February 24, 1999 Minutes Of The Regular Meeting Of: Fill & Download for Free

The Buried History of the 1982 Massacre at Hama, Syria.Hama Syria (Hama - Wikipedia)In August 1999, I attended an archaeological conference in Hama, Syria. It was my first year of excavating and living in Syria, while working on my dissertation at the University of Chicago. My arabic was non-existant and I was travelling alone, intending to meet up with others in a few weeks. Unfamilar with the country, customs and late summer heat that literally takes your breath away, I stayed at hotels reminiscent of those back home.Hama was a beautiful city with an intact Old City reminiscent of the Middle Ages with traces of occupation dating back almost 9000 years. Due to the influx of tourists and scholars, finding a hotel within walking distance of the conference was challenging, and I settled for a hotel just outside the medieval city walls on a promontory.After the second day of the conference, there was a reception overlooking the historic watermill and amphitheatre. Seated at a table with collegues, talk quickly shifted to on going excavations, projects, research etc. Towards the end of the evening around 8:30 PM a signal was given letting all female attendees know it was time to return to their lodgings. Hama is a conservative city and women are strongly requested to be out of public view by 9 PM.I noticed that many colleagues were leaving the property, making transportation arrangements. Slightly confused, I inquired where everyone was going, assuming like myself, they were staying at the hotel adjacent to the meeting hall. I recieved many shocked and uncomfortable looks, before someone was kind enough to pull me aside and share with me the reason many avoided staying at the hotel. This is what I learned.photo of hafez assadHama in particular was a "stronghold of landed conservatism and of the Muslim Brothers," and "had long been a redoubtable opponent of the Ba'athist state."[1]The first full-scale clash between the two occurred shortly after the 1963 coup, in which the Ba'ath party first gained power in Syria. In April 1964 riots erupted in Hama, where Muslim insurgents put up "roadblocks, stockpiled food and weapons, ransacked wine shops."[2] After an Ismaili Ba'ath militiaman was killed, riots intensified and rebels attacked "every vestige" of the Ba'ath party in Hama. Tanks were brought in to crush the rebellion and 70 members of the Muslim Brotherhood died, with many others wounded or captured, and still more disappearing underground.[3]After the clashes in Hama, the situation periodically erupted into clashes between the government and various Islamic sections. However a more serious challenge occurred after the Syrian invasion of Lebanon in 1976.[4] From 1976 to 1982, Sunni Islamists fought the Ba'ath Party -controlled government of Syria in what has been called a "long campaign of terror".[5]In 1979, the Brotherhood implemented a series of guerrilla tactics in multiple cities within the country targeting military officers and government officials.[6] The resulting government repression included abusive tactics, torture, mass arrests, and a number of massacres. In July 1980, the ratification of Law No. 49 made membership in the Muslim Brotherhood a capital offense.[7]Throughout the first years of the 1980s, the Muslim Brotherwood and various other Islamist factions staged hit-and-run bomb attacks against the government and its officials, including a nearly successful attempt to assassinate President Hafez al-Assad on 26 June 1980, during an official state reception for the president of Mali.[8] When a machine-gun salvo missed him, al-Assad allegedly kicked aside a hand grenade, and his bodyguard (who survived and was later promoted to a much higher position) smothered the explosion of another one.[9] Surviving with only light injuries, al-Assad's revenge was swift and merciless: only hours later a large number of imprisoned Islamists (reports say more than 1200) were executed in their cells in Tadmor Prison (near Palmyra), by units loyal to the President's brother Rifaat al-Assad.[10]Between 1980–81, supposed rebellious activity was fermenting in the Syrian city of Hama. The Assad regime appeared to be losing control; it had issued vague warnings about an Islamist takeover, but had gone ominously silent in late 1981.[11] One incident in 1981, resulted in the death of over 300 residents of Hama killed by security forces, in a revenge attack for an Islamist terror incident. [12] A government-planned trip to the city was canceled. Syrian officials warned privately that any attempts by intrepid journalists to visit Hama would be “life-threatening.”[13]Although the massacre in February 1982 became known worldwide, the Syrian regime committed, before this massacre, several other massacres in adjacent regions. Many of the losses were women, children and elderly. One these massacres was the massacre on Jisr Alshaghoor, which took place on the 10th of March 1980. Some sources said that mortars bombed the city and 97 people were shot dead, after being taken from their homes, and 30 houses were demolished.[14]The massacres of Sarmadah saw 40 citizens killed[15] , as well as dozens massacred at the village Kinsafrah, which took place at the same time as the massacre of Jisr Alshaghoor.[16] This massacre took place when the villagers asked for improved public services, one citizen was killed and 10 injured.Several months later, the massacre of Palmyra prison was committed on the 26th of June 1980, when around 1200 detainees were killed in their cells.[17] The massacre in the Mashariqah neighbourhood, occurred on the morning of Eid Al-Adha, which saw 83 citizens killed after being forced out of their flats.[18] And the massacre at the Sunday market where 42 citizens were killed and 150 were injured. In Al-Raqah, tens of citizens held captive in a secondary school were burnt to death.[19]James MacManus,reporting for The Guardian in a dispatch from 23 January 1982, reported that government forces laid siege to Hama as house-to-house fighting wiped out any opposition.[20] He recalled a series of car bomb attacks in Damascus culminating in an attack on a shopping centre in which more than 100 people died, describing the attacks as "the high point, but by no means the end, of a campaign of terror and counter terror... which President Assad now claims to have won".[21]The 1982 Hama MassacreAccording to Syrian media, anti-government rebels initiated the fighting when they "pounced on our comrades while sleeping in their homes and killed whomever they could kill of women and children, mutilating the bodies of the martyrs in the streets, driven, like mad dogs, by their black hatred."[22] Security forces then "rose to confront these crimes" and "taught the murderers a lesson that has snuffed out their breath".[23]Hama became the epicenter of a massacre in February 1982 when deceased leader of the Alawi regime President Hafez al-Assad, father of the current president Bashar al-Assad, razed the city to crush an armed Sunni rebellion (estimated to consist of 200–500 fighters), slaughtering an estimated 20,000 of his own people.[24] Assad's troops pounded Hama with artillery fire for several days and, with the city in ruins, his bulldozers moved in and flattened neighborhoods.While Western reporters stationed in Damascus were acutely aware that a bloody insurgency was underway in the city, they had little sense of its scope. On Feb. 24, the Associated Press quoted Western diplomatic sources saying that the fighting in Hama had “resulted in an estimated 2,000 casualties on both sides” — an approximation that grossly underestimated the number of people killed.[25]It was not until a year and a half later that reports of the Hama massacre’s true extent filtered into the international media. Amnesty International’s November 1983 report estimated that 10,000 to 25,000 people had been killed during the crackdown. The report also contained chilling details about the Assad regime’s methods of coercion. “I was stripped naked…. My wrists were then tied and I was hung up and whipped on my back and all over my body,” recounted a Syrian trader detained in 1980. “I was beaten on the toes until my nails fell out.”[26]Even then, Hama did not become a byword for the brutality with which Middle Eastern autocrats treated their subjects until the publication of Thomas Friedman’s From Beirut to Jerusalem in 1989, which offered a blow-by-blow account of the massacre.[27] Friedman recounted a conversation he had with a friend — a businessman who had been involved in several deals with Rifaat al-Assad — who said that the Syrian general had pushed back against some estimates of those killed as too low, not wanting to erode the fear that the Assad regime had instilled in the Syrian population.[28] “What are you talking about, 7,000?” Rifaat reportedly said. “No, no. We killed 38,000.”[29]Ruins of Hama 1982 (Breaking the silence over Hama atrocities)The subsequent 27-day military campaign left somewhere between 10,000 to 40,000 people killed and almost two thirds of the city destroyed, according to human rights organisations and foreign journalists who were in Syria but were not allowed to enter the city.[30] Some neighbourhoods were completely destroyed and at least 80 mosques were demolished.[31]To this day, the death toll is in dispute and is at best an estimate. Human rights groups, which were not present during the slaughter, have put the toll at around 10,000 dead or more.[32] The Muslim Brotherhood claims 40,000 died in Hama, with 100,000 expelled and 15,000 who disappeared.[33] The number of missing has never been acknowledged by the Syrian leadership.Thirty three years on the Hama Massacre: The Criminals Remain Outside the Realm of JusticeThe Taleea (the Muslim Brotherhood’s military wing) had tried to resist and clashed with the government forces but was crushed in few days. [34] The Baroudiyeh neighbourhood, where the Taleea was based, was overtaken by the army just hours after the military campaign was launched.[35] Almost every family in Hama, which at the time had about 250,000 inhabitants, lost a member.[36] The campaign continued for days and most of the dead were civilians who had nothing to do with the Brotherhood.On February 27, journalist Harish Chandola reported from Hama after the guns fell silent. He saw a column of smoke rising from the old quarter, where the fighting was the worst, noting: "I was not allowed to visit it. The security forces are tightly controlling entry and exit from the city to prevent the Muslim Brothers from escaping."[37]One of the ugliest phenomenons that haunted the city afterwards were the packs of wild dogs roaming the streets. Because many dead bodies were left on the streets for many days before the families could leave homes to bury them, dogs had eaten some of the dead bodies.[38] The dogs would come at night to attack people, just like in movies. The municipality of Hama struggled for two years to rid the city of these dogs.[39]When the military campaign was over, Hafez al-Assad declared that "what has happened in Hama has happened, and it is all over."[40]Apamee Cham Palace- Hama, Syria (Apamee Cham Palace Hama Syrial)Residents say they knew where the bodies were unceremoniously dumped back in 1982 — in the plot under the Cham Palace Hotel, under the streets of what is now a vegetable market in al-Hamidiyeh neighborhood, in places where residential buildings have since sprung up, in a garden near the Bakr al-Sadiq Mosque in al-Hamidiyeh. They didn't dare pray over them, they say, such was the regime's unrelenting hatred for its foes, even in death.[41]Syrian officials continued to terrorize the Hama community, transporting suspected rebels to the notorious Tadmour prison and executing them there until 1986.[42] The Mukhabarat (members of the security intelligence) continued for many years to interrogate subsequent generations of Hamians. Regular security check-ups and investigations of young men continued well into the 1990s to punish the whole of Hama.[43] Hafez al-Assad wanted to teach all Syrians the consequences of challenging the regime. And it worked. It worked for 30 years. The fear of Hama’s residents to even mention the massacre only began to falter when anti-government protests erupted across the country in March 2011.[44]Stock Photo - Omar ibn al Kattab Mosque Hama Syria Middle East30 years later, the first protest in Hama in 2011 originated from the Omar Bin Khattab Mosque near Hama’s castle. People chanted for freedom and the fall of the regime, the first serious challenge to the Assad dynasty in decades.[45] That same mosque is where, 30 years earlier, mothers, children, elderly and the infirm saught refuge, during the first few days of the military campaign in 1982.In 1982, the mosque turned into a detention centre. Women and children were separated from their fathers, husbands and brothers, never to be seen again. Women leaving the sanctuary of the mosque to search for missing husbands, fathers, sons and brothers remember being shouted at by soliders from behind the mosque’s gate: "Do not expect to see your men when you are out." The regime wanted to keep people in a constant waiting mode. They wouldn’t tell families if their loved ones they took were dead or alive.[46]Yehya Zeidan, the head of the military intelligence branch in Hama, was one of the most loathed officials in the city.[47] He extorted fortunes simply to reveal the fate of a detained person or to grant people a few minute prison visitation. Frequently, people gave him everything they owned but receiving in return. Decades later, families continue to fear retribution inquiring over missing family members.[48]The message was simple: This is what happens when you defy us. That was the lesson, and every Syrian seemed to abide by it for almost three decades. Hardly anyone objected.The Hama massacre is often raised in indictment of the Assad government's poor human rights record.[49] Within Syria, mention of the massacre has been strictly suppressed, although the general contours of the events—and various partisan versions, on all sides—are well known throughout the country. When the massacre is publicly referenced, it is only as the "events" or "incident" at Hama.[50]The Hama revolt began as a sectarian challenge, with the Sunni Muslims of the Brotherhood against the minority Alawite sect that dominates the regime and the upper ranks of the military. After it was crushed, it then became a lesson to any challenger to Assad family rule. The 1982 massacre is regarded as the single bloodiest assault by an Arab ruler against his own people in modern times and remains a pivotal event in Syrian history. The "Hama example" stood firm until the spring of 2011.[51]After a brief summation of the 1982 Hama massacre, I returned to my hotel room as my female collegues returned to their hotels along the outskirts of Hama. Depite being after 9 PM, I gathered my belongings, checked out of the nicest hotel in Hama and checked into a small local hotel with a view of the Old City. Two days later, after the conference concluded , I left Hama and continued onto the coast for a few days of rest before traveling to Yemen.In all my wanderings throughout Syria, I never travelled through or around Hama again, despite being a place of incredible beauty and archaeology. To this day, I have been unable to comprehend the images of guests enjoying the pool and upscale restaurants all the while thousands of innocent people are interred in the construction fill below the hotel. Maybe that is the lesson- that there is no understanding and that in attempting to bury Hama's secrets, the Syrian government ultimately failed setting the stage for Civil War again 30 years later.Footnotes[1] 1982 Hama massacre - Wikipedia[2] The Islamist Uprising in Syria, 1976–82: The History and Legacy of a Failed Revolt[3] Baath Party Compelled to Restore its Defining Roles in Syria - The Syrian Observer[4] Syrian Military Intervention in Lebanon and Its Consequences[5] 1982 Hama massacre - Wikipedia[6] When Assad Won[7] The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood[8] https://www.revolvy.com/page/June-1980-assassination-attempt-on-Hafez-al-Assad?stype=topics&cmd=list[9] Hafez al-Assad[10] Inside Tadmur: The worst prison in the world?[11] 1982: Syria's President Hafez al-Assad crushes rebellion in Hama[12] A Wasted Decade | Human Rights in Syria during Bashar al-Asad’s First Ten Years in Power[13] 1982 Hama massacre looms over Syria revolt[14] Massacre of Hama (February 1982) Genocide and A crime against Humanity[15] SHRC Publishes Names of Hundreds of Political Detainees[16] The Assads An iron-fisted dynasty[17] Inside Tadmur: The worst prison in the world?[18] Downplaying a Massacre[19] The Assads: An iron-fisted dynasty[20] 1982: Syria's President Hafez al-Assad crushes rebellion in Hama[21] https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://statecrime.org/data/2018/07/Nafeez-Ahmed-State-Propaganda-in-Syria-ISCI-Report-July-2018.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwijoZPJnvniAhVQA6wKHfEgD5EQFjAJegQICxAB&usg=AOvVaw3N57IuDP2nc5K7DQDApZh3[22] http://The New York Times. 24 Feb 1982. Syria Offers Picture of Hama Revolt][23] http://Fisk, Robert. 1990. Pity the Nation. London: Touchstone, ISBN 0-671-74770-3.[24] Tumult in Syria's Hama in 1925: The Failure of a Revolt[25] The 1982 Hama Massacre[26] Harrowing accounts of torture, inhuman conditions and mass deaths in Syria's prisons[27] From Beirut to Jerusalem - Wikipedia[28] From Beirut to Jerusalem, by Thomas L. Friedman - Commentary[29] From Beirut to Jerusalem[30] https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.sciencespo.fr/mass-violence-war-massacre-resistance/printpdf/2743&ved=2ahUKEwiK_6zjoPniAhVPF6wKHT-nAxEQFjAcegQIBxAB&usg=AOvVaw2prYx6NtIHa_V8xwz58_co&cshid=1561074807680[31] Statistics in the Information War: an Instructive Example from Hama, 1982[32] Syria: Shootings, Arrests Follow Hama Protest[33] 30 Years Later, Photos Emerge From Killings In Syria[34] Political Islam and the Syrian Revolution[35] Assad or We Burn the Country[36] Scenes From the Hama Massacre From Those Who Lived It - The Syrian Observer[37] https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/middle-east-live/2011/jul/05/syria-libya-middle-east-unrest-live&ved=2ahUKEwjL9bfjovniAhVRKqwKHaxADAYQFjALegQIARAB&usg=AOvVaw0LlsCmCZLsC-sQMZVe6rx9[38] Hama’s Ghosts[39] No More ‘Hama Rules’[40] Like Father, Like Son - Tyranny in Syria, A Massacre in Hama - Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training[41] Breaking News, Analysis, Politics, Blogs, News Photos, Video, Tech Reviews - TIME.com[42] Breaking the Silence of Tadmor Military Prison[43] If the Dead Could Speak | Mass Deaths and Torture in Syria’s Detention Facilities[44] Syrian Troops Open Fire on Protesters in Several Cities[45] Syrian Troops and Tanks Push Into Defiant City of Hama[46] Survivors of Syria's Hama massacre watch and hope[47] Breaking the silence over Hama atrocities[48] The 1982 Hama Massacre[49] World Report 2019: Rights Trends in Syria[50] Hama: The Forgotten Front[51] Syria: Is Homs 2011 Hama 1982 in slow motion?

