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Yes. Nine years ago we wrote the Mt. Airy Emergency Operations Plan. It has been tested and updated and used in 3 events since then.Emergency Operations PlanMount Airy, MarylandTown Hall is located in downtown Mount Airy at 110 South Main Street, Mount Airy, MD 21771301 829 1424301 831 5768410 795 6012301 829 1259 faxAPPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATIONTown of Mount Airy, MarylandEmergency Operations PlanThis emergency operations plan is hereby approved. This plan is effective immediately and supersedes all previous editions.Mayor DateTown Administrator DateRECORD OF CHANGESChange #Date of ChangeChange Entered ByDate EnteredTown Hall located at 110 South Main Street, Mount Airy, MD 21771EMERGENCY PHONE NUMBERSAMBULANCE/FIRE/POLICE 911FEMA (Federal Emergency Management Agency) 1-202-646-4600Statewide Emergency NumberPoison Control Center 1-800-492-2414Chemical Spills 1-800-424-8802American Red CrossFrederick County 1- 301-662-5131Carroll County 1- 410-848-4334Fire/Rescue Services Frederick County 1- 301-600-1536Fire/Rescue Services Carroll CountyFrederick County Health Department 1-301-600-1029 (Urgent Calls) 1-301-600-1603Carroll County Health Department 1-410-857-5000Frederick Memorial HospitalGeneral Information 1-240-566-3300Emergency Room 1-240-566-3500Carroll Hospital CenterGeneral Information 1-410-876-3000Emergency Room 1-410-871-7186 TTYAllegheny Power 1-800-296-6460Baltimore Gas and Electric 1-410-685-0123Oil CompaniesTevis Oil 410-848-2200Voneiff Oil 301-829-0244Carroll Fuel 410-848-4477Southern States 410-848-9420Maryland Labor Department 1-866-487-9243Maryland Occupational Safety and Health 1-301-791-4600Maryland State Police - Westminster Barracks 1-410-386-3000Maryland Workers Compensation Commission 1-800-492-0479Frederick County Sheriffs Office 1-301-600-1046Non-Emergency 1-301-600-2071Carroll County Sheriffs Office 1-410-386-2900MAVFC, Non –Emergency 301-829-0100Carroll County Humane Society 410-848-4810Frederick County Humane Society 301-600-1546/1544TABLE OF CONTENTSAPPROVAL AND IMPLEMENTATION. iiRECORD OF CHANGES. iiiI. PURPOSE. 1II. EXPLANATION OF TERMS. 1A. Acronyms. 1B. Definitions. 2III. ASSUMPTIONS. 4IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. 5A. Objectives. 5B. General. 5C. Operational Guidance. 6D. Incident Command System (ICS) 7E. Incident Command System (ICS) — Town Command Center (TCC) Interface. 9F. State, Federal, and Other Assistance. 10G. Emergency Declarations. 10H. Activities by Phases of Emergency Management. 14V. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITIES. 15A. Organization. 15B. Assignment of Responsibilities. 15C. Response Operations Functional Responsibilities. 18VI. DIRECTION AND CONTROL. 20A. General. 20B. Emergency Facilities. 20C. Continuity of Government. 21VII. EVACUATION. 22A. Evacuation. 22B. Evacuation Situation. 22C. Evacuation Assumptions. 23D. Concept of Operations. 24VIII. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORT.24A. Agreements and Contracts. 24B. Records. 24C. Consumer Protection. 25D. Post-Incident and Exercise Review.. 25IX. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCE. 25A. Plan Development. 25B. Distribution of Planning Documents. 26C. Review.. 26D. Update. 26X. APPENDICES. 26Distribution List. 27Town Contact List. 28Assignment of Town Responsibilities. 29Carroll County EOP Annex Assignments. 32BASIC PLANI. PURPOSEThe purpose of this Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) is to define the actions to be taken by Town Mount Airy, MD (hereafter referred to as Town) officials, in coordination with Carroll County, Frederick County, State of Maryland, federal agencies and other nongovernment organizations in the event of a significant disaster or emergency within the corporate limits of Mount Airy. This plan is intended to work in conjunction with the Carroll County (hereafter referred to as County) EOP and its more specific functional annexes. This plan establishes the overall roles and responsibilities for emergency operations, as well as the concept of operations for the Town. It is intended to be used in conjunction with established operational procedures, plans and protocols.II. EXPLANATION OF TERMSA. AcronymsBOCC Board of County Commissioners of Carroll CountyCCSO Carroll County Sheriff’s OfficeDOD Department of DefenseDOE Department of EnergyECC Emergency Communications CenterEMAC Emergency Management Assistance CompactEOC Emergency Operations CenterEOP Emergency Operations PlanEPA Environmental Protection AgencyEPI Emergency Public informationFEMA Federal Emergency Management AgencyHHS Health and Human ServicesIA Individual AssistanceIC Incident CommanderICP Incident Command PostICS Incident Command SystemJIC Joint Information CenterLWP Local Warning PointMEMA Maryland Emergency Management AgencyMEMAC Maryland Emergency Management Assistance CompactNCP National Contingency PlanNDMS National Disaster Medical SystemNIMS National Incident Management SystemNRF National Response FrameworkOPSSS Office of Public Safety Support ServicesOSC On-Scene CommanderPA Public AssistancePDA Preliminary Damage AssessmentSBA Small Business AdministrationSOG Standard Operating GuidelineSOP Standard Operating ProcedureTCC Town Command CenterB. Definitions1.Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC)A congressionally ratified organization that provides form and structure to interstate mutual aid.2.Emergency Operations Center (EOC)Specially equipped facilities from which government officials exercise direction and control and coordinate necessary resources in an emergency situation.3.Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)A plan put into effect whenever a crisis, man-made or natural, disrupts operations, threatens life, creates major damage, and occurs within or nearby the community.4.Emergency Public Information (EPI)Emergency information that is disseminated to the public before, during, or after an emergency or disaster.5.Emergency Situation (See the County EOP for further information).As used in this plan, this term is intended to describe a range of situations, from an incident to a major disaster. It includes the following:a.Event- any large-scale emergency, disaster or planned activity that results in the implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS) or Emergency Operations Center (EOC) to manage County resources and command/control activities. An event may include, but is not limited to, tornado, tropical storm, severe thunderstorm with flash flooding, influenza outbreak, large public gathering or public festival.b.Incident - situation that is limited in scope and potential effects.c.Emergency - a situation larger in scope and more severe in terms of actual or potential effects than an incident.d.Disaster - the occurrence or threat of significant casualties or widespread property damage that is beyond the capability of the local government to handle with its own resources.6.Hazardous MaterialA substance in a quantity or form posing an unreasonable risk to health, safety, or property when manufactured, stored, or transported. The substance, by its nature, containment, and reactivity, has the capability for inflicting harm during an accidental occurrence. It can be toxic, corrosive, flammable, reactive, irritative, or strongly sensitizing, and poses a threat to health and the environment when improperly managed. Hazardous materials include toxic substances, certain infectious agents, radiological materials, and other related materials such as oil, used oil, petroleum products and industrial solid waste substances.7.Join Information CenterCentral location where Public Information Officers (PIOs) representing agencies or jurisdictions during an emergency gather to coordinate the content of information to be conveyed to the public.8.Inter-local agreementsArrangements between governments or organizations, either public or private, for reciprocal aid and assistance during