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Was it a good tank? Undoubtedly.Was it a successfull tank? Well….It certainly didn’t win the war for Germany, which is of course no surprise. Tanks don’t operate in vacuum, they are just one part of many that makes up a country’s armed forces. In 1944 Germany could have fielded Shermans or Leopard 2s - it doesn’t matter. Instead of lightly damaged or broken down Panthers littered all over the countryside, we would have lightly damaged or broken down Shermans and Leopards.On the tactical level, however, when it could make the best use of its formidable gun, frontal armor and mobility, it often did very well. It was, like the Tiger, generally loved by its crews, something which not always could be said about its main opponents, the M4 Sherman and the T-34.General Fritz Bayerlein, amongst others, appreciated the Panther's virtues when used in the right conditions, writing:"An ideal vehicle for tank battles and infantry support.The best tank in existence for its weight".Report from the Panther I./Pz.Rgt.2 battalion:“….With its excellent barrel and good frontal armor, whenever it is used correctly, the Panther is superior to all types of enemy tanks. The technical problems suffered have also suffered the Panzer III and Panzer IV. Only the fact that the Panther burns very easily, is something that must necessarily be improved.”“In general, it is my opinion that our Sherman tanks ranks clumsily with the German Mark III and Mark IV tanks, and their Mark V and Mark VI tanks are in a class by themselves, having a better silhouette, better armor, better flotation and maneurability, far better guns with much better sight reticles, and superior ammunition.”Capt. Henry W. Johnson, Co.F., 66th Armd. Regt.A well built and maintained Panther with a competent crew was by far the most formidable medium tank of the war. Unfortunately for the Germans, this triple combination was generally mostly possible during a very short period, early-mid 1944.The problems started already on the factory floor (especially so in 1944); Allied bombers disrupting the production of both tanks and parts, lack of important alloys and extensive use of slave labour was a guarantee for, to put it mildly, varying quality of the Panthers built.And when the gigantic summer battles began in earnest, enemy air superiority and partisans targeting the supply lines, mechanical breakdowns and combat damage, both minor and major, quickly made sure the number of available Panzers dropped. As the Panzers were almost always outnumbered and a lot of firepower, both direct and indirect, was directed especially against them, it very often meant that a relatively high percentage (compared to Allied tanks) of the Panzers received damage, and even if it could be just minor damage it had to be repaired and the tank taken out of the frontline. The repair shops were overwhelmed, replacement tanks and spare parts and fuel were destroyed or delayed by Allied jabos and resistance fighters, meaning that that even lightly damaged Panzers often had to be left behind when the Germans retreated.No other tank, except the heavy and very specialized Tigers, IS-2 and the latecomer M26 Pershing had the same combination of armor, gun and mobility as the Panther. Among the “standard” tanks it was really in a class of its own. If the T-34 was the sinister grandmother of the MBT, the Panther was the fancy mother - and the Centurion, US Patton series and T54 her illegitimate children.Still, the Panther is probably THE most controversial tank of WW2, even more so than the Tiger and M4.It has basically gone the same route as the Tiger, Bismarck, ME 262 and General Custer(!): From being “the greatest thing since sliced bread” to “a piece of junk”, then halfway back again to todays’s more balanced view of “pretty good, but with its share of flaws”.The Panther has been both overrated (best tank ever) or underrated (worst piece of junk ever). The “truth”, as always, lays somewhere in the middle.Good points:Very good frontal armor, especially the upper hull glacis which had an effective armor thickness of no less than 180 mm (including “slope factor”). Very few WW2 AT guns could deal with that. Even APCR and APDS didn’t help much, because in WW2 these rounds were only marginally better than standard AT rounds against sloped armor.“The Sherman opened fire on the Panther turret with its 75-mm gun at point blank range with no effect. …The only way the Panther could be defeated from the front was to deflect a shot off of the mantlet downward onto the armor above the driver’s head (ref. 10). This was the fabled “lucky shot,” and the odds of achieving this effect are extremely unfavorable”.“The M10 Tank Destroyer crews discovered in July 1944 that the 3-in. APC shell bounced off of the front glacis plate of the Panther tank at all ranges (ref. 16). The M62A1 was also the primary anti-tank round for the 76-mm M1 Guns, which proved unfortunate for the M18 Tank Destroyer crews. The inability of the 3 in. and 76-mm to penetrate the frontal armor of the Panther sent a shockwave through allied command.““The M62A1 could not pierce this mantlet, so the 76-mm APC could not have defeated the Panther in front attacks even at point blank range.”“Even the M93 HVAP-T would not be able to defeat the hull frontal armor of the Panther tank since the V50 is above the 3400-fps muzzle velocity of the round. Thompson is more forgiving for the turret and sides but is the worst case for the front hull of the Panther. The PRODAS and Thompson both predict the HVAP-T to penetrate the front of the turret, where Lambert indicates failure against the Panther under the same criteria.”“The German Panther earned a reputation of invincibility as a result of the frontal armor resistance to the 76-mm shells. The Pz IV upgrades also took the Americans by surprise, leading to a scramble for the new HVAP-T shell. The development of the HVAP-T round to supplement the 76-mm gun was successful in improving close range capability against Pz IV upgrades, but supplies were never adequate until nearly the end of the war in the spring of 1945.”Technical Report ARMET-TR-17002: THE 76-MM GUN M1A1 AND M1A2: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. ANTI-TANK CAPABILITIES DURING WORLD WAR II by Jose Cosme, Jeff Ranu Shawn, Spickert-Fulton.https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1045347.pdfReport on the operation of PzRgt (Panther) von Lauchert:Armour: All enemy anti-tank fire failed to penetrate the frontal armour of the PzKpfw V Panther. Fire from 7.62cm anti-tank and tank guns falling vertically on the cupola also failed to penetrate. However, the sides of the Panther were penetrated even at ranges over 1,000m. On the turret and also against the sloping and vertical hull sides, fire from 7.62cm anti-tank guns and tank guns went through; subsequently most Panthers so hit burst into flame, probably on account of the large amount of explosive in the shell.One of the very best and accurate tank guns of the war. Comparable to the UK 17pdr against armor, but was more accurate, had higher ROF (compared to the cramped Firefly, generated less smoke and had a smaller muzzle blast when firing and had much better HE round. Contrary to myth, the L/70 had a good HE round, roughly in the same ballpark as the US 75mm. Carried a lot of ammo, 79–82 rounds were standard, but could carry (and often did) up to 120 rounds. The standard German AT round from 1942 onwards, the PzGr 39–1 (PzGr 39/42 in the Panther), was the best of its kind in WW2, far better than especially US and Soviet standard rounds. Late war US testing of the of the PzGr 39–1 vs the US 76 mm and 75 mm and Soviet 76 mm found that the German round penetrated about 15% more than the next best round when all guns were fired fired at the same velocity (610 m/s).Report on the operation of PzRgt (Panther) von Lauchert:The main gun: Hit and penetration is good. By 10 July 1943, 140 enemy tanks had been destroyed. The average range was 1,500m to 2,000m. A T-34 was even destroyed at 3,000m."Memorandum on the PzKpfw V Panther In August 1943 the PzBrig staff identified ten basic tactical principles for the PzKpfw Panther:… 5.) The great effectiveness of the gun makes it possible to exchange of fire with enemy tanks at long range. A KV-1 can be destroyed at 3,400m, a T-34 at 1,500 to 2,000m.From “Germany’s Panther Tank” by Thomas JentzSee at 18:57.“Geijsteren Castle sits north of the Dutch town of Venlo on the banks of the Meuse River. In late 1944, the castle was a strongpoint in the local German defenses and under attack by elements of the British Sixth Guards Tank Brigade. The German troops garrisoning the fortress had held against attacks by infantry and heavy artillery bombardment. Now, the brigade’s tanks would try their hand at knocking out the enemy position.The British crews moved their Churchill tanks to positions within range of the castle and began to fire. Equipped with various versions of the Churchill, the tankers sent rounds from 6-pounder and 75mm cannon, as well as the 95mm howitzers, crashing into the walls of Geijsteren. The smaller tank guns proved ineffective against the stout walls of this fortress with ramparts built to withstand the long bombardments of an earlier era of warfare.The 95mm howitzers were much more successful, but one tank outdid them all. The crew of this particular tank, which bore the name “Cuckoo” painted on both sides of its turret, methodically pummeled the castle’s defenders, selecting a window and then unerringly putting a round right through the opening and into the strongpoint’s interior. Cuckoo’s crew was lauded for the precision of their fire in the attack.The defeated Germans, however, had good reason to feel frustration that day, for the tank that had put such devastating fire into their position was none other than a German-built Mark V Panther medium tank, captured intact by the British and placed into their service.”Cuckoo - the British PantherVery steady gun platform. Big size and heavy weight hasn’t just downsides.Excellent Commander’s cupola - which, to some extent, made up for the lack of a roof periscope for the gunner.Excellent optics - far superior to Allied optics regarding sharpness, clarity and brightness.“German optical sights were far superior to anything the Western Allies or the Red Army mounted on their tanks during WW2.” From Panzers at war by Michael and Gladys Green.Tom Sator, an M4 crewman who served in the 4th Armored Division from late 44 to the end of the war, took a look at the sights of an abandoned PzIV: “There were always a lot of talk about the effectiveness of the German tank guns against us. It is true that they had to stop to fire, but they started firing from 1200 to 1500 yards. Their first shot was always a hit. We, on the other hand, had to get within 500 to 600 yards to be within effective firing distance, and even our best gunners needed at least two shots before they could score a hit.”… Then I saw the gunsight and I figured I might as well look through it while I was there, and as soon as I did, the realisation came to me why the German gunners were so accurate. “Shit, I wanna go home” is the only thing I could think of at the moment. Their sights were so far superior to ours that we didn’t stand a chance.” From Panzers at war by Michael and Gladys Green.“Cuckoo’s new operators were impressed and happy with their acquisition; in particular, they admired the high quality of the optics in the tank’s sights, something for which the Germans were noted.”Cuckoo - the British PantherBest off-road mobility of any WW2 tank.“The suspension and the drive were excellent. The suspension can absorb uneven ground up to 50 cm, This is simply absorbed by these torsion bars. This figure was only reached again during the cold war. The Leopard 2 manages to beat that figure later on. In between, it doesn’t happen.” See video “Fat Cat” further down.The winter was harsh, and icy conditions made for difficult going. Cuckoo both impressed and angered its new owners. While the Churchill tanks seemed to constantly slide and become stuck on the icy roads, the Panther kept moving with absolutely no problem at all, oblivious to the conditions plaguing the British armor.Cuckoo - the British PantherRelatively cheap, it did cost only slightly more than a PzIV, but was a much more formidable tank. Relatively easy to mass produce.Relatively fast. Most powerfull tank engine of WW2.Easy and light steering.Relatively easy maintenance. Was designed with mass production and easy maintenance in mind.See video at 6:55.WO 291/1003 lists these "outstanding" features (apart from the “obvious” ones”) of the Panther they tested:Good Features:- Main armament loading times- Driver's "opened-up" position- Large hull hatches- Empty-case bin and fumes extractor for the gunNot so good points:Tough on the outside, fragile on the inside. Transmission, engine and especially final drives sources of more or less constant concern.Weak side armor for a 45 ton tank. Most Allied AT weapons, including even 37 mm guns, could penetrate the side armor at several hundred meters. The side armor was still comparable to other medium “standard” tanks like the M4 and T-34.Short barrel life of main gun (about 2000 rounds, compared to about 6000 for PzIV and Tiger 1 and just 1200 for Tiger 2).The gun mantlet created a dangerous shot trap(solved on many late Ausf G).Panther shot trap created by its it's curved gun mantlet.On many Panther late Gs this was fixed with the addition of a "chin".Very dependent on good, experienced drivers and commanders.Heavy, too heavy for many bridges.Relatively cramped for such a big vehicle. Crew layout not quite as good as the excellent PzIII, PzIV or M4, but much better than any Soviet tank.Turret traverse dependent on engine RPM. Could be a disadvantage in meeting encounters at close range.Big and tall. The size along with the long gun made it especially difficult to use in confined areas. General Fritz Bayerlein reported on the difficulties experienced by the Panther tank in the fighting in Normandy:While the PzKpfw IV could still be used to advantage, the PzKpfw V [Panther] proved ill adapted to the terrain. The Sherman because of its maneuverability and height was good ... [the Panther was] poorly suited for hedgerow terrain because of its width. Long gun barrel and width of tank reduce maneuverability in village and forest fighting. It is very front-heavy and therefore quickly wears out the front final drives, made of low-grade steel. High silhouette. Very sensitive power-train requiring well-trained drivers. Weak side armor; tank top vulnerable to fighter-bombers. Fuel lines of porous material that allow gasoline fumes to escape into the tank interior causing a grave fire hazard. Absence of vision slits makes defense against close attack impossible.The interleaved road wheels were prone to becoming clogged with mud and debris and even completely freezing up in harsh Russian winters. The interleaved design also meant that changing a damaged wheel was a major headache. If an inner wheel was damaged, several outer wheels might have to be removed before it could be replaced.Lack of roof periscope for gunner (something which it shared with all German tanks). Could be a disadvantage in meeting encounters at close range.Lack of important alloys etc. affected the Panther and all German AFVs greatly, especially the transmission, final drive, engine, turret traverse, armor, gun (APCR).WO 291/1003 lists these "outstanding" features (apart from the “obvious” ones”) of the Panther they tested:Bad features:- No loader's seat (position still deemed satisfactory)- Position of gunner's and bow gunner's seats in relation to their controls.