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Ooh how I have been waiting for question like this to appear. Thank you very much for this. This is a very legitimately good question.I used to worship ancient Chinese wisdom too. Afterall, I am mostly a Chinese-descent person with 1/4 Javanese blood. 3 out of 4 elders in my family are ultra conservative Chinese traditionalists. One of my grandma has her feet bound, a practice that goes back to early Ming Dynasty. These old folks are hardline diehard Chinese advocates. One of them even still hated Japanese people to this day.So, they of course told me to read ancient Chinese wisdom a lot. Of course, as a good 3/4 Chinese children, I obliged. I read Confucius, Mencius, Laozi, 3 out of 4 greatest Chinese literatures (Journey to The West by Wu Cheng’en, Romance of the Three Kingdoms by Luo Guanzhong, and Water Margin by Shi Nai’an), and accompanied them in watching localized TV drama series based on “Dream of the Red Chamber”.They bought me a lot of “boy” things, American jet fighter models, tanks, army men figurines, and once I was hooked, they started telling me things about Sun Zi. They never read it and thus couldn’t say much, so I did. A lot of comic books by Taiwanese comic artist Tsai Chih-Chung, and Beijing illustrator Ren Changhong.When I finally graduated high school, my elders planned to buy me a book. They asked me, what kind of book do you want to read?I answered clearly “Sun Zi’s Art of War!”“But you have so many Sun Zi’s book already, why do you want to buy another?”“Those are comic books full of practical illustrations, I want the real deal! The serious wordy book that discuss about all 13 chapters of the original Art of War.”“Fine choice! We are very proud of you, boy!”So, in this Singapore-published, Hong Kong-written “Sun Tzu’s Art of War for Business” it quoted several remarks about the book from several famous figures that I never verified. It said that Kaiser Wilhelm II quipped that he shouldn’t have lost the throne if he read this book in the first place. Then Napoleon Bonaparte, as well as Bernard Viscount of Alamein Montgomery.I kind of indulged in mocking this “superiority” impression that sometimes accompanies the oriental mysticism. The hypocrite Asians hated it as a pervasive superstitious stereotype, yet dwelled on the misdirected amazements at it. Classical figures like Zhuge Liang, which reputation was overinflated in Luo Guanzhong’s novel Romance of the Three Kingdoms, also received that kind of glorification.The facts are simple:Regarding the Chinese-Taiwanese book: Kaiser Wilhelm I is sinophobic bigot, a big “yellow peril” propagator, to the point that it annoyed Queen Victoria and offended President Theodore Roosevelt, both Asian culture fans. I seriously doubt he read a Chinese book.Zhuge Liang’s side lost the war. His side was outlasted by rival kingdoms Wu and Wei. The novel’s perspective cleverly excuses Shu’s losses as series of misfortune and scapegoating Liu Bei’s previously unwanted son. All of them neglected their “printing a worthy successor” duty.So, Sun Tzu’s (or Sun Zi) Art of War is never a cure-all, fix-all magic book that made its reader invulnerable in all kinds of war. Just like Tai Chi or some kungfu techniques makes you invincible in hand-to-hand combat. China not only suffered greatly during World War 2, but since the time when Sun Zi’s book has been published, they also:Lost to a group of barbarian tribes such as the Xiongnu during Han Dynasty. They are forced to pay tributes to keep them off their Western borders.Lost to the Northern Jin, about a thousand years later.Lost to the Mongols, soon.Lost to the Manchurians, another few hundred years later.Lost to the European & US powers, another hundred years later.Ceded vast amount of territories to Japan, before going down to civil war, the traditionalist lost to the “uncultured and rootless” communists.Those are just the famous ones, China has suffered so much defeat and facing internal uprisings that they failed to contain several times throughout the history.So to answer your question:If the Art of War by Sun Tzu is a useful masterpiece in strategies, why would China lose in the Second World War? If China had applied the strategies, why would it be still terribly invaded by Japan? If China had not applied them, why?Let’s disect this into several points:Is Sun Tzu’s Art of War really useful?Yes, of course. It preached all the right messages, that probably has become a cliché, yet remains true.Don’t waste resources, don’t fight a war for prolonged time, don’t fight in unknown grounds, don’t fight a war you know you can’t win, preparations beat the unprepared, do not corner an enemy into desperation, never attack the strong points, always attack the weakpoints, etc etc etc yada-yada-yada. Your opponent probably has been reading the same material as you do.But it is like the age old simple misattributions:“is eating salad healthy?”Yes, it is relatively healthier than eating meats.“is eating apple healthy?”Yes, for the same reason.“Can I cure my sickness by eating salads and apples?”It may help, but to be sure, please see a qualified physician or doctor.Sun Tzu’s advices are like basic instructions: never get distracted when driving. Stay focused when playing football. Series of cliché advices, often ignored, but often made people regret for not heeding it.Yes, I have read this book more than a thousand times, why can’t I beat the other guy?Is the other guy illiterate? No? He probably had read the same material too. Easy.Sun Tzu’s principles are too broadly defined that made his words almost infallible. You might as well tell him, “thanks captain obvious!”But his best advice for me, my personal favourite is probably this:“It is always best to defeat the enemy by defeating their plans rather than fight them and win in open battles.”Original quote from Chapter 3:Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plansTherefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.This principle is applicable in almost everything. You beat the opposing football team’s strategy and game play, rather than practically wrestled them out of ball possessions.Yeah, but the French team never really have a good strategy to win the World Cup. Does this principle not apply?Well, since “defeating their gameplan” requires intel report on their actual gameplan, then if you don’t have reliable intel, how are you going to target at “their gameplan?”So, all they need to do is just to turn their strength into their weakness, then forcing them to play our strength, using our advantage for our own benefit. France handed the opponents the ball, letting them have the possession, which they need to hold against technically superior and gifted French players. Then their possession build up can be instantly turned against them by dashing lightning quick counter attack. This is an example of the application of another cliché “know yourself and know your enemy”, and the “energy” or turning the momentum principle as in this quote:Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his onset, and prompt in his decision.So, if China had applied the strategies, why would it be still terribly invaded by Japan? If China had not applied them, why?Easy, modern warfare are more than just the wisdom of Huang Shigong, Sun Wu Zi (Sun Tzu), Sun Bin, Zhuge Liang, Li Jing, Yue Fei, and so on. And it is not like their wisdom aren’t unknown to the Japanese as well. Japan has been reading Chinese history since long ago. Takeda Shingen is a known reader of Sun Zi’s book, let alone Japanese military officers in World War 2.There were gunpowder technologies involved, that did not exist during Sun Zi’s time. Then the major factors: artileries, tanks, and aircrafts. It makes applying Sun Zi’s theory much more difficult in literal sense.Yes, China lost air superiority, and thus no matter what Sun Zi lesson they applied, they would still lose. I don’t know the details, but defeated parties during World War 2 never had air superiorities.The French forces in 1940 had superior tanks, yet they all lay sitting ducks to German dive bombers. The Germans at 1943 Kursk campaign were exposed to Soviet’s air attacks, slowing their advances greatly, because although the Luftwaffe was not completely defeated, they can’t maintain dominance in the air. Normandy 1944, obviously, the Germans are unable to answer back, because their ground forces are being bombarded from air, such as the 21st Panzer Division that was meant to push towards Juno Beach and the carpet bombing of Panzer Lehr division during the opening of Operation Cobra.Some of the Chinese military strategy during the World War 2 may very well follow Sun Zi’s. They know that their forces are inferior to the Japanese, and decided to avoid direct confrontation instead. This preservation of strength lead to unspeakable consequences. While swath of densely populated coastal teritorries were ceded to the Japanese, where numerous atrocities and cruelties were committed.The Mindset of a NativistsThe Chinese traditionalists and aristocratics, occupying most of the Chinese teritorries as a warlord allied to the Nationalist China at the time, probably were stuck to their classical ancient military theories and never gave airpower or mechanised warfare a serious thought.To give you a picture of the seriousness of this kind of problem amongst Asians, you need to experience it firsthand.In 21st Century Indonesia, there was this return-to-abacus fad, rumoured to be able to make your children count “faster than a calculator”. For certain cases, it could be true, but in overall, it was a fad, fueled by Chimese nativists, seeing their ancient tool (abacus) getting an enthusiastic revival in the face of western technology (calculator and computer) dominance.It is very easy to imagine those old generalissimos discussing Sun Tzu’s Art of War enthusiastically and convincing themselves that they will be able to defeat Japan, by believing in their better understanding of Sun Tzu’s works.It is more or less, a repeat of Boxer rebellion once again. A bunch of kungfu fighters with acrobatic Shaolin-like martial arts skills trying to dodge bullets. This time, a bunch of classicists trying to win modern war using their obsolete understanding of “catch-all” military warfare principles.Right now, in a hindsight, we can just easily ask: “do they ever read this?”We mean this obvious part of Sun Zi’s Art of War:Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat.“Do they even know that the Japanese has planes, bomber planes, capable of raining down bombs upon us?”Yes, and it seems that Japan has already “defeated” China even before the war started. Japan was superior in technology and industrial capability. It appears that they already “balked” Chinese plans.Applying a catch-all principlesI mean, it took more than just reading and understanding Sun Zi’s book in its native language to be able to practice it.It requires a lot of effort to adhere to Sun Zi’s principles. For example: educating yourself about the enemy. It is clear here, that wrong understanding about the enemy will still result in your probable defeat according to Sun Zi.Remember, never treat the Art of War like a religious book.Too many people think that the principles are infallible. Of course it is, judging from the ambiguous and wordings that are very open to interpretations. Afterall, it is an “art” piece, not a manual or guidebook with detailed exact instructions.Too many people think that by reading and understanding the book, they will be invincible in warfare, just like they think about instant salvation through the Holy books. Nah, it is not like that in the real world.There is more to warfare than just Sun Zi’s books.

