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I think of “deep state” as being about the behind the scenes machinery of government; the inner workings of the civil service and secret negotiations of politicians.In this piece, I argue that yes, the deep state has played its part, but the main issue is the weakness and susceptibility of our Prime Minister, to manipulation. In short, May has been soft and pliable with the EU, who know her as “Mrs No until she says Yes”, while being infuriatingly stubborn with her own party and country.To start with, let’s consider what we know. For me, these are the relevant facts:Leave won the 2016 referendum, Cameron resigned, the Tories appointed Theresa May as leader and Theresa May said she would deliver BrexitTheresa May lost her majority in the 2017 General Election, meaning she would have to depend on the votes of all her own MPs plus those of the DUP to get legislation throughTheresa May sacked her advisers Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill, effectively replacing them with Olly Robbins, a civil servant. Shortly afterwards, she dropped DExEU from having a lead role in the exit negotiations, putting Olly Robbins in chargeTheresa May’s first notable move in the negotiations proper, was to accept without a fight, the EU’s sequencing demands. This was a major surprise. Notes of the meeting showed the EU delegation acting both surprised and delighted. Minutes show EU officials asking for reconfirmation that this was really the UK’s positionIn late 2017, Theresa May allowed talk of remaining in the customs union to resurface, doing nothing to clarify the government’s policy, which was to leave the customs unionIn December 2017, Theresa May signed a political agreement giving away £39 billion and signed us up to a “backstop” that would commit the UK to remaining under EU control until it had found a way of managing the customs border in Ireland, in a way that satisfied the EUWhen the political declaration was converted into legal text, Theresa May said “no British PM could sign this”. This was the only thing of note, that Theresa May said about Brexit in the first half of 2018. She later did sign itIn mid-2018, Theresa May faced a backbench rebellion attempting to force legislation to keep us in the customs union. Theresa May invited the ringleader Dominic Grieve to Downing Street to persuade him to drop his rebellion. It is understood that she made him privy to a plan that was at this stage, not widely known. Dominic Grieve promptly dropped his rebellionIn July 2018, Theresa May held the Chequers summit where she unveiled the Brexit whitepaper. She told her government, the meeting would not end until everyone had agreed to it and if anyone resigned, ministerial transport would not be available for the trip homeThe whitepaper horrified some ministers, who believed it amounted to a customs union in all but name. Boris Johnson resigned. David Davis resignedIn his resignation speech, Davis criticised May for sidelining his department, which had been set up to prepare the UK for its departure from the EU, while instead favouring her own civil service adviser Olly RobbinsIn replying, Theresa May said Davis’s department had not come up with a workable planIn an article in the Telegraph, Davis replied that this was deeply disingenuous. His department had a detailed and carefully worked out plan. It was she, the PM who had chosen to ignore it while developing her own alternative plan without telling anyoneJohnson wrote in the Telegraph, that Theresa May had allowed the Ireland border to become prominent in the negotiations because she had unquestioningly accepted the EU’s framing of the issue and had not even tried to find a solutionCome December 2018, the EU published their Withdrawal Agreement (WA). It was very similar to the Chequers whitepaper, except that it lacked the May/Robbins scheme for the UK collecting tariffs on behalf of the EU. The WA’s political declaration sought a future relationship that would build upon “the single customs territory”Minutes of the meeting where Theresa May signed the WA showed that the EU had said “The customs union will be the basis for the future relationship. The EU will retain all control”. Theresa May had signed a document that she knew the EU interpreted as implying a permanent customs union, and in which the EU would retain full controlThe WA was voted down three times by Parliament. Most notably, it was voted down by Brexit-supporting MPs who believed it was “not Brexit” and by the DUP who believed it had sold out their territoryThe Brady amendment gave Theresa May a mandate to renegotiate the Ireland backstop, which keeps the UK in a customs union with the EU until the EU approves the UK’s plans for managing the borderMay largely ignored this mandate, saying she would not attempt a renegotiation but instead, half-heartedly said she would “seek changes”On the basis of the above, it is reasonable to conclude that the main reason Brexit (in this incarnation) has failed, is that Theresa May changed course. While her general stance was initially to the liking of Brexit supporting MPs, her final deal, was not.Having lost her majority in parliament, she inevitably had to work harder to