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A-to-A.Well, I personally have never sought a protection from abuse order (“PFA”). However, I’ve had a few clients and seen other parties in PFA court where the orders were denied.Obviously, a court is free to deny a PFA if it believes the petitioner has failed to prove their case. That’s a straight-up credibility determination.But that aside, these actions are statutorily authorised and in that light, definitions are everything. And they vary a bit by state.There are two common “legal” reasons for PFAs to be denied.Type of harm not covered by statute: In Pennsylvania, “verbal abuse” does not justify a PFA. The petitioner must have an actual apprehension of physical violence or child abuse¹ that might be perpetrated by the respondent. One of the cases I mentioned above involved a case where the petitioner believed respondent was stalking her, because he popped up twice in a single day in public places where she was. The court was not satisfied after testimony that this could not have been coincidence; it was conceded the respondent had not initiated any other contact with her during the incidents.Class of respondent not covered by statute: Only certain specified relationships may give rise to PFA proceedings.²While the court does usually grant an temporary PFA order (ex parte and without prejudice) upon the filing of the case, occasionally the judge is not satisfied with the level of danger alleged in the petition itself. This doesn’t mean that the petitioner cannot come in and pursue the case at a hearing, any more than it means the defendant cannot appear and contest the case after a temporary order is entered. See this answer for some observations about the procedure of these cases.N.B. this answer and the linked answers relate to Pennsylvania law. While I believe the answer is representative for the sake of “reusable knowledge,” it is actually really important that questions about PFA proceedings be resolved with regard to the law of the place where the action is happening. It is also not legal advice.Notes:¹ The definition of “abuse” in our statute is currently:The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between family or household members, sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological parenthood:(1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury, serious bodily injury, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, sexual assault, statutory sexual assault, aggravated indecent assault, indecent assault or incest with or without a deadly weapon.(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury.(3) The infliction of false imprisonment pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 2903 (relating to false imprisonment).(4) Physically or sexually abusing minor children, including such terms as defined in Chapter 63 (relating to child protective services).(5) Knowingly engaging in a course of conduct or repeatedly committing acts toward another person, including following the person, without proper authority, under circumstances which place the person in reasonable fear of bodily injury. The definition of this paragraph applies only to proceedings commenced under this title and is inapplicable to any criminal prosecutions commenced under Title 18 (relating to crimes and offenses).23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a). See also this answer.² “Family or household members” are:Spouses or persons who have been spouses, persons living as spouses or who lived as spouses, parents and children, other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, current or former sexual or intimate partners or persons who share biological parenthood.Id. See also McCance v. McCance, 908 A.2d 905 (Pa.Super. 2006) (in-laws are relatives by “affinity”); Evans v. Braun, 12 A.3d 395 (Pa.Super. 2010) (dating is usually sufficient to show “intimate partnership”). But see Scott v. Shay, 928 A.2d 312 (Pa.Super. 2007) (sexual assault by defendant does not bring defendant within civil PFA statute as a “partner”; statute intended to supplement criminal law for borderline cases).

The situation does not pertain to “illegal immigrants” but to legal petitioners for refugee status. The current Administration is extremely unprincipled in its gross misrepresentation of the facts and shirking its responsibility in applying the UN Convention on Refugees. Ailing Justice: Texas. Soaring Immigration Detention, Shrinking Due ProcessThey are “refugee petitioners” NOT “illegal immigrants”. The situation in the news is that people legally going to a border post are requesting “political asylum”; they are not “illegal immigrants” in the sense of foreigners who overstayed or sneaked into the US without informing CBP. The Administration is displaying mal intent if it continues to call them thus.The current Administration has the policy of not releasing petitioners and also wishes to discourage the growing demand for asylum requests by placing minors in care of “child services”. So as to prevent them from disappearing into the general population, they are detained!Due to grossly inadequate federal staff involved in processing asylum claims, it may take months to do all the requisite paperwork to formally petition for asylum but the legal process to assess and adjudicate a petition takes years, during which time the petitioner is in administrative limbo. The 2014 table below shows that the least unsuccessful petitions are at major international gateway airports; that’s because those petitioners had already been vetted; the situation for the land border posts are much worse since they usually have no preparation, language ability or documentation required (approval rates from Latin America are 1–9% and delays may exceed 3 years!).So, due to the extremely lengthy, and increasingly overwhelmed immigration court and processing systems, one has to place the petitioners somewhere and provide for them for a few years, either with a stipend or allowing them to earn a living!In the past, to minimize cost and hassle, previous Administrations often “paroled” (allowed pending an administrative decision about a case) and allowed to stay with friends or family in the US. However, many didn’t respect the call-back, causing frustration with the system.The vast majority of asylum petitions from Latin Americans are denied with only 1–9% historically granted; that means that 91–99% of petitioners are to be repatiated. The fact that most/many of those denied refugee status became “undocumented aliens” is an entirely predictable outcome of grossly inadequate infrastructure and unacceptable delays in processing systems for petitioners.What the US Administration is Morally Behoven to Do.The US is signatory to the UN convention on refugees. If there is an increased number of petitions for asylum at its borders, it has the legal obligation to make reasonable attempts to process the petitions in a reasonable time including<Adequately staffing the CBP and immigration processing system to meet demand in a reasonable timeframe.Providing for adequate housing and placement of petioners under humane conditions for AS LONG AS THE PETITION PROCESS TAKES.Providing transport of rejected applicants to their countries of origin.Possible Solutions?I fully understand the frustration but using detention and separation of minors from petitioning parents is untenable, widely condemned by all segments of society, religious groups and foreign leaders. However, I also suggest practical solutions.Short-termEmergency housing for perhaps hundreds of thousands of petitioners; surely FEMA can use its infrastructure and capacity to avoid a humanitarian crisis at detention facilities?Tracking bracelets may be a possible solution instead of detention for those without a criminal record and who have US-based sponsors for housing and living.Putting responsibility, along with budgets and staffing, to have in-country refugee petitions done at local embassies or consultates.Having guidelines on reasonable delays for adjudication of petitions. This is entirely the responsibility of the Department of Justice since Immigration Courts are controlled by it.Longer-termAddress the root causes of the refugee flow. That involves a country-by-country analysis.