emergency situations where the resources of a single jurisdiction or organization are insufficient or inappropriate for the tasks that must be performed to control the situation. Commonly referred to as a mutual aid agreement.9.Local Warning Point (LWP)A facility in a city, County, town or community that receives warnings and activates the public warning system in its jurisdictional area of responsibility.10.Maryland Emergency Management Assistance Compact (MEMAC)An intrastate assistance compact among local political subdivisions within the State of Maryland.11.National Contingency PlanThe federal government's plan for responding to both oil spills and hazardous substance releases.12.National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)A federally coordinated system that augments the Nation's medical response capability.13.National Incident Management System (NIMS)A system mandated by Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) - 5 that provides a consistent nationwide approach for federal, state, local and tribal governments, the private-sector and nongovernmental organizations to work effectively and efficiently together to prepare for, respond to, and recover from domestic incidents, regardless of cause, size or complexity.14.National Response Framework (NRF)Part of the National Strategy for Homeland Security that presents the guiding principles enabling all levels of domestic response partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. Building on the existing National Incident Management System (NIMS) as well as the Incident Command System (ICS), the NRF coordinating structures are always in effect for implementation at any level and at any time for local, state, and national emergency or disaster response.15.On-Scene-Coordinator (OSC)The federal official responsible for providing access to federal resources and technical assistance and coordinating federal containment, removal, and disposal efforts and resources during an oil or hazardous material incident.16.Standard Operating Guide (SOG)A statement written to guide the performance or behavior of departmental staff, whether functioning alone or in groups.17.Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)Approved method for accomplishing a task or set of tasks. SOPs are typically prepared at the department or agency level.18.Town Command Center (TCC)The location where Town officials provide direction and control for local response to an emergency or disaster.19.Unified CommandIncident Commanders representing agencies or jurisdictions that share responsibility for the incident manage the response from a single Incident Command Post. This allows agencies with different legal, geographic, and functional authorities and responsibilities to work together effectively without affecting individual agency authority, responsibility or accountability.III. ASSUMPTIONSA.Since most of the Town is located within Carroll County, with only a small residential area lying within Frederick County, the Town will follow its’ normal process and seek assistance from Carroll County before seeking assistance from Frederick County.B.Most emergency situations will be handled routinely by the normal responding emergency service agencies.C.In the event of a significant disaster or emergency, the immediate response priority will be to protect public health and safety, preserve the environment and protect public and private property.D.Disasters and emergencies can periodically occur within the Town that may require the mobilization and reallocation of Town resources.E.Certain emergencies or disasters will occur with enough warning that appropriate emergency notifications will be made to ensure some level of preparedness. Other emergencies or disasters will occur with little or no warning.F.The Town’s main responsibility will be to commit available Town resources to save lives and minimize property damage in coordination with the County.G.For most emergencies or disasters, the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company, Resident State Trooper or Carroll County Sheriff’s Office (CCSO) will be the first responders and will implement initial incident command.H.Assistance may be available through mutual aid from nearby jurisdictions, including Frederick County, , the Maryland Emergency Management Assistance Compact (MEMAC), the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS), and Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).I.Town residents and businesses can expect to use their own resources and be self-sufficient for at least three days following a significant disaster event.J.The effects of a disaster or emergency will likely extend beyond the Town boundaries. Many other areas of the County may also experience casualties, property loss and disruption of normal support systems.K.Employees of the Town may become casualties and/or experience damage to their home or property.L.Widespread power and communication outages may require the use of alternate methods of providing public information and delivering essential services. Everyday methods of communication may be difficult to use or unavailable due to demand exceeding capacity (i.e. no cell phone service).M.Upon request, the County, state or federal government will provide outside assistance if local capabilities or resources are overwhelmed or exhausted.N.Emergency operations will be managed in accordance with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).IV. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONSA. ObjectivesThe objectives of the Town emergency operations are to protect public health and safety, preserve the environment and protect public and private property.B. General1. The Town is vulnerable to various natural and technological hazards as detailed in the County EOP. The scope and magnitude of these emergencies may vary from minor impact requiring a minimum response to major impact requiring a significant response.2. It is the responsibility of Town and County officials to protect public health and safety and preserve property from the effects of hazardous events. This involves identifying and mitigating hazards, preparing for and responding to emergencies, and managing the recovery from emergency situations that affect the Town.3. It is impossible for government to do everything that is required to protect the lives and property of the population. Citizens of the Town have the responsibility to prepare themselves and their families to cope with emergency situations and manage their affairs and property in ways that will aid the government in managing emergencies. The Town will assist citizens in carrying out these responsibilities by providing public information and instructions prior to and during emergency situations in coordination with the County.4. The Town has limited capability to respond to emergency situations and will rely on the County to respond to significant incidents within the Town. The County maintains a robust emergency management program that includes organizing, training, and equipping local emergency responders and emergency management personnel, providing appropriate emergency facilities, providing suitable communications systems, and contracting for emergency services.5. This plan is based on an all-hazard approach to emergency planning. It addresses general functions that may need to be performed during any emergency situation.6. Town organizations tasked in this plan are expected to develop and keep current SOPs and SOGs that describe how their assigned emergency tasks will be performed.7. This plan is based upon the concept that the emergency functions that must be performed by many Town departments generally parallel some of their normal day-to-day functions. To the extent possible, the same personnel and material resources used for day-to-day activities will be employed during emergency situations. Because personnel and equipment resources are limited, some routine functions that do not contribute directly to