- No adjustment for commander's seat- Gunner's restricted vision- Bad controls for turret traverse- Handwheel handles too short- Small ammounts of ammunition available at 2, 3 and 9 o' clock- Position of clips on arms in pannier racks- Gunner must move headset to sight.Like any other WW2 tank, it had more than its share of design quirks and flaws.It was designed by MAN, which had little previous experience in designing tanks. Panther production began in December 1942 at the main MAN plant at Nuremberg and at other locations. That represents a stunning achievement – just seven months from design approval to the first tanks being assembled on the production line, but is also an indiciation of the hurry the Germans were in. The Panther was a rushed design rushed into combat, something which had disastrous results in the summer of 1943.The infamous final drive problems were something it shared with all other German tanks, most of all the PzIV.The Panther’s Achilles heel. The final drive at 33:22.Minutes from a meeting of the Panzer Commision 23 January, 1945Final DriveFrom the front there continues to be serious complaints regarding final drive breakdowns in all vehicle types. Approximately 200 breakdowns have been reported with the 38(t). Prior to the 1945 eastern offensive there have been 500 defective final drives in the Panzer IV. From the Panther 370 and from the Tiger roughly 100. General Thomale explained that in such circumstances an orderly utilization of tank is simply impossible. The troops lose their confidence and, in some situation, abandon the whole vehicle just because of this problem. He requests an increase in efforts for the final drive, since only this way can the problem be laid to rest. With the previously intense criticism of the engine and the final drive continually playing such a roll, it is welcome news to learn that the gearbox generally enjoys a good reputation. Direktor Wiebicke claims that the Heerestechnisches Buro of the Waffenamt had for its part rejected the sun-and-planet final drive and demanded the spur wheel reduction drive. This claim led to a confrontation between Oberst Holzhauer and Oberbaurat Knonagel. Oberingenier Wiebicke clarified that for the past on and a half years there has been ongoing discussion regarding the introduction of the planetary gearing but as of yet nothing significant has been accomplished. Whereas during this entire time attempts have been made to improve the final drive, with only minimal improvement being noted. It must, however, be kept in mind that MAN, as the responsible manufacturing firm, cannot now hold other companies responsible. MAN as availed itself of all offices which have the prospect of providing a way out of these difficulties with the final reduction drive.From “Panther and its Variants” by Walther SpeilbergerOn 28 June 1944, General Guderian reported:Panther-Abteilungen in the WestOn 28 June 1944, Guderian reported on experiences in opposing the Allied landing in Normandy: The Pz.Kpfw.IV, V, and VI have proven to be successful. The Panther appears to catch fire quickly. The lifespan of the Panther’s motors (1400 to 1500 km) is significantly higher than the Panther’s final drives. A solution to the final drive problem is urgently needed. The fasteners for the Schuerzen must be strengthened to prevent them from being torn off by the hedgerows in the Normandy. Soon the troops will demand that protective armor shields be mounted over the rear decks because of the success of fighter-bomber attacks. The height of the guns in the Strumgeshuetz is too low for the terrain in Normandy.From “Germany’s Panther Tank” by Thomas JentzThe final drive served as the further reduction of the driving RPM. It contained two spur gear sets. The housing was sealed off by labyrinth packing at the point of the drive sprocket hub. The drive sprocket was joined to the final drive by its drive sprocket shaft. the toothed rims of the drive sprocket could be replaced without actually having to remove the sprockets themselves. The final drive (gear teeth and bearing) was the weakest part of the Panther. It was a risky proposition to use a spur gear system for transferring the drive power – especially considering that the available steel during the war did not have a particularly high stress tolerance. A better solution would have been to use an epicyclic gear system; a prototype final reduction drive using planetary gear reduction had already been tested and had performed flawlessly. However, as mentioned previously, a shortage of gear cutting machinery for the hollow gearing prevented this type of final drive from being mass produced. In order to bridge the gap a final reduction gear system was installed in front of the main gear drive, but due to installation restrictions its mounting were far too weak and could not be strengthened. Because of gear teeth being under too great a load and the weak mountings, the gears were pushed out of alignment – virtually guaranteeing mount and tooth breakage.The general consensus of the industry was that inner-toothed gear wheels could not be produced due to a lack of proper machinery. This meant that a final drive using planetary gear reduction and pre-selector spur gearing – found to be reliable in company testing – could not be installed in the production tanks. All attempts to improve the final drive met with failure, despite the offers of a special bonus as an incentive. The housings, which initially had proven too weak and whose outer mounts had been bent out of alignment by the track’s pull, were eventually replaced by stronger ones.From “Panther and its Variants” by Walther SpeilbergerDuring World War II, a German prisoner of war informed his British captors that the weakness of the Panther’s steering mechanism was well known. Panther tank drivers were instructed to use the auxiliary skid brakes for steering and to avoid pivot steers. He went on to say the steering unit problem appeared to be result of the overloading of the steering clutch during tight-radius and pivot steering maneuvers.A late-war U.S. Army report noted of the Panther’s auxiliary skid brake steering ability, “The skid turn feature of the steering system, which is utilized by pulling the steering lever all the way [back] and locking one track, cannot be employed at speeds in excess of approximately 8 to 10 miles per hours, and can only be used when the vehicle is in second gear, as the engine will be stalled if such a turn is made in a higher gear.”British engineers concluded that Panther final-drive units had inadequate bearings and poor housing strength. IN addition, critical areas of some gears were not hardened properly. these and other major design and manufacturing defects lead to poor final-drive reliability. Later information revealed that the Germans had approached a French firm during the war years to investigate the practicality of producing a new type of final drive for the Panther tank. The French received the assembly drawings, but nothing ever came of the proposed project.Panther Transmission details.Panther transmission installation.Jaqcues Littlefield talked about what he has learned about Panther tank final drives in the process of restoring a Panther Auf. A:“My understanding is that the final drives were always a problem. I’ve heard different things, for instance, that [the Germans] couldn’t get the proper alloy, they couldn’t heat-treat it properly, or whatever. When we test ours, the alloy and the strength of these particular gears was as good as what you could make them from today. [We] looked at maybe duplicating them, using the same physical size, but just using a stronger alloy or better treatment, and the answer we got back was that it was as good then as we can do it now.Part of the problem with the final drives was no doubt due to the vehicle’s growth in weight. It grew in weight from its original goal of 30 to 35 tons to the low 40s. I’m going to guess that what ended up happening with the final drives is that they were designed for the lower-weigh vehicle, and there wasn’t the physical size [available] to where you could make the gears wider and stronger. Since they weren’t able to make them wider, they just left them the way they were originally designed.It is interesting that the American Sherman tank used double-herringbone gears in the final drives, which provides more torque capability for the given width of a final drive. The Panther uses straight spur gears, so there must have been a manufacturing limitation, as double herringbone gears were well known at the time for their ability to carry larger amounts of torque for a given width.”From “Panzers at War” Michael and Gladys GreenAs troublesome as the final drives were, there's still a huge difference in performance between the French post-war use of Panthers, and German war-time reports on examples of improvements of Panther reliability.From the French report, titled "Le Panther 1947":"The truly weak spot of the Panther is its final drive, which is of too weak a design and has an average fatigue life of only 150 km."The Chieftain's Hatch: French PanthersThere’s probably a reason for this disparity: The French were not operating their Panthers according to regulations. Forced marches without maintenance halts increased the number of mechanical failures and breakdowns. Crews often kept the tank in 3rd gear during long marches, and then controlling the speed using only the accelerator (rather than shifting to the higher gears). This is something that German crews had been explicitly warned not to do, as it would lead to premature stripping of the cogs (even if many inexperienced German drivers also would do the same mistake). The 3rd gear was under-designed because it was only meant to be a transition to higher gears.But even so, the notion of the Panthers final drives having an average “fatigue life of only 150 km” is not true. There are numerous incidents where this figure was exceeded by a large margin.German war-time reports of improvements of Panther reliability:General Guderian reported on 5 March 1944:The Iatest experience reports from the Panzer-Abteilungen state that with the exception of minor deficiencies, the Panther is at Iast front ripe. As an example on 22 February 1944, Panzer-Regiment l had reported: "In its present form, the Panther is troop ripe. It is far superior to the T 34 tank. Almost all the bugs have been worked out. This Panzer has exceptional armament, armor, cross country travel ability, and speed. At this time, the Iifespan of the motor is 700 to 1000 kilometers. Motor failures have decreased. Final drive breakdowns no Ionger occur. The steering gear and transmission have proven to be acceptable."He further noted a specific instance of mechanical reliability:From 6 March to 15 April 1944, the 1.Abteilung/Panzerregiment 2 (1st Battalion, 2nd Panzer Regiment) reported a distance of between 1500 km to 1800 km. Four of their seven Panthers was still combat ready without any transmission or engine failure.The same united noted also:Many kilometres without a breakdown is the hallmark of a good driver and commander. In that respect, the battalion mentions PzKpfw V Chassis No. 154338, Engine No. 8322046 reading 1,878km, driver Obergrefeiter Gablewski, 4. Kp/ PzRgt 2. The vehicle is still completely operational. With exception of track, all other items are still in very good condition. Engine oil consumption has been 10ltr per 100km. The tank is still running with its original engine and transmission.from “Panther: Germany’s Quest for Combat Dominance”by Michael and Gladys GreenAfter that report from the units, the The Inspector General of Armored Troops acknowledged this in a report of 6 June 1944:The report confirms the opinion that thanks to the continuous improvement of its components, the life of the Panther tank has increased. The average lifespan of a Panther can now be roughly equal to that of a Panzer IV with around 1,500 - 2,000 kilometers between two major repair and maintenance processes.And, gearboxes also have a longer life. Even so, in several cases, at approximately 1500 km, the gear has broken down and the boxes have had to be replaced.June 1944 edition of Nachrichtenblatt der Panzertruppen (Armoured Troops Bulletin):Performance of a Panther-recovery tank driver. Unteroffizier Krause of a Panther workshop platoon has up to 3 May 1944 driven his Panther recovery tank – Chassis No. 212132 – 4,200km without an engine change or damage to the transmission, including the final drive units, gearbox and drive shaft. Approximately 1,000km of this was made towing a Panther tank. The vehicle and engine are still in excellent condition and continue to be operational."The Allied invasion of 6 June 1944 found the individual companies of the “Hitlerjugend” Panther battalion billeted to villages around Le Neuborg, France and the battalion staff company in the town itself. On being ordered to the invasion front, the fastest way the leadership of the 12th ss Panzer Regiment could get its Panthers there was by driving them. The sixty-six tanks of this unit covered a distance of 140 kilometres to reach the Normandy combat zone, travelling from 6 to 8 June 1944 under incessant air attack. For a tank unit in the Second World War, this was a sizeable distance. A number of tanks would be expected to fall out, despite maintenance halts. The march of the battalion began at 1 p.m. on 6 June 1944 and evening found the companies in the following locations: The 1st Company had reached Berthouville, the 2nd was in Barsen, the 3rd was in Le Thiel-Nolent, and 4th Company had reached in St. Claire. The battalion staff company had reached Boissy. Late evening saw the battalion continue west via the route Thiberville- Orbec-Monnai-Gace. From there the march continued all day on 7 June 1944 via Trun-Falaise-Thury Harcourthen to Amaye in the Maizet district. Here the battalion was dispersed and waited for fuel on the night of 7–8 June 1944. It is noted at this point that a single Panther that had become separated from its company rejoined it ."Destroying the PanthersThe 11th Panzer Division was involved in heavy fighting from August 1944. They tried to contain the allied landing in southern France, and conducted several long road marches. The Panther tanks required an overhaul after 800 km. But due to heavy combat, the 11th Panzer Division was unable to stick to regulations. By September 1944 several of the Panthers had driven over 1500 km without final drive failure, ten times longer than the French.From “Ghost Division: The 11th "Gespenster" Panzer Division and the German Armored Force in World War II by A. Harding GanzThe British did tests on a captured Panther tank which had 500 miles (800 km) on it. The vehicle needed repairs to the engine and steering. After this, it was able to successfully pass an obstacle course that both the Sherman and Cromwell failed. It was then put through two additional trials, and then the transmission finally broke down. That means it traveled five times further than the French claimed was possible.In September and October 1944, a number of modifications were fitted into the final drives as countermeasures to the reported problems including worn gear teeth, parts, bearings, and insufficient lubrication.The Panther initially experienced numerous automotive problems with required a continuous series of modifications to correct. These problems can be traced to three main causes: leaking seals and gaskets, an overtaxed drive train originally designed for a 30 metric ton vehicle, and an untested engine. But, following modification of key automotive components, with mature drives taking required maintenance halts, the Panther could be maintained in a satisfactory operational condition.From “Germany’s Panther Tank” by Thomas JentzAn improved version, confusingly called the Panther Ausf. A, entered production in August 1943. This version standardized improvements that had been gradually introduced into the Panther Ausf. D and included an improved turret with a new commander’s cupola. Additional changes continued to be incorporated into the design through 1943 and into 1944. These improvements began to have an effect on the availability rate of the tanks deployed on the Eastern Front, going from the 37 percent in February to 50 percent in April and 78 percent by the end of may 1944.From “Panther vs Sherman: Battle of the Bulge 1944” by Steven ZalogaThe following experience was obtained during the period from 6 march to 15 April 1944 with the Panzerkampfwagen V of the 1.Abteilung/Panzer-Regiment 2:Maybach HL 230 P30 Motors: In general, the new motors have significantly longer lifespan the first series. The longest distance achieved by the motor is 1700 to 1800 kilometers in 3 of the 7 Panthers that are still available. The motor failures that did occur were all the same nature, bearing damage and broken connecting rods.Starting up the Maybach.Engine installation.Motor fires: motor fires also significantly decreased. the proven causes of motor fires at present are:Oil leaks from the valve covers due to poor gaskets. The oil drops on the hot exhaust where it ignites.In several cases, a heavy overflowing from the carburetors was noticed.The spark plugs became wet and didn’t fire. The unburnt fuel was then discharged to the exhaust header and leaked through the gaskets. This caused fire to spread on the outside of the motor.Transmissions: The transmissions also achieved an increased lifespan. However, in several cases the 3rd gear failed at about 1500 km so that a new transmission needs to be installed. The damage maybe caused by overtaxing the 3rd gear during the muddy period that lasted almost a quarter year. Since there was no chance to obtain new transmission, three