Asset Purchase Agreement For The Wastewater: Fill & Download for Free

There are two water agreements still in force between Malaysia and Singapore: the 1962 agreement and the 1990 agreement.SHORT Answer:With regards to the 1962 agreement it is clearly unfair to Malaysia. In this agreement Singapore is allowed to buy from Johor up to 250 million gallons of raw water per day at an exploitative price of RM 0.03 per 1000 gallons. In return it only needs to supply to Malaysia treated water up to 5 million gallons (2% of the raw water it takes) per day at RM0.50 per 1000 gallons.Although Singapore sells this treated water at below cost, this small benefit to Malaysia is more than offset by having to sell its raw water so cheaply. The loss to Singapore for having to sell treated water at below cost is minuscule compared to the money it saves by buying Malaysia's raw water at RM0.03 sen per 1000 gallons.If Singapore had to give 5 million gallons of treated water to Malaysia per day without charge, would Singapore still consider the 1962 Agreement a good deal? Most definitely, without a doubt. The benefit it gains from buying raw water at such cheap rates (literally close to zero) makes that a certainty.You may remember that Singapore's next cheapest source of water is desalinated water and that costs RM 6 per 1000 gallons (200 times of 3 sen). Recent events may show that even that price is unsustainably low. Singapore's domestic water tariff is RM 37 to RM 50 per 1000 gallons (converted from PUB's tariff of $S2.74 to S$3.69 per cubic meter) so the profit it makes from the 250 million gallons of raw water per day is astronomical.It has become increasingly clear to me that the ‘loss’ Singapore claims to suffer from having to sell treated water at 50 sen per 1000 gallons is merely an excuse to demonstrate FEIGNED OUTRAGE and to muster their best PRETENCE of INDIGNATION.Note: Calculations in the long answer.LONG Answer:Continuing from the short answer, allow me to enumerate the reasons why 3 sen per 1000 gallons is an exceedingly unfair and unreasonable price, if is not already immediately obvious to you.Below is a summary of my answer for another question:'Sebastian Hong's answer to Under the 1961 & 1962 water agreements between Malaysia and Singapore, is Singapore unreasonable paying 3 sen for raw water?'1) THE PRICE of RM0.03 WAS SET IN THE 1920sSurely inflation and a comparison of the purchasing power of money then and now would mean that 3 sen is patently too low.2) THE 1962 AGREEMENT ALLOWS FOR REVIEW OF PRICES BASED ON PURCHASING POWER OF MONEY.The 1962 agreement allow for the prices of water to be revised “after the expiry of twenty-five years”. The factors to be taken account of in determining the new price are “the rise or fall in the purchasing power of money and any rise or fall in the cost of labour, power and materials for the purpose of supplying the labour”.It is crystal clear that the framers of the agreement had wanted the prices to keep pace with inflation.Since the point of a price review is to keep pace with the current purchasing power of money, it is disingenuous, churlish and absurd to suggest that the right to review is lost if not effected after 25 years. This is a 100 year contract. Price reviews need to be done more than once to keep pace with inflation.3) COMPARISON WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL WATER AGREEMENTSIt has been reported that China sells Hong Kong water at RM14 per 1000 gallons. That is more than 450 times of RM0.03. Notwithstanding the different circumstances, that's a massive difference that cannot be simply explained by geography or politics.Source: WSD - Dongjiang Water4) PRICE AT WHICH SINGAPORE BUYS WATER FROM PRIVATE PRODUCERSPUB buys desalinated untreated water from Tuaspring for approximately RM6 per 1000 gallons. That's 200 times more than the 3 sen it pays Malaysia for basically the same thing. Bear in mind that other bids to supply desalinated water were significantly higher.5) PRICE AT WHICH SINGAPORE SELLS WATER TO CONSUMERSSingapore's domestic water tariff is between $S2.74 to S$3.69 per cubic meter. That translates to RM 37 to RM 50 per 1000 gallons. That means it sells treated water at 15-20 times the cost to produce this water.6) RAW WATER PRICE OF THE 1990 AGREEMENTUnder the 1990 agreement, Singapore can purchase treated water from Johor IN EXCESS of the 250 mgd (million gallons per day) of raw water under the 1962 agreement. The price of this additional supply would be calculated based on a fixed formula.To derive the price of raw water here, one need only deduct RM2.40 (cost of treatment) from treated water price. Would you bet against this figure being many multiples of RM0.03?Bear in mind that Singapore considers this new raw water price reasonable even after it factors in the cost of the dam, compensation and land rent which it has to pay. Isn’t this a tacit acknowledgement that the 1962 price of 3 sen is unreasonable?Now I will turn my attention to several reasons offered to try to justify this unreasonable price and to assuage the guilt associated with benefitting from the unconscionable price. As a wise man once said “It’s incredibly easy to convince ourselves that the order of things – especially when it favours us – is logical, natural and just.”1) Repugnant statement: Malaysia gets its water for free. It is just rain water which is FOC (free of charge). If they don't sell it, they won't be able to use it.By far the most repugnant, insulting and disingenuous reason.It suggests that:1) Since Malaysia is blessed with natural freshwater from rainfall, it should not charge a fair rate for it. Instead it must be sold cheaply; and/or2) Anything above zero is a profit for Malaysia and they should be happy with that.If such reasoning were accepted, shouldn't oil-producing countries be selling their oil cheaply too? The oil just happens to be on their land and for some countries like Saudi Arabia, the cost of extraction is very low (no need to build a dam). Do we demand that oil be sold at just above extraction costs? Or how about Vietnam which sells sand to Singapore? Does Singapore tell Vietnam that their sand is a free gift from nature and needs to be sold cheaply?I wonder about the intellectual honesty and morality of the people who come up with this reason. One chap even told me that it's impossible to come up with a market rate price because there is no international market for raw water.2) Dubious statement: Singapore sells Johor 16 million gallons per day (mgd) of treated water instead of 5 mgd.Invariably the evidence for this is a ST or TODAY newspaper article which says the same thing in different words.One example:“Singapore has supplied additional treated water to Malaysia, at Johor's request, after production there was disrupted due to pollution. In response to media queries, national water agency PUB said yesterday that an additional six million gallons per day (mgd) of treated water was supplied between Jan 2 and Jan 4.”Or the article may say “Singapore has been regularly providing 16 mgd to Johor” or “The 6 mgd was on top of the 16 mgd that Singapore usually supplies Johor.”Why does the news article have to use ambiguous words like “regularly” and “usually”? Are these good evidence that the daily average supplied is 16 million gallons since 1962.....or at least for the last 10 years.If I say I regularly go the dentist, that may be only once every six months. If I say I jog regularly, that could be once to thrice a week. How can one conclude from the words “regularly” or “usually” that 16 mgd is the average supplied to Johor? And for how many years?Why has PUB or the minister not come up with a definitive and comprehensive statement to confirm the daily average amount of treated water supplied to Johor under the 1962 agreement for the last 5, 10, 20 or 30 years?At any rate, even if we grant that 16-22 mgd of below cost treated water is supplied, it hardly changes the mathematics of the massive advantage to Singapore.3) Dubious statement: Singapore takes far less than 250 mgdThis assertion rests on information from a Singapore gov website that says Singapore water requirements are 430 mgd. Newater and Desalinated water make up 65% of it. The remaining 35% (about 150 mgd) is supplied by Local reservoirs and Imported water. Hence, many conclude that imported water taken must be less than 150 mgd.It seems to make sense but it gives rise to inconvenient questions. Why has the minister not confirmed that Singapore takes far less raw water than it is entitled too under the 1962 agreement? Won't this help to allay the feeling in Malaysian of being short-changed? Why do the Singapore media not mention this?A minister should say something along these lines “For the last X years Singapore has only taken per day on average 150 mgd of raw water while supplying Johor on average 16 mgd of treated water.” The fact that he has not leads me to doubt the veracity of the above statement.Furthermore, does it even make sense for Singapore to meet its water needs by buying Desalinated water at RM6 per 1000 gallons and not take it's full allotment of 250 million gallons which it can buy for merely RM 0.03 per 1000 gallons?4) Dubious argument: Singapore has spent hundred's of millions on infrastructure (dams, buildings etc.) in Johor and pays rent. All this will be given to Johor in the end.There are some problems with this argument:a) The infrastructure that they speak of pertains to the 1990 agreement where water is drawn from the Linggiu river. Malaysia has no grievance with the 1990 agreement which was the result of long and difficult negotiations with Singapore. It is the 1962 agreement in which Malaysia has a grievance with.b) In exchange for all the infrastructure and rent paid, Singapore is allowed to draw water in EXCESS the 250 mgd permitted under the 1962 agreement. They can do this every day for the seventy years that the 1990 agreement will be in operation. So why is Singapore complaining about this? Are they contending that the 1990 agreement is not fair to them?Suggestion: Amortize the cost of infrastructure and rent over the 72 years of the 1990 agreement and compare with your benefit per year.c) If Singapore is complaining about the rent and infrastructure paid under the 1962 agreement, they should state what this amount is and compare that with the gain per year they receive for being able to buy water at 3 sen per 1000 gallons for almost a hundred years. They should find it is well worth it.5) False claim: Singapore supplies all of Johor's treated waterThis I received from a strange chap who seems to think that multiplying Johor's daily water usage with its water tariff is equivalent to the total daily profits of SAJ.A cursory check of SAJ's website will reveal that SAJ possesses 44 of its own water treatment plants.“SAJ currently has a total treatment capacity of 1986MLD, 3.9m customers and 392MLD of wastewater and reclaim water treatment plants outside Johor, i.e. in Thailand and China. The group maintains and operates 44 water treatment plants, 17 dams and 22,150km of water pipes in Johor. SAJ also has the right of use of Johor water assets for 45 years under a lease agreement with PAAB (National Water Asset Management). “How then can it be true that SAJ receives free treated water from Singapore? This is only something which dishonest people would have you believe.6) Dubious claim: SAJ is making astronomical profits off SingaporeApparently some people believe that because SAJ resells the 5 mgd they receive from Singapore, they are making huge profits. Let's do the math together:MALAYSIA:a) Buys 5 mgd at RM0.50 per 1000 gallons from Singapore.NOTE: I reject the myth that Singapore supplies 22 mgd or 16mgd (on average) to Johor under the 1962 agreement. The agreement says 5 mgd or 2% of raw water supplied to Singapore.b) Sells at RM9 per 1000 gallons.(RM2 per meter cube as a median price of Johor domestic consumer price.SAJ rates here: https://ranhillsaj.com.my/water-tariffs/)c) PROFIT = RM9-RM0.50= RM8.50 per 1000 gallonsd) Nett profit= RM8.50 per 1000 gallons X 5 million = RM 42,500 per dayThat's not bad at all...but how much does Singapore profit?SINGAPOREa) Buys 250 mgd at RM 0.03 per 1000 gallon.b) Treats it for RM 2.40. Total cost = RM2.43 per 1000 gallons.c) Sells to its consumers at between between $S2.74 to S$3.69 per cubic meter.Convert to Ringgit: RM 8.22 to RM11.07 per cubic meter.Convert to Per 1000 gallons: RM 37 to RM 50 per 1000 gallons.(Note: 1000 imperial gallons=4.54609 cubic meter)d) Median consumer price of water RM43.50 (in between 37 and 50) per 1000 gallons.e) PROFIT = RM43.50-RM2.43= RM41 per 1000 gallonsf) Nett profit= RM41 per 1000 gallons X 250 million = RM 10.25 MILLION per daySingapore's Profit from the 1962 agreement is over 240 times the 'profit” of SAJ.In one year, Singapore profits to the tune ofThree Billion seven hundred forty-one million two hundred fifty thousand Ringgit.Now you see why Singapore's “complaint” that it sells treated water Johor at below cost is just a red herring.Would Singapore agree to buy 250 mgd at RM3 per 1000 gallons if Johor paid for 5 mgd (or even 20 mgd) at RM50 per 1000 gallons?7) Dubious claim: This is not a moral issue. Not about the rich exploiting the poor.From an ST article: “Dr Balakrishnan added that Singapore honours its international agreements and commitments, and that he would leave it to Singaporeans to decide whether the country had been “fair” or “morally wrong” in the pricing of water.”It seems like the good minister is keeping mum on what he thinks of 3 sen per 1000 gallons. Instead it seems he wants the Singapore public to decide.I respectfully disagree and assert there is a moral issue involved here. The moral question: Is it ethical to take the resources of another country at a price not commensurate with the true value of said resource?8) Sanctity of Agreements is paramount?Well it's no surprise if the Singapore minister wants to look at it this way. On the ethical and moral side, I think he would be on shaky ground. Anyone can see that the price is unfair and inequitable and frankly downright unconscionable.Nevertheless, if we want to stick to the agreement, please note that clause 14 states that the prices are subject to review “after the expiry of 25 years” and one of the factors to be taken into account is the purchasing power of money. These are the plain words in the agreement.If Singapore asserts that the right to review has been lost, Malaysia can call for arbitration according to Malaysian arbitration law and Singapore will be bound by this.