the emergency may be suspended for the duration of an emergency. The personnel, equipment, and supplies that would normally be required for those functions will be redirected to accomplish emergency tasks.C. Operational Guidance1.Initial Responsea.The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company and local law enforcement are likely to be the first agencies on the scene of an emergency situation. They will normally take charge and remain in charge of the incident until it is resolved or others, who have legal authority to do so, assume responsibility. They will seek guidance and direction from local officials and seek technical assistance from state and federal agencies and industry, where appropriate.2.Implementation of the Incident Command System (ICS)a.The first local emergency responder to arrive at the scene of an emergency situation will implement the ICS and serve as the Incident Commander (IC) until relieved by a more senior or more qualified individual. The IC will establish an incident command post (ICP) and provide an assessment of the situation to Town and County officials, identify response resources required, and direct the on-scene response from the ICP.b.For some types of emergency situations, a specific incident scene may not exist in the initial response phase and the Town Command Center (TCC) or County Emergency Operations Center (EOC) may be activated to accomplish initial response actions, such as mobilizing personnel and equipment and issuing precautionary warning to the public. As the potential threat becomes clearer and a specific impact site or sites identified, an ICP may be established, and direction and control of the response transitioned to the IC.3.Source and Use of Resourcesa.The Town will use their own resources to respond to emergency situations, purchase supplies and equipment, if necessary, and request assistance if the resources are insufficient or inappropriate. The County should be the first channel through which the Town requests assistance when its resources are exceeded.b.The Town Administrator, or designee, will direct all requests for assistance that cannot be addressed through mutual aid to the County OPSSS or the County EOC.c.The following are sources for resources that may be available to the Town in responding to disasters and emergencies:1)Personnel, equipment, and facilities belonging to the Town.2)Resources available from the County and through mutual aid.3)Resources available from the private sector through acquisition/ purchasing.4)Resources of the state of Maryland, including the National Guard.5)Mutual aid available through MEMAC.6)Mutual aid resources from other states through the EMAC.7)Resources available from the federal government under the National Response Framework (NRF).8)Donations, whether monetary, goods or volunteer workers.D. Incident Command System (ICS)1.The Town and County will employ ICS in managing emergencies. ICS is both a strategy and a set of organizational arrangements for directing and controlling field operations. It is designed to effectively integrate resources from different agencies into a temporary emergency organization at an incident site that can expand and contract with the magnitude of the incident and resources on hand.a.The IC is responsible for carrying out the ICS function of command—managing the incident. The four other major management activities that form the basis of ICS are operations, planning, logistics, and finance/administration. For small-scale incidents, the IC and one or two individuals may perform all of these functions. For larger incidents, a number of individuals from different departments or agencies may be assigned to separate staff sections charged with those functions. The chart below depicts the standard ICS organization.2.An IC using response resources from one or two departments or agencies can handle the majority of emergency situations. Departments or agencies participating in this type of incident response will normally obtain support through their own department or agency.3.In emergency situations where other jurisdictions or the state or federal government are providing significant response resources or technical assistance, it is generally desirable to transition from the normal ICS structure to a Unified Command structure. This arrangement helps to ensure that all participating agencies are involved in developing objectives and strategies to deal with the emergency.4.Within the Town, the departments identified in the table below will serve as the primary agency for specific incidents and will assume initial IC role. Depending on the incident type and magnitude, incident command may default to an official of the Mt. Airy Volunteer Fire Company, County Division of Health Services (hereafter referred to as Health Department), Resident State Trooper or the CCSO with support, as needed, from the Town.Designated Departments for Establishing Incident CommandIncident TypeDepartment/AgencyBiological incident (e.g. influenza pandemic)Carroll County Health DepartmentBuilding collapse, construction accidentMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyFireMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyFloodMount Airy Department of Public WorksHazardous materialMount Airy Volunteer Fire DepartmentHurricane/tropical stormCoordination: Carroll County OPSSSRemediation: Town of Mount AiryMass fatalityDepending on the circumstances, the IC could be from Carroll County Sheriff’s Office, MD State Police or Carroll County Health Department.Nuclear/radiological incidentMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyPipeline spill/fire or explosionMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyRiots, civil disturbancesCarroll County Sheriff’s Office/MD State PoliceSevere thunderstorms/tornadoesCoordination: Carroll County OPSSSRemediation: Town of Mount AiryTerrorist incidentCarroll County Sheriff’s Office/ MD State PoliceTrain derailmentMount Airy Volunteer Fire CompanyWater distribution/water qualityMount Airy Department of Water and SewerWinter stormCoordination: Carroll County OPSSSRemediation: Town of Mount AiryE. Incident Command System (ICS) — Town Command Center (TCC) Interface1.For major emergencies and disasters, the Town will activate its Command Center, located at Town Hall, 110 S. Main Street, Mount Airy (alternate location is the Mount Airy Maintenance Building). When the TCC is activated, it is essential to establish a division of responsibilities between the ICP and the TCC. A general division of responsibilities is outlined below.2.The IC is generally responsible for field operations, including:a.Isolating the scene.b.Directing and controlling the on-scene response to the emergency situation and managing the emergency resources committed there.c.Warning the population in the area of the incident and providing emergency instructions to them.d.Determining and implementing protective measures (evacuation or in-place sheltering) for the population in the immediate area of the incident and for emergency responders at the scene.e.Implementing traffic control arrangements in and around the incident scene.f.Requesting additional resources from the TCC or County EOC, whichever is appropriate.3.The TCC is generally responsible for:a.Providing Town resource support for the incident command operations.b.Issuing public warnings in coordination with the IC.c.Issuing instructions and providing information to the general public.d.Organizing large-scale evacuations.e.Coordinating with the County, as necessary, to provide shelter and mass care arrangements for evacuees.f.Coordinating traffic control for large-scale evacuations.g.Requesting assistance from the County, state and other external sources through the County EOC.F. State, Federal, and Other Assistance1.State and Federal Assistancea.If Town and County resources are inadequate to deal with an emergency situation, assistance from the state will be requested through the County. State assistance