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He is a scamster. Pls avoid.If you dont and public start aping his portfolio and buy rumors another Harshad mehta in the making!! Pls study the fundamentals of the stock (there are many sites giving this info) and invest.A general assessment by some consultants has shown that when nifty and indices go up by certain percent, Mr Jhunjun stocks go up by less!!! And when index falls his stocks fall a LOT!But here is some recent news about him which will convince (SEBI VIOLATIONS AND INSIDER TRADING).Apart from Aptech and HCL insider trading for which he was booked (very late, i may add, since our indian system , you know reacts late !) probably this is just one tenth of what he has actually done!!!

I see the following pains as being deep-rooted. Fixing them requires a shift in education, attitude, policies and opening-up of the market.Patent painsGlobally, patents are seen as the bedrock for creating truly differentiated companies. In India it is a difficult, time-consuming and opaque process. And a very small percentage of Indian startups go this route. For one, there are very few, truly innovative technology based startups and two, the process is so bureaucratic and inefficient that it does not encourage more entrepreneurs to think about patenting and patent-able innovations at early stages.Having said that the government has taken the right step in addressing this under the 'Startup India' plan and we need to wait and watch how things evolve.Business adoption of technologyThe climate is not very conducive for true innovation in the B2B products context. Businesses at best want to see products that ape what's already present in the US at a cheaper cost. Timely payments are an issue and clients are fickle.One startup founder who has had a successful exit quipped, "After this, I will go the valley and actually build something truly innovative. There is no market for completely innovative B2B products in India."More VCs and hedge funds, less InvestorsOver the last few years there has been a blitzkrieg of startup funding. We have seen some spectacular blowups too (Housing, for instance). The funds are in such a hurry to capture market segments and be part of the next, big unicorn story that they are taking a betting view of the market. Because of their ridiculous expectations of accelerated success, startups are being pushed toward short-term solutions and unreasonable scale very early.For the young founders running companies and scaling it for the first time, there isn't enough support and mentoring and the investors are creating more harm than good. I personally know several startups that glowed too bright and fizzled because the investors had set only one goal; that of achieving 3x or 5x in a short span of time. This is because it is a house of cards that they are building wanting to push the company towards a higher valuation and bigger fund infusion from a larger investor as quickly as possible (so that they reduce risk).The young founders, under pressure and possessed by the single minded objective, approach it without long term orientation, attention to team culture and it usually ends up being disastrous.EmployeesWhile its a cliche, startups require the right kind of employees with a great balance of ability and attitude. India is still nascent in terms of the startup culture and there aren't enough high-quality employees that all the growing startups need. If you are an extremely well-funded unicorn in the making, there are no issues. But for the other 99%, hiring great employees is a supremely difficult task. It takes an enormous amount of time (to sift through people who don't meet the bar), is very expensive (employees have irrational expectations of salary set by a few large startups) and the pool is not very big. Employees too face a lot of uncertainty over poorly defined benefits like stock-options and esoteric salary components. For a young college graduate there isn't enough information to assess working for a startup.Early stage capitalAccess to early stage capital (and very late stage capital) are major issues. Apart from the unorganized route of angel funding or some seed funding, there aren't enough channels which open up capital to new, young startups. Banks, for instance, have not participated in this market at all. There aren't enough incubation cells and funding from different organizations directed towards improvement in certain areas. Startup ecosystem is a pyramid that should be very wide at the bottom and narrow at the top. The pyramid is not wide enough (not enough early stage startups that has access to capital) to create a powerful ecosystem yet.

The hypothesis in brief: there are three categories of potential developments that can lead to a potential destruction of all human life, or at least a large proportion. It confines to human-created developments and not natural events.It then proposes a series of thoughts on how the risk can be mitigated, where Nick Bostrom’s line of thought includes increased surveillance and global government.I will related this to something more practical, things I’m working on in my day to day job as we speak.I’m working on a series of risk assessments. The (IT) security organisation identifies these on application level. I object, but right now it’s not my role or responsibility to go against it full force. Risk is present on information processing systems, which include not only applications but also the business processes and all storing/conversion/manipulation of data/information. The focus on application is too limited and creates additional challenges later on the road (the “we always do things this way” syndrome being one of them).Next I’m working on increasing monitoring capabilities on the information processing systems. This raises interesting questions on what to monitor (we experience a disturbance and IT answers: servers are running), who is responsible, who is accountable and this split to various events (incidents have a different process and different responsibilities than results of trend analysis), and eventually the interesting question that needs to be raised is: who’s going to pay, both for the monitoring and when it fails? Will I get my money back when IT monitoring fails and I experience downtime?I’m also working on a small change proposal that business wants, and it’s similar to something my department has done before “we always do things this way …”. But that solution is set up the wrong way, and business is pressing for the similar solution because it’s possible with current technology. I’m having a chat with people involved as well as operational risk management to make sure the solution fits risk requirements and how to mitigate the remaining risk.We can relate these small scale issues to Bostrom’s hypothesis.In my domain Bostrom’s hypothesis would be: a significant event which will turn the funding ratio of our clients (close) to zero.A huge part of my domain is related to risk management, which reduces this risk significant, but still we can imagine an outside event where the funding ratio collapses (along with the entire economic/monetary system). This is similar to a natural disaster - which is not in scope of Bostrom’s hypothesis.The next question is: can we imagine an event where the funding ratio is reduced to zero by an internal cause.While our asset allocation procedures prevent this, and our custodians have a checking role on large transactions as well, such events are not unknown in the financial world. Very often fraud or malicious actions are causes, but an act of ignorance might have significant impact as well.Bostrom describes two “detectable” events, one where malicious action is the