Panthers with damaged 3rd gears remained in action and still succeeded in traveling an additional 250 km. In this case, the driver had to shift from 2nd to 4th gear. In several cases the main clutches were damaged during the ong muddy period and head to be replaced. The longest distance driven without transmission failure is 1500 km to 1800 km by four of the 7 Panthers that are still available.The large play in the steering gear may also be traced to extensive driving in mud. Because of the comparatively complicated adjustment of the steering mechanism and short technical training, in all cases the drivers can not be expected to correctly adjust the brakes by themselves. Since in most cases, Panthers with steering problems must remain in service, this results in final drive damage and increased brake wear.Final Drives: A very large percent of Panthers broke down through damage to the final drives. As an example, since the first of March, 13 final drives were replaced in 30 Panthers, more on the left than the right. bolts on the large gear inside the final drive shear off. Final drives can not hold up to steering in reverse in heavy soil.Tracks and Suspension: At about 1500 to 1800 km, the tracks are very heavily worn. In many cases the guide horns are bent outward or broken off. In four cases the tracks had to be replaced, since a complete row of guide horns broke off.In spite of the fact that Panthers have achieved a significantly longer lifespan, an attempt should be made to further increase their lifespan through additional modifications. The Panther needs to be able to tolerate the following situations that occur during combat:Over revving the motor especially when driving uphill and during combat in heavy soil!Steering in reverse (which can’t be avoided during combat).Overtaxing the clutch.From “Germany’s Panther Tank” by Thomas JentzWhat did Panther tank crews think of their vehicle’s technical problems?Dr. Wolfgang Sterner, a WW2 Panther tank commander, answered:“I experienced some of them (technical problems) when I was assigned to the Panzer Lehr Division in January 1945. However, by then the technical problems with the Panther were not so dramatic anymore, because at that time many things had been improved. Of course, another positive factor was the shorter distances on the Western Front. Therefore, the strain on the mechanical equipment of a tank was not as severe as it would have been on the Eastern Front. We still had mechanical breakdowns with the Panther, but not much more than with the Mark IV. On the other hand, we never had any problems with the tactical fighting capabilities of the Panther; in my opinion it was outstanding.”Percentage operational at the front 1944–45The percentage of operational Panzers was high at the eve of the monumental summer campaigns of 1944, low at the end of the same, then again high in the “campaign pause” late in 1944, and then sunk dramatically towards the very end of the war. What these stats don’t show is how many Panzers were out of action due to mechanical breakdowns, combat damage or a combination.Overturned 12th SS Panther in Normandy.Unavailable due to being unreliable or damaged?Challenging its perception as mechanically unreliable, this Canadian article argues Allied combat action was responsible for a large percentage of Panthers that were out of action.Destroying the PanthersThe Effect of Allied Combat Action on I./SS Panzer Regiment 12 in Normandy, 1944Arthur Gullachsen“This article will argue that Allied combat action, not mechanical reliability issues, was the main factor responsible for disabling a large percentage of Panthers. ““While literature criticising the Panther’s operational record focuses on mechanical defects, the incidence of battle damage is ignored as a cause. Furthermore, the inefficient German Army tank repair and replacement system, with its shortages and logistical issues, created a false impression that the Panther was mechanically defective. Its slow turn-around times and lack of replacement vehicles obscured the fact that Panthers were not unreliable, just being destroyed or disabled at a rapid rate. Due to its adequate frontal armour, many Panthers were only badly damaged and the Germans had a limited capability to replace or repair these tanks quickly. ““Automotively, the Mark A and G Panther models were huge improvements over the disastrous Mark D models (D coming before A) that debuted at Kursk in 1943. ““In reality, the tank’s improved reliability in the summer of 1944 allowed its crews to conduct long road moves. This was made evident by Panther battalions in Normandy conducting regular forced marches during June-July 1944.”“Prior to combat in Normandy, the battalion’s vehicles demonstrated their automotive reliability by completing a 140 kilometre road march in difficult conditions. A large number of tanks took part in the 8 June 1944 night attack against the village of Bretteville L’Orgueilleuse, verifying that a majority of the Panthers completed the march.”“A difficult challenge for Panther crews in combat was the issue of numerical inferiority, a factor which influenced the number of panzers that were destroyed or put out of action. Instances of battle damage were far more probable due to Panthers in company or platoon strength attacking superior numbers of Allied tanks or groups of anti-tank guns. Numerically superior forces firing at a high rate would often target individual Panthers with multiple tanks or anti-tank guns. In the course of engagement that could last hours, the probability of all Panthers being hit at least once was very high. The large number of tanks that escaped total destruction and were only damaged highlights the capability of the Panther’s armour. The sloped armoured hull that limited its automotive ability was vital to its survival capability.”“Indirect fire and mines were also a problem for German tank crews. On detection Panthers were shelled intensively with all kinds of indirect fire and often ran into belts of Allied anti-tank minefields. Mines and artillery could damage the track and road wheels significantly, and this damage could take up to a day to repair. If a mine field was covered by direct and indirect fire, an immobile Panther would become a sitting target. Indirect artillery strikes on the turret top or engine cover could cause severe engine or main gun damage. ““German commanders were loath to write off panzers and instead carried them on their books ad infinitum, wary of sending them back to the homeland for fear they would never be replaced. As a result, dead lined vehicles would be dragged forward during an attack, and dragged backward during a retreat. Thus they stayed in repair much longer, and the myth was born that Panzers were significantly less mechanically reliable than Allied tanks.”“Panther versus Sherman, 30–31. Zaloga accurately claims twenty of forty-seven Panthers examined by Allied intelligence post-Battle of the Bulge in January 1945 had been destroyed by their own crews due to their inability to recover the tanks. But he does not mention if battle damage was a factor with these wrecks, or the conditions of the retreat that had led them to be abandoned.”“In conclusion, the Panther tank was not a perfect model of reliability, but in contrast to the arguments of some current works, it was far from non-functional. A close study of the war diary of the 12th ss Panzer Division’s Panther battalion in the period June to July 1944 suggests a number of limited conclusions. During its combat deployment in Normandy the tank displayed an acceptable level of automotive reliability. What 12th ss Panthers were unserviceable during this period were out of action mainly due to battle damage, not mechanical failure. Whenever a number of these vehicles went into combat, Anglo-Canadian forces went to extraordinary lengths to destroy them, writing off many and leaving others battle damaged. The repair and recovery assets within the battalion workshop platoon were unequal to the task asked of them, and the battalion itself received few replacement tanks.”“The opposing First Canadian Army in Normandy had a much more effective system in place to replace broken, damaged, and destroyed tanks with new operational ones. Starved of new replacement tanks and forced to conduct repairs near the chaos of the front lines, the German repair and recovery system in comparison was a model of poor performance.”“During the period 28 August–7 September 1944, the 4th Canadian Armoured Division lost fifty-seven tanks to mechanical causes and only five to enemy action. “Knocked out Panther in Normandy.The Panther had very little chance to be successfull on a larger scale.By the time it was combat ready, it is early 1944. Germany was losing the war, and losing badly. They had lost access to important alloys. They had lost air superiority on all fronts and were strictly on the defence. After the summer battles of 1944, experienced crews and, most of all, fuel were in short supply. With inexperienced drivers the mechanical breakdowns became rampant.Men against boys: In the hands of poorly trained kids, even the best tank will fail.Meanwhile, thousands of Panthers and its components were, directly and indirectly, destroyed already on the factory floor by Allied heavy bombers. The bombing also forced a steep drop in the production of spare parts, which as a percentage of tank production dropped from 25–30 percent in 1943 to 8 percent in late 1944.Germany produced 19000 Panzers/Assault guns in 1944 (including 4000 Panthers/Jagdpanthers and more than 1000 Tiger 1 and 2). In addition, it is estimated that an extra 30–40% would have been produced if not for the Allied bombing campaign. Still, Germany produced nearly as many tanks/tank destroyers as USA in 1944 (20000), and in sheer tonnage actually outproduced USA by a considerable margin (USA produced some 37000 tanks/tank destroyers in 1943 and were pgearing down tank production in 1944).Simply, the problems with the Panther could not be fully solved in a chaotic Germany bound for collapse and utter defeat.A post-war “Panther Ausf. H” with access to all the important alloys would have been an excellent tank well into the 50thies with gradual upgrades to the automotive components, armor and gun. OTH, there was no need for the other major powers to adopt the Panther; they already had the basics for new, formidable tanks (M26 Pershing, Centurion, T-54).Everything wrong with German tanks:

Extraterrestrial Technology Adopted from Crashed UFOs by Reverse-Engineering in Area-51 base(USA).Overview Of antigravity craft developed by various US military contractors as a result of reverse engineering captured UFOs.This should come as no surprise based on what Col Philip Corso revealed in terms of his involvement in U.S. Army efforts to pass on extraterrestrial technologies to civilian industries from the Roswell wreckage available in his filing cabinet. Of course, the scraps of ET material in Corso’s filing cabinet pales in comparison with the actual craft retrieved by elite UFO retrieval units on many occasions as whistle blowers such as Sgt Clifford Stone claim.While the details of each covert program cited by Boylan may be called into question due to the inherent problem in whistle blower testimonies that may be seeded with disinformation, his basic premise and overview appears well thought through. Boylan’s research reveals that Space based weapon systems already exist and have been used for several decades..This suggests that the Strategic Defense Initiative is just a cover for a covert weapons program that has been underway for some time and has already been deployed. SDI therefore may be little more than an effort to take space based weapons systems out of the ‘black’ world of illicit black budget funding, into the ‘white world’ of Congressionally approved Special Access Programs that can be funded by federal appropriations. This allows the black budget funds raised through illicit sources that previously funded these covert programs to be earmarked for other ‘urgent’ purposes.This suggests that efforts to prevent the weaponization of space need to consider the covert programs already deployed and the need of military policy makers to get some of these into the ‘white world’ in order to gain Congressional funding for other ‘black projects’. The proper focus should therefore be on making transparent the space weapons systems currently deployed, and to have some accountability process for the deployment and use of such weapons systems by Congressional committees. Turning back the covert deployment of space based weapons is a much more difficult challenge than preventing their initial deployment which has already occurred..Furthermore, the targeting of extraterrestrial vehicles by exotic weapons systems is certainly a major cause for concern as Boylan points out. However, as influential insiders such as Col Philip Corso have indicated, there is genuine military concern over extraterrestrial violations of national sovereignty and human rights..This has led to Corso and others supporting the deployment of such space based weapons systems. Consequently, there is great work to be done in bridging genuine military concerns over intrusive extraterrestrial activities, and egregious military practices of targeting extraterrestrial vehicles with exotic weapons systems.Michael Salla, PhDAs a behavioral scientist and clinician, I have been working for over 15 years with persons who report having had an encounter with an extraterrestrial intelligent life form, a Star Visitor.During the course of this work I have felt it necessary to learn as much as possible about the veridical reality of UFOs, and what the government already knows about these visitors from afar.As information on Star Visitors and their encounters with humans piled up, I began to publish my findings, presenting them at national and international conferences, in specialty journals, and in media interviews. This in turn brought me to the attention of certain figures, currently or formerly in highly-classified sectors of government and the military ad intelligence agencies. These individuals decided to leak certain additional information to me, knowing that I would thus serve as a conduit to bring such leaked information to the attention of the portion of the public interested and ready for such information.My doctoral training in psychology and anthropology taught the value of first-hand field research. And because the existence and operations of various undeclared or secret government installations related to Star Visitor matters are not going to be plumbed without field research, I made it my task, starting in 1992, to reconnoiter, observe, and in some instances penetrate many of the most important of these installations.I reasoned that the knowledge I gained could be very helpful to the experiencers who consult with me, to help them feel secure that they had not hallucinated, but that such advanced technology exists, and in fact, the American government is in possession of some of this technology.Additionally, the hundreds of experiencers of encounters shared with me information they possessed, including about advanced U.S. craft, either by reason of being told such things by the Star Visitors, or by being kidnapped by rogue military-intelligence units and taken aboard one of these craft to one or other of these installations, or viewed such craft once they arrived. This added to my store of information and data on advanced U.S. anti-gravity craft.While I have gathered, or been entrusted by others with, considerable information on special American aerospace craft, I do not purport to know everything that is in the U.S. arsenal, nor everything about the operations and capabilities of the craft that I am about to identify. What I know is presented here. I have held nothing back.At this time, I am aware of the existence of ten kinds of special-technology advanced aerospace platforms [mil-speak for craft], all incorporating anti-gravity technology in some form.These ten are:the Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit Stealth Bomberthe AuroraLockheed-Martin’s X-33ABoeing and Airbus Industries’ Nautilusthe TR3-A Pumpkinseedthe TR3-B TriangleNorthrop’s Great Pumpkin discTeledyne Ryan Aeronautical’s XH-75DShark antigravity helicopterLockheed-Martin and Northrop’s jointly-developed TAW-50 hypersonic antigravity fighter-bomberBefore we examine these ten exotic aerospace craft, a brief overview of the different forms of generating antigravity fields is in order.The most primitive antigravity technology is electrogravitic. This involves using voltages in the millions of volts to disrupt the ambient gravitational field. This results in an 89% reduction in gravity’s hold on airframes in such vehicles as the B-2 Stealth Bomber and the TR3-B Astra triangular craft. And given the considerable ambient ionization field I observed around the X-22A, it is reasonable to assume that extreme-voltage electrogravitics is also employed with these craft.The next level up of sophistication is magnetogravitic. This involves generating high-energy toroidal fields spun at incredible rpm’s, which also disrupts the ambient gravitational field, indeed to the extent that a counterforce to Earth’s gravitational pull is generated. The early British aeronautical engineers called this dynamic counterbary. This may have been used in some earlier American saucers and prototypes, but I have only been told that the secret Nautilus spacefaring craft uses magnetic pulsing , which appears to utilize this technology.The third level of sophistication, that used in the more modern American antigravity craft, is direct generation and harnessing of the gravitational strong force. Such a strong-force field extends slightly beyond the atomic nucleus of Element 115, an exotic element donated by Star Visitor scientist-consultants to human scientists at S-4, a secret base south of Area 51. By amplifying that exposed gravitational strong force, and using antimatter reactor high energy, and then directing it, it is possible to lift a craft from the Earth and then change directions by vectoring the shaped antigravity force field thus generated. Important information about this third technology is available on Bob Lazar’s website. (1) This information is also described on the Bob Lazar video. Lazar worked on extraterrestrial technology at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Area 51’s Site S-4. (2)Let us now examine these 10 advanced craft in more detail. The amount of information available for each varies; in some cases more is known, in other cases very little.1) The B-2 Stealth bomber is manufactured Northrop-GrummanThe Air Force describes it as a low-observable, strategic, long-range heavy bomber capable of penetrating sophisticated and dense air-defense shields.Retired Air Force Colonel Donald Ware passed on to me information from a three-star general he knows, who revealed to him in July that the B-2 [Stealth bombers] have electro-gravitic systems on board; and that this explains why our 21 Northrop B-2s costabout a billion dollars each.