Appropriate, These Issues Will Include: Fill & Download for Free

Historically the Spanish American War in 1898 set the foundation for the US Navy to replace the Royal Navy as a worldwide naval force.Spanish-American WarCONTENTSRemember the Maine!War Is DeclaredSpanish-American War BeginsTreaty of ParisThe Spanish-American War was an 1898 conflict between the United States and Spain that ended Spanish colonial rule in the Americas and resulted in U.S. acquisition of territories in the western Pacific and Latin America.Remember the Maine!The war originated in the Cuban struggle for independence from Spain, which began in February 1895.Spain’s brutally repressive measures to halt the rebellion were graphically portrayed for the U.S. public by several sensational newspapers, and American sympathy for the Cuban rebels rose.The growing popular demand for U.S. intervention became an insistent chorus after the still-unexplained sinking in Havana harbor of the American battleship USS Maine, which had been sent to protect U.S. citizens and property after anti-Spanish rioting in Havana.War Is DeclaredSpain announced an armistice on April 9 and speeded up its new program to grant Cuba limited powers of self-government.But the U.S. Congress soon afterward issued resolutions that declared Cuba’s right to independence, demanded the withdrawal of Spain’s armed forces from the island, and authorized the use of force by President William McKinley to secure that withdrawal while renouncing any U.S. design for annexing Cuba.Spain declared war on the United States on April 24, followed by a U.S. declaration of war on the 25th, which was made retroactive to April 21.Spanish-American War BeginsThe ensuing war was pathetically one-sided, since Spain had readied neither its army nor its navy for a distant war with the formidable power of the United States.Commo. George Dewey led a U.S. naval squadron into Manila Bay in the Philippines on May 1, 1898, and destroyed the anchored Spanish fleet in a leisurely morning engagement that cost only seven American seamen wounded. Manila itself was occupied by U.S. troops by August.The elusive Spanish Caribbean fleet under Adm. Pascual Cervera was located in Santiago harbour in Cuba by U.S. reconnaissance. An army of regular troops and volunteers under Gen. William Shafter (including Theodore Roosevelt and his 1st Volunteer Cavalry, the “Rough Riders”) landed on the coast east of Santiago and slowly advanced on the city in an effort to force Cervera’s fleet out of the harbour.Cervera led his squadron out of Santiago on July 3 and tried to escape westward along the coast. In the ensuing battle all of his ships came under heavy fire from U.S. guns and were beached in a burning or sinking condition.Santiago surrendered to Shafter on July 17, thus effectively ending the brief but momentous war.Treaty of ParisBy the Treaty of Paris (signed Dec. 10, 1898), Spain renounced all claim to Cuba, ceded Guam and Puerto Rico to the United States, and transferred sovereignty over the Philippines to the United States for $20 million.The Spanish-American War was an important turning point in the history of both antagonists. Spain’s defeat decisively turned the nation’s attention away from its overseas colonial adventures and inward upon its domestic needs, a process that led to both a cultural and a literary renaissance and two decades of much-needed economic development in Spain.Documenting United States Naval Activities During the Spanish-American WarSpring 1998, Vol. 30, No. 1By Richard W. PeuserFor many people, the conflict known as the Spanish-American War is a little understood episode in U.S. history. It evokes gripping images such as the explosion of the battleship Maine in Havana Harbor on February 15, 1898, or Teddy Roosevelt and the Rough Riders charging up San Juan Hill on July 1, 1898. But few scholars examined the subject at the fiftieth anniversary in 1948, and as the centennial anniversary of the war approaches, there is still a relatively short bibliography. This is unfortunate, since the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) holds hundreds of thousands of pages of records covering U.S. military activities during this period, many untapped by the research community. It is impossible to cite every series in all navy-related record groups relating to the Spanish-American War, but this article will mention the obvious and some not-so-obvious holdings that document United States naval activities during this period.The United States emerged from the Spanish-American War with a global empire, having acquired the possessions of Cuba, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Philippines. It was a popular war with both the public and the press. The victories were glorified by newspapers, popular magazines, and veterans' own accounts published after the war. Songs, poems, and dirges written by the general public romanticized the exploits of ships, soldiers, and sailors. The following poem written by J. L. Miller of Denver, Idaho, entitled Our War Cry Is "The Maine" was sent to the secretary of the navy with the request that it be used as an "official" poem for "Sampson's Fleet":Our War Cry Is "The Maine"Air: "Rally Round the Flag, Boys"Our Court has found that Spain,By her treachery has slainOur brave and noble sailors,By blowing up the Maine.And now our Uncle Sam is plainIn dealing with the same.He calls us "come on, boysWe'll soundly whip old Spain!"[chorus]Old Glory forever, hurrah, boys, hurrah,Down with the Spanish; and up with the stars!While we rally round old glory, boys,Rally once again,Shouting the battle cry: "The Maine, boys."1Despite tensions with Spain dating back to 1895, the McKinley administration only reluctantly went to war. The explosion that destroyed the USS Maine did not convince the cautious McKinley to take immediate aggressive action. Instead he studied all available options short of declaring war. But the public clamor for war was very strong, and newspapers such as the New York World and the New York Journal exerted incredible pressure on both Congress and the White House. Eventually, both bowed to this pressure, and McKinley asked Congress for a declaration of war, which was granted on April 25, 1898. Recent scholarship portrays McKinley as a fully competent commander in chief who grasped the strategic objectives and coordinated policy through both the Navy and War Departments.2Administration of the Navy Department in 1898In order to understand the types of documentation relating to U.S. naval operations, it is important to understand the organization of the naval establishment in 1898. The Department of the Navy was headed by a presidentially appointed civilian secretary. Under him was an assistant secretary and the department's "legal adviser," the Judge Advocate General. In addition, the U.S. Marine Corps fell under naval jurisdiction. The basic organization of the department was the bureau system, which had been implemented in 1842. The bureaus were Construction and Repair, Equipment, Medicine and Surgery, Navigation, Ordinance, Steam Engineering, Supplies and Accounts, and Yards and Docks. Each bureau was further divided into offices. For example, the Naval Academy and the Office of Naval Intelligence were placed in the Bureau of Navigation. The Naval Observatory was administered by the Bureau of Equipment. The navy also created and appointed temporary and permanent boards. Examples of "temporary" boards were the board of inquiry concerning the destruction of the Maine and the Naval War Board, the latter organized by Secretary of the Navy John Long as an informal policy and strategy group accountable directly to him for the duration of the war.3 Examples of "permanent" boards were the Judge Advocate General's promotion and retirement boards which were set up to measure the "fitness" (both mental and physical) of officers serving in the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps.Like the War Department during this period, the navy had organizational flaws. Two major obstacles were lack of coordination among the bureaus and of a centralized policy or planning apparatus to prepare the department for future wars. The latter problem was partially addressed by the creation of the General Board in 1900.4 Despite its organizational flaws and shortcomings, the navy performed capably in the war with Spain. The vision of men such as Capt. Alfred T. Mahan, Rear Adm. Stephen B. Luce, and Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy, as well as technological innovations developed after the Civil War, made a strong enough foundation for the navy's preparedness and successful conduct of war. The outcome was never in doubt. Anchored around the newly developed armored battleship advocated by Mahan, the "Steel Navy" of the United States defeated the outdated, outmanned, and outclassed fleet of the Spanish navy in every battle from the opening guns at Manila Bay, May 1, 1898, to the ultimate destruction of the Spanish fleet at Santiago de Cuba, July 3, 1898.The war with Spain involved naval operations in both the Atlantic and Pacific. Documentation concerning operations, training, administration, and personnel as well as other subjects relating to the naval establishment in 1898 are abundant among the holdings of the National Archives. Before conducting research at the National Archives, individuals are strongly encouraged to examine the variety of the published documentation that is available.Published DocumentationSignificant published primary sources consist of annual reports of the Navy Department (for specific years) and selected published proceedings such as the Report of the Naval Court of Inquiry Upon the Destruction of the United States Battleship Maine in Havana Harbor, February 15, 1898, Together with the Testimony Taken Before the Court (U.S. Senate document 207, 55th Cong., 2d sess.) and Record of Proceedings of a Court of Inquiry in the Case of Rear-Admiral Winfield S. Schley, U.S. Navy (2 volumes, 57th Cong., 1st sess). The Register of the Commissioned and Warrant Officers of the Navy of the United States, and of the Marine Corps (for specific years) is also a fine source for information concerning the names and duty stations of the officers that staffed the navy for given years. These published documents are part of the congressional serial set and are indispensable for researching U.S. naval activities during the conflict. In many instances, testimony of officers and supporting documentation such as "extracts" from a decklog or ship movement orders are included. The Government Printing Office (GPO) published these reports and registers, and they are available at designated depository libraries throughout the United States.A unique resource for the study of U.S. Navy operations during the war with Spain is the Annual Reports of the Secretary of the Navy for the Year 1898. All executive branch agencies are required by law to submit an annual report to Congress explaining actions taken during the previous year. Under the direction of the secretary of the navy, who produced his own report on the overall "state of the navy" and his office's activities, each bureau and administrative office, such as the Judge Advocate General and the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC), produced reports concerning its own specific activities. The Annual Reports for the Navy Department for the Year 1898 consists of two volumes of administrative reports by the bureaus and "independent" offices and a separate volume, Appendix to the Report of the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation, relating to "fleet" and other operational components of the navy in the war with Spain. The main volume consists of orders, maps, statistical summaries, and battle reports. The appendix contains the list of officers and enlisted men killed, drowned, and saved from the USS Maine and the findings of the United States and Spanish naval courts of inquiry concerning the destruction of the Maine. It also includes battle reports, orders, and other documentation relating to operations of the U.S. naval forces in Cuban waters and the Philippines. These printed reports compiled as the "appendix" were extracted and transcribed from the General Correspondence File, 1897–1926 (Entry 19), General Records of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Record Group 80. All the entries include the "Sec. Nav." file number.Archival ResearchRecords in the custody of the National Archives are divided into "record groups," which maintain the same arrangement the creating agency used. Conducting research at the National Archives and Records Administration can be quite challenging, especially for first-time researchers. The depth of research depends on the researcher and the topic. The Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States is the first step for individuals conducting research on broad subjects, particular agencies, or getting general information on the holdings of the National Archives. It is available at most large reference and university libraries and is also available online through the "Research Room" section of the NARA home page on the World Wide Web at http://www.archives.gov/research/. Descriptions include administrative histories, record types (i.e., general correspondence, photographs), and dates covered. The Guide also provides the next step for archival research by listing the pertinent inventories for individual record groups.An "inventory" is a listing designed to tell the researcher both the quantity and nature of the records in a particular record group. Inventories contain a brief administrative history of the agency in question and a series-by-series description of the records. Inventories may also list related records available in other record groups (and in some cases, other repositories) and records that have been made into National Archives microfilm publications. Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel (Record Group 24) even lists the "Chiefs of the Bureau of Naval personnel and of the Predecessor Bureau of Navigation, 1862–1959" (p. 4), and the Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (Record Group 38)includes as an appendix a "List of the First Naval Attachés, 1882–1919" (p. 105).One important source not to be overlooked is the Guide to Materials on Latin America in the National Archives of the United States, compiled by George S. Ulibarri and John P. Harrison. It includes descriptions of various naval record groups that contain information or documentation on a variety of subjects relating to the Spanish-American War. The guide is arranged by branch or function of government, thereunder by record group. A subject index is included at the back of the volume.Records DescriptionThis section describes record groups and pertinent finding aids relating to naval activities during the Spanish-American War. Many significant series of records are available as National Archives microfilm publications. All National Archives microfilm publications are listed in National Archives Microfilm Resources for Research: A Comprehensive Catalog.Record Group 19, Records of the Bureau of ShipsFinding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Ships (1961).(Bureau of Construction and Repair, 1898; Bureau of Equipment, 1898)Functions in 1898: Responsible for ship designs, building, fitting, and repairing all U.S. Navy ships and ship equipment.These records relate to the design and construction of U.S. naval battleships and auxiliary craft. Some general correspondence files concern steel construction of ships and include blueprints and specifications. One of the entries, "Returns of the New York (December 1898–September 1900)" includes cruising information, places sailed, weather conditions, and information on the physical features of the flagship of the North Atlantic Station, which was commanded by Capt. William T. Sampson.Other series include information on coaling stations and coaling equipment, in particular the U.S. naval coaling stations at Honolulu, Hawaii (1885-1899), and Pichilingus Harbor, La Paz, Mexico (1885–1897). One fascinating series, "Records Relating to Homing Pigeons (1896 - 1899)," contains, in addition to correspondence to the U.S. Navy Department, sample packets of pigeon food and one packet labeled "feces." These packets were sent by pigeon experts in Dijon, France, to show the quality of carrier pigeon produced in that region. (The navy experimented with the idea of using messenger pigeons especially for ship-to-ship service.)Record Group 24, Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel(Note: To avoid duplication, this segment will not discuss records relating to U.S. Navy personnel since "Genealogy Notes" in this issue will cover records relating to individuals.)Finding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Bureau of Naval Personnel (1960).