Communication Observation Checklist: Fill & Download for Free

Some ways in which you can overcome your relatively weak communication skills at an interview are as under:Prepare for obvious / frequently asked questionsTell me something about yourselfWhy should we select youWhat are your strengths and weaknessWhere do you see yourself X years from nowWhy are you looking for a changeDress smartFormal wear / color coordinated clothesAppropriate footwearNeat physical appearance - proper groomingBe aware of your non verbal communicationsA genuine smile not a nervous grinDo not slouch nor have a casual walkFirm handshakeSit erect - comfortable but not relaxedListen - listen - listen ( do not interrupt when a question is being asked)Be aware of the non verbal signals you give out when nervousWhen communicating with the interviewers make sure youMake eye contact with interviewersNever lie - if you do not know an answer say so with an apologetic toneDo not ramble - it happens when you know part of an answer or when you are unsure of the answer but think you have a clue about itAvoid fillers that you are prone to use when communicating e.g. hmm/ ummm/ you know / what I mean isDemonstrate your manners and etiquette'sThe best way to ensure you are able to do well in an interview is to attend mock interviews and get feedback. Ideally form a group of friends and ensure a couple of them have good language skills. Ask a couple of them to be interviewers. Have the rest as observers giving feedback while one of the group is being interviewed. You can use the above points as observers checklist for feedback.Best Wishes

As I had been a career Airline pilot for a long time and still continue to instruct Airline pilots in current day equipment, in active retirement, an interesting observation I make from this question, is the way Airline pilots had been trained from days of yore to handle problems in a sick airplane, to current day operating philosophies.Any situation requiring getting one’s aerial ass and your precious passengers back to terra firma, required three simple rules to be remembered. Then, and now.Aviate…Navigate…Communicate.In the first instance, one was always taught to fly the airplane….to keep it under control, at all costs.The second, was to navigate the airplane to a safe landing somewhere suitable…..pronto.The third, was to communicate your predicament to those on the ground who could help you get back safely. Air Traffic Control, Company Maintenance people, other pilots in the air, if it came to that. Yes, I had talked down one crew with problems in an airplane that I was familiar with.An interesting aside to this, is the way we had been taught in the past how to ‘trouble shoot’ a problem. ‘Systems knowledge’ or intricate understanding of the mechanical gobbledygook behind the airplane’s many mechanical, electrical, hydraulics, environment systems was held in high esteem and was a matter of personal pride among the A-Types. The engineering types among us sometimes went ‘over and above’ the recommended checklists created for Non Normal situations, to try and rectify a problematic system…eg a runaway stabiliser. I have been in the Company of such pilots who were so enamoured of trying to fix things from the cockpit without a full…er understanding of the offending beast at hand, because they thought they knew better. It might take a firm hand ( or a hard object ! ) to keep such eager beavers at bay to save one’s ass from grief.Therein lies the rub, in that an over smart pilot attempting to go over and above the recommended required actions to maintain control and land ASAP, might just possibly let himself to fall into a trap, by attempting trouble shooting to the point where he could just make matters worse and get the initial problem completely out of hand and not survive the subsequent self induced loss of control. ; because he had just made the problem worse, in the mistaken belief that he could rectify the problem by applying ‘systems knowledge’ in an effort to improve the situation.Those misguided philosophies have changed in current times. Current day Operations Manuals , and training philosophy requires strict adherence to laid down procedures to tackle a problem, unless…..the said procedure did not rectify the problem and there was a clear and present danger of ‘losing control’, in which case the pilot is instructed to ‘do everything possible’ to maintain control and land ASAP.‘To do everything possible’ in guarded aviation legal speak, means just sufficient brainy inputs to merely contain the problem and maintain control, not an attempt to restore the offending system, which is best done on the ground.Aviate, Navigate, Communicate……land ASAP at the most suitable airport, is now the clear mantra encouraged in modern day Airline Operations in Non Normal situations that are ambiguous, misunderstood or simply puzzling to a pilot’s basic senses.To give an example, in the Boeing Dreamliners that I instruct pilots on, the designer has gone to electronic and virtual circuit breakers. CBs are thermodynamic switching devices designed to protect and/or cut power to a given electrical or electronic circuit to prevent a ‘runaway’ situation. In the past, checklists gave instructions to physically ‘trip’ certain circuit breakers, in an attempt to isolate or solve a problem. In current day thinking, even the un called for tripping of such CBs is considered a no-no. The CBs in the Dreamliner are never to be touched by the pilots unless instructions are received from ground maintenance personnel, using data link communications ! They, are in a better position to think through and solve a problematic system on board through constant data streaming, received in their cosy air conditioned offices, while the Captain sweats it upstairs in dark stormy skies, without knowing the full and complete story.There was one fatal accident when the crew tripped a circuit breaker in the mistaken belief that it would solve a problem they had encountered on the ground. Their tripping of that CB set into motion other electrical faults that prevented a vital flight control from operating correctly, and the airplane crashed on take off. What the crew did not know, was that the particular CB actually controlled two parts of a circuit that fixed one problem, but left the other vulnerable and failed. S…t happens !So, to come back to the question above, my mind would be leave well enough alone, as long as I had control of the aircraft and had a bolt hole to dive into, I would land ASAP and let the boffins figure things out.Of course the riders are gonna be somewhat unhappy, but then their fannies will be safe and sound on terra firma !So will mine….chicken !(Edits are minor and typos only !)