(3)2) The Aurora SR-33A is a moderate-sized spacefaring vehicleThe late National Security Council scientist Dr. Michael Wolf(4)of NSC’s unacknowledged Special Studies Group subcommittee, (formerly called MJ-12), has stated that the Aurora can operate on both conventional fuel and antigravity field propulsion systems.He further stated that the Aurora can travel to the Moon.Wolf had also disclosed to me that the U.S. has a small station on the Moon, and a tiny observation post on Mars(5).Thus I doubt that Dr. Wolf would characterize the Aurora thus, unless it was a vessel already used in making such trips. He disclosed additionally that the Aurora operates out of Area 51, (Groom Dry Lake Air Force Station), at the northeast corner of the Nellis AFB Range, north of Las Vegas, Nevada.3) The Lockheed-Martin X-33A military spaceplaneIs a prototype of Lockheed’s other spaceplane, the single-stage-to-orbit reuseable aerospace vehicle, the National SpacePlane .Lockheed-Martin does not say too much about its winged, delta-shape X-33 VentureStar, except to say that we are building it. To be at that stage of development for its public-program SpacePlane, clearly Lockheed-Martin has already long since built prototypes, as well as an unacknowledged military version, which I have dubbed the X-33A. The ’A’ suffix stands for antigravity.Colonel Donald Ware, USAF (ret.) told me that he had recently learned from a three-star General that the VentureStar X-33 has an electrogravitics (antigravity) system on board(6). This virtually assures that the unacknowledged military antigravity version, the X-33 A, must surely also have electrogravitics on board. It is possible that what I have called the X-33A is the Aurora craft which Dr. Wolf described.4) The Lockheed X-22A is a two-man antigravity disc fighterThe late Colonel Steve Wilson, USAF (ret.), stated that military astronauts trained at a secret aerospace academy separate from the regular Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, CO.These military astronauts then operate out of Beale and Vandenberg Air Force Bases, Northern California From those bases, these military astronauts regularly fly trans-atmospherically and out into space(7) One of the aerospace craft they use, Colonel Wilson reported, is the X-22A.Another informant, ’Z’, aka ’Jesse’, who formerly worked at the NSA, told me that the Lockheed X-22A antigravity fighter disc fleet is equipped with Neutral Particle Beam directed-energy weapons, that it is capable of effecting optical as well as radar invisibility, and that it is deployable for worldwide military operations from the new U.S. Space Warfare Headquarters, located in hardened underground facilities beneath 13,528’ King’s Peak in the Wasatch Mountains’ High Uintas Primitive (Wilderness) Area, 80 miles east of Salt Lake City(8)Recently I also heard from an Army engineer, formerly TDY’ed to NASA, who shall remain unnamed at his request. He also confirmed that Lockheed had made the X-22A, the two-man antigravity fighter disc which I had seen test-flown in a canyon adjacent to the main Area 51 operations zone.He explained why I had seen the X-22A so nervously flown during that test flight. He said that the original X-22A had had a standard altimeter hard-wired into it, but that such an instrument would give faulty readings in the craft’s antigravity field, which bends space-time. He had recommended that they instead use a gradiometer, which would function better.Apparently his suggestion was finally taken up, since in more recent years I have seen the X-22As flying more smoothly and confidently at high altitudes over and near Area 51.Another informant who wishes his identity kept private related operational details about military deployment of antigravity disc craft which sound like the X-22A. He reports:’During operation Desert Storm a close relative of mine was in charge of a Marine Division right on the front. In the first days film footage and especially video-cams which a large number of G.I.s had were impounded, so they wouldn’t capture any sensitive material.Iraq was pumped up and Gung-Ho, since they had well over 50,000 troops ready to charge us, [and] since we only had about 3500 they knew of, and they knew [that], because of the close proximity of troops we couldn’t nuke them, so, they were assuming piece of cake. Wrong.’Two pictures my relative confiscated from one of his officers showed:1. a large disc-shaped craft slightly in front of our men with a high intensity beam of light emitting out of it; then,2. where men, equipment, etc. was [had stood], there only remained dark charcoal-like spots on the desert floor. We have had this technology for quite a while.’The described disc was clearly an antigravity, levitating, aerial-weapons platform in the U.S. arsenal.Quite possibly it was the Lockheed X-22A two-man discoid craft, the real DarkStar, of which the unmanned drone X-22 DarkStar is but an aircraft ’cover’ program to disguise the existence of this manned antigravity fighter disc, the X-22A.Further, as ’Z’ noted, the real manned discs come equipped with the latest Neutral Particle Beam weapons, which take apart the target at the molecular level. Star Visitor craft do not incinerate humans. Only human military fighters are so deployed.So the above report does not deal with any extraterrestrial event.5) The Nautilus is another space-faring craftA secret military spacecraft which operates by magnetic pulsing(9).It operates out of the unacknowledged new headquarters of the U.S. Space Command, deep under a mountain in Utah. It makes twice-a-week trips up to the secret military-intelligence space station, which has been in deep space for the past thirty years, and manned by U.S. and USSR (now CIS) military astronauts.The Nautilus also is used for superfast surveillance operations, utilizing its ability to penetrate target country airspace from above from deep space, a direction not usually expected.It is manufactured jointly by Boeing’s Phantom Works near Seattle and EU’s Airbus Industries Anglo-French consortium.During travel to Washington State several years ago, I had a conversation with a former Boeing executive who worked in their Phantom Works, Boeing’s black projects division, (roughly the equivalent of Lockheed’s Skunk Works).The executive confirmed what I had earlier learned from an intelligence insider: that Boeing had teamed up with Europe’sAirbus Industrie to manufacture the Nautilus.6) The TR3-A ’Pumpkinseed’ is a super-fast air vehicleThe ’Pumpkinseed’ nickname is a reference to its thin oval airframe, whose contours resemble that seed.It may be the craft identified as using pulse detonation technology for propulsion in a sub-hypersonic regime, and also uses antigravity technology for either mass-reduction or complementary field propulsion at higher speed levels.As air breathers, these Pulse Detonation Wave Engines (PDWEs) could theoretically propel a hypersonic aircraft towards Mach 10 at an altitude in excess of 180,000 feet. Used to power an trans-atmospheric vehicle, the same PDWEs might be capable of lifting the craft to the edge of space when switched to rocket mode.7) the TR3-B ’Astra"Is a large triangular anti-gravity craft within the U.S. fleet. Black projects defense industry insider Edgar Rothschild Fouche wrote about the existence of the TR3-B in his book, Alien Rapture(10) My ex-NSA informant, ’Z’, also confirmed that the TR3-B is operational. ’Z’ had this to say about the TR3-B triangular antigravity craft.TR3-B. This is the code name for what everyone on Earth has seen. It is a very large triangular-shaped re-entry vehicle with anti-gravity. It is what the November [2000] issue of Popular Mechanics identified as the Lenticular Reentry Vehicle, a nuclear-powered flying saucer, the first version of which went operational in 1962, [the version which Popular Mechanics illustrated.]It was used in Gulf War’s early hours with electromagnetic-pulse/laser cannons. It literally sat mid-air, firing long-, medium-, short-range to take out antennas, towers, communications, air traffic control towers, TV dishes and centers, etc. For three hours, these three triangles [TR3-Bs] just sat there blowing up everything in sight.Then the Stealth fighters had fun for the rest of the day into the early evening next night. Then [followed] carpet bombings from high altitude B-52 Strato-Fortresses. They dumped all the old, aged Vietnam-era crap [munitions]; a third blew up and the rest [were] duds. Anyways, the TR3B has been in testing since the ’60s. But it has only been perfected for the last 8 years [since 1992].It is a good remake of what Truman first saw, [the Roswell semi-circular craft]. It is compartmentalized, built by the Skunk Works (Lockheed-Martin’s classified plant at Palmdale, CA) and Boeing [Phantom Works, Seattle]. It is housed in Utah.’Z’ was reminding of his earlier revelation that the U.S. Space Command has located its prime headquarters and antigravity space-launch fleet facility beneath King Mountain, the tallest mountain in the Wasatch Range east of Salt Lake City, Utah.8) Northrop Aircraft Corporation has manufactured its Northrop antigravity disc (designation unknown)...which I have dubbed the ’Great Pumpkin’ , from its brilliant ruddy golden-orangish glow. I first saw these craft operationally test-flown in 1992 above the Groom Range ridge line at Area 51, Nevada.Later I saw the same intensely burning-bright orange-gold craft that I had seen above Area 51 being test-flown sixty miles north of Los Angeles, in the Tehachapi Mountains east of Edwards Air Force Base.There the Northrop has its secret saucer manufacturing works buried deep within the mountains. I saw the same intensely burning-bright orange-gold craft test-flown above Northrop’s mountaintop test bed there as I had seen above Areas 51/S-4(11).When energized these discs emit their characteristic intense glow. It is reasonable to assume that this is due to strong ionization, and that electrogravitics is the methodology of their field propulsion.9) The XH-75D or XH Shark antigravity helicopterIs manufactured by Teledyne Ryan Aeronautical Corporation of San Diego.USAF Colonel Steve Wilson reported that many of these XH-75Ds were assigned to the Delta/National Reconnaissance Organization Division which retrieves downed UFOs.That Division is also implicated in mutilating cattle as a psychological warfare program on the American public, to try to get citizens to fear and hate extraterrestrials through assuming that aliens are the ones cutting up the cattle.Colonel Wilson also leaked a drawing of the XH-75D Shark.10) The TAW-50 is a hypersonic, antigravity space fighter-bomberA defense contractor with whom I have been in communication leaked to me details of this U.S. Advanced TAW-50 warcraft.Developed during the early 1990s, the capabilities of this war-bird are jaw-dropping. And the technology shows that the Defense Department did not fail to utilize what it learned combing through the wreckage of various UFO crashes.The TAW-50 was jointly developed by the Lockheed-Martin Skunk Works (Palmdale-Helendale, CA) and Northrop(undoubtedly at their undeclared Anthill facility within the Tehachapi Mountains, northwest of Lancaster, CA.) Both companies have a history of development of secret anti-gravity craft at these Mojave Desert facilities.The TAW-50 has speed capabilities well in excess of Mach 50, a number the contractor calls ’a very conservative estimate’. Its actual speed is classified.Since Mach-1 is 1,225 kilometers per hour, (approximately 748 mph), this means that the TAW-50 is capable of moving considerably faster than 38,000 mph. In comparison, the velocity required to escape Earth’s gravity is 25,000 mph. Therefore the TAW-50 is capable of going into space, and does.The TAW-50 has a SCRAM (supersonic ramjet) propulsion system for passing through the outer atmosphere. The TAW-50 utilizes electrogravitics to maintain its own artificial gravity while in weightless space, as well as to nullify the vehicle’s mass during operations. The TAW-50’s power supply is provided by a small nuclear power generator that the contractor said is Normal-Inert.The contractor said that the space plane uses electromagnetoferrometric power generation by the immersion of pellets in heavy water (deuterium) and specially-designed coil superconductive magnets, which yield enormous amounts of free electrons when placed in an immersion which has been triggered into an oscillating field-state flux.The TAW-50 has a crew of four. Nevertheless, the TAW-50 flies so fast that it requires computers to fly it. These were developed by American Computer Company, who derived them from its Valkyrie XB/9000 AI [artificial intelligence] Guidance series. They utilize a RISC Milspec Superchip. There are 180 of them in the flight control system, and 64 more in the weapons guidance system, the contractor reported.It can carry a combined payload of glide bombs and a package of MIRV (Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles, mil-speak for a group of intercontinental ballistic missiles), each of which can seek out and strike a different target. The MIRV pack also contains reentry-capable balloon countermeasures to make it very difficult for laser and other defensive weapons to track down where the real MIRVs are and intercept them.The TAW-50 is armed with its own Kill Laser system, which can track and immolate SAM (Surface-to-Air missiles), STTA (Surface-To-Trans-Atmosphere missiles), ATA (Air-To- Air missiles), and ATTA (Air-To-Trans-Atmospheric missiles). The TAW-50’s killer lasers can also knock down high-performance fighter interceptors.The TAW’s Kill Laser is much smaller than the earlier 1980s-era SDI (Star Wars program) models, and has a miniaturized cooling core and 500 times the wattage. The contractor said it uses a spontaneous nucleonic burst to trigger the lasing [laser] effect.In addition, the TAW-50 is armed with microsuperexplosive HyperDart missiles. These are just a little larger than ordinary aircraft cannon ammunition, but travel at hypersonic speed for up to three minutes, and have enormous explosive capability. One HyperDart can blow apart a MiG fighter anywhere within 20 feet of the HyperDart. The TAW-50 carries several hundred HyperDarts.Because the TAW-50 is designed to operate in space, it has on board a two-day air supply. This air supply can be extended by using its scoop system and traveling into the upper atmosphere to harvest more oxygen.The contractor did not reveal the size of the space fighter-bomber except to say, ’It’s a pretty big thing.’The performance of the TAW-50 makes it virtually impossible to defend against.It can hide in orbit many hundreds of miles into space, orbiting at times at 22,000 mph.Then, without warning, it can dive straight down through the atmosphere at over 38,000 miles per hour on an 80-degree attack vector, reverse direction within 150 feet of the ground with very little loss of motion and without a glide turn, and almost instantly go vertically straight up at over 38,000 mph until long after it leaves the atmosphere and resumes orbiting in space.The contractor noted, ’Those [electro-] gravitics allow it to change its mass to almost nothing in a moment, and reverse direction in a second, increase its acceleration to so many times G [Earth’s gravity] it’s not funny, yet they are able to nearly nullify the G-force on the pilots.They [the electrogravitics] are fourth-generation, with the ability to bring it to a complete standstill in under 2 milliseconds, if need be, without crushing the pilots, and keep it there for quite some time.’ The contractor notes, ’It’s far too fast for tracking radars.’ ’And,’ he adds, ’what military aims its radars straight up?’The TAW-50 can be refueled and rearmed in orbit by docking with the secret undeclared Military Space Station that is in orbit(12)The entire refueling and rearming procedure takes under 10 minutes. Who mans the gas pumps? Military astronauts trained at the Secret Air Force Academy, located in the hills immediately west of the official Air Force Academy at Colorado Springs, CO.These military astronauts rotate duty by traveling to and from Vandenberg Air Force Base on other military antigravity vehicles(13).The Cape Canaveral Space Shuttles have carried the arming platforms (’classified Defense Department payloads’) up to the secret Military Space Station. The contractor reported that with a few extra tanks of LOX (liquid oxygen), the TAW-50 could fly to the Moon and back.As of 2002, the U.S. has 20 TAW-50s in its arsenal. But, as the contractor commented, ’You could take out an entire nation in under 10 days with only 10 of these, doing three attacks a day.One can wipe out an entire city the size of suburban Cleveland in a single attack without having to use any nukes at all.’The electrogravitics for the TAW-50 was produced by GE Radionics.Pratt & Whitney designed the SCRAM atmospheric penetrator technology.American Computer Company created the artificial-intelligence supercomputers.The contractor said he could not tell me anything else. And it was clear he did not want his name used. So, this is what is known.11) The Northrop Quantum Teleportation Disc?Are the above the current state-of-the-art in advanced aerospace craft? No.There have been advances beyond “mere” antigravity field propulsion. Quantum particulate physics is now being used to update a variety of aerospace craft and their weapons systems.On a recent (09/16/05) field trip to the boundary of Area 51, during a middle-of-the-night observation, I saw first one, then another, and finally six brightly-lit objects suddenly appear at approximately 1000’ (305 meters) height above the desert floor. The intensely-glowing, ruddy, golden-orangish ionization field surrounding these craft appeared identical to the field around the Northrop antigravity disc.But in the 13 years since I had last observed the Northrop discs above Area 51, and at their Tehachapi Mountains manufacturing site, considerable progress has been made.In 1992, the Northrop disc slowly rose vertically from its flight pad and gradually reached flight altitude. But in 2005 these craft are able to depart from their flight pad and suddenly appear at flight altitude without any visible ascent. And it is not a matter of their ionization field having been turned off during ascent for stealth purposes.The ionization field comes with electrogravitic field propulsion. If the ionization were turned off, the craft would have fallen from the sky. Rather what appears to be going on is that the Northrop engineers have incorporated quantum physics principles into the propulsion.Simply stated, Northrop appears to have harnessed quantum entanglement to achieve quantum teleportation. To the observer the craft simply ceases to exist on the flight pad and instantly begins to exist at, (in this case), 1000 feet altitude.If the interpretation of this observation is correct, then there exists an 11thentry in the U.S. antigravity arsenal, the Northrop Quantum Teleportation Disc.If the black-budget scientists keep advancing along these lines, we could foresee the day when a fleet of Air Force craft suddenly “cease to exist” on the air base runway and instantly appear at 35,000 feet altitude over a target city halfway around the globe.America has used its enormous wealth to become the global super-power.The TAW-50 is but one example of its exotic, unnecessarily proliferative, and highly-destructive arsenal. The world awaits the day when America finds its soul, and pays more attention to matters of spirit, mind, and metaphysical development, and withdraws from its addiction to war toys.It has been said that if the American people knew what the military had in their arsenal today, they wouldn’t believe it, and would think that someone was fantasizing about a George Lucas Star Wars movie episode.But it’s not science-fiction. The future is already here.The implications of the advanced antigravity craft back-engineered by humans are several. All of the antigravity technology is in the control of the organization conducting the UFO Cover-Up.This organization is so heavily infiltrated by Cabal types that Dr. Michael Wolf regretfully concluded that the Cabal had effective control of it. He should know; he was a high member of that Special Studies Group, [formerly "MJ-12"], buried within the National Security Council.Since the Cabal effectively control the development and special uses of these craft, there remains a very high danger that the Cabal will use its growing antigravity fleet to try to repel the Star Visitors and even conduct Space War. Elements within the U.S. Air Force and the Naval Space Command are making preparations for such a Space War.What can we do about this as light workers, Star Kids, Star Seed adults or other humans of good will?First is to keep ourselves informed about dangerous and evil uses of antigravity (and quantum) technology.Second is to contact our political representatives to oppose policies and weapons systems development that is oriented towards space warfare.Third is to encourage the release of this technology into the civilian sector, where it can revolutionize transportation, energy generation, large construction projects, and other peaceful uses.Fourth, the existence of this human technology is a two-edged sword for the Cabal. Not only is the existence of antigravity technology starting to get out to the public, but also the very existence of a massive worldwide organization conducting the UFO Cover-Up and confiscation of Star Visitor technology.As the public becomes aware that the Cabal have unfairly monopolized this technology for 40+ years, the public will become incensed at the Cabal for their greed and selfishness.This then becomes the opportunity to expose and discredit the Cabal, the Number One obstacle to human safety and progress.Footnotes1. UFOs and Area 51, Vol. 2 - The Bob Lazar Video (1999)2. Personal communication, September 20, 1997.3. See: MJ-12: Inside Revelations - Dr Michael Wolf4. See: Quotations From Chairman Wolf5. Personal communication, September 20, 1997.6. See: http://www.drboylan.com/swilson2.html7. Personal communication, February 10, 2002.8. See: Extraterrestrial Base On Earth, Sanctioned By Officials Since 19549. See: http://www.wealth4freedom.com/truth/bt3r.htm10. See: http://www.drboylan.com/grantour2.html11. See: Extraterrestrial Base On Earth, Sanctioned By Officials Since 195412. See: http://www.drboylan.com/colww3a.html13. See: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qt-entangleHave a look this documentary based on ETs( extraterrestrial) & the universal energy sources-THRIVE,Link-Since decades,we have been visited by ETs from other solar system.There are thousand of pattern has been recorded around the world in the crop field that are created by extraterrestrial living beings.The ancient picture from all over world especially Great Pyramid Of Giza,Egypt,Machhu-Pichhu.Working with ETs in Antarctica especially Nazis,Mexico UFO crash,Area 51 Deep secret like EBE-1 & EBE-2 alien interviews,technology in US Air Force’s secret advanced bomber TR-3B run in anti-gravity technology,HAARP’s secret experiments over ETs and thousands of stories of UFO abduction in US and lots more….Have a Look this secret Russian book by CIA.You can download this book directly by searching in google.You can see more evidence from the world’s largest ET research center SETI(USA).Link-SETI Institute

Q. What happened during the Easter Offensive and why did it get such little attention by the American press?A. Tuan Nguyen's answer to “Is it true that ARVN soldiers experienced more intense fighting during the Easter Offensive than American soldiers during their time in the war?”ARVN FlagARVN was victorious due to strong support by US Air power and naval gunfire (Operation Linebacker). ARVN troops and even local forces stood and fought as never before. The ARVN soldier emerges as a remarkable individual who perseveres in spite of great hardships. He has earned a victory. In 1972, in one of their finest hours, the South Vietnamese defended their country with courage and tenacity, rewarded with eventual hard-won success.The North Vietnamese Army suffered more than 100,000 casualties in its attacking force of 200,000--perhaps 40,000 killed--and lost more than half its tanks and heavy artillery.The South Vietnamese lost over 8,000 killed in action during the Easter Offensive, about three times that many wounded, and nearly 3,500 missing.Lt. General Ngo Quang Truong - Best ARVN generalBelow links to his authorative treatise on the Easter Offensive of 1972 (Indochina Monographs series).http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/full...https://thelastsevendays.files.w...Napalm Girl(Phan Thi Kim Phuc - Wikipedia) On June 8, 1972, a South Vietnamese Air Force pilot mistook Kim Phúc, a group of civilians and South Vietnamese soldiers fleeing from Cao Dai Temple to South Vietnamese-held positions, for enemy soldiers and dropped a napalm bomb. Two of Kim Phúc's cousins and two other villagers were killed. Kim Phúc was badly burned and tore off her burning clothes.PARAMETERS, US Army War College QuarterlyCourage and Blood: South Vietnam's Repulse of the 1972 Easter Invasion(The three pronged NGUYEN HUE OFFENSIVE)© 1999 Lewis SorleyNot long after the watershed Tet Offensive of early 1968, dramatic changes occurred in nearly every aspect of the US approach to the war in Vietnam. General Creighton Abrams succeeded to the top military post there, joining Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker and, before long, Ambassador William Colby in forming a capable and like-minded leadership team.General Creighton AbramsTheir shared concept was that the conflict must be approached as "one war" in which combat operations, pacification, and improvement of South Vietnam's forces were given equal emphasis and importance. The large-scale "search and destroy" sweeps of the past gave way to "clear and hold" operations. Security for the people in the hamlets and villages replaced attrition of enemy forces as the primary objective, while the achieved level of security replaced "body count" as the measure of merit. This coherent approach brought about dramatic improvements in the military, economic, and political situations in South Vietnam, despite the progressive withdrawal of US forces that also characterized these later years."By 1972," observed William Colby, "the pacification program had essentially eliminated the guerrilla problem in most of the country."[1] John Paul Vann saw it the same way. "We are now at the lowest level of fighting the war has ever seen," he said in January 1972. "Today there is an air of prosperity throughout the rural areas of Vietnam, and it cannot be denied. Today the roads are open and the bridges are up, and you run much greater risk travelling any road in Vietnam today from the scurrying, bustling, hustling Hondas and Lambrettas than you do from the VC." Concluded Vann, "This program of Vietnamization has gone kind of literally beyond my wildest dreams of success."[2]Lt Colonel John Paul Vann - Vietnam’s Lawrence of ArabiaBy the beginning of 1972 most of the planned expansion and improvement of South Vietnam's armed forces had been completed, providing a formidable capability based on 11 infantry divisions fielding 120 infantry battalions. There were also 58 artillery battalions, 19 armored battalions of various types, and the appropriate engineer, signal, and other supporting arms and services. The Airborne Division and the Marine Division, along with 21 Ranger battalions, were the general reserve, while along the frontier 37 Ranger border defense battalions were positioned. The navy had grown to 1,680 craft of many types; the air force fielded over 1,000 aircraft. Most important of all, perhaps, were the Territorial Forces--the Regional Forces and Popular Forces--constituting at some 550,000 the bulk of the forces overall and providing the all-important close-in security by means of 1,679 RF companies and 8,356 PF platoons stationed throughout the provinces. Complementing the regular armed forces were the National Police, another 116,000 men, and the People's Self-Defense Forces, numbering more than four million.[3]Vietnamization: training the South Vietnam Civil GuardMeanwhile the enemy sought once again to regain the initiative and fashion some means of achieving a victory. "The result of successful Vietnamization and pacification," stated Sir Robert Thompson, "was that by early 1971 the North decided that the only thing left was to invade."[4] General Giap, observed Douglas Pike, had "spent the period from 1968 to 1971 devising still another variant of armed dau tranh," meaning the armed struggle movement, "one that would rectify earlier shortcomings." This modified approach, which Pike characterized as a sort of "high-technology armed dau tranh strategy," was unveiled in the enemy's 1972 Easter Offensive. Outmatching the defenders in tanks and long-range artillery, the North Vietnamese launched a massive invasion that was, concluded Pike's analysis, defeated because "air power prevented massing of forces and because of stubborn, even heroic, South Vietnamese defense." The attackers absorbed devastating losses, especially from airpower while preparing to attack, but most important was that "ARVN troops and even local forces stood and fought as never before."[5]As 1972 began, Abrams--reviewing all the indicators of impending combat that had been amassed--said of the enemy, "I feel very strongly that he's going to try to materialize all that we have seen here, in some way, in the course of 1972." President Nixon reacted by announcing that 70,000 more US troops--the largest single increment of the war--would be withdrawn from Vietnam by 1 May. Abrams was philosophical. "On the one hand," he told his field commanders, "we've got Giap's great campaign coming up. On the other hand, we've got the great redeployment thing coming up. There's a tendency in there for some conflict."[6]In North Vietnam, General Vo Nguyen Giap had just delivered a speech saying, "We must fight with determination to win in order to ensure victory, which is near." Adding that "a costly battle is ahead" and that it would involve "much sacrifice and heartache," Giap closed with his own version of "light at the end of the tunnel": "Victory is in sight."