Excerpt from an official bankruptcy document filed 11/22/13:Preliminary Statement1. The Debtors were founded in 2007 with the goal of designing, assembling, and manufacturing premium plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (“PHEVs”). To facilitate these efforts, the United States Department of Energy (“DOE”) arranged for loans to the Debtors from the Federal Financing Bank (the “FFB”) in an aggregate amount of up to approximately $530 million pursuant to the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program.2 The Debtors drew a total of approximately $192 million on these loans and also raised significant amounts of equity financing2 The Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program was promulgated under section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, 42 U.S.C. § 17013.2DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001from a wide range of venture capital, private equity, and sovereign wealth funds. Beginning in 2007, the Debtors established a global network of vendors, suppliers, distributors, and retailers, along with an international reputation for both their award-winning Karma sedan and their innovative hybrid electric powertrain technology. The Karma sedan is the world’s first environmentally responsible luxury PHEV and was the centerpiece of the Debtors’ prepetition manufacturing and sales efforts. The Debtors sold approximately 1,800 Karma sedans to individual buyers through a global network of independent retailers and distributors.2. Despite these accomplishments, the Debtors were unable to achieve certain financial covenants and project milestones embedded in their loan agreements with DOE. In particular, the Debtors’ loan agreements with DOE originally required the Debtors to produce, manufacture, and sell 11,000 Karma sedans by February 2012. But the Debtors were obliged to delay serial production of the Karma until October 2011 for a number of reasons, including completion of vehicle and manufacturing engineering, finalizing tooling and component specifications with the Debtors’ supply chain, and completing safety and emissions testing and certifications.3. Further, once serial production of the Karma began, vehicle sales failed to meet expectations. Factors affecting sales included negative press, initial quality and performance issues, lingering effects of the global financial recession, and challenges arising from the Debtors’ supply chain. For example, the high-voltage battery packs for the Karma, an essential component for any electric vehicle, and which were manufactured exclusively by A123 Systems, Inc.3 (“A123”), exhibited a number of performance problems. The Debtors initiated a voluntary safety recall for a small number of Karma vehicles almost immediately following the Karma’s 2011 launch relating to A123’s misalignment of internal hose clamps. A123 also announced a service campaign in3 A123 Systems, Inc. has since changed its name to B456 Systems, Inc.3DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001March 2012 relating to a manufacturing defect that affected the durability and performance of all battery packs manufactured at A123’s Livonia, Michigan facility. Moreover, A123 suspended Karma battery production in October 2012 when it sought bankruptcy protection.4 As a result, the Debtors were left without a high-voltage battery supplier, and the Debtors have not restarted Karma vehicle production since a previously scheduled seasonal shutdown commenced in July 2012.4. The Debtors have at all times been mindful of their commitments to stakeholders, their obligation to preserve and maximize value, and the public interest at issue here. To this end, and as discussed in greater detail below, the Debtors explored a series of alternatives to obtain financing to fulfill these commitments and to maximize stakeholder value, including with respect to DOE. Among other things, the Debtors sought additional equity and debt financing to refinance the DOE loan and provide additional working capital. More recently, the Debtors engaged with financial sponsors, original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”), and other parties regarding astrategic investment or a going concern transaction. In this process, the Debtors retained experienced investment banking, financial, and restructuring advisors to facilitate their review, analysis, and development of potential alternatives.5 The Debtors also undertook steps to minimize costs and to preserve liquidity. These steps included, among other things, the difficult determination to conduct headcount reductions and to initiate nonpaid employee furloughs in the spring of 2013. Notwithstanding these efforts, the Debtors’ cash position continued to erode.5. To preserve and maximize value, the Debtors sought to implement a sale process in connection with a chapter 11 filing. Throughout the spring of 2013, the Debtors engaged in4 As discussed more fully below, A123 ultimately rejected its exclusive supply agreement with the Debtors effective as of February 2013.5 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Debtor’s prepetition restructuring efforts).4DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001substantial, good faith negotiations with DOE regarding the Debtors’ consensual use of its cash collateral to help fund a chapter 11 case and sale process. Despite significant efforts by the parties, these negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, and DOE applied the approximately $20 million of cash that it controlled to the Debtors’ outstanding indebtedness.6. Since that time, the Debtors have operated with limited junior funding provided by related parties. The Debtors’ operations have remained curtailed, and headcount reductions have continued through both additional layoffs and voluntary attrition. The Debtors have also continued to engage in discussions and negotiations surrounding various restructuring transactions in an effort to maximize stakeholder value. Meanwhile, DOE conducted a public marketing and auction process for the purchase of its interests in the DOE loan pursuant to a competitive auction process. On October 7, 2013, an affiliate of Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC emerged as the successful bidder, and the parties closed the loan purchase on November 22, 2013.7. Recognizing that this purchase would provide the Debtors with an opportunity to move forward, the Debtors entered into extensive arm’s-length discussions with Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC (the “Purchaser”) and its affiliates regarding the Purchaser’s potential acquisition ofcertain of the Debtors’ assets through a credit bid of all or part of the DOE loan. These discussions culminated in the parties’ entry into a purchase agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”), as more fully described herein, pursuant to which the Purchaser would acquire substantially all the Debtors assets, with the remainder of the estates’ assets to be administered through a chapter 11 