Jyothi reddy went from being farm labourer in Andhra Pradesh (where she earned 5 Rs/day) to owning a recruiting firm in the US with a turnover of $5 MILLION.At the age of 16,she married because of her family financial. By the age of 18,she became mother of two girls.she worked for Rs 5 per day BUT today she is the CEO of a company named Key software solutions in USA."Despite my husband’s disapproval, I moved out of the village, Mailaran, with my children and went to Hanamkonda town. I joined a typing institute, did a craft course and earned Rs 20-25 daily by stitching petticoats at Re 1 per piece. I used to sell sarees in the train every day to earn the extra money. I also got a job as the librarian at Janasikshana Nilayam and joined an open school where I would go every Sunday to continue my studies.My next step was to learn software from VCL Computers in Hyderabad. got my passport and H1 visa ready and in 2000 I went to the US, where my husband’s cousin was. I took a job in a shop earning $60 for a 12-hour job.Then a contact in the US asked me to join as a software recruiter. Though I wasn’t fluent in English then, I overcame all challenges and gradually started my own company,” said Reddy.With her children, who are now engineering graduates, married and settled in the US, Reddy wants to focus on her dream project which is providing placement and training to 1,000 youth and to start a school that has classes from LKG to PG. Reddy, who is associated with numerous charitable projects, is also an ardent advocate of orphans’ rights.“I want to do much more. Women can also become better businessmen than men by sheer hard work and intelligence,” she said.SALUTES HER HARDWORK AND SPIRIT OF NEVER DIE APPROACH AND SELF CONFIDENCE .Shirin Juwaley is an amazing lady. Her life was similar to many other young women like her . she completed her schooling, graduated and agreed to an arranged marriage with hopes of a happy married life. But her world came crashing down when she was only 24.After her wedding in February 1998, Shirin saw the deep cracks in the relationship and realised that she did not want to remain trapped in an unhappy marriage. "I dared to opt out and asked for a divorce," she says, remembering how she returned to her parents' home and started working.On May 28, 1998, when she was returning home at around 9 pm, she saw a man dressed in black trousers, black shirt, black monkey cap and dark glasses. She knew that was her husband. She saw him for a second before he threw acid on her face.In that split second, her life changed forever. Shirin's husband flew to Kuwait the same night. As she was in hospital for two months and had only her mother to help her, she did not pursue the police case.With her face disfigured, her trauma was intense. She felt the case would drag on unless he was arrested, and decided instead to build her own life once again.Shirin founded the Palash Foundation (named after the visually striking flower) which aims to stop discrimination against people who have been disfigured. In addition to providing emotional and financial support to burns survivors, the organisation runs workshops at schools addressing body image and organises events to raise the plight of those who have been disfigured.Naga Naresh Karutura's story has just passed out of IIT Madras in Computer Science and has joined Google in Bangalore .You may ask, what's so special about this 21-year-old when there are hundreds of students passing out from various IITs and joining big companies like Google?Naresh is special. He met with an accident in January 1993. As a result his legs got injured.He underwent a surgery as his intestine was twisted and both his legs were amputated upto the hips.He has no legs and moves around in his powered wheel chair. Now He is Looking after his poor family,His Father Prasad is a Lorry Driver and mother is House Wife.Ever smiling, optimistic and full of spirit; that is Naresh. He says, "God has always been planning things for me. That is why I feel I am lucky."Before you complain about your shoes , think of those who do not have feet .......!!An unexpected participant proved to be the game changer for the Baramati athletes participating in this year’s marathon race. The new participant took the organisers as well as spectators by complete surprise.Lata Bhagwan Kare won first place in the contest leaving “athletes” way behind within minutes of the “start” fire.Everything about this winner was surprising. Let’s start with her age. She is 61, She wore a traditional nauvari and ran barefoot.And this was her maiden run. She was adjudged this year’s Fastest Marathon Runner.The thing that caught everyone’s attention at the race was Kare’s dress -- the traditional nauvari. Secondly, she ran without shoes, and finally amused one and all when she defeated all the experienced and regular runners.Kare is a resident of Pimpli, about 7 km from Baramati, and works as a farm labourer.Before the event, Kare used to walk daily one kilometre in her village.When asked how she felt standing there on the start line, she said, “a little awkward, as all the other participants were staring at my dress. That also made me a little nervous. However, when the race began and I started overtaking them one by one, I gained my energy. While running I was talking to myself and telling that I want to win this race and I did it.”“I used to go for morning walks daily, but I had never run. If I had even tried to run, people would have found it strange and they would have asked me uncomfortable questions,” Kare laughed.She started her run with her slippers on. After a metres, one of her slipplers slipped out. She then left the other one too and continued running, which explains why she was barefoot.organiser's said, “We never expected a participant like Kare to be the winner of the race. It was pleasant surprise. We were extremely happy while handing over the trophy to Kare.”Strength does not come from physical capacity. It comes from an indomitable will.The strife-torn Kashmir is known for struggle, fight, or quarrel,bitter conflict has produced a record performance in the civil services this year, with eight of its candidates cracking the top exam.27-year-old Ruveda Salam has become the first Muslim woman from the Kashmir to clear the exam.In all, 11 candidates from the state have cracked the exam this year out of which three are women.Dr Ruveda, who hails from far flung Farkin village in the border district of Kupwara, had cleared the Kashmir Administrative Service in 2009, Initially she was discouraged to continue her study by locals and society but wanted to do better. After a year of hard work, she emerged successful without joining any coaching centre.Ruveda wants Kashmiri girls to seize the moment and join the civil services to make their parents and the India proud and to serve Mother India.She says "irrespective of cast,creed,sex all children's should be sent to school and encouraged to study."Captain Laxmi Sehgal is one of the lion hearted women, India ever had.Laxmi Sehgal was born in 1914 to a traditional Tamil family. . Sahgal chose to study medicine and received an MBBS degree from Madras Medical College in 1938 ,A year later, she received her diploma in gynaecology and obstetrics and went to Singapore for a career as a doctor.However something very different was waiting for her.Singapore at that time was ruled by Brutal British and Womens were Raped By Officials ,Yet no Actions are taken against British officers and Thousands of Indians were taken as prisoners for no reasons.At this juncture, Netaji invited the Indian prisoners to join the INA and fight against the British. Laxmi was one of them and Laxmi was impressed by his courage and She joined Indian National Army (INA) founded by Netaji Subash Chandra Bose and led women’s regiment, to be called the Rani of Jhansi regiment. led it like a tigress for the struggle for Indian freedom.The INA marched to Burma with the Japanese army in December 1944,and fought against British Government.Thus British had to surrender when the Japanese with INA invaded the country.She fought like a tigress against the British in the jungles of Burma. But she was wounded in the war and was arrested by the British army in May 1945,later March 1946, when she was sent to India.She established a clinic for the poor, most of whom were migrant laborers from India.she aided wounded prisoners of war, many of whom who were interested in forming an Indian liberation army and even working among the flood of refugees who had come from Pakistan, and earning the trust and gratitude of both Hindus and Muslims.During the anti-Sikh riots that followed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s assassination in 1984, she was out on the streets in Kanpur, confronting anti-Sikh mobs and ensuring that no Sikh or Sikh establishment in the crowded area near her clinic was attacked.In 1998, Sahgal was awarded the Padma Vibhushan by Indian president K. R. Narayanan.Till her death she worked for the betterment of the Society.On 19 Jul 2012, Sehgal suffered a cardiac arrest and died.Her body was donated to Kanpur Medical college for medical research.In one of her Interview when asked about India after Independence. she said: “Freedom comes in three forms,” “The first is political emancipation from the conqueror, the second is economic [emancipation] and the third is social… India has only achieved the first.”The Girl Who Gave Up Everything For Betterment Of Poor.Chhavi Rajawat had everything one could ever want but she was not satisfied, She wanted to do something better.M.B.A, BIMM Pune graduate, a tag for which one would lock himself up for over year in a room. A high Profile corporate jobs in companies such as Times of India, Carlson Group of Hotels, Airtel, etc with money written all over it but She didn't feel quite right about it. So She left her job, came back to her village Soda, 60km from Jaipur,India. and she worked for development of Soda village.Today, she is the Sarpanch (elected head of the Village Council) in Soda village, Tonk district, Rajasthan. She is not affiliated to any political party.She may be the first woman Sarpanch in India with an MBA degree.After becoming the Sarpanch of the village, she has implemented many projects successfully i.e. rain water harvesting, toilets facilities in all the houses, concrete roads and 24x7 electricity etc.She banned Alcohol and dowry practice in her village. Improved the condition of government schools and hospital. she took initiative against child labour andHer aim is to make her village 100 percent educated.Her village is recognized as one of the finest village in the world.She says she's paying her debt to the village she grew up in.Her message for the youth of India: “Don’t run away from your roots because that is your foundation and the nation’s foundation too. If you want to make a difference, you have got to start at the bottom. There is so much one can do.”She was honoured by former President of India APJ Abdul Kalam at the Technology Day function at New Delhi.She left behind corporate glamour and city life,she went back to her village Soda to help develop rural India.She is the real hero. She isn't celebrity, she is ordinarily human with extraordinary compassion But Indian media forget her.Neera Chopra lived through abuse, poverty and some tough choices to make her once-unwanted girl child, Pooja Chopra (Miss India 2009) ,"I don’t know where to begin... they were terrible times. My husband was well-placed, but the marriage had begun to sink almost as soon as it began. Like most women do, I tried to work against all the odds .My in-laws insisted everything would be alright if I had a son. My first child was a daughter, and that didn’t do me any good... but I couldn’t walk out. I had lost my father, my brother was in a not-so-senior position in Bata. I didn’t want to be a burden on my family and continued to live in my marital home in Kolkata.I looked after my mother-inlaw, who was suffering from cancer, and while bathing her, I would tell myself she would bless me and put things right.I don’t know how I tolerated it all. The least a man can do, if he must philander, is to not flaunt his women in his wife’s face. Then began the manhandling. I still wanted my marriage to survive. I was a pure vegetarian and learnt to cook non-vegetarian delicacies thinking it would please him.Then, I was pregnant again. When Pooja was eight months in my womb, my husband brought a girl to the house and announced he would marry her. I thought of killing myself. I hung on the slight hope that if the baby was a boy, my marriage could be saved.When Pooja was born a girl, for three days, nobody came to the hospital. There was a squadron leader’s wife on the opposite bed, who was kind enough to give me baby clothes for Pooja to wear. When she was 20 days old, I had to make a choice. I left the house with my girls ‘ Pooja and Shubra, who was seven then. I haven’t seen my husband since. I promised myself, even if we had just one roti, we would share it, but together.I began life in Mumbai with the support of my mother, brother, who was by then married. It wasn’t the ideal situation, especially when he had children - space, money, everything was short. I began work at the Taj Colaba and got my own place. How did I manage? Truth be told, I would put a chatai on the floor, leave two glasses of milk and some food, and bolt the door from outside before going to work. I would leave the key with the neighbours and tell the kids to shout out to them when it was time to leave for school.Their tiny hands would do homework on their own, feed themselves on days that I worked late. My elder daughter Shubhra would make Pooja do her corrections... This is how they grew up. At a birthday party, Pooja would not eat her piece of cake, but pack it and bring it home to share with her sister. When Shubhra started working, she would skip lunch and pack a chicken sandwich that she would slip in her sister’s lunchbox the next day.I used to pray, ‘God, punish me for my karma, but not my innocent little kids. Please let me provide them the basics.’ I used to struggle for shoes, socks, uniforms. I was living in Bangur Nagar, Goregaon. Pooja would walk four bus stops down to the St ThomasAcademy . Then, too little to cross the road, she would ask a passerby to help her. I had to save the bus money to be able to put some milk in their bodies.Life began to change when I got a job for Rs 6,000 at the then Goa Penta. Mr Chhabra, the owner, and his wife, were kind enough to provide a loan for me. I sent my daughters to my sister’s house in Pune, with my mother as support. I spent four years working in Goa while I saved to buy a small one-bedroom house in Pune (where the family still lives). I would work 16-18 hours a day, not even taking weekly offs to accumulate leave and visit my daughters three or four times a year.Once I bought my house and found a job in Pune, life began to settle. I worked in Hotel Blue Diamond for a year and then finally joined Mainland China ‘ which changed my life. The consideration of the team and management brought me the stability to bring them up, despite late hours and the travelling a hotelier must do.Shubhra got a job in Hotel Blue Diamond, being the youngest employee there while still in college, and managed to finish her Masters in commerce and her BBM. Today, she is married to a sweet Catholic boy who is in the Merchant Navy and has a sweet daughter.I continue to finish my day job and come home and take tuitions, as I have done for all these years. I also do all my household chores myself.Through the years, Shubhra has been my anchor and Pooja, the rock. Pooja’s tiny hands have wiped away my tears when I broke down. She has stood up for me, when I couldn’t speak for myself. Academically brilliant, she participated in all extra-curricular activities. When she needed high heels to model in, she did odd shows and bought them for herself.When I saw Pooja give her speech on TV, I knew it came from her heart. I could see the twinkle in her eye. And I thought to myself as she won ‘My God, this is my little girl.’ God was trying to tell me something.Today, I’ve no regrets. I believe every cloud has a silver lining. As a mother, I’ve done nothing great."Pantaloons Femina Miss India Pooja Chopra’s mother promised, ‘One day, this girl will make me proud’.Pooja speaks on fulfilling that promise... "When I was 20 days old, my mother was asked to make a choice. It was either me, a girl child, or her husband. She chose me. As she walked out she turned around and told her husband, ‘One day, this girl will make me proud’. That day has come. Her husband went on to marry a woman who gave him two sons. Today, as I stand here a Miss India, I don’t even know if my father knows that it is me, his daughter, who has set out to conquer the world, a crown on my head."Our lives have not been easy, least so for my mother. Financially, emotionally, she struggled to stay afloat, to keep her job and yet allow us to be the best that we could be. I was given only one condition when I started modelling ‘ my grades wouldn’t drop."All the girls in the pageant worked hard, but my edge was my mother’s sacrifice, her karma. Today, when people call to congratulate me, it’s not me they pay tribute to, but to her life and her struggle. She’s the true Woman of Substance. She is my light, my mentor, my driving force."An Indian scientist at the University of Washington has performed the world's first ever non-invasive human-to-human brain interface, in which one researcher was able to send a brain signal via the internet to control the hand motions of a fellow researcher.Rajesh Rao used Electroencephalography or EEG — routinely used to record brain activity non-invasively from the scalp — to play a computer game with his mind.Rao looked at a computer screen and a simple video game with his mind. When he was supposed to fire a cannon at a target, he imagined moving his right hand (being careful not to actually move his hand), causing a cursor to hit the "fire" button.Rao, a professor of computer science and engineering who has been working on brain-computer interfacing for more than a decade, said, "It was both exciting and eerie to watch an imagined action from my brain get translated into actual action by another brain. This was basically a one-way flow of information from my brain to his. The next step is having a more equitable two-way conversation directly between the two brains."It’s time for us to meet the World’s Youngest CEO and Youngest Girl Web designer.You would be awestruck to know that she has so far designed more than 20 websites within a span of 6 years.Cute little Sreelakshmi has grabbed many accolades from international bodies, including the most prestigious Global web award for excellence in web designing. highest National Child Award for Exceptional Achievement 2008, which is the highest award for Children in India. She now has more than 30 awards to her credit.'The children of life convicts are rendered orphans for all practical purposes, and to see them crying outside the jail is very sad,' V Mani, who started a home for them.While working as an assistant general manager at the Reserve Bank of India, Mani passed the central jail in Bengaluru every day. The sight of relatives, particularly children, waiting outside the jail to see their loved ones made him decide that he needed to do something for the children of prisoners and hence Socare Ind (Society's care for Indegent) was born.Mani put all his provident-fund savings into the creation of So Care in 1999. It took off with a few children and some likeminded volunteers as staff. Gradually, more children came into this fold and his noble aim became crystallised into a detailed mission statement: Provide comprehensive care to the children of lifetime convicts and undertrails. This care covers food, shelter, clothing, education and health care and help them grow into physically and emotionally healthy, normal individuals. Teach the children to be self-confident and help them integrate with the community. Rehabilitate the convicts’ families. Provide vocational training to children not inclined or not equipped to go to school or college.