Loan Agreement. Financing For Energy Efficiency & Energy Generation Projects: Fill & Download for Free

China can expand its soft power by continuing to do what it is already doing.In 2005 President Hu⁠[1] asked the UN General Assembly to investigate ”New ways to solve conflicts in international society featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination..distinct from the law of the jungle and power politics to create peaceful, mutual, win-win benefits and development across the world.” He was speaking from experience.In 2001 he had founded the world's most powerful military and security partnership, the Shanghai Cooperative Organization, SCO, that bound Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, India, Pakistan and China in a regional security and stability pact. By 2019 Iran and Afghanistan were considering joining and the SCO was active across Eurasia in global governance and international relations, education, science, technology, health care, environmental protection, tourism, media, sports, humanitarian aid and culture.In 2017, his successor, President Xi⁠[2], suggested developing state-to-state relations through communication rather than confrontation and through partnerships rather than alliances. He called for settling disputes through dialogue and resolving differences through discussion, coordinating responses to traditional and non-traditional threats and opposing terrorism in all its forms. The UN Security Council, the Human Rights Council and the First Committee of the UN General Assembly made the proposal an international consensus and enshrined it in a formal UN Resolution.The following year, he joined Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, Myanmar, Cambodia, Australia and New Zealand–half the world’s population and forty percent of its GDP–and incorporated the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, the world's largest economic bloc, based on Hu’s and Xi’s guidelines. In 2018, after providing $100 billion financing for one hundred sixty projects in the region, China signed an agreement on trade and economic cooperation with the Eurasian Economic Union (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan) and the EU is investigating joining and completing a single, integrated market from the Pacific to the Atlantic, physically connected by networks of fiberoptic cables, satellites, pipelines, roads, rail lines, air and sea ports, reducing trade frictions, security threats and costs.China has also proposed a unique way to reduce currency costs and fluctuations for its trading partners.China has zero interest in supplanting the US$ with the RMB because they see it as a trap: national currencies, in their opinion, must serve national needs–among which is the ability to borrow, tax and spend without regard to international creditors' wishes. So. after the Great Financial Crisis Zhou Xiaochuan, Governor of the Bank of China announced, "The world needs an international reserve currency that is disconnected from individual nations and able to remain stable in the long run, removing the inherent deficiencies caused by using credit-based national currencies.”He proposed the Special Drawing Right, SDR, which derives its value from a dynamic basket of dollars, euros, renminbi, yen and pounds sterling. American Nobelist C. Fred Bergsten was supportive of Zhou's project, "Washington should welcome initiatives put forward over the past year by China to begin a serious discussion of reforming the international monetary system.” Fellow Nobelists Robert Mundell and Joseph Stieglitz added, "The creation of a global currency would restore a needed coherence to the international monetary system, give the IMF a function that would help it to promote stability and be a catalyst for international harmony.”China then made its point by valuing the RMB against a basket of dollars, euros, yen and pounds sterling to demonstrate its stability and predictability and the RMB has been both steady and fairly valued ever since. Have you noticed that all complaints about RMB valuations have fallen silent? After that convincing demonstration,• In 2014 the IMF made its first SDR loan.• In 2016, the World Bank issued the first SDR bond.• In 2017 Standard Chartered Bank issued the first commercial SDR notes.• In 2018, central banks were stating their reserves in SDRs.Do you see a pattern here?The SDR thing went over everyone's heads but China's establishment the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in 2015 that got the Wests' attention. Former US Treasury Secretary Larry Summers called the AIIB’s creation, "The moment the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system. I can think of no event since Bretton Woods⁠ comparable to the combination of China’s effort to establish a major new institution–and the failure of the US to persuade dozens of its traditional allies, starting with Britain–to stay out of it.”The new bank offers patient capital, long-term, government guaranteed, low interest development loans. From 2018 the Bank's 2018 report: "The AIIB Board of Directors has approved a loan of up to $200 million to the Industrial Development Bank of Turkey (TSKB), backed by a guarantee from the Government of Turkey. The loan will support long-term financing, primarily for renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. The existence of a long-term financing gap for infrastructure in Turkey exposes projects to refinancing or rollover risk. This project will help to fill this gap. The investment will also support renewable energy projects that can qualify for the Turkish government’s Renewable Energy Support Mechanism. The loan will finance renewable energy projects, including solar, hydropower, wind, geothermal, biomass and energy efficiency projects, and to a lesser extent in other infrastructure sectors, such as transport, water management and treatment, power transmission and telecommunications.”For the foreseeable future, Eurasia will need a trillion dollars each year for infrastructure, poverty reduction, growth and climate change mitigation.For the foreseeable future, Eurasia’s four billion savers, banks and insurance companies will generate a trillions of dollars that need to be invested in government-guaranteed bonds.For the foreseeable future, the AIIB will make it possible for them to do so in their local currencies, mobilizing money that has had few creative or trustworthy outlets heretofore.For the foreseeable future, China’s core strengths will be providing faster, better and cheaper infrastructure, poverty reduction and climate change mitigation and to do this Beijing created the Belt and Road Initiative, a plan to funnel savings into synergistic development projects around the globe.By integrating sixty-six countries, four billion people and forty percent of the world’s trade, the BRI is changing the planet’s economies, trade, logistics, communications, international relations and even its geography. To create it the Chinese President and Premier visited all sixty-six countries (some several times), signed hundreds of political, legal, financial and regulatory agreements and funded the Silk Road International Bank. It mobilizes local savings by allowing members to finance, insure, import and export goods and services in their national currencies, as The New York Times reported presciently in 2017.Chinese money is building power plants in Pakistan to address chronic electricity shortages, part of an expected $46 billion worth of investment. Chinese planners are mapping out train lines from Budapest, Hungary to Belgrade, Serbia, providing another artery for Chinese goods flowing into Europe through a Chinese-owned port in Greece. The massive infrastructure