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Projects and plans behind the curtains [1](by Arben Puto)Neville Chamberlain. The Prime Minister of the British EmpireOn the 6th of April of 1939, one day before the Italian assault of Albanian coast, the Prime Minister of the British Empire Neville Chamberlain declared in the House of Commons that the British Empire has no direct interest in Albania thus fully accepting the eventual occupation of the country by Fascist Italy. *1A copy of the declaration is found in PRO-FO/371. "Albania" 1939 File No. 23714. From unpublished documents we know that the very next day, Mussolini send a special message to Chamberlain in which he expressed his delight for that declaration, and assured him that he would do everything in his power so that the “Italo-Albanian affair would find a solution that would not cause any crisis, both in the British-Italian relations and in the international situation in general.” *1Mussolini's message sent to Chamberlain dated 7.IV.1939, PRO-FO/371. File No. 23714. By recognizing the occupation of Albanian by Fascist Italy, the British Empire repudiated all post WW1 war and pre WW2 war international acts that itself had been member of and had signed.Italian troops disembarking in the Albanian port of Durrës.However, this situation didn’t last but a few months. In June 1940, Italy would declare war to both France and the British Empire. This allowed the British government to consider itself free from the October declaration of 1939 related to the occupation of Albania by making another declaration in the House of Commons by the end of June 1940.But did this mean that the British government was returning to the previous held position and reaffirm the validity of the treaties of the European Powers of 1913, which recognized the independence of Albania? Starting from this moment up until the end of 1942, the British diplomacy would make a myriad of projects and plans related to Albania but without ever committing itself to the independence of the country after the war. The British government would constantly make sure that whatever its actions regarding the issue were, none of the policies would be interpreted as an intention of British Empire to revive Albanian independence.Old War Office building in LondonBy 1940 the Albaniant case had become a matter of some importance and this new interest of the British Empire was not expressed by the Foreign Office but by the War Office.*1 This ministry had a myriad of secret organisations operating under its umbrella, the objective of which was to organise “subversive activities” in the rear of the enemy frontlines. The branches of these organisations that were already working in Yugoslavia and Greece turned their eyes towards Albania starting from June 1940, when the plans of Italy to enter the war were becoming more evident. These intentions were materialised when in the period between July and August the possibility of “provoking unrest in the Italian rear of the Albanian frontlines” was taken under consideration. All measures for the gathering of information were taken by the “wandering” British agents throughout the Balkans and Turkey with visits to Athens, Belgrade, Sofia, Istanbul and Ankara. During this period there was a recruitment of local agents and collaborators such as Gani Kryeziu, Mustafa Gjinishi and Abaz Kupi which were infiltrated into Albanian from the Northern borders of the country.It was not by chance that it was precisely the War Office that sent an officer of the Army's secret service, Major Kenyon, to the Foreign Office in July to try to change the first decision to send Zog to America, because it could be that he might be used as a "figure-head" According to the report of P. Dixon on the conversation with major Kenyon dated 19.VII.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24863. Major David Smiley, Captain Julian Amery and Colonel Billy McLean at Mal i Bardhe, Albania, September 1944.All this information is presented in the book of Julian Amery titled “Sons of the Eagle”[2] and published in 1948, *1 a British ex-officer that was operating in Albanian during the war. But Gradually, the case was turning from a strict military case into a political issue. In several meetings between the representatives of the Foreign Office and that of the War Office, it was concluded that King Zog should not be allowed to travel to the United States. *2 The idea that he could become a rallying point of resistance forces both inside and outside of Albania was starting to win terrain.Julian Amery "Sons of the Eagle". London 1948. Interesting information about the attempts of these secret organizations in connection with Albania in the summer of 1940 can be found in a series of documents included in PRO-FO/371. File No. 24866. Refer to a report dated 25.VIII.1940 and P. Dixon's promemoria dated 19.IX.1940. Ibid: Report of P. Dixon dated 30.VII.1940, PRO-FO/371.  File No. 24868. In the Foreign Office it was clear that the political aspect of the matter could not be put aside. Would these projects have repercussions regarding the future of the country, to what degree and in what way? It was concluded that both the status of Albania and it's territorial integrity of its borders would become a subject of debate in the post-war Peace Conference. It was already concluded that Albania, just like in the past, would not be able to survive as a country without the protection of a larger power. It was even suggested that this power could be Italy, but it could also be Yugoslavia and Greece, which would together be “guarantors” of Albania *1. From this it can be concluded that the project envisioned the recruitment of Albania mercenaries and their usage as canon fodder for a few partial and immediate military objectives, without ever imposing any political commitment to the British Empire. *2Report of P. Dixon dated 12.XI.1940, together with notations that follow by P. Nichols dated 13.XI.1940, and that of Dixon after conversation with O. Sargent dated 15.X1.1940. PRO-FO/371. File No. 24868. "We do not want to tie ourselves down as far as the future status of Albania is concerned" wrote P. Dixon in his memorandum dated 18.IX.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No.24866.  King Zog leaving the Ritz hotelAmidst this order of ideas, by the end of September the Foreign Office decided that an Albanian Central Committee called the London Committee, was to set up shop as soon as possible in London, with branches, - “subsidiary committees” - in other places as well. The “London Committee”, which was to be secret and unofficial, was to be headed by general Percy. It would include in its mist both British “experts on Albania” as well as representatives of Albanian emigrant communities at the head of which were certainly King Zog, Tajar Zavalani, and others. *1Report of P.Dixon dated 25.IX.1940, PRO-FO/:J71. File No. 24866. The matter did not proceed beyond the initial phase, because neither Yugoslavia nor Greece were involved in the war and they were being very careful to ensure that the Albanian activities of the British agents, within in their territories, would not be used as a cause for attack against them by Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany.The Italian Julia Alpini Division march into Greece, October 1940However, as is known, fascist Italy found the cause it was looking for (the murder of Daut Hoxha) and at the end of October 1940, the invasion of Greece began. The Albanian project immediately resurfaced once again, even more so since the military actions took on an unexpected turn, forcing the Italian troops to retreat along the whole front. At the War Office they were convinced that a general insurrection in the Italian rear would be of great assistance to Greece. *1This and many arguments connected with it are reflected in a whole series of documents in files PRO-FO/371. File No. 24867 and 24868. See especially the note of P. Dixon dated 30.X.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24867.  Zog interest was also peeked. He thought that his time had come and tried to convince the British that he, and he alone, held the key to the success of this entire operation. He said that he had previously hidden about 20 thousand rifles in his native region. The highlanders were waiting only his signal to revolt and in a few days he would have under his command in the northern districts more than 30 thousand insurgents. Moreover he was very familiar with the country and could give valuable advice as to the direction that the subsequent attack by the Greek troops at the front should take. *1 At his meeting with Ryan in the first week of November, Zog also proposed a “concrete plan” of action: he was ready to go to Istanbul where there were about 14 thousand Albanians with whom he could organize an armed force — an Albanian legion — which, with the consent of the Greek Government, could land at Salonica and then be sent to the front to hold a small sector. From this sector Zog would establish contact with the northern districts of Kosovo and Dibra, in order to raise them in insurrection. *2Report of functionary of S02 Philip Browd on conversation with Zog at the "Ritz" Hotel dated 23.XI.