“As long as a person has productive years left in him, he should contribute to society. And I am only doing that duty,” Mani Believes.11 year old ‘Dinesh Dwivedi’ has never been to school, but he is able to solve toughest mathematics problems in minutes. He also imparts tutions to students preparing for most toughest entrance exam for engineering (IIT-JEE).Living in a small rented room along with his father, elder brother and sister in Mutthiganj, Dinesh is favourite ‘guruji’ to hundreds of students who dream of cracking IIT but cannot afford expensive coaching classes.Nearly 250 students are coaching under this wonder kid and are hoping to make it big, with the child having had a brilliant track record in training up aspirants .After just four months of coaching 8 out of 12 students cleared the AIEEE, whereas four cleared the SSC. Surprisingly,There are lots of people who are ready to pay any price for a seat in his class, but they are unable to get a seat.The students studying under him are free to ask any question and raise any kind of doubts while teaching. This superbrain is able to solve the problem in a jiffy, without books and notes in hand. His fame is not just restricted to Allahabad. Students from different districts of the area come to his class for guidance while preparing for competitive examinations.Dinesh Dwivedi, the 11 year old Engineering Teacher claims, “I never went to school and whatever I have learnt I have learnt at home. I am teaching IIT students from last year. I teach Physics, Chemistry and Maths.”The child when asked of this extraordinary brain and its capacity, he says, his plans are to become an IAS and serve the country. He also wishes to make some groundbreaking discovery in the field of science.Akrit Pran Jaswal performed his first surgery at the age of seven.According to his mother Raksha Kumari Jaswal, Akrit was an early starter, skipped the toddler stage and started walking. He started speaking in his 10th month and was reading Shakespeare at the age of five.He has an estimated IQ of 146.Akrit came to public attention when in 2000 he performed his first medical procedure at his family home, at the age of seven. A poor family, unable to pay for regular healthcare, heard about his amazing abilities, and asked if he would operate on their daughter. Her hand had been burnt in a fire, causing her fingers to close into a tight fist that wouldn't open. Akrit had no formal medical training and no experience of surgery,Akrit read everything he could on the topic and he was successful in performing the surgery. He managed to free her fingers and she was able to use her hand again.At 12 years old, he is the youngest person to be admitted to a medical university in India (Punjab University).He focused his phenomenal intelligence on medicine and he hopes some day to come up with a cure for cancer.Manohar Aich from East Indian state of West Bengal is one of the oldest and Greatest body-builders in the world.Born in a poor family, Aich braved monetary odds to pursue his passion. He joined the Royal Air Force in the British-ruled India in 1942.He was very patriotic and was also imprisoned for slapping a British officer who had passed oppressive remarks against Indians. He began his weight training seriously while in jail. He would spend hours in physical exercises.In 1949 He was released from jail.In 1950, at the age of 37, He won the Mr. Hercules contest.In 1951 he stood second in the Mr. Universe contest.In 1952 he won the Mr. Universe title.He also won three straight Asian Games gold medals for India.His last show was performed at 2003 at the age of 90.This 101-year young sports icon is yet to receive any recognition from either the state or the central government.Source :Inspiring Biography of Mrs. Jyothi Reddy‘If You Don’t Like My Face, Don’t look’Sixty-six-year-old granny runs 'marathon' in a saree in Maharashtra The destiny of Kashmiris lies with India: Dr Ruveda SalamCaptain Lakshmi Sahgal (1914 - 2012) - A life of struggleChhavi Rajawat, an MBA graduate, is India's youngest sarpanchRajesh P.N. RaoWEB DESIGN KOZHIKODE KERALAV. Mani, the unsung hero who has given a new life to the children of life-term prisoners - AchhiKhabrehttp://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/allahabad/Boy-wonder-aims-high-wants-to-crack-IIT-JEE/articleshow/14683980.cmsIndia’s Youngest Surgeon :- Akrit JaswalIndia's first Mr Universe Manohar Aich turns 100 : Health

Q. How effective were ARVN soldiers during the Vietnam War when led by competent officers and under American air support?A. I have two previous posts and a new post. One is about Lt Gen Ngo Quang Truong, considered the best field commander in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam. The second is a post about the Easter Offensive in 1972, when American troops were being withdrawn and Vietnamization was well underway. It was a resounding triumph for ARVN, and was led by competent officers (including Gen Truong) and round-the-clock American Air Support. Just three years later, US Congress no longer had the stomach for the war and refused all military aid, despite Richard Nixon’s reassurance of heavy punishment should the NVA violate the Paris Accords. The third regards the Battle of Xuan Loc, ARVN’s last stand.TN's answer to “Is it true that ARVN soldiers experienced more intense fighting during the Easter Offensive than American soldiers during their time in the war?”TN's answer to “Who was the best general of Vietnam War​?”Battle of Xuan Loc is one great story not because many military tacticians, historians, or journalists have praised the successful repulse of one ARVN battered Division against four fully equipped PAVN Divisions backed with Regiments of tanks and artillery. It was great because of the spirit of the men who made a stand and fought: when all senior and junior officers who participated in the battle knew they had been betrayed by their US ally, and when all the soldiers under their command had witnessed the debacle of their fellow comrades' units from the 1st and 2nd Regional Corps. On those darkest, grieving days of April 1975, the ARVN soldiers stood up and fought at Xuan Loc for just a few simple reasons: the pride of their units' colors, camaraderie, and duty.Q. Is it true that ARVN soldiers experienced more intense fighting during the Easter Offensive than American soldiers during their time in the war?I’ve read that the sheer scale and the intense of fighting during the Easter Offensive exceed nearly all of the fighting from the prior years. Is there truth to this claim?A. ARVN was victorious due to strong support by US Air power and naval gunfire (Operation Linebacker). ARVN troops and even local forces stood and fought as never before. The ARVN soldier emerges as a remarkable individual who perseveres in spite of great hardships. He has earned a victory. In 1972, in one of their finest hours, the South Vietnamese defended their country with courage and tenacity, rewarded with eventual hard-won success.The North Vietnamese Army suffered more than 100,000 casualties in its attacking force of 200,000--perhaps 40,000 killed--and lost more than half its tanks and heavy artillery.The South Vietnamese lost over 8,000 killed in action during the Easter Offensive, about three times that many wounded, and nearly 3,500 missing.Napalm GirlOn June 8, 1972, a South Vietnamese Air Force pilot mistook Phan Thi Kim Phuc, a group of civilians and South Vietnamese soldiers fleeing from Cao Dai Temple to South Vietnamese-held positions, for enemy soldiers and dropped a napalm bomb. Two of Kim Phúc's cousins and two other villagers were killed. Kim Phúc was badly burned and tore off her burning clothes.PARAMETERS, US Army War College QuarterlyCourage and Blood: South Vietnam's Repulse of the 1972 Easter Invasion(The three pronged NGUYEN HUE OFFENSIVE)© 1999 Lewis SorleyNot long after the watershed Tet Offensive of early 1968, dramatic changes occurred in nearly every aspect of the US approach to the war in Vietnam. General Creighton Abrams succeeded to the top military post there, joining Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and, before long, Ambassador (former CIA Station Chief) William Colby in forming a capable and like-minded leadership team.General Creighton AbramsTheir shared concept was that the conflict must be approached as "one war" in which combat operations, pacification, and improvement of South Vietnam's forces were given equal emphasis and importance. The large-scale ”search and destroy” sweeps of the past gave way to ”clear and hold” operations. Security for the people in the hamlets and villages replaced attrition of enemy forces as the primary objective, while the achieved level of security replaced "body count" as the measure of merit. This coherent approach brought about dramatic improvements in the military, economic, and political situations in South Vietnam, despite the progressive withdrawal of US forces that also characterized these later years."By 1972," observed William Colby, "the pacification program had essentially eliminated the guerrilla problem in most of the country."[1] John Paul Vann saw it the same way. "We are now at the lowest level of fighting the war has ever seen," he said in January 1972. "Today there is an air of prosperity throughout the rural areas of Vietnam, and it cannot be denied. Today the roads are open and the bridges are up, and you run much greater risk traveling any road in Vietnam today from the scurrying, bustling, hustling Hondas and Lambrettas than you do from the VC." Concluded Vann, "This program of Vietnamization has gone kind of literally beyond my wildest dreams of success."[2]Lt Colonel John Paul Vann - Vietnam’s Lawrence of ArabiaBy the beginning of 1972, most of the planned expansion and improvement of South Vietnam's armed forces had been completed, providing a formidable capability based on 11 infantry divisions fielding 120 infantry battalions. There were also 58 artillery battalions, 19 armored battalions of various types, and the appropriate engineer, signal, and other supporting arms and services. The Airborne Division and the Marine Division, along with 21 Rangers battalions, were the general reserve, while along the frontier 37 Ranger border defense battalions were positioned. The navy had grown to 1,680 craft of many types; the air force fielded over 1,000 aircraft. Most important of all, perhaps, were the Territorial Forces--the Regional Forces and Popular Forces constituting at some 550,000 the bulk of the forces overall, and providing the all-important close-in security by means of 1,679 RF companies and 8,356 PF platoons stationed throughout the provinces. Complementing the regular armed forces were the National Police, another 116,000 men, and the People's Self-Defense Forces, numbering more than four million.[3]Vietnamization: training the South Vietnam Civil GuardMeanwhile the enemy sought once again to regain the initiative and fashion some means of achieving a victory. "The result of successful Vietnamization and pacification," stated Sir Robert Thompson, "was that by early 1971 the North decided that the only thing left was to invade."[4] General Giap, observed Douglas Pike, had "spent the period from 1968 to 1971 devising still another variant of armed dau tranh" meaning the armed struggle movement, "one that would rectify earlier shortcomings." This modified approach, which Pike characterized as a sort of "high-technology armed dau tranh strategy," was unveiled in the enemy's 1972 Easter Offensive. Outmatching the defenders in tanks and long-range artillery, the North Vietnamese launched a massive invasion that was, concluded Pike's analysis, defeated because "air power prevented massing of forces and because of stubborn, even heroic, South Vietnamese defense." The attackers absorbed devastating losses, especially from airpower while preparing to attack, but most important was that "ARVN troops and even local forces stood and fought as never before."[5]As 1972 began, Abrams--reviewing all the indicators of impending combat that had been amassed--said of the enemy, "I feel very strongly that he's going to try to materialize all that we have seen here, in some way, in the course of 1972." President Nixon reacted by announcing that 70,000 more US troops--the largest single increment of the war--would be withdrawn from Vietnam by 1 May. Abrams was philosophical. "On the one hand," he told his field commanders, "we've got Giap's great campaign coming up. On the other hand, we've got the great redeployment thing coming up. There's a tendency in there for some conflict."[6]By March 1972, almost all American infantry, armor, and artillery units had left South Vietnam. One U.S. combat unit, the 196th Infantry Brigade, remained in-country, based at Da Nang, while another, a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, was stationed far to the south near Saigon. The northernmost remaining American base was the Phu Bai Installation, located 65 miles south of the DMZ and straddling Highway One, Vietnam’s major north-south highway. This base consisted of a few square miles of one-story Quonset buildings, supply warehouses, helicopter pads, perimeter guardhouses and observation towers. It was a support installation, not a combat base.Sammy Davis Jr. performs for 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) in an undisclosed location in Vietnam during February of 1972In North Vietnam, General Võ Nguyên Giáp had just delivered a speech saying, "We must fight with determination to win in order to ensure victory, which is near." Adding that "a costly battle is ahead" and that it would involve "much sacrifice and heartache," Giap closed with his own version of "light at the end of the tunnel": "Victory is in sight."[7]General Võ Nguyên Giáp approved the plan to fight US’ B52 aircrafts in Hanoi in 1972.Of the South Vietnamese, said Abrams, "Here again, as there's always been, there are deficiencies, inadequacies, inadequate performances, and so on, but the state of readiness, the alertness and activity on the part of the armed forces here in this country is the highest that I've ever seen it, even though there's some that are still asleep at the switch. You're never going to eliminate it."As for the Americans still in country, Abrams had 20 Inspector General teams out combing the country to check on the state of readiness, supplementing what the chain of command was doing. Given later assertions about the questionable condition of the troops at this late stage of the war, what they found is instructive. "I just have to say I'm quite gratified--yeah, he found some things, and of course you've all found a lot more," Abrams told his field commanders, "but really the responsiveness of the chain of command I think is really quite excellent. The total is good. The word got out, right down to the bottom of the thing. People knew what the hell they were doing, and they were responding. I just think that that part of it is really quite healthy."ARVN Marines with US AdviserIn February, CBS news correspondent Phil Jones filmed a report based on his visit to the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division, one of the few US combat units still in Vietnam. Later MACV got a tape of the program and screened it during one of the Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates held on Saturday mornings in Saigon. On the sound track can be heard the plop-plop-plop of rotor blades as Jones is helicoptered to the field along with Brigadier General James Hamlet, the brigade commander. "You always hear about the protesters and the potheads who are back in the rear areas," Hamlet is heard saying, "but you ask these men how they feel about their mission. They have volunteered for the most dangerous job left in Vietnam, going into the bush every day looking for the enemy."[8]When Jones got out with the troops he found them pretty outspoken. "In the past ten years we've lost a lot of American lives here in Vietnam," said one, "and to just toss them out the window and say `to hell with it,' that's pretty low. And these are just a different caliber of people than what's out in the world. What you see on the streets in D.C. is pretty disgraceful. But here, I think, is what America should see. These are the men, not those freaks or fakes or whatever you want to call them. These are men." A trooper from the division's Ranger Company spoke proudly of his unit, emphasizing that "the war's not over. Since we're here I think we have to be professional. And this company is the most professional company in Vietnam." The broadcast closed with Hamlet's tribute to his men: "From my point of view, the Vietnam story is the story of the American soldier who fights so well and often gets so little credit for it."[9]Soon Abrams cabled urgent representations to Washington of his need for additional operational authority to counter the coming enemy offensive, including authority for fighter aircraft to strike enemy MiGs on the ground at Dong Hoi, Vinh, and Quan Lang and to strike active ground control intercept radars in North Vietnam below 20 degrees north. Abrams also asked authority to have fighters strike any occupied surface-to-air missile site within range of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), to emplace sensors in the DMZ, and for emergency use of aircraft in support of limited cross-border operations by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces(RVNAF).Republic of Vietnam Air Force pilot"The stakes in this battle will be great," Abrams told the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "If it is skillfully fought by the Republic of Vietnam, supported by all available US air, the outcome will be a major defeat for the enemy, leaving him in a weakened condition and gaining decisive time for the consolidation of the Vietnamization effort. We are running out of time in which to apply the full weight of air power against the build-up. The additional authorities requested are urgently needed."