After the deposition of Abdülhamid II, the head of state and the government were separated through the reinstatement and modification of the constitution. As always, it is more than a little complicated who ruled, so I’ll go into it with a little more history (not much though - just pushing the date back to the revolution of 1908).Pre-Post Script: This answer grew in size incredibly quickly. I usually use Quora as a place to organize my thoughts and have used it to put down some ideas about the last years of the Ottoman Government. It quickly grew into a sprawling, self-indulgent octopus. There are a lot of names, and while I think the visual aids help, it can get overwhelming. If you want my broad strokes answer, there is a TL:DR at the end (Actually two of them). So… caveat emptor.Head Of StateUntil 1909, the head of state remained Abdülhamid II. In 1909, after Abdülhamid II was deposed following a counter-revolution attempt, he was replaced with his brother Mehmed (V) Reşad:When he died in 1918, he was succeeded by his brother Mehmed (VI) Vahdeddin:He remained the de jure head of state until the abolishment of the Sultanate in 1922.Government and the LegislativeA. Before 1909Following the Revolution of 1908, the constitution had been reinstated (although Abdülhamid claimed that he reinstated it out of his own volition), and the rule of the state became a three way battle between these three elements:The Yıldız Palace (Abdülhamid II)The Sublime Porte (the government)The Committee of Union and Progress (henceforth CUP), and the ParliamentUntil the counter-revolution of 1909, the CUP had remained in the background. Following the general election of November and December 1908, CUP had a parliamentary advantage (but not a crushing one) against the Liberal Party.The cabinet at the time was being headed by the anti-CUP liberal politician and Liberal Party member “İngiliz” Kamil Paşa, so-called because of his closeness to the English:He was attacked by the CUP press and especially their newspaper Tanin for failing to carry out internal reforms. After trying to replace the Ministers of the Army and the Navy with his own men, his actions were described as a coup d'état and he was forced to resign, much to the chagrin of the English language press.On February 14th 1909, he was replaced by Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa:He remained until the counter-revolution of 1909, when he was forced to resign.B. During the CounterrevolutionThe counterrevolution attempt was a result of the marriage of convenience between a few elements in the new constitutional era. 1908 had been a shaky year with the formal Declaration of Independence by Bulgaria (which had been de facto independent but legally under the suzerainty of the Porte), the formal annexation by Austria-Hungary of Bosnia and Herzegovina that it had been ruling de facto since the 1870s, and the declaration of enosis (union) between the Cretan State (again only formally under Ottoman Control but in reality independent under British protection) and the Greek Kingdom. These problems, as well as a marriage of convenience between multiple elements in the Ottoman state system led to the counterrevolution attempt of 1909. These elements were:‘Alaylı’ officers. The Ottoman army had a parallel way of promoting its officers. Officers who began their careers as military school graduates ‘mektepli’, and those that rose from among the enlisted men ‘alaylı’. The revolution of 1908 was very much the brain child of the ‘mektepli’ group and using the prestige gain from this, the academy officers increased their mistreatment of (the usually much older) enlisted officers.The traditional and religious Istanbulites who did not like the ‘new age of liberty’ and wanted the restoration of sharia law (which was still the law of the land, by the way). The softas - or the theological school graduates made up an important part of the counterrevolution.Careerists and opportunists who had not been able to get what they wanted or what they believed they deserved from the revolution.On night of 12/13 April 1909, the troops of the First Army Corps mutinied. There is a case to be made here that the CUP allowed for this mutiny to happen so they could ‘clean’ the unwanted elements from the news state.The more coherent ones among the leaders of the counterrevolution demanded:The dismissal of the Minister of War and the President of then Chamber Ahmet Rıza,Restoration of the Sharia (?) and the restriction of Muslim women to their homesThe CUP delegates fled the city, Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa cabinet fell and Abdülhamid II gave out a Royal order appointing Ahmed Tevfik Paşa, who was a member of the Liberal Party.This marriage between the religious and liberal parties may seem bizarre to an outside (especially American) observer but it continued through the following Turkish history. Why this has been the case is outside the scope of this answer.As the CUP offices and newspapers were being sacked a few murders took place of CUP related officers such as the naval captain Ali Kabuli Bey of the ironclad Asar-ı Tevfik and two parliamentarians mistaken for the editors of Tanin.The CUP asked for the help of the 3rd Army under Mahmud Şevket Paşa, who organized a strike force called “Hareket Ordusu” (The Army of Action). Interesting side note is that his Chief-of-Staff was Captain Mustafa Kemal.ABOVE: Mahmud Şevket PaşaABOVE: Some Officers Of The Army Of Action. Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) is The Third from The RightAnyways, before departing for Istanbul, Mahmud Şevket Paşa made the following speech to his troops:Brothers! Our constitution, won by the blood of hundreds of thousands of martyrs, is being threatened to be replaced again by tyranny, by that wicked owl perched upon that tower of old Byzantium of Yıldız [Palace] in Istanbul [i.e. Abdülhamid II], by that glutton for human blood and the tears of orphans, by that beast in human clothes who besmirches the 600 year glorious and victorious history of a nation and the honor of its ancestors, who has seduced [some soldiers]; and now these scum, who would sell their honor for money, have driven the troops, through trickery, to rebellion.However many patriotic brothers, young academy-educated officers there are, are now being martyred in the most brutal manner.Among these martyrs is Ali Kabuli Bey, the captain of the ironclad Asar-ı Tevfik. The honorable folk of Istanbul dare not look out of their windows. The seat of the caliphate is weeping blood. The Capital looks for relief from us, the army. The country is being lost, and the nation is in ruins. What are we waiting for?Have we no courage, no patriotism? I dedicate my entire fortune to the salvation of the army and my life - my life to the nation!There are many heroes among us who will come with me to Istanbul for the restoration of liberty.Therefore, to the sound of Ordu March, onward!These were his words and he marched and took the Capital after some fighting. Part of the reason for my transmission of the entire speech is self-indulgence but also it provides some light to the sort of folk hero status that Mahmud Şevket Paşa will have after the restoration of the constitution.C. Post Counterrevolution to The Raid on the Sublime PorteTwo days before the Army of Action’s quenching of the rebellion, on 22 April 1909, the two chambers sat together at Yeşilköy, outside Istanbul and declared that the actions of the army were in conformity with the will of the nation.Five days later, the National Assembly deposed Abdülhamid II and replaced him with his brother Mehmed Reşad (see above). Power structure changed so that the Palace stopped being an important part of the political landscape of the Empire but was replaced with the army instead.To quote at length,“The events of 13 April had shown the Committee’s inability to control the situation and maintain law and order. The chaos that followed forced the army to intervene as the instrument of law and order, and not as the instrument of the CUP. Until April 1909, the soldier had played the subordinate role to the politician, and only junior officers had been members of the Committee. The revolt brought in the senior officers. Mahmud Şevket Paşa took care to point out that he and his army were not acting as agents of the Committee, and that his only aim was to see law and order maintained and the discipline of the army restored.” [p.45]Following the restoration of the constitution, Ahmed Tevfik Paşa resigned and was replaced by Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa again (see above).The state of emergency continued and all real power remained in the hands of Mahmud Şevket Paşa. “Though he did not exercise this power directly, at first it was always exercised under his personal supervision.” [p. 48]At this point it may be important to give the political structure of the army. The army consisted of three different kinds of soldiers