fatal. But in this case, quite opposite of Chancellorsville you had a well positioned Union force with deep strategic reserves, and a commander in George Meade who responded to the situation with a huge reposte that stopped Longstreet and disarticulated the echelon plan. Sickles didn’t win Gettysburg, but he baited the lead element of the Confederate battle and set him up for a body slam by Meade.Was Sickles disciplined? He lost his command.For all the bad things you can say about Dirty Dan, he went back to Congress and became a champion for veterans affairs and the groundwork for memorialization of Civil War battlefields.