[10] Stressing that he expected the major action to occur in the area just north and south of the DMZ, Abrams closed with an observation: "In the final analysis, when this is all over, specific targets hit in the southern part of North Vietnam will not be a major issue. The issue will be whether Vietnamization has been a success or a failure.""As messages go," said Abrams, "this is probably the most unequivocal message we've ever sent--on the situation. But I think the evidence is very clear." Ambassador Bunker agreed: "I think it's time to be unequivocal, because there's so much at stake." On 20 January the message was dispatched to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Six days later Abrams got an answer. Some authorities were granted for immediate execution and some for standby execution later. But the most crucial, those having to do with strikes against MiG airfields, active radars, missile sites, and logistics facilities, were all still "pending approval." To call the JCS response tepid would grossly understate the case.But--a very significant development--augmentation of US air and naval forces in theater had begun. Eighteen F-4s arrived from Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Provisions were made for a minimum of two carriers to be maintained offshore within easy striking distance, with a third on 48-hour alert status and a fourth en route from the United States. The monthly B-52 sortie rate was increased from 1,000 to 1,200, with additional aircraft positioned on Guam sufficient for a surge effort to 1,500. That proved to be only a beginning; by June the rate skyrocketed to 3,150, the peak for the entire war.[11]Pacific Fleet placed a cruiser, two guided missile destroyers, and another destroyer on 72-hour alert, ready to reinforce the naval gun line off the coast of South Vietnam. Additional P-3 aircraft were standing by to augment coastal patrols if needed, and supplemental C-130 and C-141 cargo aircraft were also on standby. The entire American military establishment in theater was geared up and involved, watching to see how Abrams would conduct his last great battle. "The VC side of it is over," said the visiting Sir Robert Thompson. "The people have rejected the VC." Now it was going to be just plain old hard-nosed conventional warfare in a fight to the death.On 5 February, based on intelligence of the enemy's continued buildup and the positioning of his major troop units as reviewed with Admiral McCain, General Abrams made a determination that the enemy offensive had in fact begun, a judgment which triggered some of his standby authorities to retaliate. Thus, with all in readiness for the coming offensive, MACV brought to bear on the enemy buildup everything it had--within the still restrictive rules of engagement. Tactical air sorties, gunships, and B-52 strikes were brought in practically nonstop. As Abrams met with his senior field commanders, a 48-hour maximum effort was begun, concentrating all available airpower against the B-3 Front in the Highlands. Then, after a mandatory 24-hour Tet cease-fire, the same effort was applied in Military Region 1 in the north.US Air Support"We've got a 24-hour flow of aircraft now," confirmed Seventh Air Force Commander General John D. Lavelle, "and we can keep the flow now. It's set up, it's scheduled, so there's something every few minutes. And we just keep it coming and change the target area, so whenever General Abrams makes a decision as to where to put the weight of effort, or where to go next, we've already got the flow of aircraft."When, despite allied expectations, the enemy still had not attacked, that became an issue. After a visit from Peter Osnos of The Washington Post, Abrams said, "The wicket he appears to be on is that, for some insidious political reason, we have created the myth of this impending campaign." There was not much meeting of the minds. "I'm sure he . . . feels that I feel that he's a scurrilous shit," Abrams told Sir Robert Thompson.A US navy destroyer shooting 5 inch shells into North Vietnam just north of the DMZ, approximately one week before the start of the Easter OffensiveAllied forces took one significant casualty even before the main battle began. General Lavelle was found to have ordered a number of "protective reaction" strikes against targets in North Vietnam, thereby violating the rules of engagement then in effect. The offense was compounded by the fact that false reports, representing these strikes as genuine protective reactions, were subsequently filed. Summoned home by the Air Force Chief of Staff, Lavelle was relieved of his command and retired in two-star rank. Said Abrams, in agreeing that Lavelle had "acted improperly," rules were a way of life in Vietnam. In a purely military sense, he acknowledged, some of those rules looked silly, but "if you are going to hold it together, they must be followed."[12] Lavelle's successor, General John Vogt, Jr, arrived just in time for Easter.At noon on 30 March 1972, the long-expected enemy offensive began in Military Region 1 with widespread attacks by fire. By midnight about 4,000 rounds of mortar, 122mm rocket, and 122mm, 130mm, and 152mm artillery fire had blanketed friendly fire bases across the front. The next day a heavy ground attack struck Quang Tri combat base, and Cam Lo was heavily attacked. Friendly troops were withdrawn from a crescent of fire support bases as enemy tanks were engaged by South Vietnamese armor south of the Cam Lo River. In an early report to Admiral Moorer, Abrams advised that "the enemy's offensive in Quang Tri Province involves a total of ten infantry and five artillery regiments" from the 304th and 308th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions.[13]North Vietnam's 1972 Easter OffensiveQuickly a second prong of the enemy offensive thrust at the Central Highlands, and a day later yet a third targeted Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province, about 100 kilometers north of Saigon. The defending forces there were quickly overwhelmed, withdrawing under heavy pressure southward toward An Loc.[14] Soon the 325th NVA Division, North Vietnam's last remaining division in the north, was fixed in the Vinh area, 240 kilometers south of its usual location near Hanoi. Six enemy divisions had attacked on three fronts. "It's a full court press," Abrams almost exulted.Kon Tum Front. North Vietnamese artillery pounds ARVN positions. The 130 mm towed field gun had a range of 30 kilometers and played a major role during the offensive.After a week, President Nixon decided to retaliate for this enemy aggression by launching a strong air offensive in the north. Two weeks into the offensive John Vann wrote an assessment that he mailed to a number of friends. "There is very little assistance being provided [to the enemy] in I, II, and III Corps by the local forces, and the enemy's infrastructure plays hardly any role at all," he reported. "The explanation for the latter is fairly simple. The existing infrastructure in South Vietnam hardly deserves its name or notoriety. The overwhelming number of the individuals now called members of the infrastructure no longer reside in populated areas, but instead exist in the base areas, carry weapons, and are largely indistinguishable from other military personnel."President Richard Nixon launched Operation LinebackerWhat was under way, then, was a straightforward conventional invasion on multiple axes. Even at this early stage, and there was much, much hard fighting ahead, Vann forecast the outcome. "It is quite predictable," he wrote, "that their regular forces will . . . be defeated and will suffer such heavy casualties and losses of equipment as to be ineffective for the next one to two years."[15]In Military Region 1 the first five days of heavy assaults on the northern crescent of fire bases resulted in enemy advances as far south as the Dong Hai River, but there resistance by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) stiffened and the enemy paused to regroup and resupply. A later history of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, aka the North Vietnamese Army) acknowledged the effective fight put up by ARVN defenders. "Relying on defensive fortifications already in place and on their reinforced troop strength," it recalled,the enemy organized a defensive system consisting of three centers--Dong Ha, Ai Tu, and La Vang-Quang Tri. Hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers formed a barrier of steel surrounding these bases. Artillery fire bases and tank guns fired scores of thousands of rounds into our positions. All types of tactical aircraft and B-52 strategic bombers dropped hundreds of tons of bombs. Because the enemy had increased his troop strength and his fire support, and because he had changed his defensive plan, the wave of assaults made by our troops on 9 April was not successful.[16]The paratroopers of the ARVN´s 11th airborne battalion fought back courageously.Sir Robert Thompson noted that the enemy had moved only 18 miles in three weeks, "not exactly an electric advance."[17] When the assault resumed, however, Quang Tri City was captured on 1 May and evacuation of Fire Support Base Nancy was forced two days later. The proximate cause of these reverses was withdrawal of the 20th Armored Squadron, ordered by 1st Armored Brigade commander Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat without notifying either higher headquarters or adjacent units. This move spooked other friendly forces into displacing prematurely and opened a convenient hole through which the attacking NVA drove deep into friendly lines.[18]North Vietnamese T-54 tanks roll into actionAt the end of the third week, Abrams brought his field commanders in to review the situation and gain a little perspective. "There's been some poor performances," he acknowledged, then continued:But there always have been poor performances--in war or anything else. And I think that there always will be. You've got a few guys do great, a few guys who are sort of satisfactory most of the time, and then you've got a few guys that are just miserable. But in this thing now, until this is over, there's no point--you've just got to accept the fact that there're going to be some poor performances. The trouble is that you're doing it with human beings. If you didn't have them, you wouldn't run into that. Some poor performances are not going to lose it. It's the good performances that are going to win it."I doubt the fabric of this thing could have been held together without US air," Abrams told his commanders,but the thing that had to happen before that is the Vietnamese, some numbers of them, had to stand and fight. If they didn't do that, ten times the air we've got wouldn't have stopped them. So--with all the screwups that have occurred, and with all the bad performances that have occurred . . . we wouldn't be where we are this morning if some numbers of the Vietnamese hadn't decided to stand and fight.North Vietnamese infantry supported by a T-54 tank advance deep intoSouth Vietnam.On 24 April, Abrams cabled Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird his personal assessment of the situation. "The North Vietnamese have launched from their sanctuary in [North Vietnam] an all-out effort against the Republic of Vietnam," he began. "They are holding nothing back. Their last reserve division has been moved south near the DMZ and can enter the battle within two to four days after receiving orders." Four divisions and an independent regiment had already been brought down from North Vietnam, joining the seven divisions, 22 independent regiments, and seven artillery regiments already in South Vietnam. "It has been a conventional warfare battle employing the most sophisticated weapons."F-111-A fighter jet at Takhil Airbase in Thailand involved in Operation Linebacker"Overall," Abrams reported, "the South Vietnamese have fought well under extremely difficult circumstances. There has been a mixture of effective and ineffective performance, as in any combat situation, but on the whole the effective far outweighs the ineffective. Thus far the South Vietnamese have prevented the enemy from achieving his major objectives." One significant improvement from the battles of Lam Son 719 the previous year was the integration of air, armor, artillery, and infantry into a coherent whole. "This has been outstanding," said Abrams. "They have made great progress in this area during the past year in particular."Perhaps most gratifying of all, given the earlier problems, was that "leadership at the presidential level has been outstanding. President Thieu has provided sound guidance to the Joint General Staff, has made prompt decisions, and has made his personal presence felt by timely visits to combat areas."[19]USS OriskanyWhile fierce ground fights were raging along the DMZ, in the Central Highlands, and on the approaches to Saigon, an air and naval campaign of unprecedented ferocity was taking the war to the North Vietnamese. President Nixon ordered available fleet and air elements nearly doubled by rapid reentry to the combat zone of multiple squadrons of combat and supporting aircraft, including a hundred more B-52s--so many that on Guam one whole runway had to be closed for use as a parking lot--and over 50 naval combatants.[20] Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tactical air came streaming into the theater from the continental United States, Hawaii, Korea, Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines. From 35 tactical air squadrons--US Air Force, US Navy, and Vietnamese Air Force--the total increased to 74, including five US Marine Corps, generating more than 55,000 sorties through early June. B-52s contributed another 4,759 devastating sorties, and fixed-wing gunships many more, with the daily average of tactical air sorties rising from about 380 to over 650 and B-52 sorties going from 33 a day to 150. Six aircraft carriers were assigned, putting four on station at all times. Along the naval gunline during the peak period, three cruisers and 38 destroyers provided naval gunfire support.[21] In a campaign designated "Operation Linebacker," these forces began intensive bombing of targets in North Vietnam, including military facilities in and near the key cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as round-the-clock support for South Vietnam's defending forces.A flying fortress B-52 D of the USAF´s 306th Bomb Wing carpet bombing in the Central Highlands of Military Region II during the Easter Offensive.Soon air strikes brought to a halt all rail traffic south of Hanoi. On 8 May the MACV briefer stated that "pilots reported 16 bombs out of 20 on the power plant. If there're any lights burning in Hanoi tonight, they'll be candle power." Advances in bombing technology since earlier in the war were now providing greater accuracy and a humanitarian dividend as well. Newly introduced laser-guided bombs made it possible to take out in a single attack point targets such as key bridges that had withstood hundreds of attempts to destroy them with conventional munitions.[22] "And with the smart bombs," reported Seventh Air Force, "we don't have any problem with the civilian population." Beginning 9 May, all the major North Vietnamese ports were mined. It took only a minute, literally, for nine Navy aircraft off the USS Coral Sea, roaring in at 400 knots only 400 feet off the deck, to put 36 Mark 52 mines--huge magnetic things weighing 1,100 pounds and packing 625 pounds of high explosive--in at Haiphong, the first target hit and North Vietnam's most important seaport. Over successive days the lesser ports were sowed, with all mines set to activate at 0900 hours on 12 May. "It took us eight years to get permission" to mine Haiphong harbor, said Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Afterward not one ship entered or left the harbor until we took up the mines."[23] This aerial bombardment campaign, wrote Allan Millett, "ruined North Vietnam's economy, paralyzed its transportation system, reduced imports by 80 percent, and exhausted its air defenses."[24] Commented Lieutenant General Dave Palmer, "Linebacker was not Rolling Thunder--it was war."[25]South Vietnamese soldiers watch as a B-52 air strike hits a North Vietnamese tank column west of Dong Ha city, just south of the DMZ.Again the enemy agreed. "This war was different than the first war of destruction," observed a history of PAVN, contrasting Linebacker with the Rolling Thunder campaign of an earlier period in the war. "This time the enemy massed larger forces and made massive attacks right from the first day of operation, using many types of modernized technical weapons and equipment."[26]Anderson Air Force Base, GuamIn early May the South Vietnamese suffered a series of battlefield reverses so serious that Abrams cabled Laird that "the situation has changed significantly since my assessment of 24 April." In Military Region 1, Dong Ha had fallen, Quang Tri combat base had been evacuated, and Quang Tri City was threatened and would soon fall, overwhelmed by 40,000 attackers and outnumbered three to one. Farther south, Fire Support Bases Bastogne and Checkmate, important positions blocking Route 547 to Hue, had also fallen. In Military Region 2, the 22nd Division in the Tan Canh/Dak To area had performed poorly and suffered a costly defeat. In Binh Dinh province the situation was also very serious, with the only remaining friendly position in the northern half of the province not expected to hold.[27] In Military Region 3, ARVN troops were hanging on at An Loc in what Douglas Pike called "probably the single most important battle in the war," a terrific struggle in which a heroic and successful defense ended General Giap's hopes for decisive victory in the campaign.[28] Ultimately the enemy would commit to these three attacks his entire combat force--14 divisions, 26 separate regiments, and a huge array of supporting armor and artillery--save for one division remaining in Laos.[29]Almost 13 years into the conflict, Thames Televisions Peter Taylor reports ARVN's attempt to relieve the besieged town of An Loc."Enemy staying power is his most effective battlefield characteristic," said Abrams. "It is based first on his complete disregard for the expenditure of resources, both men and materiel, and second on discipline through fear, intimidation, and brutality. An enemy decision to attack carries an inherent acceptance that the forces involved may be expended totally."[30]Battle of An LocThen Abrams set forth the crux of the changed situation. "The RVNAF capability to turn back the enemy offensive is now a function of two intangibles. The first is RVNAF resolve and will to fight. Although the will to fight among senior leaders in MR-1 continues to be strong, there are serious problems in this regard at the lower levels, and command and control is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain." The problems in Quang Tri were serious, said Abrams, "and may be beyond correction." The poor performance of the 22nd Division in Military Region 2 put the defense of Kontum City in doubt, but at An Loc and Fire Support Base Bastogne surrounded ARVN forces fought well. "Unless the ARVN forces hold on the ground and generate lucrative targets, US and [Vietnamese] air power cannot achieve [its] full effectiveness." The second factor mentioned by Abrams, not yet ascertained, was the amount of damage done to the enemy.