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24868 Report of A. Ryan on meeting with Zog dated 8.XI.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24868.  Surprisingly enough, they fell for it in the military circles. Of course the British strategists must have been in a desperate situation if they were putting their bets on Zog to make things right at the frontline. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, as long as the British were concerned, the project of using him on the Greek front went quite a long way. A particular interest was expressed by the secret organisations of the War Office - MIR and S.O.2. In the second half of November it was decided that Zog should be sent to the vicinity of the frontline on the eve of November 28, so that his presence would serve as a signal to the “northern tribes”. It remained to be determined just exactly where. At one time they spoke of dropping him by parachute into Albania, in the north, then they thought of sending him to Greece, then to Egypt and in turn to Turkey, Palestine and Malta. *1See files of documents entitled "Albania: King Zog" (The end of November — beginning of December 1940) PRO-FO/371. File No. 24868. The SO2 agents displayed excessive zeal when they went to the “Ritz” Hotel on one of those nights of November 1940 and proposed to him that he get on a special RAF aircraft the next day to go to Cairo and continue in the direction of the theatre of military operations. *1 Zog's reply on this occasion does not come out very clearly. Certain documents tell us that he wavered at the prospect of leaving his comforts at the “Ritz” and going to wear himself out among difficulties and life privations in the line of fire. Other information tells us that he imposed the prior condition of a meeting either with the British Prime Minister Churchill, or with the Foreign Secretary Halifax. *2See above report of P. Browd dated 23.XI.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No, 24868. See above report Of P. Browd dated 23.XI.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24868. Foreign Office building in LondonIn any case, this brought to light once again the political side of the issue. *1 This explains why the Foreign Office too a rather serious interest in the matter. Of course the military considerations could not be overlooked. However two problems demanded special attention in this case: the personal position of Zog and the “status” of Albania after the war. While the former could be easily overcome with a please-all formula (for instance “the question of the regime will be decided after the war”), the latter demanded a more precise reply involving a clear commitment. Although the concepts of British diplomacy on Albania and the Albanians in the forties did not differ much from those of the past century — still there were some in the Foreign Office who thought that it would have been difficult for this nation (the Albanians), no matter how undeveloped, to undertake such a far-reaching action without first knowing what was to be done with their country in the future.The political aspect of the problem is broadly treated in two memoranda of P. Dixon, one dated 28.XI.1940, and the other 4.XII.1940, also supported by the thoughts of P. Nichols and O. Sargent. Both memoranda in question are to be found in PRO-FO/371. File No. 24867 Was it then necessary for the British government to make a declaration regarding Albania, in which, besides the non-recognition of the Italian occupation, should have also contained the reaffirmation of its independence? The gesture could have been even more significant and effective if it were to be linked with the approaching celebrations of November 28, on which occasion Zog could call on the Albanians for an uprising!? *1Ibid. Standing in the middle Ioannis Metaxas, Prime Minister of Greece.However, soon the Foreign Office arrived at what must have long been a postulate of its policy on the Albanian question: nothing can be undertaken in Albania without first consulting with the Greek government. *1 Thus, there could be no talk of a declaration on the future of Albania if Greece was not on board with it. True, during those days, in a moment of “magnanimity” and in the atmosphere of optimism created by the successes at the front, the Greek Prime Minister at that time, General Metaxas, had said that the Greeks were fighting not only for themselves, but also for the freedom of all the oppressed peoples, hence for the “liberation of Albania”, too.Memorandum of P. Dixon dated 11.XII.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 2486R. Greek troops in Korçë, Albania, Nov 1940However, when Athens was asked confidentially about the plan of the Albanian uprising, as well as the proposed declaration on Albania, the opposition to the plan was vehement. King Zog was not admitted to Greek territory nor was the independence of Albania looked upon favourably. It was explained by Athens that Metaxas really did speak about the liberation of Albania, but he made no mention of its independence after the war. If the Greek troops were to “liberate” the southern provinces, Korça and Gjirokastra. they would not do this in order to leave them again to the independent Albania.The chief of the Southern Department, P. Nichols personally dealt with this subject at the end of November. In an official letter sent to the S.O.2 official Jebb he informed him that the Foreign Office had just received from Athens the French version of the speech that General Metaxas had delivered over the radio on November 22, 1940 on the occasion of the fall of Korça into the hands of the Greek troops. He had said that the Greeks “are fighting not only for their own existence but also for that of the other peoples of the Balkans, as well as for the liberation of Albania (Italics in the original in the original message). However, - observed Nichols - “the term liberation has an entirely different meaning from the word independence in Greek and it is clear that what General Metaxas wanted to say is that Greece is fighting for the liberation of Albania from Italian rule, but does not in any way intend to commit itself to the restoration of an independent Albania." In concluding this reasoning, that sounds much more like a very stale wordplay, Nichols added that “this is of course, on point with the approach that we are pursuing, and it is unnecessary to stress of what great importance it is for us to be on par with the Greek Government in our policy towards Albania”.Official letter of P. Nichols sent to Jebb dated 29.XI.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24866.  Several days later, P. Dixon would make a very clear interpretation of the meaning of General Metaxas's declaration in his memorandum of 11th of December 1940 when he said that, true, General Metaxas «has announced to the world that Greece is fighting for the liberation of Albania. In actual fact everyone knows that no single Greek gives the slightest importance to warrant the shedding of his blood for the freedom of the Albanians, and General Metaxas no doubt made that declaration largely for purposes of public relations and appeal to world opinion. Therefore, even if General Metaxas may be ready to tell us too that he hopes for an independent Albania after the war, it is doubtful whether he would like this to be proclaimed publicly.The above memorandum of P. Dixon dated 11.XII.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24868.  Albanian territories under Greek occupationAt the Foreign Office they showed a complete understanding both for this stance of Athens and for the Greek intentions at that time. Since Greece was able to occupy the southern districts of Albania with its own forces, there no reason why they should have not remained under its possession even after the war. In general it could have been accepted as of that moment the criterion of the right of Greece to grab as much territory as its troops were “capable” of grabbing from the Italian troops in the war. This made it necessary that if any declaration on Albania were to be issued, it should have been be in such general terms as to avoid both the discouraging the Albanians and the angering the Greeks. For instance, a way out could be the formula that the “status of Albania and its borders would be settled after the war”.At the beginning of December, three representatives of S.0.2, under the chairmanship of O. Sargent, met to discuss this subject in its various aspects. After the S.O.2 representatives, through Major Taylor, pointed out the usefulness of the Albanians as “potential allies” in the war against Italy, they expressed the opinion that only a declaration that would express the “explicit” commitment of Great Britain on the independence of Albania could arouse the necessary response among the broadest Albanian circles inside and outside the country.Pierson John DixonThe objections to this suggestion were presented by P. Dixon who had replaced Noble at the Foreign Office in the handling of all matters that pertained to Albania. First, he repeated the former thesis that Albania was not capable of existing on its own, that it would need a “protector” power which could not be decided at that point. Without doubt the most important aspect of Dixon's narrative was the reasoning that “it was likely to prove difficult after the war to find any territorial reward for the Greeks other than what was offered by the Albanian provinces. *1Minutes of December 2, 1940 meeting "for discussion of the policy on the Albanian question" with the participation of O. Sargent. P. Nichols. P. Dixon for the Foreign Office and Jebb, Browd, Major Taylor, as representatives of S.0.2. PRO-FO/371. File No. 24867.  