projects, along with hundreds of others across Asia, Africa and Europe form the backbone of China’s ambitious economic and geopolitical agenda.China is literally and figuratively forging ties, creating new markets for the country’s construction companies and exporting its model of state-led development in a quest to create deep economic connections and strong diplomatic relationships. The initiative, called ‘One Belt, One Road,’ looms on a scope and scale with little precedent in modern history, promising more than $1 trillion in infrastructure and spanning more than 60 countries... Mr. Xi is aiming to use China’s wealth and industrial know-how to create a new kind of globalization that will dispense with the rules of the aging Western-dominated institutions. The goal is to refashion the global economic order, drawing countries and companies more tightly into China’s orbit. It is impossible for any foreign leader, multinational executive or international banker to ignore China’s push to remake global trade. American influence in the region is seen to be waning.Projects like the $51 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor–two thousand miles of roads, rail lines, pipelines and fiberoptic cables–are slashed communications costs across Eurasia and even promising to put the region at the forefront of 5G deployment. ‘Peaceful, mutual, win-win’ projects like oil and gas pipelines from Pakistan’s new port of Gwadar, on the Persian Gulf, to Kunming, China bypass the Malacca Straits. The Pan-Asia Railway Network has begun linking Laos, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Vietnam and Cambodia, and Russia has begun work on the Western end of a projected high speed rail line designed to run from Moscow to Beijing and North Korea is proposed as the development hub for East Asia. Africa, integral to the BRI, opened five hundred miles of its first transcontinental railway–from Djibouti to Addis Ababa–in 2017 and the new Nairobi-Mombasa line is being extended to a new port on Kenya’s north coast while work continues on six more rail lines, four deep ocean ports, inland rail terminals and thirty cross-border transmission and communications projects. By 2019, BRI had delivered six major railway lines, started eight more and accounted for one-third of China’s total trade.By 2018 China had invested $1.6 trillion in eighty generation and transmission projects across Latin America, Africa, Europe and North America so Beijing launched the Global Electric Interconnect, GEI, a grid of ultra-high voltages lines transmitting clean energy around the globe continually, following the sun. Its CEO is the former head of the world’s biggest power company and, by 2050, the GEI expects to boost economic growth, lower electricity bills, create a hundred million jobs and eliminate billions of tons of carbon emissions across the globe.China has also created the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, RCEP, a multilateral free trade partnership of half the world’s people, linking Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand. If signed by 2020, RCEP will increase global real incomes by $286 billion per year by 2030 and, by 2045, the entire Eurasian continent will be bound by treaties, roads, railways, ports, fiberoptic cables, electrical grids and pipelines and China new world order will contribute to China’s rebirth, strength and prosperity. Mao would be pleased.Historian David Graeber[⁠3] says China has plans for America, too, ”There's every reason to believe that, from China's point of view, this is the first stage of a very long process of reducing the United States to something like a traditional Chinese client state.”Now that’s what I call soft power!–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––-1 Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity. Speech by H.E. Hu Jintao to the United Nations Summit, New York, September 15, 20052 ‘Work Together to Build a Community with Shared Future for Mankind’ . January 2017. Later incorporated in a UN resolution by the 55th UN Commission for Social Development3 Debt, the First 5,000 Years. David Graeber

Solar Power industry in India is gaining more and more prominence with each passing day. The domestic/off-grid industry is picking up speed too. Owing to the queries I am receiving regarding the various issues pertaining to Solar Power Plant setup, I thought it would be a great idea to put together a bunch of questions and answer the same.GeneralHow much land is required to setup a 1MW solar power generation Unit?The land required for a 1 MW power plant setup is around 4.5-5 acres for Crystalline technology and around 6.5-7.5 acres for Thin-Film technology. This is only a rough benchmark and may vary based on technology and efficiency of panels.What is the life-time of a typical Solar Power plant?The useful life of a typical Solar Power plant is considered to be 25 years. This is the duration for which long-term PPAs are signed and financial models are built. However, Solar Power plants can run beyond 25 years while producing a lower output. Many Solar Panel manufacturers guarantee an output of 90% at the end of 10 years and 80% at the end of 25 years.What is the annual energy generated from a 1 MW Solar Power plant?The usual benchmark for energy generated from a 1 MW Solar Power plant is considered as 1.5 Million units. This is only a benchmark and should not be considered as the actual output for a given location. The amount of actual energy generated from a Solar Power Plant in an year depends on both internal and external factors. External factors which are beyond the control of a Solar developer can include the following:Number of sunny daysSolar IrradiationDay TemperaturesAir MassThe output also depends on the following internal factors all of which are within the control of a Solar Developer:Plant LocationUsage of Solar Tracking systemsQuality of equipment usedWorkmanship of the EPC contractorO&M activitiesWhat are the various modes under which we can setup a Solar Power plant?The various modes under which a Solar Power plant can be setup depends on the specific requirement. All the following are valid modes and the costs for each kind of system varies based on various factors:Off-Grid Captive Consumption for domestic premisesOff-Grid Captive Consumption for commercial premisesGrid Connected (Net Metered) Captive Consumption for domestic premisesGrid Connected (Net Metered) Captive Consumption for commercial premisesSale of Power generated to local Distribution Company (DISCOM)Sale of Power generated to 3rd Party consumer (Industry or Commercial entity)What is the cost of setting up a Rooftop Solar Power plant for domestic or commercial use?Rooftop Solar Power plants can be broadly categorized into Battery-based and Non-Battery based systems. The benchmark cost set by MNRE for the year 2013-14 for these systems are Rs.90-100 per W for Non-Battery based systems and Rs.170-210 per W for Battery-based systems. More details can be accessed on the following MNRE webpage: http://mnre.gov.in/file-manager/UserFiles/amendmends-benchmarkcost-aa-jnnsm-2013-14.pdfWhat size Solar Power plant is required for domestic or commercial use?Identifying the Solar Power plant size for your domestic or commercial premises depends on the following factors:Wattage of appliances to be run on SolarMonthly energy consumption from these appliancesEnergy Backup or Days of Autonomy requiredRoof space available for plant setupBased on these factors, the power plant sizing can be accordingly done at your end.And now one of the most Important question:-How do I calculate ROI on my Solar Plant?There are ways in which you can generate a report to get an estimated ROI for the solar power