furnished to local governments is intended to supplement local resources and not substitute for such resources, including mutual aid resources, equipment purchases or leases, or resources covered by emergency service contracts.b.Requests for state assistance will be made in accordance with the County EOP.2.Other Assistancea.If resources required to control an emergency situation are not available within the state, the Govenor may request assistance from other states pursuant to a number of interstate compacts or from the federal government through FEMA.b.For major emergencies and disasters for which a presidential declaration has been issued, federal agencies may be mobilized to provide assistance to states and local governments. The NRF describes the policies, planning assumptions, concept of operations, and responsibilities of designated federal agencies for various response and recovery functions.c.FEMA has the primary responsibility for coordinating federal disaster assistance. No direct federal assistance is authorized prior to a presidential emergency or disaster declaration, but FEMA has limited authority to stage initial response resources near the disaster site and activate command and control structures prior to a declaration and the Department of Defense (DOD) has the authority to commit its resources to save lives prior to an emergency or disaster declaration. The Recovery Annex to the County EOP provides additional information on the assistance that may be available during disaster recovery.G. Emergency Declarations1.Non-Declared DisastersThe mayor or Town Administrator may direct Town personnel to respond to emergencies or disasters without a formal declaration of an emergency when the expectation is that Town resources will be used. The Town Administrator, or designee, may redirect and deploy Town resources and assets, as necessary, to prepare for, adequately respond to, and quickly recover from an emergency incident.2.Emergency DeclarationsThere are three types of emergency declarations that may apply to a disaster or emergency within the Town, depending upon the scope and magnitude of the event:a.Local Declaration: A local emergency declaration activates the EOP and provides for the expeditious mobilization of Town resources in responding to a major incident. The County may also declare a local state of emergency that includes the Town for incidents that impact other areas of the County.b.State Declaration: A declaration of an emergency by the Govenor of Maryland provides the Town access to the resources and assistance of the departments and agencies of the state, including the National Guard, in the event local resources are insufficient to meet the needs.c.Federal Declaration: The Govenor may request a federal emergency or major disaster declaration. In the event that the Town is declared a federal disaster area, the resources of federal departments and agencies are available to provide resources and assistance to augment those of the Town, County and the state.3.Local Emergency DeclarationA local emergency is declared when, in the judgment of the mayor, the threat or actual occurrence of an emergency or disaster is of sufficient severity and magnitude to warrant a coordinated response by the various Town departments and for assistance from outside the Town.a.The declaration of a local emergency by the mayor activates the Town Emergency Operations Plan (EOP). A local emergency is declared when, in the judgment of the mayor, the threat or occurrence of an incident is of sufficient severity to warrant a multi-department response by the Town and the need for outside assistance.b.The president of the Board of Commissioners (BOCC) of Carroll County has the authority to declare a local emergency that may include the Town.c.For instances where a resource shortage (e.g. gasoline, heating oil) is substantially or wholly the cause of a local emergency, a local emergency can only be declared by the Govenor based upon the request of the mayor though the County OPSSS.d.When, in their judgment, all emergency activities have been completed, the mayor or town council will take action to terminate the declared emergency.e.A local emergency declaration may be enacted by the mayor for up to seven days. A local emergency may only be extended beyond seven days with approval of the town council.4.State of Emergencya.The Maryland Emergency Management Act, found in the Annotated Code of Maryland, Public Safety Article, § 14-101, et. seq., prescribes the authority and implications of a declaration of a state of emergency by the Govenor.b.The Governor may declare a state of emergency to exist whenever the Governor finds an emergency has developed or is impeding due to any cause. The state of emergency is declared by executive order or proclamation.c.The Governor’s Declaration of a State of Emergency provides for the expeditious provision of assistance to local jurisdictions, including use of the Maryland National Guard.5.Federal Emergency and Major Disaster Declarationsa.Under the provisions of the Robert T. Stafford Act, the Govenor may request the president to declare a major disaster or emergency declaration for incidents that are (or threaten to be) beyond the scope of the state and local jurisdictions to effectively respond.b.A presidential Major Disaster Declaration puts into motion long-term federal recovery programs designed to help disaster victims, businesses, and public entities.c.An emergency declaration is more limited in scope and without the long-term federal recovery programs of a major disaster declaration. Generally, federal assistance and funding are provided to meet a specific emergency needs or to help prevent a major disaster from occurring.d.The major disaster or emergency declaration designates the political subdivisions within the state that are eligible for assistance. There are three major categories of disaster aid available under a major disaster declaration1)Individual Assistance (IA): Aid to individuals and households.a)Disaster Housing - provides up to 18 months temporary housing assistance for displaced persons whose residences were heavily damaged or destroyed. Funding also can be provided for housing repairs and replacement.b)Disaster Grants - may be available to help meet other serious disaster related needs and necessary expenses not covered by insurance and other aid programs. These may include replacement of personal property, transportation, medical, dental, and funeral expenses.c)Low-Interest Disaster Loans - may be available after a disaster for homeowners and renters from the U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) to cover uninsured property losses. Loans may be for repair or replacement of homes, automobiles, clothing, or other damaged personal property. Loans are also available to businesses for property loss and economic injury.d)Other disaster aid programs include crisis counseling, disaster-related unemployment assistance, legal aid and assistance with income tax, Social Security, and Veteran’s benefits. Other State or local help may also be available.2)Public Assistance (PA): Aid to state or local governments to pay part of the costs of rebuilding a community’s damaged infrastructure. PA may include debris removal, emergency protective measures and public services, repair of damaged public property, loans needed by communities for essential government functions, and grants for repair of damaged public and private nonprofit schools and educational facilities.3)Hazard Mitigation: Funding for measures designed to reduce future losses to public and private property.6.Other Declarationsa.Several federal agencies have independent authorities to declare disasters or emergencies. These authorities may be exercised concurrently or become part of a major disaster or emergency declared under the Stafford Act. These other authorities include:1)The administrator of the SBA may make a disaster declaration based upon physical damage to