[7]General Vo Nguyen Giap approved the plan to fight US’ B52 aircrafts in Hanoi in 1972.Of the South Vietnamese, said Abrams, "Here again, as there's always been, there are deficiencies, inadequacies, inadequate performances, and so on, but the state of readiness, the alertness and activity on the part of the armed forces here in this country is the highest that I've ever seen it, even though there's some that are still asleep at the switch. You're never going to eliminate it."As for the Americans still in country, Abrams had 20 Inspector General teams out combing the country to check on the state of readiness, supplementing what the chain of command was doing. Given later assertions about the questionable condition of the troops at this late stage of the war, what they found is instructive. "I just have to say I'm quite gratified--yeah, he found some things, and of course you've all found a lot more," Abrams told his field commanders, "but really the responsiveness of the chain of command I think is really quite excellent. The total is good. The word got out, right down to the bottom of the thing. People knew what the hell they were doing, and they were responding. I just think that that part of it is really quite healthy."In February, CBS news correspondent Phil Jones filmed a report based on his visit to the 3d Brigade of the 1st Air Cavalry Division, one of the few US combat units still in Vietnam. Later MACV got a tape of the program and screened it during one of the Weekly Intelligence Estimate Updates held on Saturday mornings in Saigon. On the sound track can be heard the plop-plop-plop of rotor blades as Jones is helicoptered to the field along with Brigadier General James Hamlet, the brigade commander. "You always hear about the protesters and the potheads who are back in the rear areas," Hamlet is heard saying, "but you ask these men how they feel about their mission. They have volunteered for the most dangerous job left in Vietnam, going into the bush every day looking for the enemy."[8]When Jones got out with the troops he found them pretty outspoken. "In the past ten years we've lost a lot of American lives here in Vietnam," said one, "and to just toss them out the window and say `to hell with it,' that's pretty low. And these are just a different caliber of people than what's out in the world. What you see on the streets in D.C. is pretty disgraceful. But here, I think, is what America should see. These are the men, not those freaks or fakes or whatever you want to call them. These are men." A trooper from the division's Ranger Company spoke proudly of his unit, emphasizing that "the war's not over. Since we're here I think we have to be professional. And this company is the most professional company in Vietnam." The broadcast closed with Hamlet's tribute to his men: "From my point of view, the Vietnam story is the story of the American soldier who fights so well and often gets so little credit for it."[9]Soon Abrams cabled urgent representations to Washington of his need for additional operational authority to counter the coming enemy offensive, including authority for fighter aircraft to strike enemy MiGs on the ground at Dong Hoi, Vinh, and Quan Lang and to strike active ground control intercept radars in North Vietnam below 20 degrees north. Abrams also asked authority to have fighters strike any occupied surface-to-air missile site within range of the demilitarized zone (DMZ), to emplace sensors in the DMZ, and for emergency use of aircraft in support of limited cross-border operations by Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF).Republic of Vietnam Air Force pilot"The stakes in this battle will be great," Abrams told the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "If it is skillfully fought by the Republic of Vietnam, supported by all available US air, the outcome will be a major defeat for the enemy, leaving him in a weakened condition and gaining decisive time for the consolidation of the Vietnamization effort. We are running out of time in which to apply the full weight of air power against the build-up. The additional authorities requested are urgently needed."[10] Stressing that he expected the major action to occur in the area just north and south of the DMZ, Abrams closed with an observation: "In the final analysis, when this is all over, specific targets hit in the southern part of North Vietnam will not be a major issue. The issue will be whether Vietnamization has been a success or a failure.""As messages go," said Abrams, "this is probably the most unequivocal message we've ever sent--on the situation. But I think the evidence is very clear." Ambassador Bunker agreed: "I think it's time to be unequivocal, because there's so much at stake." On 20 January the message was dispatched to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Six days later Abrams got an answer. Some authorities were granted for immediate execution and some for standby execution later. But the most crucial, those having to do with strikes against MiG airfields, active radars, missile sites, and logistics facilities, were all still "pending approval." To call the JCS response tepid would grossly understate the case.But--a very significant development--augmentation of US air and naval forces in theater had begun. Eighteen F-4s arrived from Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Provisions were made for a minimum of two carriers to be maintained offshore within easy striking distance, with a third on 48-hour alert status and a fourth en route from the United States. The monthly B-52 sortie rate was increased from 1,000 to 1,200, with additional aircraft positioned on Guam sufficient for a surge effort to 1,500. That proved to be only a beginning; by June the rate skyrocketed to 3,150, the peak for the entire war.[11]Pacific Fleet placed a cruiser, two guided missile destroyers, and another destroyer on 72-hour alert, ready to reinforce the naval gun line off the coast of South Vietnam. Additional P-3 aircraft were standing by to augment coastal patrols if needed, and supplemental C-130 and C-141 cargo aircraft were also on standby. The entire American military establishment in theater was geared up and involved, watching to see how Abrams would conduct his last great battle. "The VC side of it is over," said the visiting Sir Robert Thompson. "The people have rejected the VC." Now it was going to be just plain old hard-nosed conventional warfare in a fight to the death.On 5 February, based on intelligence of the enemy's continued buildup and the positioning of his major troop units as reviewed with Admiral McCain, General Abrams made a determination that the enemy offensive had in fact begun, a judgment which triggered some of his standby authorities to retaliate. Thus, with all in readiness for the coming offensive, MACV brought to bear on the enemy buildup everything it had--within the still restrictive rules of engagement. Tactical air sorties, gunships, and B-52 strikes were brought in practically nonstop. As Abrams met with his senior field commanders, a 48-hour maximum effort was begun, concentrating all available airpower against the B-3 Front in the Highlands. Then, after a mandatory 24-hour Tet cease-fire, the same effort was applied in Military Region 1 in the north.US Air Support"We've got a 24-hour flow of aircraft now," confirmed Seventh Air Force Commander General John D. Lavelle, "and we can keep the flow now. It's set up, it's scheduled, so there's something every few minutes. And we just keep it coming and change the target area, so whenever General Abrams makes a decision as to where to put the weight of effort, or where to go next, we've already got the flow of aircraft."When, despite allied expectations, the enemy still had not attacked, that became an issue. After a visit from Peter Osnos of The Washington Post, Abrams said, "The wicket he appears to be on is that, for some insidious political reason, we have created the myth of this impending campaign." There was not much meeting of the minds. "I'm sure he . . . feels that I feel that he's a scurrilous shit," Abrams told Sir Robert Thompson.Allied forces took one significant casualty even before the main battle began. General Lavelle was found to have ordered a number of "protective reaction" strikes against targets in North Vietnam, thereby violating the rules of engagement then in effect. The offense was compounded by the fact that false reports, representing these strikes as genuine protective reactions, were subsequently filed. Summoned home by the Air Force Chief of Staff, Lavelle was relieved of his command and retired in two-star rank. Said Abrams, in agreeing that Lavelle had "acted improperly," rules were a way of life in Vietnam. In a purely military sense, he acknowledged, some of those rules looked silly, but "if you are going to hold it together, they must be followed."[12] Lavelle's successor, General John Vogt, arrived just in time for Easter.Almost 13 years into the conflict , Thames Televisions Peter Taylor reports from South Vietnam near the town of An Loc on Highway 13 to observe the South Vietnamese Army's attempt to relieve the besieged town of An Loc.At noon on 30 March 1972, the long-expected enemy offensive began in Military Region 1 with widespread attacks by fire. By midnight about 4,000 rounds of mortar, 122mm rocket, and 122mm, 130mm, and 152mm artillery fire had blanketed friendly fire bases across the front. The next day a heavy ground attack struck Quang Tri combat base, and Cam Lo was heavily attacked. Friendly troops were withdrawn from a crescent of fire support bases as enemy tanks were engaged by South Vietnamese armor south of the Cam Lo River. In an early report to Admiral Moorer, Abrams advised that "the enemy's offensive in Quang Tri Province involves a total of ten infantry and five artillery regiments" from the 304th and 308th North Vietnamese Army (NVA) divisions.[13]North Vietnam's 1972 Easter Offensive.Quickly a second prong of the enemy offensive thrust at the Central Highlands, and a day later yet a third targeted Loc Ninh in Binh Long Province, about 100 kilometers north of Saigon. The defending forces there were quickly overwhelmed, withdrawing under heavy pressure southward toward An Loc.[14] Soon the 325th NVA Division, North Vietnam's last remaining division in the north, was fixed in the Vinh area, 240 kilometers south of its usual location near Hanoi. Six enemy divisions had attacked on three fronts. "It's a full court press," Abrams almost exulted.After a week, President Nixon decided to retaliate for this enemy aggression by launching a strong air offensive in the north. Two weeks into the offensive John Vann wrote an assessment that he mailed to a number of friends. "There is very little assistance being provided [to the enemy] in I, II, and III Corps by the local forces, and the enemy's infrastructure plays hardly any role at all," he reported. "The explanation for the latter is fairly simple. The existing infrastructure in South Vietnam hardly deserves its name or notoriety. The overwhelming number of the individuals now called members of the infrastructure no longer reside in populated areas, but instead exist in the base areas, carry weapons, and are largely indistinguishable from other military personnel."President Richard Nixon launched Operation LinebackerWhat was under way, then, was a straightforward conventional invasion on multiple axes. Even at this early stage, and there was much, much hard fighting ahead, Vann forecast the outcome. "It is quite predictable," he wrote, "that their regular forces will . . . be defeated and will suffer such heavy casualties and losses of equipment as to be ineffective for the next one to two years."[15]In Military Region 1 the first five days of heavy assaults on the northern crescent of fire bases resulted in enemy advances as far south as the Dong Hai River, but there resistance by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) stiffened and the enemy paused to regroup and resupply. A later history of the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN, aka the North Vietnamese Army) acknowledged the effective fight put up by ARVN defenders. "Relying on defensive fortifications already in place and on their reinforced troop strength," it recalled,the enemy organized a defensive system consisting of three centers--Dong Ha, Ai Tu, and La Vang-Quang Tri. Hundreds of tanks and armored personnel carriers formed a barrier of steel surrounding these bases. Artillery fire bases and tank guns fired scores of thousands of rounds into our positions. All types of tactical aircraft and B-52 strategic bombers dropped hundreds of tons of bombs. Because the enemy had increased his troop strength and his fire support, and because he had changed his defensive plan, the wave of assaults made by our troops on 9 April was not successful.[16]The paratroopers of the ARVN´s 11th airborne battalion fought back courageously.Sir Robert Thompson noted that the enemy had moved only 18 miles in three weeks, "not exactly an electric advance."[17] When the assault resumed, however, Quang Tri City was captured on 1 May and evacuation of Fire Support Base Nancy was forced two days later. The proximate cause of these reverses was withdrawal of the 20th Armored Squadron, ordered by 1st Armored Brigade commander Colonel Nguyen Trong Luat without notifying either higher headquarters or adjacent units. This move spooked other friendly forces into displacing prematurely and opened a convenient hole through which the attacking NVA drove deep into friendly lines.[18]At the end of the third week, Abrams brought his field commanders in to review the situation and gain a little perspective. "There's been some poor performances," he acknowledged, then continued:But there always have been poor performances--in war or anything else. And I think that there always will be. You've got a few guys do great, a few guys who are sort of satisfactory most of the time, and then you've got a few guys that are just miserable. But in this thing now, until this is over, there's no point--you've just got to accept the fact that there're going to be some poor performances. The trouble is that you're doing it with human beings. If you didn't have them, you wouldn't run into that. Some poor performances are not going to lose it. It's the good performances that are going to win it."I doubt the fabric of this thing could have been held together without US air," Abrams told his commanders,but the thing that had to happen before that is the Vietnamese, some numbers of them, had to stand and fight. If they didn't do that, ten times the air we've got wouldn't have stopped them. So--with all the screwups that have occurred, and with all the bad performances that have occurred . . . we wouldn't be where we are this morning if some numbers of the Vietnamese hadn't decided to stand and fight.North Vietnamese T-54 tanks roll into actionOn 24 April, Abrams cabled Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird his personal assessment of the situation. "The North Vietnamese have launched from their sanctuary in [North Vietnam] an all-out effort against the Republic of Vietnam," he began. "They are holding nothing back. Their last reserve division has been moved south near the DMZ and can enter the battle within two to four days after receiving orders." Four divisions and an independent regiment had already been brought down from North Vietnam, joining the seven divisions, 22 independent regiments, and seven artillery regiments already in South Vietnam. "It has been a conventional warfare battle employing the most sophisticated weapons.""Overall," Abrams reported, "the South Vietnamese have fought well under extremely difficult circumstances. There has been a mixture of effective and ineffective performance, as in any combat situation, but on the whole the effective far outweighs the ineffective. Thus far the South Vietnamese have prevented the enemy from achieving his major objectives." One significant improvement from the battles of Lam Son 719 the previous year was the integration of air, armor, artillery, and infantry into a coherent whole. "This has been outstanding," said Abrams. "They have made great progress in this area during the past year in particular."Perhaps most gratifying of all, given the earlier problems, was that "leadership at the presidential level has been outstanding. President Thieu has provided sound guidance to the Joint General Staff, has made prompt decisions, and has made his personal presence felt by timely visits to combat areas."[19]While fierce ground fights were raging along the DMZ, in the Central Highlands, and on the approaches to Saigon, an air and naval campaign of unprecedented ferocity was taking the war to the North Vietnamese. President Nixon ordered available fleet and air elements nearly doubled by rapid reentry to the combat zone of multiple squadrons of combat and supporting aircraft, including a hundred more B-52s--so many that on Guam one whole runway had to be closed for use as a parking lot--and over 50 naval combatants.