[31]An A-1E Skyraider of the RVNAF´s 41st tactical wing dropped a napalm bomb on the target.Abrams closed with an unvarnished statement of the realities. "In summary of all that has happened here since 30 March 1972, I must report that as the pressure has mounted and the battle has become brutal the senior military leadership has begun to bend and in some cases to break. In adversity it is losing its will and cannot be depended on to take the measures necessary to stand and fight." Abrams cited two known exceptions--General Truong, commanding IV Corps, and the 1st Division's General Phu. "In light of this, there is no basis for confidence that Hue or Kontum will be held."[32] Secretary Laird's reply to this evaluation showed that he understood the situation: "It is boiling down, as we have thought, to RVN’s will and desire."[33]RVNAF (Air Force)The next morning Bunker and Abrams met alone with President Thieu. Abrams showed Thieu the assessment he had sent to Washington the previous evening. Thieu read it carefully, then--said Abrams--described in "big arrow" fashion how the battle should be fought. When he finished, Abrams stated his conviction that the real problem was the effectiveness of South Vietnam's field commanders, following that with a by-name description of individuals who were not measuring up. "I told President Thieu," reported Abrams to Laird, "that it was my conviction that all that had been accomplished over the last four years was now at stake, and, at this stage, it was the effectiveness of his field commanders that would determine the outcome--either winning all or losing all."ARVN RangersThieu interrupted the meeting at that point to issue instructions for all corps commanders to report to the Palace later that day. Then Thieu offered the view that if Hue and Kontum could hold for four days they would have won the battle. Again Abrams expressed a contrary outlook. "I told the President that no one should think in any less terms than six weeks more of heavy, bloody fighting and maybe more. This is a battle to the death, the communists have planned it that way and will not quit until they have been totally exhausted."[34]That same day Abrams found it necessary to transmit a grim order to his field commanders: "Effective immediately, no Vietnamese commander will be air lifted out of a unit defensive position by US fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter unless such evacuation is directed personally by the RVNMF corps commander. Inform your counterpart."[35]Soon thereafter Abrams sketched the nature of the fight and its effects on the enemy for visiting Assistant Secretary of Defense Barry Shillito. "Every one of these regiments that are in the fight [has] already been engaged," he said. "It's just an all-out onslaught, and the losses on both sides--I mean, he's losing tanks like he didn't care about having any more, and people, and artillery, and equipment. The level of violence, and the level of brutality, in this whole thing right now is on a scale not before achieved in the war in Vietnam. And that's what you're in."NVA soldier fires a bazooka as communist forces continue to advance southWith disaster impending in Military Region 1, President Thieu made a dramatic command change, moving Lieutenant General Ngô Quang Trưởng from Military Region 4 to take charge in the north. Said General Vien of the relieved Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, "Confronted with conventional warfare . . . he was at a loss." Later Vien was understanding, if not sympathetic, remarking that "the influence of politics on officers of General Lam's generation and their very background perhaps did not contribute to the cultivation of military leadership required by the circumstances."[36]The effects of the change in command were electric. "General Truong is a symbol in that part of the country of all that's good in Vietnamese terms," said Abrams. "He went up there day before yesterday to take command. And when he went to Hue the first thing he did was to get on the radio and television. He told them that they were going to defend Hue. It would not fall. And at the end of it, he called on every soldier to report back to his unit--now. And those who failed to do it would be shot."Lt. Gen. Ngô Quang TrưởngIt was not only Truong's personal leadership and charisma that turned things around, but also his professional approach to doing business. "Prior to his arrival we [the South Vietnamese] ran I Corps on the dial exchange telephone by personal calls from the corps commander to division commanders, and then never a staff follow-up to tell everybody else what was said to a particular division," observed General Fred Kroesen, the senior American advisor in Region 1. Things were different under Truong. "He's got the staff functioning for the first time ever in I Corps. General Truong has got that staff working, and there's a sense of urgency in the staff that's never been there before."In a later account the enemy also paid implicit tribute to Truong's professional competence. After Truong took command in Military Region 1, read a history of PAVN, "the enemy concentrated on consolidating his defensive line along the My Chanh River and utilized this line as a base to strike out to the east and west in order to sabotage our preparations to attack Hue." Due to intensive B-52 and naval gunfire, "our troops encountered many difficulties in maintaining their supplies." Then, "because we were slow to change our campaign tactics at a time when the enemy had strengthened his forces and solidified his defenses, our assault against the My Chanh defensive line . . . was unsuccessful, and our losses in that attack were twice those suffered during the two previous attacks." Fighting on that front had become "very complicated."[37]Sometime during May, remembered an officer on the MACV staff, General Abrams arrived for a briefing and began with an observation:Every morning, when I walk over to my office from the quarters, I feel just like a company commander on the battlefield, tired and apprehensive. I haven't had enough sleep because the phone from Washington keeps ringing, and I know that there will be another battle waiting, another hill to be taken. And, sure as hell, there won't be enough ammo, the weather will be bad, and replacements not up yet. But all I will hear is, "Abrams, get moving and take that hill."There Abrams paused for a moment, smiling broadly as he looked around at everyone: "But, you know, I like it!"[38]Ferrying ARVN Rangers, American helicopters from the Light Infantry Brigade swooped into a landing zone.Colonel William F. Wollenberg was then in charge of drafting daily messages expressing the "Personal Assessment of the COMUSMACV." After one such message was dispatched, there came a query back: "Can the South Vietnamese hold?" Major General John Carley, the J-3, took it upon himself to draft a six-page reply. Abrams rejected it. Then Wollenberg was given the task. He wrote simply: "It looks to us like the job will get done." Abrams looked at that, made one change, and the message was dispatched: "It looks to me like the job will get done."ARVN RangersSubsequently, as the critical point approached on multiple fronts, Abrams determined to mass his most potent weapon, the B-52, for concentrated strikes in sequence on each battlefield in turn. On 10 May he cabled Fred Kroesen in Region 1, John Vann in Region 2, and Jim Hollingsworth in Region 3."I want to use the three days, 11, 12, and 13 May," he told these commanders, “which we may have before the enemy attack, to inflict as much damage as possible on the major enemy troop units and their supporting artillery. Therefore, I have decided to allocate the entire B-52 effort to MR-3 on 11 May, to MR-2 on 12 May, and to MR-1 on 13 May. This means that for two days between 11 and 13 May each of you will have no B-52 support and you must plan your tacair, naval gunfire, and artillery support accordingly. On the day that you have the entire B-52 effort, the targeting will be against enemy troop units posing the greatest threat to An Lộc, Kon Tum, and the Hue area and their supporting artillery and not against the deep logistics areas. You should apply multiple strikes to major enemy troop locations with consecutive TOTs [the time on target for each scheduled strike] on each rather than spreading the TOTs over a long period.”[39]That concentration of force meant they'd be getting three B-52 sorties every 55 minutes, around the clock, for 24 hours.KC-135A refueling Wild Weasel teamThe results of this tactic were spectacular. Hollingsworth in particular thought the airstrikes had been his salvation. When he got the word that Abrams was giving him the total sortie allocation, he said, "If it'd done any good to show my appreciation, I'd have just jumped out of the damn helicopter. By god it just saved us, that's all. And I'll say that your intelligence department must be awful damn good--that you knew that that was the time to go. We just couldn't hit her any better on this one."The enemy saw it the same way. In a subsequent historical analysis the North Vietnamese acknowledged that during April and May, "The enemy mobilized a large number of B-52 sorties to viciously attack our campaign rear areas." Thus "three waves of assaults against Binh Long City," apparently the enemy's designation for An Loc, "were all unsuccessful. Our units suffered heavy casualties and over half of the tanks we used in the battle were destroyed. On 15 May, after 32 days of ferocious combat, our troops ended the attack on Binh Long City."[40]ARVN AirborneIn the middle of these fearsome strikes, Abrams held a commanders' brief at which he spoke frankly of what he had been telling the South Vietnamese."For the last several years I've tried to maintain rapport with the Vietnamese that I work with. And I've tried not to do things that they would find insulting--always been kind of careful about that," he began, but I wanted to tell you, in the last few weeks, in my conversations with General Vien, and with the President, I've said it straight, and called it for what it was worth. Just the other day General Vien was telling me about some equipment they wanted, and I told him that we were doing everything we could to get this equipment to them and so on. But I then went on to tell him, I said, "Equipment is not what you need. You need men that will fight. And you need officers that will fight, and will lead the men." I said, "No amount of equipment will change the situation. It's in the hands of men, and if they'll fight, and their officers will lead them, you've got--even today--you've got all the equipment you need." I said, "That's the trouble." I said, "I don't think you've lost a tank to enemy fire. You lost all the tanks in the 20th because the men abandoned them, led by the officers. You lost most of your artillery because it was abandoned and people wouldn't fight." Now I don't want you to go back and tell your counterpart that I told the President off. That's not why I'm telling you this. I want you to know the way I'm conducting my business with the counterparts I have to deal with, and I think it has to be straight with them. I'm never insulting and so on, but it's a fact. And that's what we must talk about are the facts.ARVN troops in Quang TriBy mid-May the friendly situation was looking much more favorable in the Highlands, in fact all around. "Since the fall of Quảng Trị," said Abrams, the enemy "really hasn't been able to put anything together. Now you may say, `Well, that's right. He didn't plan to. He's just gathering stuff together and he will eventually.' And maybe that'll happen. But we do know that the divisions in here--the 308th, the 304th and the 324 Bravo--have taken really horrible losses." As for retaking Quang Tri, suggested Abrams, "I think all we've got to do is keep [the Joint General Staff] out of it and let Truong develop a plan. And then it will be a good one."Lt General Ngo Quang TruongThe tide of battle was now sweeping back in favor of the South Vietnamese, with the outcome in fact decided, and only some more hard fighting needed to nail it down. When Abrams and journalist George McArthur discussed the situation, McArthur asked an interesting question: "You always hesitated to criticize Giap," he observed. "What about now?" Abrams recalled Cornelius Ryan's book about the last 100 days of World War II in Europe. "Those Germans knew the war was over," said Abrams; "they knew that all the decisions had been made; they knew they had lost. They knew they had no hope and they went ahead and just died. In a way I think we might be at that point now. Giap is a very resourceful fellow. But I think"--and here, said McArthur, Abrams was very emotional--"what is going on now is just a lot of unnecessary killing."[41]North Vietnamese infantry advance over rubble in Quang Tri City, scene of some of fiercest fighting. The town was captured early by NVA and then recaptured by ARVN forces after bloody, months-long struggle.In Military Region 1 the enemy was stopped at the My Chanh River, the southern boundary of Quang Tri Province. Late in June the Airborne Division was airlifted south of the river and, attacking with other ARVN and marine troops, drove the NVA back 20 kilometers to Quang Tri City.[42] "Beginning in late June 1972," observed the North Vietnamese in their later historical analysis, "combat on the Tri Thien Front became very complicated, with fierce back-and-forth fighting between our troops and the enemy."[43] Fielding three divisions against six of the enemy, Truong led a fight that lasted the rest of the summer. With marines leading the way, he retook Quang Tri City. In late September the reconstituted 3d ARVN Division began an operation to drive the enemy out of Tien Phuoc and, after a week of bitter fighting, retook the town.At Kontum City, the equivalent of three enemy divisions kept the city under siege for nearly two months. The airfield had to be closed due to enemy fire, and resupply was accomplished by air drop. But the defenders--now the 23rd ARVN Division, a unit far superior to the routed 22nd Division--held on, inflicting casualties on the enemy estimated to exceed 16,000.[44] The performance of the South Vietnamese Air Force (RVNAF) had counted for a lot. "VNAF came into its own during the 1972 offensive," said a USAF advisor. "In the defense of Kontum, the RVNAF has been magnificent, absolutely magnificent."[45] B-52s weighed in at Kontum in a decisive way as well. Late on 14 May the enemy broke through the seam between two defending regiments and began a series of mass assaults. Fortunately two B-52 strikes had been planned for that night. "The two B-52 strikes came exactly on time, as planned," recalled General Truong, "like thunderbolts unleashed over the masses of enemy troops. The explosions rocked the small city and seemed to cave in the rib cages of ARVN troops not far away. As the roar subsided, a dreadful silence fell over the scene. At dawn, ARVN search elements discovered several hundred enemy bodies with their weapons scattered all around. Kontum was saved."[46] John Vann credited the Territorial Forces, not the army, with much of what went right in Region 2. "The RF and PF, in most places, have performed quite well and were a much more stabilizing force than the ARVN," he reported.ARVN MarinesMeanwhile at An Loc the defenders had withstood three months of constant North Vietnamese bombardment in what General Hollingsworth called "this desperate, fanatic adventure on the part of Hanoi."[47] Attacks by fire reached a peak on 10 May when over 7,600 rounds were received, part of more than 47,000 rounds during that month, bombardments punctuated by repeated tank and infantry attacks. General Truong called it "the longest and bloodiest siege of the war."[48] With the B-52 onslaught of 11 May, the back of the enemy siege was broken. Despite one attack after another by three divisions, An Loc could not be taken, and the enemy was left with more than 12,000 casualties to show for his efforts.The South Vietnamese lost over 8,000 killed in action during the Easter Offensive, about three times that many wounded, and nearly 3,500 missing. During the campaign over 53,000 men volunteered for military service and nearly 18,000 additional were conscripted, while more than 40,000 of those already serving deserted. Said Lieutenant General William McCaffrey, "The ARVN soldier emerges as a remarkable individual who perseveres in spite of great hardships. He has earned a victory."[49]The North Vietnamese Army suffered more than 100,000 casualties in its attacking force of 200,000--perhaps 40,000 killed--and lost more than half its tanks and heavy artillery. It took three years to recover sufficiently from these losses to mount another major offensive, and in the meantime General Vo Nguyen Giap found himself eased out as NVA commander.[50]NVA T59 Tank captured by South Vietnamese 20th Tank Regiment 1st Infantry Division south of Dong Ha, Quang Tri ProvinceOne important result of the Easter Offensive was the relief from command of certain ARVN incompetents. Two corps commanders--Lieutenant General Lam and Lieutenant General Ngo Dzu--lost their jobs. Brigadier General Vu Van Giai, who had commanded the newly formed and ill-fated 3rd Infantry Division until its collapse a month into the battle, was not only relieved but court-martialed and imprisoned. Giai was, it appeared, a victim of General Lam's shortcomings, a radically overextended span of control (at one point two of his own infantry regiments, two marine brigades, four ranger groups, an armor brigade, and all the province's territorial forces were under his command), and the inevitable liabilities of a new division. Wrote Major General Hoang Lac sympathetically, "General Giai, a soldier with most of his life sleeping out in the jungle, was sentenced to five years in military confinement and imprisonment. Giai remained there until the NVA took over Saigon and put him in their camp, a fate undeserved for a good and brave soldier."[51] The Marine Division commander was also relieved, and the commander of the 22nd Division had simply disappeared. At the regimental level, the 56th Regiment was surrendered intact by its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Dinh, who soon thereafter came on the airwaves urging other ARVN soldiers to come over to the enemy side.[52]After the war, General Truong wrote a thoughtful analysis of the Easter Offensive and its aftereffects. "The American response during the enemy offensive was timely, forceful, and decisive," he affirmed. "This staunch resolve of the US to stand behind its ally stunned the enemy. Additionally, it brought about a strong feeling of self-assurance among the armed forces and population of South Vietnam."[53]"When the enemy offensive began," added Truong, "Vietnam's fate was in its own hands. President Thieu, the Joint General Staff, and the corps commanders had to decide where, when, and how to fight." Much of that was of course dictated by the dimensions of the enemy offensive, but--as Truong also observed--on the part of the South Vietnamese "there was no change in strategy; the concept of securing all national territory continued to be the order of the day. Every area, every strongpoint, no matter how small or remote, had to be held `at all cost.'"President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu celebrating with his generalsTruong recalled President Thieu's strong insistence that "we would not yield even a pebble in Quang Tri or a handful of mud in Ca Mau to the enemy." On other occasions, many other occasions, Thieu had repeated and emphasized what he called his "four no's": "no coalition, no neutralization, no territorial concessions, and never let communist forces operate openly in South Vietnam." Yet now, despite successful defense against the three major thrusts of the Easter Offensive, some lost territory could not be recovered. "South Vietnam had in effect lost a continuous, wide expanse of territory extending along the border from the DMZ to the northern Delta," wrote General Bruce Palmer, "an area which North Vietnam referred to as the `Third Vietnam.'"