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While I have not seen this film, and only watched the clip. American Policing and Laws have not changed since the 70s. But to understand both sides of the argument you have to walk 5miles in each persons shoes.The are inherited biases on both sides, and being a black man in America, I can only speak to my biases and my experiences with encountering with majority white local police officers.A few fallacies:All black men have illegal guns (Facts is a greater percentage of more white male citizens that have firearms than all black men in America)All black males are drug dealers and criminals (Fact, there are more white males that have a criminal record than all black men incarcerated).All black people are low income and are dependent upon public services to survive(Fact: There are more rural white women dependent on public assistance that all black men and women combined).Here lies the issue, public display of the black communities shows low income, high crime rates for blacks in America. What they dont show you, is the large number of black college graduates, businessmen, support foundations for black and brown youth. Also, it would be impossible for blacks to have the highest number of criminals because blacks are only 12-13% of the US Population, and whites still out number all minorities by 2-5%.All white cops are racist. (I agree that not all white cops are racist, no not racist prejudice, and surely not all)White cops are afraid of black males(I agree that this is a fallacy but the issue is an avg white police does not know how to introduce conflict and anger management). Granted we are all humans with emotions, and if a subject under investigation is belligerent and verbally ggressive, a proud cop does not know how to enable customers service. They appear to only know power and control(that was my biases speaking).Now, that you have some insight of one black male in America that have had a gun point to my face by Police a few times since the age 16, I'm now 44. Oh, and for folks that are pro-LEO, let's go through the checklist that blacks often get when we make my previous statement.No, I dont have a criminal recordNo over never been arrestedYes, I have a High School diploma, Bachelor's degree, advance IT Professional, served in US ARMY for 17yrs, Served during OIF (Operation Iraqi Freedom, during the kickoff of the War at Walter Reed treating Combat Casualties, I was Army Trained as a Surgical Assistant).I work as a DOD Manager today and have been for the past 15yrs, GS14 type(look it up to see how high ranking a GS 14) .And now that we have established I'm not a criminal. And while I dont get pulled over often any longer… why Police consider high criminal threats to be 16-25, black males. And yes, they have their statistics.So, to my point, I was stopped by a local county police about a year ago, failure to fully stop at a stop sign. And during initial checks, he unstrap his side arm and held his on his service weapon for the entire stop. Another cop can tell me if that's standard procedure, the FBI agents that I talked to, stated no. He eventually didn't give me a ticket but when I asked if he felt threatened, he did not respond and just left. Standard procedure, bias or scared? You be the judge.In summary, does this happen to black males in America? Not so much taking a cops gun and shooting him, and yes that does happen, but not often. At least cops shooting unarmed black men, happens way more than a black man taking a cops gun and shooting him with it.But the out of control police stops, overly aggressive tones… yes, every day. False imprisonment, maybe twice a month. I've lived in Germany, Italy and Bahrain, and never had 1 police officer in those countries pull their weapon on me during a traffic violation stop.

Historically the Spanish American War in 1898 set the foundation for the US Navy to replace the Royal Navy as a worldwide naval force.Spanish-American WarCONTENTSRemember the Maine!War Is DeclaredSpanish-American War BeginsTreaty of ParisThe Spanish-American War was an 1898 conflict between the United States and Spain that ended Spanish colonial rule in the Americas and resulted in U.S. acquisition of territories in the western Pacific and Latin America.Remember the Maine!The war originated in the Cuban struggle for independence from Spain, which began in February 1895.Spain’s brutally repressive measures to halt the rebellion were graphically portrayed for the U.S. public by several sensational newspapers, and American sympathy for the Cuban rebels rose.The growing popular demand for U.S. intervention became an insistent chorus after the still-unexplained sinking in Havana harbor of the American battleship USS Maine, which had been sent to protect U.S. citizens and property after anti-Spanish rioting in Havana.War Is DeclaredSpain announced an armistice on April 9 and speeded up its new program to grant Cuba limited powers of self-government.But the U.S. Congress soon afterward issued resolutions that declared Cuba’s right to independence, demanded the withdrawal of Spain’s armed forces from the island, and authorized the use of force by President William McKinley to secure that withdrawal while renouncing any U.S. design for annexing Cuba.Spain declared war on the United States on April 24, followed by a U.S. declaration of war on the 25th, which was made retroactive to April 21.Spanish-American War BeginsThe ensuing war was pathetically one-sided, since Spain had readied neither its army nor its navy for a distant war with the formidable power of the United States.Commo. George Dewey led a U.S. naval squadron into Manila Bay in the Philippines on May 1, 1898, and destroyed the anchored Spanish fleet in a leisurely morning engagement that cost only seven American seamen wounded. Manila itself was occupied by U.S. troops by August.The elusive Spanish Caribbean fleet under Adm. Pascual Cervera was located in Santiago harbour in Cuba by U.S. reconnaissance. An army of regular troops and volunteers under Gen. William Shafter (including Theodore Roosevelt and his 1st Volunteer Cavalry, the “Rough Riders”) landed on the coast east of Santiago and slowly advanced on the city in an effort to force Cervera’s fleet out of the harbour.Cervera led his squadron out of Santiago on July 3 and tried to escape westward along the coast. In the ensuing battle all of his ships came under heavy fire from U.S. guns and were beached in a burning or sinking condition.Santiago surrendered to Shafter on July 17, thus effectively ending the brief but momentous war.Treaty of ParisBy the Treaty of Paris (signed Dec. 10, 1898), Spain renounced all claim to Cuba, ceded Guam and Puerto Rico to the United States, and transferred sovereignty over the Philippines to the United States for $20 million.The Spanish-American War was an important turning point in the history of both antagonists. Spain’s defeat decisively turned the nation’s attention away from its overseas colonial adventures and inward upon its domestic needs, a process that led to both a cultural and a literary renaissance and two decades of much-needed economic development in Spain.Documenting United States Naval Activities During the Spanish-American WarSpring 1998, Vol. 30, No. 1By Richard W. PeuserFor many people, the conflict known as the Spanish-American War is a little understood episode in U.S. history. It evokes gripping images such as the explosion of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898, or Teddy Roosevelt and the Rough Riders charging up San Juan Hill on July 1, 1898. But few scholars examined the subject at the fiftieth anniversary in 1948, and as the centennial anniversary of the war approaches, there is still a relatively short bibliography. This is unfortunate, since the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) holds hundreds of thousands of pages of records covering U.S. military activities during this period, many untapped by the research community. It is impossible to cite every series in all navy-related record groups relating to the Spanish-American War, but this article will mention the obvious and some not-so-obvious holdings that document United States naval activities during this period.The United States emerged from the Spanish-American War with a global empire, having acquired the possessions of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. It was a popular war with both the public and the press. The victories were glorified by newspapers, popular magazines, and veterans' own accounts published after the war. Songs, poems, and dirges written by the general public romanticized the exploits of ships, soldiers, and sailors. The following poem written by J. L. Miller of Denver, Idaho, entitled Our War Cry Is "The Maine" was sent to the secretary of the navy with the request that it be used as an "official" poem for "Sampson's Fleet":Our War Cry Is "The Maine"Air: "Rally Round the Flag, Boys"Our Court has found that Spain,By her treachery has slainOur brave and noble sailors,By blowing up the Maine.And now our Uncle Sam is plainIn dealing with the same.He calls us "come on, boysWe'll soundly whip old Spain!"[chorus]Old Glory forever, hurrah, boys, hurrah,Down with the Spanish; and up with the stars!While we rally round old glory, boys,Rally once again,Shouting the battle cry: "The Maine, boys."1Despite tensions with Spain dating back to 1895, the McKinley administration only reluctantly went to war. The explosion that destroyed the USS Maine did not convince the cautious McKinley to take immediate aggressive action. Instead he studied all available options short of declaring war. But the public clamor for war was very strong, and newspapers such as the New York World and the New York Journal exerted incredible pressure on both Congress and the White House. Eventually, both bowed to this pressure, and McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war, which was granted on April 25, 1898. Recent scholarship portrays McKinley as a fully competent commander in chief who grasped the strategic objectives and coordinated policy through both the Navy and War Departments.2Administration of the Navy Department in 1898In order to understand the types of documentation relating to U.S. naval operations, it is important to understand the organization of the naval establishment in 1898. The Department of the Navy was headed by a presidentially appointed civilian secretary. Under him was an assistant secretary and the department's "legal adviser," the Judge Advocate General. In addition, the U.S. Marine Corps fell under naval jurisdiction. The basic organization of the department was the bureau system, which had been implemented in 1842. The bureaus were Construction and Repair, Equipment, Medicine and Surgery, Navigation, Ordinance, Steam Engineering, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks. Each bureau was further divided into offices. For example, the Naval Academy and the Office of Naval Intelligence were placed in the Bureau of Navigation. The Naval Observatory was administered by the Bureau of Equipment. The navy also created and appointed temporary and permanent boards. Examples of "temporary" boards were the board of inquiry concerning the destruction of the Maine and the Naval War Board, the latter organized by Secretary of the Navy John Long as an informal policy and strategy group accountable directly to him for the duration of the war.3 Examples of "permanent" boards were the Judge Advocate General's promotion and retirement boards which were set up to measure the "fitness" (both mental and physical) of officers serving in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.Like the War Department during this period, the navy had organizational flaws. Two major obstacles were lack of coordination among the bureaus and of a centralized policy or planning apparatus to prepare the department for future wars. The latter problem was partially addressed by the creation of the General Board in 1900.4 Despite its organizational flaws and shortcomings, the navy performed capably in the war with Spain. The vision of men such as Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy, as well as technological innovations developed after the Civil War, made a strong enough foundation for the navy's preparedness and successful conduct of war. The outcome was never in doubt. Anchored around the newly developed armored battleship advocated by Mahan, the "Steel Navy" of the United States defeated the outdated, outmanned, and outclassed fleet of the Spanish navy in every battle from the opening guns at Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, to the ultimate destruction of the Spanish fleet at Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898.The war with Spain involved naval operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Documentation concerning operations, training, administration, and personnel as well as other subjects relating to the naval establishment in 1898 are abundant among the holdings of the National Archives. Before conducting research at the National Archives, individuals are strongly encouraged to examine the variety of the published documentation that is available.Published DocumentationSignificant published primary sources consist of annual reports of the Navy Department (for specific years) and selected published proceedings such as the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry Upon the Destruction of the United States Battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, February 15, 1898, Together with the Testimony Taken Before the Court (U.S. Senate document 207, 55th Cong., 2d sess.) and Record of Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in the Case of Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, U.S. Navy (2 volumes, 57th Cong., 1st sess). The Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the United States, and of the Marine Corps (for specific years) is also a fine source for information concerning the names and duty stations of the officers that staffed the navy for given years. These published documents are part of the congressional serial set and are indispensable for researching U.S. naval activities during the conflict. In many instances, testimony of officers and supporting documentation such as "extracts" from a decklog or ship movement orders are included. The Government Printing Office (GPO) published these reports and registers, and they are available at designated depository libraries throughout the United States.A unique resource for the study of U.S. Navy operations during the war with Spain is the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy for the Year 1898. All executive branch agencies are required by law to submit an annual report to Congress explaining actions taken during the previous year. Under the direction of the secretary of the navy, who produced his own report on the overall "state of the navy" and his office's activities, each bureau and administrative office, such as the Judge Advocate General and the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), produced reports concerning its own specific activities. The Annual Reports for the Navy Department for the Year 1898 consists of two volumes of administrative reports by the bureaus and "independent" offices and a separate volume, Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, relating to "fleet" and other operational components of the navy in the war with Spain. The main volume consists of orders, maps, statistical summaries, and battle reports. The appendix contains the list of officers and enlisted men killed, drowned, and saved from the USS Maine and the findings of the United States and Spanish naval courts of inquiry concerning the destruction of the Maine. It also includes battle reports, orders, and other documentation relating to operations of the U.S. naval forces in Cuban waters and the Philippines. These printed reports compiled as the "appendix" were extracted and transcribed from the General Correspondence File, 1897–1926 (Entry 19), General Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Record Group 80. All the entries include the "Sec. Nav." file number.Archival ResearchRecords in the custody of the National Archives are divided into "record groups," which maintain the same arrangement the creating agency used. Conducting research at the National Archives and Records Administration can be quite challenging, especially for first-time researchers. The depth of research depends on the researcher and the topic. The Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States is the first step for individuals conducting research on broad subjects, particular agencies, or getting general information on the holdings of the National Archives. It is available at most large reference and university libraries and is also available online through the "Research Room" section of the NARA home page on the World Wide Web at http://www.archives.gov/research/. Descriptions include administrative histories, record types (i.e., general correspondence, photographs), and dates covered. The Guide also provides the next step for archival research by listing the pertinent inventories for individual record groups.An "inventory" is a listing designed to tell the researcher both the quantity and nature of the records in a particular record group. Inventories contain a brief administrative history of the agency in question and a series-by-series description of the records. Inventories may also list related records available in other record groups (and in some cases, other repositories) and records that have been made into National Archives microfilm publications. Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel (Record Group 24) even lists the "Chiefs of the Bureau of Naval personnel and of the Predecessor Bureau of Navigation, 1862–1959" (p. 4), and the Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Record Group 38)includes as an appendix a "List of the First Naval Attachés, 1882–1919" (p. 105).One important source not to be overlooked is the Guide to Materials on Latin America in the National Archives of the United States, compiled by George S. Ulibarri and John P. Harrison. It includes descriptions of various naval record groups that contain information or documentation on a variety of subjects relating to the Spanish-American War. The guide is arranged by branch or function of government, thereunder by record group. A subject index is included at the back of the volume.Records DescriptionThis section describes record groups and pertinent finding aids relating to naval activities during the Spanish-American War. Many significant series of records are available as National Archives microfilm publications. All National Archives microfilm publications are listed in National Archives Microfilm Resources for Research: A Comprehensive Catalog.Record Group 19, Records of the Bureau of ShipsFinding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Ships (1961).