Pa Drivers Permit Physical Form 2008: Fill & Download for Free

It is just fearmongering … the effects are drastically overstated … The world isn't armed anymore with anything near enough to even cause the fall of a major nation. One funny observation I have made is that most people don't want to believe the truth. They are happier believing in the apocalypse, practically defending the end of the world like it is some earned right. Don’t let yourself be brainwashed by Hollywood and extreme political rhetoric. It isn’t hard…. think for yourself.the following is from another answer of mine. The footnotes will take you there for references.Nuclear war in the 21st century would not be the end of Russia or the USA and certainly not mankindMany of us can remember a time that the threat of MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction was a very real threat. A time where you felt helpless to change the events that constantly seemed to be unraveling a half a world away. Everyone's fate was endlessly hanging on a thread an at any moment, by mistake or intent, we could all be dead in 30 minutes… or less.In the 1970’s and 1980’s the world’s nuclear arsenals grew to an unfathomable size both in quantities and in destructive force. There was no doubt that the world was facing Armageddon. It was an end that would end all of mankind and a post apocalyptic vision of hell on Earth for those who were unlucky enough to survive. We had boxed ourselves into a corner where global war was unthinkable.In 2017, a lot has changed……..The destructive force of all the world's nuclear weapons is a fraction of what it once was. Surprisingly quietly, the USA and Russia have dismantled over 50,000 nuclear weapons over the past 30 years. The nuclear materials from these bombs and other stockpiles of weapons grade materials, was recycled and used in nuclear power generation over the past 20 years. [1] A fact that few may be aware of, the situation actually crashed the uranium market in the early 2000’s. The glut of available fuel brought the open market trading value down from $20 dollars a pound to near $2 per pound at that time. So a lot has changed from the time when many of us can remember the very real threat of mutually assured destruction.Reductions in the US ArsenalSince the end of the Cold War, the United States has eliminated entire classes of nuclear weapons, for example, the Army’s nuclear artillery and tactical missiles, and the Navy’s tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships.After a dramatic build-up to more than 32,000 warheads by 1966, the trend since then has been, with a few bumps and plateaus, consistently downward. While the numbers declined by only one quarter over the next twenty years, the types of warheads in the stockpile changed dramatically, with strategic warheads increasing and tactical warheads decreasing.Of the 32,000 warheads in 1967, approximately one-third were strategic and the balance tactical. Of the 23,500 warheads in 1987, almost two-thirds were strategic and the balance tactical. Between 1987 and 1996, more than 13,300 weapons were retired leaving approximately 10,500 warheads in the stockpile. President George H.W. Bush cut the stockpile in half to the 10,000-11,000 level, by treaty agreements and unilateral actions as the Cold War ended. His son, President George W. Bush cut it in half again in the 2002-2008 period. [2]Multi Megaton Weapons Now ObsoleteWhat has changed that the world no longer is building megaton weapons? The need for multi-megaton weapons was the result of low accuracy of warhead delivery on target…. we needed a sledgehammer approach to take out hardened targets and the way that was done was through very high yield bombs >=5 MT typically. The average nuclear weapon size today in 2017 is about 443 KT at full yield but a large portion of those bombs can be adjusted in the field to a very small fraction of their potential yield.Today the accuracy of on target delivery has improved significantly ..we hit what we aim for. Making a weapon twice as accurate has the same effect on lethality as making the warhead eight times as powerful. Phrased another way, making the missile twice as precise would only require one-eighth the explosive power to maintain the same lethality. [3] This means we need less hammer to do the same job. In the 1980’s the development of earth penetrating rounds was another game changer. Not only were we on target but now we could penetrate hundreds of feet of earth and concrete before detonating the warhead. This allowed a 100 KT weapon to do the damage of a >1 MT surface detonation. This is the primary method now for targeting hardened targets and is the final driver for smaller yield bombs. (Note that conventional warheads can penetrate 100’s of feet through concrete, nuclear warheads are usually limited to less than 30 ft in concrete due to the complexity of the warhead not surviving further penetration. Soil penetration depth varies with composition but to get full ground coupling of energy only 4 or 5 meters is required)The net effect of the use of EPW’s (Earth Penetrating Weapons) is a reduction in the number of casualties as compared with the number of casualties from a surface burst. This is primarily due to a 96% reduction in the weapon yield needed using an EPW. The greater coupling of the released energy to the ground shock for a buried detonation is the same as a surface burst with 25 times the explosive energy. For rural targets, the use of a nuclear earth-penetrator weapon is estimated to reduce casualties by a factor of 10 to 100 relative to a nuclear surface burst of equivalent probability of damage.[4]To exploit that efficiency, in 1997 the US replaced its aging 9-megaton bombs with a lower-yield but earth-penetrating 300-kt model by putting the nuclear warhead from an earlier bomb design into a strengthened alloy-steel casing and a new nose cone. [5]Pictured above is the first US precision guided EPW tactical nuclear gravity bomb. The B61-12 is designed to have four selectable explosive yields: 0.3 kilotons (kt), 1.5 kt, 10 kt and 50 kt. The B61-12 will be integrated on virtually all nuclear-capable U.S. and NATO aircraft: B-2, LRS-B (next-generation long-range bomber), F-35A, F-16, F-15E, and PA-200 Tornado.[6]Continued from above……To fully appreciate this evolution consider a targeting scenario as it was in the 1970’s as compared to 2020. In the 1970′s a hardened silo target required multiple megaton bombs to destroy a 1000 psi rated silo. Since weapons accuracy was no better than 200–300 yards you needed surface burst weapons greater than 1 megaton to take out the target. Now advance to the early 2000’s. That same target can be destroyed with a 70 kt EPW with a 100 yard accuracy. Fast forward to 2020 and that target can be taken out with a 1 kt EPW weapon with an accuracy of 10 meters. It isn’t the same nuclear war we grew up under its familiar shadow. It is completely different. [7]A Common Story: “There are enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world many times over.”This is nothing more than poorly crafted fiction an urban legend. This common conclusion is not based in any factual data. It is based solely in hype, hysteria, propaganda and fear mongering.If you take every weapon in existence today, approximately 6500 megatons between 15,000 warheads with an average yield of 433 KT, [11] and put a single bomb in its own 100 square mile grid… one bomb per grid (10 miles x 10 miles), you will contain >95% of the destructive force of each bomb on average within the grid it is in. [12] This means the total landmass to receive a destructive force from all the world's nuclear bombs is an area of 