politically:The rank and file, making the majority of the army did not have any innate political leaning but could be influenced.Junior officers, educated in Hamidian Military Colleges, were political and distinctly anti-Hamidian. Many were members of the CUP.Senior officers, such as Mahmud Şevket Paşa, symbolized discipline. They wanted to free the army of politics.During the post counterrevolution period of the first session of them Ottoman Parliament, which ended in 27 August 1909, the parliament would modify the constitution to further politically disenfranchise the Sultan. Article 3 of the 1877 constitution, which had vested unconditional sovereignty on the Padishah was replaced with a conditional sovereignty, requiring the Padishah to swear an oath before the General Assembly to respect Sharia and the constitution, and to remain faithful to the country and the nation.Also it was around this time that the CUP managed to get two of their number put into positions in the cabinet. Talât Bey (later Paşa) became the Minister of the Interior and Cavit Bey became the Minister of Finance. The latter would clash with Mahmud Şevket Paşa with respect to the funding of the military.ABOVE: Talât PaşaABOVE: Cavit BeyIn the period leading up to the Ottoman-Italian War, the CUP would try to increase its influence and a strong opposition would start to develop against it as well.The Party was unhappy with Hüseyin Hilmi Paşa’s government and finally a political crisis arising from some issues related to English concessions in Basra called “The Lynch Affair” allowed them to push for his resignation.He was replaced with Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa:Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa who was a liberal and also close to the old institutions of power was the perfect compromise candidate.Around this time, Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the CUP had an uneasy but relatively cordial relationship. In order to give Mahmud Şevket Paşa’s de facto power some legitimacy, he was made the Minister of War. He would ask for increased military spending during his tenure and clash with Cavit Bey.Until the war with Italy, the power of the CUP would wane, and much opposition to it would develop. The main (and openly stated) purpose of the CUP was the creation of a centralized modern state with power over its own finances. This would invariably put them at odds with a few major groups:European powers who had many commercial and legal advantages in the form the capitulations. France, for example, offered to extend a loan of 11 million pounds only with the guarantee of special French privileges. Cavit Bey refused and instead took a loan from Germany extended without the humiliating condition.Christian minorities, who had a wide range of political desires ranging from decentralization to full independence.The traditional Muslims of the empire who disliked the changes, and what they perceived to be a deterioration of the traditional Ottoman way of life.The CUP would try to hold their power with propaganda from their newspaper Tanin and a couple of political assassinations, but Talât ended up having to resign from his ministry and CUP may have been totally swept aside if it were not for the lifeline that the War with Italy gave them.The war with Italy came unexpectedly after Italy gave an ultimatum for trumped up reasons and gave the Ottomans 24 hours to respond. Not able to reach an amicable solution (by design), Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire and sent soldiers to occupy Tripoli. As the Italians had naval supremacy in the Mediterranean and were German allies, Ottomans asked the British to intervene and even tried to form an alliance with the Entente or England in particular. Both were rejected and England did not allow the Ottomans to send soldiers through Egypt (technically under Ottoman suzerainty at the time). Therefore, a few officers, among them Mustafa Kemal and Enver were smuggled with a few soldiers to help the Libyan resistance leading to a long stalemate. Italy’s war was not going its way.But at the same time, Ibrahim Hakkı Paşa ended up taking responsibility for the war and resigned.Kamil Paşa (see above) was asked to form a cabinet but he refused. So the Grand Viziarate was awarded to Mehmed Said Paşa:Europe remained silent in face of Italian agression leading to much disillusionment in the Ottoman Empire.This event also led to the rise of the Liberal Union and the eventual fall of the CUP from power.During the stalemate with Italy, a party was formed of those, “bitterly opposed to the CUP. Otherwise the Liberal Union was a mass of contrasts and confusions where ‘liberals mingled with conservatives, clericals with free-thinkers, and constitutionalists with absolutists.’” [p.99]In the by-election for Istanbul following the departure of Rıfat Paşa, who was appointed Ottoman Ambassador to Paris, the Liberals won a significant victory.The CUP tried to have Talât, Cavit, Babanzâde Ismail Hakkı appointed to the cabinet, only to be blocked by Mahmud Şevket Paşa.Then the CUP dissolved the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house), and went to elections.The 1912 elections would become known a state “the big-stick election” (Sopalı Seçim) and the CUP would use all the tools in its arsenal to retain power: political violence, restrictive legislation against free press and holding of public meetings, promises of concessions to the disgruntled elements in Macedonia and Albania.The opposition could not muster anything close to the CUP, which won a sweeping victory.Parliament opened on 18 April 1912 but there as dissent in the CUP ranks, so they could not reach much agreement. Cynicism with politics was increasing. To quote at length:“The Government’s manipulation of the Chamber and its disregard for the opposition showed again the futility of trying to bring about change peacefully and according to the law. The measures which the Government had taken - the dissolution of the Parliament, the elections and the constitutional amendments, though absolutely legal - did much to discredit constitutionalism and its practitioners, the politicians, and especially the Unionists. Their acts revealed a total lack of direction and ideology, and led to a mood of cynicism and disillusionment. In the circumstances there seemed no other way out but for the junior officers, who had long been in the background, to step on to the stage of politics.” [pp. 105–106]A group of opposing officers calling themselves Group of Savior Officers (“Halaskar Zabıtan Grubu”), which were related to the Liberal Union and mutinous soliders in Macedonia started to make their presence known. They eventually sent a manifesto to the press, and the situation deteriorated quickly.Said Paşa tendered his resignation, and the government collapsed. The Sultan Mehmed Reşad took charge. He asked the army to refrain from politics and after consulting with both chambers created a ‘technocratic’ cabinet: one made up of experienced politicians. Finally Gazi Ahmed Muhtar Paşa was given the duty of establishing a new cabinet:The majority of his cabinet was determined to destroy the CUP, and “at the first meeting of the Cabinet the Grand Vezir told Nâzım Paşa that the Committee had ‘three or four days to live.’” [p.109]The ‘Savior Officers’ then went into action and demanded the dissolution of the Parliament within 48 hours. After a small crisis, the parliament passed a motion of censure against the government and adjourned sine die.The CUP newspaper Tanin was forced to close, and then reappeared as Cenin. After that was forced to close, it reestablished itself as Senin. Then it suspended publication and reappeared again as Hak. Finally, on November 1912, it closed doors until a more favorable time.Around this time, a political alliance between the small Balkan states with the aim of “liberating Macedonia” was formed under the tutelage of Russia.On September 30, they began mobilizing on the Ottoman border, and on October 2 they presented their demands for the ‘rights’ of the minorities in Macedonia. Among other demands,“[t]he Porte was asked to nominate with the consent of the Powers a Swiss or Belgian Governor-General of Macedonia; set up local legislative assemblies; create local gendarmeries; and lastly, carry out reform under the supervision of the Ambassadors of the Great Powers and the representatives of the four Balkan States.” [p. 112]The cabinet tried to meet some of the demands of the allies but were rebuked.“[The public opinion was that] reform must not take the form of autonomy or decentralization. The Committee warned that no cabinet should take upon itself a guarantee to carry out reform under the mandate of the Powers, or recognize Europe’s right to exercise direct or indirect control over Ottoman affairs.” [p. 112]On October 17, a peace treaty was signed with Italy in Lausanne, giving them control of Tripoli. But to save face, the Ottoman Sultan-Caliph retained the right to appoint the kadı of Tripoli.On October 18, hostilities began with the Balkan League. Ottomans, with the politicization of the army and the constitutional crisis, were highly demoralized and disorganized. To give one relevant anecdote,“[The War Minister] Nâzım Paşa, when asked if war plans were ready, replied: ‘There is a set of plans prepared during the time of Mahmud Şevket Paşa, and I am going to obtain and examine them.’ But they were never used.” [p.113]The League forces had advanced to Çatalca, just outside of Istanbul but the Ottomans began to slowly push them back to Edirne. The Committee was advocating resistance.