(Bureau of Navigation, 1898)Functions in 1898: Responsible for personnel, i.e., recruiting training, staffing (enlisted men and officers), and movement/operations of ships. Perhaps the most powerful bureau within the naval establishment during the war with Spain, the Bureau of Navigation had jurisdiction over personnel decisions of the Department of the Navy, including those relating to officers, enlisted men, and civilians who worked for the department. It administered the United States Naval Academy, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Coast Signal Service.A very popular series records is the "Logs of United States Naval Ships and Stations. 1801–1946." The National Archives has custody of all decklogs of U.S. Navy ships commissioned during the Spanish-American War. Decklogs and station logs were standardized records maintained by a specific ship or shore unit. They include a daily narrative of the unit's activity and record weather and hydrographical data. They were usually handwritten by the officer of the day. Each log begins with the name and rank of the officers and the dates covered by the log.Generally, the more active the ship or station, the more information is provided. In some cases, especially during action or by accident, the decklog was lost. Most notably, the decklog of the USS Maine was lost in the explosion in Havana Harbor, Cuba, February 15, 1898. A few of the Spanish-American War-era ships whose decklogs are in the custody of the National Archives are USS New York, USS Iowa, USS Marblehead, USS Brooklyn, USS Texas, USS Montgomery, USS Oregon, USS Massachusetts, and the USS Olympia. Logs were gathered together and bound, and each volume consists of two or three years of entries. Researchers will find an abundance of information in these logs including narratives of battles; instructions; orders; ship movements; ordnance, cargo, and personnel (including, in some cases, Spanish prisoners of war) taken aboard; and other documented day-to-day activities of navy commissioned ships.The best source to locate the names of the ship and shore units whose logs are in the custody of the National Archives is Special List #44, List of Logbooks of U.S. Navy Ships, Stations, and Miscellaneous Stations, 1801–1947. Special List #44 lists all ship and shore units alphabetically with the accompanying years covered by the logs.Beginning in 1885, the Navy Department created a general file by registering incoming and outgoing correspondence with a serial number, which was then registered with the date received or sent, the file number, name of correspondent, subject, and action taken.5 In the series "General Correspondence, 1889–1913," can be found a variety of actions and decisions made by the bureau chief (Arent Schuyler Crowninshield in 1898) concerning ships, shore establishments, and men. To locate specific documentation for the year 1898 in this series, a researcher would have to examine another entry,"Subject Registers of Letters Sent and Received ("Correspondence/Subjects"), 1896–1902" (8 volumes), which is arranged by the subjects "Persons, Vessels, Miscellaneous."6 The registers give the name of the subject, division, brief (description of incoming correspondence), writer, number, and action taken. If a researcher knows that an officer on the USS Iowa was transferred in 1898 to the USS Brooklyn, it is possible, for example, to search under the officer's name to locate the orders that sent him to the Brooklyn.Among the records of the general correspondence file is an interesting file concerning Commodore George Dewey. It acknowledges the receipt of multiple telegrams from Secretary of the Navy John Long announcing Dewey's rank as "admiral": "Hoist flag as Admiral— (signed) Long." Another telegram passes congratulations from President McKinley, Congress, and the entire Department of Navy to Dewey on his promotion to admiral.7 Other subjects within the registers include the names of executives of the U.S. governrnent, foreign dignitaries, and heads of state.Record Group 38, Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval OperationsFinding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (1966).(Office of Naval Intelligence, 1898; Office of Naval Records and Library, 1898)Functions in 1898: Responsibilities for the Office of Naval Intelligence included the collection of technical and scientific data on foreign navies, usually by written reports and newspaper clippings compiled by the various naval attachés staffing European posts. This office was placed administratively under the Bureau of Navigation when war was declared.Intelligence and intelligence-gathering activities conducted by the U.S. Navy in the war with Spain were adequate, at the least. Naval attachés stationed at U.S. consular posts abroad and commercial agents acting on behalf of the department or the U.S. government forwarded information to the department.8 This information was transmitted in the form of letters, reports, cables, or messages (sometimes in code); analyzed for content; and disseminated to appropriate offices within the department or passed onto other U.S. government agencies whose interests were represented.Letters from attachés in RG 38 are bound into twenty-five volumes covering the period October 28, 1882–December 29, 1900 (entry 90). These "letterbooks" are arranged by the name of post, including the name of the naval attaché stationed there, thereunder chronologically. The volumes covering the period of the Spanish-American War are:London (October 28, 1882–March 31, 1900), 9 volumes.Berlin, Rome, and Vienna (January 10, 1889–September 29, 1900), 6 volumes.Paris and St. Petersburg (September 6, 1892–May 30, 1900), 6 volumes.Tokyo, Madrid, London, Paris, and St. Petersburg (January 5, 1895–December 29, 1900), 1 volume.9Many of these letters include enclosures such as newspaper clippings, technical pamphlets, maps, charts, summaries, and diagrams. These letterbooks are a great source of information concerning foreign navies and merchant fleets, foreign technological developments, and in some instances, the attitude of a particular country towards the United States. They are indexed by a separate series of registers arranged by year, thereunder by subject (entry 89).Communications from the department to naval attachés are also available in this record group. "Cable Correspondence with U.S. Naval Attachés During the Spanish-American War (January 20, 1898–November 1, 1900)" consists of letters, cables, and instructions from the secretary of the navy to attachés stationed at London, Rome, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Tokyo, and Madrid. This series is arranged by post, thereunder chronologically, and consists of letters, bound in two volumes, detailing some of the actions the U.S. Navy took leading up to the actual declaration of war. Many of these letters are the instructions sent by Secretary Long and Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt during March 1898 requesting information on Spain's naval preparations for possible war. Another topic with which the department concerned itself was the condition, preparation, and movements of the Spanish fleet. Accordingly, cables and letters are included in this series, instructing the naval attachés to provide related intelligence. One cablegram, written by Roosevelt to the U.S. attaché in Madrid, Spain, urged caution while instructing him to keep fully abreast of the situation:Alusna, Madrid.March 5, 1898Keep informed state of affairs and report fully by navy secret code preparation and movement Spanish navy. Exercise discretion.Roosevelt10The Navy Department was also concerned about its own overall readiness for a possible war with Spain. Researchers can find a wealth of information in this series concerning the various steps taken by the department such as the purchasing of guns, ordnance, and other weaponry.Record Group 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and LibraryFinding Aid: Preliminary Checklist of the Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library (1945).(Office of Naval Records and Library, 1898)Functions in 1898: Administered the Navy Department Library; continued the publication and distribution of the Official Records of The War of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion.The records collected by the Office of Naval Records and Library cover the period 1775–1927 and document virtually every aspect of U.S. Navy history. The scope and depth makes it the most important record group for the study of U.S. naval history for the nineteenth century. Researchers who intend to study the U.S. Navy during the Spanish-American are strongly urged to start with this record group. The records that make up this collection were gleaned from other naval bureaus, offices, boards, and functions. They were placed into an artificial filing scheme created by the navy's historical section between the years 1923 and 1942.11 Two series are especially important.Entry 464, Subject File, 1775–1910. These records are arranged by an alpha-subject designation. An index lists the subject designations and the titles of the files in chronological order. All of the individual files are either in folders or envelopes, each clearly labeled with the contents and dates of the records inside. Information relating to the U.S. Navy during the Spanish-American War is scattered among these records. Some of the file designations and accompanying document titles are:File HA (Engagement with Enemy Vessels)"July 3,1898, Description of Battle of Santiago written by Lt. Thomas A. Kearney immediately after battle.""1898, Battle of Manila Bay—miscellaneous material. Also, a translation of a Spanish book relating to the battle.""July 3,1898, Spanish Account of the Battle of Santiago, Cuba. List of Spanish Personnel included."File HF (Fires, Explosions, Etc.)"Correspondence Relating to the loss of the USS Maine."File O1 (Reports of Inspection— U.S. Ships)File OO (Operations of Large Groups of vessels)These are the operational records of the fleet and squadron components of the U.S. Navy during the Spanish-American War, including auxiliary crafts. Some of the document titles include:"1898, Battles and Capitulation of Santiago, Cuba, including data concerning the sinking of the USS Maine from a Spanish point of view.""Activities of the German Squadron in Manila Bay, told by Chief Boatswain Ernest Heilman. Other data relative to Dewey and the German Fleet.""1898, Diary of Commodore George Dewey (Manila Campaign, January 1898–May 1898), (photostat).""1898, Narrative of Manila Campaign, preparation at Hong Kong— Battle of Manila Bay, enforcement of blockade and operations resulting in the surrender of Manila."Under the file designation VN (Naval Policy), there are two attaché reports concerning the effects or influence the Spanish-American War had on Europe, in particular, Germany and Great Britain. One report, dated September 16, 1899, written by U.S. naval attaché to Great Britain Lt. Comdr. John C. Colwell, concluded with the remark that, in respect to Her Majesty's Navy, the late war was of little interest since the "professional aspects" and outcome were already known. The second report, dated October 30, 1899, written by U.S. naval attaché to Germany Comdr. William H. Beehler, concerns the effect of the war on German naval policy. It discusses such topics as ship design, armored coast defense vessels, cruisers, and communications (telegraph). These two files reveal some general prevailing attitudes of Europe's navies to that of the U.S. Navy after the end of hostilities.12Entry 464, Area File, August 1775–December 1910. These records are arranged by geographic region, thereunder chronologically. The geographic divisions are further divided into eleven subdivisions. These records have been microfilmed as National Archives Microfilm Publication M625, Area File of the Naval Records Collection, 1775–1910 (414 rolls). The descriptive pamphlet accompanying M625 contains the administrative history of the collection; a description of the geographic locations or areas, including date or time period covered; a map of the divided areas; and a roll-by-roll list of contents.Two examples of the kind of documentation found in this collection are the famous "Sigsbee Telegram," written while the Maine's captain, Charles Sigsbee, was aboard the SS City of Washington, informing the department of the explosion of his vessel, February 15, 1898 (Area #8), and Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt's instructions (in code) to Commodore Dewey to take action against the Spanish fleet in Mirs (Manila) Bay, April 1898 (Area #10).Record Group 52, Records of the Bureau of Medicine and SurgeryFinding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of the Office of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery (1948).(Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, 1898)Functions in 1898: One of the original bureaus since 1842, it concerned itself with naval medicine, including the overall health and welfare of officers and enlisted men of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps. It administered U.S. Navy ship and shore medical facilities.As the title indicates, the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery was the medical arm of the naval establishment in 1898. Included in this record group are personnel-related series, including individual personnel histories of medical officers; records relating to the history of naval medicine; and a general correspondence file, 1885–1912, which has an alphabetical subject index. Under the subject heading, "Maine, USS, Disaster the," researchers can locate records relating to casualty lists, lists of survivors, Marine Corps casualties, final disposition of survivors, permission from the secretary of the navy for the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery to give copies of death certificates to next-of-kin, and death certificates forwarded to the commissioner of pensions.13A thin volume entitled "Casualty Book—War with Spain" includes a statistical summary of total strength, casualties from battle, deaths from battle, and deaths from all causes. The volumes contain an alphabetical listing of men, nativity (residence or origin), where enlisted, and date and place of death. In the back of the volume is an envelope that contains correspondence concerning both U.S. Navy and Marine Corps casualties in the war with Spain. Some of the documents are annotated with additional names and dates of death. The volume and accompanying correspondence are dated 1903.14Record Group 80, General Records of the Department of the Navy, 1798–1947Finding Aid: Preliminary Checklist of the General Records of the Department of the Navy, 1804–1944 (1945).(Office of the Secretary of the Navy, 1898)Functions in 1898: The secretary of the navy (John D. Long in 1898) has charge of all duties connected with the U.S. Naval Establishment including setting policy, creating and abolishing boards, and fiscal matters.The records of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy were filed numerically by subject for the period of the Spanish-American War. The "General Correspondence File, January 1897–August 1926," has an index, arranged alphabetically by name or subject. It is available on microfilm as National Archives Microfilm Publication M1052, General and Special Indexes to the General Correspondence of the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, July 1897–August 1926 (119 rolls). This publication's descriptive pamphlet contains an administrative history, notes on recordkeeping practices of the Navy Department in the late nineteenth century, and a roll-by-roll list of contents. Appendix B of the preliminary inventory for RG 80 contains an alphabetical list of the main subject headings in the file (entry 19), 1897–1926. Since the records were maintained by the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, information on a wide variety of subjects ranging from personnel actions within the department to shipbuilding programs in the navy's many shipyards may be found in this series.The Naval War Board, a policy organization whose members were Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt, Capt. Alfred Thayer Mahan, Adm. Montgomery Sicard, Capt. Arent S. Crowninshield, and Capt. Albert S. Barker, was crucial in providing coherent strategy and war planning for the navy in the war with Spain.15 Under this file heading are handwritten references to five documents whose titles are "Spanish Vessels" (file 7332-3-9), "Light Buoys" (file 7736), "Coaling Stations" (file 6951-6), "Papers from Board" (file 8153), and "Dept. directs Capt. A. T. Mahan to prepare a history of the work of the Board: The Causes leading to its organization, etc., etc., for the General Board" (file 22132). A further annotation remarks that this last document was filed in the records of the General Board. The records of the General Board (1900–1951), also part of RG 80, contain the original manuscript of "History of Naval War Board, 1898," written by Alfred T. Mahan in 1906. Attached to the manuscript are letters written by Captain Mahan to former Secretary of the Navy John D. Long and other members of the Naval War Board and a letter from the president of the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, dated January 26, 1940, requesting a copy of Mahan's work for the college. No organized body of records exists for the Naval War Board, however.16Examples of other documentation in RG 80 are records of various boards commissioned during the Spanish-American War including the Board on Construction, 1889–1909, and the Board on Auxiliary Vessels, 1898. Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Theodore Roosevelt during the period, April 1897–May 1898) also exist. There are eight volumes of letters sent by Roosevelt to other officers of the navy and to private and public individuals. Many letters relate to the formation of the First U.S. Cavalry ("Rough Riders"), the unit he and Col. Leonard Wood formed after he resigned from the position of assistant secretary in May 1898. Letters sent to the attaché in London concern the purchase of naval war stores and auxiliary vessels, and letters to various congressmen concern the push for naval preparedness. 17Record Group 313, Records of Naval Operating ForcesFinding Aid: Preliminary Inventory of the Records of Naval Operating Forces (1963).(Bureau of Navigation, 1898)Functions in 1898: Responsible for ship operations and movements. Records of the components of the U.S. Fleet include North Atlantic Squadron, Eastern Squadron, Asiatic Squadron, European Squadron, and the Flying Squadron (1898).Researchers examining the finding aid for RG 313 will find that the records described within its pages are almost exclusively of Spanish-American War vintage. There is a wealth of documentation concerning operations of the fleet, including squadrons and flotillas. Included are operational reports, journals, orders, and instructions issued by commanders of the various naval forces for the Spanish-American War. Historically, the Navy Department operated five geographically organized squadrons from immediately after the Civil War until 1906–1907: North Atlantic Squadron, European Squadron, Asiatic Squadron, Pacific Squadron, and Training Squadron.18 Accordingly, the records are arranged by squadrons thereunder by type of record and date. Included in this record group is the journal of Rear Adm. William T. Sampson, Commander, North Atlantic Squadron, March–August, 1898. Reports of action during the Battle of Santiago de Cuba can be found in the journal.There are records of the "Flying Squadron," commanded by Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, March 28–November 11, 1898, and records of the United States Auxiliary Naval Force, 1898, which had been organized for the coastal defense of the United States. Other series include correspondence with bureaus of the Navy Department (entry 47) and correspondence with Commodore John C. Watson (entry 51) and Commodore George C. Remey (entry 53). These series are letters sent to the officers by other commanders in the field and the Navy Department in Washington, D.C.These are examples of the kinds of documentation available in the National Archives relating to the U.S. Navy in the "Age of Empire." There is much more. Some of the record groups not covered in this essay includeRecord Group 37, Records of the Hydrographic Office;Record Group 71, Records of the Bureau of Yards and Docks;Record Group 74, Records of the Bureau of Ordnance;Record Group 125, Records of the Office of the Judge Advocate General (Navy);Record Group 127, Records of the U.S. Marine Corps;Record Group 143, Records of the Bureau of Supply and Accounts (Navy);and Record Group 181, Records of Naval Districts and Shore Establishments.Researchers are encouraged to explore these sources as well.One final note for researchers to keep in mind: as mentioned previously, many records in these record groups were removed and placed in Record Group 45, Naval Records Collection of the Office of Naval Records and Library. If records cannot be found in the above record groups, chances are they were refiled in RG 45.Archival research takes time and patience. Both staff and scholars have compared it to detective work. It is important to remember that this kind of research is a layered process, going from the general to the specific. One of the best strategies for archival research is to know and understand the secondary sources relating to a topic before consulting primary documents. Checking footnotes and bibliographies cited by other authors and specialists in the field may help individuals open doors into the world of archival research. The "Suggested Readings" list contains several excellent secondary works concerning U.S. naval operations during the Spanish-American War written in the past thirty years.Researchers are also encouraged to consult with the NARA reference staff archivists who are familiar with the pertinent records and finding aids relating to the U.S. Naval Establishment at the turn of the century. NARA archivists who work with military records can help map out research strategies for prospective researchers.19 Letters of introduction and intention are especially useful prior to a visit to the Archives.This is not the first time a call has been made for more research in this period of U.S. naval history. David F. Trask, in his essay entitled "Research Opportunities in the Spanish-Cuban-American War and World War I," delivered at the National Archives Conference on Naval History, May 29–31, 1974, concluded with "a plea for efforts to stimulate use of the National Archives collections (for this period)." He further stated that, "if and when these sources are properly exploited, we will assuredly process more of the illusive 'new naval History,' about which we hear so much and which indeed is attainable in our time."20 These words echo as loudly today as they did when he first issued the call twenty-three years ago.War Plans and Preparations and Their Impact on U.S. Naval Operations in the Spanish-American Warby Mark L. Hayes, Early History Branch, Naval Historical CenterPaper presented at Congreso Internacional Ejército y Armada en El 98:Cuba, Puerto Rico y Filipinas on 23 March 1998.The United States Navy, much like the nation itself, was in a state of transition in 1898. Traditionally the navy embraced a defensive strategy with an emphasis on commerce raiding. In contrast, the navy was asked during the Spanish-American War to gain control of the waters around the Philippine Islands and the Caribbean Sea. After twenty years of rapid decline into obsolescence following the American Civil War, the navy was in the process of re-equipping itself with steel warships of modern design. The implications of these changes for the conduct of war at sea were not lost on America's naval leadership, who had spent the years and months prior to the war with Spain preparing for conflict with a European power. However, the war itself revealed the growing tactical and logistical complexities of modern naval warfare, and the U.S. Navy, like all navies, was in the process of overcoming the challenges presented by the technology of the new steel warships.The U.S. Navy had in commission over 600 vessels at the close of the American Civil War. Nearly all of the new ships were wartime purchases, hasty constructions, or made from unseasoned timber. After the war, most were sold off or destroyed. In spite of international crises such as the Virginius Affair in 1873, contention with Great Britain over the Alabama Claims, and problems with France over a projected canal in Panama, the strength of the navy continued to decline. By 1879 only forty-eight of the navy's 142 vessels were available for immediate service, and these were obsolete wooden or old ironclad ships. Naval technology had stagnated in the U.S., illustrated by the fact that there was not a single high-power, long-range rifled gun in the entire fleet. In 1884 the U.S. Navy's newest ships were wooden-hulled steam sloops built in the previous decade.1Modernization began during the administration of President Chester Arthur in the early 1880s. Rapid growth in overseas markets and a foreign policy aimed at U.S. control of communications across the isthmus of Central America drove the country towards naval expansion. President Arthur addressed a receptive Congress in his first annual message when he concluded, "I cannot too strongly urge upon you my conviction, that every consideration of national safety, economy, and honor imperatively demands a thorough rehabilitation of the navy."2 Two years of debate on the nature of this expansion culminated with the Navy Act of 1883, authorizing the construction of the steel cruisers Atlanta, Boston, and Chicago, and the dispatch vessel Dolphin. Congress continued the process by approving additional steel warships, including the New Navy's first armored ships, USS Texas and USS Maine. Toward the end of the decade the U.S. Navy still embraced a defensive oriented strategy with cruisers designed for commerce protection and raiding. Even the armored ships under construction were designed to counter the threat of similar vessels in South American navies.3It was during the administration of Benjamin Harrison (1889-93) that the navy's strategy and policy began to change. In his inaugural address, President Harrison called for the continued and rapid construction of modern warships, and the acquisition of bases to maintain the U.S. fleet in foreign seas. Later he urged Congress to authorize construction of battleships, giving support to Secretary of the Navy B.F. Tracy's goal of making the U.S. fleet strong enough "to be able to divert an enemy's force from our coast by threatening his own, for a war, though defensive in principle, may be conducted most effectively by being offensive in its operations."4 Tracy proved to be an excellent administrator, and he marshaled allies for his expansionist policies in both Congress and the navy, including Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Their work bore fruit with the Navy Bill of 30 June 1890, authorizing construction of three battleships later named Indiana, Oregon, and Massachusetts. Along with the battleship Iowa, authorized in 1892, this force formed the core of a new fleet willing to challenge European navies for control of the waters in the Western Hemisphere.While civilian leadership and U.S. industry prepared the navy materially for an offensive war, a new institution, the Naval War College, prepared the service intellectually. Founded in 1884 and placed under the direction of Commodore Stephen B. Luce, the War College contributed greatly to the professionalization of the U.S. Naval Officer Corps at the end of the nineteenth century. Explaining to the Senate the reason for creating the institution, Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler stated that "the constant changes in the methods of conducting naval warfare imposed by the introduction of armored ships, swift cruisers, rams, sea-going torpedo boats, and high- power guns. . .render imperative the establishment of a school where our officers may be enabled to keep abreast of the improvements going on in every navy in the world."5By the 1890s the curriculum at the War College included training problems where students drafted plans for operations in the event of war with specific countries under particular circumstances. Beginning in 1894 the War College, and later special boards convened by the Secretary of the Navy, examined the possibility of war with Spain over trouble in Cuba. When Secretary of the Navy John Long formed the Naval War Board in March 1898, the Navy Department and the McKinley administration had the benefit of four years of planning for such a conflict. The first plan to emerge from the Naval War College was a paper prepared in 1894 by Lieutenant Commander Charles J. Train who was assigned to write on "Strategy in the Event of War with Spain." Train believed that the first priority of the U.S. Navy was the destruction of the Spanish fleet which should be accomplished at the earliest possible date. The plan called for the seizure of Nipe Bay on Cuba's northeast coast as an anchorage and coaling station to support a blockade of the island's principal ports. It was expected that a Spanish expedition from Cadiz would attempt to relieve Cuba via Puerto Rico, but would be met by a concentrated U.S. fleet ready to defeat it.6When the Cuban insurrection broke out the following year, the officers in charge at the Naval War College believed that it was important to undertake a full-scale study of a Spanish-American conflict. They gave the class of 1895 a "special problem" concerning war with Spain where the objective was to secure independence for Cuba. The plan, submitted to the Navy Department in January 1896, called for an early joint operations against Havana. Thirty thousand regulars would be landed near the colonial capital from a staging area in Tampa, Florida, fifteen days after war was declared, followed by 25,000 volunteers two weeks later. The U.S. fleet, based out of Key West, would intercept any Spanish expedition attempting to reinforce the defenders in Cuba. Such a relief attempt was expected thirty days into the conflict.7The Office of Naval Intelligence entered the planning effort later in 1896. Lieutenant William Kimball prepared a plan that focussed on a tight naval blockade of Cuba as the primary means of persuading Spain to release control of her colony. Supporting attacks against Manila and the Spanish coast would, it was believed, further induce Spain to negotiate an end to the conflict. According to Kimball's plan, only if these efforts failed to bring about peace, would the army land in Cuba and operate against Havana. The Naval War College criticized the plan on the grounds that it dispersed U.S. naval strength to a dangerous extent, and warned that a blockade alone would be insufficient to bring Spain to the negotiating table. The proposed expedition to Spanish waters was thought to be counter-productive as it might harden Spanish resolve and invite unwanted diplomatic pressure from other European countries. However, Captain Henry Taylor, president of the War College, endorsed the idea to use the Asiatic Squadron against Spanish forces in the Philippines, and this element would reappear in later plans.8Admiral Francis M. Ramsay, chief of the influential Bureau of Navigation, had long been an strong opponent of the Naval War College, and it is likely that he was the one who persuaded Secretary of the Navy Hilary Herbert to convene a board in the summer of 1896 to draft a separate plan for war with Spain. Like the Kimball plan, the Ramsay Board focused on the a naval blockade, but added the deep water ports of Puerto Rico to those of Cuba. The destruction of crops in Cuba by both sides led the Board to believe that the Spanish garrison needed to import food in order to survive. A relief force from Spain would consume most of its coal simply in crossing the Atlantic and thus would be in no position to engage American naval forces. Although the present strength of the U.S. Navy was sufficient to meet and defeat any fleet arriving from Spain, the Board called for the purchase of a number of small fast steamers to enforce the blockade. Finally, the European Squadron should be reinforced by ships from the U.S. and the Asiatic Squadron, and together operate against the Spanish coast after capturing the Canary Islands as an advance base. Captain Taylor strongly dissented from the views of the Board stating that large operations in Spanish waters were too dangerous, and that a naval blockade would not be sufficient to subdue Spanish forces in Cuba.9Perhaps confused by the different positions in the existing plans, the new Secretary of the Navy, John Long, convened his own War Planning Board under Commander in Chief of the North Atlantic Station, Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard, in June 1897. Chief Intelligence Officer Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright was the only member who had served on the previous board. The Sicard Board endorsed the War College idea that joint operations against Havana would be necessary to end the