[54]It took the North Vietnamese three years to recover sufficiently to mount their next offensive, a conventional invasion involving some 20 divisions. With US support for South Vietnam having evaporated, the outcome was foreordained. But in 1972, in one of their finest hours, the South Vietnamese defended their country with courage and tenacity, rewarded with eventual hard-won success.NOTES1. William E. Colby, Keynote Address, Vietnam Symposium, Texas Tech University, 18 April 1996.2. John Paul Vann, remarks, Lexington, Ky., 8 January 1972, Vann Papers, Patterson School, University of Kentucky. In 1969 Joseph Kraft had written that Vann was "the all-pro pessimist among American officials here and the true source of much journalistic skepticism and not a few Pulitzer Prizes." Chicago Daily News, 25 August 1969.3. James Lawton Collins, Jr., The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army (Washington: Department of the Army, 1975), pp. 90-91.4. Sir Robert Thompson in The Lessons of Vietnam, ed. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 103.5. Douglas Pike, PAVN: The People's Army of Vietnam (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986), pp. 224-25.6. Nixon made the announcement on 13 January 1972. This increment had to be out by 1 May, leaving the United States with 69,000 troops in Vietnam. At that time, Abrams noted, "We will have redeployed 95 percent of the maneuver battalions, 97 percent of the artillery battalions, and 91 percent of the attack aircraft squadrons." Recording, COMUS-ROK Minister of National Defense Brief, 10 February 1972, Abrams Special Collection (ASC), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.7. Printed in the 19 December 1971 issue of Nhan Dan, as quoted in Recording, Commanders WIEU (Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update), 22 January 1972, ASC.8. Recording, WIEU, 4 March 1972, ASC.9. Ibid.10. Recording, Special Authorities Brief, 20 January 1972, ASC.11. James Pinckney Harrison, The Endless War: Fifty Years of Struggle in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1982), p. 255.12. Abrams' comments were made in his confirmation hearing as Army Chief of Staff-designate.13. Message, Abrams to Moorer, MAC 03019, 042335Z APR 1972, ASC.14. By MACV's calculations the enemy had initiated the offensive on the night of 30 March in MR-1, on 31 March on the B-3 Front, and on 1 April in western MR-3. Recording, Commanders WIEU, 22 April 1972, ASC.15. John P. Vann, letter for "My Friends," 12 April 1972, Vann Papers.16. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., unpublished trans. by Merle Pribbenow.17. As quoted in Michael Charlton and Anthony Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam (London: Scolar Press, 1978), p. 197.18. Cecil B. Smyth, Jr., in Michael Martin, Angels in Red Hats: Paratroopers of the Second Indochina War (Louisville, Ky.: Harmony House, 1995), p. 43, n. 2. Luat had previously been a problem as commander of the 17th Armored Squadron during Lam Son 719.19. Message, Abrams to Laird, MAC 03757, 241111Z APR 1972, US Army Center of Military History (CMH).20. David Fulghum and Terrence Maitland, The Vietnam Experience: South Vietnam on Trial, Mid-1970 to 1972 (Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984), p. 142. Also Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 379.21. Ngo Quang Truong, The Easter Offensive of 1972 (Washington: CMH, 1979), p. 77.22. MACV Command Briefing, 23 October 1972.23. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, interview, 26 September 1994.24. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984), pp. 564-65.25. Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: A History of the Vietnam War from a Military Man's Viewpoint (New York: Ballantine, 1978), p. 321.26. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., trans. Pribbenow. The history continued:Because the enemy had escalated rapidly, was bombarding us massively, and was using many types of new weapons and items of technical equipment (laser-guided bombs, guided missiles, various types of jammers, etc.) many units and local areas suffered heavy losses. Almost all the important bridges on the railroad and on the road corridors were knocked down. Ground transportation became difficult. Coastal and river transportation were blocked. The quantity of supplies shipped across the Gianh River forward to the battlefields was only a few thousand tons for one month. Enemy jamming equipment made it difficult to locate targets, especially B-52's. Our low combat efficiency, as revealed by the ineffectiveness of our targets and by the low number of enemy aircraft shot down, became a source of concern.27. Message, Abrams to Laird, MAC 04021, 011601Z MAY 1972, CMH.28. Pike, p. 225.29. Truong, p. 13.30. Message, Abrams to Laird, MAC 04021, 011601Z MAY 1972, CMH.31. Ibid.32. Ibid.33. Message, Laird to Bunker and Abrams, OSD 04321, 031617Z MAY 1972, CMH.34. Message, Abrams to Laird, MAC 04039, 020443Z MAY 1972, CMH.35. Message, Abrams to multiple addressees, MAC 04040, 020452Z MAY 1972, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.36. Cao Van Vien, Leadership (Washington: CMH, 1981), pp. 138-39.37. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., trans. Pribbenow.38. As quoted by Major General Stan L. McClellan, letter to Mrs. Abrams, 8 October 1974, enclosing "Recollections of Maj. Gen. Stan L. McClellan on 4 September 1974."39. Message, Abrams to multiple addressees, MAC 04325, 100730Z MAY 1972, ASC.40. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., trans. Pribbenow.41. George McArthur, notes of 24 May 1972, provided to the author by Mr. McArthur.42. Cecil B. Smyth, Jr., in Martin, p. 40.43. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., trans. Pribbenow.44. MACV Command Briefing, 23 October 1972.45. Major Gordon E. Bloom as quoted in Project CHECO, Kontum: Battle for the Central Highlands, 30 March-10 June 1972 (Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, n.d.), p. 83.46. Truong, p. 98.47. Message, Hollingsworth to Vogt and Monger, ARV 0969, 221550Z APR 1972, CMH.48. Truong, p. 176.49. Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, December 1972, MHI.50. Harry G. Summers, Jr., Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995), p. 178. Other estimates of the enemy's casualties are much higher, Sir Robert Thompson, for example, wrote that "the `great sacrifices' called for by General Giap had been paid to the extent of an estimated 130,000 men killed and disabled." Peace Is Not at Hand (New York: David McKay, 1974), p. 121. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., stated in his study of CIA intelligence on the war that enemy "losses for the March-September 1972 period were conservatively estimated at over 100,000 killed." "US Intelligence and Vietnam," Studies in Intelligence (1984 Special Issue), p. 94. Palmer's work also demonstrated that by this point CIA was virtually ignoring the war. A National Intelligence Estimate published in April 1971 was the last NIE or SNIE on Vietnam until October 1973, almost two and a half years later. Ibid., p. 91.51. Hoang Lac and Ha Mai Viet, Blind Design: Why America Lost the Vietnam War (privately printed, 1996), p. 78. General Truong agreed, stating that "to put it briefly, the 3d Division failed because it was overburdened." Truong, p. 166.52. G. H. Turley, The Easter Offensive: Vietnam, 1972 (Novato: Presidio, 1985), p. 274. In commenting on this development, Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., recalled how, during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II, the US 106th Infantry Division panicked and two of its regiments surrendered to the Germans. Vietnam War Almanac, p. 292.53. Truong, p. 179.54. Palmer, "US Intelligence and Vietnam," Studies in Intelligence (1984 Special Issue), p. 94.Tet With Tanks - The NVA Easter Offensive, 1972Lewis Sorley is the author of biographies of Generals Creighton Abrams and Harold K. Johnson. This article is adapted from his book A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (June 1999, Harcourt Brace).Reviewed 25 May 1999. Please send comments or corrections to [email protected]‘The Most Brilliant Commander’: Ngo Quang TruongBY JAMES H. WILLBANKS10/15/2007 • VIETNAMNgô Quang Trưởng died of cancer on January 22, 2007, in Fairfax, Virginia. Shortly after his death, the Virginia Legislature passed a Joint Resolution “Celebrating the Life of Ngo Quang Truong.” This singular honor for a man who came to this country in 1975 was clearly justified by the sacrifices that Truong made in defense of his South Vietnamese homeland and the exemplary life that he lived both before and after coming to his adopted country.He was considered one of the most honest and capable generals of the South Vietnamese army during the long war in Southeast Asia. The US officers that worked with him generally rated him to be superior to most American commanders. General Bruce Palmer Jr. described him in his book The 25-Year War as a “tough, seasoned, fighting leader” and “probably the best field commander in South Vietnam.” General Creighton Abrams, who commanded American military operations in Vietnam from 1968 to 1972, told subordinates that he thought General Truong was capable of commanding an American division. He was also renowned for his integrity and his uninvolvement in corruption, favoritism or political cronyism, as well as his empathy and solidarity with his soldiers.Truong was born on December 19, 1929, to a well-to-do family in the Mekong Delta province of Kien Hoa, Mỏ Cày District. After graduating from My Tho College, he attended the Reserve Officer School in Thu Duc, then received his commission as an infantry officer in the South Vietnamese Army in 1954. Truong went immediately to airborne school and spent the next 12 years in the elite airborne brigade, first assigned as commander of 1st Company, 5th Airborne Battalion.He soon saw action in a 1955 operation to eliminate the Bình Xuyên river pirates who were vying with President Ngo Dinh Diem’s government for control of Saigon and the surrounding area. For his role in this operation, he was awarded a battlefield promotion to first lieutenant. In 1964, promoted to major and appointed commander of the 5th Airborne Battalion, he led a heliborne assault into the Do Xa Secret Zone in Minh Long district, Quang Ngai province, shattering the base area of the Viet Cong’s B-1 Front Headquarters. Meanwhile, Truong built a reputation as a charismatic leader who led from the front and took care of his soldiers.The 5th Airborne Battalion, still under his command, conducted a helicopter assault in 1965 into the Hac Dich Secret Zone in the area of Ong Trinh Mountain in Phuoc Tuy (Ba Ria) province, the base area of the VC’s 7th Division. After two days of fighting during which his battalion inflicted heavy losses on two enemy regiments, Truong received a battlefield promotion to lieutenant colonel and was also awarded the National Defense Medal, Fourth Class.After the Hac Dich battle, Truong was assigned as chief of staff of the Airborne Brigade and then became chief of staff of the Airborne Division in late 1965. As historian Dale Andradé points out, this non combat position might have stagnated his career, but his reputation for bravery and fairness got him noticed by the top brass in Saigon. General Cao Văn Viên, chief of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff from 1965 to 1975, later described Truong as “one of the best commanders at every echelon the Airborne Division ever had.”In 1966, when violent civil disorders broke out in central Vietnam, he was appointed acting commander of the 1st Infantry Division in Hue. Although Truong, a Buddhist, was uncomfortable commanding a unit charged with quelling demonstrations by Buddhists protesting military control of the government, he carried out his duties with professionalism, and Saigon made the appointment permanent. With his hands-on leadership, Truong quickly molded the division, which had a poor reputation prior to his arrival, into one of the best units in the South Vietnamese army. Lieutenant General Robert E. Cushman Jr., commander of III Marine Amphibious Force in I Corps Tactical Zone, and his principal subordinate, Lt. Gen. Richard G. Stilwell, commander of XXIV Corps, both felt that because of Truong’s efforts, the ARVN 1st Division was “equal to any American unit.”His American adviser at the time wrote that Truong was “dedicated, humble, imaginative and tactically sound.” And General William Westmoreland, commander of Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, said that Truong "would rate high on any list of capable South Vietnamese leaders … [other U.S. commanders] so admired Truong that they would trust him to command an American division."In 1967 Truong’s units of the 1st Infantry Division attacked and destroyed the Viet Cong infrastructure and a large number of guerrilla forces of the Luong Co–Dong Xuyen–My Xa Front in Huong Tra district, Thua Thien province. After this, he was promoted to brigadier general.A Shau ValleyDuring the Tet Offensive of 1968, General Truong commanded the 1st Division during some of the war’s bloodiest fighting in Huế. Two nights before the offensive began, Truong, at his headquarters in the old Imperial capital, sensed something amiss and put his troops on alert. When the night passed uneventfully, he dismissed his advisers but kept his troops ready.The battle began at 0330 hours on January 31, 1968, with two battalions of the North Vietnamese Army’s 6th Regiment attacking the old Imperial capital and the 4th NVA Regiment attacking the U.S. MACV compound in the “New City” south of the Perfume River. General Truong, whose Hac Bao (Black Panther) reaction company had managed to hold the division headquarters compound against the initial assault, immediately ordered his 3rd Regiment, then on an operation north of the city, to come to his relief. The regiment, reinforced by three ARVN airborne battalions, reached his headquarters in the Citadel’s northeast corner on the evening of January 31. The next day, Truong began an attack to retake the entire Citadel and clear the north bank of the river. At his request, U.S. Marines were committed to clear the south bank of the river.Hac Bao Reaction CompanyOn February 4, the 1st Battalion, 1st Marines, reinforced by the 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines, began fighting house-to-house to drive the enemy from the area. By February 9, the south bank had been cleared. When the ARVN 1st Division attack north of the river stalled on February 12, the division was reinforced by two Vietnamese marine battalions. Truong also asked for U.S. assistance, and the U.S. 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, was committed to the fight. Together, the U.S Marines and South Vietnamese soldiers and marines fought house to house to force the enemy out of the area. On March 2, 1968, the Battle of Huếwas officially at an end. More than 50 percent of the city had been either damaged or destroyed. ARVN and Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps casualties included 384 killed and 1,830 wounded; the U.S. Marines suffered 142 killed and 857 wounded. The U.S. Army suffered 74 killed and 507 wounded in fighting outside the city.As usual, Truong had performed magnificently, directing his troops in a calm but charismatic fashion. Lieutenant General Cushman, who became his close friend after working with him, described Truong’s performance during the battle: “He survived with the enemy all around him. They never took his command post, but they took the rest of the Citadel.”After Tet, Truong was given a special promotion to the rank of major general. In August 1970, he was assigned to command IV Corps headquartered at Can Tho in the Mekong Delta (Military Region 4). In June 1971, he was promoted to lieutenant general.As commander of the ARVN forces in the Mekong Delta, Truong’s strategy was to establish a system of outposts along the Cambodian border to interdict movement of Communist troops and supplies into the area, while his three assigned divisions broke into regimental-sized combined arms task forces and conducted operations to find and destroy enemy forces in their traditional strongholds located throughout the region. The scrupulously honest Truong meanwhile launched a campaign against “ghost” and “ornamental” soldiers, deserters and draft-dodgers in the IV Corps zone. He also increased the capability of the Regional Forces and Popular Forces in his area, making them an integral part of the defensive plan for the security of the Mekong Delta.On March 30, 1972, the North Vietnamese launched their “Easter Offensive.” The attacking force included 14 infantry divisions and 26 separate regiments, with more than 120,000 troops and about 1,200 tanks and other armored vehicles. The main NVA objectives were Quảng Trị Province in the north, Kon Tum Province in the Central Highlands and An Lộc farther south in Military Region III.The attack began at noon on Good Friday, with heavy artillery strikes on all the firebases in the I Corps area south of the demilitarized zone. The next day, three divisions from the North Vietnamese B-5 Front struck the string of ARVN firebases just south of the DMZ, which were manned by the green ARVN 3rd Division. The South Vietnamese troops, outnumbered 3-to-1, fell back as the North Viet­namese pushed south. As firebase after firebase fell to the 40,000 NVA, Quảng Trị Combat Base was threatened and ultimately evacuated in the face of the attack. In the bitter fighting, the ARVN 3rd Division was shattered and ceased to exist as a viable fighting force.On May 1, 1972, Communist troops captured Quảng Trị, the first provincial capital to fall during their offensive. This gave the North Vietnamese control of the surrounding province, and they continued the attack to the south.Realizing the dire circumstances, President Nguyen Van Thieu relieved I Corps commander Lt. Gen. Hoàng Xuân Lãm, who had been unable to stop the North Vietnamese advance, and ordered General Truong to assume command of I Corps. Truong left his IV Corps headquarters at Can Tho and arrived in Danang on May 3. Historian Lewis Sorley later wrote that the effects of the change in command were “electric.” Truong’s arrival helped calm the situation, and his mere presence gave new hope to the South Vietnamese forces in I Corps.General Truong quickly took command, broadcasting an order that all military deserters who did not return to their units within 24 hours would be shot on sight. He went on television and promised that he would hold Hue and turn back the Communists. He put together a hand-picked staff and then moved