1.5 million square miles. Not quite half of the United States and 1/38 of the world's total land mass…. that's it!In truth it would be far less. A higher concentration of detonations would take place over military targets and would be likely 10–30 times greater in concentration over those areas. [13] If they were used in war it is unlikely more than 40% would get used even in a total war situation. So the actual area of intense destruction in a nuclear war is somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000 square miles or 1/384 to 1/192 of the world’s land mass.These numbers are easily verifiable, and they are right. So many have bought into the endless rhetoric of the world shattering destructiveness and the inevitable end of civilization scenarios that they can no longer be objective or analytical as they have put their beliefs in front of rational thinking. I find this true even with most scientists. I challenge anyone to just do the math …it is easy.You win wars by taking out the opposing teams ability to make war, not their population centers. The arsenals of today are just enough to cover military objectives. There would be no wholesale war against civilians. That is just more fear mongering and Hollywood storytelling.Urban Legend: Nuclear Weapons Vaporize Everything in the FireballMuch of the actual structures that held the bombs during the above ground testing remained intact after the detonation. The blast heat is intense but brief. There is not enough thermal energy to vaporize large objects even near the hottest point with the greatest pressure of a detonation.“Observations of the remains of towers and shielding material after detonation at several ground zeros indicate that large masses of material are not vaporized. Observations of the residue of the Smoky tower [44 kt bomb atop a 700 foot high steel tower] indicated that a very significant portion of that tower remained, including the upper 200 feet of steel. Another example similar to Shot Smoky was Shot Apple II [29 kt atop a 500 ft steel tower], Teapot Series. Even though the total yield of Shot Apple II was about [29 kt], the floor of the cab [housing the nuclear bomb itself, at the top of the tower] and the main tower support columns remained intact. The results of the Shot Fizeau [11 kt atop a 500 ft steel tower] tower melt studies (W. K. Dolen and A. D. Thornborough, Fitzeau Tower Melt Studies, Sandia report SC-4185, 1958, Secret) show that about 85 percent of tower material was accounted for after the detonation and that only the upper 50 feet of tower was vaporized. No melting occurred beyond 175 feet from the top of the tower although the fireball theoretically engulfed more than 400 feet of the tower.”Dr Kermit H. Larson, et al., Distribution, Characteristics, and Biotic Availability of Fallout, Operation Plumbbob, weapon test report WT-1488, ADA077509, July 1966, page 59 [14]The Evolution of Military Doctrine - Minimize civilian casualties not take out the citiesThe Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), is an extension of that part of customary international law regulating the conduct of armed hostilities. When considering the utility of nuclear weapons, two LOAC principles are most germane:the principles of military necessityand lawful targeting.The principle of military necessity calls for using only that degree and kind of force required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy, while taking into consideration the minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. This principle is designed to limit the application of force to that required for carrying out lawful military purposes. Although the principle of military necessity recognizes that some collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians may occur when a legitimate military target is attacked, it does not excuse the wanton destruction of lives and property disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained. For the employment of any weapon, the weapons used should not cause more destruction than necessary to achieve military objectives. Consequently, a conventional weapon may be all that is needed or a smaller yield nuclear weapon may be preferred over a larger yield warhead, if the military objectives can still be achieved.In contrast, the principle of lawful targeting requires that all reasonable precautions be taken to ensure the targeting of only military objectives, so that damage to civilian objects (collateral damage) or death and injury to civilians (incidental injury ) is avoided as much as possible. This is often grouped under the term of “countervalue targeting”.[15]The view in 2016 from military law attorneys is that countervalue targeting is illegal under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). That was not always the case. In the late 1940s, the U.S. did not have a declaratory nuclear doctrine. In the event of war, military leaders assumed that the few bombs in the nuclear inventory would be used against a small number of enemy cities as they were at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) expanded the Hiroshima concept into a war plan for a single strategic air strike against major Soviet cities. It was argued that this would deter Moscow from starting a war for fear of the terrible destruction that American reprisals would inflict on the USSR.Today the US Policy is not to target civilians at all. The document, known as JSCP-N (formerly Annex C), provides nuclear planning guidance to combatant commanders in accordance with the Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP) issued by the Secretary of Defense. The details of the targeting guidance is available to the public. [16]In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear weapon. The emerging nuclear arsenal of the USSR raised an overriding new requirement for U.S. doctrine. Although the JCS continued to plan for an attack against Soviet cities, destroying enemy nuclear weapons became the priority for American nuclear forces and remains so to this day. At the same time, U.S. leaders seriously debated whether to wage a preventive war in order to destroy Soviet nuclear forces before they could be used. In 1950, President Truman rejected preventive war as inconsistent with American values.During the Kennedy administration, the Secretary of Defense McNamara developed plans that limited the U.S. nuclear attacks to only one or two of the three traditional categories of targets: nuclear forces, other military, and urban-industrial. Under the revised declaratory doctrine, known as the "no cities" or "city hostage" doctrine, U.S. forces would first, in the event of Soviet aggression, strike military targets (categories one and two) and simultaneously threaten next to hit cities (category three targets), in order to deter Moscow from retaliating against American population centers. The "no-cities" doctrine represented a shift away from massive retaliation and towards a more calibrated response to Soviet aggression. Indeed, this increased targeting flexibility was adopted by NATO in 1967 when it formally approved the declaratory doctrine of flexible response. Under this declaratory doctrine, which remains in force today, [17]During the early 1960s, deterrence was discussed in countervalue terms. For example, Jerome Wiesner, science adviser to President John F. Kennedy and President Lyndon B. Johnson, testified before Congress that the U.S. could establish deterrence based on a threat to destroy six of the 10 largest Soviet cities. However, by the mid-1980s, U.S. officials began to publicly explain that the U.S. did not target civilian populations and instead targeted Soviet military assets, including nuclear forces.