Tl;dr: The moment the cargo deck fire started, these poor guys were dead. They had already started a 180 degree turn back to Dubai before hearing about the availability of Doha, and things had gotten pretty much completely out of hand before that turn was even completed. Having one airport maybe five or seven air minutes closer wouldn’t have made any difference at all to the first officer flying solo and blind trying to get the aircraft on the ground. In any event, by human nature and the circumstances at hand, there’s no way that heading for Doha even would have seemed a viable option.That’s my professional opinion, and I’m sticking to it. Read on to see why I say these terrible things.This accident can be looked at as a canary dying in a mine — a lot of the things that happened put people’s eyes on some safety issues that never really had been strung together logically before. At the same time, the whole scenario developed so fast that nobody could have reasonably been expected to handle it any differently.The UAE’s General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) report on this tragedy (https://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/40/2010-2010%20-%20Final%20Report%20-%20Boeing%20747-44AF%20-%20N571UP%20-%20Report%2013%202010.pdf) is exhaustive and professional. I’ve gone through it carefully.Let’s start at 1512 UTC, when the crew received a “Fire main deck forward” indication. This was their first indication that something was amiss. The Captain took control of the aircraft, started a turn back to Dubai, and advised air traffic control that he was declaring an emergency.Finding #21 of the GCAA report states, “[Bahrain Area East Control] advised the crew that Doha airport was 100 nm to the left. The turn back to {Dubai] (DXB) totaled 185 nm track distance. The likely outcome of a hypothetical diversion is inconclusive.” (That’s the book answer. I fully agree with the investigators electing not to speculate on this point.)Findings #22 and 23 state, “At the time the Captain decided to turn back, the crew was not yet aware of the full extent of the fire and its effects; By the time that the smoke in the cockpit and fire damaged controls became apparent, diverting to Doha was no longer a feasible option.”Finding #32 states, “Based on the NTSB pallet and container testing results, it is now known that the growth rate of container fires after they become detectable by the aircraft’s smoke detection system can be extremely fast, precluding any mitigating action and resulting in an overwhelming fire that cannot be contained.”Finding #47 states, “Within three minutes of the fire alarm, smoke enters the cockpit area. This smoke in the cockpit, from a continuous source near and contiguous with the cockpit area, entered with sufficient volume and density to totally obscure the pilot’s view of the instruments, control panels and alert indicating systems for the duration of the flight.”Finding #50 states, “The crew made several comments concerning their inability to see anything in the cockpit. The crew in the smoke environment had reduced visibility and could not view the primary instruments such as the MFD, PFD, Nav Displays or the EICAS messages.”Finding #59 states, “Captain made a comment mentioning the high cockpit temperature, almost immediately the Captains oxygen supply abruptly stopped without warning, this occurred seven minutes six seconds after the first Main Deck Fire Warning.”Findings #63 and 64 state, “The oxygen requirement of the Captain became critical, the Captain removes the oxygen mask and separate smoke goggles and leaves the seat to look for the supplementary oxygen. The Captain did not return. The Captain was in distress locating the supplementary oxygen bottle and could not locate it before being overcome by the fumes; The Captain was incapacitated for the remainder of the flight. A post-mortem examination of the Captain indicates that the cause of death was due to carbon monoxide inhalation.”The report also lists thirteen “contributing factors” as these are defined by ICAO Annex 13. The first seven are most germane to your question:3.3.1 There is no regulatory FAA requirement in class E cargo compartments for active fire suppression.3.3.2 Freighter main deck class E fire suppression procedures which relay on venting airflow and depressurisation as the primary means of controlling a fire are not effective for large Class E cargo fires involving dangerous goods capable of Class D metal fire combustion.3.3.3 No risk assessment had been made for the failure of the cargo compartment liner based on the evolution of cargo logistics and associated cargo content fire threats, cargo hazards and bulk carriage of dangerous goods.3.3.4 The regulation standards for passive fire suppression do not adequately address the combined total thermal energy released by current cargo in a large cargo fire and the effect this has on the protection of critical systems.3.3.5 FAA and EASA regulatory requirements do not recognize the current total fire risk associated with pallets, pallet covers and containers as demonstrated by the NTSB/FAA testing.3.3.6 Class 9 Hazmat packing regulations do not address the total or potential fire risk that can result from lithium battery heat release during thermal runaway. Although non-bulk specification packaging is designed to contain leaks and protect the package from failure, the packaging for Class 9 does not function to contain thermal release.3.3.7 The growth rate of container and pallet fires after they become detectable by the aircraft’s smoke detection system can be extremely fast, precluding any mitigating action and resulting in an overwhelming total energy release and peak energy release rate for a standard fire load that cannot be contained.Given the above, my take on this question is that the situation aboard the aircraft started deteriorating fast enough, and the conditions the crew had to deal with were bad enough, that I doubt there was an opportunity for them to change their plan