“If the Porte could obtain the cessation of hostilities either by recognition of the status quo ante bellum or by some small sacrifice, it should do so. But to place Turkey unconditionally in the hands of Europe would be disastrous.” [p.114]On November 8, Salonica, which was the stronghold of the CUP, fell to the Greeks. And CUP members began being arrested in large numbers and either imprisoned or sent to exile in Anatolia.However, the numerous disastrous defeats at the hands of the League forced Ahmed Muhtar Paşa to resign his post as Grand Vezir. He was replaced by the Anglophile “İngiliz” Kamil Paşa (see above), and it was believed that this would have a positive effect on the Entente powers’ intercession on behalf of the Ottomans. It did not.The Porte signed an armistice on 3 December and peace talks began. At the time, the Ottomans were holding Edirne, which Bulgaria demanded be ceded to them. Ottoman cabinet tried refusing but were given an order to accept this demand by the Powers.In this deadlock, some unionist officers who had been planning a coup for a while took the initiative and using the Porte’s impending surrender of Edirne as cause carried out a coup d’etat on 17 January 1913, forcing the resignation of Kamil Paşa. This event would be known as the Raid on the Sublime Porte (“Bab-ı Ali Baskını”).D. From The Coup to The Armistice Of MudrosUntil this point, all the Grand Vezirs and the governments were members or related to the ancien régime. One may be led to believe that right after a coup, the CUP would put their own in charge. And while CUP would use this period to strengthen their position, they would not run the government directly until well into the First World War.After assuming power, the CUP “acted with great maturity. Instead of wreaking vengeance on the opposition and widening the existing political gulf, they adopted a moderate line hoping to mobilize the country behind the new government.” [p. 122]Prominent liberals were comfortably exiled to Europe, and the position of Grand Vezir and War Minister was awarded to Mahmud Şevket Paşa. (above, but I’ll also share a picture as a refresher):The cabinet was also non-partisan, with only three of them being (moderate) CUP members.On January 26, a joint note was delivered by the League delegates to the Ottoman delegate that the ceasefire would expire on 3 February.The reply formulated by the cabinet was to accept ceding only the part of Edirne on the Right Bank of Meriç River, as on the Left Bank, there were the mosques, tombs and other historically and religiously significant buildings were situated.They also agreed that the Powers could determine the status of the Aegean Islands but some were of importance for the security of the Dardanelles and some were an integral part of Anatolia.Finally, they asked for the eventual abolishment of the capitulations.These terms were rejected and hostilities resumed on February 3 1913 at 7 pm.On February 26, the Sublime Porte was fortified against a possible coup attempt.The CUP could not give up Edirne without losing face and possibly their position. So they defended the city until after a long and brave resistance, the city fell to a joint Serbo-Bulgar assault on March 26. On May 30th the Treaty of London was signed ceding most of the Ottoman territory in Europe to the victorious allies.On 11 June, Mahmud Şevket Paşa was assassinated on his way to the Sublime Porte. This caused Cemal Paşa, as the military commander of Istanbul to round up and exile opposition, put the capital under a 10 pm curfew. Twelve men were then sentenced to death for their part in the crime.Mehmed Said Halim Paşa, the grandson of Mehmed Ali Paşa of Egypt succeeded Mahmud Şevket Paşa in the position of Grand Vezir. He and his cabinet were of a Unionist bent.Around this time, the Balkan League having successfully liberated the Balkans, decided to try their hand at liberating each other and fighting began between the allies on June 30.On July 17, a young general called Enver Paşa, and one of the officers responsible for the coup successfully occupied Edirne using the 2nd Balkan War to his advantage.The Balkan War in general had caused the Ottoman Empire to lose most of its territory in Europe and caused a large scale refugee crisis, as the liberated areas were ethnically homogenized. This also had an effect on the Ottoman Parliament, which had become markedly less multi-ethnic.“It is generally agreed that the policy of Ottomanism was scuttled after the Balkan Wars and replaced by Pan-Islam and nationalism, nationalism of the Turanist and not the Turkish kind though the distinction is not clear cut. But the change was one of emphasis and not the introduction of a new ideological formulation. The Albanians, Greeks, and Slavs had no longer to be appeased; only the Armenians and Arabs remained. The three ingredients - Ottomanism, Islam, and nationalism, all undefined - continued to constitute the recipe for the ideological cake; only the proportions had changed.” (p. 154)In 1914, of the 259 deputies in the Ottoman parliament, 144 were Turks, 84 were Arabs, 13 were Greeks, 14 were Armenians, and 4 were Jews.After the breakout of the First World War between The Great Powers, Ottomans signed an alliance with Germany. Further,“Until 1914 the Unionists attempted to abrogate the capitulations through negotiations with the powers concerned and reforming the administration and making their application unnecessary. Their methods were of little avail. Finally they abrogated the capitulations unilaterally on 9 September 1914.” [p. 156]Through the period following the assassination of Mahmud Şevket Paşa and the end of the First World War, the CUP would slowly increase its influence and control of the government and finally Said Halim Paşa was succeeded in his positions by Talât Paşa in 1917.It is worth to stress that between the 1908 revolution and 1917, there was no CUP Grand Vezir.However, the increase of influence is generally assumed to have culminated in the so-called “triumvirate” of the Minister of War Enver Paşa:and The Minister of the Interior, Talât Paşa:and The Commander of the Forth Army and the Minister of the Navy, Cemal Paşa:All three men were quite influential, and indeed in Falih Rıfkı Atay’s (somewhat partisan) memoirs, The Mount of Olives, of his time as the Private Secretary of Cemal Paşa during the latter’s Command of the Fourth Army in Jerusalem, he would write:“During the Great War, the judgement “He is a Unionist” would not have been very descriptive. To call someone “a Unionist” was to suggest that he was an anonymous and indistinct element of the party. What mattered in those days was the honorific “man” that one was stuck with: Cemal Pasha’s man, Enver Pasha’s man, Talat Pasha’s man. Who was their own man, I do not know.“Every man had their own man. When these groups grew larger, it became more appropriate to talk of Enver Pasha’s team, Talat Pasha’s team, Cemal Pasha’s team.“Atop the Mount of Olives, there were two castes: officers of the Fourth Army, and Cemal Pasha’s men. To which of these two castes a man belonged became apparent with his importance relative to his rank.”However, to these men of influence we can a fourth man who had immense influence, which was more or less invisible: Dr. Nazım Bey, who was the head of the Special Organization (“Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa”):However, even so, this would not give us an entirely correct description of the rule of the Party either. As much as I like a good old Roman term, in truth, power did not belong to a ‘triumvirate’, as much as the secretive ‘Central Committee’ in its entirety and perhaps not even them.“Leadership in the Committee was always a collectivized process and it is over-simplification to talk of the rule of the triumvirs… The inner workings of the Committee was infinitely more complex than it appears at first sight.“Immediately after the restoration of the constitution a number of Unionists fame into prominence. They included Talât, Enver, Dr. Nâzım, Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, Rahmi Bey, and Emanuel Karasu, better known in Europe as ‘Carasso, the Jewish lawyer from Salonica.’“… The competition for power was resolved by decentralizing the power structure of the CUP. The Unionists in Parliament were conceded the right to form an ‘autonomous’ parliamentary party. In practice the autonomy of this group was restricted because someone from the inner group, like Talât, became its president. Yet there were times when the deputies disregarded the Committee’s wishes and followed their own Independent lines.” [p. 160]E. Following the Armistice to the Declaration of the RepublicWhen it became clear that the War was lost, Talât resigned his position on October 14, 1918, and was replaced by Ahmed Izzet Paşa:But he caught the Spanish flu and spent most of his premiership bedridden.Following the armistice of Mudros on 30 October 1918, the main members of the CUP fled the country and the party was abolished.Ahmed Izzet Paşa was dismissed on 8 November 1918 and was replaced by Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (see above).On 10 November 1918, the Allies began their occupation of Istanbul and pressured the Sultan to abolish the lower house of the parliament on 21 December 1918 and this ended up dissolving his government as well.He reformed his government on 19 January 1919 but “but after the invaders forced him to dissolve it once more, he resigned as [Grand Vezir] on 3 March 1919”. [from Wikipedia]He remained as the head of the upper house of the Ottoman Parliament, as Damat (=“The Groom”) Ferid Paşa was given the position of Grand Vezir:His cabinet would be made up of the liberal opposition to the CUP. One notable member was the famous liberal journalist and Anglophile Ali Kemal:Sorry, that’s his great grandson, English person Boris Johnson. This is Ali Kemal:At any rate, the name “Damat Ferid” would become a synonym with collaborationist in Turkey, similar to the names “Petain” and “Quisling” are abroad, and not without cause: at this point, the legislative and executive power was firmly in the hand of the occupying powers.The Upper House was only kept open so that it could ratify the results of the Paris Peace Conference. When the Parliament met on 28 January 1920, they agreed on six decisions with regard to the results of any peace treaty conducted with the Allies. This would be called, “Misak-ı Milli” or The National Pact. These decisions were (from Wikipedia):The future of the territories inhabited by an Arab majority at the time of the signing of the Armistice of Mudros will be determined by a referendum. On the other hand, the territories which were not occupied at that time and inhabited by a Turkish majority are the homeland of the Turkish nation.The status of Kars, Ardahan, and Batum may be determined by a referendum.The status of Western Thrace will be determined by the votes of its inhabitants.The security of Istanbul and Marmara should be provided for. Transport and free-trade on the Straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will