cause, the other is split in two parts: an intentional preventive action by a single entity, and an unintended cause of many seemingly insignificant actions. The third event is an event which might be known, but where detection will only happen at the event, since it is what’s called a long tail risk.The combination of this information leads to some interesting questions.Why are man-made events separated from events by natural causes?From a risk perspective the risk is identical, it does not matter if a cosmic burst, a collision with a celestial body, a nuclear holocaust of a “Planet of the Apes” virus kills humanity. We should assess all risk similar, including probability, and based on that define mitigation actions.How will additional monitoring/surveillance solve the problem?Apparently there is something fundamental destructive with some human beings. The recent Sri Lanka events give a good example and had these individuals access to thermonuclear weapons the damage would be far greater. In Indonesia entire families were sent on suicide missions, and such people would likely not hesitate to set the entire world on fire given the opportunity. Current intelligence does not prevent this, and widened intelligence will likely not detect this as well.We face the same problem in the financial world: when there is no culture that prevents fraud, and separation of duty is not enforced, people might commit fraud. But even when the culture prevents fraud and separation of duty is present a trader might enter a position with a disproportional risk, by ignorance, and when specific monitoring is not set up to detect this it will cause a problem when there is an unexpected event. Monitoring/surveillance is often reactive.Even if we find that additional monitoring mitigates some of the risk, it comes with a price: financial and a limitation of personal freedom.We also have to define specific actions when a monitor triggers, whether it’s trend or event. We cannot determine the first action after the event or trend is detected, since this might allow for a government power creep (national/global emergencies are powerful ways of controlling people and might last longer than intended).What price are you willing to pay for risk mitigation?As described, the main risk in my domain we can anticipate and mitigate potential events which will push the funding ratio below a certain threshold.But this cannot mitigate the entire risk. Even hedging the risk of not meeting regulatory requirements - and because of that having to increase participation fees or decreasing future liabilities - might be too expensive. No insurance company is willing to insure the very small chance of a complete financial system meltdown, the amounts involved are too large.Something similar goes for Bostrom’s hypothesis. Increased monitoring is inefficient, so we might limit individuals or countries in what they do.This requires a position of power, where either a dominant country forces a country in a certain direction, or a group of countries has similar force to move other countries in that direction. Think of the US vs Iran or the United Nations vs (??).This comes with a price, the price of granting a country or group of countries the position of superpower, which might turn from benevolent to evil.Western governments often have specific “power corrupts” mitigation, which prevents such power to accumulate at a single point or person.But even if we can avoid this, we might find that the costs of risk mitigation are tremendous. Someone, some entity, should have the means to act upon a (potential) event.When it comes to terrorists someone might need to drop the bomb, but when it comes to countries we might need something similar. Who will decide on the appropriate action if North Korea is developing a weapon able to destroy most of the world population? And how will we stop them if force is needed to stop them? This question avoids the earlier mentioned detection question, it assumes we know what they are up to.And if this force is present, how do we know it’s not used to mitigate different risk (Iran, Venezuela, Russia, the VS)?What is appropriate risk mitigation?I’m having a small change in our process which causes a bit of a headache. There is a non-zero risk of erroneous transactions in the system if the solution is implemented as suggested. When I challenged the department on this specific suggestion their response was: we already have similar solutions in place, this is just an extension of this way of working. Apparently the question was never raised: is this the right solution for this specific problem? To complicate: in the same generic proces, but with very different specific conditions, that way of working indeed makes sense. But here a different solution should be implemented, or when this solution is implemented additional checks and balances are necessary.Something similar goes for Bostrom’s hypothesis. Just because monitoring/surveillance is an option it might not be the appropriate action. Just because enforcement is an option it might not be the appropriate action. Just because something worked in the past does not mean it was the right thing, or that it will work in a similar but not identical situation.A better solution?I think the piece Bostrom wrote is worth consideration. It addresses questions that should be raised, in essence these questions boil down to risk mitigation on massive risk with low but non-zero probability.The main problem I have with the piece is that it’s limited in scope, and with that on it’s risk mitigation possibilities. If we broaden the scope to include natural disasters with similar impact - that is destruction of most of human society - we face the same risk from difference sources. It would make sense to find a solution to mitigate the underlying risk - to what extent can we prevent mass extinction/destruction - in which case it perhaps makes sense to move part of the human population to the Moon or Mars to mitigate the risk. This makes us less vulnerable as species.We might also look at our dependencies on natural resources. Suppose that some human made event turns most oxygen in the atmosphere into something else - and given this happens over a longer period of time and not instantly - what actions can we take to mitigate the risk? And perhaps we should not mitigate the risk based on costs, and accept that only Sherpa’s and other inhabitants of mountain areas will survive and adapt.We might also consider that a sentient computer based life form decides that oxygen is not necessary for computers to function, and is a risk to their existence. Again we can ask ourselves: can we prevent this from happening (thinking of Asimov’s laws), and if we cannot: how can we mitigate the risk? Will we not create the sentient computer life form, or will we make sure that oxygen is available for our survival?In both cases the risk is our dependency on a natural resource: oxygen, and not the human or natural event that deprives us from it.Bostrom’s hypothesis is what I would expect from philosophy, it raises existential questions and challenges our knowledge in domains which we have not thought of, or where we perhaps should think more.Still I find it too confined, it’s too specific, and during this answer I’ve used several references to what I call “movie plot threads” which show a specific risk instead of a generic risk. When we address a specific risk without realising it has an underlying cause that’s more generic we are not addressing the risk and applying risk mitigation as we should.Thanks for bringing it to attention Franklin Parker, it kept me pondering for a while on my own role in risk mitigation in our processes and extending it to a broader question.