plan of liquidation. The Debtors have commenced these chapter 11 cases to facilitate a timely and efficient sale and plan process that will preserve and maximize the value of the Debtors’ estates.8. To familiarize the Court with the Debtors and the relief sought at the outset of these chapter 11 cases, this Declaration is organized in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the5DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001Debtors’ historical operations and capital structure. Part II describes the events leading up to the commencement of these chapter 11 cases. Part III sets forth the relevant facts supporting the relief requested by the First Day Motions.Part I: The DebtorsA. Overview of the Debtors’ Corporate History and Business Operations1. The Debtors’ History and Operations13. The Debtors were formed in 2007 with the goal of designing, engineering, and manufacturing premium PHEVs. To this end, the Debtors developed an electric vehicle with extended range, which they trademarked as “EVer.” The Debtors also established an international reputation as a leading developer of premium extended range PHEVs. The Debtors’ Karma sedan is the world’s first environmentally responsible luxury PHEV, and was developed by a highly skilled team of automotive designers and engineers located in the United States. The Karma sedan was also the centerpiece of the Debtors’ operations and won awards for excellence, innovation, and environmental responsibility from Time magazine (identifying the Karma as one of the “Green Design 100” in 2009), Top Gear Magazine (identifying the Karma as “Luxury Car of the Year” in 2011), and Automobile Magazine (identifying the Karma as “Design of the Year” in 2012).Fisker Vehicle DesignsKarma Sedan Atlantic Sedan (Concept)6DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00114. The Karma sedans were assembled by Valmet Automotive, Inc. (“Valmet”) in Uusikaupunki, Finland. The Debtors had planned, however, to build future vehicles at a company-owned and -operated assembly facility in the United States to improve volumes and to leverage their design, engineering, and technical expertise.15. To that end, in July 2010, the Debtors acquired a manufacturing facility covering approximately 3.2 million square feet located on approximately 142 acres at 801 Boxwood Road, Wilmington, Delaware (the “Delaware Facility”). The Debtors purchased the Delaware Facilitythrough the General Motors bankruptcy proceedings for a cash purchase price of approximately $21 million. The Delaware Facility is equipped with a number of technical and utility systems for automotive manufacturing, including a paint facility, powerhouse capability, a conveyor system, a wastewater treatment facility, and an emissions abatement system. The Debtors have not conducted active operations at that location.16. The Debtors obtained components and systems for the Karma’s assembly through a number of third-party supply relationships. For example, the Debtors had a licensing and tool use agreement with a General Motors affiliate. Through this relationship, the Debtors were able to purchase parts and components directly from suppliers that also sold to General Motors and use General Motors tooling to manufacture the parts or components. In addition, the Debtors relied on a number of “single source” suppliers for particular components. One such “single source” supplier was A123, whom the Debtors contracted with in January 2010 to act as the exclusive manufacturer of the Karma sedan’s high-voltage battery pack, as discussed more fully below.17. The Debtors began delivering the Karma sedan for sale to the general public in October 2011. This milestone was the culmination of the Debtors’ four-year effort to bring the Karma sedan from design, to concept car, to finished product ready for the showroom floor. The7DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001Karma sedan retailed for approximately $100,000 to $120,000, subject to consumer specifications and corresponding purchase price adjustments. The Debtors assembled approximately 2,700 Karma sedans, and approximately 1,800 Karma sedans have been sold to individual customers.18. The Debtors also planned to have another platform, the “N” or “Nina Platform,” which included the prototype Atlantic sedan. The Debtors made significant progress developing the N Platform, including entering into a number of additional supply and service agreements with third-party vendors and suppliers. These agreements included an engine purchase, supply, and development agreement with Bayerische Moteren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, or BMW. The Debtors first unveiled the Atlantic sedan at the April 2012 New York Auto Show, but have not engaged in active production of the Atlantic sedan or other N Platform derivatives.2. The Debtors’ Sales Network and Customers19. The Debtors sold the Karma sedan in the United States and Canada through a network of independent retailers located throughout the United States and Canada (each, a “Retailer”). In addition, the Debtors sold the Karma sedan in Europe, the Middle East, and China through local, independent distributors (each, a “Distributor”). Typically, Retailers and Distributors would purchase vehicles from the Debtors and then hold the vehicles for sale to the general public. A “Retail Agreement” or “Distributorship Agreement” typically governed each relationship among the parties.20. The Retail Agreements and Distributorship Agreements generally provided that the Retailers and Distributors would purchase vehicles directly from the Debtors and then hold those vehicles for sale in an assigned geographic territory. In certain circumstances, these Retailers and Distributors hold the right to compel the Debtors to repurchase their vehicles. Additionally, while the Retailers and Distributors bear primary responsibility for performing warranty repairs associated with sold vehicles, these warranty repairs may be subject to reimbursement from the Debtors.8DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/0013. The Debtors’ Employees21. The Debtors currently employ approximately 21 full-time employees, located primarily at their Anaheim, California headquarters, and primarily tasked with engineering, product development, financial, and reporting functions. None of the Debtors’ employees are subject to a collective bargaining agreement. The Debtors’ current staffing level reflects significant headcount reductions and voluntary attrition in the period prior to these chapter 11 filings.4. Fisker GmbH22. Fisker Automotive GmbH (“Fisker GmbH”), a non-Debtor in these cases, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Fisker Automotive, Inc. organized under the laws of Germany. Fisker GmbH’s office was located in Munich, Germany, and provided international sales and marketing services to the Debtors. Fisker GmbH has no active operations.B. Overview of the Debtors’ Capital Structure23. As of the Petition Date, the Debtors had approximately $203.2 million in funded debt and related obligations outstanding, consisting of the DOE Facility, the SVB Working Capital Facility, the DEDA Loan, and the Related Party Notes (each as defined herein). As