be determined by Turkey and other concerned countries.The rights of minorities will be issued on condition that the rights of the Muslim minorities in neighboring countries are protected.In order to develop in every field, the country should be independent and free; all restrictions on political, judicial and financial development will be removed.The Allied powers found these decisions disagreeable and forced the Sultan to close the Ottoman Parliament on 11 April 1920, and began rounding up the turbulent parliamentarians. However,Some 100 members of the Ottoman Parliament were able to escape the Allied roundup and joined 190 deputies elected around the country by the national resistance group. On April 23, 1920, the new Assembly gathered for the first time, making Mustafa Kemal its first president and İsmet Inonü, now deputy from Edirne, chief of the General Staff.At this point the narrative will split into two. First will follow the collaborationist government in Istanbul led by Damat Ferid Paşa (see above) until 1922, and the other following the Grand National Assembly (henceforth GNA).E1. Collaborationist Government 1920–1922Having closed the Ottoman Parliament on 10 April 1920, the Allied Powers held a conference in San Remo, Italy to decide on the fate of the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman Government was not invited.Having decided on the future of the Ottoman Empire’s territories, they invited an Ottoman delegation to the Parisian banlieue of Sèvres and signed a treaty with the Ottoman Government on 10 August 1920.ABOVE: The members of the Ottoman Government at Sevres. The gentleman with the Fez is Damat Ferid PaşaHowever, given that there was no parliament and the Ottoman constitution required the ratification of the treaty by a parliament, the treaty never went into effect.This disastrous treaty caused Damat Ferid to become immensely hated in the Empire and eventually he had to resign his post on 21 October 1920 and was replaced by Ahmed Tevfik Paşa (see above, but I am also putting the picture again as refresher):In his third term as Grand Vezir, and now quite powerless, he continued to serve at the pleasure of the occupying forces until the abolition of the Sultanate on 1 November 1922, giving this unlucky fellow the dubious honor of being the last Grand Vezir of the Ottoman Empire.E2. The Nationalist Government 1920–1923On 19 March 1920, Mustafa Kemal Paşa announced, “an Assembly will be gathered in Ankara that will possess extraordinary powers" and communicated how the members who would participate in the assembly would be elected and the need to realise elections, at the latest, within 15 days. He also stated that the members of the dispersed Ottoman Chamber of Deputies could also participate in the assembly in Ankara, to increase the representative power of the parliament.” [from Wikipedia]Following the 1920 elections, the 1920 session of the Grand National Assembly was first held on 23 April 1920 in the Nationlist Headquaters of Ankara.This assembly also had the strange attribute of being (until the declaration of the republic), the chief executive organ of the state.There were five governments of the Grand National Assembly, and all were accepted to be provisional while the capital was under foreign occupation. Its ministers were called ‘vekil’ (acting representative), and not the common ‘nazır’ (minister).The first cabinet of executive ministers were formed between 3 May 1920 – 24 January 1921, and its chairman (= Grand Vezir in the traditional system) was Mustafa Kemal Paşa:The next two formed between 24 January 1921 – 19 May 1921 and 19 May 1921 – 9 July 1922 respectively had Fevzi Paşa as their chairman:The Third one, formed between 12 July 1922- 4 August 1923 had Rauf Bey, a recent returnee from Allied internment at Malta as its chairman:And the last one formed between 14 August 1923- 27 October 1923, and which formed because of Rauf Bey’s resignation following his displeasure with the Treaty of Lausanne had Ali Fethi Bey as its chairman:These governments took care of the executive functions of governing the regions of the Ottoman Empire under nationalist control.However, on 5 August 1921, the GNA gave Mustafa Kemal Paşa the title of “Commander in Chief” (after he resigned his position as the speaker of the parliament after being denied in his request for the post), giving him extra-ordinary legislative and executive powers in practice. He would use these powers to issue the National Requirement Orders (“Tekalif-i Milliye Emirleri”) on 7 August 1921, giving the army the right to immediately requisition 40% or more of all private property in defense of the nation.This order would allow for the Army’s readiness for the Greek Offensive at the Battle of Sakarya on 22 August 1921.Following the compete rout of the Greek Army after the Battle of Dumlupınar on 26 August 1922, peace talks were initiated with the Entente Powers on 20 November 1922.However, the Entente powers had requested the presence of both the Ankara and the Istanbul governments. Until this point a large number of the delegates in the Ankara government were of the opinion that they were fighting to restore the Ottoman Empire. Mustafa Kemal Paşa was of the opinion that it was time to declare a republic. Following debates in the Parliament concerning the abolishment of the Sultane, Mustafa Kemal Paşa shared his opinion on the subject with the delegates on 30 September 1922:Gentlemen! Government and sovereignty are not given from one to another by debate and conversation in accordance with scientific principles. Government and sovereignty are taken by might, power and force. The Sons of Osman have held the government and sovereignty of the Turkish nation by force. They kept at their impertinence for six hundred years. Now the Turkish nation has reminded these rapacious impudents of their place and have claimed their government and sovereignty by rebellion. This is a fait accompli. The question now is not about whether we will leave the nation with its sovereignty and government. The question is about the expression of a self-evident truth. This will invariably happen. If all present here in this parliament see this as natural, in my opinion, it will be appropriate. Otherwise, the truth will find some of form expression in any case. However, perhaps, some heads will be cut off.Having listened to his arguments, the Parliament abolished the Sultanate on 1 November 1922. A year later on 29 October 1923, the republic was declared.TL:DR (obviously)Following Abdülhamid’s deposition in 1909, the Ottoman Government remained a contested area between the Army, the CUP and the opposition with the CUP even being actively oppressed for a period.After the coup of 1913, the CUP slowly concentrated power in the hands of the Central Committee.After the Armistice of Mudros, until 1920, a puppet government ruled in Istanbul. After 23 April 1920, the rule of the Empire became contested between the collaborationist government in Istanbul and the nationalist government in Ankara.The Sultanate was abolished in 1922, leaving the government in Ankara as the only legitimate one.Really TL:DRI don’t like horses.Sources:[1] Ahmad, Feroz. The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress im Turkish Politics 1908–1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1969A lot of visual and other sources that I haphazardly and inconsistently tried to add through the text: this answer very quickly grew in scope, so my starting intent got buried and I lost track very quickly.

I am reposting from an article by Abdullah al Andalusi titled - "ISIS: STORM OR PAWN?"The link to the original article - ISIS in Iraq: Storm or Pawn?-------------------------------------------------------------------------------Last week, much media coverage focused on ISIS’s capture of Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul. ISIS, which stands for ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ declare themselves not just a Jihad army, but an actual ‘Islamic State’, which talks of establishing a Caliphate! Many questions were raised – How could a force of roughly 800 defeat an army of 30,000 (1) in Mosul? Did this victory signify an existential threat to Iraq, the region, and ultimately the United States of America? And has the long-awaited Caliphate returned?Like most media coverage, a lot of details have been, somewhat deliberately, obscured or under-reported. Before we can discuss what the future holds, let us understand the situation and history of the very shadowy ISIS.Iraq and the Origins of ISISThe proto-ISIS group, Tawhid al-Jihad (TJ) arose during the Iraq war, as a group amongst a coalition of resistance fighters against Iraqi occupation. It changed its name a few times: under Ayad Zawahiri, becoming the ‘The organisation of the base of Jihad in the land of the two rivers’; then the ‘Islamic State of Iraq’ (ISI) in 2006 from a coalition of multiple resistance movements; and in 2013 it branched into Syria, and appended the title ‘The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria’ (ISIS).TJ, being mainly a home-grown Iraqi group, then strategically allied itself with the international Al-Qaeda franchise to attract funding, resources and Muslim volunteers from outside Iraq to bolster its ranks. However, it made a number of strategic mistakes, as well as adopting an un-Islamic methodology of deeming civilians to be acceptable targets in war.The first strategic mistake was declaring war on Iraq’s Shia Muslims in response to Iraqi collaborators helping the U.S. forces attack and kill Iraqi civilians (who happened to be mainly Sunni). Despite such a war declaration being completely against Islam, it was also militarily and politically counter-productive and detrimental to the resistance. The resistance fighters of Iraq included Shia groups as well as Sunni groups, however TJ managed to ultimately incite Shias groups against Sunni groups, causing untold horror and misery upon Muslim civilians of both persuasions. This helped the U.S’s occupation of Iraq, as they could now portray themselves as the ‘lesser of two evils’ and ‘neutral’ to both sides. This sectarian war in Iraq got so bad that even Ayman Zawahiri had to plead with them to stop attacking Shia forces and populations, and focus on the U.S. occupation force. Some people