plant. Various websites such as Helical Power for example, provides a Solar PV pre-feasibility report that provides valuable technical information and bankable financial analysis required for better decision making prior to investing in a solar plant. It also contains Solar data, system sizing, solar energy potential of your site, performance ratio, system cost, Internal Rate of Return (IRR), Net Present Value (NPV), payback period, etcPermissions and Bank LoansWhat permissions/clearances are required to setup a Solar PV Plant?A certain set of permissions need to be obtained and documents need to be submitted in order to setup a Solar PV plant. While these may vary from state-to-state, in order to get a Solar PV Project Accredited by AP State Load Dispatch Center (AP SLDC) for REC mechanism, the following are the statutory clearances and environmental clearances to be furnished:Industrial ClearanceLand conversion (Agricultural to Non-Agricultural)Environmental Clearance CertificateContract labour license from Gujarat Labour DepartmentFire Safety certificate from Gujarat Fire DepartmentLatest tax receipt from the Municipal/Gram Panchayat for the factory land.Auditor compliance certificate regarding fossil fuel utilizationApproval from Chief Electrical InspectorClearance from Forest departmentAlso, all necessary approvals/agreements before start of Solar PV project construction are to be furnished as and when necessary. These include the following:Land purchasePower Evacuation arrangement permission letter from DISCOMConfirmation of Metering Arrangement and locationABT meter type, Manufacture, Model, Serial No. details for Energy Metering.Copy of PPA (important as Preferential PPA projects are not eligible for REC mechanism)Proposed Model and make of plant equipmentUndertaking for compliance with the usage of fossil fuel criteria as specified by MNREDetails of Connectivity with DISCOMConnectivity Diagram and Single Line Diagram of PlantDetails of pending court cases with APERC, Supreme Court of India, High Court of A.P. or any other courtsAny other documents requested by AP SLDCWhile these are the documents that AP SLDC requires for REC project accreditation, these are typically the clearances/documents required in general for a Solar PV project.Can Solar Power developers avail loans from banks for Solar Power plant setup? What is the loan % and what criteria does a bank/lending institution look for?There are 2 kinds of Financing mechanisms that are usually discussed – Recourse Financing and Non-Recourse Financing. Recourse Financing requires collaterals and other extensive guarantees from the Solar developer who wishes to avail loan. Non-Recourse Financing, on the other hand, does not require any additional collateral as the Asset or Power Plant itself is the collateral in this case. Recourse Financing is the prevalent mechanism in India currently owing to lack of confidence of banks in the Power and Solar Power sector. The typical Debt-Equity Ratio (Loan to Investment Ratio) for Solar Power plants is 70:30. And the typical collaterals required for a 70% project cost loan could be in the range of 40-60% project cost. This, however, varies from bank to bank as each bank has its own risk perception/mitigation strategy, exposure targets to various sectors and Non-Performing Asset (NPA) limits.You can also look for financing options at Helical Power through their financing solutions for renewable sources of energy.Hope this Helps. Good Luck!

Excerpt from an official bankruptcy document filed 11/22/13:Preliminary Statement1. The Debtors were founded in 2007 with the goal of designing, assembling, and manufacturing premium plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (“PHEVs”). To facilitate these efforts, the United States Department of Energy (“DOE”) arranged for loans to the Debtors from the Federal Financing Bank (the “FFB”) in an aggregate amount of up to approximately $530 million pursuant to the Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program.2 The Debtors drew a total of approximately $192 million on these loans and also raised significant amounts of equity financing2 The Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program was promulgated under section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, 42 U.S.C. § 17013.2DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001from a wide range of venture capital, private equity, and sovereign wealth funds. Beginning in 2007, the Debtors established a global network of vendors, suppliers, distributors, and retailers, along with an international reputation for both their award-winning Karma sedan and their innovative hybrid electric powertrain technology. The Karma sedan is the world’s first environmentally responsible luxury PHEV and was the centerpiece of the Debtors’ prepetition manufacturing and sales efforts. The Debtors sold approximately 1,800 Karma sedans to individual buyers through a global network of independent retailers and distributors.2. Despite these accomplishments, the Debtors were unable to achieve certain financial covenants and project milestones embedded in their loan agreements with DOE. In particular, the Debtors’ loan agreements with DOE originally required the Debtors to produce, manufacture, and sell 11,000 Karma sedans by February 2012. But the Debtors were obliged to delay serial production of the Karma until October 2011 for a number of reasons, including completion of vehicle and manufacturing engineering, finalizing tooling and component specifications with the Debtors’ supply chain, and completing safety and emissions testing and certifications.3. Further, once serial production of the Karma began, vehicle sales failed to meet expectations. Factors affecting sales included negative press, initial quality and performance issues, lingering effects of the global financial recession, and challenges arising from the Debtors’ supply chain. For example, the high-voltage battery packs for the Karma, an essential component for any electric vehicle, and which were manufactured exclusively by A123 Systems, Inc.3 (“A123”), exhibited a number of performance problems. The Debtors initiated a voluntary safety recall for a small number of Karma vehicles almost immediately following the Karma’s 2011 launch relating to A123’s misalignment of internal hose clamps. A123 also announced a service campaign in3 A123 Systems, Inc. has since changed its name to B456 Systems, Inc.3DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001March 2012 relating to a manufacturing defect that affected the durability and performance of all battery packs manufactured at A123’s Livonia, Michigan facility. Moreover, A123 suspended Karma battery production in October 2012 when it sought bankruptcy protection.4 As a result, the Debtors were left without a high-voltage battery supplier, and the Debtors have not restarted Karma vehicle production since a previously scheduled seasonal shutdown commenced in July 2012.4. The Debtors have at all times been mindful of their commitments to stakeholders, their obligation to preserve and maximize value, and the public interest at issue here. To this end, and as discussed in greater detail below, the Debtors explored a series of alternatives to obtain financing to fulfill these commitments and to maximize stakeholder value, including with respect to DOE. Among other things, the Debtors sought additional equity and debt financing to refinance the DOE loan and provide additional working capital. More recently, the Debtors engaged with financial sponsors, original equipment manufacturers (“OEMs”), and other parties regarding astrategic investment or a going concern transaction. In this process, the Debtors retained experienced