of the Petition Date, the Debtors’ funded debt obligations, excluding accrued interest, are summarized as follows:$ millionsDOE Facility $168.5SVB Working Capital Facility $6.6DEDA Loan $12.5Related Party Notes $15.6Total: $203.2In addition, the Debtors have obligations under a number of contractual and vendor-related agreements, including with respect to various prepetition supply and assembly agreements. These obligations are discussed in turn.9DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/0011. The DOE Facilitya. The DOE Facility Generally24. Fisker Automotive, Inc., as borrower (“Fisker Automotive”), Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. (“Fisker Automotive Holdings”), and DOE are parties to that certain Loan Arrangement and Reimbursement Agreement, dated as of April 22, 2010 (the “DOE Loan Agreement”).6Pursuant to the DOE Loan Agreement, DOE agreed to, among otherthings:(a) arrange for purchases by the FFB of notes from Fisker Automotive in an amount not to exceed $169.3 million to fund the development, commercial production, sale and marketing, and all related engineering integration of the Debtors’ Karma sedan (the “Karma Lending Facility”); and(b) arrange for purchases by the FFB of notes from Fisker Automotive in an amount not to exceed $359.4 million to fund the development, commercial production, and sale and marketing of the Debtors’ Nina model automobile, now known as the Atlantic sedan, including the establishment and construction of an assembly and production site in the United States (the “Nina Lending Facility,” and, together with the Karma Lending Facility, the “DOE Facility”).7 Fisker Automotive Holdings unconditionally guaranteed obligations arising under the DOE Facility pursuant to that certain ParentGuarantee, dated as of April 22, 2010, made by Fisker Automotive Holdings in favor of DOE, FFB, and certain holders of notes. As discussed in detail below, on November 22, 2013, DOE sold its rights under the DOE Loan Agreement and certain related agreements to an affiliate of the Purchaser.6 See The Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program, which was promulgated under section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, 42 U.S.C.§ 17013.7 Pursuant to that certain Program Financing Agreement, dated as of September 16, 2009, between DOE and FFB, DOE is obligated to reimburse FFB for any liabilities, losses, costs, or expenses incurred by FFB from time to time with respect to the Notes or the related Note Purchase Agreement (each as defined in the DOE Loan Agreement).10DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00125. As of the Petition Date, the Debtors estimate that they had approximately $168.5 million in principal outstanding under the DOE Facility. Interest on the Karma Lending Facility is payable quarterly, bears interest at a weighted average interest rate of 2.00 percent, and was scheduled to mature on April 24, 2017. The Nina Lending Facility bears interest at a weighted average interest rate of 2.60 percent and was scheduled to mature on April 22, 2026. The DOE Loan Agreement further required the Debtors to achieve certain construction, production, manufacturing, and other milestones necessary for the completion of the Karma project and the Nina project, each by certain pre-established dates.26. Obligations arising under the DOE Facility are secured by a first priority lien on substantially all the Debtors’ assets, including personal and real property, pursuant to that certain Amended and Restated Pledge and Security Agreement, dated as of July 30, 2010 (the “Pledge andSecurity Agreement”), between Fisker Automotive and PNC Bank, N.A., d/b/a Midland Loan Services, a division of PNC Bank, N.A., as successor by merger to Midland Loan Services, Inc., as collateral agent (the “Collateral Agent”).827. In particular, DOE held an exclusive, first priority security interest in a debt service reserve account established pursuant to the DOE Loan Agreement (the “DOE Debt Service Reserve Account”), which was controlled by DOE. The DOE Debt Service Reserve Account formerly held approximately $20.6 million of cash. During the spring of 2013, the Debtors engaged in substantial, good-faith negotiations with DOE regarding the Debtors’ access to funds held in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account. However, and despite significant efforts by the parties, these8 The collateral pledged to secure obligations arising under the DOE Facility specifically excludes, among other things, the Debtors’ rights to or interests in any lease, contract, property rights, agreement, or trademark if the grant of a security interests in such property would result in (a) the cancellation or unenforceability of the Debtors’ right or interest, or (b) a breach, default, or termination of any such property (collectively, the “Excluded Assets”).11DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, and DOE applied the funds held in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account to the Debtor’s outstanding indebtedness in March 2013. As of the Petition Date, approximately $0 remains in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account.b. Business Covenants Arising Under the DOE Loan28. In addition to traditional financial reporting, fixed charge, and EBITDA covenants, the DOE Loan Agreement imposed a number of milestones and obligations with respect to the Debtors’ business plan and performance. Among other things, the DOE Loan Agreement required the Debtors to: (a) achieve Karma sales of 11,000 units by February 29, 2012; (b) achieve an average Karma selling price of not less than $87,900 by that time; and (c) obtain $270.0 million of incremental equity financing by October 2010. The covenants and milestones provided under the DOE Loan Agreement materially affected the Debtors’ ability to pursue projects or transactions not contemplated by the business plan originally submitted to DOE in 2010.2. The SVB Working Capital Facility29. Fisker Automotive, as borrower, Fisker Automotive Holdings, as obligor, and Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”), as lender, are parties to that certain Loan Agreement dated as of July 30, 2010 (the “SVB Loan Agreement”). The SVB Loan Agreement provided for a term loan facility and an asset-based revolving credit facility in the total amount of $21.0 million (the “SVB Working Capital Facility”). As of the Petition Date, a term loan of approximately $6.6 million remains outstanding on the SVB Working Capital Facility, and SVB is no longer providing the Debtors funding under the SVB Loan Agreement. The SVB Working Capital Facility has a weighted average interest rate of 9.00 percent and was scheduled to mature on July 30, 2014.99 Pursuant to correspondence dated April 5, 2013, SVB has taken the position that an event of default occurred under the SVB Loan Agreement on account of an unpaid principal and interest payment due on April 1, 2013.12DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00130. Pursuant to the Pledge and Security Agreement, obligations arising under the SVB Working Capital Facility are also secured by a lien on substantially all the Debtors’ personal property.10 