even believed that the U.S. government deliberately gave enough leeway to TJ in order to ensure this exact result.ISI’s relationship with Sunni resistance groups also fell apart due to their second strategic blunder, namely their inability to understand the nuances of Islamic laws of warfare, governance and a superficial and unsubtle understanding of Islamic law that made their application of it little different to vigilantes. Their zero-tolerance policy to any dissent caused the Iraqi Muslims who had been working with it to become deeply disaffected. ISI unilaterally (and without consultation of pledges of allegiance from other groups) declared themselves to be an ‘Islamic State’, and viewed their work and political authority over all Muslims as Islamically mandatory. This led them to reason that any and all those who thereafter disagree with them, must be rebels and apostates to cause of Islam, and therefore deserved severe punishment. This led to summary executions, bombing attacks against Iraqi Muslim tribal chiefs, bombing of Sunni civilians and assassinations of fellow resistance fighter commanders.U.S. policy makers simply watched the besieged Sunni Iraq population, being squeezed between ISI, the Shia sectarian ‘death squad’ militias and the American military forces, until the right moment, where they then offered money and weapons to the Iraqi tribal chiefs and resistance fighters to stop fighting the U.S. and create their own ‘Awakening Councils’ to fight ISI and secure their own lands from marauding Shia militias (who had been brutalising and killing Sunni Iraqi civilians during the peak of the sectarian conflict). Thus the ISI lost their ‘allies’ en masse and were kicked out of many territories – forcing them to go underground.However, after the elections, the political system of Iraq caused much oppression by the majority backed political parties against the minorities within Iraq. ISI’s come back would be helped by the most divisive and socially destructive force known in politics – Democracy.Iraqi Democracy, and the return of ISISThe Nouri al Maliki’s political party, Hizb ul Dawah, attained power in Iraq using the U.S-framed political system. It ignored the warning against using the system of democracy in the works of its highly respected, deceased founder Mohammed Baqir ul Sadr (killed by Saddam), an intellectual and scholar who advocated Caliphate in his works on Wilayet al Ummah. Sadr rejected democracy strongly when he said ‘democracy is a system destined for definite collapse and failure’ in his book, ‘Our Philosophy’. He predicted that democracy would lead to oppression of the minority by the majority (2), and creating a system of people in constant conflict with each other (3). Unfortunately, what he predicted came true – ironically, caused by the very organisation he founded.Under the democratic system, Iraq’s already entrenched divisions (mostly created by a successful U.S. divide and rule strategy) became even more exacerbated and led to a land sharply divided between the ‘categories’ of ‘Sunni Muslims’, ‘Shia Muslims’ and ‘Kurds’ (despite Kurds being mostly ‘Sunni Muslims’). It should be mentioned that before the invasion of Iraq, the concept of one’s school of thought as defining a distinct community in Muslim society was mostly alien to Iraqis. However, the seeds of division were planted after the first gulf war, and compounded with the deliberate and differential treatment U.S. occupation forces gave to Iraqis based upon the ‘categories’ as part of their divide and rule strategy.The Iraqi regime, being predominantly composed of ‘Shia Muslim’ politicians, then did what every democratic government does when consisting of a majority, it sidelined its minorities, and ultimately treated them as second-class citizens, leading ultimately to a campaign of torture, killing, and severe persecution. ‘Sunni Muslim’ party politicians were harassed, threatened with prosecution who voicing dissent (4), imprisoned, assassinated or had to flee Iraq. The Vice-president Tariq al Hashemi, was accused of supporting terrorism, and he had to flee to Turkey. He was sentenced to death in absentia (5). Nouri al Maliki was a president as tyrannical as any of Iraq’s previous leaders – with one exception, the Iraqi army he commanded, mostly armed and trained by U.S. Army, was undisciplined and unprofessional – and very unreliable. They had mostly depended on U.S. military support to conduct their operations (and still do).Under Iraq’s new democratic regime, the Muslims of the north became more and more aggrieved, and this offered the perfect opportunity for the return of ISI to prominence. ISI had never left Iraq, and had instead waged an underground terror campaign against mainly ‘Shia Muslim’ population areas. The more civilians they killed, the more the Iraqi government clamped down on Sunnis, the more the Sunni population would be sympathetic to ISIS.ISIS – a minority faction of the uprising against the Iraqi RegimeISIS are not the only armed northern group, nor even the majority amongst the groups. There are thousands of armed former resistance fighters from a number of groups, like former Baathists military, armed Iraqi ‘Sunni tribes’ (a single tribe can command 10,000 men), The Supreme Command for Jihad and Liberation (a coalition of 23 groups, led by the lead group ‘The Army of Men of the Order of Naqshaband’), Ansar ul Sunnah and many others. Many of these different groups have been resisting the Iraqi central government, and attempting to defend Iraqis in the north and west from government persecution. In fact, ‘pro-Sunni’ TV channels in Iraq like Al-Rafidain refer to the ‘Sunni armed forces’ as the General Military Council of Iraqi Revolutionaries, and NOT ISIS (6). This begs the question, why does virtually all Western media channels, and Western/Iraqi government politicians refer exclusively to the fighters as ISIS?ISIS have been reported to have learnt lessons from their past about how to work with others. They seem to have making an attempts to try and win hearts and minds of the Sunni populations by focusing on administering their territories, providing resources and facilities for the public. In their invasion of Mosul, we hear from a variety of sources, that they have to some extent been welcomed as ‘liberators’ (7) (8).However, the disproportionate media attention on ISIS, as opposed to the majority (9) (10) of other groups fighting against oppression by the Iraqi central government, is notable and significant. The cause of the oppressed northern and western Iraqi Muslims has been played down, deliberately leaving the only issue of notice to be the ‘roving terrorists of ISIS’. This conveniently plays into the hands of both the Iraqi regime and the U.S. Of course, Bashar al Assad also deployed the ‘terror card’ to great success in the media to demonise the Syrian opposition in Syria.ISIS are now carefully wooing ‘Sunni tribes’, and other armed groups to ally with them to push back the generally perceived oppressive Iraqi regime. But despite this, ISIS still retains some of its un-Islamic policies. Its depiction of the fight as a general one against all ‘Shia Muslims’ will end up going against them – uniting the Muslims in the south under a banner of defence against sectarian opponents perceived as coming to kill them. Iran has used this perception to attempt to increase its influence in Iraq (being its neighbour, and having the ability to easily deploy troops there). This perception has also allowed Nouri al Maliki to rouse sectarian concerns to desperately recruit volunteers to his cause (and replace the defunct soldiers of the Iraqi army). Grand Ayatollah Sistani has rallied volunteers to fight ISIS, believing, like most southern Iraqis do, that this is a war against sectarian terrorists. This means that ISIS have caused their opponents to rally a large amount of people against them and their allies. The allies of ISIS, northern and western ‘Sunni Iraqis’, who only wanted liberation from a tyrannical ‘democratic’ government, will now have to bare the brunt of enemies they really had no interest in fighting, the majority population of Shias in the South – who are innocent of the actions of the Iraqi government. The claimed ISIS spokesman Abu Mohammed al-Adnani allegedly said:“March towards Baghdad. The Shia are a disgraced people. God forbid that they become victorious over you. How can they when they are polytheists. Don’t stop until you reach Baghdad and Kerbala. Be prepared! Iraq will transform into a living hell for the Shia and other heretic.”If this is true, than this represents the same gross misjudgment that led to ISIS’s previous failures and trouble-making for rebels and resistance fighters in Syria as well as Iraq.Unwitting pawns of oppressive regimesIn 1991, an election in Algeria yielded a landslide victory to the FIS Islamic party in fair elections. Before the next round could take place, the Algerian government, backed by the U.S. and Europe, annulled the elections ‘to protect democracy’ and banned the FIS. This led to a popular uprising lasting 10 years and leading to thousands of deaths. An armed resistance formed, and many of the Algerian people supported it. How did the Algerian government deal with a popular rebellion? Simple, they infiltrated and promoted the most extreme fringe group amongst them, namely a group within the loosely organised GIA (Armed Islamic Group). The government then set a faction within the GIA to fight each other. This fringe group within the GIA then started ‘apparently’ killing their own supporters from amongst the civilian population, and fighting rival factions, like the pro-FIS AIS (Islamic Salvation Army). The fringe faction from the GIA committed so many massacres (with secret Algerian army help, and even instigation), that the non-fringe faction of GIA had to publicly separate from it and created their own group called GSPC (Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat). This tactic was a success for the Algerian government, who portrayed themselves as the ‘lesser of two evils’ (11) and won over the Algerian population to their cause.In Syria, Bashar al Assad is claimed to have released ISI members in Syrian jails during the outset of the rebellion, in order to purposely divide the rebels. Assad also skillfully turned the conflict from being one