[18]The committee notes that although some scenarios show substantial nuclear-radiation-induced fatalities, military operational guidance is to attack targets in ways to minimize collateral effects. Calculated numbers of fatalities to be expected from an attack on an HDBT might be reduced by operational planning and employment tactics. Assuming that other strategic considerations permit, the operational commander could warn of a nuclear attack on an HDBT or could time such an attack to take advantage of wind conditions that would reduce expected casualties from acute and latent effects of fallout by factors of up to 100, assuming that the wind conditions were known well enough and were stable and that defenses against the attack could not be mobilized. However, a nuclear weapon burst in a densely populated urban environment will always result in a large number of casualties.[19]After the Korean War the U.S. Army’s revised the field manual on the law of land warfare introduced a new statement that expressed as doctrine the growing importance of intention. The revised 1956 manual said, “It is a generally recognized rule of international law that civilians must not be made the object of attack directed exclusively against them.” Previous army manuals had left this rule unexpressed. As a subculture, military professionals may have placed even more emphasis on their intentions not to harm noncombatants even in the face of widespread civilian deaths. While the sources make it difficult to assess the personal sentiments of officers and soldiers about civilian casualties during the Korean War, it is not hard to believe that many in private did not want to think of themselves as waging war against defenseless civilians.[20]Survival - Fallout is a short lived problem in most places.Using the 7/10 rule of exponential radionuclide decay, after just 49 days the radiation will be 1/10,000 the level it was an hour after the bombs went off and after a year and a half the radiation will have dropped below 1/100,000 of that initial level. The majority of bombs would be airburst which create little to no fallout which significantly reduces these dangers. [27]Surface bursts are tactically undesirable. Instead there would be earth penetrating warheads. The reason we no longer stock multi megaton weapons is one that our delivery accuracy no longer needs a sledgehammer approach, we hit what we aim for within feet and yards. Secondly the development of ground penetrating warheads vastly reduced the energy required to take out hardened targets. Ground penetrators while messy are not as bad of a fallout generator as a surface burst is, as there is little neutron activation of secondary materials which is a major contributor to surface burst fallout.[28][29]7/10 Rule chart above[30]Where are you safest from fallout?A regular cellar is not much better than being outside. A good fallout shelter has a rating of 1000, meaning it reduces your exposure to the fallout outside by a factor of 1000. A typical basement is only rated at a 10 which means you are dead if you are in the path of some major fallout.Places rated at a 1000 or higher:a sub-basement (basement under a basement) you need at least 6 feet of dirt over your head to protect you from all forms of radiation.the second level below street level of a concrete reinforced parking garage (obviously that also can be closed off at the entrance as well)the inner windowless rooms on the 4th floor or higher in a high-rise building (always leave at least 2 floors above you before the roof.According to FEMA these are your best bets. Whatever gives you the greatest distance from the source of the radiation is your best option. If none of these examples are available you just need to apply that distance guideline and some common sense. [31][32]Plan on being there at least 2 weeks and perhaps a month.A 2017 report by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), a binational research organization funded by the governments of the United States and Japan, investigates the health effects of atomic bomb radiation among A-bomb survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The findings from the study of the atomic bomb survivors that have shown that the actual biological risk from nuclear radiation is surprisingly smaller than most people realize. The lifetime cancer death rate among those survivors went up less than one percent, and no biological effects at all have been detected among those who received lower doses (below 110 millisieverts). No multi-generational genetic damage has been detected either. [33]Nuclear WinterPolitically motivated bad science . For more detail see the answer where the footnotes take you. In general:Russell Seitz, Associate of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs, argues that the winter model's assumptions give results which the researchers want to achieve and is a case of "worst-case analysis run amok". Seitz criticized the theory for being based on successive worst-case events. [92]A recent and the most complete analysis done to date, indicates that the risk isn't real. Climate Impact of a Regional Nuclear Weapons Exchange: An Improved Assessment Based On Detailed Source Calculations. Fundamental assumptions and model parameters used in the past studies were wrong . Some of this was wrong by intent in order to get the desired results. A brief summarization below.our comprehensive urbanfire simulations indicate that the bulk of the carbon mass remains in the troposphere, where it is quickly removed from the atmosphere. In most previous work, for example, that of Stenke et al. (2013) and Mills et al. (2014), all of the soot produced by the urbanfires is directly injected near the top of the troposphere, and therefore much of it rises into the stratosphere, where it shades and cools the Earth. In contrast, if we use a realistic vertical profile for the BC aerosols as input to the climate model, the long-term global impacts on climate are much less severe than predicted by previous studies. This was true even with conservative, worst case assumptions regarding BC production.[103]The truth is out there…..

Nothing … the effects are drastically overstated … The world isn't armed anymore with anything near enough to even cause the fall of a major nation. One funny observation I have made is that most people don't want to believe the truth. They are happier believing in the apocalypse, practically defending the end of the world like it is some earned right. Don’t let yourself be brainwashed by Hollywood and extreme political rhetoric. It isn’t hard…. think for yourself.the following is from another answer of mine. The footnotes will take you there for references.Nuclear war in the 21st century would not be the end of Russia or the USA and certainly not mankindMany of us can remember a time that the threat of MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction was a very real threat. A time where you felt helpless to change the events that constantly seemed to be unraveling a half a world away. Everyone's fate was endlessly hanging on a thread an at any moment, by mistake or intent, we could all be dead in 30 minutes… or less.In the 1970’s and 1980’s the world’s nuclear arsenals grew to an unfathomable size both in quantities and in destructive force. There was no doubt that the world was facing Armageddon. It was an end that would end all of mankind and a post apocalyptic vision of hell on Earth for those who were unlucky enough to survive. We had boxed ourselves into a corner where global war was unthinkable.In 2017, a lot has changed……..The destructive force of all the world's nuclear weapons