However, the collateral securing the SVB Working Capital Facility excludes, among other things, cash held in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account and the Delaware Facility.3. The DEDA Agreementsa. The DEDA Loan Agreement31. Fisker Automotive, Fisker Automotive Holdings, and the Delaware Economic Development Authority (“DEDA”), a body corporate and politic constituted as an instrumentality of the State of Delaware, are parties to that certain Loan and Security Agreement dated as of December 10, 2010 (the “DEDA Loan Agreement”). The DEDA Loan Agreement provided for a$12.5 million interest-free loan (the “DEDA Loan”) to the Debtors,11 the proceeds of which were to be used to fund the Debtors’ infrastructure improvements and upgrades at the Delaware Facility.12 As of the Petition Date, approximately $12.5 million remains outstanding under the DEDA Loan, which was scheduled to mature June 1, 2015.32. Obligations arising under the DEDA Loan are secured by a security interest in substantially all the Debtors’ personal and real property, including the Delaware Facility, although such collateral excludes the cash held in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account and the Excluded10 On July 30, 2010, Fisker Automotive, Fisker Automotive Holdings, and the Collateral Agent, on behalf of DOE and SVB, entered into that certain Amended and Restated Collateral Agency Agreement, which created certain payment priorities between the DOE and SVB with respect to proceeds from different pools of collateral securing the Debtors’ obligations to DOE and SVB.11 The DEDA Loan Agreement was entered-into by the DEDA pursuant to the Delaware Strategic Fund Program, 29 Del. C. §§ 5027–29 (the “Delaware Fund Program”).12 The DEDA Loan Agreement provides that, subject to Fisker Automotive satisfying certain conditions set forth in the DEDA Loan Agreement relating to the employment of full-time employees and capital expenditures at the Delaware Facility, on or after June 1, 2015, up to the full amount of the DEDA Loan could convert to a grant. As of the date hereof, these milestones have not been achieved.13DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001Assets.13 On December 10, 2010, Fisker Automotive, Fisker Automotive Holdings, and DOE entered into that certain Third Amendment to the DOE Loan Agreement (the “Third Amendment”) requiring the Debtors to establish a collateral reserve account (the “DEDA Reserve Account”) withthe Collateral Agent. DOE controls the DEDA Reserve Account and has the power to direct the Collateral Agent to disburse funds held in the DEDA Reserve Account. DOE used this power shortly after its seizure of the cash in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account to also sweep the cash in the DEDA Reserve Account. Thus, approximately $0 remains in the DEDA Reserve Account as of the Petition Date.b. The DEDA Grant33. Fisker Automotive and DEDA are also parties to that certain Grant Agreement dated as of December 10, 2010 (the “DEDA Grant”), pursuant to which DEDA granted up to $9.0 million to Fisker Automotive under the Delaware Fund Program to be used to offset utility costs incurred while the Debtors renovated and upgraded the Delaware Facility. Payments under the DEDA Grant were disbursed to Fisker Automotive from time to time as needed to reimburse the Debtors for “Eligible Utility Costs,” which are generally defined by the DEDA Grant to cover certain utility costs incurred during the renovation of the Delaware Facility. DEDA provided approximately $7.5 million in funding pursuant to the DEDA Grant, but is no longer providing the Debtors with additional funding. All or a portion of the DEDA Grant will convert to an interest-free loan upon the occurrence of certain conditions, including the Debtors’ failure to employ at least 1,495 full-time13 As discussed more fully in the Motion of the Debtors for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing Postpetition Financing, (II) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense Priority, (III) Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral, (IV) Granting Adequate Protection, (V) Modifying the Automatic Stay, and (VI) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Sections 105, 361, 362, and 364(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 4001, and 9014 (the “DIP Motion”), the DEDA Subordination Agreement (as defined therein) subordinates DEDA’s interest in the collateral to those of DOE and SVB.14DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001employees at the Delaware Facility on March 1, 2015, or upon the occurrence of an event of default under the DEDA Loan Agreement.4. The Related Party Notes34. Commencing on April 16, 2013, the Debtors received approximately $15.6 million in financing on an unsecured basis through a series of promissory notes and loan agreements (collectively, the “Related Party Notes”) entered into by the Debtors and certain related parties,including Ace Strength International Limited, FAH Loan Purchase Fund, LLC, GSR Principals Fund IV, L.P., GSR Special Situation I Limited, GSR Ventures IV, L.P., JR Holdings IV, Ltd., and SugarPine Kids Trust and certain of their respective Affiliates. The Related Party Notes bear interest at a fixed rate of 10% per annum and were used to fund prepetition working capital needs and for other prepetition general corporate purposes. The Related Party Notes mature on the later to occur of (a) the sale, transfer, or disposition of all or substantially all the Debtors’ assets; (b) the Debtors’ dissolution or liquidation; or (c) 12 months from the date of the applicable promissory note, unless terminated earlier pursuant to their terms.5. Other Claims35. The Debtors’ capital structure also includes certain claims that may be secured by either security agreements or statutory or possessory liens. For example, Valmet holds certain work in progress and other inventory and has asserted its right to liquidate this inventory to satisfy claims that may be owing to Valmet. The Debtors are also parties to a number of supply and assembly agreements that give rise to substantial obligations on account of such agreements, including obligations relating to accounts payable, material authorizations and suspended shipments, and obligations for the settlement of certain volume-related charges under the Valmet Agreement, although analysis of such obligations remains ongoing. In addition, the Debtors are subject to a significant level of litigation and collection proceedings pending as of the Petition Date.15DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/0016. Equity36. The Debtors are privately held. Fisker Automotive Holdings is owned by a diverse group of venture capital, private equity, and sovereign wealth funds, as well as private individuals. The Debtors’ equity capital consists of common stock and seven series of convertible preferred stock. Fisker Automotive Holdings, in turn, owns 100 percent of the shares in Fisker Automotive.Part II: Events Leading to the Chapter 11 Cases37. Since their inception, the Debtors pursued a strategy committed to the design, development, engineering, and production of high performance and environmentally