(Bureau of Construction and Repair, 1898; Bureau of Equipment, 1898)Functions in 1898: Responsible for ship designs, building, fitting, and repairing all U.S. Navy ships and ship equipment.These records relate to the design and construction of U.S. naval battleships and auxiliary craft. Some general correspondence files concern steel construction of ships and include blueprints and specifications. One of the entries, "Returns of the New York (December 1898–September 1900)" includes cruising information, places sailed, weather conditions, and information on the physical features of the flagship of the North Atlantic Station, which was commanded by Capt. William T. Sampson.Other series include information on coaling stations and coaling equipment, in particular the U.S. naval coaling stations at Honolulu, Hawaii (1885-1899), and Pichilingus Harbor, La Paz, Mexico (1885–1897). One fascinating series, "Records Relating to Homing Pigeons (1896 - 1899)," contains, in addition to correspondence to the U.S. Navy Department, sample packets of pigeon food and one packet labeled "feces." These packets were sent by pigeon experts in Dijon, France, to show the quality of carrier pigeon produced in that region. (The navy experimented with the idea of using messenger pigeons especially for ship-to-ship service.)Record Group 24, Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel(Note: To avoid duplication, this segment will not discuss records relating to U.S. Navy personnel since "Genealogy Notes" in this issue will cover records relating to individuals.)Finding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel (1960).(Bureau of Navigation, 1898)Functions in 1898: Responsible for personnel, i.e., recruiting training, staffing (enlisted men and officers), and movement/operations of ships. Perhaps the most powerful bureau within the naval establishment during the war with Spain, the Bureau of Navigation had jurisdiction over personnel decisions of the Department of the Navy, including those relating to officers, enlisted men, and civilians who worked for the department. It administered the United States Naval Academy, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Coast Signal Service.A very popular series records is the "Logs of United States Naval Ships and Stations. 1801–1946." The National Archives has custody of all decklogs of U.S. Navy ships commissioned during the Spanish-American War. Decklogs and station logs were standardized records maintained by a specific ship or shore unit. They include a daily narrative of the unit's activity and record weather and hydrographical data. They were usually handwritten by the officer of the day. Each log begins with the name and rank of the officers and the dates covered by the log.Generally, the more active the ship or station, the more information is provided. In some cases, especially during action or by accident, the decklog was lost. Most notably, the decklog of the USS Maine was lost in the explosion in Havana Harbor, Cuba, February 15, 1898. A few of the Spanish-American War-era ships whose decklogs are in the custody of the National Archives are USS New York, USS Iowa, USS Marblehead, USS Brooklyn, USS Texas, USS Montgomery, USS Oregon, USS Massachusetts, and the USS Olympia. Logs were gathered together and bound, and each volume consists of two or three years of entries. Researchers will find an abundance of information in these logs including narratives of battles; instructions; orders; ship movements; ordnance, cargo, and personnel (including, in some cases, Spanish prisoners of war) taken aboard; and other documented day-to-day activities of navy commissioned ships.The best source to locate the names of the ship and shore units whose logs are in the custody of the National Archives is Special List #44, List of Logbooks of U.S. Navy Ships, Stations, and Miscellaneous Stations, 1801–1947. Special List #44 lists all ship and shore units alphabetically with the accompanying years covered by the logs.Beginning in 1885, the Navy Department created a general file by registering incoming and outgoing correspondence with a serial number, which was then registered with the date received or sent, the file number, name of correspondent, subject, and action taken.5 In the series "General Correspondence, 1889–1913," can be found a variety of actions and decisions made by the bureau chief (Arent Schuyler Crowninshield in 1898) concerning ships, shore establishments, and men. To locate specific documentation for the year 1898 in this series, a researcher would have to examine another entry,"Subject Registers of Letters Sent and Received ("Correspondence/Subjects"), 1896–1902" (8 volumes), which is arranged by the subjects "Persons, Vessels, Miscellaneous."6 The registers give the name of the subject, division, brief (description of incoming correspondence), writer, number, and action taken. If a researcher knows that an officer on the USS Iowa was transferred in 1898 to the USS Brooklyn, it is possible, for example, to search under the officer's name to locate the orders that sent him to the Brooklyn.Among the records of the general correspondence file is an interesting file concerning Commodore George Dewey. It acknowledges the receipt of multiple telegrams from Secretary of the Navy John Long announcing Dewey's rank as "admiral": "Hoist flag as Admiral— (signed) Long." Another telegram passes congratulations from President McKinley, Congress, and the entire Department of Navy to Dewey on his promotion to admiral.7 Other subjects within the registers include the names of executives of the U.S. governrnent, foreign dignitaries, and heads of state.Record Group 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval OperationsFinding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (1966).(Office of Naval Intelligence, 1898; Office of Naval Records and Library, 1898)Functions in 1898: Responsibilities for the Office of Naval Intelligence included the collection of technical and scientific data on foreign navies, usually by written reports and newspaper clippings compiled by the various naval attachés staffing European posts. This office was placed administratively under the Bureau of Navigation when war was declared.Intelligence and intelligence-gathering activities conducted by the U.S. Navy in the war with Spain were adequate, at the least. Naval attachés stationed at U.S. consular posts abroad and commercial agents acting on behalf of the department or the U.S. government forwarded information to the department.8 This information was transmitted in the form of letters, reports, cables, or messages (sometimes in code); analyzed for content; and disseminated to appropriate offices within the department or passed onto other U.S. government agencies whose interests were represented.Letters from attachés in RG 38 are bound into twenty-five volumes covering the period October 28, 1882–December 29, 1900 (entry 90). These "letterbooks" are arranged by the name of post, including the name of the naval attaché stationed there, thereunder chronologically. The volumes covering the period of the Spanish-American War are:London (October 28, 1882–March 31, 1900), 9 volumes.Berlin, Rome, and Vienna (January 10, 1889–September 29, 1900), 6 volumes.Paris and St. Petersburg (September 6, 1892–May 30, 1900), 6 volumes.Tokyo, Madrid, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg (January 5, 1895–December 29, 1900), 1 volume.9Many of these letters include enclosures such as newspaper clippings, technical pamphlets, maps, charts, summaries, and diagrams. These letterbooks are a great source of information concerning foreign navies and merchant fleets, foreign technological developments, and in some instances, the attitude of a particular country towards the United States. They are indexed by a separate series of registers arranged by year, thereunder by subject (entry 89).Communications from the department to naval attachés are also available in this record group. "Cable Correspondence with U.S. Naval Attachés During the Spanish-American War (January 20, 1898–November 1, 1900)" consists of letters, cables, and instructions from the secretary of the navy to attachés stationed at London, Rome, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, and Madrid. This series is arranged by post, thereunder chronologically, and consists of letters, bound in two volumes, detailing some of the actions the U.S. Navy took leading up to the actual declaration of war. Many of these letters are the instructions sent by Secretary Long and Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt during March 1898 requesting information on Spain's naval preparations for possible war. Another topic with which the department concerned itself was the condition, preparation, and movements of the Spanish fleet. Accordingly, cables and letters are included in this series, instructing the naval attachés to provide related intelligence. One cablegram, written by Roosevelt to the U.S. attaché in Madrid, Spain, urged caution while instructing him to keep fully abreast of the situation:Alusna, Madrid.March 5, 1898Keep informed state of affairs and report fully by navy secret code preparation and movement Spanish navy. Exercise discretion.Roosevelt10The Navy Department was also concerned about its own overall readiness for a possible war with Spain. Researchers can find a wealth of information in this series concerning the various steps taken by the department such as the purchasing of guns, ordnance, and other weaponry.Record Group 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and LibraryFinding Aid: Preliminary Checklist of the Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library (1945).(Office of Naval Records and Library, 1898)Functions in 1898: Administered the Navy Department Library; continued the publication and distribution of the Official Records of The War of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.The records collected by the Office of Naval Records and Library cover the period 1775–1927 and document virtually every aspect of U.S. Navy history. The scope and depth makes it the most important record group for the study of U.S. naval history for the nineteenth century. Researchers who intend to study the U.S. Navy during the Spanish-American are strongly urged to start with this record group. The records that make up this collection were gleaned from other naval bureaus, offices, boards, and functions. They were placed into an artificial filing scheme created by the navy's historical section between the years 1923 and 1942.11 Two series are especially important.Entry 464, Subject File, 1775–1910. These records are arranged by an alpha-subject designation. An index lists the subject designations and the titles of the files in chronological order. All of the individual files are either in folders or envelopes, each clearly labeled with the contents and dates of the records inside. Information relating to the U.S. Navy during the Spanish-American War is scattered among these records. Some of the file designations and accompanying document titles are:File HA (Engagement with Enemy Vessels)"July 3,1898, Description of Battle of Santiago written by Lt. Thomas A. Kearney immediately after battle.""1898, Battle of Manila Bay—miscellaneous material. Also, a translation of a Spanish book relating to the battle.""July 3,1898, Spanish Account of the Battle of Santiago, Cuba. List of Spanish Personnel included."File HF (Fires, Explosions, Etc.)"Correspondence Relating to the loss of the USS Maine."File O1 (Reports of Inspection— U.S. Ships)File OO (Operations of Large Groups of vessels)These are the operational records of the fleet and squadron components of the U.S. Navy during the Spanish-American War, including auxiliary crafts. Some of the document titles include:"1898, Battles and Capitulation of Santiago, Cuba, including data concerning the sinking of the USS Maine from a Spanish point of view.""Activities of the German Squadron in Manila Bay, told by Chief Boatswain Ernest Heilman. Other data relative to Dewey and the German Fleet.""1898, Diary of Commodore George Dewey (Manila Campaign, January 1898–May 1898), (photostat).""1898, Narrative of Manila Campaign, preparation at Hong Kong— Battle of Manila Bay, enforcement of blockade and operations resulting in the surrender of Manila."Under the file designation VN (Naval Policy), there are two attaché reports concerning the effects or influence the Spanish-American War had on Europe, in particular, Germany and Great Britain. One report, dated September 16, 1899, written by U.S. naval attaché to Great Britain Lt. Comdr. John C. Colwell, concluded with the remark that, in respect to Her Majesty's Navy, the late war was of little interest since the "professional aspects" and outcome were already known. The second report, dated October 30, 1899, written by U.S. naval attaché to Germany Comdr. William H. Beehler, concerns the effect of the war on German naval policy. It discusses such topics as ship design, armored coast defense vessels, cruisers, and communications (telegraph). These two files reveal some general prevailing attitudes of Europe's navies to that of the U.S. Navy after the end of hostilities.12Entry 464, Area File, August 1775–December 1910. These records are arranged by geographic region, thereunder chronologically. The geographic divisions are further divided into eleven subdivisions. These records have been microfilmed as National Archives Microfilm Publication M625, Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775–1910 (414 rolls). The descriptive pamphlet accompanying M625 contains the administrative history of the collection; a description of the geographic locations or areas, including date or time period covered; a map of the divided areas; and a roll-by-roll list of contents.Two examples of the kind of documentation found in this collection are the famous "Sigsbee Telegram," written while the Maine's captain, Charles Sigsbee, was aboard the SS City of Washington, informing the department of the explosion of his vessel, February 15, 1898 (Area #8), and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt's instructions (in code) to Commodore Dewey to take action against the Spanish fleet in Mirs (Manila) Bay, April 1898 (Area #10).Record Group 52, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and SurgeryFinding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Office of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (1948).(Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 1898)Functions in 1898: One of the original bureaus since 1842, it concerned itself with naval medicine, including the overall health and welfare of officers and enlisted men of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. It administered U.S. Navy ship and shore medical facilities.As the title indicates, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery was the medical arm of the naval establishment in 1898. Included in this record group are personnel-related series, including individual personnel histories of medical officers; records relating to the history of naval medicine; and a general correspondence file, 1885–1912, which has an alphabetical subject index. Under the subject heading, "Maine, USS, Disaster the," researchers can locate records relating to casualty lists, lists of survivors, Marine Corps casualties, final disposition of survivors, permission from the secretary of the navy for the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery to give copies of death certificates to next-of-kin, and death certificates forwarded to the commissioner of pensions.13A thin volume entitled "Casualty Book—War with Spain" includes a statistical summary of total strength, casualties from battle, deaths from battle, and deaths from all causes. The volumes contain an alphabetical listing of men, nativity (residence or origin), where enlisted, and date and place of death. In the back of the volume is an envelope that contains correspondence concerning both U.S. Navy and Marine Corps casualties in the war with Spain. Some of the documents are annotated with additional names and dates of death. The volume and accompanying correspondence are dated 1903.14Record Group 80, General Records of the Department of the Navy, 1798–1947Finding Aid: Preliminary Checklist of the General Records of the Department of the Navy, 1804–1944 (1945).(Office of the Secretary of the Navy, 1898)Functions in 1898: The secretary of the navy (John D. Long in 1898) has charge of all duties connected with the U.S. Naval Establishment including setting policy, creating and abolishing boards, and fiscal matters.The records of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy were filed numerically by subject for the period of the Spanish-American War. The "General Correspondence File, January 1897–August 1926," has an index, arranged alphabetically by name or subject. It is available on microfilm as National Archives Microfilm Publication M1052, General and Special Indexes to the General Correspondence of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, July 1897–August 1926 (119 rolls). This publication's descriptive pamphlet contains an administrative history, notes on recordkeeping practices of the Navy Department in the late nineteenth century, and a roll-by-roll list of contents. Appendix B of the preliminary inventory for RG 80 contains an alphabetical list of the main subject headings in the file (entry 19), 1897–1926. Since the records were maintained by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, information on a wide variety of subjects ranging from personnel actions within the department to shipbuilding programs in the navy's many shipyards may be found in this series.The Naval War Board, a policy organization whose members were Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Adm. Montgomery Sicard, Capt. Arent S. Crowninshield, and Capt. Albert S. Barker, was crucial in providing coherent strategy and war planning for the navy in the war with Spain.15 Under this file heading are handwritten references to five documents whose titles are "Spanish Vessels" (file 7332-3-9), "Light Buoys" (file 7736), "Coaling Stations" (file 6951-6), "Papers from Board" (file 8153), and "Dept. directs Capt. A. T. Mahan to prepare a history of the work of the Board: The Causes leading to its organization, etc., etc., for the General Board" (file 22132). A further annotation remarks that this last document was filed in the records of the General Board. The records of the General Board (1900–1951), also part of RG 80, contain the original manuscript of "History of Naval War Board, 1898," written by Alfred T. Mahan in 1906. Attached to the manuscript are letters written by Captain Mahan to former Secretary of the Navy John D. Long and other members of the Naval War Board and a letter from the president of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, dated January 26, 1940, requesting a copy of Mahan's work for the college. No organized body of records exists for the Naval War Board, however.16Examples of other documentation in RG 80 are records of various boards commissioned during the Spanish-American War including the Board on Construction, 1889–1909, and the Board on Auxiliary Vessels, 1898. Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Theodore Roosevelt during the period, April 1897–May 1898) also exist. There are eight volumes of letters sent by Roosevelt to other officers of the navy and to private and public individuals. Many letters relate to the formation of the First U.S. Cavalry ("Rough Riders"), the unit he and Col. Leonard Wood formed after he resigned from the position of assistant secretary in May 1898. Letters sent to the attaché in London concern the purchase of naval war stores and auxiliary vessels, and letters to various congressmen concern the push for naval preparedness. 17Record Group 313, Records of Naval Operating ForcesFinding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of Naval Operating Forces (1963).(Bureau of Navigation, 1898)Functions in 1898: Responsible for ship operations and movements. Records of the components of the U.S. Fleet include North Atlantic Squadron, Eastern Squadron, Asiatic Squadron, European Squadron, and the Flying Squadron (1898).Researchers examining the finding aid for RG 313 will find that the records described within its pages are almost exclusively of Spanish-American War vintage. There is a wealth of documentation concerning operations of the fleet, including squadrons and flotillas. Included are operational reports, journals, orders, and instructions issued by commanders of the various naval forces for the Spanish-American War. Historically, the Navy Department operated five geographically organized squadrons from immediately after the Civil War until 1906–1907: North Atlantic Squadron, European Squadron, Asiatic Squadron, Pacific Squadron, and Training Squadron.18 Accordingly, the records are arranged by squadrons thereunder by type of record and date. Included in this record group is the journal of Rear Adm. William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Squadron, March–August, 1898. Reports of action during the Battle of Santiago de Cuba can be found in the journal.There are records of the "Flying Squadron," commanded by Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, March 28–November 11, 1898, and records of the United States Auxiliary Naval Force, 1898, which had been organized for the coastal defense of the United States. Other series include correspondence with bureaus of the Navy Department (entry 47) and correspondence with Commodore John C. Watson (entry 51) and Commodore George C. Remey (entry 53). These series are letters sent to the officers by other commanders in the field and the Navy Department in Washington, D.C.These are examples of the kinds of documentation available in the National Archives relating to the U.S. Navy in the "Age of Empire." There is much more. Some of the record groups not covered in this essay includeRecord Group 37, Records of the Hydrographic Office;Record Group 71, Records of the Bureau of Yards and Docks;Record Group 74, Records of the Bureau of Ordnance;Record Group 125, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy);Record Group 127, Records of the U.S. Marine Corps;Record Group 143, Records of the Bureau of Supply and Accounts (Navy);and Record Group 181, Records of Naval Districts and Shore Establishments.Researchers are encouraged to explore these sources as well.One final note for researchers to keep in mind: as mentioned previously, many records in these record groups were removed and placed in Record Group 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library. If records cannot be found in the above record groups, chances are they were refiled in RG 45.Archival research takes time and patience. Both staff and scholars have compared it to detective work. It is important to remember that this kind of research is a layered process, going from the general to the specific. One of the best strategies for archival research is to know and understand the secondary sources relating to a topic before consulting primary documents. Checking footnotes and bibliographies cited by other authors and specialists in the field may help individuals open doors into the world of archival research. The "Suggested Readings" list contains several excellent secondary works concerning U.S. naval operations during the Spanish-American War written in the past thirty years.Researchers are also encouraged to consult with the NARA reference staff archivists who are familiar with the pertinent records and finding aids relating to the U.S. Naval Establishment at the turn of the century. NARA archivists who work with military records can help map out research strategies for prospective researchers.19 Letters of introduction and intention are especially useful prior to a visit to the Archives.This is not the first time a call has been made for more research in this period of U.S. naval history. David F. Trask, in his essay entitled "Research Opportunities in the Spanish-Cuban-American War and World War I," delivered at the National Archives Conference on Naval History, May 29–31, 1974, concluded with "a plea for efforts to stimulate use of the National Archives collections (for this period)." He further stated that, "if and when these sources are properly exploited, we will assuredly process more of the illusive 'new naval History,' about which we hear so much and which indeed is attainable in our time."20 These words echo as loudly today as they did when he first issued the call twenty-three years ago.War Plans and Preparations and Their Impact on U.S. Naval Operations in the Spanish-American Warby Mark L. Hayes, Early History Branch, Naval Historical CenterPaper presented at Congreso Internacional Ejército y Armada en El 98:Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas on 23 March 1998.The United States Navy, much like the nation itself, was in a state of transition in 1898. Traditionally the navy embraced a defensive strategy with an emphasis on commerce raiding. In contrast, the navy was asked during the Spanish-American War to gain control of the waters around the Philippine Islands and the Caribbean Sea. After twenty years of rapid decline into obsolescence following the American Civil War, the navy was in the process of re-equipping itself with steel warships of modern design. The implications of these changes for the conduct of war at sea were not lost on America's naval leadership, who had spent the years and months prior to the war with Spain preparing for conflict with a European power. However, the war itself revealed the growing tactical and logistical complexities of modern naval warfare, and the U.S. Navy, like all navies, was in the process of overcoming the challenges presented by the technology of the new steel warships.The U.S. Navy had in commission over 600 vessels at the close of the American Civil War. Nearly all of the new ships were wartime purchases, hasty constructions, or made from unseasoned timber. After the war, most were sold off or destroyed. In spite of international crises such as the Virginius Affair in 1873, contention with Great Britain over the Alabama Claims, and problems with France over a projected canal in Panama, the strength of the navy continued to decline. By 1879 only forty-eight of the navy's 142 vessels were available for immediate service, and these were obsolete wooden or old ironclad ships. Naval technology had stagnated in the U.S., illustrated by the fact that there was not a single high-power, long-range rifled gun in the entire fleet. In 1884 the U.S. Navy's newest ships were wooden-hulled steam sloops built in the previous decade.1Modernization began during the administration of President Chester Arthur in the early 1880s. Rapid growth in overseas markets and a foreign policy aimed at U.S. control of communications across the isthmus of Central America drove the country towards naval expansion. President Arthur addressed a receptive Congress in his first annual message when he concluded, "I cannot too strongly urge upon you my conviction, that every consideration of national safety, economy, and honor imperatively demands a thorough rehabilitation of the navy."2 Two years of debate on the nature of this expansion culminated with the Navy Act of 1883, authorizing the construction of the steel cruisers Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago, and the dispatch vessel Dolphin. Congress continued the process by approving additional steel warships, including the New Navy's first armored ships, USS Texas and USS Maine. Toward the end of the decade the U.S. Navy still embraced a defensive oriented strategy with cruisers designed for commerce protection and raiding. Even the armored ships under construction were designed to counter the threat of similar vessels in South American navies.3It was during the administration of Benjamin Harrison (1889-93) that the navy's strategy and policy began to change. In his inaugural address, President Harrison called for the continued and rapid construction of modern warships, and the acquisition of bases to maintain the U.S. fleet in foreign seas. Later he urged Congress to authorize construction of battleships, giving support to Secretary of the Navy B.F. Tracy's goal of making the U.S. fleet strong enough "to be able to divert an enemy's force from our coast by threatening his own, for a war, though defensive in principle, may be conducted most effectively by being offensive in its operations."4 Tracy proved to be an excellent administrator, and he marshaled allies for his expansionist policies in both Congress and the navy, including Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Their work bore fruit with the Navy Bill of 30 June 1890, authorizing construction of three battleships later named Indiana, Oregon, and Massachusetts. Along with the battleship Iowa, authorized in 1892, this force formed the core of a new fleet willing to challenge European navies for control of the waters in the Western Hemisphere.While civilian leadership and U.S. industry prepared the navy materially for an offensive war, a new institution, the Naval War College, prepared the service intellectually. Founded in 1884 and placed under the direction of Commodore Stephen B. Luce, the War College contributed greatly to the professionalization of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps at the end of the nineteenth century. Explaining to the Senate the reason for creating the institution, Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler stated that "the constant changes in the methods of conducting naval warfare imposed by the introduction of armored ships, swift cruisers, rams, sea-going torpedo boats, and high- power guns. . .render imperative the establishment of a school where our officers may be enabled to keep abreast of the improvements going on in every navy in the world."5By the 1890s the curriculum at the War College included training problems where students drafted plans for operations in the event of war with specific countries under particular circumstances. Beginning in 1894 the War College, and later special boards convened by the Secretary of the Navy, examined the possibility of war with Spain over trouble in Cuba. When Secretary of the Navy John Long formed the Naval War Board in March 1898, the Navy Department and the McKinley administration had the benefit of four years of planning for such a conflict. The first plan to emerge from the Naval War College was a paper prepared in 1894 by Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Train who was assigned to write on "Strategy in the Event of War with Spain." Train believed that the first priority of the U.S. Navy was the destruction of the Spanish fleet which should be accomplished at the earliest possible date. The plan called for the seizure of Nipe Bay on Cuba's northeast coast as an anchorage and coaling station to support a blockade of the island's principal ports. It was expected that a Spanish expedition from Cadiz would attempt to relieve Cuba via Puerto Rico, but would be met by a concentrated U.S. fleet ready to defeat it.6When the Cuban insurrection broke out the following year, the officers in charge at the Naval War College believed that it was important to undertake a full-scale study of a Spanish-American conflict. They gave the class of 1895 a "special problem" concerning war with Spain where the objective was to secure independence for Cuba. The plan, submitted to the Navy Department in January 1896, called for an early joint operations against Havana. Thirty thousand regulars would be landed near the colonial capital from a staging area in Tampa, Florida, fifteen days after war was declared, followed by 25,000 volunteers two weeks later. The U.S. fleet, based out of Key West, would intercept any Spanish expedition attempting to reinforce the defenders in Cuba. Such a relief attempt was expected thirty days into the conflict.7The Office of Naval Intelligence entered the planning effort later in 1896. Lieutenant William Kimball prepared a plan that focussed on a tight naval blockade of Cuba as the primary means of persuading Spain to release control of her colony. Supporting attacks against Manila and the Spanish coast would, it was believed, further induce Spain to negotiate an end to the conflict. According to Kimball's plan, only if these efforts failed to bring about peace, would the army land in Cuba and operate against Havana. The Naval War College criticized the plan on the grounds that it dispersed U.S. naval strength to a dangerous extent, and warned that a blockade alone would be insufficient to bring Spain to the negotiating table. The proposed expedition to Spanish waters was thought to be counter-productive as it might harden Spanish resolve and invite unwanted diplomatic pressure from other European countries. However, Captain Henry Taylor, president of the War College, endorsed the idea to use the Asiatic Squadron against Spanish forces in the Philippines, and this element would reappear in later plans.8Admiral Francis M. Ramsay, chief of the influential Bureau of Navigation, had long been an strong opponent of the Naval War College, and it is likely that he was the one who persuaded Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert to convene a board in the summer of 1896 to draft a separate plan for war with Spain. Like the Kimball plan, the Ramsay Board focused on the a naval blockade, but added the deep water ports of Puerto Rico to those of Cuba. The destruction of crops in Cuba by both sides led the Board to believe that the Spanish garrison needed to import food in order to survive. A relief force from Spain would consume most of its coal simply in crossing the Atlantic and thus would be in no position to engage American naval forces. Although the present strength of the U.S. Navy was sufficient to meet and defeat any fleet arriving from Spain, the Board called for the purchase of a number of small fast steamers to enforce the blockade. Finally, the European Squadron should be reinforced by ships from the U.S. and the Asiatic Squadron, and together operate against the Spanish coast after capturing the Canary Islands as an advance base. Captain Taylor strongly dissented from the views of the Board stating that large operations in Spanish waters were too dangerous, and that a naval blockade would not be sufficient to subdue Spanish forces in Cuba.9Perhaps confused by the different positions in the existing plans, the new Secretary of the Navy, John Long, convened his own War Planning Board under Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic Station, Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, in June 1897. Chief Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright was the only member who had served on the previous board. The Sicard Board endorsed the War College idea that joint operations against Havana would be necessary to end the war. Therefore, the plan called for the early seizure of Matanzas, sixty miles east of Havana, to serve as a base of operations against the latter, and to deliver arms to the Cuban insurgents. Purchased or chartered merchant steamers were to be armed and sent to the Caribbean to enforce a swift and strong blockade. This would also free the heavier ships to intercept a relief force from Spain. The members emphasized the need for colliers to refuel the fleet on blockade rather than forcing vessels to return to coaling stations. Although the Board rejected the idea of trying to capture the Canary Islands, it recommended the formation of a flying squadron consisting of two armored cruisers and two commerce destroyers to operate on the coast of Spain in order to detain Spanish ships in home waters. The plan called for the reduction and garrisoning of the principal ports of Puerto Rico as soon as circumstances permitted. The Board also returned to the idea of using the Asiatic Squadron against Spanish forces in the Philippines. As in the previous plans, the objects of these operations were to tie down or divert enemy ships and to give the United States' a stronger bargaining position at the peace settlement.10When war between the United States and Spain appeared unavoidable following the destruction of USS Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February 1898, the Navy Department had a solid body of plans and documents honed by four years of debate by its leading officers. Although the realities of war would force several modifications, many of the concepts laid out in the Sicard Plan were implemented: a strong blockade of Cuba; support for the insurgents; operations against Spanish forces in the Philippines and Puerto Rico; and the formation of a squadron to operate in Spanish waters. Perhaps more importantly, nearly every plan called for the purchase or charter of merchant vessels to serve as auxiliary cruisers, colliers, and transports. The data furnished in appended lists and the inspiration to act quickly served as a basis for decision making in those crucial weeks prior to war.At the beginning of 1898 the fleet of the United States Navy consisted of six battleships, two armored cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers, six steel monitors, eight old iron monitors, thirty- three unprotected cruisers and gunboats, six torpedo boats, and twelve tugs.11 Noticeably absent from this list are colliers, supply vessels, transports, hospital ships, repair ships, and the large number of small vessels necessary for maintaining an effective blockade of Cuba's numerous ports. As the Navy Department's war plans clearly indicated, the government would need to purchase or contract for scores of ships in the event of war with a naval power. The destruction of the Maine propelled the department into action. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt organized a Board of Auxiliary Vessels which, utilizing material in the department's war plans, prepared a list of suitable private craft that would meet the Navy's expanded needs. On 9 March Congress passed a $50 million emergency defense appropriation bill, and the Navy Department began to acquire vessels. By the end of the war, the navy had purchased or leased 103 warships and auxiliaries. Another twenty-eight vessels were added from existing government organizations including revenue cutters, lighthouse tenders, and the vessels of the Fish Commission. After the war auxiliary vessels such as colliers, refrigerator ships, and distilling ships became a permanent part of the fleet.12The availability of coal was the single most important factor in determining naval operations in 1898. A lack of coal severely limited Admiral Cervera's options upon arriving in the Caribbean with his Spanish squadron in the middle of May, and American concerns over coaling nearly allowed him to escape from Santiago de Cuba near the end of the month. There were essentially three sources of fuel available for naval squadrons: coaling stations at friendly bases, neutral ports, and other ships (usually colliers). Key West served as the base for U.S. naval operations in the Caribbean. International law permitted, but did not require, neutrals to provide visiting ships of belligerents just enough coal to allow them to make it to the nearest friendly port, but this was an option of last resort. Colliers were the most common source of fuel for vessels of the fleet blockading Cuba. Six were available to the U.S. fleet early in the war, and an additional eleven were purchased by the end.The endurance of a ship depended on a number of circumstances, such as bunker capacity, the amount of coal stored on deck, the quality of coal, how many boilers were lit, and the ship's speed while under way. Most major warships of the U.S. fleet had an operational range in the neighborhood of 4000 nautical miles, or just over two weeks of continuous steaming at ten knots.13 Naturally, ships' commanding officers were reluctant to allow their bunkers to get anywhere near empty, and they availed themselves of nearly every opportunity to add to their supply of coal.Coaling from open lighters in port was the quickest and most efficient means of refueling a ship. Winches set up on the warships hauled the coal on board in bags, where small carts carried them to the coal chutes leading from the upper deck directly to the bunkers. When coaling from colliers it was best to find a sheltered anchorage safe from the effects of rough seas. Coaling in the open sea with a ship alongside was always considered a dangerous evolution. Colliers were equipped with cotton-bale fenders to protect the ships when the motion was slight. However, any situation where the swell was sufficient to cause either ship to roll more than three or four degrees or rise more than one or two feet was considered too dangerous to attempt. There were many occasions when coaling at sea was simply not possible, and perhaps many more where it was considered problematic. The speed with which coal could be taken on board varied widely, most often dependent on the weather. On 31 May USS Brooklyn took on coal at a rate of eighteen tons per hour, while eight days later she achieved a rate of nearly fifty-seven tons per hour. The weather rarely cooperated long enough for more than a few hundred tons to be loaded on board before rising seas called a halt to the operation.14 It is important to have an appreciation of the problems inherent in refueling warships of the day for a proper perspective on strategic and operational decisions made during the war.Secretary Long formally organized the Naval War Board in March 1898 to advise him on strategy and operations. Initial members were Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt, Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard (who had just arrived from command of the North Atlantic Station), Captain Arent S. Crowninshield, and Captain Albert S. Barker. By May, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan joined the organization. Roosevelt left to become a lieutenant colonel in the First Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, and the Navy Department reassigned Captain Barker to command USS Newark. Although it had no executive authority, the Board exerted considerable influence on operations through its advisory capacity. In particular, Mahan's views often dominated. Following earlier war plans, the Board recommended concentrating on Spain's outlying possessions with a close blockade of Cuba, giving the army time to mobilize sufficient strength for land campaigns in Cuba and Puerto Rico.15As the Navy Department worked with the president and the War Department in developing strategy, Secretary Long began repositioning naval units in preparation of the opening of hostilities. Since January, much of the North Atlantic Squadron had been concentrated for winter exercises at Key West, Florida. The first colliers did not reach the fleet until 3 May, nearly two weeks after the blockade began. On 17 March the battleships Massachusetts and Texas were ordered to join the armored cruiser Brooklyn at Hampton Roads, Virginia, to form the Flying Squadron under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley. The protected cruisers Minneapolis and Columbiajoined Schley's force prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The squadron was organized to protect the U.S. coast against a sudden descent by the Spanish armored cruisers of Pascual Cervera's squadron, known to be concentrating in the Cape Verde Islands. The Navy Department recalled the protected cruiser USS San Franciscoand Commodore John A. Howell from Europe. On 20 April Howell assumed command of the newly formed Northern Patrol Squadron, which was responsible for the protection of the coast and coastal trade from the Delaware capes to Bar Harbor, Maine. Rear Admiral Henry Erben commanded the Auxiliary Naval Force with his headquarters on shore at New York City. This command consisted primarily of eight old iron monitors stationed at several U.S. ports.16Assistant Secretary Roosevelt sent a telegraphic order to Commodore George Dewey on 25 February commanding him to concentrate the ships of the Asiatic Station at Hong Kong. In the event of war he was to take his squadron and destroy the Spanish ships in Philippine waters. Dewey's command at Hong Kong consisted of the protected cruisers Olympia, Boston, and Raleigh, and the gunboats Concord and Petrel. The Revenue Cutter McCulloch joined the force on 17 April, and the protected cruiser Baltimore arrived on 22 April. Dewey also prepared for future operations in a region without friendly bases by purchasing the British steamers Nanshanand Zafiro to carry coal and supplies for his squadron.17Anticipating a showdown with Spanish fleet in the Atlantic theater, Secretary Long ordered the battleship USS Oregon to depart from its home port at Bremerton, Washington, for San Francisco, California, on 7 March, to begin the first leg of a 14,700 nautical mile journey to Key West. The gunboat USS Marietta made the battleship's voyage quicker and easier by arranging for coal and supplies in South American ports along the way. The Oregonleft San Francisco on 19 March, under the command of Captain Charles E. Clark, and arrived at Callao, Peru, on 4 April, traveling 4800 miles in just sixteen days. The battleship departed Callao on 7 April, and arrived at Sandy Point at the southern tip of the continent ten days later. Rendezvousing with the Marietta on 21 April, the Oregonheaded north, putting into Rio de Janeiro on 30 April, where Secretary Long warned Captain Clark that Admiral Cervera's squadron was at sea. Departing Rio on 5 May, the American battleship arrived at Bahia, Brazil, three days later. Not wishing to submerge his ship's armor belt in case of an encounter with the Spanish squadron, Clark ordered on board only enough coal to reach Barbados, where he arrived on 18 May. The Oregon steamed into the American base at Key West on 26 May in efficient condition and ready for operations against the Spanish fleet.18Although President McKinley continued to press for a diplomatic settlement to the Cuban problem, he accelerated military preparations begun in January when an impasse appeared likely. McKinley asked Congress on 11 April for permission to intervene in Cuba. On 21 April, the President ordered the Navy to begin the blockade of Cuba, and Spain followed with a declaration of war on 23 April. Congress responded with a formal declaration of war on 25 April, made retroactive to the start of the blockade.International law required a blockade to be effective in order to be legal. With the absence of colliers and the Atlantic fleet divided between Key West and Hampton Roads, the American effort was initially limited to the north coast of Cuba between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and Cienfuegos on the south coast. The U.S. fleet at Key West at the beginning of hostilities consisted of three armored ships, three monitors, one protected cruiser, two unprotected cruisers, seven gunboats, one armed yacht, six torpedo boats, and five armed tugs. In the early light of 22 April, Sampson's fleet deployed from Key West to steam across the Florida Straits and begin the blockade. Sampson believed he could reduce the defenses of Havana by rolling up the Spanish fortifications from the west. However, Secretary Long, following the advice of the Naval War Board, ordered him not to risk his armored ships unnecessarily against land fortifications in light of Cervera's potential deployment to the Caribbean. The Navy Department was considering occupying the port of Matanzas, garrisoning it with a large military force, and opening communications with the insurgents. Long wanted Sampson to keep his most powerful ships ready to escort the transports if McKinley should decide on an early landing in Cuba.19By the morning of 23 April the advance ships of the blockading fleet were off their assigned ports. Additional vessels reinforced them over the next several days. The U.S. Navy struggled during the first weeks of the war to assemble the logistical apparatus necessary to support the blockade. Ships had to keep steam up in their boilers to pursue unknown vessels as they came into sight. Until colliers were fitted out and sent south, most of the blockading ships were forced to return to Key West to coal. Fresh water and food were also in short supply during the early days of the war.The blockade was monotonous duty broken only by the rare capture of a Spanish vessel or an exchange of gunfire with gunboats and batteries. Although the Navy Department prohibited Sampson's vessels from engaging heavy batteries, like those around Havana, they allowed the bombardment of smaller field works. On 27 April the New York, Puritan, and Cincinnati shelled Point Gorda at Matanzas to prevent the completion of new batteries.20 Most encounters were only skirmishes resulting in few if any casualties.A few actions were intense, such as the one at Cardenas on 11 May when the U.S. Navy gunboat Wilmington, the torpedo boat Winslow, and the Revenue Cutter Hudson were drawn deep into the harbor by Spanish gunboats. Hidden Spanish batteries ambushed the Winslow, severely damaging her, killing ten and wounding twenty-one of her crew. While under heavy fire the Hudson towed the torpedo boat out of the harbor as the Wilmingtoncovered the withdrawal with rapid fire against the Spanish guns.21The U.S. blockading forces also undertook operations to isolate Cuba from telegraphic communications to Madrid via Cienfuegos, Santiago, and Guantanamo. The most celebrated action of this type occurred on 11 May off Cienfuegos. Commander Bowman McCalla of the cruiser Marblehead organized the party and planned the operation to cut the underwater cables leaving the city. Marine sharpshooters and machine guns in steam cutters poured a continuous fire into Spanish positions on shore, along with gunfire support from the Marblehead and the gunboat Nashville, while sailors in launches dragged the sea floor with grapelling hooks for the cables. The launch and cutter crews endured heavy Spanish fire for three hours and cut the two main telegraph cables (leaving a third, local line), and dragged the ends out to sea. Every member of this expedition was awarded the Medal of Honor.22The strength of the North Atlantic Fleet and the effectiveness of the blockade grew as U.S. Navy vessels concentrated in the Caribbean and yards converted and armed vessels purchased by the Congressional Bill of 9 March. From the start of the blockade until the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba in mid-July, the North Atlantic Fleet added to its strength three battleships, one armored cruiser, one monitor, five protected cruisers, one unprotected cruiser, seven auxiliary cruisers, four gunboats, two torpedo boats, five armed tugs, six revenue cutters, nine armed yachts, two supply ships, a hospital ship, a repair ship, a distilling ship, and thirteen colliers.23Secretary Long telegraphed Commodore Dewey at Hong Kong on 21 April informing him that the U.S. blockade of Cuba had begun and that war was expected at any moment. On 24 April, British authorities informed the commodore that war had been declared and he must leave the neutral port within twenty-four hours. Dewey also received a telegram from the Navy Department, instructing him to proceed immediately to the Philippine Islands and begin operations against the Spanish fleet. However, Dewey wanted to receive the latest intelligence from the American consul at Manila, Oscar Williams, who was expected daily. The American squadron moved to Mirs Bay on the Chinese coast thirty miles east of Hong Kong to await a circulating pump for the Raleigh and the arrival of Williams. They spent two days drilling, distributing ammunition, and stripping the ships of all wooden articles (which could add to the damage of fires on board ship caused by enemy gunfire). Almost immediately after Williams arrived on 27 April, the American squadron departed for the Philippines, in search of the ships of the Spanish squadron. The consul correctly informed Dewey that Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasaron intended to take his ships to Subic Bay. What Williams did not know is that Montojo returned to Manila after taking his squadron to Subic Bay only to discover that the defenses he had hoped to fight under were far from complete.24Dewey sent two of his cruisers to reconnoiter Subic Bay on 30 April. Finding it empty, and in defiance of the reports of mines in the channel, the Americans pressed on into Manila Bay and discovered the Spanish squadron near Cavite. Leaving his two auxiliaries in the bay guarded by the McCulloch, Dewey formed his remaining ships into a line and steamed in a oval pattern along the five-fathom curve, pouring a heavy fire into the outgunned Spanish force. Montojo's gunners replied from their ships and two 5.9 inch guns on Sangley Point, but with little effect. The Americans scored critical hits on the larger Spanish warships, setting them ablaze. After nearly two hours of fire, Dewey ordered his captains to withdraw, acting on reports that his ships were running low on ammunition.25Dewey took his squadron five miles off Sangley Point and signaled his captains to come on board and report their condition. The commodore discovered that his squadron had sustained very little damage and that he had plenty of ammunition to continue the battle. After allowing the crewmen of his ships to enjoy a light meal, Dewey ordered his ships to reengage the remnants of Montojo's shattered squadron. The Spanish admiral had pulled his surviving vessels behind Cavite into the shallow waters of Bacoor Bay to make a final stand. Hitting the Spanish ships in their new anchorage proved difficult, and Dewey ordered the gunboats Concord and Petrel, with their shallow draft, to destroy them at close range. The garrison at Cavite raised a white flag at about 12:15, and the firing ended shortly thereafter.Montojo's fleet was destroyed, suffering 371 casualties compared to only nine Americans wounded. When official word on the magnitude of the Navy's victory reached the United States, nearly a week later, the American public heaped enthusiastic praises on Dewey as wild celebrations erupted throughout the country. Meanwhile, the U.S. squadron took control of the arsenal and navy yard at Cavite. However, 26,000 Spanish regulars and 14,000 militia garrisoned various points in the Philippine Islands including 9000 at Manila. Dewey cabled Washington stating that, although he controlled Manila Bay and could probably induce the city to surrender, he requested 5000 men to seize Manila.26Admiral Cervera had repeatedly warned the Spanish Ministry of Marine that his squadron would face certain destruction if sent to the Caribbean. Even so, he departed the Cape Verde Islands under orders on 29 April with his squadron of four armored