reconcile the interests of her MPs, who had different opinions. However, it is clear from the above that at each node of the decision tree, she leaned towards her remainer MPs. She didn’t tell anyone this was what she was doing or why, she just did it.Her eventual WA was a death by a thousand cuts, non-Brexit Brexit. But what happened to make her change course? That’s the key question.By any standard, her behaviour in office has been extraordinary. Consider where the Tories were at the start. Dominic Lawson wrote about this in the Sunday Times, this morning in Brexit on a plate — and the Tories blew it. [1]Only two years ago the Tories were united under the firm but fair leadership of the headmistressy Theresa May, Farage had been rendered irrelevant and Labour was still riven by the shock of a referendum outcome that pitted it against the very people (the industrial working class) it was formed to represent.Thus, in February 2017, this column was headlined “Cheer Up, Mr Cameron, you won your party the greatest prize imaginable”. The former PM was being ridiculed almost daily, and yet, I argued, while the referendum result had trashed his reputation as a political winner, he was actually the accidental author of a miraculous transformation in his party’s fortunes: “Unintentionally, Cameron has achieved for the Conservatives something a string of earlier leaders signally failed to do. He has made them the party that is united over the vexed question of the UK’s relationship with the European Union and — a completely unexpected bonus — turned Labour into a house divided on this issue.”That aged well, didn’t it? In fact the second half of that analysis still holds true and explains Labour’s continuing inability to come up with a Brexit policy that could be communicated coherently (or at all) on an election leaflet. But that column was written at the moment of the party’s greatest discomfiture, the week after parliament passed the bill to invoke article 50 — giving us just two years (ha!) to negotiate our departure from the EU. Corbyn’s three-line whip ordering his MPs to back the government’s policy led to resignations from the shadow cabinet and thousands of party members quitting in protest.The reason Theresa May’s behaviour has been so extraordinary is that she did not need to lean towards Remain in her implementation of Brexit. The Tories were united around a clean Brexit. That was the referendum result. That was what the manifesto said. It could not have been clearer. Even those who did not agree with the result of the referendum, accepted both it and the government’s interpretation of it.When murmurings about a “softening” of Brexit started to emerge, May could have acted to silence them, reminding her MPs of their manifesto commitments, but she did not. From a parliamentary arithmetic point of view, it was far easier for her to lean towards her Brexiteer contingent than her Remain contingent. Leaning towards her Brexiteers would not have angered her Remainers as much as leaning towards her Remainers have angered her Brexiteers. All she needed to do was to maintain existing party policy, to which all her MPs had explicitly agreed by standing for election upon its manifesto.What happened? Theresa May is well known as someone who can be “captured” by her advisers. Who were her advisers? Before the 2017 election, her advisers were Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill — both clean Brexit advocates. After the election, her advisers were Olly Robbins and — as far as one can tell — the EU. In the past 2 years, May has spent many hours in the offices of her fellow European leaders.Now, there’s an element of deep state at work here. An anonymous civil servant wrote an article in the Telegraph titled “Believe me, the Civil Service is trying to sink Brexit. I have seen it from the inside”[2] He or she writes:A quick scroll though the social media accounts of my colleagues and you will find images of them proudly waving ‘Remain’ placards, campaigning for a ‘People’s Vote’, boasting ‘Jez we can’ and of course the usual apocalyptic messages of doom since the Brexit vote. The double-standards are astonishing. If I so much as followed the activities of Nigel Farage, I have no doubt that I would be called in for questioning. I re-call one conversation with a senior member of staff at the Foreign Office who told me she was ashamed when Boris Johnson was appointed Foreign Secretary as he is so “typically British”.This department is particularly notorious for its anti-Brexit bias. My experience tells me that there is a genuine hatred of those who voted for Brexit. I recall my first day in the Civil Service as a graduate, being invited to a meeting of senior members of staff who spent the good part of two hours in agreement that the public made a “stupid” decision in the EU referendum.Unfortunately, this bias doesn’t end with snide insults and childish quips. It goes to the root of their day-to-day work and has truly negative impacts on the way we conduct the important tasks ahead of us. I have in fact come across senior staff working on our post-Brexit relationships who openly talk down the prospect of a UK-US FTA and encourage anti-Trump hysteria. Many of them even joined the