of opposition to secular oppression, to one of sectarian warfare – allowing Iran, southern Iraqi volunteers, and Hezbollah the pretext to intervene to come to his aid.Al Qaeda’s Zawahiri pleaded with the now rebranded ‘ISIS’ to stop sectarian attacks, and their zero-tolerance of dissent with other rebel groups – all to no avail. Of course, the problem of ISIS may be due to the Syrian government’s clever policies to divide and rule. The Syrian government had previously supported the Iraqi resistance against U.S. occupation, including ISI. Witnesses and reports coming from within Syria detail ISIS selling oil to the Syrian regime for money, as well as the fact that the Syrian regime do not bomb ISIS positions to the degree that they attack the other rebels (12) (some reports even say, no bombing at all). Furthermore, ISIS’s operations in Syria seem more focused on other rebels, then they do on the Syria regime itself. While this has deeply benefitted the Syrian regime, allowing it to claim it is the ‘lesser of two evils’, and sapping global support for the Syrian resistance – the benefits ISIS have gained from their power base in Syria has allowed it increased sources of funding to permit it to take a leading role in the Iraqi rebellion against the central government. Now, Nouri al Maliki can use ISIS to collectively demonise the entire northern uprising against his regime.In conclusion, ISIS still retain their unIslamic, and strategically counter-productive policies that effectively and strategically undermine the Islamic resistance movements in both Syria and Iraq. ISIS’s gains in Iraq, also allows the U.S. to increase its influence in the region, as a weak Iraqi government must come back groveling for U.S. Military support. The U.S. withdrew all their forces in 2011, as they were unhappy with the Iraqi government’s terms to cease exempting U.S. forces from Iraqi judicial prosecution (13). ISIS has provided the perfect pretext (again) for the U.S, who have been reticent to help the Iraqi government with airstrikes months before, and may have given ISIS and the ‘Sunni insurgency’ the leeway it needed to become a problem for the Iraqi government, in order for the U.S. to have a renewed bargaining chip. This would fit the U.S. plan to perpetuate its access to Iraqi military facilities (14) and compete to increase their influence in Iraq and decrease Iran’s influence (15). This may be similar to how when the Pakistani government were forced, due to popular outrage, to request the U.S. to cease drone strikes in Pakistan last year – until the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) attack against Karachi airport allowed the Pakistani government the public support to allow U.S. to resume the drone strikes (16).Saudi Arabia and ISISPro-Bashar al Assad’s media platforms (17), and some in the Western media have speculated that ISIS may be indirectly funded by U.S. and their proxies (e.g. corrupt regimes like Saudi Arabia) in order to fight a proxy war against ‘shiites’ and Iran (18). However this narrative is part of exacerbating the Sunni/Shia conflict, rather than explaining it. This can be seen when the story is put to further scrutiny, it is simply not born out by actions or policy of the Saudi government, nor their interests. ISIS’s ideology considers Saudi Arabia an illegitimate regime based upon non-Islamic law, that must be toppled. Of course, this is shared by most Muslims – but where ISIS differs, is that it believes the Saudi rulers to be apostates from Islam. Consequently, Saudi Arabia has declared ISIS along with Jabhat al Nusra and Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist groups (19). Saudi has also banned preaching, financing and exhorting Saudis to fight abroad or travel to these conflict zones to fight (20). Furthermore, ISIS affiliated cells in Saudi, have been caught planning to renewal a terror campaign against the regime (21). While Saudi and the U.S. does indeed fund groups like the Free Syrian Army and various Syrian rebel groups (22), Saudi Arabia would not support movements that openly promote its own downfall, and could blowback against it or be uncontrollable once they became successful. This does not mean that Saudi hasn’t been funding the other ‘Sunni groups’ in Iraq who are fighting alongside ISIS, but if so, it would only be those goals are more in line with Saudi policy (e.g. a secular nationalist Arab state against Iran). However, this doesn’t mean that ISIS aren’t receiving funds from anywhere. According to analysts and U.S. officials, many private citizens within the persian gulf countries may be illegally and quietly funding such groups (23).ISIS and the ‘Phantom Caliphate’ISIS’s call to Caliphate, while a common Muslim sentiment, permits the Western media and the U.S. to demonise and depict the concept of a Caliphate as a sectarian and deeply ignorant and brutal regime. For example, just two days ago, a Channel 4 program (UK television) depicted the recent gain of Mosul by ISIS under the banner ‘Sunni vs Shia – A new Caliphate’. And a large number of media sites have arisen discussing the ISIS + the “Caliphate”. This may be the media’s attempts to create a ‘phantom caliphate’, an observation first proposed by professor Noman Hanif (24), which is essentially to damage the high esteem the concept held in the Muslim collective memory, and ultimately turn Muslims against it (and towards a Secular system). ISIS are not a Caliphate, as they are not even a state, nor are they able to effectively rule and secure the lands and boundaries supposedly under their control.While many Muslims engage in political work to re-establish the Caliphate, and many more eagerly await its return – it would be unwise to pin hopes on an irregular militia that not only lack the resources to establish a state, but are strategically vulnerable too.The StakeholdersThe U.S. policy in the region has been consistent, and should be borne in mind: it seeks to prevent the return of the Caliphate (25) (26), promote and spread the Western political system, and further U.S. influence and strengthen its foothold for it in the Middle east in order to control the region against other competitors (27).Furthermore, the U.S. and other Western powers have an interest to keep Muslim states weak and divided from eachother. Not only does this prevent the re-unification of the Muslim world, but also allows each state to be contained and dealt with individually and easily. Therefore it is in U.S, Israel and other Western powers’ interests to keep the Muslim world divided as much as possible using the useful pretext of sectarian and ethnic lines. During the Iran-Iraq war, the U.S. successfully helped to reduce the military strength of two power nations, and it became known that it even supplied arms to both nations simultaneously to affect that goal. It is for that reason that politicians, pundits and the media all echo with the chorus of ‘sectarian war’, and ‘sunni vs shia’. Indeed, they would make the audience think that the Sunni vs Shia conflict had been an actively military one for 1,400 years, with no end in sight – except embracing secularism (which is ironic, considering it was secular identity politics borne out of the democratic system which put Iraqis in this position in the first place).The Iraqi government, set up and propped up by the U.S. seeks to retain control of Iraq, and have proven an abysmal failure to control a slowly growing insurgency against it. ISIS would now provide the perfect excuse to both undermine and obscure the legitimate grievances of the rebellion, and garner domestic support from concerned southern Iraqis (who have been made to believe that the northern rebellion is an existential threat to them), and obtain U.S. military support to finish off the dissenters on the ground.Iran sees both the ISIS-labelled rebellion as an opportunity to increase its influence and control over Iraq, and constrain U.S. influence. It will attempt to mobilise to get some kind of military presence in Iraq under the pretext of ‘fighting the terrorists’, then ensure the Iraqi government dances more to its tune. It was already successful in rousing Iraqi public opinion against U.S. forces continued presence, leading to their withdrawal in 2011. Iran will also conveniently play the sectarian card, albeit depicting the conflict as a ‘Muslim vs extremism (takfiri)’ conflict. This allows it to rally Shias round its causes, without declaring war on Sunnis. While Iran doesn’t seek a ‘sunni/shia’ conflict, it will certainly take advantage of the Shias believing they are under attack, in order for them to ally themselves with Iran.The Northern and Western Iraqi rebels, due to the inevitable flaws of democracy, have bracketed themselves as an oppressed minority defined loosely by their school of thought against an unjust and sectarian Iraqi government. While most rebel groups distrust ISIS, many see them as either a ‘necessary evil’, or the ‘lesser of two evils’ (both being un-Islamic concepts). The rebels contain a mixture of secular nationalists, and pro-Islamic movements. Their most likeliest objective is either to force the Iraqi government to cease sectarian policies, or create a succession of the ‘Sunni areas’ away from southern control – much like the Kurdish semi-autonomous enclave. The Kurdish north have also voiced strong concerns about the unjust central Iraqi government, and have pursued a Kurdish nationalist agenda, recently taking the long-coveted Kirkuk and occupying it with Kurdish fighters. The Kurdish authorities will not be intending to relinquish Kirkuk anytime soon (if ever). The Kurdish authorities would prefer a weak central government, and may tolerate the new gains by the ‘Sunni Arabs’ neighbours. However, they may be incited to attack ISIS if they are promised recognition of their control of Kirkuk.ConclusionThe quick (and suspicious) retreat by 30,000 Iraqi troops from Mosul last week, may be just a weak and incompetent army, or it may be because the Iraqi army units and their commanders were recruited from the oppressed ‘Sunni minority’ in the North (who didn’t want to fight their own people (28) (29) ), or there may be something more sinister (30). However, the retreat of the Iraqi troops has certainly created the image of the perceived ‘success’ of ‘extremists‘ which now will conveniently whip up the domestic and international political will for further intervention by foreign powers aimed at further subjugating and weakening the oppressed Muslims of Iraq and the cause of Islam.As Muslims, we should not be fooled into sectarian feuding and fighting – this is just a distraction away from our Islamic obligations for unity. Indeed, the achievement of unity can only be attained via the (re)establishment of Caliphate. Iraq was ruled for centuries, peacefully under Ottoman rule, where Shias and Sunnis were considered to be under one ‘millet’, distinct from Christians, Jews and others. For most of the last 1,000 years, there had been no violence due to differing schools of thought, as the Caliphate state only cared about political allegiance, not points of theological doctrine. This neutral position on theological points of contention within Islam, allowed the Sunni Ottoman government to take responsibility for designated holy sites to the point where the Shia Iraqi shrines had been maintained for hundreds of years by Ottoman funding.