is a fraction of what it once was. Surprisingly quietly, the USA and Russia have dismantled over 50,000 nuclear weapons over the past 30 years. The nuclear materials from these bombs and other stockpiles of weapons grade materials, was recycled and used in nuclear power generation over the past 20 years. [1] A fact that few may be aware of, the situation actually crashed the uranium market in the early 2000’s. The glut of available fuel brought the open market trading value down from $20 dollars a pound to near $2 per pound at that time. So a lot has changed from the time when many of us can remember the very real threat of mutually assured destruction.Reductions in the US ArsenalSince the end of the Cold War, the United States has eliminated entire classes of nuclear weapons, for example, the Army’s nuclear artillery and tactical missiles, and the Navy’s tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships.After a dramatic build-up to more than 32,000 warheads by 1966, the trend since then has been, with a few bumps and plateaus, consistently downward. While the numbers declined by only one quarter over the next twenty years, the types of warheads in the stockpile changed dramatically, with strategic warheads increasing and tactical warheads decreasing.Of the 32,000 warheads in 1967, approximately one-third were strategic and the balance tactical. Of the 23,500 warheads in 1987, almost two-thirds were strategic and the balance tactical. Between 1987 and 1996, more than 13,300 weapons were retired leaving approximately 10,500 warheads in the stockpile. President George H.W. Bush cut the stockpile in half to the 10,000-11,000 level, by treaty agreements and unilateral actions as the Cold War ended. His son, President George W. Bush cut it in half again in the 2002-2008 period. [2]Multi Megaton Weapons Now ObsoleteWhat has changed that the world no longer is building megaton weapons? The need for multi-megaton weapons was the result of low accuracy of warhead delivery on target…. we needed a sledgehammer approach to take out hardened targets and the way that was done was through very high yield bombs >=5 MT typically. The average nuclear weapon size today in 2017 is about 443 KT at full yield but a large portion of those bombs can be adjusted in the field to a very small fraction of their potential yield.Today the accuracy of on target delivery has improved significantly ..we hit what we aim for. Making a weapon twice as accurate has the same effect on lethality as making the warhead eight times as powerful. Phrased another way, making the missile twice as precise would only require one-eighth the explosive power to maintain the same lethality. [3] This means we need less hammer to do the same job. In the 1980’s the development of earth penetrating rounds was another game changer. Not only were we on target but now we could penetrate hundreds of feet of earth and concrete before detonating the warhead. This allowed a 100 KT weapon to do the damage of a >1 MT surface detonation. This is the primary method now for targeting hardened targets and is the final driver for smaller yield bombs. (Note that conventional warheads can penetrate 100’s of feet through concrete, nuclear warheads are usually limited to less than 30 ft in concrete due to the complexity of the warhead not surviving further penetration. Soil penetration depth varies with composition but to get full ground coupling of energy only 4 or 5 meters is required)The net effect of the use of EPW’s (Earth Penetrating Weapons) is a reduction in the number of casualties as compared with the number of casualties from a surface burst. This is primarily due to a 96% reduction in the weapon yield needed using an EPW. The greater coupling of the released energy to the ground shock for a buried detonation is the same as a surface burst with 25 times the explosive energy. For rural targets, the use of a nuclear earth-penetrator weapon is estimated to reduce casualties by a factor of 10 to 100 relative to a nuclear surface burst of equivalent probability of damage.[4]To exploit that efficiency, in 1997 the US replaced its aging 9-megaton bombs with a lower-yield but earth-penetrating 300-kt model by putting the nuclear warhead from an earlier bomb design into a strengthened alloy-steel casing and a new nose cone. [5]Pictured above is the first US precision guided EPW tactical nuclear gravity bomb. The B61-12 is designed to have four selectable explosive yields: 0.3 kilotons (kt), 1.5 kt, 10 kt and 50 kt. The B61-12 will be integrated on virtually all nuclear-capable U.S. and NATO aircraft: B-2, LRS-B (next-generation long-range bomber), F-35A, F-16, F-15E, and PA-200 Tornado.[6]Continued from above……To fully appreciate this evolution consider a targeting scenario as it was in the 1970’s as compared to 2020. In the 1970′s a hardened silo target required multiple megaton bombs to destroy a 1000 psi rated silo. Since weapons accuracy was no better than 200–300 yards you needed surface burst weapons greater than 1 megaton to take out the target. Now advance to the early 2000’s. That same target can be destroyed with a 70 kt EPW with a 100 yard accuracy. Fast forward to 2020 and that target can be taken out with a 1 kt EPW weapon with an accuracy of 10 meters. It isn’t the same nuclear war we grew up under its familiar shadow. It is completely different. [7]A Common Story: “There are enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world many times over.”This is nothing more than poorly crafted fiction an urban legend. This common conclusion is not based in any factual data. It is based solely in hype, hysteria, propaganda and fear mongering.If you take every weapon in existence today, approximately 6500 megatons between 15,000 warheads with an average yield of 433 KT, [11] and put a single bomb in its own 100 square mile grid… one bomb per grid (10 miles x 10 miles), you will contain >95% of the destructive force of each bomb on average within the grid it is in. [12] This means the total landmass to receive a destructive force from all the world's nuclear bombs is an area of 1.5 million square miles. Not quite half of the United States and 1/38 of the world's total land mass…. that's it!In truth it would be far less. A higher concentration of detonations would take place over military targets and would be likely 10–30 times greater in concentration over those areas. [13] If they were used in war it is unlikely more than 40% would get used even in a total war situation. So the actual area of intense destruction in a nuclear war is somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000 square miles or 1/384 to 1/192 of the world’s land mass.These numbers are easily verifiable, and they are right. So many have bought into the endless rhetoric of the world shattering destructiveness and the inevitable end of civilization scenarios that they can no longer be objective or analytical as they have put their beliefs in front of rational thinking. I find this true even with most scientists. I challenge anyone to just do the math …it is easy.You win wars by taking out the opposing teams ability to make war, not their population centers. The arsenals of today are just enough to cover military objectives. There would be no wholesale war against civilians. That is just more fear mongering and Hollywood storytelling.Urban Legend: Nuclear Weapons Vaporize Everything in the FireballMuch of the actual structures that held the bombs during the above ground testing remained intact after the detonation. The blast heat is intense but brief. There is not enough thermal energy to vaporize large objects even near the hottest point with the greatest pressure of a detonation.