war. Therefore, the plan called for the early seizure of Matanzas, sixty miles east of Havana, to serve as a base of operations against the latter, and to deliver arms to the Cuban insurgents. Purchased or chartered merchant steamers were to be armed and sent to the Caribbean to enforce a swift and strong blockade. This would also free the heavier ships to intercept a relief force from Spain. The members emphasized the need for colliers to refuel the fleet on blockade rather than forcing vessels to return to coaling stations. Although the Board rejected the idea of trying to capture the Canary Islands, it recommended the formation of a flying squadron consisting of two armored cruisers and two commerce destroyers to operate on the coast of Spain in order to detain Spanish ships in home waters. The plan called for the reduction and garrisoning of the principal ports of Puerto Rico as soon as circumstances permitted. The Board also returned to the idea of using the Asiatic Squadron against Spanish forces in the Philippines. As in the previous plans, the objects of these operations were to tie down or divert enemy ships and to give the United States' a stronger bargaining position at the peace settlement.10When war between the United States and Spain appeared unavoidable following the destruction of USS Maine in Havana harbor on 15 February 1898, the Navy Department had a solid body of plans and documents honed by four years of debate by its leading officers. Although the realities of war would force several modifications, many of the concepts laid out in the Sicard Plan were implemented: a strong blockade of Cuba; support for the insurgents; operations against Spanish forces in the Philippines and Puerto Rico; and the formation of a squadron to operate in Spanish waters. Perhaps more importantly, nearly every plan called for the purchase or charter of merchant vessels to serve as auxiliary cruisers, colliers, and transports. The data furnished in appended lists and the inspiration to act quickly served as a basis for decision making in those crucial weeks prior to war.At the beginning of 1898 the fleet of the United States Navy consisted of six battleships, two armored cruisers, thirteen protected cruisers, six steel monitors, eight old iron monitors, thirty- three unprotected cruisers and gunboats, six torpedo boats, and twelve tugs.11 Noticeably absent from this list are colliers, supply vessels, transports, hospital ships, repair ships, and the large number of small vessels necessary for maintaining an effective blockade of Cuba's numerous ports. As the Navy Department's war plans clearly indicated, the government would need to purchase or contract for scores of ships in the event of war with a naval power. The destruction of the Maine propelled the department into action. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt organized a Board of Auxiliary Vessels which, utilizing material in the department's war plans, prepared a list of suitable private craft that would meet the Navy's expanded needs. On 9 March Congress passed a $50 million emergency defense appropriation bill, and the Navy Department began to acquire vessels. By the end of the war, the navy had purchased or leased 103 warships and auxiliaries. Another twenty-eight vessels were added from existing government organizations including revenue cutters, lighthouse tenders, and the vessels of the Fish Commission. After the war auxiliary vessels such as colliers, refrigerator ships, and distilling ships became a permanent part of the fleet.12The availability of coal was the single most important factor in determining naval operations in 1898. A lack of coal severely limited Admiral Cervera's options upon arriving in the Caribbean with his Spanish squadron in the middle of May, and American concerns over coaling nearly allowed him to escape from Santiago de Cuba near the end of the month. There were essentially three sources of fuel available for naval squadrons: coaling stations at friendly bases, neutral ports, and other ships (usually colliers). Key West served as the base for U.S. naval operations in the Caribbean. International law permitted, but did not require, neutrals to provide visiting ships of belligerents just enough coal to allow them to make it to the nearest friendly port, but this was an option of last resort. Colliers were the most common source of fuel for vessels of the fleet blockading Cuba. Six were available to the U.S. fleet early in the war, and an additional eleven were purchased by the end.The endurance of a ship depended on a number of circumstances, such as bunker capacity, the amount of coal stored on deck, the quality of coal, how many boilers were lit, and the ship's speed while under way. Most major warships of the U.S. fleet had an operational range in the neighborhood of 4000 nautical miles, or just over two weeks of continuous steaming at ten knots.13 Naturally, ships' commanding officers were reluctant to allow their bunkers to get anywhere near empty, and they availed themselves of nearly every opportunity to add to their supply of coal.Coaling from open lighters in port was the quickest and most efficient means of refueling a ship. Winches set up on the warships hauled the coal on board in bags, where small carts carried them to the coal chutes leading from the upper deck directly to the bunkers. When coaling from colliers it was best to find a sheltered anchorage safe from the effects of rough seas. Coaling in the open sea with a ship alongside was always considered a dangerous evolution. Colliers were equipped with cotton-bale fenders to protect the ships when the motion was slight. However, any situation where the swell was sufficient to cause either ship to roll more than three or four degrees or rise more than one or two feet was considered too dangerous to attempt. There were many occasions when coaling at sea was simply not possible, and perhaps many more where it was considered problematic. The speed with which coal could be taken on board varied widely, most often dependent on the weather. On 31 May USS Brooklyn took on coal at a rate of eighteen tons per hour, while eight days later she achieved a rate of nearly fifty-seven tons per hour. The weather rarely cooperated long enough for more than a few hundred tons to be loaded on board before rising seas called a halt to the operation.14 It is important to have an appreciation of the problems inherent in refueling warships of the day for a proper perspective on strategic and operational decisions made during the war.Secretary Long formally organized the Naval War Board in March 1898 to advise him on strategy and operations. Initial members were Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt, Rear Admiral Montgomery Sicard (who had just arrived from command of the North Atlantic Station), Captain Arent S. Crowninshield, and Captain Albert S. Barker. By May, Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan joined the organization. Roosevelt left to become a lieutenant colonel in the First Volunteer Cavalry Regiment, and the Navy Department reassigned Captain Barker to command USS Newark. Although it had no executive authority, the Board exerted considerable influence on operations through its advisory capacity. In particular, Mahan's views often dominated. Following earlier war plans, the Board recommended concentrating on Spain's outlying possessions with a close blockade of Cuba, giving the army time to mobilize sufficient strength for land campaigns in Cuba and Puerto Rico.15As the Navy Department worked with the president and the War Department in developing strategy, Secretary Long began repositioning naval units in preparation of the opening of hostilities. Since January, much of the North Atlantic Squadron had been concentrated for winter exercises at Key West, Florida. The first colliers did not reach the fleet until 3 May, nearly two weeks after the blockade began. On 17 March the battleships Massachusetts and Texas were ordered to join the armored cruiser Brooklyn at Hampton Roads, Virginia, to form the Flying Squadron under Commodore Winfield Scott Schley. The protected cruisers Minneapolis and Columbiajoined Schley's force prior to the outbreak of hostilities. The squadron was organized to protect the U.S. coast against a sudden descent by the Spanish armored cruisers of Pascual Cervera's squadron, known to be concentrating in the Cape Verde Islands. The Navy Department recalled the protected cruiser USS San Franciscoand Commodore John A. Howell from Europe. On 20 April Howell assumed command of the newly formed Northern Patrol Squadron, which was responsible for the protection of the coast and coastal trade from the Delaware capes to Bar Harbor, Maine. Rear Admiral Henry Erben commanded the Auxiliary Naval Force with his headquarters on shore at New York City. This command consisted primarily of eight old iron monitors stationed at several U.S. ports.16Assistant Secretary Roosevelt sent a telegraphic order to Commodore George Dewey on 25 February commanding him to concentrate the ships of the Asiatic Station at Hong Kong. In the event of war he was to take his squadron and destroy the Spanish ships in Philippine waters. Dewey's command at Hong Kong consisted of the protected cruisers Olympia, Boston, and Raleigh, and the gunboats Concord and Petrel. The Revenue Cutter McCulloch joined the force on 17 April, and the protected cruiser Baltimore arrived on 22 April. Dewey also prepared for future operations in a region without friendly bases by purchasing the British steamers Nanshanand Zafiro to carry coal and supplies for his squadron.17Anticipating a showdown with Spanish fleet in the Atlantic theater, Secretary Long ordered the battleship USS Oregon to depart from its home port at Bremerton, Washington, for San Francisco, California, on 7 March, to begin the first leg of a 14,700 nautical mile journey to Key West. The gunboat USS Marietta made the battleship's voyage quicker and easier by arranging for coal and supplies in South American ports along the way. The Oregonleft San Francisco on 19 March, under the command of Captain Charles E. Clark, and arrived at Callao, Peru, on 4 April, traveling 4800 miles in just sixteen days. The battleship departed Callao on 7 April, and arrived at Sandy Point at the southern tip of the continent ten days later. Rendezvousing with the Marietta on 21 April, the Oregonheaded north, putting into Rio de Janeiro on 30 April, where Secretary Long warned Captain Clark that Admiral Cervera's squadron was at sea. Departing Rio on 5 May, the American battleship arrived at Bahia, Brazil, three days later. Not wishing to submerge his ship's armor belt in case of an encounter with the Spanish squadron, Clark ordered on board only enough coal to reach Barbados, where he arrived on 18 May. The Oregon steamed into the American base at Key West on 26 May in efficient condition and ready for operations against the Spanish fleet.18Although President McKinley continued to press for a diplomatic settlement to the Cuban problem, he accelerated military preparations begun in January when an impasse appeared likely. McKinley asked Congress on 11 April for permission to intervene in Cuba. On 21 April, the President ordered the Navy to begin the blockade of Cuba, and Spain followed with a declaration of war on 23 April. Congress responded with a formal declaration of war on 25 April, made retroactive to the start of the blockade.International law required a blockade to be effective in order to be legal. With the absence of colliers and the Atlantic fleet divided between Key West and Hampton Roads, the American effort was initially limited to the north coast of Cuba between Cardenas and Bahia Honda, and Cienfuegos on the south coast. The U.S. fleet at Key West at the beginning of hostilities consisted of three armored ships, three monitors, one protected cruiser, two unprotected cruisers, seven gunboats, one armed yacht, six torpedo boats, and five armed tugs. In the early light of 22 April, Sampson's fleet deployed from Key West to steam across the Florida Straits and begin the blockade. Sampson believed he could reduce the defenses of Havana by rolling up the Spanish fortifications from the west. However, Secretary Long, following the advice of the Naval War Board, ordered him not to risk his armored ships unnecessarily against land fortifications in light of Cervera's potential deployment to the Caribbean. The Navy Department was considering occupying the port of Matanzas, garrisoning it with a large military force, and opening communications with the insurgents. Long wanted Sampson to keep his most powerful ships ready to escort the transports if McKinley should decide on an early landing in Cuba.19By the morning of 23 April the advance ships of the blockading fleet were off their assigned ports. Additional vessels reinforced them over the next several days. The U.S. Navy struggled during the first weeks of the war to assemble the logistical apparatus necessary to support the blockade. Ships had to keep steam up in their boilers to pursue unknown vessels as they came into sight. Until colliers were fitted out and sent south, most of the blockading ships were forced to return to Key West to coal. Fresh water and food were also in short supply during the early days of the war.The blockade was monotonous duty broken only by the rare capture of a Spanish vessel or an exchange of gunfire with gunboats and batteries. Although the Navy Department prohibited Sampson's vessels from engaging heavy batteries, like those around Havana, they allowed the bombardment of smaller field works. On 27 April the New York, Puritan, and Cincinnati shelled Point Gorda at Matanzas to prevent the completion of new batteries.20 Most encounters were only skirmishes resulting in few if any casualties.A few actions were intense, such as the one at Cardenas on 11 May when the U.S. Navy gunboat Wilmington, the torpedo boat Winslow, and the Revenue Cutter Hudson were drawn deep into the harbor by Spanish gunboats. Hidden Spanish batteries ambushed the Winslow, severely damaging her, killing ten and wounding twenty-one of her crew. While under heavy fire the Hudson towed the torpedo boat out of the harbor as the Wilmingtoncovered the withdrawal with rapid fire against the Spanish guns.21The U.S. blockading forces also undertook operations to isolate Cuba from telegraphic communications to Madrid via Cienfuegos, Santiago, and Guantanamo. The most celebrated action of this type occurred on 11 May off Cienfuegos. Commander Bowman McCalla of the cruiser Marblehead organized the party and planned the operation to cut the underwater cables leaving the city. Marine sharpshooters and machine guns in steam cutters poured a continuous fire into Spanish positions on shore, along with gunfire support from the Marblehead and the gunboat Nashville, while sailors in launches dragged the sea floor with grapelling hooks for the cables. The launch and cutter crews endured heavy Spanish fire for three hours and cut the two main telegraph cables (leaving a third, local line), and dragged the ends out to sea. Every member of this expedition was awarded the Medal of Honor.22The strength of the North Atlantic Fleet and the effectiveness of the blockade grew as U.S. Navy vessels concentrated in the Caribbean and yards converted and armed vessels purchased by the Congressional Bill of 9 March. From the start of the blockade until the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba in mid-July, the North Atlantic Fleet added to its strength three battleships, one armored cruiser, one monitor, five protected cruisers, one unprotected cruiser, seven auxiliary cruisers, four gunboats, two torpedo boats, five armed tugs, six revenue cutters, nine armed yachts, two supply ships, a hospital ship, a repair ship, a distilling ship, and thirteen colliers.23Secretary Long telegraphed Commodore Dewey at Hong Kong on 21 April informing him that the U.S. blockade of Cuba had begun and that war was expected at any moment. On 24 April, British authorities informed the commodore that war had been declared and he must leave the neutral port within twenty-four hours. Dewey also received a telegram from the Navy Department, instructing him to proceed immediately to the Philippine Islands and begin operations against the Spanish fleet. However, Dewey wanted to receive the latest intelligence from the American consul at Manila, Oscar Williams, who was expected daily. The American squadron moved to Mirs Bay on the Chinese coast thirty miles east of Hong Kong to await a circulating pump for the Raleigh and the arrival of Williams. They spent two days drilling, distributing ammunition, and stripping the ships of all wooden articles (which could