This is another proof that British diplomacy had not changed its methods, that it had no difficulty in returning, after a short interlude, to the old idea of the partitioning of Albania in order to maintain and strengthen the existing alliances and — why not — even to create new alliances.Needless to say, in the above meeting it was Dixon's opinion that dominated. As a result, both the project of dispatching Zog “somewhere in the vicinity of the front lines” and the publication of any declaration were put aside. However, Dixon was not in favour of inactivity. On December 11th, returning once again to the question of “inciting the Albanians against the Italians” which presented “indisputable military advantages”, he wrote the following: “Whatever may be decided about the proposed declaration (on the independence of Albania — Arben Puto), there can, I think, be no doubt that acts, rather than words will lead to an Albanian revolt, and acts of course in practice mean weapons and money. At our last meeting with S.O. 2 the general conclusion reached was that we should for the present concentrate on supplying plenty of funds for the dual purpose of:buying up a large number of arms which are believed to be hidden in and about the country (Albania — Arben Puto), andbribing Albanian chieftains to resist the Italians. *1Notation of P. Dixon dated 11.XII.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24868. Clearly this vacillating stance was motivated by the Greek Government's opposition. On a side note, it is worth mentioning that Athens at this time had not yet publicly announced its true territorial ambitions. Perhaps there may be some other secret document, but, at least in those which we saw, we did not find all the views that the Greek leading circles had about the future of Albania clearly formulated. The main attacks were made against Zog as a “failed ruler”, but it is clear that Zog served only as a pretext to justify the negative stance towards Albania's independence and its territorial integrity. This was well understood in the Foreign Office. Dixon himself wrote, toward the end of November, that the criticism aimed at Zog was only an “excuse”, because the Greeks wanted to occupy Albania and to keep it for themselves; hence, if they supported Zog they feared this “would commit them to the reconstitution of an independent Albania after the war”. *1Notation of P. Dixon dated 26.XI.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24867 This would be made clear also in the next days. S.O. 2. which naturally looked at the problem from a military perspective, was convinced that the idea of an immediate “Albanian operation” behind the Italian front lines should not be completely abandoned. The first project did not work, perhaps because it was connected with Zog and Greek territory. Another plan could be attempted then, without Zog as a direct participant and with Yugoslav territory as a starting point. *1Ibid. 17.XII.1940. Gani KryeziuThus S.O. 2 Belgrade branch presented a new scheme of the uprising in the north. This time Gani Kryeziu was going to be the principal figure. *1 His headquarters were in Prizren and he was operating on account of S.O.2. in the Peja-Prizren region. Gani was to move immediately into northern Albania and occupy Kukes. Here he would announce the creation of an “Albanian national Government” headed by himself. The presence of Zog was not indispensable at this stage, but his role was not ruled out completely either. On the contrary, this was to be, so to speak, a “royal” government, with Zog as king and Gani as prime minister. Zog would have to make an immediate declaration of support. A declaration was to be expected also from the British Government.For the scheme of the revolt in the north there are a large number of documents that are related especially to the second half of December 1940; among them many telegrams exchanged with Belgrade and Athens from which the data listed below are taken. Of special value for this are: a) a telegram dated 20.XII.1940, directed to the branches of the secret service in Belgrade, Athens and Istanbul: b) a report bv P. Nichols for minister A. F.den dated 25.XII.1940. All this material is found in PRO-FO/371. File No. 24867. Material support was essential too. Gani was to create an “Albanian army” which would have to be maintained “for at least one month”. (What was to be done with it afterwards, that was not mentioned, but perhaps this was all that the British command needed.) Therefore it had to be supplied with weapons, clothing and money, especially money. It was estimated that the total cost of the operation would be around 60 thousand pounds. Gani would need an advanced payment, too, in the first instalment no more than 5,000 gold Napoleons, *1 the rest (up to 10,000) could be dropped to him later by parachute. In general air support was decisive, because the Yugoslav territory would no longer serve as a base. The authorities would turn a blind eye until Gani crossed into the North, then they would close the border with Albania for fear of some Italian or German reaction.Gold based Albanian currency of that period (AK) At first there were encouraging signs even from the Greek side. The British general Heywood had direct talks with Prime Minister Metaxas, who promised a Greek contribution of 5,000 rifles that had been captured from the Italians. *1 However, once again it was the declaration on Albania that ruined everything. London considered that a non-committal declaration (which included only as much as Metaxas himself had said on the liberation of Albania, without mentioning independence at all) had to have the approval of Athens also. The draft that had been prepared in the Foreign Office was this: “His Majesty's Government welcomes the news that a revolt by Albanian patriots has taken place in the North of Albania against their Italian aggressors. His Majesty's Government is ready to do all they can to lend their support to this movement and thus assist in the liberation of Albania”. *2See especially telegram from Athens for S.O.2 dated 19.XII.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24867. The proposed declaration is included in the report prepared for A. Eden dated 26.XII.1940, PRO-FO/371. File No. 24867.  However Athens again vetoed the plan; it was against any declaration. It turned out that the whole story was based on a misunderstanding. The Greek Government could not give its approval for an uprising of such scale as envisaged by the S.O. 2 plan. The Greek Government had expressed its readiness to support isolated actions of small separate Albanian insurgent groups in the rear of the Italian frontline, but in no way would it support a large-scale uprising that might have had any repercussions in the political arena. *1Ibid. Apparently it was considered that the problem might have taken an undesirable direction within the framework of Anglo-Greek relations in general, so important at this period for British diplomacy, because at the end of December, Foreign Secretary Eden, personally, asked for a special report about the “uprising in Albania”. *1 Two marginal notes tell more in a very few lines than whole pages. The first note is that of the chief of the Southern Department Nichols: «This is a matter in which we cannot act contrary to the wishes of the Greek Government. It is they who are doing all the hard fighting in Albania”. *3 The second note is by Eden himself and is a real “ear pulling” for the people of S.O.2: “S.O.2 seem to have rushed ahead without much thought”. *3 It was only a few weeks since Eden had replaced Halifax at the Foreign Office, and perhaps this was the first time that he had been obliged to look at S.O. 2 and its activities from the angle of policy and diplomacy. Later he would have occasion to become better acquainted with it, to become fed up with its «overzealous initiatives” and would later write what was to remain as a criticism to the SO2. One thing must be clear: «S.O. 2 do not and must not conduct foreign policy. They are our