protests against the President’s visit last year. During his visit it was common to hear jokes about Trump’s assassination from the very people meant to be working with our closest ally. The only thing worse than being pro-Brexit in the Civil Service is being pro-Trump.But it doesn’t stop there. There is a strong presence of Anglophobia, combined with cultural Marxism that runs through the civil service. It has meant that many Civil Servants, including myself, have been actively discouraged from co-operating with Think Tanks which are seen as being “too right wing” despite sharing our goal of promoting free trade. This attitude also prevails in our work with our closest allies, particularly in the Commonwealth, where we are afraid to be seen as overly keen to work with countries that are run by “rich white men”.Contrary to popular belief, Civil Servants often shape the views of Ministers. This makes the prevalent leftist culture within the Civil Service all the more concerning. These ardent remainer and left wing civil servants are the ones who provide the briefings, select the invites and choose the priorities for Ministers. How did we get to this point? The Civil Service is one of the biggest graduate employers, whilst universities have allowed a leftist culture of political correctness to flourish in recent decades.Brexit is the greatest opportunity this country has faced in years, yet our Government machine is currently working from within to frustrate it. This must not go on. In the next phase of the Brexit negotiations it is vital our civil service ceases to allow the massive remain voting bias that has so far helped scupper our post-Brexit future.Add to that the misuse of Treasury resources for giving misleading information about the economic consequences of Brexit — resources that were refused to other departments requesting them for no-deal preparations — and it’s clear there’s an element of deep state at work. However, it is the weakness and stubbornness of our Prime Minister, that is the most important part of the explanation.It’s like a disease. If you’re unhealthy and have a weakened immune system, you are more susceptible to diseases. For most healthy people, flu can be an unpleasant few days in bed. For weakened people, it can be a killer.That the civil service has worked to frustrate Brexit is both credible and predictable. However, it is the Prime Minister’s susceptibility to it, that has led to the failure of her attempt to deliver Brexit.Footnotes[1] Brexit on a plate — and the Tories blew it[2] Believe me, the Civil Service is trying to sink Brexit. I have seen it from the inside

When Napoleon rose to power, one of his first actions was to go to war with the Ottoman Empire. He launched an invasion of Egypt, then an Ottoman territory, in 1798.The Battle of the Pyramids, 21 July 1798His main motive for this was imperialist; he wanted to establish French power in the Eastern Mediterranean, create a foothold in the Middle East, and set up a staging-post that would give him a route to India. France had once had significant power in India, but had been defeated and driven out by the British some 40 years earlier. Napoleon dreamed of reversing that defeat and replacing British dominance of India by French control. Once Egypt was conquered, he decided, a French army 15,000 strong would be sent to Mysore, whose ruler was anti-British and so a potential French ally.Another motive was ideological. Napoleon's political views are complex. He ruled France as a dictator and later as an Emperor; but he rose to power as a result of the French revolution that proclaimed liberty, equality and fraternity — and it seems he did believe in those ideals himself, at least to some extent. He was opposed to the entrenched privileges of the feudal nobility and the established Church. He believed that government should be meritocratic, with positions in the civil service or the army awarded due to talent, not birth. And he believed that the armies of the French Republic had the right to impose these ideals on other countries by force, in order to liberate their people from feudal tyranny.Egypt's political situation was complex. It had been conquered by the Ottoman Empire back in 1517, so had been under their rule for three centuries. However, it was a rebellious province whose rulers regularly asserted their independence from their overlords in Constantinople, having to be brought back into line by force. Power in Egypt was in the hands of the Mamluks, a military caste whose origins lay in the slave-soldiers of the mediaeval sultanates. Early Arab and Turkish rulers had realised that foreign slaves made good soldiers, since they had no allegiance to domestic political factions, and could be kept loyal by the promise of rewards or the threat of puishment. These slave-soldiers were called mamluks, (Arabic for 'slaves') but in Egypt they eventually overthrew their overlord and seized power for themselves.The Mamluks thus formed a closed military caste that ruled Egypt. They recruited new members in the traditional way, by buying youths and boys from the slave-markets (mostly white slaves from Armenia, Georgia and the Caucasus), then raising them in barracks and subjecting them to