add to the damage of fires on board ship caused by enemy gunfire). Almost immediately after Williams arrived on 27 April, the American squadron departed for the Philippines, in search of the ships of the Spanish squadron. The consul correctly informed Dewey that Rear Admiral Patricio Montojo y Pasaron intended to take his ships to Subic Bay. What Williams did not know is that Montojo returned to Manila after taking his squadron to Subic Bay only to discover that the defenses he had hoped to fight under were far from complete.24Dewey sent two of his cruisers to reconnoiter Subic Bay on 30 April. Finding it empty, and in defiance of the reports of mines in the channel, the Americans pressed on into Manila Bay and discovered the Spanish squadron near Cavite. Leaving his two auxiliaries in the bay guarded by the McCulloch, Dewey formed his remaining ships into a line and steamed in a oval pattern along the five-fathom curve, pouring a heavy fire into the outgunned Spanish force. Montojo's gunners replied from their ships and two 5.9 inch guns on Sangley Point, but with little effect. The Americans scored critical hits on the larger Spanish warships, setting them ablaze. After nearly two hours of fire, Dewey ordered his captains to withdraw, acting on reports that his ships were running low on ammunition.25Dewey took his squadron five miles off Sangley Point and signaled his captains to come on board and report their condition. The commodore discovered that his squadron had sustained very little damage and that he had plenty of ammunition to continue the battle. After allowing the crewmen of his ships to enjoy a light meal, Dewey ordered his ships to reengage the remnants of Montojo's shattered squadron. The Spanish admiral had pulled his surviving vessels behind Cavite into the shallow waters of Bacoor Bay to make a final stand. Hitting the Spanish ships in their new anchorage proved difficult, and Dewey ordered the gunboats Concord and Petrel, with their shallow draft, to destroy them at close range. The garrison at Cavite raised a white flag at about 12:15, and the firing ended shortly thereafter.Montojo's fleet was destroyed, suffering 371 casualties compared to only nine Americans wounded. When official word on the magnitude of the Navy's victory reached the United States, nearly a week later, the American public heaped enthusiastic praises on Dewey as wild celebrations erupted throughout the country. Meanwhile, the U.S. squadron took control of the arsenal and navy yard at Cavite. However, 26,000 Spanish regulars and 14,000 militia garrisoned various points in the Philippine Islands including 9000 at Manila. Dewey cabled Washington stating that, although he controlled Manila Bay and could probably induce the city to surrender, he requested 5000 men to seize Manila.26Admiral Cervera had repeatedly warned the Spanish Ministry of Marine that his squadron would face certain destruction if sent to the Caribbean. Even so, he departed the Cape Verde Islands under orders on 29 April with his squadron of four armored cruisers, towing three torpedo-boat destroyers, intending to steam for Puerto Rico. To look for the Spanish squadron, the U.S. Navy Department had three fast former mail steamers, Harvard, Yale, and St. Louis, establish a patrol line stretching from Puerto Rico and along the Leeward and Windward Islands. As long as Cervera's location remained uncertain, the strength of the U.S. fleet would be divided between Rear Admiral Sampson's North Atlantic Fleet based in Key West and Commodore Schley's Flying Squadron based in Hampton Roads; the former to maintain the blockade of Cuba and the latter to guard the east coast of the United States from a sudden descent by the Spanish cruisers.27Sampson correctly deduced that Cervera intended to make for San Juan, Puerto Rico, and he determined to deprive the Spanish fleet of the benefits of that port. Leaving his smaller ships to maintain the blockade of Cuba's northern ports, the American admiral embarked on an eight-day journey, plagued by the slow speed and mechanical unreliability of his two monitors. The American force arrived off San Juan early on 12 May. After a nearly four-hour bombardment of the Spanish works, Sampson broke off the engagement and returned to Key West, satisfied that Cervera's ships were not in San Juan.28The Spanish squadron's crossing of the Atlantic had been slowed by the need to tow the fragile destroyers. As he approached the West Indies, the Spanish admiral dispatched two of these vessels to the French island of Martinique to gain information on American movements and the availability of coal. On 12 May Cervera learned that Sampson was at San Juan. The Spanish admiral also discovered that the French had refused to sell him any coal. Driven by the need to refuel his ships and the desire to avoid combat with a superior American squadron, Cervera steamed for the Dutch harbor of Curaçao. He arrived there on 14 May only to be further disappointed when the expected Spanish collier failed to arrive, and the Dutch governor authorized the purchase of only 600 tons of coal. After considering his options, Cervera chose to take his fleet to Santiago de Cuba where he arrived on the morning of 19 May.29With Sampson out of touch for long periods during his return from Puerto Rico, the Navy Department on 13 May ordered Commodore Schley's Flying Squadron to Charleston, South Carolina, in preparation to intercept the Spanish fleet. Further orders directed Schley to Key West and a meeting with Rear Admiral Sampson. The Navy Department believed that Cervera's most likely objective was Cienfuegos because of its rail connection to Havana. Therefore, after arriving in Key West on 18 May, Schley received orders to take his squadron, reinforced by the battleship Iowa and several small vessels, and proceed to Cienfuegos. On 19 May, after Schley left on his mission, the White House received a report that the Spanish ships had run into Santiago de Cuba. The source of this information was Domingo Villaverde, an agent working as a telegraph operator in the governor-general's palace in Havana. This connection was a closely guarded secret, so when the information reached the Navy Department as an unconfirmed report, Long's telegram to Sampson sounded less than certain.30Sampson forwarded Long's notice to Schley along with his own decision to maintain the Flying Squadron off Cienfuegos, believing that even if Cervera had put into Santiago, he would have to bring his squadron west to deliver the munitions thought to be an essential part of his mission. USS Minneapolis and the St. Paul were sent to Santiago to confirm the presence of the Spanish squadron, and Sampson instructed Schley to keep in communication with them. On 20 May Sampson received a report from the assistant chief of staff at Key West confirming the previous report from Washington that the Spanish squadron had put into Santiago. He then sent orders instructing Schley to proceed to Santiago if he was satisfied that Cervera was not in Cienfuegos. On 21 May Sampson sent the collier Merrimac with 4500 tons of coal to Schley's support. Two days later the rear admiral departed Key West and cruised in the Bahama Channel with a force of thirteen ships to block any attempt by Cervera to enter Havana from the north side of the island. As additional information arrived at the Navy Department confirming Cervera's presence at Santiago, Long and Sampson dispatched several messages encouraging Schley to proceed to that port and prevent the Spanish squadron from escaping.31The Flying Squadron arrived off Cienfuegos early on the morning of 22 May when Schley received the first notice that the Spanish squadron might be at Santiago. The following day he received the second. However, the initial uncertainty of the Spanish squadron's whereabouts and the difficulty of observing ships in Cienfuegos led Schley to remain where he was. Finally, on 24 May, the commodore learned through Cuban insurgents that Cervera's ships were not in port. That evening the American squadron headed east, two days later than Sampson expected.32In his message informing Sampson of his departure Schley stated that he was concerned about having a sufficient supply of coal in his warships. The Iowa had arrived off Cienfuegos with half her capacity, and on 23 May she took on just 255 tons more. The Texas was also short of coal, and her projecting sponsons made coaling at sea almost impossible. The one collier then with the squadron was insufficient to coal enough ships when the weather afforded an opportunity. Schley informed Sampson that these concerns and his desire to coal his ships at a protected anchorage led him to choose Môle St. Nicolas, Haiti, as his next destination.33The Flying Squadron arrived at the longitude of Santiago on 26 May, and Schley communicated with the American cruisers watching the port. Engine problems on the collier Merrimac caused the squadron to average only seven knots in its journey from Cienfuegos. The weather had been too rough to allow coaling at sea and several of his smaller vessels in addition to the Texas were running low on fuel. Rather than remaining on station with his larger ships and trusting Sampson to supply him what he needed, Schley ordered his squadron to head west for Key West to refuel. Sampson, who had since returned to Key West, and Secretary Long were shocked when they learned of Schley's intentions on 28 May. Making it clear that he and the Navy Department expected the Flying Squadron to remain on station, Sampson assembled his squadron and departed for Santiago. On 27 May the weather off the south coast of Cuba improved, and Schley reversed course once again, finally establishing a blockade at Santiago de Cuba on 29 May.34Schley's coaling problems impressed on Sampson and the Navy Department the need to seize a sheltered anchorage on the south coast of Cuba, and Guantánamo Bay had already been considered. Shortly after Schley established the blockade of Santiago Sampson ordered the First Marine Battalion at Key West to embark on their transports and prepare to land in Cuba. At the same time he sent Commander Bowman McCalla and USS Marblehead to reconnoiter Guantánamo Bay as a possible anchorage. McCalla's report was favorable, and on 10 June the Marine battalion under Lieutenant Colonel Robert Huntington landed, establishing a position on the east side of the outer harbor that served to protect the fleet during its coaling operations throughout the campaign.35 Having a reliable location to refuel so close to Santiago proved invaluable to the blockading fleet. It allowed American captains to keep steam up in their ships' boilers ready to pursue Cervera's squadron when it attempted to break out. On the morning of 3 July, the battleship Oregon had all four boilers lit, giving her the speed necessary to catch the Cristobal Colon in the running fight during the final stage of the Battle of Santiago de Cuba. This high rate of coal consumption could be maintained because the Oregon was able to refuel four times from 1 June to 3 July, once at sea and three times at Guantánamo Bay.36Although McKinley and his advisors had intended to wait until the end of the rainy season to send a major land expedition to Cuba, they believed that the bottling up of the Spanish squadron at Santiago afforded the U.S. an opportunity to strike a damaging blow to the enemy's military capability in the Caribbean. On 1 June Sampson received a report from Secretary Long that 25,000 men under Major General William Shafter were preparing to embark for Cuba from Tampa, Florida, and that the North Atlantic Fleet should convoy the troops and assist the landing near Santiago. As the navy prepared to carry the troops, Sampson took steps to tighten the blockade of Cervera's squadron.At the onset of the campaign Sampson seized on the idea to sink a vessel in the narrow channel leading to the harbor of Santiago. His intention was to keep the Spanish ships from escaping until the army could capture the city or assist the navy in passing the forts and mines at the harbor entrance. The Naval War Board in Washington approved, and Sampson selected the collier Merrimac under naval constructor Richard Pearson Hobson for the operation. Hobson and seven volunteers took the ship into the channel during the early morning hours of 3 June. Spanish gunfire from shore batteries shot away the vessel's steering gear and anchor chains making it impossible for the Americans to sink the vessel in the proper location. Only two of the ten prepared scuttling charges went off, and the Merrimac came to rest too far up the channel to pose a serious obstacle. Hobson and his men were captured by the Spanish.37Major General Shafter's troop transports departed Tampa on 14 June, rendezvousing with their navy escorts the following day. The expedition arrived off Santiago on 20 June and began to disembark east of the city at Daiquiri two days later. In addition to providing escort for the convoy, Sampson's ships furnished fifty-two steam launches, sailing launches, whaleboats, lifeboats, and cutters to help the army and its equipment ashore. Shafter expressed deep appreciation for the navy's assistance in this matter, as the boats on the army's transports were too few in number to disembark the expedition in any reasonable length of time.38Sampson's armored ships maintained a tight blockade of Santiago de Cuba, coaling from colliers in open water when the seas were calm and from colliers at Guantánamo Bay when the weather required it. On the morning of 3 July, Admiral Cervera attempted to break out of the American blockade thus precipitating the Battle of Santiago de Cuba. Off the entrance to the bay that morning were the battleships Texas, Oregon, Iowa, and Indiana, the armored cruiser Brooklyn, and the armed yachts Vixen and Gloucester. Most of the battle was a running fight as the blockading vessels attempted to get enough steam up to keep up with their quarry. Foul bottoms and poor quality coal reduced the speeds of the usually swift Spanish cruisers. Ranges were often in excess of 4000 yards: greater than the crews trained for and longer than the new rangefinders could handle. In addition, radical turns in the early stages of the battle further complicated the gunnery problem for the Americans. Smoke from the weapons' brown powder and frequent mechanical failures further reduced the effectiveness of the U.S. Navy's gunfire. The battleships and the Brooklyn generally registered hits when they achieved a parallel or near parallel course with the Spanish cruisers and maintained it for several minutes. Although only 1.29 percent of American shots hit their targets, the volume of fire was sufficient to destroy or run aground each one of Cervera's vessels.39 The defeat of this squadron freed President McKinley and the Navy Department to pursue other plans.In the years prior to the war, U.S. planning boards had never reached a consensus on the issue of deploying a squadron of warships to European waters. Although the Naval War Board had not ordinally planned such a deployment, the formation of the Spanish Navy's Reserve Squadron resurrected the debate. Following the departure of Cervera's squadron to the Caribbean, the Ministry of Marine began to organize a second squadron under Rear Admiral Manuel de la Cámara y Libermoore centered around the battleship Pelayo and the armored cruiser Emperator Carlos V. Although it was believed by the Navy Department that this force would reinforce Cervera, it held out the possibility that the Spanish ships would head for the Philippines. Consequently, the monitors Monterey and Monadnock were prepared to undertake a slow and hazardous voyage across the Pacific to reinforce Dewey's command at Manila. On 16 June the Reserve Squadron departed Cadiz and steamed into the Mediterranean bound for the Philippine Islands.40The Navy Department responded to the news of Cámara's deployment by ordering Rear Admiral Sampson to detail two battleships, an armored cruiser, and three auxiliary cruisers to be ready to depart for Europe if the strong Spanish force passed into the Red Sea. When the Reserve Squadron arrived at Port Said on 26 June, Washington decided to organize formally a force entitled the Eastern Squadron. The command was activated on 7 July under the leadership of Commodore John C. Watson, and consisted of the battleship Oregon, the protected cruiser Newark, and the auxiliary cruisers Yosemite and Dixie. The battleship Massachusetts was added on 9 July, the auxiliary cruiser Badger on 12 July, and the protected cruiser New Orleans on 17 July. The navy also assembled six colliers and a refrigerator ship at Hampton Roads, Virginia, to support the Eastern Squadron's deployment. The Navy Department allowed