instruments and not we theirs”. *4Refer to the report mentioned above dated 26.XII.1940, entitled "Rising in Albania". Ibid. Marginal node by A. Eden dated 28.XII,1940, on the above report. Note of A. Eden on a report by P. Dixon dated 22.1.1941. PRO-FO/371 Albania 1941. File No. 29711. Nevertheless, for several weeks more the uprising in Albania was not dismissed from the minds of those in London who had fallen flat on their faces over their military plans for the Greek-Italian war. In January-February 1941 this was a tune that was constantly played at the War Office. In the minds of the military experts it was now assuming a much simpler form. There was no time to wait. The military situation was changing rapidly. The Greek troops had run out of steam, while on the other hand, the threat of the German intervention against Yugoslavia and Greece was becoming more realistic. Therefore the political and diplomatic speculations had to be curtailed and urgent action needed to be taken: either the uprising in Albania had to be organized within a month ( starting from February 15), or otherwise it was senseless, since it would no longer be of any help to the Greeks. But what would happen to the Albanian rebels when the general outlook was so gloomy? Someone did ask the question and received the terse reply, “the wretched Albanians would be left to their own fate”. In the end even this plan was abandoned because “it would be impossible now to engineer a revolution in a month's time”. *1See sections entitled "Military Situation in Albanian" With notations by W. Knight dated 16.11.1941, R. Bowker dated 17.11.1941, J. M. Addis dated 20.11.1941, and O. Sargent dated 26.11.1941, in PRO-FO/371. File No. 29718. We should also mention that all of this indirectly points to the concept of how London looked at the role and function of the resistance movements in Europe during the Second World War. They were to be instruments of war but not political factors as well. This, of course, also determined the British preferences in selecting the local forces and leading groups of these movements. Thus in the case of Albania, the British plumped for Zog, Gani Kryeziu, Abaz Kupi, and the so called northern tribes. It still did not occur to them that, as the saying goes, they had set out for shearing but would be instead themselves sheared.Albanian territories claimed by Greece under the name of Northern EpirusFrom this point on, the Albanian question was “frozen” for months on end. Even when it was referenced, it was done so in relation to Greek claims. It is interesting to note that after the defeat and occupation of the whole of Greece by the Axis forces, the Greek Government in exile discarded all “moderation” and openly formulated its territorial ambitions in the direction of Albania. Precisely when it had lost all of its national territory, it raised it voice more loudly about “Northern Epirus”.Emmanouil Tsouderos, Prime Minister of Greece 1941–1944The Greek Prime Minister Tsouderos, who at this time had fled the country, together with the King and the government, addressed the Greek people in June by radio, and among other things, spoke of “the semi-savages of Albania”, thus casting aside any appearance of magnanimity and Balkan solidarity, returning once again to the old terminology inspired by active chauvinism. *1 At the end of September the Greek Government in exile presented to the Foreign Office a memorandum in which it set out the diplomatic history of the question of “Northern Epirus”, in a way which proved the rights of Greece over the region. *2 In November efforts were made through BBC to commemorate the “fall of Korça” a year earlier, and on this occasion the city was described as “a Greek province which was included within the boundaries of the Albanian Kingdom as a result of the Italian intrigues”. *3Telegram of Foreign Office to Palairety High Commissioner in Pretoria (South Africa), July 1941, PRO-FO/371. File No. 29715. Memorandum of 9 points dated 29.IX.1941. Ibid. Letter of the office of the Greek prime minister to Foreign Secretary A. Eden, dated 28.XI.1941. Ibid. Such an overt stance taken by members of the Greek Government in exile certainly put the Foreign Office in a difficult position, exposing it to criticism from the public and in fact protests began to come from several quarters. - ”We have never supported the cause of Albanian independence,” wrote P. Dixon at the beginning of July, *1 but he reproached the Greeks in exile for lack of self control, saying that these were not things that could be talked about and settled at that stage.Notation of P. Dixon dated 8.VII.1941, Ibid. Arnold Joseph Toynbee CH FBA was a British historian, a philosopher of history, an author of numerous books and a research professor of international history at the London School of Economics and King's College in the University of London.From this statement it can be gathered that the Greek aims were not rejected by the British and it is not accident that precisely at this time in London too, the plot for the partitioning of Albania thickens. Towards the end of 1941 the Foreign Office found it essential to have in readiness “special studies” which contained the necessary arguments that would be used at the Peace Conference. For this the aid of scientific institutions was sought. Dixon turned, in particular, to one of the most renowned British historians, Professor Arnold Toynbee, chief of the Oxford Foreign Research and Press Service Centre. It is known that science and scientists in Britain usually claim complete independence from official policy. However this did not hinder Dixon from dictating in advance to the Oxford professor the essence of the conclusions with which he must come out in his studies on the future of Albania. For instance, he had to handle the subject not only, or not so much, from the “ethnic”, nationality point of view (which would not be greatly in favour of our Greek interests), but particularly from the angle of economics and strategy in order to echo the Greek thesis that, after the war, such measures (and in the first place territorial ones) must be taken as to make a repetition of an attack against Greece from Albanian territory impossible. *1Draft ol the letter to A. Toynbee, composed by P. Dixon dated 9.X.1941, and the reply of A. Toynbee dated 20.X.1941. Ibid. Map of one of the many plans to partition Albania between the Kingdoms of Greece and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.After recommending himself as an “objective” man of science who knows the ethnic individuality of the Albanians, in his long study, Toynbee foresees two possible solutions for Albania: the first — to be left to Italy, the second — to enter a confederacy or a federation together with Yugoslavia and Greece. According to him the latter has the advantage that it also solves the problem of the territorial claims of the Greeks to Southern Albania at the same time. *1 At the Foreign Office they added a third solution to those proposed by Toynbee: simple partition between Yugoslavia and Greece. *2See above letter of A. Toynbee dated 20.X.1941 and the report entitled -"Northern Epirus" dated 29.X.1941, PRO-FO/371. File No. 29715. Report on "The Future of Albania" R. G. D. Laffen dated 6.1.1942, PROFO/37I. -"Albania 1942". File No. 33107. In the files of 1942 and 1943 there are also a couple of other “studies” on the future of Albania, compiled at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, by R. Laffen and A. Zimnern. *1 Here, the partitioning between Yugoslavia and Greece, with the border lying somewhere near Elbasan, is recommended as the most likely solution. Here, too, we see expressed the idea of the integration of Albania within the Greek- Yugoslav federation — over which it seems that the negotiations between the two royal governments in exile were very close to an understanding in principle. Moreover, when he had heard about it, Zog too, had done some timid probings in order to include his ghostly “kingdom”, but in the mind of the designers of the Albanian project Albania would not be accepted as an equal third party, but only as an appendage of the federation.PRO-FO/371 "Albania 1943". File No. 53112.  Ardi Kule's answer to Did Greece attack Albania in 1949?Ardi Kule's answer to What was the Vorio-Epirotic Sylloge and how was the Greek government involved with its activities?Ardi Kule's answer to Albania: Was any of Enver Hoxha's invasion paranoia justified?Footnotes[1] http:// https://books.google.al/books/about/From_the_Annals_of_British_Diplomacy.html?id=-ZS4AAAAIAAJ&redir_esc=y[2] Sons of the Eagle: A Study in Guerilla War: Julian Amery: 9780976738053: Amazon.com: Books