cruisers, towing three torpedo-boat destroyers, intending to steam for Puerto Rico. To look for the Spanish squadron, the U.S. Navy Department had three fast former mail steamers, Harvard, Yale, and St. Louis, establish a patrol line stretching from Puerto Rico and along the Leeward and Windward Islands. As long as Cervera's location remained uncertain, the strength of the U.S. fleet would be divided between Rear Admiral Sampson's North Atlantic Fleet based in Key West and Commodore Schley's Flying Squadron based in Hampton Roads; the former to maintain the blockade of Cuba and the latter to guard the east coast of the United States from a sudden descent by the Spanish cruisers.27Sampson correctly deduced that Cervera intended to make for San Juan, Puerto Rico, and he determined to deprive the Spanish fleet of the benefits of that port. Leaving his smaller ships to maintain the blockade of Cuba's northern ports, the American admiral embarked on an eight-day journey, plagued by the slow speed and mechanical unreliability of his two monitors. The American force arrived off San Juan early on 12 May. After a nearly four-hour bombardment of the Spanish works, Sampson broke off the engagement and returned to Key West, satisfied that Cervera's ships were not in San Juan.28The Spanish squadron's crossing of the Atlantic had been slowed by the need to tow the fragile destroyers. As he approached the West Indies, the Spanish admiral dispatched two of these vessels to the French island of Martinique to gain information on American movements and the availability of coal. On 12 May Cervera learned that Sampson was at San Juan. The Spanish admiral also discovered that the French had refused to sell him any coal. Driven by the need to refuel his ships and the desire to avoid combat with a superior American squadron, Cervera steamed for the Dutch harbor of Curaçao. He arrived there on 14 May only to be further disappointed when the expected Spanish collier failed to arrive, and the Dutch governor authorized the purchase of only 600 tons of coal. After considering his options, Cervera chose to take his fleet to Santiago de Cuba where he arrived on the morning of 19 May.29With Sampson out of touch for long periods during his return from Puerto Rico, the Navy Department on 13 May ordered Commodore Schley's Flying Squadron to Charleston, South Carolina, in preparation to intercept the Spanish fleet. Further orders directed Schley to Key West and a meeting with Rear Admiral Sampson. The Navy Department believed that Cervera's most likely objective was Cienfuegos because of its rail connection to Havana. Therefore, after arriving in Key West on 18 May, Schley received orders to take his squadron, reinforced by the battleship Iowa and several small vessels, and proceed to Cienfuegos. On 19 May, after Schley left on his mission, the White House received a report that the Spanish ships had run into Santiago de Cuba. The source of this information was Domingo Villaverde, an agent working as a telegraph operator in the governor-general's palace in Havana. This connection was a closely guarded secret, so when the information reached the Navy Department as an unconfirmed report, Long's telegram to Sampson sounded less than certain.30Sampson forwarded Long's notice to Schley along with his own decision to maintain the Flying Squadron off Cienfuegos, believing that even if Cervera had put into Santiago, he would have to bring his squadron west to deliver the munitions thought to be an essential part of his mission. USS Minneapolis and the St. Paul were sent to Santiago to confirm the presence of the Spanish squadron, and Sampson instructed Schley to keep in communication with them. On 20 May Sampson received a report from the assistant chief of staff at Key West confirming the previous report from Washington that the Spanish squadron had put into Santiago. He then sent orders instructing Schley to proceed to Santiago if he was satisfied that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos. On 21 May Sampson sent the collier Merrimac with 4500 tons of coal to Schley's support. Two days later the rear admiral departed Key West and cruised in the Bahama Channel with a force of thirteen ships to block any attempt by Cervera to enter Havana from the north side of the island. As additional information arrived at the Navy Department confirming Cervera's presence at Santiago, Long and Sampson dispatched several messages encouraging Schley to proceed to that port and prevent the Spanish squadron from escaping.31The Flying Squadron arrived off Cienfuegos early on the morning of 22 May when Schley received the first notice that the Spanish squadron might be at Santiago. The following day he received the second. However, the initial uncertainty of the Spanish squadron's whereabouts and the difficulty of observing ships in Cienfuegos led Schley to remain where he was. Finally, on 24 May, the commodore learned through Cuban insurgents that Cervera's ships were not in port. That evening the American squadron headed east, two days later than Sampson expected.32In his message informing Sampson of his departure Schley stated that he was concerned about having a sufficient supply of coal in his warships. The Iowa had arrived off Cienfuegos with half her capacity, and on 23 May she took on just 255 tons more. The Texas was also short of coal, and her projecting sponsons made coaling at sea almost impossible. The one collier then with the squadron was insufficient to coal enough ships when the weather afforded an opportunity. Schley informed Sampson that these concerns and his desire to coal his ships at a protected anchorage led him to choose Môle St. Nicolas, Haiti, as his next destination.33The Flying Squadron arrived at the longitude of Santiago on 26 May, and Schley communicated with the American cruisers watching the port. Engine problems on the collier Merrimac caused the squadron to average only seven knots in its journey from Cienfuegos. The weather had been too rough to allow coaling at sea and several of his smaller vessels in addition to the Texas were running low on fuel. Rather than remaining on station with his larger ships and trusting Sampson to supply him what he needed, Schley ordered his squadron to head west for Key West to refuel. Sampson, who had since returned to Key West, and Secretary Long were shocked when they learned of Schley's intentions on 28 May. Making it clear that he and the Navy Department expected the Flying Squadron to remain on station, Sampson assembled his squadron and departed for Santiago. On 27 May the weather off the south coast of Cuba improved, and Schley reversed course once again, finally establishing a blockade at Santiago de Cuba on 29 May.34Schley's coaling problems impressed on Sampson and the Navy Department the need to seize a sheltered anchorage on the south coast of Cuba, and Guantánamo Bay had already been considered. Shortly after Schley established the blockade of Santiago Sampson ordered the First Marine Battalion at Key West to embark on their transports and prepare to land in Cuba. At the same time he sent Commander Bowman McCalla and USS Marblehead to reconnoiter Guantánamo Bay as a possible anchorage. McCalla's report was favorable, and on 10 June the Marine battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Huntington landed, establishing a position on the east side of the outer harbor that served to protect the fleet during its coaling operations throughout the campaign.35 Having a reliable location to refuel so close to Santiago proved invaluable to the blockading fleet. It allowed American captains to keep steam up in their ships' boilers ready to pursue Cervera's squadron when it attempted to break out. On the morning of 3 July, the battleship Oregon had all four boilers lit, giving her the speed necessary to catch the Cristobal Colon in the running fight during the final stage of the Battle of Santiago de Cuba. This high rate of coal consumption could be maintained because the Oregon was able to refuel four times from 1 June to 3 July, once at sea and three times at Guantánamo Bay.36Although McKinley and his advisors had intended to wait until the end of the rainy season to send a major land expedition to Cuba, they believed that the bottling up of the Spanish squadron at Santiago afforded the U.S. an opportunity to strike a damaging blow to the enemy's military capability in the Caribbean. On 1 June Sampson received a report from Secretary Long that 25,000 men under Major General William Shafter were preparing to embark for Cuba from Tampa, Florida, and that the North Atlantic Fleet should convoy the troops and assist the landing near Santiago. As the navy prepared to carry the troops, Sampson took steps to tighten the blockade of Cervera's squadron.At the onset of the campaign Sampson seized on the idea to sink a vessel in the narrow channel leading to the harbor of Santiago. His intention was to keep the Spanish ships from escaping until the army could capture the city or assist the navy in passing the forts and mines at the harbor entrance. The Naval War Board in Washington approved, and Sampson selected the collier Merrimac under naval constructor Richard Pearson Hobson for the operation. Hobson and seven volunteers took the ship into the channel during the early morning hours of 3 June. Spanish gunfire from shore batteries shot away the vessel's steering gear and anchor chains making it impossible for the Americans to sink the vessel in the proper location. Only two of the ten prepared scuttling charges went off, and the Merrimac came to rest too far up the channel to pose a serious obstacle. Hobson and his men were captured by the Spanish.37Major General Shafter's troop transports departed Tampa on 14 June, rendezvousing with their navy escorts the following day. The expedition arrived off Santiago on 20 June and began to disembark east of the city at Daiquiri two days later. In addition to providing escort for the convoy, Sampson's ships furnished fifty-two steam launches, sailing launches, whaleboats, lifeboats, and cutters to help the army and its equipment ashore. Shafter expressed deep appreciation for the navy's assistance in this matter, as the boats on the army's transports were too few in number to disembark the expedition in any reasonable length of time.38Sampson's armored ships maintained a tight blockade of Santiago de Cuba, coaling from colliers in open water when the seas were calm and from colliers at Guantánamo Bay when the weather required it. On the morning of 3 July, Admiral Cervera attempted to break out of the American blockade thus precipitating the Battle of Santiago de Cuba. Off the entrance to the bay that morning were the battleships Texas, Oregon, Iowa, and Indiana, the armored cruiser Brooklyn, and the armed yachts Vixen and Gloucester. Most of the battle was a running fight as the blockading vessels attempted to get enough steam up to keep up with their quarry. Foul bottoms and poor quality coal reduced the speeds of the usually swift Spanish cruisers. Ranges were often in excess of 4000 yards: greater than the crews trained for and longer than the new rangefinders could handle. In addition, radical turns in the early stages of the battle further complicated the gunnery problem for the Americans. Smoke from the weapons' brown powder and frequent mechanical failures further reduced the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's gunfire. The battleships and the Brooklyn generally registered hits when they achieved a parallel or near parallel course with the Spanish cruisers and maintained it for several minutes. Although only 1.29 percent of American shots hit their targets, the volume of fire was sufficient to destroy or run aground each one of Cervera's vessels.39 The defeat of this squadron freed President McKinley and the Navy Department to pursue other plans.In the years prior to the war, U.S. planning boards had never reached a consensus on the issue of deploying a squadron of warships to European waters. Although the Naval War Board had not ordinally planned such a deployment, the formation of the Spanish Navy's Reserve Squadron resurrected the debate. Following the departure of Cervera's squadron to the Caribbean, the Ministry of Marine began to organize a second squadron under Rear Admiral Manuel de la Cámara y Libermoore centered around the battleship Pelayo and the armored cruiser Emperator Carlos V. Although it was believed by the Navy Department that this force would reinforce Cervera, it held out the possibility that the Spanish ships would head for the Philippines. Consequently, the monitors Monterey and Monadnock were prepared to undertake a slow and hazardous voyage across the Pacific to reinforce Dewey's command at Manila. On 16 June the Reserve Squadron departed Cadiz and steamed into the Mediterranean bound for the Philippine Islands.40The Navy Department responded to the news of Cámara's deployment by ordering Rear Admiral Sampson to detail two battleships, an armored cruiser, and three auxiliary cruisers to be ready to depart for Europe if the strong Spanish force passed into the Red Sea. When the Reserve Squadron arrived at Port Said on 26 June, Washington decided to organize formally a force entitled the Eastern Squadron. The command was activated on 7 July under the leadership of Commodore John C. Watson, and consisted of the battleship Oregon, the protected cruiser Newark, and the auxiliary cruisers Yosemite and Dixie. The battleship Massachusetts was added on 9 July, the auxiliary cruiser Badger on 12 July, and the protected cruiser New Orleans on 17 July. The navy also assembled six colliers and a refrigerator ship at Hampton Roads, Virginia, to support the Eastern Squadron's deployment. The Navy Department allowed news of the squadron's formation and its intended target to be widely circulated. It was hoped that such news would force Spain to recall the Reserve Squadron to Spanish waters.41Cámara ran into difficulty attempting to refuel his ships at Port Said. The Egyptian government refused to sell him coal, nor would it allow the Spanish squadron to take on coal from its own colliers while in port. Cámara was forced to take his ships out to sea where bad weather prevented any attempt at coaling. The Spanish admiral took his squadron through the Suez Canal, into the Red Sea and began to refuel on 7 July. The delay gave the Spanish government an opportunity to reconsider Cámara's mission in light of the near certainty that American ships would enter Spanish waters. The Sagasta government made the decision to recall the Reserve Squadron to Cadiz, and Watson's deployment was held in abeyance for the time being.42Even though Spain no longer threatened Dewey's control of the situation at Manila, the Navy Department was still concerned about German intentions, especially in the Philippines where it was thought Germany might try to take advantage of the situation to increase her colonial possessions in the Pacific. Rear Admiral Sicard and Captain Crowninshield of the Naval War Board still wanted to send Watson to reinforce Dewey. Captain Mahan dissented from this view. In the mean time, Watson's ships were needed to support the expedition to Puerto Rico. By the time the Eastern Squadron was free to depart the Caribbean peace negotiations were under way and Watson's deployment was held back for good.43One overlooked role in the story of the Eastern Squadron is that played by the repair ship Vulcan. She was fully equipped with lathes, jacks, and small foundries for brass and iron castings. The Vulcan reported for duty off Santiago on 1 July and was stationed at Guantánamo Bay for the remainder of the war. During that time she filled 528 orders for repairs and 256 requisitions for supplies. This work included making extensive repairs of boilers, engines, and pumps, much of it fitting out the ships of the Eastern Squadron as it prepared for its trans-Atlantic voyage.44 It is thought that the pressure put on the Spanish government by the possible deployment of the Eastern Squadron was an important factor in starting peace negotiations in August 1898. If so, the repair ship Vulcan played a significant role in bringing about an end to the war.The U.S. Navy provided escort and support for the army's final two campaigns of the war. On the afternoon of 21 July the lead forces for the invasion of Puerto Rico got under way from Guantanamo Bay. Thirty-five hundred men embarked in nine transports were escorted by the battleship Massachusetts as well as the Dixie, Gloucester, Columbia, and Yale, all under the command of Capt. F. J. Higginson. Originally planning to land east of San Juan at Playa de Fajardo, the expedition's commander Major General Nelson A. Miles directed the Navy to land his force on the island's south coast. The expedition arrived off Port Guanica on the morning of 25 July. Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright of the Gloucester requested and received permission to send a landing party ashore. They soon came under fire from the small Spanish garrison, but held their position until the first army troops arrived and secured the landing place. Wainwright also assisted the amphibious landing at Port Ponce three days later by sneaking into the inner harbor the night before, gathering up a number of barges for the army to use.45 In Manila Bay, Dewey's squadron maintained a foothold at Cavite, opened communications with the insurgents, and provided naval gunfire support during the army's assault on Manila on 13 August.Pre-war plans and preparations by the U.S. Navy contributed substantially to the American victory. Most major strategic decisions were anticipated by the Naval War College studies and the secretary's war planning boards. Information appended to the boards' reports on merchant ships available for purchase or charter provided a strong background for Roosevelt's Board of Auxiliary Vessels as it sought to provide the U.S. fleet with ships such as colliers, auxiliary cruisers, and repair ships, indispensable for conducting war. In particular, the early procurement of colliers gave the U.S. Navy the strategic mobility to extend the blockade to Cuba's southern ports, keep Cervera's squadron bottled up in Santiago de Cuba, and threaten to send a major force to European waters. In addition Dewey's purchase of Nanshan and its cargo of coal permitted him to hold Manila Bay until an American expedition arrived from across the Pacific Ocean. Secretary Long's pre-war orders preparing and concentrating U.S. warships in the Atlantic theater ensured material superiority over any expedition Spain might send to the Caribbean.There are several areas where more extensive preparations would have enhanced the navy's effectiveness even further. If the U.S. had constructed specialized colliers with their own winches, like those in the British Navy, these vessels could have refueled Schley's ships at sea more rapidly during the brief times that the weather allowed. If the navy had had plans to seize Guantanamo Bay, the Isle of Pines, or some other sheltered anchorage on the south coast of Cuba at the beginning of the war, the U.S. Navy would have been in a much better position to prevent Cervera from entering any port in Cuba. Stronger coastal defenses might have prevented the public cry for warships to defend the major harbors of the United States, thus negating the need to divide the fleet between the North Atlantic and Flying Squadrons.The overall success of U.S. naval operations during the Spanish-American War demonstrated the value of extensive peace-time preparations. In the technological warfare of the last one hundred years, the most important preparations have not always been the construction of major warships, but also planning for adequate logistical support and vigorous intellectual debate.