investment banking, financial, and restructuring advisors to facilitate their review, analysis, and development of potential alternatives.5 The Debtors also undertook steps to minimize costs and to preserve liquidity. These steps included, among other things, the difficult determination to conduct headcount reductions and to initiate nonpaid employee furloughs in the spring of 2013. Notwithstanding these efforts, the Debtors’ cash position continued to erode.5. To preserve and maximize value, the Debtors sought to implement a sale process in connection with a chapter 11 filing. Throughout the spring of 2013, the Debtors engaged in4 As discussed more fully below, A123 ultimately rejected its exclusive supply agreement with the Debtors effective as of February 2013.5 See infra Part II.C (discussing the Debtor’s prepetition restructuring efforts).4DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001substantial, good faith negotiations with DOE regarding the Debtors’ consensual use of its cash collateral to help fund a chapter 11 case and sale process. Despite significant efforts by the parties, these negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, and DOE applied the approximately $20 million of cash that it controlled to the Debtors’ outstanding indebtedness.6. Since that time, the Debtors have operated with limited junior funding provided by related parties. The Debtors’ operations have remained curtailed, and headcount reductions have continued through both additional layoffs and voluntary attrition. The Debtors have also continued to engage in discussions and negotiations surrounding various restructuring transactions in an effort to maximize stakeholder value. Meanwhile, DOE conducted a public marketing and auction process for the purchase of its interests in the DOE loan pursuant to a competitive auction process. On October 7, 2013, an affiliate of Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC emerged as the successful bidder, and the parties closed the loan purchase on November 22, 2013.7. Recognizing that this purchase would provide the Debtors with an opportunity to move forward, the Debtors entered into extensive arm’s-length discussions with Hybrid Tech Holdings, LLC (the “Purchaser”) and its affiliates regarding the Purchaser’s potential acquisition ofcertain of the Debtors’ assets through a credit bid of all or part of the DOE loan. These discussions culminated in the parties’ entry into a purchase agreement (the “Purchase Agreement”), as more fully described herein, pursuant to which the Purchaser would acquire substantially all the Debtors assets, with the remainder of the estates’ assets to be administered through a chapter 11 plan of liquidation. The Debtors have commenced these chapter 11 cases to facilitate a timely and efficient sale and plan process that will preserve and maximize the value of the Debtors’ estates.8. To familiarize the Court with the Debtors and the relief sought at the outset of these chapter 11 cases, this Declaration is organized in three parts. Part I provides an overview of the5DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001Debtors’ historical operations and capital structure. Part II describes the events leading up to the commencement of these chapter 11 cases. Part III sets forth the relevant facts supporting the relief requested by the First Day Motions.Part I: The DebtorsA. Overview of the Debtors’ Corporate History and Business Operations1. The Debtors’ History and Operations13. The Debtors were formed in 2007 with the goal of designing, engineering, and manufacturing premium PHEVs. To this end, the Debtors developed an electric vehicle with extended range, which they trademarked as “EVer.” The Debtors also established an international reputation as a leading developer of premium extended range PHEVs. The Debtors’ Karma sedan is the world’s first environmentally responsible luxury PHEV, and was developed by a highly skilled team of automotive designers and engineers located in the United States. The Karma sedan was also the centerpiece of the Debtors’ operations and won awards for excellence, innovation, and environmental responsibility from Time magazine (identifying the Karma as one of the “Green Design 100” in 2009), Top Gear Magazine (identifying the Karma as “Luxury Car of the Year” in 2011), and Automobile Magazine (identifying the Karma as “Design of the Year” in 2012).Fisker Vehicle DesignsKarma Sedan Atlantic Sedan (Concept)6DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00114. The Karma sedans were assembled by Valmet Automotive, Inc. (“Valmet”) in Uusikaupunki, Finland. The Debtors had planned, however, to build future vehicles at a company-owned and -operated assembly facility in the United States to improve volumes and to leverage their design, engineering, and technical expertise.15. To that end, in July 2010, the Debtors acquired a manufacturing facility covering approximately 3.2 million square feet located on approximately 142 acres at 801 Boxwood Road, Wilmington, Delaware (the “Delaware Facility”). The Debtors purchased the Delaware Facilitythrough the General Motors bankruptcy proceedings for a cash purchase price of approximately $21 million. The Delaware Facility is equipped with a number of technical and utility systems for automotive manufacturing, including a paint facility, powerhouse capability, a conveyor system, a wastewater treatment facility, and an emissions abatement system. The Debtors have not conducted active operations at that location.16. The Debtors obtained components and systems for the Karma’s assembly through a number of third-party supply relationships. For example, the Debtors had a licensing and tool use agreement with a General Motors affiliate. Through this relationship, the Debtors were able to purchase parts and components directly from suppliers that also sold to General Motors and use General Motors tooling to manufacture the parts or components. In addition, the Debtors relied on a number of “single source” suppliers for particular components. One such “single source” supplier was A123, whom the Debtors contracted with in January 2010 to act as the exclusive manufacturer of the Karma sedan’s high-voltage battery pack, as discussed more fully below.17. The Debtors began delivering the Karma sedan for sale to the general public in October 2011. This milestone was the culmination of the Debtors’ four-year effort to bring the Karma sedan from design, to concept car, to finished product ready for the showroom floor. The7DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001Karma sedan retailed for approximately $100,000 to $120,000, subject to consumer specifications and corresponding purchase price adjustments. The Debtors assembled approximately 2,700 Karma sedans, and approximately 1,800 Karma sedans have been sold to individual customers.18. The Debtors also planned to have another platform, the “N” or “Nina Platform,” which included the prototype Atlantic sedan. The Debtors made significant progress developing the N Platform, including entering into a number of additional supply and service agreements with third-party vendors and suppliers. These agreements included an engine purchase, supply, and development agreement with Bayerische Moteren Werke Aktiengesellschaft, or BMW. The Debtors first unveiled the Atlantic sedan at the April 2012 New York Auto Show, but have not engaged in active production of the Atlantic sedan or other N Platform derivatives.2. The Debtors’ Sales Network and Customers19. The Debtors sold the Karma sedan in the United States and Canada through a network of independent retailers located throughout the United States and Canada (each, a “Retailer”). In addition, the Debtors