news of the squadron's formation and its intended target to be widely circulated. It was hoped that such news would force Spain to recall the Reserve Squadron to Spanish waters.41Cámara ran into difficulty attempting to refuel his ships at Port Said. The Egyptian government refused to sell him coal, nor would it allow the Spanish squadron to take on coal from its own colliers while in port. Cámara was forced to take his ships out to sea where bad weather prevented any attempt at coaling. The Spanish admiral took his squadron through the Suez Canal, into the Red Sea and began to refuel on 7 July. The delay gave the Spanish government an opportunity to reconsider Cámara's mission in light of the near certainty that American ships would enter Spanish waters. The Sagasta government made the decision to recall the Reserve Squadron to Cadiz, and Watson's deployment was held in abeyance for the time being.42Even though Spain no longer threatened Dewey's control of the situation at Manila, the Navy Department was still concerned about German intentions, especially in the Philippines where it was thought Germany might try to take advantage of the situation to increase her colonial possessions in the Pacific. Rear Admiral Sicard and Captain Crowninshield of the Naval War Board still wanted to send Watson to reinforce Dewey. Captain Mahan dissented from this view. In the mean time, Watson's ships were needed to support the expedition to Puerto Rico. By the time the Eastern Squadron was free to depart the Caribbean peace negotiations were under way and Watson's deployment was held back for good.43One overlooked role in the story of the Eastern Squadron is that played by the repair ship Vulcan. She was fully equipped with lathes, jacks, and small foundries for brass and iron castings. The Vulcan reported for duty off Santiago on 1 July and was stationed at Guantánamo Bay for the remainder of the war. During that time she filled 528 orders for repairs and 256 requisitions for supplies. This work included making extensive repairs of boilers, engines, and pumps, much of it fitting out the ships of the Eastern Squadron as it prepared for its trans-Atlantic voyage.44 It is thought that the pressure put on the Spanish government by the possible deployment of the Eastern Squadron was an important factor in starting peace negotiations in August 1898. If so, the repair ship Vulcan played a significant role in bringing about an end to the war.The U.S. Navy provided escort and support for the army's final two campaigns of the war. On the afternoon of 21 July the lead forces for the invasion of Puerto Rico got under way from Guantanamo Bay. Thirty-five hundred men embarked in nine transports were escorted by the battleship Massachusetts as well as the Dixie, Gloucester, Columbia, and Yale, all under the command of Capt. F. J. Higginson. Originally planning to land east of San Juan at Playa de Fajardo, the expedition's commander Major General Nelson A. Miles directed the Navy to land his force on the island's south coast. The expedition arrived off Port Guanica on the morning of 25 July. Lieutenant Commander Richard Wainwright of the Gloucester requested and received permission to send a landing party ashore. They soon came under fire from the small Spanish garrison, but held their position until the first army troops arrived and secured the landing place. Wainwright also assisted the amphibious landing at Port Ponce three days later by sneaking into the inner harbor the night before, gathering up a number of barges for the army to use.45 In Manila Bay, Dewey's squadron maintained a foothold at Cavite, opened communications with the insurgents, and provided naval gunfire support during the army's assault on Manila on 13 August.Pre-war plans and preparations by the U.S. Navy contributed substantially to the American victory. Most major strategic decisions were anticipated by the Naval War College studies and the secretary's war planning boards. Information appended to the boards' reports on merchant ships available for purchase or charter provided a strong background for Roosevelt's Board of Auxiliary Vessels as it sought to provide the U.S. fleet with ships such as colliers, auxiliary cruisers, and repair ships, indispensable for conducting war. In particular, the early procurement of colliers gave the U.S. Navy the strategic mobility to extend the blockade to Cuba's southern ports, keep Cervera's squadron bottled up in Santiago de Cuba, and threaten to send a major force to European waters. In addition Dewey's purchase of Nanshan and its cargo of coal permitted him to hold Manila Bay until an American expedition arrived from across the Pacific Ocean. Secretary Long's pre-war orders preparing and concentrating U.S. warships in the Atlantic theater ensured material superiority over any expedition Spain might send to the Caribbean.There are several areas where more extensive preparations would have enhanced the navy's effectiveness even further. If the U.S. had constructed specialized colliers with their own winches, like those in the British Navy, these vessels could have refueled Schley's ships at sea more rapidly during the brief times that the weather allowed. If the navy had had plans to seize Guantanamo Bay, the Isle of Pines, or some other sheltered anchorage on the south coast of Cuba at the beginning of the war, the U.S. Navy would have been in a much better position to prevent Cervera from entering any port in Cuba. Stronger coastal defenses might have prevented the public cry for warships to defend the major harbors of the United States, thus negating the need to divide the fleet between the North Atlantic and Flying Squadrons.The overall success of U.S. naval operations during the Spanish-American War demonstrated the value of extensive peace-time preparations. In the technological warfare of the last one hundred years, the most important preparations have not always been the construction of major warships, but also planning for adequate logistical support and vigorous intellectual debate.

Q. What militaries today exemplify 'quality over quantity'?A. Due to the small size of their population/military, their existential requirement to not lose any war, and relative large war chest, Israel and Singapore are kindred in having quality state of the art weaponry and hard training.Articles discuss Quality vs Quantity views from various sources/think tanks, including the Moscow Times. In addition lively Quora discussions over the subject using WWII as proof. Finally analysis of IDF and Singaporean Armed Forces, their wikipedia links and discussions of current relative military strengths and ranking.Future War: Why Quantity Will Trump Quality (thediplomat.com) counterintuitiveQuality and quantity (defenseissues.net) long treatiseQuality Over Quantity (moscowtimes.com)In war is quantity over quality better? (Quora)Can it be said WWII was a war of quantity against quality? It has been alleged that WWII can be seen a war between quality(Germany and Japan) and quantity-oriented powers (the USSR, USA, and China), so that the quantity prevailed. (Quora)In WWII it seemed that quantity trumped quality. The current US arsenal seems to have both quality and quantity. What would it take for the US to shift from quality to quantity in their military? (Quora)Singapore, a military power in South Asia built on the Israeli modelNathalie BoehlerIsraeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Singaporean counterpart, Lee Hsien Loong, April 19, 2016The ties between the two countries started even before diplomatic relations were formally established in 1969The current Prime Minister of Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong, responded to the invitation of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The third head of government in the history of Singapore is its first leader to visit Israel, where he arrived on Monday as part of a historic visit consolidating nearly fifty years of relations and cooperation between the two states.The link between the Lion City and the Jewish state goes back to the first years after the establishment of Israel, even before diplomatic relations were officially established in 1969.It was then that the premier — and the father of the current prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew — quit the Malaysian Federation in order to found Singapore. His army was then comprised of merely two infantry regiments commanded by British officers and two thirds of the soldiers were foreign. Like Israel in 1948, Singapore has very quickly felt the need to build a defense amid a turbulent local and regional situation.Defense Minister Goh Ken Swee and Major General Rehavam Zeevi (Gandhi), 22 July 1967Seized by the urgent task, Lee Kuan Yew first turned to India and Egypt, the "natural" allies of the "nonaligned," eventually choosing to secretly deploy Israeli military advisers.General Rehavam Zeevi (Gandhi), Colonel Yaakov Elazari and Colonel Yehuda Golan and other officers nicknamed "the Mexicans" by the Singapore government who wanted to hide their presence in the region, have overseen the creation of the current Singaporean army and were the source of its military doctrine: the "brown Book.""The Singapore army was built, trained and equipped following the model of the Israeli army. Singaporeans are surrounded by Muslim countries, making their islands susceptible to paranoia. For this reason the State has developed a disproportionate military, broad and powerful. And from this point of view, their army is for them very similar to the Israeli army," said Yossi Melman, Israeli security and intelligence expert.Singaporean men, whether they are Chinese or belong to small Malay and Indian minorities are subjected to two years of military service followed up by reserve duty that can amount to up to forty days a year until they reach the age of 40.The Singapore Armed Forces, an army modeled on the Israeli armyThe Singaporean army, today considered one of the most powerful in Southeast Asia has, since the late 1960s, used the same type of weapons as Israel's military and can mobilize hundreds of thousands of reservists within a few hours.Since Israeli military advisers gradually left the city-state in the mid-1970s, close relationships have developed in the field of defense industry and technology in general.For Israel, Singapore is now one of the main customers of its military industry, the outcome of forty years of cooperation carefully kept as a secret.Singapore's Defense Minister Ng Eng Hen considering purchase of Lockheed Martin's F-35 fighter jet"We find in Singapore almost all the types of weapons produced by the Israeli army. The research projects or prototypes of some of them are sometimes partly funded by the city-state, which then has a license to produce these systems," says Melman.The arms trade contracts between Israel and Singapore include the sale of tanks, air-to-ground "Barak" missiles and the "Hermes" drone system, fighter jets equipped with the latest Israeli electronic devices and warships.Recently, cooperation between the intelligence services of the two states has increased due to the terrorist threat posed by the Islamist organization "Jemaah Islamiyah," responsible for the Bali bombings in 2002 and the Marriott Hotel bombing in Jakarta the following year.Guided missile corvette "RSS Victory." Israeli electronics and SAM "Barak""Israel has a significant presence in Singapore with experts, delegations and military installations. In addition, there is close cooperation in terms of exchange of information in the field of intelligence, particularly due to the presence in Asia southeast of terrorist groups such as al-Qaida and Hezbollah-affiliated networks," Melman says.In 2014, the Israeli military industry unveiled at the Singapore Airshow its drone Super Heron, touted as "the world's most advanced MALE or super-tactical UAV," developed by IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries) whose characteristics surpassed those of its predecessor, the Heron ("Shoval" in Hebrew), operational since 2005.Singapore Land Systems,Singapore Military Power Force, Military SingaporeIn addition, the show was an opportunity for the Israeli weapons producer Rafael to unveil for the first time its "Iron Beam" defensive shield, inspired by the famous "Iron Dome" and capable of intercepting mortars and missile fired from a very short range by using a laser.Additionally, the visit of Lee Hsien Loong is returning the friendly gesture and declarations of Israeli President Reuven Rivlin, who went to Singapore to pay his last respects to the first premier who died last March at the age of 91."I will represent the State of Israel and its citizens, not only to express our condolences on the death of a founder of Singapore, but also to express our appreciation for his work as valuable and important leader. And I have no doubt that relations between the two countries will continue to strengthen," Rivlin asserted.Nathalie Boehler is journalist for i24newsThe Singapore Armed Forces: Protecting Singapore in 2030Intelligence File: The ties that bindIsrael and Singapore’s discreet but flourishing defense relationship.BY YOSSI MELMAN MAY 1, 2016 12:38In first visit ever by Singapore PM, leader thanks Israel for defense aid over the yearsPrime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu meets with visiting counterpart from Singapore, Lee Hsien Loong. (photo credit: HAIM ZACH/GPO)Last week Lee Hsien Loong, the prime minister of tiny Singapore, paid an official visit to Israel. It was the first visit of its kind. Accompanied by ministers and businessmen, he and his host, Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, issued statements praising the good relations and joint ventures between the two countries in the fields of hi-tech, cyber, water, environmental conservation and more.Netanyahu also mentioned the first prime minister of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, who happens to be the father of the current one and is considered in his country as the founder of the republic. Netanyahu “forgot” to mention the first chief minister, David Marshall, who was a local Jew, whose legacy has been erased from Singaporean history books by the dictatorial regimes of father and son.However, what was missing during the visit in all public declarations was the glue that binds the two countries. That glue, according to foreign reports, is the military, intelligence and security ties between the two countries. The ties are very close to the extent that Singapore has over five decades become a very important market for Israel’s military industries not only in Southeast Asia but on a global level, and a partner in joint research and development ventures of advanced weapon systems. The country attracts hundreds of former Israeli military and intelligence officers and hosts major security corporations such as Israel Aerospace Industries, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and Elbit Systems, in addition to the Israeli Embassy with its military attachés.Rafael Advanced Defense Systems Ltd: Iron DomeSurprisingly, it was the guest who recalled the secret past military ties by saying, “We thank Israel for your assistance when Singapore was forced to get its independence in 1965, when our security and survival were in doubt. Israel Defense Forces helped to build our armed forces when other states refused.”Lee also recalled how he first visited Israel in 1977 when he was a junior military officer while escorting Lt.