buildings, machinery, equipment, homes, and other property as well as economic injury.2)The Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) may declare, after consultation with public health officials, a public health emergency in the event of a significant outbreak of infectious diseases or bioterrorist attack.3)The U. S. Army Corps of Engineers may issue a disaster declaration in response to flooding or coastal storms.4)The Secretary of Agriculture may declare a disaster in certain situations in which a County sustained a production loss of 30 percent or greater in a single major enterprise.5)A federal On-Scene-Coordinator (OSC), designated by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), U.S. States Coast Guard, or the Department of Energy (DOE) under the National Contingency Plan (NCP), has the authority to direct response efforts at the scene of a discharge of oil, hazardous substance, pollutants, or contaminants, depending upon the location and source of the release.7.The Declaration Processa.A local emergency may be declared by the mayor. The mayor will consult with the County OPSSS, when possible, to assist with the declaration. The local emergency declaration may be based upon reports of an actual event or on the forecast or prediction of emergency conditions.b.Whenever a local emergency has been declared, the Town Administrator will immediately notify the County OPSSS. The County will notify the Maryland Emergency Management Agency (MEMA).c.For an incident that affects the Town and other areas of the County, the County, concurrently with the Town declaration or upon the request of the Town, may issue the local emergency declaration.d.A local emergency must be declared before state and federal assistance can be requested unless a state or federal state of emergency has already been declared.e.Based upon the request of the County or other information available, the Governor may declare a state of emergency. The Governor’s declaration of a state of emergency provides for expedited assistance from state departments, agencies and the Maryland National Guard.f.Once a determination is made by MEMA that the event is, or may be, beyond the capabilities of the Town, County and state, the Governor may request assistance from FEMA. Generally this request will result in joint federal/state Preliminary Damage Assessment (PDA).1)A PDA is an on-site survey of the affected area(s) by federal and state officials to determine the scope and magnitude of damages and to determine if federal assistance is warranted. Generally, a PDA is conducted prior to an official request by the Governor for a declaration of an emergency or major disaster by the president. The County OPSSS will provide assistance in facilitating the PDA process within the Town.a)Depending upon the extent and scope of damages provided in the initial reports, PDA teams may be organized to assess damage to private property (Individual Assistance) and/or public property (Public Assistance).b)For events of unusual severity and magnitude, state and federal officials may delay the PDA pending more immediate needs assessment activities.c)The PDA process verifies the general magnitude of damage and whether federal assistance will be requested.d)Based upon the results of the PDA and consultations with FEMA, MEMA will prepare for the Governor’s signature an official request for an emergency or major disaster declaration.g.The presidential declaration will stipulate the types of federal assistance authorized for the Town.H.Activities by Phases of Emergency Management1.MitigationThe Town will conduct mitigation activities to lessen or eliminate hazards, reduce the probability of hazards causing an emergency situation, or lesson the consequences of unavoidable hazards and participate in the review and updates of the County Natural Hazard Mitigation Plan.2.PreparednessPreparedness activities will be conducted in coordination with the County OPSSS to develop the response capabilities needed in the event of an emergency.3.ResponseThe Town will respond to emergency situations using the resources available and will request assistance, as needed, through the County for response operations. Response activities include emergency medical services, firefighting, law enforcement operations, evacuation, sheltering and mass care, search and rescue and other associated functions.4.RecoveryIf a disaster occurs, the Town will carry out a recovery program that involves both short-term and long-term efforts. Short-term operations seek to restore vital services to the community and provide for the basic needs of the public. Long-term recovery focuses on restoring the community to its natural state.V. ORGANIZATION AND ASSIGNMENTS OF RESPONSIBILITIESA. Organization1.In the event of a significant emergency or disaster impacting the Town, the mayor, assisted by the Town Administrator, will coordinate emergency operations within the Town and request outside resources, as needed. The TCC will be activated, as necessary, to coordinate the Town’s response operations. The Town may request a representative from the County OPSSS to assist the Town.2.In the event the County EOC is activated to coordinate operations, the mayor may designate a representative to the County EOC to coordinate activities within the Town.B.Assignment of Responsibilities1.The Mayor will:a.Establish objectives and priorities for the emergency management program and provide general policy guidance.b.Serve as, or appoint, a chief spokesperson for the Town during emergency events.c.Confer with the Town Administrator and other town officials, as appropriate, on policy issues related to the response and recovery operations.d.Coordinate with other elected officials at the County, regional and state level, including the congressional delegation.e.Order evacuations and implement this plan.f.Keep the public informed during emergency situations.g.In coordination with the County OPSSS, declare a local state of emergency, request the Governor declare a state of emergency, or invoke the emergency powers of government, when necessary.h.Request assistance from other local governments, when necessary.i.Exercise overall responsibility for plans and operations for emergency and disaster assistance within the Town.2.The town council will:a.Monitor the emergency response during disaster situations and provide direction where appropriate.b.Ensure funds are available to support emergency operations as outlined in this plan.c.Communicate with the public and provide guidance on responding to an emergency or disaster.d.As necessary, vote to extend a local emergency declaration beyond seven days.e.Host community meetings to ensure needs are being addressed and information is provided to residents.f.Promulgate the codes, regulations, and ordinances of the Town, and provides the funds required to implement and enforce an effective mitigation program.g.Enact emergency ordinances, as appropriate.3.Town Attorney will:a.Advise Town officials concerning legal responsibilities, powers and liabilities regarding emergency operations and post-disaster assistance.b.Prepare, as appropriate, emergency ordinances (i.e., gouging and curfews) and local declarations.c.Assist with the preparation of applications, legal interpretations or opinions.d.Assist in obtaining waivers and legal clearances needed to dispose of debris and materials resulting from an emergency or disaster.e.Assist with the implementation of isolation and quarantine orders and other court orders as needed.f.Advise Town officials on other legal matters arising from an emergency or disaster.4.The Town Administrator will:a.Activate the Town EOP.b.Provide direction and control of Town departments and organizations during emergency operations. In the event the TCC is activated, the Town Administrator will serve as the TCC manager.c.Direct and reallocate Town assets and resources during an emergency.d.Serve as the lead for the Town in managing recovery operations.e.Implement the policies and