“And hold fast to the rope of Allah, and do not be divided amongst yourselves.”(Quran 3:103)The incitement to sectarian mindsets, and the constantly blind faith in Secular democracy to deliver success and unity, has been the root cause of the problems of the Iraqi people.It was narrated that the Prophet Muhammed (saaw) said, ‘If the leaders do not govern according to the Book of Allah, you should realise that this has never happened without Allah making them into groups and making them fight one another’ [Hadith collection of Ibn Majah].The Muslim world must not be fooled into thinking that the Islamic Caliphate resembles anything like the vigilante understanding exhibited by ISIS. The historical Caliphates were enlightened, merciful and principled – unfortunately the current Muslim world suffers from a post-colonial amnesia and illiteracy when it comes to Islamic political thought (and jurisprudence). The Muslims of Iraq, and indeed the Muslim world must rid themselves of puppet, nationalistic and parochial governments, and establish for themselves just and accountable government that rules with Islamic laws, and liberates Muslims to be independent from foreign control.Until such time, the Muslims fighting against oppressive government regimes in Iraq and Syria will have difficult times ahead, as yet again, their cause is discredited and deliberately obscured by politicians and the media’s disproportionate and exclusive attention on a fringe group amongst their ranks.———————————————-———————————————-—————1 Iraq army capitulates to Isis militants in four cities2 ‘If we wished to present the links in the chain of social tragedies that resulted from this system [of democracy], which is neither well studied, nor philosophically based, there would be no room for doing so in the space designated for the present discussion. Because of this, we will [only] make a brief allusion to this point. The first of these links is the following.The majority governed the minority, their vital interests and affairs. Political freedom meant that the majority had the prerogative to lay down the system and its laws (p. 22), as well as their management. Let us imagine that the group which represents the nation’s majority seizes the reins of power and legislation, and adopts the capitalistic democratic mentality which is purely materialistic in its orientation, inclinations, purposes and desires.What then would be the fate of the other group? Or what life would you expect for the minority under laws legislated with the majority and the preservation of its interests in mind? Would it be strange for the majority to legislate laws, particularly in light of its own welfare, to neglect the welfare of the minority, and to turn toward fulfilling its desires in a manner unjust to others? Then who would preserve the minority’s vital structure, and defend it against injustice, if personal interest is the [sole] concern of every individual, and if the majority’s social mentality lacks the notion of spiritual and moral values?It is natural that under (this) system, the despotic rule continues as before, and that the phenomena of manipulation and neglect of the rights and interests of others persist in the social atmosphere of this system as they did in the old social atmosphere. Put briefly, the difference [between the present and the old systems] is that neglect of human dignity arose [in the older systems] because of individuals in the nation; while in the present system, it arises because of groups that represent majorities in relation to minorities. [But] the totality [of these minorities] constitutes a large number of people’ [Our Philosophy, Mohammed Baqir ul Sadr]3 ‘Estimate for yourself the lot of a society established on the basis of this system…in it the individual lives feeling that he is responsible for himself alone, and that he is endangered by any interests of others that may clash with his. It is as if he is engaged in a constant struggle and a continuous fight, equipped with no weapons other than his personal powers, and provided with no purposes other than his personal interests’ [Our Philosophy, Mohammed Baqir ul Sadr]4 Iraq's Al Qaeda claims 2 deadly attacks on Shiites5 The New York Times6 Iraqi TV reflects sectarian split7 ‘Mosul residents Ali Aziz, 35, a humanitarian worker, said: “We got statements by them confirming that they won’t cause harm to anyone and all the minorities will be protected by them. They are really welcomed and we are so happy to have them rather than having Maliki’s bloody, brutal forces…I feel we have been liberated of an awful nightmare that was suffocating us for 11 years. The army and the police never stopped arresting, detaining and killing people, let alone the bribes they were taken from the detainees’ families…Me and my neighbours are waiting for the news that the other six Sunni protesting provinces falling in the hand of the Isis fighters to declare our Sunni region like the three provinces in Kurdistan.”Iraq army capitulates to Isis militants in four cities8 Video allegedly depicting the reception of a ISIS convoy in Mosul9 'We are stronger than ISIS'10 West Warned Over ISIS And Sunni-Iraqi Alliance11 For more information on the algerian civil war, read further herePage on virginia.edu12 Rebels in Syria claim control of resources - The Boston Globe13 U.S. Abandoning Plans To Keep Troops In Iraq 14 ‘establishing main operating airbases in Iraq is not politically desirable in the foreseeable future. However, the United States should not foreclose the option of access to Iraqi military facilities, if welcomed by a sovereign Iraqi government, which could be necessary to respond to future military contingencies in the Gulf’ [U.S. Strategy in the Muslim World After 9/11, RAND Corporation, 2004]15 ‘The expectations of Iraqi Shi’ites for a greater say in the governance of their country presents an opportunity for the United States to align its policy with Shi’ite aspirations for greater freedom of religious and political expression, in Iraq and elsewhere. If this alignment can be brought about, it could be a powerful barrier to radical Iranian influence and a foundation for a stable U.S. position in the region. Of course, this alignment would not come about easily. A reversal of the U.S. commitment to de-Ba’athification in Iraq or a U.S. policy that is perceived as pro-Sunni would erode trust in the U.S. commitment to democracy and drive otherwise moderate Shi’ites into the arms of Iran’ [U.S. Strategy in the Muslim World After 9/11, RAND Corporation, 2004]16 US drone hits 'resume in Pakistan'17 Iraq Under Attack by US, France, Saudi Arabia18http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/06/12/iraq_mosul_isis_sunni_shiite_divide_iran_saudi_arabia_syria19 Page on alarabiya.net20 Full text of the communique issued by the Saudi Interior Ministry on proscribed organisations21 Saudi Arabia breaks up 'al-Qaida-linked terror cell'22 Free Syrian Army funded by US and Saudi Arabia – FSA warlordThis link interesting contains a video produced by ISIS of a defector from FSA to ISIS, exposing Saudi and Western collaboration with other Syrian rebel groups – clearly as something blameworthy.23 Jihadist expansion in Iraq puts Persian Gulf states in a tight spot24 ‘Bearing in mind the RAND reports suggestion of US failure to derail political Islam in the Arab world and with the ever critical threat of regime collapse, the theory of the Western powers being forced to install a pliant Phantom Caliphate in order to suck the life out of the Caliphate movement has some resonance…This suggestion may seem extremely fanciful and conspiratorial at first, but it does have precedent’ [‘Hizb-ut-Tahrir Strategy and the Caliphate Conference in Indonesia’, 2007]Royal Holloway, University of London25 ‘We are up against a vicious enemy, the radical Islamists are there, they intend to try to create a caliphate in this world and fundamentally alter the nature of nation states’ Donald Rumsfeld, 201126 ‘We do not want to see a caliphate established” House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Rep. Ed Royce, 201427 ‘Over the medium to long term, the impact of Iraq on the political evolution of the Greater Middle East will depend on whether the new Iraq emerges as a pluralistic and reasonably democratic and stable state or whether it reverts to authoritarianism or fragments into ethnic enclaves. The first outcome would challenge current negative perceptions of the United States’ role in the region, demonstrate that some form of democracy—what we call “democracy with Iraqi characteristics”—is possible in the Middle East, and undermine extremists and autocrats alike. However, any of the unfavorable outcomes would further destabilize the Middle East, diminish U.S. credibility and influence, discredit democracy-based policies, and open opportunities for encroachment by U.S. adversaries in a vital region of the world’ [U.S. Strategy in the Muslim World After 9/11, RAND Corporation, 2004]28 CNN video on Facebook - CNN.com Video29 Iraq crisis: Generals in army 'handed over' entire city to al-Qaeda inspired ISIS forces - Telegraph30 Interview with senior kurdish politician: baghdad ‘wanted mosul to be captured by extremists’interview with senior kurdish politician: baghdad ‘wanted mosul to be captured by extremists’