indoctrination from a young age so they were loyal to their Mamluk brothers. Few or no native Egyptians were ever inducted into the Mamluks, so from the local perspective they were a closed foreign ruling class.As far as Napoleon was concerned, the Mamluks were just a rather more exotic version of the old feudal aristocracies that French revolutionary armies had been overthrowing in France itself, the Low Countries, Italy, and Germany. He anticipated that ordinary Egyptians would welcome him as a liberator from their tyranny. He also, more optimistically, hoped that the Ottoman government in Constantinople would also accept his actions, since the Mamluks had never been loyal subjects of the Sultan, and so he thought they might not object if Mamluk power was simply replaced by French power. In this respect, he was wrong.Ottoman reaction to Napoleon's invasion of Egypt was slow, but in August 1798 the British fleet under Admiral Nelson destroyed the French Mediterranean fleet at the battle of Aboukir Bay, stranding Napoleon and his army in Egypt with no way to obtain supplies or reinforcements. This inflicted even more harm than the obvious results; first because it meant Napoleon had to raise taxes on the Egyptian people to support his army locally, which meant they quicky came to see the French as occupiers rather than liberators; and second, it encouraged Sultan Selim III to mobilise his armies to fight the French and reconquer Egypt.An Ottoman army began a slow overland march from Constantinople through Anatolia and Syria and down into Palestine towards Egypt, gathering more forces as it went. Napoleon heard of their advance and in February 1799 the French army marched into Palestine to meet them. At the battle of Mount Tabor in Galilee on 16 April Napoleon with 4,000 French soldiers defeated an Ottoman army 35,000 strong (the Duke of Wellington once said that 'the presence of Napoleon on a battlefield is worth 40,000 men'). However, the French failed to capture the fortified port at the old Crusader stronghold of Acre, and bubonic plague broke out in their army; and so Napoleon decided to retreat again.The Ottomans followed this up by landing another army from the sea in the Nile delta. However, Napoleon attacked them and thoroughly defeated them. Having thus restored his military reputation and stabilised the situation in Egypt, Napoleon decided to leave his army there and return to France (a controversial move, criticised by some as abandoning his loyal troops to their fate; though Napoleon's supporters argue that when he left, Egypt was secure while France itself was under threat.)The French garrison retained control of Egypt for two more years after Napoleon left. However, by this time the Ottomans and Britain had signed a formal treaty of alliance, and so a new combined British-Turkish army was landed on Egypt's coast courtesy of the Royal Navy, which proceeded to recapture Cairo and Alexandria in the summer of 1801. The French army surrendered on the condition that it be allowed to be repatriated back to France.Napoleon's Egyptian campaign 1798-99In June 1802 a formal peace treaty was signed between France and the Ottoman Empire, ending the war. No territory changed hands; the effect of the treaty was to restore the status quo ante bellum. Since France failed to gain anything from the war they began, this can be classed as a French defeat. However, the Sultan did agree to restore the extraterritorial privileges that French traders and merchants had previously enjoyed in Ottoman territories before the war, so France did not lose out in the long term either. (Apart from all their dead soldiers and wasted money.)After the signing of this treaty, Napoleon changed course. His war in Egypt had driven the Ottomans, once a French ally, into the arms of the British and even the Russians, who had also made an anti-French alliance with the Sultan in 1799. Napoleon ordered his diplomats to try and win back Turkish friendship and counter the influence of his enemies at the Sublime Porte. The result was several years of diplomatic manoeuvring.As for Sultan Selim III, he was faced by serious internal problems and sought neutrality in the larger European war. In 1802 Wahhabi religious rebels seized the holy cities of Mecca and Medina, a serious challenge to Ottoman prestige; and in 1804 the Christians of Serbia also rebelled against Ottoman rule beginning a decade-long guerrilla war. These domestic conflicts absorbed much of the Ottomans' military strength. In consequence, he did his best to avoid committing himself to either side, while the French ambassador on one side and the British and Russian ambassadors on the other both tried to pressure him over to support them.In 1805, the Allies seemed to be winning the upper hand. Selim declined to recognise Napoleon's new self-proclaimed title of Emperor (despite a personal letter appealing to him from Napoleon himself) and in September 1805 signed a defensive alliance with Russia, which also allowed Russian warships to pass through the Straits.However, the crushing defeat of the Russians and Austrians at Austerlitz in December 1805 convinced Selim that he had backed the wrong side. He hastily backpedalled back to neutrality; the new alliance