-Gen. Winston Choo, then his country’s chief of staff and now the ambassador in Tel Aviv.Singapore is a modern-day city-state spread over 700 square kilometers, with a population of 5.5 million. Seventy-five percent are of Chinese descent, 13% Malayan Muslims and 10% Indians. It is surrounded by two large Muslim nations – Malaysia and Indonesia.In that sense Singapore sees parallels between its situation and Israel’s: two small nations with advanced economies, surrounded by hostile states with different backgrounds, religions and cultures.Israeli soldier with Spike anti-tank missile launcherThis seeming similarity brought Singapore in the mid ’60s to ask Israel to build its armed forces, after India, Egypt and Britain declined.In 1965 Israel sent a military delegation led by Col. Yaakov Elazari and later by Binyamin Ben-Eliezer, who years later would be the defense minister. The Israeli advisers advised Singapore to form an army based on the IDF’s experience, tactics and doctrines.To conceal the presence of their nationality the Israeli advisers were locally referred to as the “Mexicans.”After forming the armed forces, Israel began supplying Singapore with weapons of all sorts and, according to foreign reports, it continues to do so today. According to these reports, the arms deals have included patrol and missile boats, upgrading of fighter planes, intelligence equipment, missiles and control and command centers.Defense News reported that the Singaporean air force is flying two squadrons of Israeli- made drones. One is composed of the Hermes model manufactured by Elbit, and one the Heron made by IAI.The French newsletter Intelligence Online wrote last year that Singapore also purchased dozens of Israel made Merkava tanks to be used as artillery to repel any future invasion of the country.Merkava Mk.4 - Israel Main Battle Tank [Review]Since the Defense Ministry doesn’t name the countries that purchase weapons from Israel, it is unknown what the export volume to Singapore was. But if all the deals, as reported in the foreign media, are added up, it is possible to conclude that Israel has sold Singapore over the years weapons worth billions of dollars.It was also reported that the two countries’ military industries cooperate in joint ventures in third countries.For example, IAI and its Singaporean counterpart won a tender to upgrade Turkish fighter planes. Another pattern revealed by some foreign reports is that Singapore invests money in the research and development of Israeli weapons systems and in return gets to manufacture them in its own industries.One example stands out. For the last five years there were consistent reports in the foreign media that Singapore was financially involved in the Israeli-made Iron Dome, a system to “kill” rockets and missiles, which was used in the last two wars in Gaza.Both Israel and Singapore didn’t comment.Last week during Lee’s visit, it was the Singaporean Ministry of Defense that broke its own silence by announcing that it had bought advanced radar from Elta, a subsidiary of IAI. This radar is part of the Iron Dome system.US grants $225 million more to Israel’s anti-missile Iron DomeIn the last decade-and-a half, since 9/11/2001, intelligence cooperation between the two nations to combat terrorism has been on the increase. Together with foreign intelligence agencies, Singapore exposed terrorist cells of al-Qaida and recently Islamic State that originated in neighboring Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.The cells planned to hit ships anchoring in or sailing to the port of Singapore, embassies and other Western installations, including Israel’s.The Mossad, for its part, uncovered a Hezbollah plot that spread from the Philippines to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Thailand.One can expect that after the visit of Lee, who invited Netanyahu for a reciprocal visit, Israeli-Singaporean relations will develop even further.The 25 most powerful militaries in the worldSkye Gould and Paul Szoldra Mar. 15, 2017, 1:16 PMUS NavyAn all-out fight may be the only real way to compare military strength, but fortunately, the world hasn't had many opportunities lately.Despite an increasingly tense situation in the South China Sea , continued fighting in Ukraine , and proxy wars throughout the Middle East , warfare between nation-states has mostly taken a backseat to peacekeeping missions and fights against terror groups.Still, a simple evaluation of pure military power can be interesting, so we turned to the Global Firepower Index , a ranking of 106 nations based on more than 50 factors — including each country's military budget, manpower, and the amount of equipment each country has in its respective arsenal, and its natural resources.It's important to note the index focuses on quantity while ignoring significant qualitative differences. For example, North Korea's 70 submarines are old and decidedly low-tech compared to what the US and others have. The index doesn't take into account nuclear stockpiles , which are still the ultimate trump card in geopolitics. And it doesn't penalize landlocked nations for lack of a standing navy.We've created a chart to compare the top 25 militaries according to the Global Firepower Index. The ranking was released in April (before events like the Russian invasion of Eastern Ukraine in August, ISIS's blitz through Iraq, and the flare-up between Israel and Hamas) and involves a complex set of data that is subject to ongoing adjustments and corrections.Skye Gould/Business InsiderHere Are The Key Findings From The Index :America's investment in being the world's leading military force.The US leads the world in military spending at nearly $600 billion a year. China is in a distant second, at nearly $160 billion — less than one-third of America's overall spending.The Ministry of Defence of the Russian FederationAccording to a report from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) , the US has reduced its defense budget by 7.8% chiefly because of America's gradual withdrawal in overseas military operations, such as in Afghanistan and Iraq. However, President Donald Trump's proposed budget would effectively reverse that downward trend.Russia, meanwhile, has increased its arms spending and continues to modernize its military equipment and implement higher quality training for its personnel.Aircraft carriers are key, but few countries have even one.Aircraft carriers contribute greatly to a country's overall military strength. These massive vessels allow nations to project force far beyond their borders and across the entire face of the globe. They're essentially mobile naval and air force bases.Aircraft carriers can also carry unmanned aerial systems — drones — which significantly change the global surveillance game.The US's absolute monopoly on super-carriers significantly boosts its forward operating power. The US has deployed an aircraft carrier toward the Persian Gulf to bolster its sea and air power before possible strikes against ISIS in Iraq. It also has others keeping a close on the Korean peninsula.Russia has previously deployed an aircraft carrier to the Mediterranean to support the Assad government in Syria.KCNA/ReutersNorth Korea's submarines are pretty much useless.At first look, it seems North Korea is amazing when it comes to submarine warfare, but there's a little more to the story.Pyongyang does command one of the largest submarine fleets on earth, but most of its vessels are unusable.A third of North Korea's subs are noisy diesel-powered Romeos, which have been obsolete since 1961 . These submarines have a weapons range of only four miles, whereas a modern US submarine has a range of 150 miles. The Hermit Kingdom's fleet is unsophisticated but still durable, according to the Pentagon.In a fight with a more sophisticated adversary, North Korean subs would be toast.Here's the hardware the world's top 25 militaries have in their arsenalsAndrew Renneisen / Stringer / Getty ImagesThe US is the world's most powerful military, according to firepower.Russia and China aren't far behind.President Donald Trump has reemphasized military strength, reportedly planning to ask for $716 billion in defense spending in 2019 — a 7% increase over the 2018 budget (though spending is currently limited by budget caps).US defense spending is the highest in the world, more than the combined budgets of the next several countries. But US plans to ramp up acquisitions of military hardware will only add to an already booming arms industry.Between 2012 and 2016, more weapons were delivered around the world than during any five-year period since 1990.Below, you can see the world's top 25 militaries and the assets they can deploy to the battlefield, as ranked by Global Firepower Index.The ranking assesses the diversity of weapons held by each country and pays particular attention to the manpower available."Balance is the key — a large, strong fighting force across land, sea and air backed by a resilient economy and defensible territory along with an efficient infrastructure — such qualities are those used to round out a particular nation's total fighting strength on paper," the ranking states.But a few defining aspects of those countries' ability to muster military power are not directly related to their armed forces.Employees stand in front of the Indian navy's first Scorpene submarine at Mazagon Docks in Mumbai, April 6, 2015.REUTERS/Shailesh Andrade/FileGeographical factors, logistical flexibility, natural resources, and local industry all influenced the final ranking, Global Firepower said.Each of the top 10 countries have a labor force of more than 30 million people. Three of the top five — the US, China, and India — have more than 150 million available workers.The following 15 countries vary more widely in labor-force size — from 123.7 million in Indonesia to 3.9 million in Israel — but they still have more than 37.2 million workers on average.Industrial and labor capacity are complemented by robust logistical capabilities, including extensive railway and roadway networks, numerous major ports and airports, and strong merchant-marine corps. Extensive coastlines and waterways also facilitate the movement of goods and people.For the US, those logistical capacities have been tested by increasing activity in Afghanistan as well as efforts to built up its presence in Europe.The US Army's 1st Armored Division Sustainment Brigade served as the logistics headquarters in Afghanistan in 2017. During its six-month deployment, the unit distributed more than 380 million gallons of fuel throughout Afghanistan — a landlocked country roughly the size of Texas."It's not easy to [transport] fuel. You have to get it to the right place at the right time. You have to make sure it's of the right quality, and you have to make sure you have storage on one end and distribution capability on the other end," Col. Michael Lalor, the brigade commander, said in late February. "That's what always kept me up at night."Vehicles and other cargo are unloaded from the USNS Bob Hope by the soldiers of the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, US Army/Sgt. Jaccob HearnUS Military Sealift Command (MSC), which oversees the US Navy's fleet of mostly civilian-crewed support ships, is adding ships to boost its presence around Europe and Africa, in response to both insurgent activity and growing tensions with Russia — all of which have added tension to the US's already strained supply lines.In 2017, MSC moved twice as much ordnance, three times as many critical parts, and one-third as much cargo in Europe and Africa as it did in 2016."I definitely don't see (activity) going down any time soon," Capt. Eric Conzen, MSC commander in Europe and Africa, told Stars and Stripes of his unit's workload. "There's a desire for it to increase."NOW WATCH: How Russia's most advanced military equipment stacks up against NATO hardwareIsrael Defense Forces - WikipediaSingapore Armed Forces - WikipediaThe Value of Sustainability for the Singapore Armed Forces by LTA Julie Lim Yee Sin (www.mindef.gov.sg)Singapore vs. Israel: Who’s the better role model?“The grass is always greener…” may be a banality, but it’s an appropriate one for what is turning out to be an internal debate in two countries known for their technology – Israel and Singapore.At an event in Tel Aviv Monday, both Economics Minister Naftali Bennett and Google Israel chairman Meir Brand bemoaned (or at least expressed concern) over why Israel, despite its reputation as the Start-Up Nation, was failing to “cash in” the way Asian tiger countries like Singapore have.But in conversations with the Times of Israel, it’s Israel that students, entrepreneurs, and business figures from south Asia, including Singapore, feel that their countries should emulate. “The Asians just don’t have the start-up spirit,” said Singaporean Adry Lee, who in a recent interview described himself as a serial entrepreneur.Lee’s comments were typical of those of numerous Singaporeans the Times of Israel has interviewed at several events geared to promoting Israel-Asia business relations, such as last May’s Israel-Asia Business Summit. “It’s very hard for Singaporeans to think out of the box and come up with non-traditional ideas as Israelis do,” he said.That wasn’t the feeling in Israel, or at least among the speakers — including Economics Minister Naftali Bennett and Google Israel chairman Meir Brand — at the launch of an initiative called E-nnovate Israel, a hub initiated by Google Israel for projects and studies to promote innovation and economic growth in Israel, with an emphasis on strengthening the country’s information infrastructure.As its first project, E-nnovate introduced on Monday a report by consulting firm Trigger-Foresight Group Deloitte — the report was funded by Google Israel — which compared the impact of Israel’s tech economy on the country’s overall economy. Israel, according to the study, is a world leader in the size of its “internet economy,” the term used to describe industries that produce “information economy” internet-related products and services (like most high-tech companies). Those companies represented 6.4% of Israel’s GDP in 2009, and will exceed 8% by 2015 — on a par with most advanced European countries, like Germany and the UK, and not far behind the US.But somehow Israel’s tech savvy has not translated into economic benefits, as it has elsewhere. The study took Singapore as a good example of how well Israel hasn’t done. The GDP for both countries was similar throughout the 1980s — but then Singapore’s fortunes took off, leaving Israel in the dust. Today, the Asian tiger’s GDP is about $60,000 — nearly double that of Israel.What happened? It’s not about military spending, as many believe; surprisingly, Singapore’s per capita defense spending for 2012 ($1,593) wasn’t that much less than Israel’s ($1,882); Singapore, it turns out, ranked 23rd in the world in military expenditures in 2012, compared to Israel’s 17th-place ranking.What it is about, said the report, is that Singapore has much more successfully leveraged its Internet technology to make its economy more efficient. Israel hasn’t, and that has been very bad for the economy. The report cited an analysis of productivity in Israel which said that despite Israel’s position as a high-tech country, it’s only 24th (out of 30) in the OECD in terms of productivity. “Even though Israel, in its early years, narrowed the productivity gap between itself and the OECD countries, it stagnated on par with the OECD average from the 1970s until today,” said the study.It was a future told by American economist Robert Solow, who won the Nobel Prize in 1987 for proving the close connection between economic growth and increased productivity and innovation, the study said. “However, innovation also necessitates creatively providing useful, efficient and effective solutions to non-economic problems. This is the only way to increase productivity and create growth in advanced economies.” The way to do that, the study said, was for Israel to implement Internet-efficient communications and technologies in a much wider manner.And the only way to make that happen, said Google chairman Brand, was for the government to embark on an aggressive Internet infrastructure investment campaign. “A program like this would require an investment in infrastructure, but could save the economy millions,” he said. The money could go towards direct funding for infrastructure projects, or be available for low-cost loans for organizations that wanted to upgrade their communications and network systems to make themselves more efficient.For example, said Google’s Doron Avni — who heads Google’s Middle East, Israel, and Africa government relations department — the government here could fund a project similar to one in the UK, where the National Health Service borrowed money to set up an online portal for information, appointments, and self-diagnosis for certain conditions (via apps, questionnaires, etc.) The money was given as a loan to the NHS, which paid it back in full within four years, and saved the organization 110 million euros in 2008 alone.Another example is that of the Virtual High School in Florida, a special online and in-person school that has students doing much of their work through the internet via videoconferencing with teachers, remote submission of reports and homework, and more. Costs to the state for students in such schools are $1,000 less than for students in “regular” schools.According to entrepreneur Lee, Singaporeans ‘don’t have the chutzpah you need to buck trends… We are taught to listen to our elders’The secret to getting this done, said Brand, is instituting an Information and Communication Technology (ICT) policy, as successful countries — such as Singapore, Germany, Japan, and others have. Such a policy, he said, would ensure that Israel could enjoy the economic benefits of the technology developed here, instead of just making others richer. “The