responsible PHEVs. This strategy was reflected by the Debtors’ loan agreements, through which the Debtors were obliged to, among other things, achieve sales in excess of 11,000 vehicles less than 5 years from their initial inception and to employ approximately 1,500 full-time employees in automobile manufacturing here in the United States. The Debtors’ ability to achieve their original sales and production goals, however, was limited by a combination of negative press, lingering effects of the global financial recession, unforeseen business disruptions, and liquidity shortfalls, among other factors.A. Challenging Operating Environment38. The Debtors, like most OEMs, were responsible for the overall engineering, design, and development of the Karma sedan. In this process, the Debtors leveraged the expertise of a wide range of suppliers and service providers to complete the engineering work and to manufacture the thousands of parts and components necessary to complete each Karma sedan. In addition, and as noted above, Karma assembly was contracted to Valmet under the Valmet Agreement—although, the Debtors’ business plan contemplated that assembly operations could ultimately be brought “in house.” As a result, Karma production remained dependent on the seamless interaction of suppliers located across North America, Europe, and Asia.16DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00139. Building the Fisker platform, supply chain, and network of Retailers and Distributors from scratch ultimately delayed the initial Karma launch from 2009 until 2011. This delay created significant challenges with respect to the Debtors’ February 2012 deadline to sell more than 11,000 Karma sedans at an average selling price of $87,900, as required by the DOE Loan Agreement.14 The Debtors further believe that sales were adversely affected by negative press with respect to Karma performance, their existing liquidity position, and the A123 battery recall.40. In particular, these challenges were exacerbated by severe complications arising from the Debtors’ relationship with A123. As noted above, A123 was formerly the exclusive high-voltage battery pack manufacturer for the Karma sedan. The Debtors encountered a number of issues with the performance of the A123 battery packs almost immediately following the Karma’s launch in October 2011. At or about that time, the Debtors conducted a voluntary safety recall to check and correct a potential misalignment of internal hose clamps within the battery packs. In March 2012, A123 announced a voluntary service campaign to replace all Karma battery packs because of a faulty manufacturing process at A123’s production facility in Livonia, Michigan, that affected the expected performance and durability of the battery packs—the problem that caused a Karma sedan to shutdown during testing by Consumer Reports.41. A123 did not complete the service campaign and later suspended its production of Karma battery packs.15 As a result, the Debtors were left with approximately a $48.7 million warranty claim against A123’s bankruptcy estate and no supply of high-voltage battery packs to14 As noted above, approximately 1,800 Karma sedans have been sold to individual customers.15 A123 sought bankruptcy protection in October 2012 and, following its acquisition by Wanxiang Group Corp. in January 2013, rejected its battery pack supply agreement with the Debtors.17DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001continue Karma production.16 Facing these challenges, the Debtors have not restarted Karma production following a previously scheduled seasonal shutdown that began in July 2012.42. The Debtors suffered an additional loss on October 29, 2012, when Hurricane Sandy and its related windstorms, storm surges, and floods, destroyed approximately 338 Karma sedans located at the port in Newark, New Jersey. These vehicles represented substantially all of Fisker’s then-available Karma inventory in the United States. The Debtors’ insurance carriers denied coverage for the loss. After filing suit, the Debtors settled their coverage claims for an amount far less than the approximately $30 million wholesale value of the destroyed vehicles in order to avoid the risk and cost of protracted litigation with their insurance carriers.B. Prepetition Covenant Defaults and Capital-Raising Efforts43. As noted above, the DOE Loan Agreement required the Debtors to achieve various performance milestones, including the Debtors’ obligation to sell 11,000 Fisker sedans by February 29, 2012. Fisker did not achieve certain of these milestones in light of, among other things, the performance challenges discussed above. The Debtors’ operating position was further complicated in 2011 when DOE informed the Debtors that it would not honor future disbursement requests under the DOE Facility, and since that time DOE has ceased all funding under the DOE Facility. The Debtors subsequently engaged in good faith negotiations with DOE regarding modification or waiver of certain conditions imposed by the DOE Loan Agreement, through which the Debtors agreed to raise additional equity capital to fund operations and improve the Debtors’ overall capitalization. Since DOE suspended its funding commitments in 2011, the Debtors raised16 On April 17, 2013, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware approved the Debtors’ stipulation with A123 settling the Debtors’ claims against A123—the approximately $48.7 million warranty claim and a $91.2 million contract damages claim—for approximately $15 million. In re A123 Sys., Inc., No. 12-12859 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 16, 2012) [Docket No. 1467]. The Debtors subsequently sold their warranty claim, and, pursuant to their settlement, the Debtors’ $91.2 million contract damages claim was disallowed.18DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001approximately $500 million of new capital in three separate equity raises while continuing negotiations with DOE.C. Prepetition Restructuring Efforts44. Commencing in early 2012, the Debtors began exploring strategic alternatives with respect to their business and operations. To facilitate this process, the Debtors retained Evercore Group L.L.C. (“Evercore”) on two separate occasions to explore strategic alliances, junior equityinvestment opportunities, or, potentially, a going-concern sale transaction with one or more parties with respect to the Debtors’ business. Evercore’s initial efforts led to the exchange of several letters of intent between the Debtors and a major automotive OEM with a respect to a potential strategic alliance. Despite substantial negotiations, including meetings with the Debtors’ management, the parties were ultimately unable to agree to a transaction and terminated further discussions in July 2012.45. The Debtors then reengaged Evercore in December 2012 to search more broadly, and in early 2013 Evercore engaged a worldwide universe of more than 50 prospective strategic and financial investors through a structured process designed to publicize the opportunity and induce interest in a transaction. Again, management was actively involved with discussions with potentially interested parties, and approximately