with Russia was not ratified, and in February 1806 the Sublime Porte officially recognised Napoleon's title as Emperor.Napoleon sent a new ambassador, Sebastiani, to Constantinople in 1806, with instructions to assure the Sultan that France wished to see the Ottoman Empire preserved and even expanded; to explore the possiblity of an alliance between France, the Ottomans and Persia directed against Russia; and to present the offer that the Crimea might be handed over to Turkish control if the Ottomans joined in a war against Russia.Growing tension in the Balkans brought things to a head. The Russians supported the Serbian rebels, seeing them as fellow Orthodox Christians. Russia proposed a deal under which Serbia would be a semi-independent state (not unlike Mamluk Egypt had been) with its own government and army but acknowledging Ottoman sovereignity. The Sultan rejected this and mobilised an army to crush the Serb rebellion. Tsar Alexander responded by mobilising his own army.The Serbian rebellion was the flashpoint between the Ottomans and the RussiansThe Ottoman vassal states of Moldavia and Wallachia - modern Romania - bordered the Russian Empire, and were ruled by two princes of ethnic Greek origin and Orthodox Christian religion. They were suspected of being pro-Russian and potential traitors. The French government urged Selim to get rid of them, promising support if he did so; and so in October 1806 the Sultan dismissed the two princes and appointed pro-French replacements.The Russian reaction was far more decisive than Selim had expected. Undeterred by French influence, the Tsar immediately ordered 35,000 troops across the border to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia — though the news of this would not reach Constantinople for another two months. The British also sent a warning that if the Ottomans allied openly with France, their navy would bombard Constantinople.Selim dithered and almost gave in to the Anglo-Russian pressure, but news of France's defeat of Prussia and re-creation of a Polish state strengthened his resolve. France sent military engineers to help repair and extend the fortifications of Constantinople against the threatened British attack. When a Royal Navy squadron did show up in February 1807, they found the city too well-defended and were forced to retreat. This success, achieved thanks to French assistance, cemented the Sultan's friendship with France.It seemed that Napoleon was about to achieve his aim of a formal military alliance with the Ottoman Empire, Unfortunately, in May 1807 the Empire was shaken by a major revolt by the Janissaries and conservative Muslim clerics. Selim was deposed from power and imprisoned, and a year later murdered. His successor Mustafa IV was believed to be conservative and anti-French.At the same time, Napoleon had decisively defeated the Russian army at the Battle of Friedland in June 1807. and forced the Tsar to sign the Treaty of Tilsit. This agreement marked the high water point for Napoleon's empire. It also meant he had no further need of Ottoman assistance against Russia.The Treaty of Tilsit between Emperor Napoleon and Tsar Alexander, negotiated on a raft floating on the River Nieman which formed the border between France and Russia. (Today, it's the border between Russia and Lithuania)The result was an astonishing volte-face. France abandoned the Ottomans and made a secret agreement with Russia to support them against the Turks, in return for Russian assistance against Britain. The overthrow of the pro-French Selim III was used to justify this reversal of policy. Nevertheless, the angry Turks saw it as a stab in the back, though they were partially mollified by a French-brokered promise that the Russians would withdraw their troops from Moldavia and Wallachia. However, this promise was not kept.In September 1808 Napoleon met Tsar Alexander again at the Congress of Erfurt. In secret, the two emperors discussed a possible partition of the Ottoman Empire — but they failed to agree over who should occupy Constantinople and the Straits. It is open to question whether Napoleon genuinely intended to carve up the Ottoman Empire in this way, or if he was merely stringing the Russians along to keep their support.Although Napoleon had negotiated an armistice between Russia and the Turks in summer 1807, the Tsar used the opportunity of peace with France to transfer 80,000 troops to the Danube region, and re-open the fighting. The Russo-Turkish war ground on for several years of sieges and counter-sieges. Though the Russians generally had the advantage, neither side was able to achieve a decisive victory.The 23-year old Mahmud II became Sultan in November 1808 after the overthrow of his half-brother, the short-lived Mustafa IV. He inherited the ongoing war with Russia as well as unrest in the Hejaz and Balkans.By around 1811, Napoleon had realised that his alliance with Russia was not working. Russia was still trading with Britain, despite their agreement to cease doing so; and their territorial ambitions were a threat to French dominance of Europe. Foreseeing that another war with Russia was likely, Napoleon again turned his attention to the Ottoman Empire. They would be a useful ally against Russia, so