“Observations of the remains of towers and shielding material after detonation at several ground zeros indicate that large masses of material are not vaporized. Observations of the residue of the Smoky tower [44 kt bomb atop a 700 foot high steel tower] indicated that a very significant portion of that tower remained, including the upper 200 feet of steel. Another example similar to Shot Smoky was Shot Apple II [29 kt atop a 500 ft steel tower], Teapot Series. Even though the total yield of Shot Apple II was about [29 kt], the floor of the cab [housing the nuclear bomb itself, at the top of the tower] and the main tower support columns remained intact. The results of the Shot Fizeau [11 kt atop a 500 ft steel tower] tower melt studies (W. K. Dolen and A. D. Thornborough, Fitzeau Tower Melt Studies, Sandia report SC-4185, 1958, Secret) show that about 85 percent of tower material was accounted for after the detonation and that only the upper 50 feet of tower was vaporized. No melting occurred beyond 175 feet from the top of the tower although the fireball theoretically engulfed more than 400 feet of the tower.”Dr Kermit H. Larson, et al., Distribution, Characteristics, and Biotic Availability of Fallout, Operation Plumbbob, weapon test report WT-1488, ADA077509, July 1966, page 59 [14]The Evolution of Military Doctrine - Minimize civilian casualties not take out the citiesThe Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), is an extension of that part of customary international law regulating the conduct of armed hostilities. When considering the utility of nuclear weapons, two LOAC principles are most germane:the principles of military necessityand lawful targeting.The principle of military necessity calls for using only that degree and kind of force required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy, while taking into consideration the minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. This principle is designed to limit the application of force to that required for carrying out lawful military purposes. Although the principle of military necessity recognizes that some collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians may occur when a legitimate military target is attacked, it does not excuse the wanton destruction of lives and property disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained. For the employment of any weapon, the weapons used should not cause more destruction than necessary to achieve military objectives. Consequently, a conventional weapon may be all that is needed or a smaller yield nuclear weapon may be preferred over a larger yield warhead, if the military objectives can still be achieved.In contrast, the principle of lawful targeting requires that all reasonable precautions be taken to ensure the targeting of only military objectives, so that damage to civilian objects (collateral damage) or death and injury to civilians (incidental injury ) is avoided as much as possible. This is often grouped under the term of “countervalue targeting”.[15]The view in 2016 from military law attorneys is that countervalue targeting is illegal under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). That was not always the case. In the late 1940s, the U.S. did not have a declaratory nuclear doctrine. In the event of war, military leaders assumed that the few bombs in the nuclear inventory would be used against a small number of enemy cities as they were at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) expanded the Hiroshima concept into a war plan for a single strategic air strike against major Soviet cities. It was argued that this would deter Moscow from starting a war for fear of the terrible destruction that American reprisals would inflict on the USSR.Today the US Policy is not to target civilians at all. The document, known as JSCP-N (formerly Annex C), provides nuclear planning guidance to combatant commanders in accordance with the Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP) issued by the Secretary of Defense. The details of the targeting guidance is available to the public. [16]In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear weapon. The emerging nuclear arsenal of the USSR raised an overriding new requirement for U.S. doctrine. Although the JCS continued to plan for an attack against Soviet cities, destroying enemy nuclear weapons became the priority for American nuclear forces and remains so to this day. At the same time, U.S. leaders seriously debated whether to wage a preventive war in order to destroy Soviet nuclear forces before they could be used. In 1950, President Truman rejected preventive war as inconsistent with American values.During the Kennedy administration, the Secretary of Defense McNamara developed plans that limited the U.S. nuclear attacks to only one or two of the three traditional categories of targets: nuclear forces, other military, and urban-industrial. Under the revised declaratory doctrine, known as the "no cities" or "city hostage" doctrine, U.S. forces would first, in the event of Soviet aggression, strike military targets (categories one and two) and simultaneously threaten next to hit cities (category three targets), in order to deter Moscow from retaliating against American population centers. The "no-cities" doctrine represented a shift away from massive retaliation and towards a more calibrated response to Soviet aggression. Indeed, this increased targeting flexibility was adopted by NATO in 1967 when it formally approved the declaratory doctrine of flexible response. Under this declaratory doctrine, which remains in force today, [17]During the early 1960s, deterrence was discussed in countervalue terms. For example, Jerome Wiesner, science adviser to President John F. Kennedy and President Lyndon B. Johnson, testified before Congress that the U.S. could establish deterrence based on a threat to destroy six of the 10 largest Soviet cities. However, by the mid-1980s, U.S. officials began to publicly explain that the U.S. did not target civilian populations and instead targeted Soviet military assets, including nuclear forces.[18]The committee notes that although some scenarios show substantial nuclear-radiation-induced fatalities, military operational guidance is to attack targets in ways to minimize collateral effects. Calculated numbers of fatalities to be expected from an attack on an HDBT might be reduced by operational planning and employment tactics. Assuming that other strategic considerations permit, the operational commander could warn of a nuclear attack on an HDBT or could time such an attack to take advantage of wind conditions that would reduce expected casualties from acute and latent effects of fallout by factors of up to 100, assuming that the wind conditions were known well enough and were stable and that defenses against the attack could not be mobilized. However, a nuclear weapon burst in a densely populated urban environment will always result in a large number of casualties.[19]After the Korean War the U.S. Army’s revised the field manual on the law of land warfare introduced a new statement that expressed as doctrine the growing importance of intention. The revised 1956 manual said, “It is a generally recognized rule of international law that civilians must not be made the object of attack directed exclusively against them.” Previous army manuals had left this rule unexpressed. As a subculture, military professionals may have placed even more emphasis on their intentions not to harm noncombatants even in the face of widespread civilian deaths. While the sources make it difficult to assess the personal sentiments of officers and soldiers about civilian casualties during the Korean War, it is not hard to believe that many in private did not want to think of themselves as waging war against defenseless civilians.