thirteen parties executed non-disclosure agreements and accessed an extensive electronic data room. Of these parties, two submitted preliminary non-binding proposals; however, the Debtors were again unable to reach definitive agreements with any of the potential purchasers, due to the Debtors’ inability to, among other things: (a) secure additional financing to fund a potential sale transaction; (b) reach an agreement with DOE regarding the consensual use of cash collateral to fund a potential chapter 11 case; and (c) secure third-party financing to fund a potential chapter 11 sale process.19DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00146. The Debtors then sought to market their assets for sale in three discrete groups, with the goal of reaching agreements with one or more bidders that would serve as stalking horses for a sale process in chapter 11 that would be funded by either DOE or third parties. Based on information gleaned from their interactions in the prior processes, Evercore re-solicited interest on this basis from fifteen parties. Again, however, the Debtors were unable to reach definitive agreements with any parties, again, largely due to funding issues.47. In addition to these efforts to locate a transaction partner, the Debtors also took substantial additional steps over the past year to address their liquidity position and preserve operational stability as much as reasonably possible. The Debtors engaged financial advisors that facilitated the Debtors’ efforts to preserve liquidity, while permitting executive management to continue to focus on the Debtors’ overall business plan and strategic alternatives. The financial advisors, in conjunction with the Debtors’ management team and Evercore, continued to negotiate with DOE to provide for the Debtors’ continued access to liquidity on a prepetition basis. Similarly, the Debtors implemented a cash preservation plan that facilitated the Debtors’ efforts to maintain liquidity as they continued to explore strategic alternatives.48. Despite their extensive efforts to preserve cash and execute on a restructuring transaction outside a chapter 11 process, no transaction with investors or purchasers materialized, and the Debtors’ liquidity position continued to deteriorate. As a result, the Debtors made the difficult decision to implement nonpaid employee furloughs and a series of headcount reductions, including voluntary attrition, beginning during the spring of 2013.49. The Debtors continued to explore potential strategic alternatives, but were unsuccessful until their universe of available restructuring alternatives materially shifted in mid-2013 when DOE commenced a marketing and auction process for its interests under the DOE20DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001Loan Agreement. The DOE auction process commenced on September 17, 2013, when DOE publicized its plan to sell its interests through a competitive auction. The Debtors actively facilitated diligence and engaged with DOE throughout this process, and it is my understanding that DOE received over twenty written expressions of interest in performing due diligence and participating in the auction process. I further understand that those expressing interest were contacted by DOE’s financial advisor, Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc. (“Houlihan”), and over half of the potentiallyinterested parties executed non-disclosure agreements with DOE and the Debtors. Approximately half of these potentially interested parties that executed non-disclosure agreements ultimately submitted binding bids before the October 7, 2013 bid deadline, and I further understand that Houlihan conducted the final, live phase of the auction on October 11, 2013. An affiliate of the Purchaser was the successful bidder, and the parties closed the loan purchase on November 22, 2013.50. Recognizing that the DOE marketing and auction process would provide the Debtors with an opportunity to move forward with their restructuring process, the Debtors entered into extensive arm’s-length discussions with the Purchaser regarding the Purchaser’s potential acquisition of certain of the Debtors’ assets through a credit bid of all or part of the DOE loan. These discussions culminated in the parties’ entry into the Purchase Agreement described below.D. The Proposed Sale51. Contemporaneously herewith, the Debtors filed a motion (the “Sale Motion”) seeking authorization of a sale, pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, of substantially all of the Debtors’ assets to the Purchaser free and clear of all claims, liens, and other encumbrances pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code in exchange for, among other things: (a) $75 million in the form of a credit bid of claims owned by the Purchaser under the DOE loan; (b) the Purchaser’s agreement to waive $4 million of claims held by the Purchaser or its affiliates under the Debtors’21DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001proposed postpetition financing;17 and (c) the assumption of customary liabilities in accordance with the Purchase Agreement. In addition, the Purchaser has committed to support the Debtors’ proposed chapter 11 plan by, among other things, funding up to $725,000 in creditor distributions pursuant to the Plan, each as set forth more fully in the Purchase Agreement.52. In evaluating the benefits and issues associated with another marketing process, the Debtors determined that a sale to a third party other than the Purchaser was highly unlikely to generate greater value than the Debtors’ proposed sale transaction or advisable under the facts and circumstances of these chapter 11 cases. Specifically, as the Debtors’ senior secured lender, the Purchaser holds approximately $168.5 million in claims secured by substantially all of the Debtors’ assets. As a result, I believe the Purchaser holds an overwhelming advantage in any prospective sale process. Thus, given that a competitive auction process or pursuing a potential transaction with an entity other than the Purchaser would be highly unlikely to increase value for the Debtors’ estates—particularly given the extensive prepetition marketing efforts conducted by both the Debtors and DOE prior to the date hereof—the Sale Motion seeks approval of a private sale. The Debtors believe that a private sale will maximize value for the benefit of all creditors and clear the way for the Debtors to expeditiously complete these chapter 11 cases.E. Chapter 11 Plan Process53. The Debtors intend to file their proposed chapter 11 plan promptly after the commencement of these cases. Generally, the Debtors seek to utilize proceeds from the Purchase Agreement, the Purchaser’s additional undertakings to fund creditor recoveries, and their remaining assets to administer these chapter 11 estates, fund creditor recoveries, and bring these chapter 1117 As set forth more fully in the DIP Motion, the Purchaser is also an affiliate of the Debtors’ proposed DIP lender.22DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001cases to a prompt conclusion. The Debtors further anticipate seeking approval of their related disclosure statement and plan confirmation in the near term.