Between 2004 and 2018, the United States government attacked thousands of targets in Northwest Pakistan using unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) operated by the United States Air Force under the operational control of the Central Intelligence Agency's Special Activities Division.[23][24] Most of these attacks were on targets in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas along the Afghan border in Northwest Pakistan. These strikes began during the administration of United States President George W. Bush, and increased substantially under his successor Barack Obama.[25] Some in the media referred to the attacks as a "drone war".[26][27] The George W. Bush administration officially denied the extent of its policy; in May 2013, the Obama administration acknowledged for the first time that four US citizens had been killed in the strikes.[28] In December 2013, the National Assembly of Pakistan unanimously approved a resolution against US drone strikes in Pakistan, calling them a violation of "the charter of the United Nations, international laws and humanitarian norms."[29]Pakistan's former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, had repeatedly demanded an end to the strikes, stating: "The use of drones is not only a continual violation of our territorial integrity but also detrimental to our resolve and efforts at eliminating terrorism from our country".[30] However, despite the public opposition of Pakistani officials, multiple former Prime Ministers gave covert permission to the United States to carry out these attacks. The Peshawar High Court has ruled that the attacks are illegal, inhumane, violate the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and constitute a war crime.[31] The Obama administration disagreed, contending that the attacks did not violate international law and that the method of attack was precise and effective.[30][32] Notable targets of the strikes included Fazlullah, the leader of the Pakistani Taliban (killed in a strike on June 14, 2018 on the Afghanistan–Pakistan border), Baitullah Mehsud, the former leader of the Pakistani Taliban (killed in a strike in South Waziristan on August 5, 2009), Hakimullah Mehsud, Mehsud's successor (killed in a strike on November 1, 2013), Hafiz Saeed Khan, the leader (emir) of ISIS-K (killed in a strike on the border of the Achin District), and Akhtar Mansour, leader of the Afghan Taliban (killed in a strike on May 21, 2016 in Ahmad Wal, Pakistan).The operations in Pakistan were closely tied to a related drone campaign in Afghanistan, along the same border area. These strikes have killed 3,798–5,059 militants and 161–473 civilians. Among the militant deaths are hundreds of high-level leaders of the Afghan Taliban, the Pakistani Taliban, the Islamic State, Al-Qaeda, the Haqqani Network, and other organizations, with 70 Taliban leaders killed in one ten-day period of May 2017 alone.[33]Overview[edit]Pakistan's government publicly condemned these attacks.[34] However, it also allegedly allowed the drones to operate from Shamsi Airfield in Pakistan until 21 April 2011.[35] According to secret diplomatic cables leaked by WikiLeaks, Pakistan's Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani not only tacitly agreed to the drone flights, but in 2008 requested that Americans increase them.[36] However, Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik said, "drone missiles cause collateral damage. A few militants are killed, but the majority of victims are innocent citizens."[37] The strikes are often linked to anti-American sentiment in Pakistan and the growing questionability of the scope and extent of CIA activities in Pakistan.Reports of the number of militant versus civilian casualties differ.[38] In general, the CIA and other American agencies have claimed a high rate of militant killings, relying in part on a disputed estimation method that "counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants ... unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent".[39] For instance, the CIA has claimed that strikes conducted between May 2010 and August 2011 killed over 600 militants without any civilian fatalities, a claim that many have disputed.[38] The New America Foundation has estimated that 80 percent of those killed in the attacks were militants.[40] On the other hand, several experts have stated that in reality, far fewer militants and many more civilians have been killed. In a 2009 opinion article, Daniel L. Byman of the Brookings Institution wrote that drone strikes may have killed "10 or so civilians" for every militant that they killed.[41] The Pakistani military has stated that most of those killed were Al-Qaeda and Taliban militants.[42] The Bureau of Investigative Journalism found that 423 to 965 civilians were killed out of a total of 2,497 to 3,999 including 172 to 207 children. The Bureau also claimed that since Obama took office at least 50 civilians were killed in follow-up strikes when they had gone to help victims and more than 20 civilians have also been attacked in strikes on funerals and mourners, a practice condemned by legal experts.[43][44][45]Barbara Elias-Sanborn has also claimed that, "as much of the literature on drones suggests, such killings usually harden militants' determination to fight, stalling any potential negotiations and settlement."[46] However, analysis by the RAND Corporation suggests that "drone strikes are associated with decreases in the incidence and lethality of terrorist attacks" in Pakistan.[47]A motive that the 2010 Times Square car bomber Faisal Shahzad stated was the repeated CIA drone attacks in Pakistan, his native country.[48]Drone strikes were halted in November 2011 after NATO forces killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in the Salala incident.[49] Shamsi Airfield was evacuated of Americans and taken over by the Pakistanis December 2011.[50] The incident prompted an approximately two-month stop to the drone strikes, which resumed on 10 January 2012.In March 2013, Ben Emmerson, the United Nations Special Rapporteur, led a U.N. team that looked into civilian casualties from the U.S. drone attacks, and stated that the attacks are a violation of the sovereignty of Pakistan. Emmerson said government officials from the country clearly stated Pakistan does not agree to the drone attacks, which is contradicted by U.S. officials.[51] In October 2013, Amnesty International brought out a detailed study of the impact of drone strikes that strongly condemned the strikes. The report stated that the number of arbitrary civilian deaths, the tactics used (such as follow-up attacks targeting individuals helping the wounded) and the violation of Pakistani sovereignty meant that some of the strikes could be considered as unlawful executions and war crimes.[52]In May 2014, the targeted killing program was described as "basically over," with no attack having occurred since December 2013. The lull in attacks coincided with a new Obama Administration policy requiring a "near certainty" that civilians would not be harmed, requests from lawmakers that the drone program be brought under operational control of the Department of Defense[53] (for better congressional oversight), a reduced US military and CIA presence in Afghanistan, a reduced al-Qaida presence in Pakistan, and an increased military role (at the expense of the CIA) in the execution of drone strikes.[54][55]Statistics[edit]See also: List of drone strikes in Pakistan and List of Taliban fatality reports in PakistanU.S. drone strike statistics estimate,according to the New America Foundation(as of 1 January 2018):[56]YearAttacksCasualtiesMilitantsCiviliansUnknownTotal20041322720053564152006219309420074510126320083622328472982009543877092549201012278816458492011704156235512201248268533306201326145441532014221450014520151057005720163900920178362139Total4092,5332882753,096The Bureau of Investigative Journalism estimates the following cumulative statistics about U.S. drone strikes (as of 17 September 2017):[20]Total strikes: 429Total killed: 2,514 – 4,023Civilians killed: 424 – 969Children killed: 172 – 207Injured: 1,162 – 1,749Strikes under the Bush Administration: 51Strikes under the Obama Administration: 373Strikes under the Trump Administration: 584 of the 2,379 dead have been identified as members of al-Qaeda[57]A formerly classified Pakistani government report obtained in July 2013 by the BIJ shows details of 75 drone strikes that occurred between 2006 and 2009. According to the 12-page report, in this period, 176 of the 746 reported dead were civilians.[58] According to the Long War Journal, the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, and the New America Foundation, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009 had some of the highest civilian casualty ratios of any years.U.S. viewpoint[edit]See also: Targeted killing and Disposition MatrixU.S. President George W. Bush vastly accelerated the drone strikes during the final year of his presidency.[citation needed] A list of the high-ranking victims of the drones was provided to Pakistan in 2009.[59] Bush's successor, President Obama, broadened attacks to include targets against groups considered to be seeking to destabilize Pakistani civilian government; the attacks of 14 and 16 February 2009 were against training camps run by Baitullah Mehsud.[60] On 25 February 2009 Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA, indicated the strikes will continue.[61] On 4 March 2009 The Washington Times reported that the drones were targeting Baitullah Mehsud.[62] Obama was reported in March 2009 as considering expanding these strikes to include Balochistan.[63]The US government cited the inability of states to control and keep track of terrorist activities as a characteristic of a failed state, represented by the lack of military and governmental control in Pakistan's Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and was operating within the states' right of self-defense according to Article 51 in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. In President Obama's 2013 speech at the National Defense University, he stated "we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat".[64]On 25 March 2010 US State Department legal advisor Harold Koh stated that the drone strikes were legal because of the right to self-defense. According to Koh, the US is involved in an armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and their affiliates and therefore may use force consistent with self-defense under international law.[65]Former CIA officials state that the agency uses a careful screening process in making decisions on which individuals to kill via drone strikes. The process, carried out at the agency's counterterrorist center, involves up to 10 lawyers who write briefs justifying the targeting of specific individuals. According to the former officials, if a brief's argument is weak, the request to target the individual is denied.[66] Since 2008 the CIA has relied less on its list of individuals and increasingly targeted "signatures," or suspect behavior. This change in tactics has resulted in fewer deaths of high-value targets and in more deaths of lower-level fighters, or "mere foot soldiers" as the one senior Pakistani official told The Washington Post.[67] Signature strikes there must be supported by two sources of corroborating intelligence. Sources of intelligence include information from a communication intercept, a sighting of militant training camps or intelligence from CIA assets on the ground.[68] "Signature targeting" has been the source of controversy. Drone critics argue that regular citizen behaviors can easily be mistaken for militant signatures.US officials stated in March 2009 that the Predator strikes had killed nine of al Qaeda's 20 top commanders. The officials added that many top Taliban and al Qaeda leaders, as a result of the strikes, had fled to Quetta or even further to Karachi.[69]Some US politicians and academics have condemned the drone strikes. US Congressman Dennis Kucinich asserted that the United States was violating international law by carrying out strikes against a country that never attacked the United States.[70] Georgetown University professor Gary D. Solis asserts that since the drone operators at the CIA are civilians directly engaged in armed conflict, this makes them "unlawful combatants" and possibly subject to prosecution.[66]US military reports asserted that al Qaeda is being slowly but systematically routed because of these attacks, and that they have served to sow the seeds of uncertainty and discord among their ranks. They also claimed that the drone attacks have addled and confused the Taliban, and have led them to turn against each other.[71] In July 2009 it was reported that (according to US officials) Osama Bin Laden's son Saad bin Laden was believed to have been killed in a drone attack earlier in the year.[72]During a protest against drone attacks, in an event sponsored by Nevada Desert Experience, Father Louie Vitale, Kathy Kelly, Stephen Kelly (SJ), Eve Tetaz, John Dear, and others were arrested outside Creech Air Force Base on Wednesday 9 April 2009.[73][74]In May 2009 it was reported that the US was sharing drone intelligence with Pakistan.[75] Leon Panetta reiterated on 19 May 2009 that the US intended to continue the drone attacks.[76]In December 2009 expansion of the drone attacks was authorized by Barack Obama to parallel the decision to send 30,000 more American troops to Afghanistan.[77] Senior US officials are reportedly pushing for extending the strikes into Quetta in Balochistan against the Quetta Shura.[78] Speaking at a news conference in Islamabad on 7 January 2010 Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman stated the drone attacks were effective and would continue but stated that US would make greater efforts to prevent collateral damage.[79] In an effort to strengthen trust with Pakistan "US sharing drone surveillance data with Pakistan", said Mike Mullen.[80] US defence budget for 2011 asked for a 75% increase in funds to enhance the drone operations.[81]Compare Mr. Obama's use of drone strikes with that of his predecessor. During the Bush administration, there was an American drone attack in Pakistan every 43 days; during the first two years of the Obama administration, there was a drone strike there every four days.[82]—Peter Bergen, April 2012The Associated Press (AP) noted that Barack Obama apparently expanded the scope and increased the aggressiveness of the drone campaign against militants in Pakistan after taking office. According to the news agency, the US increased strikes against the Pakistani Taliban, which earned favor from the Pakistani government, resulting in increased cooperation from Pakistani intelligence services. Also, the Obama administration toned down the US government's public rhetoric against Islamic terrorism, garnering better cooperation from other Islamic governments. Furthermore, with the drawdown of the war in Iraq, more drones, support personnel, and intelligence assets became available for the campaigns in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Since Obama took office, according to the AP, the number of drones operated by the CIA over Afghanistan and Pakistan doubled.[83]According to some current and former counterterrorism officials, the Obama administration's increase in the use of drone strikes is an unintended consequence of the president's executive orders banning secret CIA detention centers and his attempt to close the Guantanamo Bay prison camp, and capturing prisoners has become a "less viable option".[84] Senator Saxby Chambliss of Georgia alleged that, "Their policy is to take out high-value targets, versus capturing high-value targets ... They are not going to advertise that, but that's what they are doing." Obama's aides argued that it is often impossible to capture targets in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Yemen, and that other targets are in foreign custody thanks to American tips. Obama's counter-terrorism adviser, John O. Brennan, said that, "The purpose of these actions is to mitigate threats to U.S. persons' lives", and continued, "It is the option of last recourse. So the president, and I think all of us here, don't like the fact that people have to die. And so he wants to make sure that we go through a rigorous checklist: The infeasibility of capture, the certainty of the intelligence base, the imminence of the threat, all of these things." In response to the concerns about the number of killings, Jeh C. Johnson stated, "We have to be vigilant to avoid a no-quarter, or take-no-prisoners policy."[85]A study called "The Year of the Drone" published in February 2010 by the New America Foundation found that from a total of 114 drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and early 2010, between 834 and 1,216 individuals had been killed. About two thirds of these were thought to be militants and one third were civilians.[21]On 28 April 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama appointed General David Petraeus as director of the CIA overseeing the drone attacks. According to Pakistani and American officials this could further inflame relations between the two nations.