[20] Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps tactical air came streaming into the theater from the continental United States, Hawaii, Korea, Japan, Okinawa and the Philippines. From 35 tactical air squadrons--US Air Force, US Navy, and Vietnamese Air Force--the total increased to 74, including five US Marine Corps, generating more than 55,000 sorties through early June. B-52s contributed another 4,759 devastating sorties, and fixed-wing gunships many more, with the daily average of tactical air sorties rising from about 380 to over 650 and B-52 sorties going from 33 a day to 150. Six aircraft carriers were assigned, putting four on station at all times. Along the naval gunline during the peak period, three cruisers and 38 destroyers provided naval gunfire support.[21] In a campaign designated "Linebacker," these forces began intensive bombing of targets in North Vietnam, including military facilities in and near the key cities of Hanoi and Haiphong, as well as round-the-clock support for South Vietnam's defending forces.A flying fortress B-52 D of the USAF´s 306th Bomb Wing in a carpet bombing by dropping many unguided bombs on the enemy targets in the Central Highlands of Military Region II during the Easter Offensive in 1972.Soon air strikes brought to a halt all rail traffic south of Hanoi. On 8 May the MACV briefer stated that "pilots reported 16 bombs out of 20 on the power plant. If there're any lights burning in Hanoi tonight, they'll be candle power." Advances in bombing technology since earlier in the war were now providing greater accuracy and a humanitarian dividend as well. Newly introduced laser-guided bombs made it possible to take out in a single attack point targets such as key bridges that had withstood hundreds of attempts to destroy them with conventional munitions.[22] "And with the smart bombs," reported Seventh Air Force, "we don't have any problem with the civilian population."Beginning 9 May, all the major North Vietnamese ports were mined. It took only a minute, literally, for nine Navy aircraft off the USS Coral Sea, roaring in at 400 knots only 400 feet off the deck, to put 36 Mark 52 mines--huge magnetic things weighing 1,100 pounds and packing 625 pounds of high explosive--in at Haiphong, the first target hit and North Vietnam's most important seaport. Over successive days the lesser ports were sowed, with all mines set to activate at 0900 hours on 12 May. "It took us eight years to get permission" to mine Haiphong harbor, said Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "Afterward not one ship entered or left the harbor until we took up the mines."[23] This aerial bombardment campaign, wrote Allan Millett, "ruined North Vietnam's economy, paralyzed its transportation system, reduced imports by 80 percent, and exhausted its air defenses."[24] Commented Lieutenant General Dave Palmer, "Linebacker was not Rolling Thunder--it was war."[25]South Vietnamese soldiers watch as a B-52 air strike hits a North Vietnamese tank column west of Dong Ha city, just south of the DMZ.Again the enemy agreed. "This war was different than the first war of destruction," observed a history of PAVN, contrasting Linebacker with the Rolling Thunder campaign of an earlier period in the war. "This time the enemy massed larger forces and made massive attacks right from the first day of operation, using many types of modernized technical weapons and equipment."[26]In early May the South Vietnamese suffered a series of battlefield reverses so serious that Abrams cabled Laird that "the situation has changed significantly since my assessment of 24 April." In Military Region 1, Dong Ha had fallen, Quang Tri combat base had been evacuated, and Quang Tri City was threatened and would soon fall, overwhelmed by 40,000 attackers and outnumbered three to one. Farther south, Fire Support Bases Bastogne and Checkmate, important positions blocking Route 547 to Hue, had also fallen. In Military Region 2, the 22d ARVN Division in the Tan Canh/Dak To area had performed poorly and suffered a costly defeat. In Binh Dinh province the situation was also very serious, with the only remaining friendly position in the northern half of the province not expected to hold.[27] In Military Region 3, ARVN troops were hanging on at An Loc in what Douglas Pike called "probably the single most important battle in the war," a terrific struggle in which a heroic and successful defense ended General Giap's hopes for decisive victory in the campaign.[28] Ultimately the enemy would commit to these three attacks his entire combat force--14 divisions, 26 separate regiments, and a huge array of supporting armor and artillery--save for one division remaining in Laos.[29]Airstrike by an A-1 Skyraider during the Battle of Kontum"Enemy staying power is his most effective battlefield characteristic," said Abrams. "It is based first on his complete disregard for the expenditure of resources, both men and materiel, and second on discipline through fear, intimidation, and brutality. An enemy decision to attack carries an inherent acceptance that the forces involved may be expended totally."[30]Then Abrams set forth the crux of the changed situation. "The RVNAF capability to turn back the enemy offensive is now a function of two intangibles. The first is RVNAF resolve and will to fight. Although the will to fight among senior leaders in MR-1 continues to be strong, there are serious problems in this regard at the lower levels, and command and control is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain." The problems in Quang Tri were serious, said Abrams, "and may be beyond correction." The poor performance of the 22d ARVN Division in Military Region 2 put the defense of Kontum City in doubt, but at An Loc and Fire Support Base Bastogne surrounded ARVN forces fought well. "Unless the ARVN forces hold on the ground and generate lucrative targets, US and [Vietnamese] air power cannot achieve [its] full effectiveness." The second factor mentioned by Abrams, not yet ascertained, was the amount of damage done to the enemy.[31]An A-1E Skyraider of the VNAF´s 41st tactical wing dropped a napalm bomb on the target.Abrams closed with an unvarnished statement of the realities. "In summary of all that has happened here since 30 March 1972, I must report that as the pressure has mounted and the battle has become brutal the senior military leadership has begun to bend and in some cases to break. In adversity it is losing its will and cannot be depended on to take the measures necessary to stand and fight." Abrams cited two known exceptions--General Truong, commanding IV Corps, and the 1st Division's General Phu. "In light of this there is no basis for confidence that Hue or Kontum will be held."[32] Secretary Laird's reply to this evaluation showed that he understood the situation: "It is boiling down, as we have thought, to RVN will and desire."[33]The next morning Bunker and Abrams met alone with President Thieu. Abrams showed Thieu the assessment he had sent to Washington the previous evening. Thieu read it carefully, then--said Abrams--described in "big arrow" fashion how the battle should be fought. When he finished, Abrams stated his conviction that the real problem was the effectiveness of South Vietnam's field commanders, following that with a by-name description of individuals who were not measuring up. "I told President Thieu," reported Abrams to Laird, "that it was my conviction that all that had been accomplished over the last four years was now at stake, and, at this stage, it was the effectiveness of his field commanders that would determine the outcome--either winning all or losing all."Thieu interrupted the meeting at that point to issue instructions for all corps commanders to report to the Palace later that day. Then Thieu offered the view that if Hue and Kontum could hold for four days they would have won the battle. Again Abrams expressed a contrary outlook. "I told the President that no one should think in any less terms than six weeks more of heavy, bloody fighting and maybe more. This is a battle to the death, the communists have planned it that way and will not quit until they have been totally exhausted."[34]That same day Abrams found it necessary to transmit a grim order to his field commanders: "Effective immediately no Vietnamese commander will be air lifted out of a unit defensive position by US fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter unless such evacuation is directed personally by the RVNAF corps commander. Inform your counterpart."[35]Soon thereafter Abrams sketched the nature of the fight and its effects on the enemy for visiting Assistant Secretary of Defense Barry Shillito. "Every one of these regiments that are in the fight [has] already been engaged," he said. "It's just an all-out onslaught, and the losses on both sides--I mean, he's losing tanks like he didn't care about having any more, and people, and artillery, and equipment. The level of violence, and the level of brutality, in this whole thing right now is on a scale not before achieved in the war in Vietnam. And that's what you're in."With disaster impending in Military Region 1, President Thieu made a dramatic command change, moving Lieutenant General Ngo Quang Truong from Military Region 4 to take charge in the north. Said General Vien of the relieved Lieutenant General Hoang Xuan Lam, "Confronted with conventional warfare . . . he was at a loss." Later Vien was understanding, if not sympathetic, remarking that "the influence of politics on officers of General Lam's generation and their very background perhaps did not contribute to the cultivation of military leadership required by the circumstances."[36]The effects of the change in command were electric. "General Truong is a symbol in that part of the country of all that's good in Vietnamese terms," said Abrams. "He went up there day before yesterday to take command. And when he went to Hue the first thing he did was to get on the radio and television. He told them that they were going to defend Hue. It would not fall. And at the end of it he called on every soldier to report back to his unit--now. And those who failed to do it would be shot."Lt General Ngo Quang TruongIt was not only Truong's personal leadership and charisma that turned things around, but also his professional approach to doing business. "Prior to his arrival we [the South Vietnamese] ran I Corps on the dial exchange telephone by personal calls from the corps commander to division commanders, and then never a staff follow-up to tell everybody else what was said to a particular division," observed General Fred Kroesen, the senior American advisor in Region 1. Things were different under Truong. "He's got the staff functioning for the first time ever in I Corps. General Truong has got that staff working, and there's a sense of urgency in the staff that's never been there before."In a later account the enemy also paid implicit tribute to Truong's professional competence. After Truong took command in Military Region 1, read a history of PAVN, "the enemy concentrated on consolidating his defensive line along the My Chanh River and utilized this line as a base to strike out to the east and west in order to sabotage our preparations to attack Hue." Due to intensive B-52 and naval gunfire, "our troops encountered many difficulties in maintaining their supplies." Then, "because we were slow to change our campaign tactics at a time when the enemy had strengthened his forces and solidified his defenses, our assault against the My Chanh defensive line . . . was unsuccessful, and our losses in that attack were twice those suffered during the two previous attacks." Fighting on that front had become "very complicated."[37]Sometime during May, remembered an officer on the MACV staff, General Abrams arrived for a briefing and began with an observation:Every morning, when I walk over to my office from the quarters, I feel just like a company commander on the battlefield, tired and apprehensive. I haven't had enough sleep because the phone from Washington keeps ringing, and I know that there will be another battle waiting, another hill to be taken. And, sure as hell, there won't be enough ammo, the weather will be bad, and replacements not up yet. But all I will hear is, "Abrams, get moving and take that hill."There Abrams paused for a moment, smiling broadly as he looked around at everyone: "But, you know, I like it!"[38]Colonel William F. Wollenberg was then in charge of drafting daily messages expressing the "Personal Assessment of the COMUSMACV." After one such message was dispatched, there came a query back: "Can the South Vietnamese hold?" Major General John Carley, the J-3, took it upon himself to draft a six-page reply. Abrams rejected it. Then Wollenberg was given the task. He wrote simply: "It looks to us like the job will get done." Abrams looked at that, made one change, and the message was dispatched: "It looks to me like the job will get done."Subsequently, as the critical point approached on multiple fronts, Abrams determined to mass his most potent weapon, the B-52, for concentrated strikes in sequence on each battlefield in turn. On 10 May he cabled Fred Kroesen in Region 1, John Vann in Region 2, and Jim Hollingsworth in Region 3. "I want to use the three days, 11, 12, and 13 May," he told these commanders,which we may have before the enemy attack, to inflict as much damage as possible on the major enemy troop units and their supporting artillery. Therefore, I have decided to allocate the entire B-52 effort to MR-3 on 11 May, to MR-2 on 12 May, and to MR-1 on 13 May. This means that for two days between 11 and 13 May each of you will have no B-52 support and you must plan your tacair, naval gunfire, and artillery support accordingly. On the day that you have the entire B-52 effort, the targeting will be against enemy troop units posing the greatest threat to An Loc, Kontum, and the Hue area and their supporting artillery and not against the deep logistics areas. You should apply multiple strikes to major enemy troop locations with consecutive TOTs [the time on target for each scheduled strike] on each rather than spreading the TOTs over a long period.[39]That concentration of force meant they'd be getting three B-52 sorties every 55 minutes, around the clock, for 24 hours.The results of this tactic were spectacular. Hollingsworth in particular thought the airstrikes had been his salvation. When he got the word that Abrams was giving him the total sortie allocation, he said, "If it'd done any good to show my appreciation I'd have just jumped out of the damn helicopter. By god it just saved us, that's all. And I'll say that your intelligence department must be awful damn good--that you knew that that was the time to go. We just couldn't hit her any better on this one."The enemy saw it the same way. In a subsequent historical analysis the North Vietnamese acknowledged that during April and May, "The enemy mobilized a large number of B-52 sorties to viciously attack our campaign rear areas." Thus "three waves of assaults against Binh Long City," apparently the enemy's designation for An Loc, "were all unsuccessful. Our units suffered heavy casualties and over half of the tanks we used in the battle were destroyed. On 15 May, after 32 days of ferocious combat, our troops ended the attack on Binh Long City."[40]In the middle of these fearsome strikes, Abrams held a commanders' brief at which he spoke frankly of what he had been telling the South Vietnamese. "For the last several years I've tried to maintain rapport with the Vietnamese that I work with. And I've tried not to do things that they would find insulting--always been kind of careful about that," he began,but I wanted to tell you, in the last few weeks, in my conversations with General Vien, and with the President, I've said it straight, and called it for what it was worth. Just the other day General Vien was telling me about some equipment they wanted, and I told him that we were doing everything we could to get this equipment to them and so on. But I then went on to tell him, I said, "Equipment is not what you need. You need men that will fight. And you need officers that will fight, and will lead the men." I said, "No amount of equipment will change the situation. It's in the hands of men, and if they'll fight, and their officers will lead them, you've got--even today--you've got all the equipment you need." I said, "That's the trouble." I said, "I don't think you've lost a tank to enemy fire. You lost all the tanks in the 20th because the men abandoned them, led by the officers. You lost most of your artillery because it was abandoned and people wouldn't fight." Now I don't want you to go back and tell your counterpart that I told the President off. That's not why I'm telling you this. I want you to know the way I'm conducting my business with the counterparts I have to deal with, and I think it has to be straight with them. I'm never insulting and so on, but it's a fact. And that's what we must talk about are the facts.By mid-May the friendly situation was looking much more favorable in the Highlands, in fact all around. "Since the fall of Quang Tri," said Abrams, the enemy "really hasn't been able to put anything together. Now you may say, `Well, that's right. He didn't plan to. He's just gathering stuff together and he will eventually.' And maybe that'll happen. But we do know that the divisions in here--the 308th, the 304th and the 324 Bravo--have taken really horrible losses." As for retaking Quang Tri, suggested Abrams, "I think all we've got to do is keep [the Joint General Staff] out of it and let Truong develop a plan. And then it will be a good one."Lt General Ngo Quang TruongThe tide of battle was now sweeping back in favor of the South Vietnamese, with the outcome in fact decided, and only some more hard fighting needed to nail it down. When Abrams and journalist George McArthur discussed the situation, McArthur asked an interesting question: "You always hesitated to criticize Giap," he observed. "What about now?" Abrams recalled Cornelius Ryan's book about the last 100 days of World War II in Europe. "Those Germans knew the war was over," said Abrams; "they knew that all the decisions had been made; they knew they had lost. They knew they had no hope and they went ahead and just died. In a way I think we might be at that point now. Giap is a very resourceful fellow. But I think"--and here, said McArthur, Abrams was very emotional--"what is going on now is just a lot of unnecessary killing."