This is going to be a long one, and is not entirely documented by meThe government of India came out with a plan to construct a series of dams over the Narmada river .Thus was started a multi crore project that would generate a big revenue for the government. The Narmada Valley Development plan is the the most promised and most challenging plan in the history of India. The proponents are of the view that it will produce 1450 MW of electricity and pure drinking water to 40 million people covering thousands of villages and towns.India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, once called dams the ‘‘temples of modern India.’’ This unrealistic analogy, given by him, is often invoked to support the view that building large dams is essential to meeting India’s mammoth development needs. Though he later retracted his statement and called large dams ‘‘a disease of gigantism’’ that India must abandon, the drive to build large dams for the sake of building large dams continues to blind the government to their human and environmental costs. The biggest implication of this was viewed along the banks of the Narmada river.The Narmada River traverses three of India’s north-western states: Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra. In 1978, the Indian government sought the World Bank’s assistance to build a complex of dams along the river as part of the Narmada Valley Development Project (‘‘Narmada Project’’). The Narmada Project included the creation of thirty large dams, 135 medium dams, and 3,000 small dams. The Indian government promised that the dams would help provide potable water for almost forty million people, irrigation for over six million hectares of land, and hydroelectric power for the entire region.Central to the claim that the dams were essential for India’s economic development was the assertion that these benefits, which would purportedly accrue to millions of people living in the Narmada River valley, outweighed any potential human or environmental costs. The project focussed on so-called “collective good”, without paying any attention to the environmental degradation.The Sardar Sarovar Project (‘‘SSP’’) in the state of Gujarat includes the most controversial large dam. The government claimed that the Sardar Sarovar dam alone would irrigate almost 1.8 million hectares of land in Gujarat and an additional 73,000 hectares in the dry neighbouring state of Rajasthan, in addition to providing potable water to over 8,000 Gujarati villages and 135 urban centres. The benefits, however, would come at a high cost, including the displacement of tens of thousands of individuals and considerable environmental damage. Despite these foreseeable consequences, and in the absence of consultation with indigenous communities that would experience the environmental impact and involuntary displacement, in 1985 the World Bank agreed to finance the Sardar Sarovar dam to the tune of $450 million, approximately 10% of the total cost of the project. Thus not only the Indian Government, but also an International Organisation, the World Bank, was keen to complete the project, and so it granted the required funds.The Narmada Valley Dam ProjectThe idea of building dams in the Narmada river basin predates independent India. In 1946, India’s Central Waterways, Irrigation, and Navigation Commission constituted a committee to study the feasibility of such a project. Fifteen years later, Prime Minister Nehru inaugurated the Narmada Valley Development Project. The Narmada Project’s costs have been both human and environmental though the most important issue remains the displacement of the Narmada basin’s inhabitants.The Narmada basin is almost 100,000 square kilometers in size and is home to twenty-one million people. The Sardar Sarovar dam’s impounding of water in a 455–foot–high reservoir would ultimately submerge 37,000 hectares of land in Gujarat, Maharashtra, and MadhyaPradesh, and divert 9.5 million acre feet of water into a canal and irrigation system. According to unofficial estimates, the Sardar Sarovar dam alone has displaced 320,000 people. Added to these human costs is the considerable environmental damage to a valley that was once blossoming with plantand animal life. The Indian government has not reported official statistics on the number of displaced individuals, reflecting a level of disregard for the seriousness of the problem that continues to date.Narmada Water Disputes TribunalThe Narmada Water Disputes Tribunal (‘‘Narmada Tribunal’’) was set up in 1969 to resolve the river water sharing dispute between Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, and Maharashtra. Additionally, the Narmada Tribunal aimed to set out conditions regarding the resettlement and rehabilitation of those displaced by the dams. It was chaired by then-sitting Supreme Court Justice V. Ramaswami. The Tribunal was assisted by a number of technical experts. However, this team of experts lacked sociologists, anthropologists or environmental engineers, which cannot be left unnoticed.In 1978, the Narmada Tribunal approved the Narmada Project and final planning and the work started. With regard to the treatment of the displaced population, the Narmada Tribunal made it mandatory for the state of Gujarat, as the primary beneficiary of the project ,provide ‘‘land forland’’ to those displaced by the Sardar Sarovar dam. While the Narmada Tribunal’s Final Order aimed to alleviate displacement, commentators have critiqued both the judgment and its implementation by the government of Gujarat. The judgment, for instance, only guaranteedcompensation for legal landowners even though many dam-affected villages kept poor land records. In addition, many displaced persons were tribal community members who lacked formal land ownership rights under Indian law. A more general indictment suggested that ‘‘the [Narmada] Tribunal was itself a creature of politics that was incapable, ab initio, of delivering justice.’’ First, the Narmada Tribunal focused on the interstate dispute between riparian states and insufficiently considered the affected communities themselves. Second, political deal-making between the states limited the Narmada Tribunal’s terms of reference, including consideration of whether alternatives existed to achieve the project’s objectives.In December 1979, the Narmada Tribunal’s final award came into effect, and finally in 1987 construction began on the Sardar Sarovar dam. Problems soon emerged with Gujarat’s resettlement policy, which formally sought to award each eligible family settling there at least five irrigable acres, housing, and various entitlements to facilities. In reality, there was not enough land available for distribution; amenities were substandard; and settlers had difficulty integrating with host communities. As a result, though 196 families had accepted the resettlement offer, many settlers ended up returning to their homes, which were already partially submerged, because of the waters from the river flooding the banks.The World Bank’s Involvement in Sardar Sarover Dam ProjectAlthough the Bank had long been interested in financing the Sardar Sarovar dam, it could not do so before the Narmada Tribunal’s Final Order. Once the order was issued, the Bank quickly stepped in. The bank prepared the First Stage project by 1979-1983, without laying any emphasis on the social and environmental issues. In 1985 the Bank lent the three state governments a total of $200 million and gave them $250 million in credits to finance the Sardar Sarovar dam. The Bank’s involvement trans nationalized the projects at multiple levels. First, it indicated international approval, bringing in several other foreign actors. Second, it internationalized resistance to the project. Third, the Bank’s internal policies provided a standard against which to judge the project’s performance with regard to involuntary resettlement. Despite the benefits of trans nationalization, the Bank ignored shortcomings in the approval process to the point of violating its own policies concerning resettlement and environmental degradation.Tension Emerges between the World Bank’s Policies and its Support of the DamThe Bank’s role in the construction of the Sardar Sarovar dam must be viewed against the backdrop of various human rights-related policies adopted by the Bank in the 1980s and 1990s. The World Bank’s Operational Policies and Directives developed in response to external and internal pressure to establish environmental and human rights guidelines for its lending practices. The Bank’s first general resettlement policy, adopted in 1980, provided that ‘‘upon resettlement, displaced persons should regain at least their previous standard of living.’’ Two years later the Bank adopted a resettlement policy specifically addressing ‘‘tribal’’ populations and requiring that customary usage of tribal land be respected and that tribal community members only be displaced when the borrowing country can effectively safeguard their integrity and wellbeing.The Bank approved the project even though the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests would not consent to the project without completed environmental impact studies, which were never performed.The Narmada Bachao Andolan Movement [NBA]Since the early 1980s, the Narmada Project has faced mounting opposition from a variety of sources. Protest groups formed in all three affected states and included or were supported by individuals facing displacement, students, social activists, Indian environmental NGOs, international NGOs, and transnational networks. In Gujarat, nineteen villages, whose submersion the Sardar Sarovar dam ensured, formed the Chhatra Yuva Sangharsh Vahini, a youth protest group. The group engaged in protests and initiated court actions, ultimately forcing the government of Gujarat to offer a more generous resettlement package. The group’s belief that Gujarat’s water needs made the dam project necessary guided its decision to focus on rehabilitation efforts and to ensure that the government adhered to its promises.In contrast, groups in Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra opposed the dams altogether. Two such groups, the Narmada Ghati Navnirman Samiti in Madhya Pradesh and the Narmada Ghati Dharangrastha Samiti in Maharashtra, subsequently merged to form the Narmada Bachao Andolan in 1989. Under the leadership of the principal figure associated with the movement, Medha Patkar, the NBA initially sought to verify the claims regarding the benefits that would flow from the construction of the dams. In the process, it focused on securing access to documents from the government and the World Bank to ensure greater transparency.The NBA’s MethodsThe success of the NBA campaign resulted from its innovative strategies of resistance that operated simultaneously at the grassroots, national, and international level. As such, the campaign’s significance as a social movement extends far beyond India’s national borders. BalakrishnanRajagopal—a leading scholar on development and social movements and a long-time observer and researcher of the Narmada struggle— notes that globally, the NBA is ‘‘regarded as one of the signature public contestations of the twentieth century that redefined the terms of development, democracy and accountability.’’While the NBA originally employed ‘‘Gandhian methods’’ such as peaceful marches and protests,after a high-profile hunger fast in 1991 failed, the NBA announced a ‘‘noncooperation movement’’ in the Narmada valley. This movement campaigned against the payment of taxes and sought to deny entry to the villages to all government officials, except teachers and doctors. The NBA subsequently began to consider litigation as an additional option for a variety of reasons. Their tactics up to this point had frequently drawn violent reactions from the government. In addition, other disadvantaged groups had successfully moved the Supreme Court, inspiring the NBA to do the same.The NBA’s LeadershipOne of the biggest reason for the success of the NBA was the excellent leadership provided by the most able persons of the country. The NBA, a broad-based participatory movement, flourished under the leadership of visionary environmental champions. One of India’s most vibrant and best known living activists, Medha Patkar (or Medha didi (big sister) as she is called) has led the Narmada movement for over two decades. Her uncompromising stance against government apathy toward the human and social costs of dam construction and her ongoing efforts to ensure that transparency and accountability remain hallmark features of development projects have helped fashion the NBA into one of the most dynamic social movements of our time. A ‘‘veteran of several fasts [and] monsoon satyagrahas [civil disobedience] on the banks of the rising Narmada,’’ she has endured police beatings and jail terms in her quest to secure the right to life and the right to livelihood for the over twenty million people whose lives would be adversely affected by the Narmada Project.Other women have also played central roles in the campaign. The NBA’s struggle against the Maheshwar Dam in Madhya Pradesh state, for instance, has been led by the Narmada Shakti Dal, a separate women’s organization within the NBA that was set up on March 8, 1988—International Women’s Day—and is comprised of female villagers from Maheshwar. Alongside Medha Patkar, social activist Baba Amteprovided moral leadership to the cause to preserve the Narmada River. Though renowned for his work against leprosy, beginning in the early 1980s he involved himself in the struggle against mega dams. Amte first achieved national prominence for his work on dams with the publication of Cry O Beloved Narmada in 1989, an elegiac booklet that made the case for a dam-free Narmada.Direct ActionMedha Patkar and Baba Amte together let a series of protests, some of which failed while the others achieved success. In September 1989, Amte led a 60,000-person anti-dam NBA rally in Harsud—a town of 20,000 people in Madhya Pradesh that faced submersion. In May 1990, a massive NBA five-daydharna (sit-in) at then-Prime Minister V. P. Singh’s residence in New Delhi forced the Prime Minister to agree to ‘‘reconsider’’ the project. In December 1990, Amte, along with 5,000 protestors, began the Narmada Jan Vikas Sangharsh Yatra (Narmada people’s progress struggle march), marching over a hundred kilometers from Amte’s headquarters near Barwani in Madhya Pradesh to Ferkuva on the Madhya Pradesh–Gujarat border. The government reacted by deploying the Gujarati police force and by bussing in thousands of governmentsupported pro-dam demonstrators from urban centers in Gujarat. Following the government’s announcement that rising waters from the dam would begin to submerge villages, domestic protest intensified and with it the resulting backlash from the state. On January 5, 1991, Amte began a ‘‘dharna [sit-in] unto death.’’The most popular slogans of the NBA were Vikas Chahiye, vinash nahin! (‘‘We want development, not destruction’’) and Koi nahi hatega, bandh nahi banega! (‘‘No one will move, the dam will not be built’’).The World Bank WithdrawsThe protests against the building of dams were going on increasing day after day. In response to this, the World Bank decided to review its policies. The World Bank announced in June 1991 that it would commission a team of independent experts, known as the Morse Commission, to reexamine the Sardar Sarovar Project.96 The Commission’s independent review had two aims: to assess steps taken to resettle those affected by the Sardar Sarovar dam, and to assess the efficacy of measures aimed at diminishing the project’s environmental impact.97 It was chaired by Bradford Morse, the former head of the UN Development Programme, and Thomas Berger, a former British Columbia Supreme Court judge, neither of whom had ever been Bank employees.The Commission completed its task and prepared a 357 page report. The report clearly mentioned that there were several discrepancies in the functioning of the Bank and granting the loan to the Indian Government. It also recorded a great deal of environmental degradation and a huge violation of human rights.According to one of the passages of the report…. :-“We think the Sardar Sarovar Projects as they stand are flawed, that resettlement and rehabilitation of all those displaced by the Projects is not possible under prevailing circumstances, and that environmental impacts of the Projects have not been properly considered or adequately addressed. Moreover we believe that the Bank shares responsibility with the borrower for the situation that has developed… We have decided that it would be irresponsible for us to patch together a series of recommendations on implementation when the flaws in the Projects are as obvious as they seem to us. As a result, we think that the wisest course would be for the Bank to step back from the Projects and consider them afresh. The failure of the Bank’s incremental strategy should be acknowledged. ”As a result of the report and huge criticism of the Bank, the Bank withdrew its support from the project.The Sardar Sarovar Project TodayConstruction of the Sardar Sarovar dam proceeded uninterrupted after the suspension on construction was lifted in 1999. On December 31, 2006 Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi announced the completion of the Sardar Sarovar dam and symbolically poured the last bucket of concrete. Construction was halted at 121.92 meters and experts associated with the project announced they would install only thirty gates of fifty feet [15.24 m] each within three years. As noted above, according to unofficial estimates, approximately 320,000 people have been displaced by the Sardar Sarovar dam and as many as one million may be affected due to related displacements by the canal system and other allied projects. The NBA has continued to engage in various forms of direct action even as it pursued its legal remedies. While the case stagnated in the Court system, NBA activists organized and participated in public meetings, rallies, marches, demonstrations, fasts, dharnas, and satyagrahas. These activities have had three overlapping aims: first, to call for rehabilitation work to take place at the same time as the raising of the dam as ordered by the Supreme Court; second, to demand the termination of the project altogether; and third, to protest the series of Supreme Court orders declining to suspend construction. The struggle of the NBA has also fired the imagination of some of India’s most prominent citizens who have, along the way, acted as the voice of the movement.As for the movement’s leaders, each won countless human rights awards in recognition of their contributions. In 2000, Amte returned to his community development project at Anandwan (Forest of Bliss) near Nagpur in Maharashtra, where he passed away in February 2008 at the age of ninety-four. Upon his death, the Dalai Lama lamented, ‘‘[h]is demise is a great loss to all of us. I am an admirer of Baba Amte…… [H]is [compassion] shone through everything he did, including his work for creating greater awareness about the protection of our environment.’’ Patkar continues to protest against the Narmada Project. While she has abandoned efforts to pressure the government to forsake the dam, she continues to fight for the rights of displaced persons in Madhya Pradesh to receive the compensation that the Narmada Tribunal determined they were owed.ConclusionAccording to one NBA partner, the campaign against the construction of dams on the Narmada River is ‘‘symbolic of a global struggle for social and environmental justice,’’ while the NBA itself is a ‘‘symbol of hope for people’s movements all over the world that are fighting for just, equitable, and participatory development.’’ Though the NBA has yet to achieve the goals for which it has so tirelessly fought, its victories against the mammoth odds have earned it the reputation of being one of the most dynamic social movements of our time and one that the government continues to expend considerable resources to fight against. As noted by Medha Patkar upon her release from jail on August 6, 2007: ‘‘It’s obvious that the Government [of Madhya Pradesh] is all out to kill our right to land and also [our] right to agitate.’’

The USA “founding fathers” certainly did envision “career politicians,” because they saw them in Britain, and they were determined to prevent such a class from developing in America.I discovered this when doing research in 2016 and 2017 on the reasons why 119 future federal office-holders took-up arms in the period prior to the Declaration of Independence on July 4, 1776 (I studied 153 individuals, but could not find any evidence for 34 of them). I wrote-up that research into a long study that I offered to Social Science Research Network (SSRN) which posted my study in September 2017. (I have since corrected some typographical errors, in my own current version, but have received no criticism on the substance and research in my study from the academic community).One of the grievances in the Declaration of Independence focused against career politicians:“He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harass our people and eat out their substance.”Section 5 of the Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted in June 1776, warned against career politicians:“That the legislative and executive powers of the state should be separate and distinct from the judiciary; and that the members of the two first may be restrained from oppression, by feeling and participating the burdens of the people, they should, at fixed periods, be reduced to a private station, return into that body from which they were originally taken, and the vacancies be supplied by frequent, certain, and regular elections, in which all, or any part, of the former members, to be again eligible, or ineligible, as the laws shall direct.”Section 6 of the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights was similar:“That those who are employed in the legislative and executive business of the State, may be restrained from oppression, the people have a right, at such periods as they may think proper, to reduce their public officers to a private station, and supply the vacancies by certain and regular elections.”In 1780, the Massachusetts Constitution drafted by John Adams included as Declaration of Rights Section 8:“In order to prevent those who are vested with authority from becoming oppressors, the people have a right at such periods and in such manner as they shall establish by their frame of government, to cause their public officers to return to private life; and to fill up vacant places by certain and regular elections and appointments.”American resistance also focused on resistance to “transfer payments” - which in the 1760s and 1770s went not to the poor, but to well-placed British insiders.Future 1st US Congress House Representatives and 5th US Vice President and President of the US Senate, Elbridge Gerry, a resident of Marblehead north of Boston, put the issue clearly on May 12, 1774, in a letter to long-time resistance leader Samuel Adams in Boston:“The point is, whether Americans shall enjoy the fruits of their labor, or send them in taxes to Great Britain; whether they shall happily maintain their families by the proceeds of their industry, or remit it to Great Britain to maintain pensioners in luxury.”King George the Third’s own words to his Prime Minister, Lord North, on May 24, 1776, (King’s Letter 358) confirmation of the issue of pensions:“I cannot help saying that the pensions proposed are enormous; but as thing are situated, must be complied with.”Pensions were the technique of the time to use the power of taxation to make wealth transfer payments, not to perform contracts to pay those who worked for the government, but to enrich insiders who had political leverage. The “Political Register and Impartial review of New Books,” volume 2, for 1768, at pages 267-270, denounced“the fury of pensioning: … [F]or should the public revenue be fatally appropriated to maintain the pomp and equipage of nobility … his poverty and dependence would expose him to bribery and corruption …. Should the rage for pensioning continue, honour will no longer be the incentive for patriotism. …”But if the pensions were paid out of revenue from America – which the House of Commons had no interest in protecting (no member of the House being elected by Americans) and which no minister had any interest in protecting (no Minister coming from America to be the king’s close advisor) – the pensioning could go on without limit.There is an inherent link between the growth of government “transfer payments” and the growth of “career politicians” because the best way to become a career politician is to promote transfer payments. The recipients of the payments will always devote a portion of them towards the payment and continuation in office of the politicians who seek to be career politicians.This economic reality exists regardless of the moral arguments for or against the transfer payments.The opponent politicians against the transfer payments are always in a defensive mode, trying to protect the interests of those who are taxed to get the money to make the payments. The supporters of the opponent-politicians must draw their money from their own earnings and assets to support the opponent politicians - and if the advocates of the transfer payments are successful in convincing citizens that they are not being taxed for the transfer payments, those citizens will not pull their own earnings and assets from their pockets to expend to support the opponent politicians.In Britain in the late 1760s and early 1770s, the advocates of continuing and increasing transfer payments told the subjects in Britain that they would not be the ones taxed to fund the transfer payments - the money would come from America (which served in the role of today’s slogan “the one percent”) - and thus, the Britons had no reason to support any opponent of the increasing transfer payments.Concern over development of “career politicians” had surfaced in Massachusetts earlier, in 1772, when the colonists discovered that King George III had initiated a secret program to take new tax-money raised in America and use it to pay colony government officials, including judges, free of any need to convene the colony legislature to appropriate colony tax-funds to pay the colony officials. In my study I short-hand the King’s program as “the King’s Coin.”On 20 November 1772, in Massachusetts at Boston, the Boston Town Meeting adopted a long letter, and with an attached “Rights of the Colonists,” which the Town Meeting approved. The focus was on the King’s Coin payment of the colony high court judges – the first British effort to convert the constitutional nature of the Massachusetts colony courts. I will use the rest of this answer to make available to Quora readers the key provisions of this 1772 statement. Key portions included:“We, the Freeholders and other Inhabitants of Boston, in Town-Meeting duly assembled, according to law, apprehending there is abundant reason to be alarmed that the plan of despotism, which the enemies of our invaluable rights have concerted, is rapidly hastening to a completion, can no longer conceal our impatience under a constant, unremitted, uniform aim to enslave us, or confide in an Administration which threatens us with certain and inevitable destruction.