[86]According to The Washington Post, as of September 2011, around 30 Predator and Reaper drones were operating under CIA direction in the Afghanistan/Pakistan area of operations. The drones are flown by United States Air Force pilots located at an unnamed base in the United States. US Department of Defense armed drones, which also sometimes take part in strikes on terrorist targets, are flown by US Air Force pilots located at Creech Air Force Base and Holloman Air Force Base. The CIA drones are operated by an office called the Pakistan-Afghanistan Department, which operates under the CIA's Counterterrorism Center (CTC), based at CIA's headquarters in Langley, Virginia. As of September 2011, the CTC had about 2,000 people on staff.[19][87]US President Obama affirmed on 30 January 2012 that the US was conducting drone strikes in Pakistan. He stressed that civilian casualties in the strikes were low.[88] In a February 2012 poll of 1,000 US adults, 83% of them (77% of the liberal Democrats) replied they support the drone strikes.[89] The Obama administration offered its first extensive explanation on drone-strike policy in April 2012, concluding that it was "legal, ethical and wise".[90] The CIA's general counsel, Stephen Preston, in a speech entitled "CIA and the Rule of Law" at Harvard Law School on 10 April 2012, claimed the agency was not bound by the laws of war; in response, Human Rights Watch called for the strike program to be brought under the control of the US military.[91] In May, the US began stepping up drone attacks after talks at the NATO summit in Chicago did not lead to the progress it desired regarding Pakistan's continued closure of its Afghan borders to the alliance's supply convoys.[92]Minneapolis anti-war protest: 'Stop Killer Drones', 5 May 2013In 2013, the sustained and growing criticism of his drone policy forced Obama to announce stricter conditions on executing drone strikes abroad, including an unspoken plan to partly shift the program from the CIA to the ostensibly more accountable Pentagon,[93] In anticipation of his speech, Obama instructed Attorney General Eric Holder to divulge that four U.S. citizens had been killed by drones since 2009, and that only one of those men had been intentionally targeted.[94] Following Obama's announcement, the United Nations' drone investigator, British lawyer Ben Emmerson, made clear his expectation of a "significant reduction" in the number of strikes over the 18 months to follow,[95] although the period immediately after Obama's speech was "business as usual".[96] Six months later, the CIA was still carrying out the "vast majority" of drone strikes.[97] However, no attack has occurred since December 2013, and the drone war was described as "basically over" in May 2014.[54]At Senator Dianne Feinstein's insistence, beginning in early 2010 staffs of the United States House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence have begun reviewing each CIA drone strike. The staff members hold monthly meetings with CIA personnel involved with the drone campaign, review videos of each strike, and attempt to confirm that the strike was executed properly.[98]One of the leading critics of drones in the US Congress is Senator Rand Paul. In 2013, he performed a thirteen-hour filibuster to try to achieve a public admission from U.S. President Obama that he could not kill an American citizen with a drone on American soil, who was not actively engaged in combat. Attorney General Eric Holder responded soon after, confirming that the president had no authority to use drones for this purpose.Eric M. Blanchard, assistant professor of Political Science at Columbia University, notes that, "the use of drones reflects several on-going historical military developments that, in turn, reflect the culture and values of American society."[99] In this, he alludes to technological idealism (the pursuit of a "decisive" technology to end war) and the need to seize the moral high ground, by delivering more "humane" approaches to warfare. Military support for the drones remains strong for a host of reasons: expansion of battlespace, extension of an individual soldiers capabilities, and a reduction of American casualties.[100] Support has also been noted across the political spectrum as focus in the Middle East shifted from stabilization in Afghanistan to antiterrorist strikes aimed at al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.Blanchard also points to a shift in how gender is viewed in terms of warfare with the advent of technology in place of human soldiers. Fighters often represent an idealized masculinity, portraying strength, bravery, and chivalry, but during the Gulf War of 1990–91 the focus had changed. The computer programmers, missile technologists, high-tech pilots, and other servicemen who were centred around technology were now the focal point of news coverage, removing the warrior-soldier from the conversation.[101]Pakistani position[edit]Shamsi airbase in 2006, reported to show three Predator drones[102]For at least some of the initial drone strikes, in 2004 and 2005, the US operated with the approval of Pakistan's ISI. Former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf told The New Yorker in 2014 that he allowed the CIA to fly drones within Pakistan and that in exchange the US supplied helicopters and night-vision equipment to the Pakistanis. Musharraf wanted the drones to operate under Pakistani control, but the US wouldn't allow it.[103]Pakistan has repeatedly protested these attacks as an infringement of its sovereignty and because civilian deaths have also resulted, including women and children, which has further angered the Pakistani government and people.[90][104][105][106] General David Petraeus was told in November 2008 that these strikes were unhelpful.[107] However, on 4 October 2008 The Washington Post reported that there was a secret deal between the US and Pakistan allowing these drone attacks.[108] US Senator Dianne Feinstein said in February 2009: "As I understand it, these are flown out of a Pakistani base."[109] Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi denied that this was true.[110]On 8 September 2008, a spokesman for the Pakistani army condemned Washington's killing of Pakistani civilians and warned of retaliatory action: "Border violations by US-led forces in Afghanistan, which have killed scores of Pakistani civilians, would no longer be tolerated, and we have informed them that we reserve the right to self defense and that we will retaliate if the US continues cross-border attacks."[111]The drone attacks continue, despite repeated requests made by ex-Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari through different channels.[112][113] Baitullah Mehsud, while claiming responsibility for the 2009 Lahore police academy attacks, stated that it was in retaliation for the drone attacks.[114] According to The Daily Telegraph, Pakistani intelligence has agreed to secretly provide information to the United States on Mehsud's and his militants' whereabouts while publicly the Pakistani government will continue to condemn the attacks.[115]On 28 April 2009 Pakistan's consul general to the US, Aqil Nadeem, asked the US to hand over control of its drones in Pakistan to his government. "Do we want to lose the war on terror or do we want to keep those weapons classified? If the American government insists on our true cooperation, then they should also be helping us in fighting those terrorists", said Said Nadeem.[116] Pakistan President Zardari has also requested that Pakistan be given control over the drones, but this has been rejected by the US who are worried that Pakistanis will leak information about targets to militants.[117] In December 2009 Pakistan's Defence minister Ahmad Mukhtar acknowledged that Americans were using Shamsi Airfield but stated that Pakistan was not satisfied with payments for using the facility.[118]In December 2010 the CIA's Station Chief in Islamabad operating under the alias Jonathan Banks was hastily pulled from the country.[119][120] Lawsuits filed by families of victims of drone strikes had named Banks as a defendant, he had been receiving death threats, and a Pakistani journalist whose brother and son died in a drone strike called for prosecuting Banks for murder.[121][122]In March 2011 the General Officer Commanding of 7th division of Pakistani Army, Major General Ghayur Mehmood delivered a briefing "Myths and rumours about US predator strikes" in Miramshah. He said that most of those who were killed by the drone strikes were Al-qaeda and Taliban terrorists. Military's official paper on the attacks till 7 March 2011 said that between 2007 and 2011 about 164 predator strikes had been carried out and over 964 terrorists had been killed. Those killed included 793 locals and 171 foreigners. The foreigners included Arabs, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Chechens, Filipinos and Moroccans.[42]On 9 December 2011, Pakistan's Army Chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani issued a directive to shoot down US drones. A senior Pakistani military official said, "Any object entering into our air space, including U.S. drones, will be treated as hostile and be shot down."[123]The daily Indian newspaper The Hindu reported that Pakistan reached a secret agreement with United States to readmit the attacks of guided airplanes on its soil. According to a high western official linked with the negotiations, the pact was signed by ISI chief Lieutenant General Shuja Ahmad Pasha, and the director of the Central Intelligence Agency general David Petraeus during a meeting in Qatar January 2012. According to The Hindu, Lieutenant General Pasha also agreed to enlarge the CIA presence in Shahbaz air base, near the city of Abbottabad, where Al-Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden was killed in May 2011.[124]According to unnamed US government officials, beginning in early 2011 the US would fax notifications to Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI) detailing the dates and general areas of future drone attack operations. The ISI would send a return fax acknowledging receipt, but not approving the operation. Nevertheless, it appeared that Pakistan would clear the airspace over the area and on the dates designated in the US fax. After the May 2011 raid that killed bin Laden, the ISI ceased acknowledging the US faxes, but Pakistani authorities have appeared to continue clearing the airspace in the areas where US drones are operating. According to an unnamed Pakistani government official, the Pakistan government believes that the US sends the faxes primarily to support legal justification for the drone attacks.[125]In May 2013, a Pakistani court ruled that CIA drone strikes in Pakistan were illegal. A Peshawar High Court judge said the Pakistani government must end drone strikes, using force if needed.[126] Also at that time, an International Crisis Group report concluded that drone strikes were an "ineffective" way of combating militants in Pakistan.[127] A week later, the Pakistani Taliban withdrew an offer of peace talks after a drone strike killed their deputy leader.[128] The Pakistani Taliban's threat to "teach a lesson" to the US and Pakistan, after the aggressive American rejection of peace talks, resulted in the shooting of 10 foreign mountain climbers,[129] as well as a mis-targeted bomb killing fourteen civilians, including four children, instead of security forces in Peshawar at the end of June 2013.[130] In early June, it was reported that the CIA did not even know who it was killing in some drone strikes.[131] A few days later, the freshly elected Pakistani Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, called for an end to drone strikes in his country.[132] Not long after, a US strike killed another nine people, an act that prompted Sharif to summon the US chargé d'affaires in protest and to demand, again, an "immediate halt" to the Anglo-American drone program.[133]In July 2013, it was reported that the US had drastically scaled back drone attacks in order to appease the Pakistani military, which was under growing pressure to move to end American "airspace violations". The CIA was instructed to be more "cautious" and limit the drone strikes to high-value targets, to cut down on so-called signature strikes (attacks that target a group of militants based purely on their behavior). Pakistani military officials had earlier stated that these drone attacks cannot continue at the tempo they are going at, and that civilian casualties in these strikes are spawning more militants.[134]On 1 November 2013, the US killed Hakimullah Mehsud.[135] The expressions of anger in Pakistan about the continuance of drone strikes peaked again at the end of November as a political party announced publicly the alleged name of the CIA's station chief in Islamabad, and called for them and CIA director John Brennan to be tried for murder.[136]After a six-month break, June 2014 saw a drone strike kill 13 people; the attack was again condemned by Pakistan as a violation of its sovereignty.[137] A month later, in July 2014, a similar attack which killed six militants was again criticized by the Pakistani government, particularly as it had just launched an offensive against militants in the area where the strike occurred.[138]On 16 July 2014, Pakistan conducted a drone attack in North Waziristan killing militants.[139]Media reporting from other countries[edit]The British newspaper The Times stated on 18 February 2009 that the CIA was using Pakistan's Shamsi Airfield, 190 miles (310 km) southwest of Quetta and 30 miles (48 km) from the Afghan border, as its base for drone operations. Safar Khan, a journalist based in the area near Shamsi, told the Times, "We can see the planes flying from the base. The area around the base is a high-security zone and no one is allowed there."[140]Top US officials confirmed to Fox News Channel that Shamsi Airfield had been used by the CIA to launch the drones since 2002.[102]Al Qaeda response[edit]Messages recovered from Osama bin Laden's home after his death in 2011, including one from then al Qaeda No. 3, Atiyah Abd al-Rahman reportedly, according to the Agence France-Presse and The Washington Post, expressed frustration with the drone strikes in Pakistan. According to an unnamed U.S. government official, in his message al-Rahman complained that drone-launched missiles were killing al Qaeda operatives faster than they could be replaced.[141][142]In June and July 2011, law enforcement authorities found messages on al Qaeda-linked websites calling for attacks against executives of drone aircraft manufacturer AeroVironment. Law enforcement believed that the messages were in response to calls for action against Americans by Adam Yahiye Gadahn.[143]United Nations human rights concerns[edit]On 3 June 2009, the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) delivered a report sharply critical of US tactics. The report asserted that the US government has failed to keep track of civilian casualties of its military operations, including the drone attacks, and to provide means for citizens of affected nations to obtain information about the casualties and any legal inquests regarding them.[144] Any such information held by the U.S. military is allegedly inaccessible to the public due to the high level of secrecy surrounding the drone attacks program.[145] The US representative at UNHRC has argued that the UN investigator for extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions does not have jurisdiction over US military actions,[144] while another US diplomat claimed that the US military is investigating any wrongdoing and doing all it can to furnish information about the deaths.[146]On 27 October 2009 UNHRC investigator Philip Alston called on the US to demonstrate that it was not randomly killing people in violation of international law through its use of drones on the Afghan border. Alston criticized the US's refusal to respond to date to the UN's concerns. Said Alston, "Otherwise you have the really problematic bottom line, which is that the Central Intelligence Agency is running a program that is killing significant numbers of people and there is absolutely no accountability in terms of the relevant international laws."[147]On 2 June 2010 Alston's team released a report on its investigation into the drone strikes, criticizing the United States for being "the most prolific user of targeted killings" in the world. Alston, however, acknowledged that the drone attacks may be justified under the right to self-defense. He called on the US to be more open about the program. Alston's report was submitted to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights the following day.[148]On 7 June 2012, after a four-day visit to Pakistan, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay called for a new investigation into US drone strikes in Pakistan, repeatedly referring to the attacks as "indiscriminate," and said that the attacks constitute human rights violations.[149] In a report issued on 18 June 2012, Christof Heyns, U.N. special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, called on the Obama administration to justify its use of targeted assassinations rather than attempting to capture al Qaeda or Taliban suspects.[150]Reactions from people in Pakistan[edit]According to a report by researchers at Stanford and New York University law schools in 2012, civilians in Waziristan interviewed for the report believed "that the US actively seeks to kill them simply for being Muslims, viewing the drone campaign as a part of a religious crusade against Islam."[151] Many professionals working in Waziristan believe that drone strikes encourage terrorism.[151] The report notes similar conclusions reached by reporters for Der Spiegel, The New York Times and CNN.[151]US drone strikes are extremely unpopular in Pakistan. A 2012 poll by the Pew Research Center's Global Attitude project found that only 17% of Pakistanis supported drone strikes. And remarkably, among those who professed to know a lot or a little about drones, 97% considered drone strikes bad policy.[151]—Stanford Law School, September 2012According to ongoing surveys of public opinion conducted by the New America Foundation, 9 out of 10 of civilians in Waziristan "oppose the U.S. military pursuing al-Qaeda and the Taliban" and nearly 70% "want the Pakistani military alone to fight Taliban and al-Qaeda militants in the tribal areas."