likelihood that Israel will develop the next big thing in telemedicine, for example, but that the device will be used in Denmark, Singapore, and Finland – but not here – is very high,” said Brand. “In order to avoid this, Israel must learn from other countries that have developed successful ICT policies, to develop the Internet and make it into a tool that can be used in many areas.”But is Singapore the right role model for Israel? According to Singaporean entrepreneur Lee, “the government has been spending a lot of money setting up incubators and accelerators for entrepreneurs, but the program has been less successful than they hoped it would be.” While Singapore has the “form” of a start-up nation, Singaporeans “don’t have the chutzpah you need to buck trends and come up with something truly innovative. We are taught to listen to our elders,” he said, “and of course to teachers.” Whereas stories about Israeli or American tech heroes who were dropouts are not uncommon, said Lee, no Singaporean in his or her right mind would drop out of college, much less high school, for fear they would be frozen out of jobs at large corporations.It’s the same Asian mindset described by another Asian entrepreneur, Bowei Gai, in a recent interview with the Times of Israel. Describing why Israelis start-up entrepreneurs are more creative and innovative than those in China, Gai said that China — considered by many to be the most dynamic and creative economy in Asia — concentrates on what he calls “commodity innovation,” a rehashing of existing technology and methodologies that builds on widely known models. “In the end it’s about making money, and the best and easiest way to do that in a place like China is by using proven models that have been successful elsewhere. There are so many ways to make money in China using these models because there are so many people to market to, and they don’t need to innovate or invent something new to succeed. It’s much easier to go for the ‘low hanging fruit’ of commodity innovation by basically duplicating existing technology,” said Gai.But you can’t argue with the bottom line, Bennett said at the E-nnovation event Monday. Israelis may have “creative genes,” he said, “but genes alone, like a seed, cannot grow unless planted in the right kind of soil. The government’s job is to prepare that soil so that the seeds can sprout. Entrepreneurs and the private sector are racing ahead, while the government remains behind. We must invest in physical infrastructure, and develop the human infrastructure.”

Thanks anon,The addresses on the Canadian federal site could be useful (JustAnswers http://goo.gl/Yhn5Ph). It appears that one is a PO Box forwarding address; the other seems to share the address of a law firm.DomainAgents Platform Inc6951 Derry Rd, #40051 Building BMilton ON L9T 7W4 CanadaLaBarge Weinstein LLPhttp://www.lwlaw.com/contact-us/515 LEGGET DRIVE SUITE 800OTTAWA ON K2K 3G4 CanadaT: 613.599.9600 F: 613.599.0018Perhaps someone can check if this law firm are the legal representatives for DomainAgents Platform Inc (DAPI)? If LaBarge Weinstein LLP isn’t, then a complaint could be filed with Canadian Federal Government that DAPI have not provided correct and current information.Canada has a number of privacy laws and principles, which could be applied i.e. PIPEDA.https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/guide_org_e.aspPrinciple 3 – Obtain consent, may be relevant for example. Canada also has an Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to whom you may write.FABULOUS.COM - WHOISOLOGY INTERNET REGISTRARICANN’s whois currently lists ‘Fabulous.com’ as the Internet Registrar for whoisology.com.http://whois.icann.org/en/lookup?name=whoisology.comFabulous.com is an Australian company located in Fortitude Valley, Queensland.I am not a lawyer, or an expert, but as an Australian Corporate entity, it and/or its parent companies and/or related entities may arguably have obligations and accountabilities under the Privacy Act 1988 (and amendments) for the handling of personal information. You can read about The Act here:The Privacy Act| Office of the Australian Information Commissioner - OAICWhile this Act primarily applies to government organizations, it can apply to corporate entities.Also note, that Information about Australian Companies (directors - past and present, investors, appointment dates etc.) can be purchased. A good report is the “Current & Historical Company Extract”. This can be obtained from the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) website:https://goo.gl/xNzQNnYou could perform a search like this:Search Within: Organization and business namesFor: [ENTER AUSTRALIAN COMPANY NAME]WHAT YOU COULD TRY-- Write to DomainAgents Platform Inc --Before you consider escalating a request, you may want to write to the legal address shown the Canadian Federal Corporate Information website (https://goo.gl/ZpxY33). However, this is not a requirement according to PIPEDA “An individual may complain to the organization in question or to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada about any alleged breaches of the law” ( https://goo.gl/8co5Hj)-- Escalate it to the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada --Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada30 Victoria Street, 1st FloorGatineau, QCK1A 1H3Telephone: (819)994-5444Toll-free: 1-800-282-1376Fax: (819) 994-5424-- Write to Fabulous.com and/or parent companies --Before you escalate a request to Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) - you would probably want to write a letter to Fabulous.com. You could consider asking Fabulous.com to:Forward your copl privacy complaint to whoisology.comFacilitate the removal of your private information from Whoisology.comInvestigate possible harvesting of ICANN ‘whois data’ (The Law of Spam Harvesting)Review its spam policy in relation to the use of its “services” (http://goo.gl/H5Jjzv)Review its role (and that of its registered websites) in relation to their ICANN registrar agreement (for example 3.3.6.3 – 3.3.6.5) and ICANN consensus policy “Whois Marketing Restriction Policy”Fabulous.com Pty LtdACN 094 218 443)http://www.fabulous.comOffice Address:Level 1, 91 Bridge StreetFortitude Valley QLD 4006+61 7 3007 0070Postal Address:PO Box 757Fortitude Valley QLD 4006Telephone:Dark Blue Sea Pty Limitedhttp://darkbluesea.com/?s=privacyACN 091 509 796 - Previous Holding CompanyEnero Pty LtdACN 091 524 515 – Current Holding Companyhttp://www.enero.com/about-eneroLevel 3, 1-9 Buckingham Street,SURRY HILLS NSW 2010+61 2 8213 3031Accredited ICANN registrars are listed here:http://www.icann.org/registrar-reports/accredited-list.htmlDoes Fabulous.com use the 2013 Agreement listed here?:https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/approved-with-specs-2013-09-17-enRelevant items may include 3.3.6.3 – 3.3.6.5-- Escalate it to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner --After 30 days, you could escalate your request to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC).http://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/our-regulatory-approach/privacy-regulatory-action-policy/Street address:GPO Box 5218 Sydney NSW 2001I would imagine the more letters to OAIC, the better.-- Consider sending copies to members of parliement --Consider if you want to send copies of your OAIC complaint to Member/s of Parliament:Hon Teresa Gambaro MP (Federal)Senator Claire Moore (Local)-- Consider writing to the REGISTRY --This topic may be a little confusing… If you have questions, the whirlpool.com forums may be more appropriate (or choose another interactive forum).You may wish to contact the Registry (in addition to the registrar). In some jurisdictions, the location of the website may be considered the location of the Registry.Simply put, Registries are accredited by ICANN. They make domain name extensions (i.e. .com, .info etc) available to internet registrars through whom the end users (registrants) purchase their names. If you have a .com domain for example, I think VeriSign, Inc. would be the registry (https://goo.gl/j2k8e1)For this reason, I believe the whoisology.com website could relate to VeriSign Inc. So this may be another avenue. I am not sure which of the VeriSign addresses is best - probably VeriSign Worldwide Headquarters (Contact Us - Verisign).If the registry of a domain is in the US – then US privacy and CAN-SPAM laws may apply (The Law of Spam Harvesting)Does anyone know if this is the applicable VeriSign Registry-Registrar agreement? (https://goo.gl/j2k8e1)Relevant clauses of the agreement may include:2.12. Compliance with Operational Requirements2.15. ICANN RequirementsAn interesting discussion on the legal role and confusion between registry and registrar can be found here:Court Says Domain Name Is Located Where Its Registrar Registry Is Located | TechdirtA helpful quote from the page: In the ruling the court in fact stated that they believe jurisdiction can be both the registry AND registrar locationsICANN lists its accredited registries here:- http://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registries/registries-agreements-en#c-- Other Lines of Inquiry --PREVIOUS DIRECTORS - DOMAINAGENTS PLATFORM INC.It may also be worthwhile checking the previous directors as this could open up other lines of enquiry. There is a cached result here:DomainAgents Platform Inc.Does anyone have access to the Federal Canadian Corporate information? Surely a company history could be obtained??OTHER ENTITIES - DOMAINAGENTS.COM AND DOMAIN GUARDIANSSome sources link DomainAgents Platform Inc with the DomainAgents.com website.http://whois.icann.org/en/lookup?name=domainagents.comhttp://DomainAgents.comhttp://onlinedomain.com/2014/05/18/news/whoisology-a-free-domain-name-whois-research-toolhttp://domaingang.com/domain-news/domain-agents-thread-receives-controversy-at-dnforum/According to ICANN’s whois, DomainAgents.com currently uses Domain Guardians as their registrar. Domain Guardians Pty Ltd is an Australian company located in Fortitude Valley in Queensland.Domain Guardians Pty Ltdhttp://whois.icann.org/en/lookup?name=domainagents.comACN: 147 748 838Level 10, 15 Green Square Close,FORTITUDE VALLEY QLD 4006Again, this may give you other lines of inquiry such as the current and previous directors, appointment dates, investors etc. It could be a good idea to obtain a “Current & Historical Company Extract” from ASIC. (see above)Again, the accredited ICANN registrars are listed here:ICANN | ICANN-Accredited RegistrarsThere seems to be a discrepancy between the ICANN listing for Domain Guardians in the above link (listed as the United Stated). Is there an American company called Domain Guardians, LLC?Do Domain Guardians use the 2009 ICANN Agreement available here? (https://goo.gl/P3GO0m)WHY YOU MAY BE CONCERNED-- Whoisology API --According to some sources, Whoisology have an Application Programming Interface (API):http://blog.mccopro.com/domain-news/whoisology-api-released-into-beta-2/http://eight.tweettunnel.com/reverse2.php?textfield=Whoisology-- ICANN Privacy Policy Proposals --ICANN seem to be in the process of making further changes to privacy / whois protection which may affect small business. This may mean mom and pop home-type businesses will be exposed. Could you imagine the possible impacts of this policy change combined with a whoisology API?Namecheap sponsored a campaign to help protect privacy rights with ICANN. It is explained on the website http://respectourprivacy.com.NOTE: Unfortunately “the close date for comments is July 7, 2015”Click on ‘send an email’ to reveal more information.-- Privacy and who owns whois data? --This is an interesting question. There is an interesting case in law - “Nominet UK v Diverse Internet Pty Ltd” that discusses the Intellectual Property of whois data and the privacy issues it raises. You can read about it here (by David Lindsay):Lindsay, David --- "Whose WHOIS privacy? - The Nominet case" [2004] PrivLawPRpr 43; (2004) 11(4) Privacy Law and Policy Reporter 91Here are some questions worth perhaps further exploration:Whose databases are being accessed by whoisology.com, and why aren’t the owners/operators of these databases complaining as in the Nominet UK v Diverse Internet Pty Ltd case?Who has or continues to benefit from whoisology.com?Who would benefit from the recent proposed ICANN changes to whois privacy?Some other interesting reads:Historical Whois Data and Privacy LawsHistorical Whois Data - Look Who Sells It!OTHER RESOURCESYou will need to copy and paste some of the links below directly into a private / incognito browser window (** PW **). PLEASE THINK ABOUT KEEPING COPIES of all the information below for future reference. Instructions for opening a private window are given at the end.-- Whoisology, DomainAgents --Whoisology.com whois historyWhoisology: Find Connections Between Domain Names & Their Owners | Product HuntDomainAgents Exclusively Brokering Sale of Mario.comhttp://goo.gl/val27c (DELETED) --> https://goo.gl/pzNre2https://goo.gl/OFCbDl (DELETED) ---> ** copy and paste into PW **https://goo.gl/h6KBhF (DELETED) ---> ** copy and paste into PW **https://www.linkedin.com/in/adamstrong (DELETED) --> https://goo.gl/DmvCzJhttp://goo.gl/6Kzkrohttp://goo.gl/zbqxQt-- Fabulous.com, Domain Guardians, Dark Blue Sea --http://goo.gl/C8XgYghttp://goo.gl/FjjXobhttp://goo.gl/Rw0IWshttp://goo.gl/bPhGz2http://goo.gl/5clkn6http://goo.gl/CDumT3https://goo.gl/iLPd8Fhttp://goo.gl/FWb9Uthttps://goo.gl/81cIsqLINKEDINhttps://goo.gl/4idROK (DELETED) --> ** copy and paste into PW **https://goo.gl/8ytmYX (DELETED) --> ** copy and paste into PW **https://goo.gl/Ds8GuXhttps://goo.gl/OKhVjUThere are quite a number of other sources that can be accessed.*** How to open a private window ***Chrome users:Browse in private with incognito modeMozilla Firefox:Private Browsing - Use Firefox without saving historyWHAT ELSE COULD YOU DO?Share what you’ve learnt, but be mindful not to publish private information. All we should be concerned with is seeking a legal and legitimate means of redressing the privacy issues raised by whoisology.com.I rang Fabulous.com and had the most bizarre conversation of my life. I was gob-smacked, dismayed, extremely frustrated and disappointed at the roadblocks I hit with the replies given to my inquiries and request. So I opted instead to post on the 12th July on OnlineDomain (http://onlinedomain.com/2014/05/18/news/whoisology-a-free-domain-name-whois-research-tool/).Whoisology.com may have successfully avoided dealing with privacy issues to date. Perhaps people like myself have not wanted to take further action because:Whoisology already had my private information and could do anything with it (‘anonymously’ if they chose)I ‘valued’ my privacy in the first place, but taking action could make matters worse “Streisand effect”Whoisology and others appear to be well fundedWhoisology and others seem to be unmoved by requests to remove information, despite what damage they 'may' cause (either directly or indirectly)I say ‘damage they may cause’, because I have read other online complainants about this website relating to:Women who claim to have stalkersPeople who claim that their information has been miss-matched to elicit websites - affecting their job prospects andPeople claiming to have purchased privacy protection, but through no fault of their own, had their information exposed because of another registrar’s administrative mistakeThere are other examples. This is not a straight out case of blaming those who did not purchase privacy protection. Some domains extensions do not allow the use of privacy protection. So then, consider an individual who ‘does the right thing’ and provides correct whois information. They may still do this with the reasonable expectation that:While their whois information may be queriedIt arguably cannot be legally harvested or published by the parties who access it-- Chilling Effects --The Quora website itself uses chilling Effects. It is written under their terms “Copyright Policy” whereby a copy of legal notices may be sent to http://www.chillingeffects.org.-- Write to ICANN AGAIN! --You may want to write to ICANN – the more the better. In the document “Whois Marketing Restriction Policy”, ICANN places restrictions on the use of Whois data by 3rd parties.https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/registrars/consensus-policies/wmrp-enRegistrars are to include these Terms and Conditions as part of 3rd party access to whois data.Perhaps ICANN could AT A MINIMUM provide a means of verifying and logging users who access the whois database (driver’s license etc.). This may offer some balance between openness and accountability. Perhaps this should be the role of an independent body.- Nyree