In Jagdish Jugtawat Vs Manjulata in the Supreme Court on 23 April 2002, (2002) 5 SCC 422 the Supreme Court has held that maintenance petition filed by the major daughter even if she does not fall in one of the exceptions mentioned in Section 125(1)(c) Cr. P.C., would be still maintainable on a combined reading of both Sections 125 Cr.P.C. and Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956._______________________Jagdish Jugtawat Vs Manju Lata and Others in the Supreme Court on 23 April 2002IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIASLP(Crl.) No.905 of 2001Jagdish JugtawatVsManju Lata and OthersTHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D. P. MOHAPATRATHE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BRIJESH KUMAR &THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE D.M. DHARAMADHIKARIJudgement Date: 23 April 2002Order1. By the order passed on 23-2-2001, notice was issued to the respondents to show cause why the order granting maintenance in favour of Respondent 3 Kumari Rakhi shall not be modified to the extent that she is entitled to receive maintenance only till she attains majority. In view of the said order, learned counsel for the parties have confined their submissions to that question.2. The petitioner is the father of Kumari Rakhi, Respondent 3 herein, who is a minor unmarried girl. Considering the application filed under section 125 of the criminal procedure code by Respondent 1, wife of the petitioner and mother of Respondent 3, claiming maintenance for herself and her two children, the Family Court by order dated 22-7-2000 granted maintenance @ Rs 500 per month to each of the applicants. The petitioner herein filed a revision petition before the High Court assailing the order of the Family Court on the ground, inter alia, that Respondent 3 was entitled to maintenance only till she attains majority and not thereafter. Considering the point the learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the legal position that under Section 125 CrPC, a minor daughter is entitled to maintenance from her parents only till she attains majority, but declined to interfere with the order passed by the Family Court taking the cue from section 20(3) of the hindu adoptions and maintenance act under which the right of maintenance is given to a minor daughter till her marriage. The learned Single Judge was persuaded to maintain the order of the Family Court with a view to avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The relevant portion of the judgment of the High Court is quoted here:“Thus, in view of the above, though it cannot be said that the order impugned runs counter to the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the provisions of section 125 CrPC are applicable irrespective of the personal law and it does not make any distinction whether the daughter claiming maintenance is a Hindu or a Muslim. However, taking an overall view of the matter, I, with all respect to the Hon'ble Court, am of the candid view that the provisions require literal interpretation and a daughter would cease to have the benefit of the provisions under Section 125 CrPC on attaining majority, though she would be entitled to claim the benefits further under the statute/personal law. But the Court is not inclined to interfere, as the order does not result in miscarriage of justice, rather interfering with the order would create great inconvenience to Respondent 3 as she would be forced to file another petition under sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act of 1956 for further maintenance etc. Thus, in order to avoid multiplicity of litigations, the order impugned does not warrant interference.”3. In view of the finding recorded and the observations made by the learned Single Judge of the High Court, the only question that arises for consideration is whether the order calls for interference. A similar question came up for consideration by this Court in the case of Noor Saba Khatoon v. Mohd. Quasim 1997 6 SCC 233 relating to the claim of a Muslim divorced woman for maintenance from her husband for herself and her minor children. This Court while accepting the position that Section 125 CrPC does not fix liability of parents to maintain children beyond attainment of majority, read the said provision and section 3(1)(b) of the muslim women (protection of rights on divorce) act together and held that under the latter statutory provision liability of providing maintenance extends beyond attainment of majority of a dependent girl.4. Applying the principle to the facts and circumstances of the case in hand, it is manifest that the right of a minor girl for maintenance from parents after attaining majority till her marriage is recognized in section 20(3) of THE HINDU ADOPTIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACT. Therefore, no exception can be taken to the judgment/order passed by the learned Single Judge for maintaining the order passed by the Family Court which is based on a combined reading of section 125 CrPC and section 20(3) of THE HINDU ADOPTIONS AND MAINTENANCE ACT. For the reasons aforestated we are of the view that on facts and in the circumstances of the case no interference with the impugned judgment/ order of the High Court is called for.5. The special leave petition is accordingly dismissed.