“But, when in addition to the repeated inroads made upon the rights and liberties of the Colonists, and of those in this Province in particular, we reflect on the late extraordinary measure in affixing stipends, or salaries from the Crown to the offices of the Judges of the Superior Court of Judicature, making them not only entirely independent of the people, whose lives and fortunes are so much in their power, but absolutely dependent on the Crown, (which may hereafter be worn by a tyrant) both for their appointment and support, we cannot but be extremely alarmed at the mischievous tendency of this innovation; which, in our opinion, is directly contrary to the spirit of the British Constitution, pregnant with innumerable evils, & hath a direct tendency to deprive us of every thing valuable as men, as Christians, and as subjects, entitled, by the Royal Charter, to all the Rights, Liberties and Privileges of native Britons.“Such being the critical State of this Province, we think it our duty on this truly distressing occasion, to ask you, What can withstand the attacks of mere power? What can preserve the liberties of the subject, when the barriers of the Constitution are taken away? …“Great pains has been taken to persuade the British Administration to think, that the good people of this Province in general are quiet and undisturbed at the late measures: and that any uneasiness that appears, arises only from a few factious designing and disaffected men. This renders it the more necessary, that the sense of the people should be explicitly declared. – A free communication of your sentiments to this Town, of our common danger, is earnestly solicited and will be gratefully received.“If you concur with us in opinion, that our rights are properly stated, and that, the several Acts of Parliament, and measures of Administration, pointed out by us, are subversive of these rights, you will doubtless think it of the utmost importance that we stand firm as one man, to recover and support them; and to take such measures, by directing our representatives, or otherwise, as your wisdom and fortitude shall dictate, to rescue from impending ruin our happy and glorious Constitution.“But if it should be the general voice of this Province, that the rights, as we have stated them, do not belong to us; or, that the several measures of Administration in the British Court, are no violations of these rights; or, that if they are thus violated or infringed, they are not worth contending for, or resolutely maintaining; – should this be the general voice of the Province, we must be resigned to our wretched fate; but shall forever lament the extinction of that generous ardor for civil and religious liberty, which in the face of every danger, and even death itself, induced our fathers, to forsake the bosom of their Native Country, and begin a settlement on bare creation. …”The “Rights of the Colonists” stated many of the points that the First Continental Congress would make in its petitions of 1774, and some of the points that would also appear in the Declaration of Independence from the Crown on July 4, 1776:“I. Natural Rights of the Colonists as Men.“Among the natural rights of the Colonists are these: First, a right to life; Secondly, to liberty; Thirdly, to property; together with the right to support and defend them in the best manner they can. These are evident branches of, rather than deductions from, the duty of self-preservation, commonly called the first law of nature. …“When men enter into society, it is by voluntary consent; and they have a right to demand and insist upon the performance of such conditions and previous limitations as form an equitable original compact. … In the state of nature every man is, under God, judge and sole judge of his own rights and of the injuries done him. By entering into society he agrees to an arbiter or indifferent judge between him and his neighbors; but he no more renounces his original right than by taking a cause out of the ordinary course of law, and leaving the decision to referees or indifferent arbitrators. In the last case, he must pay the referees for time and trouble. He should also be willing to pay his just quota for the support of government, the law, and the constitution; the end of which is to furnish indifferent and impartial judges in all cases that may happen, whether civil, ecclesiastical, marine, or military. …“Government was instituted for the purposes of common defence, and those who hold the reins of government have an equitable, natural right to an honorable support from the same principle that ‘the laborer is worthy of his hire.’ But then the same community which they serve ought to be the assessors of their pay. Governors have no right to seek and take what they please; by this, instead of being content with the station assigned them, that of honorable servants of the society, they would soon become absolute masters, despots, and tyrants. Hence, as a private man has a right to say what wages he will give in his private affairs, so has a community to determine what they will give and grant of their substance for the administration of public affairs. …“[I]t is the greatest absurdity to suppose it in the power of one, or any number of men, at the entering into society, to renounce their essential natural rights, or the means of preserving those rights; when the grand end of civil government, from the very nature of its institution, is for the support, protection, and defence of those very rights; the principal of which, as is before observed, are Life, Liberty, and Property. If men, through fear, fraud, or mistake, should in terms renounce or give up any essential natural right, the eternal law of reason and the grand end of society would absolutely vacate such renunciation. The right to freedom being the gift of God Almighty, it is not in the power of man to alienate this gift and voluntarily become a slave.“II. The Rights of the Colonists as Christians.“These may be best understood by reading and carefully studying the institutes of the great Law Giver and Head of the Christian Church, which are to be found clearly written and promulgated in the New Testament. …“III. The Rights of the Colonists as Subjects.“A commonwealth or state is a body politic, or civil society of men, united together to promote their mutual safety and prosperity by means of their union. The absolute rights of Englishmen and all freemen, in or out of civil society, are principally personal security, personal liberty, and private property. All persons born in the British American Colonies are, by the laws of God and nature and by the common law of England, exclusive of all charters from the Crown, well entitled, and by acts of the British Parliament are declared to be entitled, to all the natural, essential, inherent, and inseparable rights, liberties, and privileges of subjects born in Great Britain or within the realm. Among those rights are the following, which no man, or body of men, consistently with their own rights as men and citizens, or members of society, can for themselves give up or take away from others.“First, ‘The first fundamental, positive law of all common wealths or states is the establishing the legislative power. As the first fundamental natural law, also, which is to govern even the legislative power itself, is the preservation of the society.’“Secondly, The Legislative has no right to absolute, arbitrary power over the lives and fortunes of the people; nor can mortals assume a prerogative not only too high for men, but for angels, and therefore reserved for the exercise of the Deity alone. …“Thirdly, The supreme power cannot justly take from any man any part of his property, without his consent in person or by his representative.“These are some of the first principles of natural law and justice, and the great barriers of all free states and of the British Constitution in particular. It is utterly irreconcilable to these principles and to many other fundamental maxims of the common law, common sense, and reason that a British House of Commons should have a right at pleasure to give and grant the property of the Colonists. …“The inhabitants of this country, in all probability, in a few years, will be more numerous than those of Great Britain and Ireland together [note: this would not occur until 1860]; yet it is absurdly expected by the promoters of the present measures that these, with their posterity to all generations, should be easy, while their property shall be disposed of by a House of Commons at three thousand miles’ distance from them, and who cannot be supposed to have the least care or concern for their real interest; who have not only no natural care for their interest, but must be in effect bribed against it, as every burden they lay on the Colonists is so much saved or gained to themselves. …”