decisions of the governing body related to emergency management.5.The Town engineer will:a.Develop and maintain the Public Works and Engineering Annex to this plan.b.Manage the public works and engineering operations during emergency situations.c.Oversee the repair and restoration of key Town facilities and systems.d.Manage debris removal operations.6.The director, Streets and Road Department will:a.Provide personnel, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations, upon request.b.Develop and maintain SOPs/SOGs for emergency tasks.c.Monitor the status of the Town’s transportation infrastructure and repair roads and traffic control systems, as necessary.d.Provide support for traffic control, as necessary.e.Manage snow and debris removal on Town streets.f.Provide support for evacuations.7.The director, Water and Sewer will:a.Develop and maintain SOPs/SOGS.b.Conduct damage assessments of water supply, distribution and control facilities, sanitary sewer systems and related facilities.c.Manage the repair and restoration, as necessary, of Town water and sanitary sewer systems.d.Provide for emergency water supply and assist with distribution.e.Ensure the continued supply of potable water.f.Ensure continuous wastewater collection services.g.In conjunction with the County Health Department, provide warnings and advice for contaminated or low water levels and “boil water” alerts.8.Law enforcement will:a.Provide available staff, resources, and facilities to support emergency operations.b.As appropriate, establish on-scene incident command.c.Assist in evacuation operations.d.Provide security of emergency site(s), evacuated areas, shelter areas, vital facilities, supplies, and other assigned locations.e.Provide assistance in search operations.f.Provide law enforcement services.g.Initiate on-scene warning and alerting in cooperation with the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company.h.Provide traffic control and management.i.Conduct investigations in accordance with Federal, State, and local laws.9.The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company will:a.Provide fire prevention, suppression and rescue services.b.Provide support for emergency notifications.c.As appropriate, establish initial on-scene incident command.d.Provide emergency triage, medical care and transportation of patients.e.Assist in evacuation operations.f.Assist in search operations.10.Parks and Recreation will:a.Provide available staff and resources to support emergency operations.b.Provide facilities, as required, for use as staging areas and/or points of distribution.C.Response Operations Functional Responsibilities1.The Town EOP is based upon common functions that may be needed following a significant emergency or disaster. These functions are based upon those identified in the County EOP.a.Warning – the Town will use all means available to provide the Town population with appropriate warning information. This includes radio and television, loudspeakers, sirens and telephones. Warning activities will be coordinated by the Mayor. The Town will request support from the County ECC and OPSSS, as needed. The Town receives warning information through the Carroll County ECC that serves as the Local Warning Point (LWP). Upon activation of the TCC, warning activities in the Town will be coordinated by the EOC Manager.b.Communications – the Town will request communication support, as needed, through the County. The Town will coordinate the use of its internal communication assets through the TCC.c.Radiological Protection – the Town will request support, as needed, from the County as detailed in the Radiological Protection Annex to the County EOP. Primary responsibility for this function is the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company.d.Evacuation – the Town will be assisted by the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company with support requested from the County, as needed, as detailed in the Evacuation Annex to the County EOP. The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company may provide support in conducting door-to-door warnings and instructions.e.Damage Assessment – the County OPSSS has primary responsibility for coordinating damage assessment activities as detailed in the Damage Assessment Annex to the County EOP. The Town will be responsible for damage assessment of critical infrastructure and for providing support and information for damage within the Town boundaries.f.Firefighting and other Fire/Rescue Functions – the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company has primary responsibility for these functions within the Town and will coordinate requests for support through existing mutual aid.g.Emergency Medical Services (EMS) – The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company has primary responsibility for this function within the Town and will coordinate requests for support with existing mutual aid.h.Law Enforcement – the Resident State Trooper has primary responsibility for law enforcement functions within the Town during emergency situations and will provide support as detailed in the Law Enforcement Annex to the County EOP.i.Direction and Control - primary responsibility for direction and control with the Town is assigned to the mayor, assisted by the Town Administrator. The Town Administrator will serve as the TCC manager upon activation and will manage the Town’s emergency response operations.j.Hazardous Materials and Oil Spills – the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company has primary responsibility for hazardous material response operations as detailed in the Hazardous Material and Oil Spill Response Annex to the County EOP.k.Search and Rescue – the MD State Police/CCSO has primary responsibility for search operations following a major disaster or emergency as detailed in the Law Enforcement Annex to the County EOP. The Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company has primary responsibility for rescue operations following a major disaster or emergency as detailed in the Fire and Rescue Annex to the County EOP. (CC may have search and rescue annex)l.Terrorist Incident – the MD State Police/CCSO has primary responsibility for local response to a terrorist incident as detailed in the Terrorist Incident Annex to the County EOP.m.Shelter and Mass Care – the County Citizens Services Division has the primary responsibility for shelter and mass care operations as detailed in the Shelter and Mass Care Annex to the County EOP.n.Health and Medical Services – the County Health Department has the primary responsibility for health and medical service operations as detailed in the Health and Medical Services Annex to the County EOP.o.Human Services – the County Citizens Services Division has the primary responsibility of coordinating human services as detailed in the Human Services Annex to the County EOP.p.Transportation – the Town Department of Streets and Roads has primary responsibility for coordinating transportation support. The County will assist, when requested, as detailed in the Transportation Annex to the County EOP.q.Emergency Public Information (EPI) - The mayor or the mayor’s designee will serve as the chief spokesperson for the Town. The Town will coordinate its EPI with the County and assign a representative to the County Joint Information Center (JIC), if activated.r.Recovery – The Town Administrator will be the lead for recovery operations within the Town and will serve as the Town’s point of contact with the County.s.Public Works and Engineering – the Town’s Department of Public Works has the primary responsibility for this function.t.Utilities – the Town’s Superintendent, Water and Sewer, has the primary responsibility for this function.u.Resource Management – The Town will, upon exhaustion of Town resources, request assistance from the County.v.Donations and Volunteer Management - the County Citizens Services Division has the primary responsibility for coordinating donations and