Napoleon once again offered them new territory in the Danube valley and Crimea if they kept on fighting the Russians in the south while France attacked them from the west.The Ottomans and Mahmud II, however, had had enough. They no longer trusted French diplomacy; they felt betrayed by Napoleon's constant changes of policy. Accordingly, they ignored his requests to renew their alliance, and instead negotiated a treaty with Russia to end their six-year long war.The Treaty of Bucharest was signed in May 1812. Russia evacuated Moldavia and Wallachia and handed them back over to the Ottomans, who in return ceded the province of Bessarabia (modern Moldova) to Russia. Serbia was given autonomy under Ottoman sovereignity. The Russians thus made minor gains, but much less than they'd hoped for; the Ottomans had managed to preserve the bulk of their empire intact at a time when it was being torn apart by civil wars and revolts. Both sides were glad the war was over.South-east Europe after the Treaty of Bucharest 1812Napoleon was not glad. He declared war on Russia in June 1812; but instead of the Ottomans pinning down much of the Tsar's forces as he'd hoped, he instead found himself facing the entire Russian army, undistracted and focussed solely on defeating him. The result was the eventual destruction of the Grande Armée and the beginning of the campaign that would end, two years later, with Russian cavalry watering their horses in the River Seine in Paris, and Napoleon heading into exile.There's not much evidence of Napoleon turning his attention to the Ottoman Empire or the Middle East after 1812. He had too much to think about elsewhere.

I would agree with the answers given by Peter Lenard and Robert Lopez related to how this is largely based upon preference. To answer the question in more detail, it is helpful to provide a bit more context on the overall path of GSB classes and how students typically differentiate in the classes they choose.As Anneke Jong wrote in a blog post (http://annekejong.blogspot.com/2010/11/is-business-school-hard.html), the first year is quite challenging for a number of reasons, and few students look back on it as academically inspiring. Most complain incessantly about it, sometimes with good reason and sometimes due to lack of perspective (I count myself in the latter group). It is the year where you take the classes that any MBA would be expected to take. As I reflect on it now, I wish that I had been less negative on it in the moment, as many of the classes were quite good and / or will serve me well, particularly finance, accounting, economics, and data and decisions (i.e., statistics). Though it is painful, the administration is wise in packing these into the first year. By the end, you are done with the "required" courses and the second year is wide open. As long as you complete a grand total of 105 course units, including 93 at the GSB and 93 graded (vs. pass/fail), you can graduate. By the end of the first year, most students have ~60 units completed, so in addition to a lighter course load, the classes are completely of your choosing.During the second year, students end up splitting down a number of tracks. As would be expected, some focus on finance / investment classes, others on general management / entrepreneurship classes, others on product design / marketing classes, and others on leadership / soft skills (NOTE: this is my rough categorization for the purposes of this answer, not an official categorization of the Stanford GSB). Still others venture "across the street" whether on a one-off basis or through joint degree programs, taking classes at the law school, medical school, E-IPER program (environment and resources), design school, education school, public policy / administration program (whether Stanford or Harvard Kennedy), etc. These are rough lines, and many students take classes across several of them. From what I have seen though, you can generally see each person allocating his / her time in 1-2 tracks more than the others. I personally focused on general management / entrepreneurship and leadership / soft skills, so I can only really speak to those. I will try to reference other highly rated classes as well.The "signature" classes: While there might be some differences of opinion on these, there are a couple of classes that are notable across generations of GSB students. This is with good reason too, these classes end up being described as life and / or career changing.Interpersonal Dynamics (OB 374) -- This is probably the most famous of them all. Commonly called "touchy feely," over 90-95% of the class takes this and many (including me) describe it as transformational. The premise of the course is that communication and connection between you and others is one of, if not the most important factors related to your personal and professional success. Furthermore, most of us aren't really all that good at it. We tend to speak and respond to others, especially during times of stress, in ways that are counterproductive and prone to hurting, rather than building relationships. There is a lecture portion of the course, but the real action takes place in T-group (i.e., training group), where a group of 12 students and 2 facilitators