sold the Karma sedan in Europe, the Middle East, and China through local, independent distributors (each, a “Distributor”). Typically, Retailers and Distributors would purchase vehicles from the Debtors and then hold the vehicles for sale to the general public. A “Retail Agreement” or “Distributorship Agreement” typically governed each relationship among the parties.20. The Retail Agreements and Distributorship Agreements generally provided that the Retailers and Distributors would purchase vehicles directly from the Debtors and then hold those vehicles for sale in an assigned geographic territory. In certain circumstances, these Retailers and Distributors hold the right to compel the Debtors to repurchase their vehicles. Additionally, while the Retailers and Distributors bear primary responsibility for performing warranty repairs associated with sold vehicles, these warranty repairs may be subject to reimbursement from the Debtors.8DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/0013. The Debtors’ Employees21. The Debtors currently employ approximately 21 full-time employees, located primarily at their Anaheim, California headquarters, and primarily tasked with engineering, product development, financial, and reporting functions. None of the Debtors’ employees are subject to a collective bargaining agreement. The Debtors’ current staffing level reflects significant headcount reductions and voluntary attrition in the period prior to these chapter 11 filings.4. Fisker GmbH22. Fisker Automotive GmbH (“Fisker GmbH”), a non-Debtor in these cases, was a wholly owned subsidiary of Fisker Automotive, Inc. organized under the laws of Germany. Fisker GmbH’s office was located in Munich, Germany, and provided international sales and marketing services to the Debtors. Fisker GmbH has no active operations.B. Overview of the Debtors’ Capital Structure23. As of the Petition Date, the Debtors had approximately $203.2 million in funded debt and related obligations outstanding, consisting of the DOE Facility, the SVB Working Capital Facility, the DEDA Loan, and the Related Party Notes (each as defined herein). As of the Petition Date, the Debtors’ funded debt obligations, excluding accrued interest, are summarized as follows:$ millionsDOE Facility $168.5SVB Working Capital Facility $6.6DEDA Loan $12.5Related Party Notes $15.6Total: $203.2In addition, the Debtors have obligations under a number of contractual and vendor-related agreements, including with respect to various prepetition supply and assembly agreements. These obligations are discussed in turn.9DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/0011. The DOE Facilitya. The DOE Facility Generally24. Fisker Automotive, Inc., as borrower (“Fisker Automotive”), Fisker Automotive Holdings, Inc. (“Fisker Automotive Holdings”), and DOE are parties to that certain Loan Arrangement and Reimbursement Agreement, dated as of April 22, 2010 (the “DOE Loan Agreement”).6Pursuant to the DOE Loan Agreement, DOE agreed to, among otherthings:(a) arrange for purchases by the FFB of notes from Fisker Automotive in an amount not to exceed $169.3 million to fund the development, commercial production, sale and marketing, and all related engineering integration of the Debtors’ Karma sedan (the “Karma Lending Facility”); and(b) arrange for purchases by the FFB of notes from Fisker Automotive in an amount not to exceed $359.4 million to fund the development, commercial production, and sale and marketing of the Debtors’ Nina model automobile, now known as the Atlantic sedan, including the establishment and construction of an assembly and production site in the United States (the “Nina Lending Facility,” and, together with the Karma Lending Facility, the “DOE Facility”).7 Fisker Automotive Holdings unconditionally guaranteed obligations arising under the DOE Facility pursuant to that certain ParentGuarantee, dated as of April 22, 2010, made by Fisker Automotive Holdings in favor of DOE, FFB, and certain holders of notes. As discussed in detail below, on November 22, 2013, DOE sold its rights under the DOE Loan Agreement and certain related agreements to an affiliate of the Purchaser.6 See The Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturing Incentive Program, which was promulgated under section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. 110-140, 121 Stat. 1492, 42 U.S.C.§ 17013.7 Pursuant to that certain Program Financing Agreement, dated as of September 16, 2009, between DOE and FFB, DOE is obligated to reimburse FFB for any liabilities, losses, costs, or expenses incurred by FFB from time to time with respect to the Notes or the related Note Purchase Agreement (each as defined in the DOE Loan Agreement).10DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00125. As of the Petition Date, the Debtors estimate that they had approximately $168.5 million in principal outstanding under the DOE Facility. Interest on the Karma Lending Facility is payable quarterly, bears interest at a weighted average interest rate of 2.00 percent, and was scheduled to mature on April 24, 2017. The Nina Lending Facility bears interest at a weighted average interest rate of 2.60 percent and was scheduled to mature on April 22, 2026. The DOE Loan Agreement further required the Debtors to achieve certain construction, production, manufacturing, and other milestones necessary for the completion of the Karma project and the Nina project, each by certain pre-established dates.26. Obligations arising under the DOE Facility are secured by a first priority lien on substantially all the Debtors’ assets, including personal and real property, pursuant to that certain Amended and Restated Pledge and Security Agreement, dated as of July 30, 2010 (the “Pledge andSecurity Agreement”), between Fisker Automotive and PNC Bank, N.A., d/b/a Midland Loan Services, a division of PNC Bank, N.A., as successor by merger to Midland Loan Services, Inc., as collateral agent (the “Collateral Agent”).827. In particular, DOE held an exclusive, first priority security interest in a debt service reserve account established pursuant to the DOE Loan Agreement (the “DOE Debt Service Reserve Account”), which was controlled by DOE. The DOE Debt Service Reserve Account formerly held approximately $20.6 million of cash. During the spring of 2013, the Debtors engaged in substantial, good-faith negotiations with DOE regarding the Debtors’ access to funds held in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account. However, and despite significant efforts by the parties, these8 The collateral pledged to secure obligations arising under the DOE Facility specifically excludes, among other things, the Debtors’ rights to or interests in any lease, contract, property rights, agreement, or trademark if the grant of a security interests in such property would result in (a) the cancellation or unenforceability of the Debtors’ right or interest, or (b) a breach, default, or termination of any such property (collectively, the “Excluded Assets”).11DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, and DOE applied the funds held in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account to the Debtor’s outstanding indebtedness in March 2013. As of the Petition Date, approximately $0 remains in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account.b. Business Covenants Arising Under the DOE Loan28. In addition to traditional financial reporting, fixed charge, and EBITDA covenants, the DOE Loan Agreement imposed a number of milestones and obligations with respect to the Debtors’ business plan and performance. Among other things, the DOE Loan Agreement required the Debtors to: (a) achieve Karma sales of 11,000 units by February 29, 2012; (b) achieve