[152]According to a public opinion survey conducted between November 2008 and January 2009 by the Pakistani Aryana Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy, approximately half of the respondents considered drone strikes in Federally Administered Tribal Areas accurate and approximately the same number of respondents said that the strikes did not lead to anti-American sentiment and were effective in damaging the militants.[153] The researchers concluded that "the popular notion outside the Pakhtun belt that a large majority of the local population supports the Taliban movement lacks substance."[154] According to Farhat Taj a member of AIRRA the drones have never killed any civilians. Some people in Waziristan compare the drones to Ababils, the holy swallows sent by Allah to avenge Abraha, the invader of the Khana Kaaba.[155] Irfan Husain, writing in Dawn, agreed called for more drone attacks: "We need to wake up to the reality that the enemy has grown very strong in the years we temporized and tried to do deals with them. Clearly, we need allies in this fight. Howling at the moon is not going to get us the cooperation we so desperately need. A solid case can be made for more drone attacks, not less."[156] In October 2013, the Economist found support among locals for the drone attacks as protection against the militants, claiming no civilians were killed this year.[157]The Los Angeles Times has reported that in North Waziristan a militant group called Khorasan Mujahedin targets people suspected of being informants. According to the report, the group kidnaps people from an area suspected of selling information that led to the strike, tortures and usually kills them, and sells videotapes of killings in street markets as warnings to others.[158]Imran Khan, chairman Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf political party in Pakistan, announced a Peace March to South Waziristan on 6–7 October 2012 to create global awareness about innocent civilian deaths in US drone attacks. He proposed to take a rally of 100,000 people from Islamabad to South Waziristan. The South Waziristan administration denied the group permission for the rally on the grounds that they can not provide security,[159] but PTI has maintained that they will go ahead with the Peace March. Many International human rights activists and NGOs have shown their support to the Peace March, with former US colonel Ann Wright and British NGO Reprieve joining the Peace March. Pakistani Taliban have agreed to not attack the Peace rally and offered to provide security for the rally.[160]A 2014 study in Political Science Quarterly and a 2015 study in the Journal of Strategic Studies disputes that drone strikes are a major source of anger for Pakistanis.[161][162]Aftermath[edit]Results[edit]The strikes led to the deaths of some 2,000 to 3,500 militants from various organizations (Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Haqqani Network, etc.), of which at least 75 were high-level leaders. These have included the head (emir) of the Afghan Taliban, multiple heads of the Pakistani Taliban, the deputy commander of the Pakistani Taliban, the top commander of the Haqqani Network, and the deputy commander of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.[163]According to a quantitative analysis on drone strikes in Pakistan conducted by Stanford University postdoctoral fellows Asfandyar Mir and Dylan Moore, "the drone strike program was associated with monthly reductions of around 9-13 insurgent attacks and 51-86 casualties in the area affected by the program. This change was sizable as in the year before the program the affected area experienced around 21 attacks and 100 casualties per month. Additional quantitative and qualitative evidence suggests that this drop is attributable to the drone program." In addition to the actual damage dealt, drone strikes changed "the insurgents’ perception of the risk", and caused them "to avoid targeting, severely compromising their movement and communication abilities."[164] Another quantitative study, published in International Studies Quarterly by Stanford fellow Anoop K. Sarbahi, found that "drone strikes are associated with decreases in the incidence and lethality of terrorist attacks, as well as decreases in selective targeting of tribal elders" based on "detailed data on US drone strikes and terrorism in Pakistan from 2007–2011."[165]The impact of drone strikes on local attitudes has also been studied. Political scientist and Carnegie Endowment fellow Aquil Shah conducted one such study in 2018 for the journal International Security, based on interview and survey data from Pakistan (n=167), which Shah claims provides a more complete and accurate view than opposing points "based primarily on anecdotal evidence, unreliable media reports, and advocacy-driven research." Shah's study found that there was "little or no evidence [in the data] that drone strikes have a significant impact on militant Islamist recruitment either locally or nationally. Rather, the data reveals the importance of factors such as political and economic grievances, the Pakistani state's selective counterterrorism policies, its indiscriminate repression of the local population, and forced recruitment of youth by militant groups." The study also extended to trial testimony and accounts of domestic Islamic terrorists in the United States and Europe. In their case, there was "scant evidence that drone strikes are the main cause of militant Islamism. Instead, factors that matter include a transnational Islamic identity's appeal to young immigrants with conflicted identities, state immigration and integration policies that marginalize Muslim communities, the influence of peers and social networks, and online exposure to violent jihadist ideologies."[166] An earlier survey in 2016 focusing specifically on the North Waziristan region (n=148), the region most affected by the Taliban insurgency, showed similar results. Over 79 percent of those polled supported the U.S. drone strikes, 56 percent believed that "the drones seldom killed non-militants", and more than 66 percent believed "most of the non-militant civilians who die in drone attacks are known militant collaborators who may already be radicalized." Additionally, the majority of respondents agreed that the drone campaign decisively broke the back of the Pakistani Taliban in the region. A student from the town of Mir Ali explained local sentiment: "When the government left us at the mercy of the cruel Taliban, we used to feel utterly helpless and cower in fear. Since nobody seemed concerned with our plight, the drones were the closest thing to getting your prayers answered."[167]In documents captured from Osama bin Laden's compound on Abbottabad, the Al-Qaeda leader talked extensively about American drones (referred to as "spy planes"), citing them as the chief threat to Al-Qaeda and its allies. He stated that “over the last two years, the problem of the spying war and spying aircrafts [sic] benefited the enemy greatly and led to the killing of many jihadi cadres, leaders, and others. This is something that is concerning us and exhausting us." He also advised his men, as well as their affiliates in Somalia, to avoid cars, as American drones had been targeting them, and to "benefit from the art of gathering and dispersion experience, as well as movement, night and day transportation, camouflage, and other techniques related to war tricks."[168]Paranoia over being targeted by drone strikes has led to wide-scale executions of suspected spies by Taliban agents in the FATA area, including the creation of a special task force Lashkar al Khorasan for this purpose in North Waziristan. This has extended to the Pakistani Taliban publicly executing dozens of local car mechanics whom they accused of bugging their trucks and cars. Vehicles are particularly preferred as targets by the CIA because the drones could see who entered the vehicles and target them when they were driving in isolated areas.[169]Civilian casualties[edit]See also: Civilian casualties from US drone strikesAccording to unnamed counterterrorism officials, in 2009 or 2010 CIA drones began employing smaller missiles in airstrikes in Pakistan in order to reduce civilian casualties. The new missiles, called the Small Smart Weapon or Scorpion, are reportedly about the size of a violin case (21 inches long) and weigh 16 kg. The missiles are used in combination with new technology intended to increase accuracy and expand surveillance, including the use of small, unarmed surveillance drones to exactly pinpoint the location of targets. These "micro-UAVs" (unmanned aerial vehicles) can be roughly the size of a pizza platter and meant to monitor potential targets at close range, for hours or days at a time. One former U.S. official who worked with micro-UAVs said that they can be almost impossible to detect at night. "It can be outside your window and you won't hear a whisper," the official said.[170] The drone operators also have changed to trying to target insurgents in vehicles rather than residences to reduce the chances of civilian casualties.[40]An oft-quoted 2010 study by Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann at the New America Foundation went as follows: "Our study shows that the 265 reported drone strikes in Northwest Pakistan, including 52 in 2011, from 2004 to the present, have killed approximately between 1,628 and 2,561 individuals, of whom around 1,335 to 2,090 were described as militants in reliable press accounts. Thus, the true non-militant fatality rate since 2004 according to our analysis is approximately 20 percent. Prior to 2010 it was 5 percent." In a separate report, written by Bergen in 2012, he commented that civilian casualties continued to fall even as drone strikes increased, concluding that "Today, for the first time, the estimated civilian death rate is close to zero."[171]The New York Times reported in 2013 that the Obama Administration embraced a disputed method for counting civilian casualties, which in effect counts all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants, giving partial explanation to the official claims of extraordinarily low collateral deaths.[172]A January 2011 report by Bloomberg stated that civilian casualties in the strikes had apparently decreased. According to the report, the U.S. government believed that 1,300 militants and only 30 civilians had been killed in drone strikes since mid-2008, with no civilians killed since August 2010.[173]On 14 July 2009, Daniel L. Byman of the Brookings Institution stated that although accurate data on the results of drone strikes is difficult to obtain, it seemed that ten civilians had died in the drone attacks for every militant killed. Byman argues that civilian killings constitute a humanitarian tragedy and create dangerous political problems, including damage to the legitimacy of the Pakistani government and alienation of the Pakistani populace from America. He suggested that the real answer to halting al-Qaeda's activity in Pakistan will be long-term support of Pakistan's counterinsurgency efforts.[41]United States officials claim that interviews with locals do not provide accurate numbers of civilian casualties because relatives or acquaintances of the dead refuse to state that the victims were involved in militant activities.[174]The CIA reportedly passed up three chances to kill militant leaders, including Sirajuddin Haqqani, with drone missiles in 2010 because civilians were nearby. The New America Foundation believes that between zero and 18 civilians have been killed in drone strikes since 23 August 2010 and that overall civilian casualties have decreased from 25% of the total in prior years to an estimated of 6% in 2010. The Foundation estimates that between 277 and 435 non-combatants have died since 2004, out of 1,374 to 2,189 total deaths.[174]According to a report of the Islamabad-based Conflict Monitoring Center (CMC), as of 2011 more than 2000 persons have been killed, and most of those deaths were civilians. The CMC termed the CIA drone strikes as an "assassination campaign turning out to be revenge campaign", and showed that 2010 was the deadliest year so far regarding casualties resulting from drone attacks, with 134 strikes inflicting over 900 deaths.[175]According to the Long War Journal, as of mid-2011, the drone strikes in Pakistan since 2006 had killed 2,018 militants and 138 civilians.[176] The New America Foundation stated in mid-2011 that from 2004 to 2011, 80% of the 2,551 people killed in the strikes were militants. The Foundation stated that 95% of those killed in 2010 were militants and that, as of 2012, 15% of the total people killed by drone strikes were either civilians or unknown.[40] The foundation also states that in 2012 the rate of civilian and unknown casualties was 2 percent, whereas the Bureau of Investigative Journalism say the rate of civilian casualties for 2012 is 9 percent.[177]The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, based on extensive research in mid-2011, claims that "credible reports" indicate 392 civilians were among the dead, including 175 children, out of the 2,347 people reported killed in US attacks since 2004. In the same article, the BIJ also claimed that "the intended targets – militants in the tribal areas – appear to make up the majority of those killed. There are almost 150 named militants among the dead since 2004, though hundreds are unknown, low-ranking fighters."[45]The CIA has claimed that the strikes conducted between May 2010 and August 2011 killed over 600 militants and did not result in any civilian fatalities; this assessment has been criticized by Bill Roggio from the Long War Journal and other commentators as being unrealistic. Unnamed American officials who spoke to The New York Times claimed that, as of August 2011, the drone campaign had killed over 2,000 militants and approximately 50 non-combatants.[38]An independent research site Pakistan Body Count run by Dr. Zeeshan-ul-hassan, a Fulbright scholar keeping track of all the drone attacks, claims that 2179 civilians were among the dead, and 12.4% children and women.[178] A report by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, released 4 February 2012, stated that under the Obama administration (2008–2011) drone strikes killed between 282 and 535 civilians, including 60 children.[179]The British human rights group Reprieve filed a case with the United Nations Human Rights Council, based on affidavits by 18 family members of civilians killed in the attacks – many of them children. They are calling on the UNHRC "to condemn the attacks as illegal human rights violations."[180]A February 2012 Associated Press investigation found that militants were the main victims of drone strikes in North Waziristan contrary to the "widespread perception in Pakistan that civilians ... are the principal victims." The AP studied 10 drone strikes. Their reporters spoke to about 80 villagers in North Waziristan, and were told that at least 194 people died in the ten attacks. According to the villagers 56 of those were either civilians or tribal police and 138 were militants. Thirty-eight of the civilians died in a single attack on 17 March 2011. Villagers stated that one way to tell if civilians were killed was to observe how many funerals took place after a strike; the bodies of militants were usually taken elsewhere for burial, while civilians were usually buried immediately and locally.[181]A September 2012 report by researchers from Stanford University and New York University criticized the drone campaign, stating that it was killing a high number of civilians and turning the Pakistani public against the United States. The report, compiled by interviewing witnesses, drone-attack survivors, and others in Pakistan provided by a Pakistani human rights organization, Foundation for Fundamental Rights, concluded that only 2% of drone strike victims are "high-level" militant leaders. The report's authors did not estimate the numbers of total civilian casualties, but suggested that the February 2012 Bureau of Investigative Journalism report was more accurate than the Long War Journal report (both detailed above) on civilian casualties. The report also opined that the drone attacks were violations of international law, because the US government had not shown that the targets were direct threats to the US.[182] The report further noted the US policy of considering all military-age males in a strike zone as militants following the air strike unless exonerating evidence proves otherwise. Media outlets were also urged to cease using the term "militant" when reporting on drone attacks without further explanation.[183]In an interview in October 2013, one former drone operator described events suggesting that child casualties may go unrecognized in some mission assessments.[184] A week later, Pakistan's Ministry of Defense stated that 67 civilians had been among the 2,227 people killed in 317 drone strikes since 2008. The Ministry said that the remainder of those killed were Islamic militants.[185] Research published by Reprieve in 2014 suggested that U.S. drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan have had an unknown person to target casualty ratio of 28:1 with one attack in the study having a ratio of 128:1 with 13 children being killed.[186]US hostage Warren Weinstein and Italian hostage Giovanni Lo Porto were killed in a January 2015 US-led drone strike on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, as announced by U.S. President Barack Obama at a White House press conference on April 23, 2015.[187]Impact[edit]According to a 2018 study in the journal International Security, there is scant evidence that drone strikes in Pakistan radicalize at the local, national or transnational level.[188]According to a 2016 study in International Studies Quarterly, drone strikes are an effective counterterrorist tool in Pakistan. The study found that "drone strikes are associated with decreases in the incidence and lethality of terrorist attacks, as well as decreases in selective targeting of tribal elders."[189]See also[edit]Pakistan portalDrone strikes in Yemen, Afghanistan, Libya and SomaliaPakistan–United States military relationsSaheb al-AmiriDisposition Matrix—database of US capture/kill listList of terrorist incidents in Pakistan since 2001Terrorism in PakistanViolence in Pakistan 2006-09Unmanned: America's Drone Wars (2013 documentary film)Good Kill (2014 film)