[20]Survival - Fallout is a short lived problem in most places.Using the 7/10 rule of exponential radionuclide decay, after just 49 days the radiation will be 1/10,000 the level it was an hour after the bombs went off and after a year and a half the radiation will have dropped below 1/100,000 of that initial level. The majority of bombs would be airburst which create little to no fallout which significantly reduces these dangers. [27]Surface bursts are tactically undesirable. Instead there would be earth penetrating warheads. The reason we no longer stock multi megaton weapons is one that our delivery accuracy no longer needs a sledgehammer approach, we hit what we aim for within feet and yards. Secondly the development of ground penetrating warheads vastly reduced the energy required to take out hardened targets. Ground penetrators while messy are not as bad of a fallout generator as a surface burst is, as there is little neutron activation of secondary materials which is a major contributor to surface burst fallout.[28][29]7/10 Rule chart above[30]Where are you safest from fallout?A regular cellar is not much better than being outside. A good fallout shelter has a rating of 1000, meaning it reduces your exposure to the fallout outside by a factor of 1000. A typical basement is only rated at a 10 which means you are dead if you are in the path of some major fallout.Places rated at a 1000 or higher:a sub-basement (basement under a basement) you need at least 6 feet of dirt over your head to protect you from all forms of radiation.the second level below street level of a concrete reinforced parking garage (obviously that also can be closed off at the entrance as well)the inner windowless rooms on the 4th floor or higher in a high-rise building (always leave at least 2 floors above you before the roof.According to FEMA these are your best bets. Whatever gives you the greatest distance from the source of the radiation is your best option. If none of these examples are available you just need to apply that distance guideline and some common sense. [31][32]Plan on being there at least 2 weeks and perhaps a month.A 2017 report by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), a binational research organization funded by the governments of the United States and Japan, investigates the health effects of atomic bomb radiation among A-bomb survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The findings from the study of the atomic bomb survivors that have shown that the actual biological risk from nuclear radiation is surprisingly smaller than most people realize. The lifetime cancer death rate among those survivors went up less than one percent, and no biological effects at all have been detected among those who received lower doses (below 110 millisieverts). No multi-generational genetic damage has been detected either. [33]

Humanity would survive with no long term adverse effects…… essentially unscathed. The effects of nuclear weapons are drastically overstated. The world isn't armed anymore with anything near enough to even cause the fall of a major nation. One funny observation I have made is that most people don't want to believe the truth. They are happier believing in the apocalypse, practically defending the end of the world like it is some earned right. Don’t let yourself be brainwashed by Hollywood and extreme political rhetoric. It isn’t hard…. think for yourself.the following is from another answer of mine. The footnotes will take you there for references.Nuclear war in the 21st century would not be the end of Russia or the USA and certainly not mankindMany of us can remember a time that the threat of MAD or Mutually Assured Destruction was a very real threat. A time where you felt helpless to change the events that constantly seemed to be unraveling a half a world away. Everyone's fate was endlessly hanging on a thread an at any moment, by mistake or intent, we could all be dead in 30 minutes… or less.In the 1970’s and 1980’s the world’s nuclear arsenals grew to an unfathomable size both in quantities and in destructive force. There was no doubt that the world was facing Armageddon. It was an end that would end all of mankind and a post apocalyptic vision of hell on Earth for those who were unlucky enough to survive. We had boxed ourselves into a corner where global war was unthinkable.In 2017, a lot has changed……..The destructive force of all the world's nuclear weapons is a fraction of what it once was. Surprisingly quietly, the USA and Russia have dismantled over 50,000 nuclear weapons over the past 30 years. The nuclear materials from these bombs and other stockpiles of weapons grade materials, was recycled and used in nuclear power generation over the past 20 years. [1] A fact that few may be aware of, the situation actually crashed the uranium market in the early 2000’s. The glut of available fuel brought the open market trading value down from $20 dollars a pound to near $2 per pound at that time. So a lot has changed from the time when many of us can remember the very real threat of mutually assured destruction.Reductions in the US ArsenalSince the end of the Cold War, the United States has eliminated entire classes of nuclear weapons, for example, the Army’s nuclear artillery and tactical missiles, and the Navy’s tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships.After a dramatic build-up to more than 32,000 warheads by 1966, the trend since then has been, with a few bumps and plateaus, consistently downward. While the numbers declined by only one quarter over the next twenty years, the types of warheads in the stockpile changed dramatically, with strategic warheads increasing and tactical warheads decreasing.Of the 32,000 warheads in 1967, approximately one-third were strategic and the balance tactical. Of the 23,500 warheads in 1987, almost two-thirds were strategic and the balance tactical. Between 1987 and 1996, more than 13,300 weapons were retired leaving approximately 10,500 warheads in the stockpile. President George H.W. Bush cut the stockpile in half to the 10,000-11,000 level, by treaty agreements and unilateral actions as the Cold War ended. His son, President George W. Bush cut it in half again in the 2002-2008 period. [2]Multi Megaton Weapons Now ObsoleteWhat has changed that the world no longer is building megaton weapons? The need for multi-megaton weapons was the result of low accuracy of warhead delivery on target…. we needed a sledgehammer approach to take out hardened targets and the way that was done was through very high yield bombs >=5 MT typically. The average nuclear weapon size today in 2017 is about 443 KT at full yield but a large portion of those bombs can be adjusted in the field to a very small fraction of their potential yield.Today the accuracy of on target delivery has improved significantly ..we hit what we aim for. Making a weapon twice as accurate has the same effect on lethality as making the warhead eight times as powerful. Phrased another way, making the missile twice as precise would only require one-eighth the explosive power to maintain the same lethality. [3] This means we need less hammer to do the same job. In the 1980’s the development of earth penetrating rounds was another game changer. Not only were we on target but now we could penetrate hundreds of feet of earth and concrete before detonating the warhead. This allowed a 100 KT weapon to do the damage of a >1 MT surface detonation. This is the primary method now for targeting hardened targets and is the final driver for smaller yield bombs. (Note that conventional warheads can penetrate 100’s of feet through concrete, nuclear warheads are usually limited to less than 30 ft in concrete due to the complexity of the warhead not surviving further penetration. Soil penetration depth varies with composition but to get full ground coupling of energy only 4 or 5 meters is required)The net effect of the use of EPW’s (Earth Penetrating Weapons) is a reduction in the number of casualties as compared with the number of casualties from a surface burst. This is primarily due to a 96% reduction in the weapon yield needed using an EPW. The greater coupling of the released energy to the ground shock for a buried detonation is the same as a surface burst with 25 times the explosive energy. For rural targets, the use of a nuclear earth-penetrator weapon is estimated to reduce casualties by a factor of 10 to 100 relative to a nuclear surface burst of equivalent probability of damage.