[41]In Military Region 1 the enemy was stopped at the My Chanh River, the southern boundary of Quang Tri Province. Late in June the Airborne Division was airlifted south of the river and, attacking with other ARVN and marine troops, drove the NVA back 20 kilometers to Quang Tri City.[42] "Beginning in late June 1972," observed the North Vietnamese in their later historical analysis, "combat on the Tri Thien Front became very complicated, with fierce back-and-forth fighting between our troops and the enemy."[43] Fielding three divisions against six of the enemy, Truong led a fight that lasted the rest of the summer. With marines leading the way, he retook Quang Tri City. In late September the reconstituted 3d ARVN Division began an operation to drive the enemy out of Tien Phuoc and, after a week of bitter fighting, retook the town.At Kontum City the equivalent of three enemy divisions kept the city under siege for nearly two months. The airfield had to be closed due to enemy fire, and resupply was accomplished by air drop. But the defenders--now the 23d ARVN Division, a unit far superior to the routed 22d Division--held on, inflicting casualties on the enemy estimated to exceed 16,000.[44] The performance of the South Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF) had counted for a lot. "VNAF came into its own during the 1972 offensive," said a USAF advisor. "In the defense of Kontum the VNAF has been magnificent, absolutely magnificent."[45] B-52s weighed in at Kontum in a decisive way as well. Late on 14 May the enemy broke through the seam between two defending regiments and began a series of mass assaults. Fortunately two B-52 strikes had been planned for that night. "The two B-52 strikes came exactly on time, as planned," recalled General Truong, "like thunderbolts unleashed over the masses of enemy troops. The explosions rocked the small city and seemed to cave in the rib cages of ARVN troops not far away. As the roar subsided, a dreadful silence fell over the scene. At dawn, ARVN search elements discovered several hundred enemy bodies with their weapons scattered all around. Kontum was saved."[46] John Vann credited the Territorial Forces, not the army, with much of what went right in Region 2. "The RF and PF, in most places, have performed quite well and were a much more stabilizing force than the ARVN," he reported.ARVN MarinesMeanwhile at An Loc the defenders had withstood three months of constant North Vietnamese bombardment in what General Hollingsworth called "this desperate, fanatic adventure on the part of Hanoi."[47] Attacks by fire reached a peak on 10 May when over 7,600 rounds were received, part of more than 47,000 rounds during that month, bombardments punctuated by repeated tank and infantry attacks. General Truong called it "the longest and bloodiest siege of the war."[48] With the B-52 onslaught of 11 May, the back of the enemy siege was broken. Despite one attack after another by three divisions, An Loc could not be taken, and the enemy was left with more than 12,000 casualties to show for his efforts.The South Vietnamese lost over 8,000 killed in action during the Easter Offensive, about three times that many wounded, and nearly 3,500 missing. During the campaign over 53,000 men volunteered for military service and nearly 18,000 additional were conscripted, while more than 40,000 of those already serving deserted. Said Lieutenant General William McCaffrey, "The ARVN soldier emerges as a remarkable individual who perseveres in spite of great hardships. He has earned a victory."[49]The North Vietnamese Army suffered more than 100,000 casualties in its attacking force of 200,000--perhaps 40,000 killed--and lost more than half its tanks and heavy artillery. It took three years to recover sufficiently from these losses to mount another major offensive, and in the meantime General Vo Nguyen Giap found himself eased out as NVA commander.[50]One important result of the Easter Offensive was the relief from command of certain ARVN incompetents. Two corps commanders--Lieutenant General Lam and Lieutenant General Ngo Dzu--lost their jobs. Brigadier General Vu Van Giai, who had commanded the newly formed and ill-fated 3d Infantry Division until its collapse a month into the battle, was not only relieved but court-martialed and imprisoned. Giai was, it appeared, a victim of General Lam's shortcomings, a radically overextended span of control (at one point two of his own infantry regiments, two marine brigades, four ranger groups, an armor brigade, and all the province's territorial forces were under his command), and the inevitable liabilities of a new division. Wrote Major General Hoang Lac sympathetically, "General Giai, a soldier with most of his life sleeping out in the jungle, was sentenced to five years in military confinement and imprisonment. Giai remained there until the NVA took over Saigon and put him in their camp, a fate undeserved for a good and brave soldier."[51] The Marine Division commander was also relieved, and the commander of the 22d Division had simply disappeared. At the regimental level, the 56th Regiment was surrendered intact by its commander, Lieutenant Colonel Pham Van Dinh, who soon thereafter came on the airwaves urging other ARVN soldiers to come over to the enemy side.[52]After the war, General Truong wrote a thoughtful analysis of the Easter Offensive and its aftereffects. "The American response during the enemy offensive was timely, forceful, and decisive," he affirmed. "This staunch resolve of the US to stand behind its ally stunned the enemy. Additionally, it brought about a strong feeling of self-assurance among the armed forces and population of South Vietnam."[53]"When the enemy offensive began," added Truong, "Vietnam's fate was in its own hands. President Thieu, the Joint General Staff, and the corps commanders had to decide where, when, and how to fight." Much of that was of course dictated by the dimensions of the enemy offensive, but--as Truong also observed--on the part of the South Vietnamese "there was no change in strategy; the concept of securing all national territory continued to be the order of the day. Every area, every strongpoint, no matter how small or remote, had to be held `at all cost.'"President Nguyen Van Thieu celebrating with his generalsTruong recalled President Thieu's strong insistence that "we would not yield even a pebble in Quang Tri or a handful of mud in Ca Mau to the enemy." On other occasions, many other occasions, Thieu had repeated and emphasized what he called his "four no's": "no coalition, no neutralization, no territorial concessions, and never let communist forces operate openly in South Vietnam." Yet now, despite successful defense against the three major thrusts of the Easter Offensive, some lost territory could not be recovered. "South Vietnam had in effect lost a continuous, wide expanse of territory extending along the border from the DMZ to the northern Delta," wrote General Bruce Palmer, "an area which North Vietnam referred to as the `Third Vietnam.'"[54]It took the North Vietnamese three years to recover sufficiently to mount their next offensive, a conventional invasion involving some 20 divisions. With US support for South Vietnam having evaporated, the outcome was foreordained. But in 1972, in one of their finest hours, the South Vietnamese defended their country with courage and tenacity, rewarded with eventual hard-won success.NOTES1. William E. Colby, Keynote Address, Vietnam Symposium, Texas Tech University, 18 April 1996.2. John Paul Vann, remarks, Lexington, Ky., 8 January 1972, Vann Papers, Patterson School, University of Kentucky. In 1969 Joseph Kraft had written that Vann was "the all-pro pessimist among American officials here and the true source of much journalistic skepticism and not a few Pulitzer Prizes." Chicago Daily News, 25 August 1969.3. James Lawton Collins, Jr., The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army (Washington: Department of the Army, 1975), pp. 90-91.4. Sir Robert Thompson in The Lessons of Vietnam, ed. W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), p. 103.5. Douglas Pike, PAVN: The People's Army of Vietnam (Novato, Calif.: Presidio, 1986), pp. 224-25.6. Nixon made the announcement on 13 January 1972. This increment had to be out by 1 May, leaving the United States with 69,000 troops in Vietnam. At that time, Abrams noted, "We will have redeployed 95 percent of the maneuver battalions, 97 percent of the artillery battalions, and 91 percent of the attack aircraft squadrons." Recording, COMUS-ROK Minister of National Defense Brief, 10 February 1972, Abrams Special Collection (ASC), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.7. Printed in the 19 December 1971 issue of Nhan Dan, as quoted in Recording, Commanders WIEU (Weekly Intelligence Estimate Update), 22 January 1972, ASC.8. Recording, WIEU, 4 March 1972, ASC.9. Ibid.10. Recording, Special Authorities Brief, 20 January 1972, ASC.11. James Pinckney Harrison, The Endless War: Fifty Years of Struggle in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 1982), p. 255.12. Abrams' comments were made in his confirmation hearing as Army Chief of Staff-designate.13. Message, Abrams to Moorer, MAC 03019, 042335Z APR 1972, ASC.14. By MACV's calculations the enemy had initiated the offensive on the night of 30 March in MR-1, on 31 March on the B-3 Front, and on 1 April in western MR-3. Recording, Commanders WIEU, 22 April 1972, ASC.15. John P. Vann, letter for "My Friends," 12 April 1972, Vann Papers.16. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., unpublished trans. by Merle Pribbenow.17. As quoted in Michael Charlton and Anthony Moncrieff, Many Reasons Why: The American Involvement in Vietnam (London: Scolar Press, 1978), p. 197.18. Cecil B. Smyth, Jr., in Michael Martin, Angels in Red Hats: Paratroopers of the Second Indochina War (Louisville, Ky.: Harmony House, 1995), p. 43, n. 2. Luat had previously been a problem as commander of the 17th Armored Squadron during Lam Son 719.19. Message, Abrams to Laird, MAC 03757, 241111Z APR 1972, US Army Center of Military History (CMH).20. David Fulghum and Terrence Maitland, The Vietnam Experience: South Vietnam on Trial, Mid-1970 to 1972 (Boston: Boston Publishing, 1984), p. 142. Also Elmo R. Zumwalt, Jr., On Watch: A Memoir (New York: Quadrangle, 1976), p. 379.21. Ngo Quang Truong, The Easter Offensive of 1972 (Washington: CMH, 1979), p. 77.22. MACV Command Briefing, 23 October 1972.23. Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, interview, 26 September 1994.24. Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States of America (New York: Free Press, 1984), pp. 564-65.25. Dave Richard Palmer, Summons of the Trumpet: A History of the Vietnam War from a Military Man's Viewpoint (New York: Ballantine, 1978), p. 321.26. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., trans. Pribbenow. The history continued:Because the enemy had escalated rapidly, was bombarding us massively, and was using many types of new weapons and items of technical equipment (laser-guided bombs, guided missiles, various types of jammers, etc.) many units and local areas suffered heavy losses. Almost all the important bridges on the railroad and on the road corridors were knocked down. Ground transportation became difficult. Coastal and river transportation were blocked. The quantity of supplies shipped across the Gianh River forward to the battlefields was only a few thousand tons for one month. Enemy jamming equipment made it difficult to locate targets, especially B-52's. Our low combat efficiency, as revealed by the ineffectiveness of our targets and by the low number of enemy aircraft shot down, became a source of concern.27. Message, Abrams to Laird, MAC 04021, 011601Z MAY 1972, CMH.28. Pike, p. 225.29. Truong, p. 13.30. Message, Abrams to Laird, MAC 04021, 011601Z MAY 1972, CMH.31. Ibid.32. Ibid.33. Message, Laird to Bunker and Abrams, OSD 04321, 031617Z MAY 1972, CMH.34. Message, Abrams to Laird, MAC 04039, 020443Z MAY 1972, CMH.35. Message, Abrams to multiple addressees, MAC 04040, 020452Z MAY 1972, US Army Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.36. Cao Van Vien, Leadership (Washington: CMH, 1981), pp. 138-39.37. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., trans. Pribbenow.38. As quoted by Major General Stan L. McClellan, letter to Mrs. Abrams, 8 October 1974, enclosing "Recollections of Maj. Gen. Stan L. McClellan on 4 September 1974."39. Message, Abrams to multiple addressees, MAC 04325, 100730Z MAY 1972, ASC.40. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., trans. Pribbenow.41. George McArthur, notes of 24 May 1972, provided to the author by Mr. McArthur.42. Cecil B. Smyth, Jr., in Martin, p. 40.43. Vietnam Military History Institute, History of the People's Army of Vietnam, II, 389ff., trans. Pribbenow.44. MACV Command Briefing, 23 October 1972.45. Major Gordon E. Bloom as quoted in Project CHECO, Kontum: Battle for the Central Highlands, 30 March-10 June 1972 (Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, n.d.), p. 83.46. Truong, p. 98.47. Message, Hollingsworth to Vogt and Monger, ARV 0969, 221550Z APR 1972, CMH.48. Truong, p. 176.49. Lieutenant General William J. McCaffrey, Senior Officer Debriefing Report, December 1972, MHI.50. Harry G. Summers, Jr., Historical Atlas of the Vietnam War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1995), p. 178. Other estimates of the enemy's casualties are much higher, Sir Robert Thompson, for example, wrote that "the `great sacrifices' called for by General Giap had been paid to the extent of an estimated 130,000 men killed and disabled." Peace Is Not at Hand (New York: David McKay, 1974), p. 121. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., stated in his study of CIA intelligence on the war that enemy "losses for the March-September 1972 period were conservatively estimated at over 100,000 killed." "US Intelligence and Vietnam," Studies in Intelligence (1984 Special Issue), p. 94. Palmer's work also demonstrated that by this point CIA was virtually ignoring the war. A National Intelligence Estimate published in April 1971 was the last NIE or SNIE on Vietnam until October 1973, almost two and a half years later. Ibid., p. 91.51. Hoang Lac and Ha Mai Viet, Blind Design: Why America Lost the Vietnam War (privately printed, 1996), p. 78. General Truong agreed, stating that "to put it briefly, the 3d Division failed because it was overburdened." Truong, p. 166.52. G. H. Turley, The Easter Offensive: Vietnam, 1972 (Novato: Presidio, 1985), p. 274. In commenting on this development, Colonel Harry Summers, Jr., recalled how, during the Battle of the Bulge in World War II, the US 106th Infantry Division panicked and two of its regiments surrendered to the Germans. Vietnam War Almanac, p. 292.53. Truong, p. 179.54. Palmer, "US Intelligence and Vietnam," Studies in Intelligence (1984 Special Issue), p. 94.Lewis Sorley is the author of biographies of Generals Creighton Abrams and Harold K. Johnson. This article is adapted from his book A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam (June 1999, Harcourt Brace).Reviewed 25 May 1999. Please send comments or corrections to [email protected]