his headquarters to Hue, which was beset by panic in the face of the continued North Vietnamese onslaught. Stabilizing the situation, he devised a comprehensive defense in depth to halt the NVA advance. At the same time, he initiated a program to refit and retrain the South Vietnamese units that had been so badly battered in the retreat from Quang Tri. Using new equipment provided by the United States, he put these units back together and gave them an accelerated training program.Hue 1972By mid-May, the Hue defenses had been solidified, the situation had stabilized and the refurbished units were ready. Truong launched a counteroffensive with three divisions to retake lost ground, with the help of U.S. firepower, including strikes by B-52 Stratofortress bombers; close air support by Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps fighter-bombers; Army attack helicopters; and naval gunfire provided by the Seventh Fleet. It was a deliberate and slow process, but Truong’s forces routed six NVA divisions to retake Quang Tri on September 16.Many of the firebases along the DMZ were recaptured, and by the end of October the situation in I Corps had stabilized. With the recapture of Quảng Trị and the ARVN steadfastness at Kontum and An Lộc, the heart went out of the North Vietnamese offensive. Truong had completely turned the disastrous situation around in I Corps by the sheer force of his personal leadership.Sadly it was not to be so again three years later. In 1975, Truong faced his greatest challenge. The ARVN defenses in the Central Highlands collapsed in the face of a new North Vietnamese offensive. President Thieu ordered Truong to defend Hue to the death, and the general set about to strengthen the city’s defenses, preparing to make a stand there. However, a week long debate with Thieu and his senior military staff followed, highlighted by accusations, conflicting orders and impossible suggestions. During these discussions, Truong was told to abandon Hue, even though he was certain that it was still defensible. As he prepared to execute his latest order, it was countermanded at the last minute and he was ordered to hold Hue at all costs. As one observer told a Time magazine correspondent: “It was like a yo-yo. First, Thieu gave the order to pull back and defend Da Nang. Then he countermanded it and ordered that Hue be held. Then he changed his mind again and told the troops to withdraw.”Confusion reigned. Truong did not receive his new orders well, but he tried to follow them the best he could. Nevertheless, the withdrawal from Hue became a disaster that rivaled the one in the Central Highlands in scope. Under shelling by heavy artillery, Truong’s forces fell apart. Because of the conflicting orders, lack of preparation and collapse of morale, the evacuation turned into a fiasco. Poor leadership in many units, the disintegration of unit integrity and concern over family members quickly led to panic and total chaos.The situation in Da Nang was just as bad. As the city was shelled by artillery from two North Vietnamese divisions, Truong tried to direct an evacuation by sea. But pandemonium ensued, as panicked civilians and soldiers alike tried to escape to the south by any means possible. Da Nang fell to the Communists on March 30. In the process of abandoning a city of 3 million people, four regular divisions disintegrated, including the ARVN’s most elite: the 1st Division and the Marine Division.Truong, who had desperately wanted to hold the line at Hue, was put in an untenable position by Thieu’s orders and counter orders. As Da Nang fell, he and his corps staff swam through the surf to the rescuing fleet of South Vietnamese boats. Truong was devastated by the loss of his forces, particularly his beloved ARVN 1st Division. Upon arriving in Saigon, he was reportedly hospitalized for a nervous breakdown. A U.S. Army officer who had worked closely with Truong heard what happened, tracked him down and arranged for his family to leave on an American ship as Saigon fell to the Communists.The general’s family was split up for some time: His wife and older son made it to Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; his daughters and middle son fled with a State Department employee to Seattle; and his youngest son, a 4-year-old who spoke no English, was at Camp Pendleton, Calif., for several weeks before his identity was established.After reuniting, Truong and his family moved to Falls Church, Va. Once settled there, he wrote several historical studies on the Vietnam War for the U.S. Army Center of Military History, including "Easter Offensive of 1972" (1979), "RVNAF and US Operational Cooperation and Coordination" (1980) and "Territorial Forces" (1981). In 1983, the same year that he became a U.S. citizen, he moved to Springfield, Va. He worked as a computer analyst for the Association of American Railroads for about a decade until he retired in 1994.Despite the outcome of the war in I Corps and the subsequent fall of South Vietnam, Truong’s reputation survived intact. General Norman Schwarzkopf, who commanded US forces during the Gulf War against Iraq in 1991, served as Truong 's adviser in the 1960s when he was deployed to South Vietnam as a major during a campaign at Ia Drang. Schwarzkopf called General Truong “the most brilliant tactical commander I have ever known” in his 1992 autobiography. “Simply by visualizing the terrain and drawing on his experience fighting the enemy for fifteen years,” he wrote, “Truong showed an uncanny ability to predict what they were going to do.”Maj Gen Ngo Quang Truong and Lt Col Norman SchwarzkopfSchwarzkopf added: “He did not look like my idea of a military genius: only five feet seven, in his midforties, very skinny, with hunched shoulders and a head that seemed too big for his body," Schwarzkopf wrote. "His face was pinched and intense, not at all handsome, and there was always a cigarette hanging from his lips. Yet he was revered by his officers and troops -- and feared by those North Vietnamese commanders who knew of his ability."Unlike some South Vietnamese generals who had grown rich as they ascended the ranks, Truong was impeccably honest and, according to a close friend, led a “spartan and ascetic” life. Lieutenant General Cushman recalled that the general didn’t own a suit, and that his wife kept pigs behind his modest quarters in the military compound in Can Tho. As Cushman further described Truong, “He was imaginative and always looked for ways to improve his troops’ living conditions and family life.”Maj Gen NQT and wifeA humble man, Truong was an unselfish individual devoted to his profession. He was fiercely loyal to his subordinates, and was known for taking care of his soldiers, often flying through heavy fire to stand with them in the rain and mud during enemy attacks. He treated everyone the same and did not play favorites. There is a story that he refused to respond to a request to give his nephew a noncombat assignment, only to have the nephew later die in battle.By all accounts, General Truong was an outstanding officer who deserved the remarkable reputation that he enjoyed among both South Vietnamese soldiers and American military officers. Ngo Quang Truong dedicated his life to his nation, and in the end, as General Palmer said, he “deserved a better fate” than watching it go down in defeat. May this warrior who always did his duty rest in peace.Survivors include his wife, Nguyen Kim-Dung of Springfield; three sons, Nguyen Xuan Thanh of Slidell, La., Ngo Quang Tri of Clifton and Ngo Tri Thien of Las Vegas; two daughters, Huynh Mai Trinh of Fairfax City and Ngo Tram-Tiara of Rockville; 12 grandchildren; and two great-grandchildren.Funeral of Lt Gen Ngo Quang Truong in 2007.Indochina Monographs Easter Offensive by Lt. Gen Ngo Quang TruongNgô Quang Trưởng - WikipediaLibGuides at USA: Gov Docs: Vietnam War, 1961-1975: Vietnamese Military-North & SouthEvolution of the US Advisory Effort in Vietnam: Lessons LearnedSouth Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia Official History VolumesNgô Quang Trưởng | WikiwandWashington Post Ngo Quang Truong Jan 25, 2007RVNAF and Us Operational Cooperation and Coordination (U.S. Army Center for Military History Indochina Monograph Series) Ngo Quan TruongThe US Advisor by General Cao Van Vien, Lt. Gen. Ngo Quang TruongThis monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion.“The United States advisory mission in South Vietnam encompassed many fields of endeavor and affected almost every level of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces. It was a demanding exercise of professional duties and a unique human experience for the American adviser who had not only to struggle with problems of environment and culture differences and face the complexities and hazards of the war, but also devote his time and energy to supplement our Vietnamese experience with US Army professionalism. The total effort by US advisers contributed directly and immeasurably to the development and modernization of the Vietnamese Armed Forces.To the Vietnamese officers and men who benefited from his expertise and experience, the US adviser was both a mentor and a Samaritan. Regardless of his level of assignment or branch of service, he could be subsumed by a common trait: a sincere desire to help and devotion to those he advised. Whatever his approach to advisory duties, he always performed with dedication and competence. For nearly two decades, these qualities were the hallmark of the US adviser in South Vietnam.To analyze and evaluate the United States advisory experience in its entirety is not an easy task. It cannot be accomplished thoroughly and effectively by a single author since there were several types of advisers representing different areas of specialty but all dedicated to a common goal. Therefore, each member of the Control Group for the Indochina Refugee Authored Monograph Program has made a significant contribution as we presented the Vietnamese point of view.”-Author’s preface.Professor James H. Willbanks is the chairman of the Military History Department at the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College. He earned a Silver Star as a U.S. adviser at the Battle of An Loc. For further reading, see: A Better War, by Lewis Sorley; and Abandoning Vietnam, by James H. Willbanks.The Republic of Vietnam, Corps Tactical ZonesVietnam WarU.S. Marines in Operation Allen Brook (Vietnam War)Vietnam War FactsDates 1954-1973Location South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Cambodia and LaosResult North Vietnamese victorTroop StrengthSouth Vietnam: 850,00United States: 540,000South Korea: 50,000Others: 80,000 plusCasualtiesSouth Vietnam: 200,000 – 400,000 civilians dead, 170,000-220,000 military dead, and over 1 million woundedUnited States: 58,200 dead and 300,000 woundedNorth Vietnam: 50,000 plus civilian dead, 400,000-1 million military dead, and over 500,000 woundedBattle of Xuân LộcARVN 18th Division soldiers at Xuân Lộc [1]Location Xuân Lộc, Đồng Nai Province, South VietnamCommanders and leaders Hoàng Cầm, Lê Minh ĐảoGeneral Lê Minh Đảo, commander of the South Vietnamese army at Xuan Loc.Photos before BattleThe Battle of Xuan Loc (Vietnamese: Trận Xuân Lộc) was the last major battle of the Vietnam War in which the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) committed almost all their remaining mobile forces, especially the South Vietnamese 18th Infantry Division, under General Le Minh Dao to the defense of Xuân Lộc, hoping to stall the advance of the North Vietnamese Army. The battle was fought between April 9 and 21, 1975, and ended when the town of Xuân Lộc was captured by the PAVN 4th Army Corps. This was the ARVN III Corps' last defensive line of South Vietnam's capital, Sài Gòn (Saigon). The line connected the city of Bình Dương, Biên Hoà Air Base, Vũng Tàu, Long An and the lynch pin centered on the strategic city of Xuân Lộc, where both the ARVN-JGS and RVNAF-JGS committed the nation's final reserve forces in Saigon's defense.Once Xuân Lộc fell on 21 April 1975, the PVN battled with the last remaining elements of III Corp Armored Task Force, remnants of the 18th Infantry Division, and depleted ARVN Marine, Airborne and Ranger Battalions in a fighting retreat that lasted nine days, until they reached Saigon and PVN armored columns crashed throughout the gates of South Vietnam's Presidential Palace on 30 April 1975, effectively ending the war.From the beginning of 1975, North Vietnam's military forces swept through the northern provinces of South Vietnam virtually unopposed. In the Central Highlands, South Vietnam's II Corps Tactical Zone was completely destroyed, whilst attempting to evacuate to the Mekong Delta region. In the cities of Huế and Da Nang, ARVN units simply dissolved without putting up resistance. [7]The devastating defeats suffered by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam prompted South Vietnam's National Assembly to question President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's handling of the war, thereby placing him under tremendous pressure to resign. [8]In the last-ditch effort to save South Vietnam, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu ordered his last military units, namely the ARVN 18th Infantry Division "The Super Men", to hold Xuân Lộc at all cost. [9]The North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps, on the other hand, was ordered to capture Xuân Lộc in order to open the gateway to Saigon. [10]During the early stages of the battle, the ARVN 18th Infantry Division managed to beat off early attempts by the Communists to capture the town, forcing North Vietnamese commanders to change their battle plan. [11]However, on April 19, 1975, Dao's forces were ordered to withdraw after Xuân Lộc was almost completely isolated, with all remaining units badly mauled. The 18th disintegrated shortly afterward.This defeat also marked the end of Thiệu's political career, as he resigned on 21 April 1975. [8]Contents1 Background2 Order of Battle 2.1 South Vietnam 2.2 North Vietnam3 Prelude4 Defense and Fall of Xuan Loc5 Aftermath 5.1 Military outcome 5.2 Political outcome6 Notes7 References8 External linksBackgroundIn the first half of 1975, the government of the Republic of Vietnam was in deep political turmoil, which reflected the military situation on the battlefield. At least two assassination attempts specifically targeting President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu were foiled. On January 23, a South Vietnamese army officer tried to shoot President Thieu with his pistol but failed. The officer was subsequently tried by a military court. [12]On April 4, South Vietnamese pilot Nguyen Thanh Trung bombed the Independence Palace with his F-5 Tiger. It later turned out that the pilot had been an undercover member of the Viet Cong since 1969. [12]Following those failed assassination attempts, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu grew suspicious of his own military commanders. [12]On April 2, the South Vietnamese Senate recommended the formation of a new government with Nguyễn Bá Cẩn as the new leader. As a result, Prime Minister Trần Thiện Khiêm resigned from his position. President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, in response to the Senate's recommendations, immediately approved Tran Thien Kiem's resignation and swore in Nguyen Ba Can as the new Prime Minister. [13]On April 4, while announcing the changes of government on Saigon television, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu also requested the arrest of three army commanders; Major General Phạm Văn Phú for the debacle in the Central Highlands, General Phạm Quốc Thuần for his failure to hold Nha Trang, and Lieutenant General Dư Quốc Đống for the loss of Phước Long. General Ngô Quang Trưởng, commander of I Corps Tactical Zone, was spared as he was undergoing medical treatment. [14]During a meeting with U.S. General Frederick C. Weyand on April 3, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu outlined his final strategy to defend South Vietnam, vowing to hold what was left of his country against Communist North Vietnam. In his strategy, President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu decided that Xuan Loc would be the center of his country's resistance, with Tây Ninh and Phan Rang on either side. [9]Eventually, the meeting became more intense when Nguyễn Văn Thiệu produced a letter written by former U.S. President Richard Nixon, which promised military retaliation against North Vietnam if they violated the terms of the Paris Peace Accords. The meeting then concluded with Nguyễn Văn Thiệu accusing the United States Government of selling out his country the moment they signed the Paris Peace Accords with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. [12]In contrast to the situation faced by their opponents in Saigon, the North Vietnamese government were buoyed by the victories achieved by their armies since December 1974. By April 8, 1975, the North Vietnamese military had captured all the provinces in South Vietnam's I and II Corps Tactical Zones, as well as Phước Long Province. While the South Vietnamese army were disintegrating all over the battlefield, North Vietnam had two army corps moving towards the last South Vietnamese stronghold at Xuan Loc. [10]The North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps, which overran Phước Long several months earlier, approached Xuan Loc from the north-east after they conquered Tây Ninh, Binh Long and Long Khánh. The 3rd Army Corps, on the other hand, moved towards Xuan Loc from the north-west after they defeated the South Vietnamese army in the Central Highlands. [10]Order of BattleSouth VietnamOn April 8, 1975, the ARVN 18th Infantry Division was the main unit defending Xuan Loc, which had three regiments (43rd, 48th and 52nd Infantry Regiments). There were also five armored brigades, four regional force battalions (340th, 342nd, 343rd and 367th Battalions), two artillery units (181st and 182nd Artillery Battalions) equipped with forty-two artillery guns, and two companies of civilian self-defense forces. [3]On April 12, Xuan Loc was reinforced with the 1st Airborne Brigade, three armored brigades (315th, 318th and 322nd Armored Brigades), the 8th Task Force from the 5th Infantry Division, and the 33rd Ranger Battalion. Air support came in the form of two air force divisions; the 5th Air Force Division based at Bien Hoa, and the 3rd Air Force Division at Tan Son Nhut. The commander of the South Vietnamese army at Xuan Loc was General Le Minh Dao. [3]North VietnamAs the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps was the first army to arrive on the battlefield at Xuan Loc, the Central Military Committee decided that the 4th Army Corps would lead the assault. The 4th Army Corps at Xuan Loc fielded three combat divisions (6th, 7th and 341st Infantry Divisions). Those divisions had support from the 71st Anti-Aircraft Regiment, two combat engineering regiments (24th and 25th Engineering Regiments), the 26th Communications Regiment, two armored battalions, two artillery battalions, and two Long Khánh provincial infantry battalions. [2]On April 3, 1975, the 4th Army Corps Command came up with two options for attack; the first option would involve capturing all enemy