once they made it. The investigators noted that the crew was provided the information about Doha being closer than going back to Dubai, but they already had turned back toward Dubai when they got that information, and everything already had really started going to worms.Here’s the accident report’s depiction of what the crew did as the sequence of events played out:This looks to me like they were making a cautious course reversal using a less than a standard rate (three degrees per second) turn — it probably was well less than even a half standard rate turn based on the headings suggested by the track depicted at the 2:00 and 6:00 points.It’s a little hard to nail down exactly when the Captain left his seat looking for oxygen. But, it’s possible to back into this information by noting the report’s observation that “There are two phases to the flight profile:Phase 1, there is a two crew operating environment, for a duration of 30 minutes 31 seconds; andPhase 2, there is a single pilot operation, for a duration of 20 minutes 27 seconds until the data ends.”The aircraft crashed at 1545 UTC, just 33 minutes after the first indication of trouble. The Captain already was in serious distress before the aircraft even had completed its course reversal back toward Dubai. Based on the above, he was out of his seat trying to find oxygen, became incapacitated, and no longer could play any part in the outcome less than 13 minutes after the first indication that something seriously bad was happening.The report’s “Summary of the Flight Profile” starting on page 148 is revealing:“The accident flight was uneventful until just before the top of climb at about 15:12, when there was a Fire Main Deck indication and crew audible alert.“As the flight progresses into the Bahrain FIR, approaching the top of climb, the transition from a normal cockpit environment and the emergency reactions by the crew were handled as expected; there was a short reaction time lag based on the startle factor, but the transition to an emergency CRM was quick. There was some alarm expressed at the onset of the emergency.“The Captain had made the command decision to return to Dubai prior to informing BAE-C of the emergency. The F.O was aware of the Captains decision to return and the transition for the configuration changes were established.“Although the crew began the Fire Main Deck non-normal checklist, they did not complete the checklist. The Captain made a decision to return to DXB instead of landing at the nearest suitable airport (Doha) provided by the BAC-C. Also, the Captain elected to descend to 10,000 feet instead of 25,000 feet per the Fire Main Deck NNC.“There were some communication issues identified early in the sequence, these however did not affect the CRM as the procedures and vital actions were running as predicted.“Three events occurred rapidly and in quick succession following the start of the turn back which diverted the crew’s attention.I. The cockpit filled with smoke. The smoke was present at the start of the sequence, but it rapidly became noticeable in the CVR statements that the volume and the density of the smoke has increased significantly. Within two minutes neither crew member could view the panels or out of the cockpit.II. At about the same time, the pitch control problem became apparent which diverted the F.O’s attention as the Captain asked the F.O to ‘figure out what was going on’. The F.O was already managing a number of other problems, including the FMC input and the checklistIII. The Captains oxygen supply stopped, the Captain asked for oxygen, the portable oxygen bottle was behind the Captains seat next to the left hand observer seat. The First Officer was not able to assist the Captain. The Captain, one minute after the oxygen supply stopped, got out of the seat and went back into the aft cockpit area. The Captain was heard to say ‘I cannot see’, the is no further CVR recording or interaction of the Captain.“Seven minutes into the emergency, the F.O is PF and the Captain is incapacitated. Almost immediately, the first relay aircraft contacts the accident flight to relay information. The F.O establishes communication with the relay, this distraction and the requirement to complete the escalating task load precluded the F.O from enquiring as to the location of the Captain.”Earlier in the report, in describing the “Damage to the Aircraft,” the investigators made two simple, stark statements:“1.3.1 The aircraft – airframe, systems and available living space - were subject to significant thermal loading caused by fire, resulting in material degradation and damage. This resulted in the exposure of primary structural elements, components and assemblies to significant heat damage and the cockpit area to continuous smoke and toxic fume penetration resulting from the on-board cargo fire.“1.3.2 The fire severely damaged significant systems leading to failures in aircraft controllability and crew survivability systems, failures which interfered with the normal flight management, directly with the aircraft controls and the crew supplementary oxygen system supply.”Within seven or eight minutes of the onset of the emergency, the first officer was flying an aircraft that was actively trying to kill him, by himself, and he quickly became unable to see more than a fraction of what he needed to see. In the pilot priorities of “aviate, navigate, communicate,” he could barely manage the first and third of those.I can hardly fault him for not having the presence of mind to say, “Why yes, please, I’d love to land at Doha.” I doubt he could have made there it anyway. He was familiar with the Dubai area and damned near made the airport flying almost blind, in impossible conditions, by himself. I doubt the outcome would have been any different no matter where he had tried to land.Note: I left a lot of the acronyms and abbreviations in the above simply because I didn’t have time to interpret all of them. I’d recommend going to the report itself at the link provided for the full glossary.