volunteers during an emergency response as detailed in the Donations and Volunteer Coordination Annex to the County EOP.w.Legal – The town attorney will provide appropriate advice to Town officials.VI. DIRECTION AND CONTROLA.General1.The mayor, assisted by the Town Administrator, is responsible for establishing objectives and policies for emergency management and providing general guidance for disaster response and recovery operations.2.The Town Administrator will provide overall direction of the response activities of all departments. As necessary, the Town Command Center (TCC) will be activated to coordinate emergency operations.3.The IC, assisted by a staff sufficient for the tasks to be performed, will manage the emergency response at an incident site.4.If the Town’s own resources are insufficient or unsuitable to deal with an emergency situation, assistance from other jurisdictions, the County, organized volunteer groups, or the state may be requested.B.Emergency Facilities1.Incident Command Post (ICP)Except when an emergency situation threatens, but has not yet occurred, and those situations for which there is no specific hazard impact site (such as severe winter storm or area-wide utility outage), an ICP or command posts will be established in the vicinity of the incident site(s). As noted previously, the IC will be responsible for directing the emergency response and managing the resources at the incident scene.2.Town Command Center (TCC)When major emergencies and disasters have occurred or appear imminent, the TCC, located at Mount Airy Town Hall, 110 S. Main Street, Mount Airy, will be activated. The alternate TCC is the Mount Airy Maintenance Facility. The mayor and OPSSS will determine if a Town liaison will be deployed to the County EOC or a liaison from the County OPSSS will be deployed to the TCC to coordinate emergency actions between the Town and the County.a.The following individuals are authorized to activate the TCC:1)mayor2)town administratorb.The general responsibilities of the TCC are:1)Assemble accurate information on the emergency situation and current resource data to allow local officials to make informed decisions on courses of action.2)Working with representatives of emergency services, determine and prioritize required response actions and coordinate their implementation.3)Provide resource support for emergency operations.4)Suspend or curtail government services, recommend the closure of schools and businesses, and cancellation of public events.5)Organize and activate large-scale evacuation and mass care operations.6)Provide emergency information to the public.c.Representatives of those departments and agencies assigned emergency functions in this plan will staff the TCC. TCC operations are addressed in the Direction and Control Annex. The interface between the TCC and the ICP is described in paragraph IV.E. above.C.Continuity of Government1.A major incident or emergency could include death or injury of key Town officials, the partial or complete destruction of established facilities, and the destruction of vital public records essential to the continued operations of the Town government. It is essential that law and order be preserved and government services maintained.2.Continuity of leadership and government services is particularly important with respect to emergency services, direction of emergency response operations, and management of recovery activities. A key aspect of this control is the continued capability to communicate official requests, situation reports, and other emergency information throughout the event.3.The line succession for the mayor is:a.Mayorb.President of the Town Councilc.Town administrator4.The line of succession for the Town Administrator is:a.Town Administratorb.Town engineerc.Director, Streets and Road DepartmentVII. EVACUATIONState law does not authorize the Governor or local officials to issue mandatory evacuation orders. State and local officials may recommend evacuation of threatened or stricken areas.A.EvacuationThe purpose of this section is to provide for the orderly and coordinated evacuation of all, or any part, of the population of the Town if it is determined that such action is the most effective means available for protecting the population from the effects of an emergency situation. This section is intended to work in conjunction with the County EOP.B.Evacuation Situation1.The Town is susceptible to both natural and man-made events such as floods, hurricanes, and hazardous material incidents that may necessitate an evacuation of nearby residents, businesses, and other facilities in order to save and protect lives. Evacuations may not always be the best option and Town officials or the on-scene IC may instead order affected populations to shelter in place. However, emergency situations such as a major fire, transportation accidents, hazardous material incidents, or localized flooding may require an evacuation of Town residents.2.The Town has the primary responsibility for ordering an evacuation and ensuring the safety of its citizens. The decision to evacuate will depend on the type of hazard, its magnitude, intensity, duration, and anticipated time of occurrence, assuming it hasn’t already happened.3.The on-scene IC may implement an evacuation, as necessary, to save lives and establish a zone around the impacted or potentially impacted area. The IC will request assistance from Town officials, as required, to provide notification, traffic management and control, and other support, as necessary. Should an evacuation become necessary, warning and evacuation instructions may be disseminated via radio, television, and other available media outlets, voice/tone siren, door-to-door notifications, etc.4.The primary means of transportation for evacuees will be by privately owned and operated motor vehicles. Town transportation resources may be utilized to provide supplementary transportation for those in need, including special needs populations, who may require accessible transportation. As necessary, additional transportation assets will be requested from the County.5.Depending upon the scope and magnitude of the incident, a Unified Command, including the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company, County OPSSS, CCSO and the MD State Police, may be established to coordinate notification to residents and businesses, and to provide direction for the orderly evacuation of the affected area. If the nature of the incident is escalating rapidly, or if large areas are impacted, the TCC may be activated to support the IC.6.In the event that emergency shelters will need to be established to support evacuations, the Town will request support from the County to establish and operate the shelter(s), as appropriate.7.Since the Town has no mandatory evacuation law, the mayor, or designee, can only recommend evacuation of a threatened area, not mandate it. However, when the mayor has issued a local disaster declaration, he or she may take action to control re-entry into a stricken area and the movement of people and occupancy of buildings within a disaster area.8.Town residents are expected to plan for the care of their pets in the event of a disaster or emergency. Companion animals are not be permitted in mass care shelters operated by the County except for service animals that accompany citizens with special needs. However, the County has made provisions for sheltering pets, as necessary, during emergencies. Refer to the County Animal Protection Annex for more information on the sheltering of pets during an emergency.C.Evacuation Assumptions1.Most people at risk will evacuate when local officials recommend that they do so. A general estimate is that 80 percent of those at risk will comply when local officials recommend evacuation. The proportion of the population that will evacuate typically increases as a threat becomes more obvious to the public or more serious.2.Some individuals will refuse to evacuate regardless of the