outposts in the surrounding areas, and isolating the town center in the process. If the opportunity arose, the 4th Army Corps would launch a full frontal assault on the town center to capture all of Xuan Loc. In the second option, if enemy forces in Xuan Loc did not have the strength to resist, the 4th Army Corps would strike directly at the town center using infantry units, with armored and artillery units in support. [15]PreludeIn March 1975 as the North Vietnamese 3rd Army Corps attacked Ban Me Thuot in the Central Highlands, the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps also initiated their own operations against South Vietnamese installations in Tây Ninh and Bình Dương, which were located in the western regions of South Vietnam. Unlike the previous three years, South Vietnamese defenses around Tây Ninh and Bình Dương were significantly weakened due to the lack of manpower and resources. Even though Tây Ninh and Bình Dương did not play a significant role in the defensive posture of South Vietnam, large formations of South Vietnamese army units made their way into those areas as a result of the early defeats in 1975. Tây Ninh became a refuge for elements of the ARVN 25th Infantry Division, four armored brigades and two ranger battalions. Bình Dương, on the other hand, hosted the ARVN 5th Infantry Division, one ranger battalion and one armored brigade. To stop South Vietnamese military units from gathering in Tây Ninh and Bình Dương, and thereby regrouping for further resistance, the North Vietnamese decided to finally capture those regions. [16]The North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps Command selected Dầu Tiếng–Chon Thanh as the first target for their operation, as it was the weakest point in the South Vietnamese defensive line in the north-west area. South Vietnam maintained four regional force battalions (35th, 304th, 312th and 352nd Battalions) which totaled 2,600 soldiers in the area, along with one armored brigade and ten 105 mm artillery guns. The military zone of Dầu Tiếng–Chon Thanh located in area adjacent to the three provinces of Tây Ninh, Bình Dương and Binh Long. The task of capturing Dầu Tiếng–Chon Thanh was entrusted to the North Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division, whose strength were bolstered by the 16th Infantry Regiment, the 22nd Armored Battalion, one artillery battalion and one air-defense battalion. At 5 am on March 11, the North Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division commenced their attack on Dầu Tiếng. South Vietnamese artillery positions in Rung Nan, Bau Don and Cha La were the primary targets of the 9th Infantry Division on the first day of the attack. [17]On the afternoon of March 11, ARVN General Le Nguyen Khang ordered the 345th Armored Squadron to move out from Bau Don to relieve the military zone of Dau Tienh, but they were defeated by the North Vietnamese 16th Infantry Regiment at Suoi Ong Hung, and were forced to retreat to their base. At the same time, South Vietnamese artillery units at Bau Don and Rung Nan were subdued by elements of the 9th Infantry Division, so they were unable to return fire. [18]By March 13, the North Vietnamese army was in complete control of the Dầu Tiếng military zone. After three hours of fighting, the North Vietnamese 3/9th Infantry Division also captured South Vietnamese positions at Vuon Chuoi, Nga ba Sac, Cau Tau and Ben Cui. The ARVN 3rd Brigade had planned to retake Dầu Tiếng using elements of the 5th Infantry Division, but President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu ordered them to pull back and defend Truong Mit, Bau Don and Tây Ninh instead. [19]On March 24, two regiments from the North Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division, in coordination with two provincial infantry battalions from Bình Phước, attacked Chon Thanh with full force but were repeatedly driven back from South Vietnamese defensive lines. On March 31, the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps sent the 273rd Regiment to bolster the strength of the 9th Infantry Division, and one artillery battalion equipped with 15 artillery guns. Following the arrival of fresh reinforcements, the North Vietnamese army continued their assault on the military zone of Chon Thanh. South Vietnam responded by deploying the 3rd Armored Brigade to relief Chon Thanh, but they were stopped by elements of the North Vietnamese 9th Infantry Division along Route 13. [20]To avoid destruction, all surviving members from the ARVN 31st Ranger Battalion retreated to Bau Don in the east. On April 2, the North Vietnamese army captured Chon Thanh; they claimed to have killed 2,134 enemy soldiers, as well as capturing 472 men, and shot down 16 aircraft. [20]In addition, North Vietnam captured 30 military vehicles (including eight tanks) and about 1,000 guns (including five artillery pieces) of various kinds. With the province of Binh Long firmly in their hands, the North Vietnamese army then set their sights on Xuan Loc. [20]Defense and Fall of Xuan LocAfter the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps successfully captured all key objectives surrounding Xuan Loc in Long Khánh Province, they had four days to prepare for the final push against the ARVN 18th Infantry Division. North Vietnamese Major General Hoang Cam personally took control of the operation; he decided to launch a full-frontal assault on Xuan Loc using his infantry, tank and artillery units from the north and northwest. Colonel Bui Cat Vu, deputy commander of the 4th Army Corps, would dictate operations from the east. [21]While the North Vietnamese were closing in on Xuan Loc, ARVN General Le Minh Dao and the chief of Long Khánh Province, Colonel Nguyen Van Phuc, were also busy lining up their units in anticipation of the enemy onslaught. Prior to the battle, General Le Minh Dao told foreign media that: "I am determined to hold Xuan Loc. I don’t care how many divisions the Communist will send against me, I will smash them all! The world shall see the strength and skill of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam". [22]At 5:40 am on April 9, 1975, the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps began bombarding South Vietnamese positions around the town of Xuan Loc. From the north of Xuan Loc, the PAVN 341st Infantry Division captured the ARVN communications center and the local police station after more than one hour of heavy fighting. [23]However, all North Vietnamese units moving down from the north were forced to stop when elements of the ARVN 52nd Task Force counter-attacked from the south. From the east, the North Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division advanced on South Vietnamese positions without tank support, and sustained heavy casualties in the initial stages of the fighting. At 8 am, the 4th Army Corps Command sent eight tanks to support the 7th Infantry Division, but three were destroyed by entrenched South Vietnamese soldiers at Bao Chanh A. [23]By midday, the North Vietnamese 209th and 270th Infantry Regiments captured the Headquarters of the ARVN 18th Infantry Division and the Governor's Residence, which was defended by the ARVN 43rd and 48th Infantry Regiments, setting ablaze seven South Vietnamese tanks in the process. [23]In the south, the North Vietnamese 6th Infantry Division attacked South Vietnamese positions on Highway No.1 from Hung Nghia to Me Bong Con, where they destroyed 11 tanks from the ARVN 322nd Armored Brigade. [24]Throughout the day on April 9, the ARVN 18th Infantry Division staged counter-attacks on North Vietnamese flanks to slow down their enemies’ momentum, especially movements from the north and northwest. [25]Between April 10 and 11, elements of the North Vietnamese 7th Infantry Division tried to destroy the ARVN 18th Infantry Division, the 52nd Task Force and the 5 Armored Cavalry, but on each occasion they were forced to stop and deal with enemy counter-attacks on their flanks. [26]In the northwest the North Vietnamese 226th and 270th Infantry Regiments, from the 341st Infantry Division, were also forced to deal with counter-attacks staged by the ARVN 43rd Infantry Regiment and the 322nd Armored Brigade. During those two days, South Vietnamese fighter-bombers from the 5th Air Force Division flew more than 200 bombing sorties in support of the ARVN 18th Infantry Division. On the night of April 11, General Le Minh Dao secretly relocated the headquarters of the ARVN 18th Infantry Division to the military zone of Tan Phong, to continue his resistance. Colonel Pham Van Phuc, on the other hand, also moved his headquarters to Nui Thi. [26]On April 12, the ARVN General Staff made the decision to bolster the defenses at Xuan Loc with units drawn from the ARVN general reserve. Subsequently, the ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade arrived at the Bao Dinh rubber plantation, while two marine battalions defended the eastern corridor leading to Bien Hoa. In addition, Tan Phong and Dau Giay received reinforcements from the 33rd Ranger Battalion, 8/5th Infantry Division, 8th Artillery Battalion and three armoured brigades (315th, 318th and 322nd Armored Brigades). As the reinforcements were making their way onto the battlefield, South Vietnamese fighter-bombers from Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhat flew between 80 and 120 combat sorties per day to support the defenders at Xuan Loc. [27]At 2 pm on April 12, South Vietnamese C-130 Hercules dropped two CBU-55 cluster bomb Fuel Air Explosive on North Vietnamese positions in the town of Xuan Vinh, close to Xuan Loc, killing about 200 civilians and North Vietnamese soldiers. [28]However, the ARVN also suffered casualties from the blast.On April 13, General Tran Van Tra, commander of the National Liberation Front Armed Forces (Viet Cong) arrived at the headquarters of the 4th Army Corps. During the meeting with other commanders, General Tran Van Tra decided to alter certain aspects of the combat operation; the 6th Infantry Division and elements of the 341st Infantry Division would attack Dau Giay, which was the weakest point in the defensive line around Xuan Loc, set up blocking positions along Highway No.2 which leads to Bà Rịa–Vũng Tàu, and Highway No.1 between Xuan Loc and Bien Hoa. [11]Gen Le Minh Dao and Col Ngo Van Minh at the forward command HQOn the same day, the North Vietnamese 2nd Army Corps ordered the 95B Infantry Regiment to join the units of the 4th Army Corps, in their efforts to capture Xuan Loc. As North Vietnamese commanders began to implement their new strategy, the South Vietnamese military declared it had successfully repulsed the "Communist attack" on Xuan Loc, thereby ending a period of continuous defeats. President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, buoyed by the fierce resistance of his army at Xuan Loc, announced that the Army of the Republic of Vietnam had "recovered its fighting ability" to defend the country. [29]On April 15, the situation on the battlefield began to change as North Vietnamese artillery stopped their shelling of Xuan Loc, but started pounding Bien Hoa instead. In just one day, the South Vietnamese 3rd Air Force Division at Bien Hoa was forced to cease all operations due to continuous North Vietnamese artillery bombardments. To continue their support of ground troops at Xuan Loc, the South Vietnamese air force mobilized the 4th Air Force Division based at Tra Noc to conduct further missions. [30]On the same day, the North Vietnamese 6th Infantry Division and the 95B Infantry Regiment defeated a combined ARVN formation which included the 52nd Task Force and the 13th Armored Squadron west of Xuan Loc. Between April 16 and 17, the North Vietnamese 6th Infantry Division and the 95B Infantry Regiment also defeated the ARVN 8th Task Force and 3rd Armored Brigade, when the South Vietnamese tried to recapture the military zone of Dau Giay. Around Xuan Loc the ARVN 43rd and 48th Infantry Regiments, as well as the 1st Airborne Brigade, suffered heavy casualties as North Vietnamese infantry units attacked them from all sides. [30]With Dau Giay and all the main roads under enemies control, Xuan Loc was completely isolated, the 18th cut off from reinforcements and surrounded by the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps. On April 19, the ARVN General Staff ordered General Le Minh Dao to evacuate the 18th Infantry Division and other support units from Xuan Loc, in order to continue their resistance elsewhere. The ARVN 18th Infantry Division, which was the main unit defending Xuan Loc, was ordered to defend Bien Hoa. [6]On April 20, under the cover of heavy rain, South Vietnamese soldiers and civilians began pulling out from Xuan Loc, in a convoy of about 200 military vehicles. On April 21, the town center of Xuan Loc was completely abandoned, with the ARVN 1st Airborne Brigade being the last unit to be evacuated from the area. At 4 am on April 21, the 3/1st Airborne Brigade was completely destroyed by the North Vietnamese army at the hamlet of Suoi Ca. By the end of the day Xuan Loc was under North Vietnamese control, and the gateway to Saigon was finally opened. [6] [31]The Xuan Loc victory monument dedicated to the Vietnam People's Army, in Đồng Nai Province.AftermathMilitary outcomeFollowing their costly victory at Xuan Loc, the North Vietnamese army effectively controlled two-thirds of South Vietnam's territory. The loss of Xuan Loc dealt a severe blow to the military strength of South Vietnam, which had lost almost every unit from its general reserve. On April 18, 1975, General Nguyen Van Toan, commander of the ARVN III Corps, informed President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu that the South Vietnamese forces at Xuan Loc had been beaten and South Vietnam's armed forces could only hold out for a few more days as a result of their losses on the battlefield. [32]According to Vietnam's official account of the battle, about 2,036 South Vietnamese soldiers were either killed or wounded and another 2,731 were captured. [6]However, the 18th ARVN Division alone suffered over 30 percent casualties of 12,000 soldiers committed to the battle, not to mention other forces. Total casualties on the Communist side are largely unknown, but the 4th Army Corps alone claimed to have suffered 460 killed in action, and another 1,428 wounded.[5]While Le Minh Dao claim that the battle has cost the North Vietnamese over 50,000 KIA and 370 tanks destroyed, American estimates only put North Vietnamese casualties at around 10 percent of those figures with 5,000 troops killed and/or wounded and 37 tanks destroyed. [4]Reports during Battle of Xuan Loc and Gen Le Minh Dao interviewPolitical outcomeIn the days following the loss of Xuan Loc, there was still much debate in both houses of South Vietnam's National Assembly about the country's wartime policies. Pro-war elements in the National Assembly argued South Vietnam should fight until the very end, in the belief that the United States would eventually give the country the necessary amount of aid to resist the North Vietnamese. [8]Anti-war elements, on the other hand, strongly opposed the idea. They believed the Government of South Vietnam should negotiate with the Communists, in order to avoid a catastrophic defeat. Despite their differences of opinion, members in both houses of South Vietnam's National Assembly agreed that Nguyễn Văn Thiệu should be held responsible for the country's dire military and political situation, because his policies had allowed the enemies to easily penetrate South Vietnam's military defenses. [8]Finally at 8 pm on April 21, 1975, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu officially resigned from his position as the President of the Republic of Vietnam upon learning that Xuan Loc had fallen that morning. In his final effort to save South Vietnam, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu gambled his political career by sending the very last units of the South Vietnamese army to Xuan Loc in an attempt to hold off the North Vietnamese 4th Army Corps. [8]Ultimately, however, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's effort came too late. The defeat at Xuan Loc only added salt into the wound of Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's political career, as the National Assembly grew hostile towards his handling of the war. One day after Nguyễn Văn Thiệu's departure to Taiwan, Trần Văn Hương was appointed as South Vietnam's President, and he was ordered to seek a negotiated peace with North Vietnam at any cost, to the disappointment of many in South Vietnam's political elite, who argued that the situation could have been different if Thieu had gone earlier. [33]Boat PeopleNotesHalstead, Dick. "Welcome to the Paris of the Orient". White Christmas. Archived from the original on 20 February 2005. Retrieved 25 September 2010.Ho Son Dai, p.112Duong Hao, pp.229–230Cao Van Vien, p.132Pham Ngoc Thach & Ho Khang, p.369Pham Ngoc Thach & Ho Khang, pp.392–393James Willbanks, p. 251Alan Dawson, p. 66Alan Dawson, p. 59Pham Ngoc Thach & Ho Khang, pp. 372–376Ho Son Dai, pp. 138–189Duong Hao, p.208Frank Snepp, p.75Alan Dawson, p.63Pham Ngoc Thach & Ho Khang, p.381Duong Hao, p.219Dinh Van Thien & Do Phuong Linh, p.3Ho Son Dai, p.102Dinh Van Thien & Do Phuong Linh, pp.3–5Ho Son Dai, pp.104–105Hoang Cam, p.168Duong Hao, pp.228–229Tran Xuan Ban, p.146Pham Ngoc Thach & Ho Khang, p.382Hoang Cam, p.172Ho Son Dai, p.135Ho Son Dai, pp.136–137Pham Ngoc Thach & Ho Khang, p.384Ho Son Dai, pp.138–139Le Anh Dai Kiet, p.181Le Anh Dai Kiet, pp.181–182Frank Snepp, p.99Duong Hao, pp.241–242ReferencesAlan Dawson. The Collapse of Saigon in 55 Days. Hanoi: Su That Publishing.Can Van Vien. (1983). The Final Collapse. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Army Center of Military HistoryDinh Van Thien. (2005). Battles on the Doorstep of Saigon. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House.Duong Hao. (1980). A Tragic Chapter. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House.Frank Snepp. (2001). A Disastrous Retreat. Ho Chi Minh City: Ho Chi Minh City Publishing.Hoang Cam. (2001). The Journey of Ten Thousand Days. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House.Ho Son Dai. (2004). History of the 4th Army Corp-Cuu Long Corp. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House.Le Dai Anh Kiet. (2003). The Narratives of Saigon Generals. Hanoi: People's Police Publishing.Nguyen Van Bieu. (2005). The Army at the Tây Nguyên Front- 3rd Army Corp. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing HousePham Ngoc Thach & Ho Khang. (2008). History of the War of Resistance against America (8th edn). Hanoi: National Politics Publishing House.Tran Xuan Ban. (2006). History of the 7th Infantry Division. Hanoi: People's Army Publishing House.Veith, George; Pribbenow, Merle (January 2004). ""Fighting Is an Art": The Army of the Republic of Vietnam's Defense of Xuan Loc, 9-21 April 1975". Journal of Military History. 68 (1): 163–213. doi:10.1353/jmh.2003.0418.James H. Willbanks. (2004). Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War. Lawrence KS: University of Kansas Press.External linksBattle of Xuan LocWeb site of Veterans of the 18th Division/ARVNDocumentary video of the battle where the ARVN General was interviewed on YouTube