[4]To exploit that efficiency, in 1997 the US replaced its aging 9-megaton bombs with a lower-yield but earth-penetrating 300-kt model by putting the nuclear warhead from an earlier bomb design into a strengthened alloy-steel casing and a new nose cone. [5]Pictured above is the first US precision guided EPW tactical nuclear gravity bomb. The B61-12 is designed to have four selectable explosive yields: 0.3 kilotons (kt), 1.5 kt, 10 kt and 50 kt. The B61-12 will be integrated on virtually all nuclear-capable U.S. and NATO aircraft: B-2, LRS-B (next-generation long-range bomber), F-35A, F-16, F-15E, and PA-200 Tornado.[6]Continued from above……To fully appreciate this evolution consider a targeting scenario as it was in the 1970’s as compared to 2020. In the 1970′s a hardened silo target required multiple megaton bombs to destroy a 1000 psi rated silo. Since weapons accuracy was no better than 200–300 yards you needed surface burst weapons greater than 1 megaton to take out the target. Now advance to the early 2000’s. That same target can be destroyed with a 70 kt EPW with a 100 yard accuracy. Fast forward to 2020 and that target can be taken out with a 1 kt EPW weapon with an accuracy of 10 meters. It isn’t the same nuclear war we grew up under its familiar shadow. It is completely different. [7]A Common Story: “There are enough nuclear weapons to destroy the world many times over.”This is nothing more than poorly crafted fiction an urban legend. This common conclusion is not based in any factual data. It is based solely in hype, hysteria, propaganda and fear mongering.If you take every weapon in existence today, approximately 6500 megatons between 15,000 warheads with an average yield of 433 KT, [11] and put a single bomb in its own 100 square mile grid… one bomb per grid (10 miles x 10 miles), you will contain >95% of the destructive force of each bomb on average within the grid it is in. [12] This means the total landmass to receive a destructive force from all the world's nuclear bombs is an area of 1.5 million square miles. Not quite half of the United States and 1/38 of the world's total land mass…. that's it!In truth it would be far less. A higher concentration of detonations would take place over military targets and would be likely 10–30 times greater in concentration over those areas. [13] If they were used in war it is unlikely more than 40% would get used even in a total war situation. So the actual area of intense destruction in a nuclear war is somewhere between 150,000 and 300,000 square miles or 1/384 to 1/192 of the world’s land mass.These numbers are easily verifiable, and they are right. So many have bought into the endless rhetoric of the world shattering destructiveness and the inevitable end of civilization scenarios that they can no longer be objective or analytical as they have put their beliefs in front of rational thinking. I find this true even with most scientists. I challenge anyone to just do the math …it is easy.You win wars by taking out the opposing teams ability to make war, not their population centers. The arsenals of today are just enough to cover military objectives. There would be no wholesale war against civilians. That is just more fear mongering and Hollywood storytelling.Urban Legend: Nuclear Weapons Vaporize Everything in the FireballMuch of the actual structures that held the bombs during the above ground testing remained intact after the detonation. The blast heat is intense but brief. There is not enough thermal energy to vaporize large objects even near the hottest point with the greatest pressure of a detonation.“Observations of the remains of towers and shielding material after detonation at several ground zeros indicate that large masses of material are not vaporized. Observations of the residue of the Smoky tower [44 kt bomb atop a 700 foot high steel tower] indicated that a very significant portion of that tower remained, including the upper 200 feet of steel. Another example similar to Shot Smoky was Shot Apple II [29 kt atop a 500 ft steel tower], Teapot Series. Even though the total yield of Shot Apple II was about [29 kt], the floor of the cab [housing the nuclear bomb itself, at the top of the tower] and the main tower support columns remained intact. The results of the Shot Fizeau [11 kt atop a 500 ft steel tower] tower melt studies (W. K. Dolen and A. D. Thornborough, Fitzeau Tower Melt Studies, Sandia report SC-4185, 1958, Secret) show that about 85 percent of tower material was accounted for after the detonation and that only the upper 50 feet of tower was vaporized. No melting occurred beyond 175 feet from the top of the tower although the fireball theoretically engulfed more than 400 feet of the tower.”Dr Kermit H. Larson, et al., Distribution, Characteristics, and Biotic Availability of Fallout, Operation Plumbbob, weapon test report WT-1488, ADA077509, July 1966, page 59 [14]The Evolution of Military Doctrine - Minimize civilian casualties not take out the citiesThe Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), is an extension of that part of customary international law regulating the conduct of armed hostilities. When considering the utility of nuclear weapons, two LOAC principles are most germane:the principles of military necessityand lawful targeting.The principle of military necessity calls for using only that degree and kind of force required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy, while taking into consideration the minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources. This principle is designed to limit the application of force to that required for carrying out lawful military purposes. Although the principle of military necessity recognizes that some collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians may occur when a legitimate military target is attacked, it does not excuse the wanton destruction of lives and property disproportionate to the military advantage to be gained. For the employment of any weapon, the weapons used should not cause more destruction than necessary to achieve military objectives. Consequently, a conventional weapon may be all that is needed or a smaller yield nuclear weapon may be preferred over a larger yield warhead, if the military objectives can still be achieved.In contrast, the principle of lawful targeting requires that all reasonable precautions be taken to ensure the targeting of only military objectives, so that damage to civilian objects (collateral damage) or death and injury to civilians (incidental injury ) is avoided as much as possible. This is often grouped under the term of “countervalue targeting”.