sit in a circle for 3-4 hours at a time. There is no agenda. The group just talks, going deep on topics relevant to each student. Disagreements and conflicts arise. Real-time feedback ensues. While it sounds unstructured, it is very often a tremendously powerful experience, changing how you communicate and connect with others.Managing Growing Enterprises (STRAMGT 355) -- Another extremely useful class, this might be better titled "Managing Difficult Situations." The most famous professor is Irv Grousbeck, but all the professors (including Joel Peterson, Jim Ellis, Kevin Taweel) are experienced practitioners who engage students in challenging role plays related to common management situations involving complex decisions and tough conversations. Each class typically revolves around a real-life case study, and the protagonists are present. After about an hour and a half of role playing the various situations, the protagonists address the class about how they handled each situation, what worked well, what didn't work well, etc.The rest of the "super round" classes: Each year, first year students go through a registration process where they can "super round" classes that are typically very high in demand. The above two classes are always on this list. The classes below are as well. Typically, each student will only get two of these (including the "signature" classes above)Leadership Perspectives (OB 363) -- A relatively new class, this has become incredibly popular in recent years. It is taught by Joel Peterson (former CEO of Trammel Crow, current Chairman of JetBlue, Managing Director of Peterson Partners, etc.) and Charles O'Reilly, a really excellent research professor focused on leadership. The format of the class includes one session per week where a prominent leader addresses the full class and a second session where small groups break out to discuss and reflect on what was learned from the leader. During my class, we heard from CEOs / board members, former athletes, a city mayor, a military general, and a nonprofit leader, among others. Each gave us 15-20 minutes of background on his / her life and path, then the next 1 hour+ was open for questioning, where we could ask just about anything (and questions / responses were guaranteed confidential within the class). It is fascinating to see the similarities and differences among leaders as they honestly discuss their personal and professional successes and failures over time.Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital (STRAMGT 354) -- While I didn't take this class, it is also extremely popular. It is taught by long-time venture capitalist Peter Wendell and Eric Schmidt. The guest list is phenomenal. This class was referenced in the recent New York Times article on Stanford (http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2012/04/30/120430fa_fact_auletta).Investment Management and Entrepreneurial Finance (FINANCE 321) -- While I didn't take this class, it is extremely popular among students with interest / focus on the finance / investment space. It is taught by Jack McDonald, a long-time professor and investor guru. I'll leave further description to an alum / student who has actually taken the class.Other interesting (and popular) classes that I did takeLeadership Fellows (OB 330/331) -- Each year, ~66 second year students take part in the Arbuckle Leadership Fellows program. While one purpose of the program is to help facilitate the Leadership Labs class taken by every first year student, there is also a heavy "coaching" component to the experience. Through this, the students in the class are trained by professional executive coaches to be coaches themselves. The point is not that most of us will actually become executive coaches (though some might), but rather that coaching is a critical part of managing, and something that many managers are not actually that good at. During the class, each student has ~3 first year students that he / she coaches for two quarters both to practice what is learned in class but more importantly, to help the first year student improve in whatever areas of life the student so desires.Lives of Consequence (OB 383) -- A small seminar class, this is focused on giving students time to reflect on what sort of life each student wants to lead. The class includes some study of individuals who have been thought to have led a "consequential" life. More importantly, the class asks each student to complete several exercises focused on his / her own life, including writing his / her own obituary and eulogy (though unusual, writing my own and listening to what others wrote about themselves was an amazing experience). Few people find the time for such structured reflection, which is exactly what this class allows.Becoming a Leader (GSBGEN 571) -- Many students coming out of MBA programs will become managers within a few years, and becoming a manager means working not just for those to whom you report, but those who report to you. This is often a difficult transition. This half-quarter class uses the experience of recent GSB graduates (classes 2000 and later, more or less) as a tool to expose us to common challenges faced by first time and young managers. Some of the examples are highlighted