an average Karma selling price of not less than $87,900 by that time; and (c) obtain $270.0 million of incremental equity financing by October 2010. The covenants and milestones provided under the DOE Loan Agreement materially affected the Debtors’ ability to pursue projects or transactions not contemplated by the business plan originally submitted to DOE in 2010.2. The SVB Working Capital Facility29. Fisker Automotive, as borrower, Fisker Automotive Holdings, as obligor, and Silicon Valley Bank (“SVB”), as lender, are parties to that certain Loan Agreement dated as of July 30, 2010 (the “SVB Loan Agreement”). The SVB Loan Agreement provided for a term loan facility and an asset-based revolving credit facility in the total amount of $21.0 million (the “SVB Working Capital Facility”). As of the Petition Date, a term loan of approximately $6.6 million remains outstanding on the SVB Working Capital Facility, and SVB is no longer providing the Debtors funding under the SVB Loan Agreement. The SVB Working Capital Facility has a weighted average interest rate of 9.00 percent and was scheduled to mature on July 30, 2014.99 Pursuant to correspondence dated April 5, 2013, SVB has taken the position that an event of default occurred under the SVB Loan Agreement on account of an unpaid principal and interest payment due on April 1, 2013.12DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00130. Pursuant to the Pledge and Security Agreement, obligations arising under the SVB Working Capital Facility are also secured by a lien on substantially all the Debtors’ personal property.10 However, the collateral securing the SVB Working Capital Facility excludes, among other things, cash held in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account and the Delaware Facility.3. The DEDA Agreementsa. The DEDA Loan Agreement31. Fisker Automotive, Fisker Automotive Holdings, and the Delaware Economic Development Authority (“DEDA”), a body corporate and politic constituted as an instrumentality of the State of Delaware, are parties to that certain Loan and Security Agreement dated as of December 10, 2010 (the “DEDA Loan Agreement”). The DEDA Loan Agreement provided for a$12.5 million interest-free loan (the “DEDA Loan”) to the Debtors,11 the proceeds of which were to be used to fund the Debtors’ infrastructure improvements and upgrades at the Delaware Facility.12 As of the Petition Date, approximately $12.5 million remains outstanding under the DEDA Loan, which was scheduled to mature June 1, 2015.32. Obligations arising under the DEDA Loan are secured by a security interest in substantially all the Debtors’ personal and real property, including the Delaware Facility, although such collateral excludes the cash held in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account and the Excluded10 On July 30, 2010, Fisker Automotive, Fisker Automotive Holdings, and the Collateral Agent, on behalf of DOE and SVB, entered into that certain Amended and Restated Collateral Agency Agreement, which created certain payment priorities between the DOE and SVB with respect to proceeds from different pools of collateral securing the Debtors’ obligations to DOE and SVB.11 The DEDA Loan Agreement was entered-into by the DEDA pursuant to the Delaware Strategic Fund Program, 29 Del. C. §§ 5027–29 (the “Delaware Fund Program”).12 The DEDA Loan Agreement provides that, subject to Fisker Automotive satisfying certain conditions set forth in the DEDA Loan Agreement relating to the employment of full-time employees and capital expenditures at the Delaware Facility, on or after June 1, 2015, up to the full amount of the DEDA Loan could convert to a grant. As of the date hereof, these milestones have not been achieved.13DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001Assets.13 On December 10, 2010, Fisker Automotive, Fisker Automotive Holdings, and DOE entered into that certain Third Amendment to the DOE Loan Agreement (the “Third Amendment”) requiring the Debtors to establish a collateral reserve account (the “DEDA Reserve Account”) withthe Collateral Agent. DOE controls the DEDA Reserve Account and has the power to direct the Collateral Agent to disburse funds held in the DEDA Reserve Account. DOE used this power shortly after its seizure of the cash in the DOE Debt Service Reserve Account to also sweep the cash in the DEDA Reserve Account. Thus, approximately $0 remains in the DEDA Reserve Account as of the Petition Date.b. The DEDA Grant33. Fisker Automotive and DEDA are also parties to that certain Grant Agreement dated as of December 10, 2010 (the “DEDA Grant”), pursuant to which DEDA granted up to $9.0 million to Fisker Automotive under the Delaware Fund Program to be used to offset utility costs incurred while the Debtors renovated and upgraded the Delaware Facility. Payments under the DEDA Grant were disbursed to Fisker Automotive from time to time as needed to reimburse the Debtors for “Eligible Utility Costs,” which are generally defined by the DEDA Grant to cover certain utility costs incurred during the renovation of the Delaware Facility. DEDA provided approximately $7.5 million in funding pursuant to the DEDA Grant, but is no longer providing the Debtors with additional funding. All or a portion of the DEDA Grant will convert to an interest-free loan upon the occurrence of certain conditions, including the Debtors’ failure to employ at least 1,495 full-time13 As discussed more fully in the Motion of the Debtors for Entry of Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing Postpetition Financing, (II) Granting Liens and Providing Superpriority Administrative Expense Priority, (III) Authorizing Use of Cash Collateral, (IV) Granting Adequate Protection, (V) Modifying the Automatic Stay, and (VI) Scheduling a Final Hearing Pursuant to Sections 105, 361, 362, and 364(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules 2002, 4001, and 9014 (the “DIP Motion”), the DEDA Subordination Agreement (as defined therein) subordinates DEDA’s interest in the collateral to those of DOE and SVB.14DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001employees at the Delaware Facility on March 1, 2015, or upon the occurrence of an event of default under the DEDA Loan Agreement.4. The Related Party Notes34. Commencing on April 16, 2013, the Debtors received approximately $15.6 million in financing on an unsecured basis through a series of promissory notes and loan agreements (collectively, the “Related Party Notes”) entered into by the Debtors and certain related parties,including Ace Strength International Limited, FAH Loan Purchase Fund, LLC, GSR Principals Fund IV, L.P., GSR Special Situation I Limited, GSR Ventures IV, L.P., JR Holdings IV, Ltd., and SugarPine Kids Trust and certain of their respective Affiliates. The Related Party Notes bear interest at a fixed rate of 10% per annum and were used to fund prepetition working capital needs and for other prepetition general corporate purposes. The Related Party Notes mature on the later to occur of (a) the sale, transfer, or disposition of all or substantially all the Debtors’ assets; (b) the Debtors’ dissolution or liquidation; or (c) 12 months from the date of the applicable promissory note, unless terminated earlier pursuant to their terms.5. Other Claims35. The Debtors’ capital structure also includes certain claims that may be secured by either security agreements or statutory or possessory liens. For example, Valmet holds certain work in progress and other inventory and has asserted its right to liquidate this inventory to satisfy claims that may be owing to Valmet. The Debtors are also parties to a number of supply and assembly agreements that give rise to substantial obligations on account of