[15]The view in 2016 from military law attorneys is that countervalue targeting is illegal under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC). That was not always the case. In the late 1940s, the U.S. did not have a declaratory nuclear doctrine. In the event of war, military leaders assumed that the few bombs in the nuclear inventory would be used against a small number of enemy cities as they were at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In 1948 the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) expanded the Hiroshima concept into a war plan for a single strategic air strike against major Soviet cities. It was argued that this would deter Moscow from starting a war for fear of the terrible destruction that American reprisals would inflict on the USSR.Today the US Policy is not to target civilians at all. The document, known as JSCP-N (formerly Annex C), provides nuclear planning guidance to combatant commanders in accordance with the Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons (NUWEP) issued by the Secretary of Defense. The details of the targeting guidance is available to the public. [16]In 1949 the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear weapon. The emerging nuclear arsenal of the USSR raised an overriding new requirement for U.S. doctrine. Although the JCS continued to plan for an attack against Soviet cities, destroying enemy nuclear weapons became the priority for American nuclear forces and remains so to this day. At the same time, U.S. leaders seriously debated whether to wage a preventive war in order to destroy Soviet nuclear forces before they could be used. In 1950, President Truman rejected preventive war as inconsistent with American values.During the Kennedy administration, the Secretary of Defense McNamara developed plans that limited the U.S. nuclear attacks to only one or two of the three traditional categories of targets: nuclear forces, other military, and urban-industrial. Under the revised declaratory doctrine, known as the "no cities" or "city hostage" doctrine, U.S. forces would first, in the event of Soviet aggression, strike military targets (categories one and two) and simultaneously threaten next to hit cities (category three targets), in order to deter Moscow from retaliating against American population centers. The "no-cities" doctrine represented a shift away from massive retaliation and towards a more calibrated response to Soviet aggression. Indeed, this increased targeting flexibility was adopted by NATO in 1967 when it formally approved the declaratory doctrine of flexible response. Under this declaratory doctrine, which remains in force today, [17]During the early 1960s, deterrence was discussed in countervalue terms. For example, Jerome Wiesner, science adviser to President John F. Kennedy and President Lyndon B. Johnson, testified before Congress that the U.S. could establish deterrence based on a threat to destroy six of the 10 largest Soviet cities. However, by the mid-1980s, U.S. officials began to publicly explain that the U.S. did not target civilian populations and instead targeted Soviet military assets, including nuclear forces.[18]The committee notes that although some scenarios show substantial nuclear-radiation-induced fatalities, military operational guidance is to attack targets in ways to minimize collateral effects. Calculated numbers of fatalities to be expected from an attack on an HDBT might be reduced by operational planning and employment tactics. Assuming that other strategic considerations permit, the operational commander could warn of a nuclear attack on an HDBT or could time such an attack to take advantage of wind conditions that would reduce expected casualties from acute and latent effects of fallout by factors of up to 100, assuming that the wind conditions were known well enough and were stable and that defenses against the attack could not be mobilized. However, a nuclear weapon burst in a densely populated urban environment will always result in a large number of casualties.[19]After the Korean War the U.S. Army’s revised the field manual on the law of land warfare introduced a new statement that expressed as doctrine the growing importance of intention. The revised 1956 manual said, “It is a generally recognized rule of international law that civilians must not be made the object of attack directed exclusively against them.” Previous army manuals had left this rule unexpressed. As a subculture, military professionals may have placed even more emphasis on their intentions not to harm noncombatants even in the face of widespread civilian deaths. While the sources make it difficult to assess the personal sentiments of officers and soldiers about civilian casualties during the Korean War, it is not hard to believe that many in private did not want to think of themselves as waging war against defenseless civilians.[20]Survival - Fallout is a short lived problem in most places.Using the 7/10 rule of exponential radionuclide decay, after just 49 days the radiation will be 1/10,000 the level it was an hour after the bombs went off and after a year and a half the radiation will have dropped below 1/100,000 of that initial level. The majority of bombs would be airburst which create little to no fallout which significantly reduces these dangers. [27]Surface bursts are tactically undesirable. Instead there would be earth penetrating warheads. The reason we no longer stock multi megaton weapons is one that our delivery accuracy no longer needs a sledgehammer approach, we hit what we aim for within feet and yards. Secondly the development of ground penetrating warheads vastly reduced the energy required to take out hardened targets. Ground penetrators while messy are not as bad of a fallout generator as a surface burst is, as there is little neutron activation of secondary materials which is a major contributor to surface burst fallout.[28][29]7/10 Rule chart above[30]Where are you safest from fallout?A regular cellar is not much better than being outside. A good fallout shelter has a rating of 1000, meaning it reduces your exposure to the fallout outside by a factor of 1000. A typical basement is only rated at a 10 which means you are dead if you are in the path of some major fallout.Places rated at a 1000 or higher:a sub-basement (basement under a basement) you need at least 6 feet of dirt over your head to protect you from all forms of radiation.the second level below street level of a concrete reinforced parking garage (obviously that also can be closed off at the entrance as well)the inner windowless rooms on the 4th floor or higher in a high-rise building (always leave at least 2 floors above you before the roof.According to FEMA these are your best bets. Whatever gives you the greatest distance from the source of the radiation is your best option. If none of these examples are available you just need to apply that distance guideline and some common sense. [31][32]Plan on being there at least 2 weeks and perhaps a month.A 2017 report by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation (RERF), a binational research organization funded by the governments of the United States and Japan, investigates the health effects of atomic bomb radiation among A-bomb survivors in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The findings from the study of the atomic bomb survivors that have shown that the actual biological risk from nuclear radiation is surprisingly smaller than most people realize. The lifetime cancer death rate among those survivors went up less than one percent, and no biological effects at all have been detected among those who received lower doses (below 110 millisieverts). No multi-generational genetic damage has been detected either. [33]