in short videos, but there are also two panel sessions.The Paths to Power (OB 377) -- Taught by Jeff Pfeffer (http://jeffreypfeffer.com/), this class is about the power and, as he says in his book, why some people have it and others don't. It is often described as a controversial class, with rationale being that it just teaches tools that allow one to accumulate power. I did not find it to be particularly controversial, but rather thought that it just highlighted a set of very basic but important considerations -- whether others know about the good work you're doing, what your network looks like and how central you are as a node within it, how you say what you say, how much social and professional capital you have, how unique you are in your organization, etc. -- that can lead to gaining and sustaining power within an organization. Throughout the course, case studies are used, and at least once a week, case protagonists and / or professionals related to the topic at hand guest teach.Formation of New Ventures (STRAMGT 353) -- This is a survey course that uses case studies to introduce challenges and considerations across the new venture lifecycle, from idea and team formulation through IPO or M&A (at which point the venture is presumably no longer new). Each class, the protagonists of the case being taught are present to comment on the discussion and what they actually did, why, how it turned out, etc. There are several sections of this class. I took a section with Andy Rachleff (Benchmark, Wealthfront) and Mark Leslie (Veritas) that was focused entirely on information technology companies. Other sections are taught by Jim Ellis (Asurion), Jeff Chambers (TA Associates), John Mortgridge (Cisco), Charles Holloway, and George Foster (Stanford).Building and Managing Professional Sales Organizations (STRAMGT 351) -- Where Formation of New Ventures is a survey course on many topics related to starting a company, this class focuses on precisely what the name implies. You're either building product or you're selling it. I knew shockingly little about the latter step before this class, and found it to be among the most practical during my whole time at the GSB. Similar to above, this class is taught with case studies, and the protagonists join each class to share their experience and learning. Additionally, there are projects and simulations used to apply the class materials. Mark Leslie, an amazing sales CEO for decades in Silicon Valley conceived of the class with James Lattin on the academic side. They are now joined in different sections by Peter Levine (A16Z), Kirk Bowman (Accel), and Mark Stevens (long time Sequoia).Conflict Management and Negotiation (OB 381) -- This is about exactly what the title suggests. Conflict and negotiation can be uncomfortable or even painful, so the course is more than 50% focused on simulations between classmates where you practice effective tools and then reflect on the outcomes. And it does get more natural with practice...Sports Business Management (GSBGEN 360), Sports Business Financing (GSBGEN 561), and Sports Marketing (GSBGEN 562) -- The GSB has a number of courses and course sequences that focus on particular topics of interest for students. I have some interest in sports and took two of the three courses above with George Foster. You do have to be interested in sports for these classes, but if you are, it is a real treat. Aside from the annual Billy Beane visit, Professor Foster manages to get the biggest names in Bay Area, and sometimes national sports, into the room discussing just about every topic related to business and sports. As you will see below, there are many other courses delving into different verticals, such as philanthropy, real estate, and entertainment.Other interesting (and popular) classes that I did not takeAligning Start-Ups with their Market (STRAMGT 359) with, Andy Rachleff, which delves deep into another topic introduced in Formation of New Ventures, product-market fitCreating a Start-Up (STRAMGT 356/366) with Haim Mendelson, whereby teams of students (often across graduate programs) create a company plan and sometimes, take the product to market during and after a two quarter course togetherBiodesign Innovation (OIT 384/385) -- some similarities in process to above, but where product is focused on healthcare technologiesEntrepreneurial Design for Extreme Affordability (OIT 333/334) -- some similarities in process to above, but where product is focused on technologies that benefit people and communities in developing countries (through Stanford SEED program)Corporate Financial Modeling (FINANCE 350) with Peter DeMarzo, who wrote our book on itMergers and Acquisitions (ACCT 332), guest taught by Safra Catz (President of Oracle)Understanding the Recent Financial Crisis (GSBGEN 340), Fiscal Policy (GSBGEN 363), and Contemporary Economic Policy (MGTECON 381) with User-13808067191255951908, former Economic Policy Advisor to President George W. Bush and Director of the US National Economic CouncilDesigning Happiness (MKTG 355) and Social Brands (MKTG 353) with Jennifer Aaker, author of The Dragonfly EffectReal Estate Investment (GSBGEN 306)Leadership in the Entertainment Industry (OB 388)Strategic Philanthropy (GSBGEN 381)