such agreements, including obligations relating to accounts payable, material authorizations and suspended shipments, and obligations for the settlement of certain volume-related charges under the Valmet Agreement, although analysis of such obligations remains ongoing. In addition, the Debtors are subject to a significant level of litigation and collection proceedings pending as of the Petition Date.15DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/0016. Equity36. The Debtors are privately held. Fisker Automotive Holdings is owned by a diverse group of venture capital, private equity, and sovereign wealth funds, as well as private individuals. The Debtors’ equity capital consists of common stock and seven series of convertible preferred stock. Fisker Automotive Holdings, in turn, owns 100 percent of the shares in Fisker Automotive.Part II: Events Leading to the Chapter 11 Cases37. Since their inception, the Debtors pursued a strategy committed to the design, development, engineering, and production of high performance and environmentally responsible PHEVs. This strategy was reflected by the Debtors’ loan agreements, through which the Debtors were obliged to, among other things, achieve sales in excess of 11,000 vehicles less than 5 years from their initial inception and to employ approximately 1,500 full-time employees in automobile manufacturing here in the United States. The Debtors’ ability to achieve their original sales and production goals, however, was limited by a combination of negative press, lingering effects of the global financial recession, unforeseen business disruptions, and liquidity shortfalls, among other factors.A. Challenging Operating Environment38. The Debtors, like most OEMs, were responsible for the overall engineering, design, and development of the Karma sedan. In this process, the Debtors leveraged the expertise of a wide range of suppliers and service providers to complete the engineering work and to manufacture the thousands of parts and components necessary to complete each Karma sedan. In addition, and as noted above, Karma assembly was contracted to Valmet under the Valmet Agreement—although, the Debtors’ business plan contemplated that assembly operations could ultimately be brought “in house.” As a result, Karma production remained dependent on the seamless interaction of suppliers located across North America, Europe, and Asia.16DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00139. Building the Fisker platform, supply chain, and network of Retailers and Distributors from scratch ultimately delayed the initial Karma launch from 2009 until 2011. This delay created significant challenges with respect to the Debtors’ February 2012 deadline to sell more than 11,000 Karma sedans at an average selling price of $87,900, as required by the DOE Loan Agreement.14 The Debtors further believe that sales were adversely affected by negative press with respect to Karma performance, their existing liquidity position, and the A123 battery recall.40. In particular, these challenges were exacerbated by severe complications arising from the Debtors’ relationship with A123. As noted above, A123 was formerly the exclusive high-voltage battery pack manufacturer for the Karma sedan. The Debtors encountered a number of issues with the performance of the A123 battery packs almost immediately following the Karma’s launch in October 2011. At or about that time, the Debtors conducted a voluntary safety recall to check and correct a potential misalignment of internal hose clamps within the battery packs. In March 2012, A123 announced a voluntary service campaign to replace all Karma battery packs because of a faulty manufacturing process at A123’s production facility in Livonia, Michigan, that affected the expected performance and durability of the battery packs—the problem that caused a Karma sedan to shutdown during testing by Consumer Reports.41. A123 did not complete the service campaign and later suspended its production of Karma battery packs.15 As a result, the Debtors were left with approximately a $48.7 million warranty claim against A123’s bankruptcy estate and no supply of high-voltage battery packs to14 As noted above, approximately 1,800 Karma sedans have been sold to individual customers.15 A123 sought bankruptcy protection in October 2012 and, following its acquisition by Wanxiang Group Corp. in January 2013, rejected its battery pack supply agreement with the Debtors.17DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001continue Karma production.16 Facing these challenges, the Debtors have not restarted Karma production following a previously scheduled seasonal shutdown that began in July 2012.42. The Debtors suffered an additional loss on October 29, 2012, when Hurricane Sandy and its related windstorms, storm surges, and floods, destroyed approximately 338 Karma sedans located at the port in Newark, New Jersey. These vehicles represented substantially all of Fisker’s then-available Karma inventory in the United States. The Debtors’ insurance carriers denied coverage for the loss. After filing suit, the Debtors settled their coverage claims for an amount far less than the approximately $30 million wholesale value of the destroyed vehicles in order to avoid the risk and cost of protracted litigation with their insurance carriers.B. Prepetition Covenant Defaults and Capital-Raising Efforts43. As noted above, the DOE Loan Agreement required the Debtors to achieve various performance milestones, including the Debtors’ obligation to sell 11,000 Fisker sedans by February 29, 2012. Fisker did not achieve certain of these milestones in light of, among other things, the performance challenges discussed above. The Debtors’ operating position was further complicated in 2011 when DOE informed the Debtors that it would not honor future disbursement requests under the DOE Facility, and since that time DOE has ceased all funding under the DOE Facility. The Debtors subsequently engaged in good faith negotiations with DOE regarding modification or waiver of certain conditions imposed by the DOE Loan Agreement, through which the Debtors agreed to raise additional equity capital to fund operations and improve the Debtors’ overall capitalization. Since DOE suspended its funding commitments in 2011, the Debtors raised16 On April 17, 2013, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware approved the Debtors’ stipulation with A123 settling the Debtors’ claims against A123—the approximately $48.7 million warranty claim and a $91.2 million contract damages claim—for approximately $15 million. In re A123 Sys., Inc., No. 12-12859 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 16, 2012) [Docket No. 1467]. The Debtors subsequently sold their warranty claim, and, pursuant to their settlement, the Debtors’ $91.2 million contract damages claim was disallowed.18DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001approximately $500 million of new capital in three separate equity raises while continuing negotiations with DOE.C. Prepetition Restructuring Efforts44. Commencing in early 2012, the Debtors began exploring strategic alternatives with respect to their business and operations. To facilitate this process, the Debtors retained Evercore Group L.L.C. (“Evercore”) on two separate occasions to explore strategic alliances, junior equityinvestment opportunities, or, potentially, a going-concern sale transaction with one or more parties with respect to the Debtors’ business. Evercore’s initial efforts led to the exchange of several letters of intent between the Debtors and a major automotive OEM with a respect to a potential strategic alliance. Despite substantial negotiations, including meetings with the Debtors’ management, the parties were ultimately unable to agree to a transaction and terminated further discussions in July 2012.45. The Debtors then reengaged Evercore in December 2012 to search more broadly, and in early 2013 Evercore engaged a worldwide universe of more than 50 prospective strategic and financial investors through a structured process designed to publicize the opportunity and induce interest in a transaction. Again, management was actively involved with discussions with potentially interested parties, and approximately thirteen parties executed non-disclosure agreements and accessed an extensive electronic data room. Of these parties, two submitted preliminary non-binding proposals; however, the Debtors were again unable to reach definitive agreements with any of the potential purchasers, due to the Debtors’ inability to, among other things: (a) secure additional financing to fund a potential sale transaction; (b) reach an agreement with DOE regarding the consensual use of cash collateral to fund a potential chapter 11 case; and (c) secure third-party financing to fund a potential chapter 11 sale process.19DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/00146. The Debtors then sought to market their assets for sale in three discrete groups, with the goal of reaching agreements with one or more bidders that would serve as stalking horses for a sale process in chapter 11 that would be funded by either DOE or third parties. Based on information gleaned from their interactions in the prior processes, Evercore re-solicited interest on this basis from fifteen parties. Again, however, the Debtors were unable to reach definitive agreements with any parties, again, largely due to funding issues.47. In addition to these efforts to locate a transaction partner, the Debtors also took substantial additional steps over the past year to address their liquidity position and preserve operational stability as much as reasonably possible. The Debtors engaged financial advisors that facilitated the Debtors’ efforts to preserve liquidity, while permitting executive management to continue to focus on the Debtors’ overall business plan and strategic alternatives. The financial advisors, in conjunction with the Debtors’ management team and Evercore, continued to negotiate with DOE to provide for the Debtors’ continued access to liquidity on a prepetition basis. Similarly, the Debtors implemented a cash preservation plan that facilitated the Debtors’ efforts to maintain liquidity as they continued to explore strategic alternatives.48. Despite their extensive efforts to preserve cash and execute on a restructuring transaction outside a chapter 11 process, no transaction with investors or purchasers materialized, and the Debtors’ liquidity position continued to deteriorate. As a result, the Debtors made the difficult decision to implement nonpaid employee furloughs and a series of headcount reductions, including voluntary attrition, beginning during the spring of 2013.49. The Debtors continued to explore potential strategic alternatives, but were unsuccessful until their universe of available restructuring alternatives materially shifted in mid-2013 when DOE commenced a marketing and auction process for its interests under the DOE20DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001Loan Agreement. The DOE auction process commenced on September 17, 2013, when DOE publicized its plan to sell its interests through a competitive auction. The Debtors actively facilitated diligence and engaged with DOE throughout this process, and it is my understanding that DOE received over twenty written expressions of interest in performing due diligence and participating in the auction process. I further understand that those expressing interest were contacted by DOE’s financial advisor, Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc. (“Houlihan”), and over half of the potentiallyinterested parties executed non-disclosure agreements with DOE and the Debtors. Approximately half of these potentially interested parties that executed non-disclosure agreements ultimately submitted binding bids before the October 7, 2013 bid deadline, and I further understand that Houlihan conducted the final, live phase of the auction on October 11, 2013. An affiliate of the Purchaser was the successful bidder, and the parties closed the loan purchase on November 22, 2013.50. Recognizing that the DOE marketing and auction process would provide the Debtors with an opportunity to move forward with their restructuring process, the Debtors entered into extensive arm’s-length discussions with the Purchaser regarding the Purchaser’s potential acquisition of certain of the Debtors’ assets through a credit bid of all or part of the DOE loan. These discussions culminated in the parties’ entry into the Purchase Agreement described below.D. The Proposed Sale51. Contemporaneously herewith, the Debtors filed a motion (the “Sale Motion”) seeking authorization of a sale, pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, of substantially all of the Debtors’ assets to the Purchaser free and clear of all claims, liens, and other encumbrances pursuant to section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code in exchange for, among other things: (a) $75 million in the form of a credit bid of claims owned by the Purchaser under the DOE loan; (b) the Purchaser’s agreement to waive $4 million of claims held by the Purchaser or its affiliates under the Debtors’21DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001proposed postpetition financing;17 and (c) the assumption of customary liabilities in accordance with the Purchase Agreement. In addition, the Purchaser has committed to support the Debtors’ proposed chapter 11 plan by, among other things, funding up to $725,000 in creditor distributions pursuant to the Plan, each as set forth more fully in the Purchase Agreement.52. In evaluating the benefits and issues associated with another marketing process, the Debtors determined that a sale to a third party other than the Purchaser was highly unlikely to generate greater value than the Debtors’ proposed sale transaction or advisable under the facts and circumstances of these chapter 11 cases. Specifically, as the Debtors’ senior secured lender, the Purchaser holds approximately $168.5 million in claims secured by substantially all of the Debtors’ assets. As a result, I believe the Purchaser holds an overwhelming advantage in any prospective sale process. Thus, given that a competitive auction process or pursuing a potential transaction with an entity other than the Purchaser would be highly unlikely to increase value for the Debtors’ estates—particularly given the extensive prepetition marketing efforts conducted by both the Debtors and DOE prior to the date hereof—the Sale Motion seeks approval of a private sale. The Debtors believe that a private sale will maximize value for the benefit of all creditors and clear the way for the Debtors to expeditiously complete these chapter 11 cases.E. Chapter 11 Plan Process53. The Debtors intend to file their proposed chapter 11 plan promptly after the commencement of these cases. Generally, the Debtors seek to utilize proceeds from the Purchase Agreement, the Purchaser’s additional undertakings to fund creditor recoveries, and their remaining assets to administer these chapter 11 estates, fund creditor recoveries, and bring these chapter 1117 As set forth more fully in the DIP Motion, the Purchaser is also an affiliate of the Debtors’ proposed DIP lender.22DOCS_DE:190465.1 28353/001cases to a prompt conclusion. The Debtors further anticipate seeking approval of their related disclosure statement and plan confirmation in the near term.