threat.3.When there is sufficient warning of a significant threat, some individuals who are not at risk will evacuate.4.Some evacuation planning for known hazard areas can, and should be, done in advance.5.While some emergency situations are slow to develop, others occur without warning. Hence, there may be time for deliberate evacuation planning or an evacuation may have to be conducted with minimal preparation time. In the case of short notice evacuations, there may be little time to obtain personnel and equipment from external sources to support evacuation operations.6.The need to evacuate may become evident at any time and there could be little control over the evacuation start time.7.In most emergency situations, the majority of evacuees will seek shelter with relatives or friends or in commercial accommodations rather than in public shelters.8.Most evacuees will use their personal vehicles to evacuate; however, transportation may need to be provided for evacuees without personal vehicles.9.Public information messages that emphasize the need for citizens to help their neighbors who lack transportation or need assistance can significantly reduce requirements for public transportation during an evacuation.D.Concept of Operations1.The IC or, for large-scale emergencies, the mayor, shall assess the need for evacuation. The Town Administrator, as the TCC manager, will plan evacuations and coordinate support among Town departments and the County, as necessary, for the evacuation effort.2.It may be appropriate to recommend precautionary evacuation of certain residents in advance of a general evacuation recommendation.3.Evacuating residents with special needs may require specialized transportation.4.Advanced planning for special needs evacuees must be coordinated to ensure that proper care may be given at designated shelter locations.5.A recommendation to evacuate will be issued by the mayor or designee. The Town will use all means available to disseminate the evacuation recommendation.6.Actual evacuation movement will be controlled by the MD State Police/CCSO.7.The Town will request support, as needed, from the County as outlined in the County EOP. The Evacuation Annex to the County EOP provides additional information.VIII. ADMINISTRATION AND SUPPORTA.Agreements and ContractsShould local resources prove to be inadequate during an emergency; requests will be made for assistance from other local jurisdictions through mutual-aid and the County EOP.B.Records1.Record Keeping for Emergency OperationsThe Town is responsible for establishing the administrative controls necessary to manage the expenditure of funds and to provide reasonable accountability and justification for expenditures made to support emergency operations. This shall be done in accordance with the established Town fiscal policies and standard cost accounting procedures.a.Incident CostsAll departments shall maintain records summarizing the use of personnel, equipment, and supplies during the response to day-to-day incidents to obtain an estimate of annual emergency response costs that can be used in preparing future department budgets.b.Emergency or Disaster CostsFor major emergencies or disasters, all departments and agencies participating in the emergency response shall maintain detailed records of costs for emergency operations to include:1)Personnel costs, especially overtime costs.2)Equipment operation costs.3)Costs for leased or rented equipment.4)Costs for contract services to support emergency operations.5)Costs of specialized supplies expended for emergency operations.These records may be used to recover costs from the responsible party or insurers or as a basis for requesting financial assistance for certain allowable response and recovery costs from the state and/or federal government.2.Preservation of Recordsa.In order to continue normal Town operations following an emergency situation or disaster, vital records must be protected. These include legal documents as well as property and tax records. The principal causes of damage to records are fire and water; therefore, essential records should be protected accordingly. Each department will include protection of vital records in its SOPs/SOGs.b.If records are damaged during an emergency situation, the Town may seek professional assistance to preserve and restore them.C.Consumer ProtectionConsumer complaints regarding alleged unfair or illegal business practices often occur in the aftermath of a disaster. Such complaints will be referred to the town attorney who will pass such complaints to the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney General.D.Post-Incident and Exercise ReviewThe mayor is responsible for organizing and conducting a critique following the conclusion of a significant emergency event/incident or exercise. The critique will entail both written and verbal input from all appropriate participants. Where deficiencies are identified, an individual or department will be assigned responsibility for correcting the deficiency and a due date shall be established for that action.IX. PLAN DEVELOPMENT AND MAINTENANCEA. Plan DevelopmentThe Town Administrator is responsible for the overall development and completion of the Town’s EOP and identified supporting annexes. The mayor is responsible for approving and promulgating this plan.B. Distribution of Planning DocumentsThe Town Administrator shall determine the distribution of this plan and its annexes, if any. This plan includes a distribution list (See Appendix 1) that indicates who receives copies of the basic plan and its annexes.C. ReviewThis plan and its annexes shall be reviewed annually by local officials. The Town Administrator will establish a schedule for annual review of planning documents by those tasked in them.D. Update1.This plan will be updated based upon deficiencies identified during actual emergency situations and exercises and when changes in threat hazards, resources and capabilities, or government structure occur.2.This plan and its annexes, if any, must be revised or updated by a formal change at least every four years. Responsibility for revising or updating the plan is assigned to the Town Administrator.3.The Town Administrator is responsible for distributing all revised or updated planning documents to all departments, agencies, and individuals tasked in those documents.X. APPENDICESAppendix 1 Distribution ListAppendix 2 Town Emergency Contact InformationAppendix 3 Assignment of Town ResponsibilitiesAppendix 4 Carroll County Emergency Operations Plan AnnexesAPPENDIX 1Distribution ListJurisdiction/Agency PlanBasic PlanAnnexesTown Command Center1AllMayor1AllTown Council5AllTown Administrator1AllStreets and Roads1AllWater and Sewer1AllParks and Recreation1AllPlanning and Zoning1AllTown Attorney1AllMount Airy Volunteer Fire Company1AllCarroll County OPSSS1AllCarroll County Division of Health Services1AllCarroll County Citizens Services Division1AllCarroll County Sheriff’s Office1AllCarroll County Finance Division1AllFrederick County Division of Emergency Management1AllAPPENDIX 2Mount Airy Contact ListNAMETITLEOFFICEHOMECELL/PAGERPatrick RockinbergMayor301-829-1424301-829-0895301-448-2598Monika WeierbachTown Administrator301-829-1424301-834-3750301-748-4943Barney QuinnTown Engineer301-829-1424301-831-5838240-793-3703Mark MoxleyDirector Streets and Roads301-831-7844301-829-1156240-793-3701Tom RobersonDirector WWTP301-829-2674301-829-0525240-793-3699Brian JohnsonDirector Water and Sewer301-831-7844301-829-8188240-793-3697MAVFCLocal Fire Company301-829-0100MD State PoliceResident Troopers301-829-0218APPENDIX 3Assignment of ResponsibilitiesRESPONSIBLE PARTYASSIGNMENTMayor·Establish objectives and priorities for the emergency management program and provide general policy guidance.·Serve as, or appoint, a chief spokesperson for the Town during emergency events.·Confer with the Town Administrator and other town officials, as appropriate, on policy issues related to the response and recovery operations.·Coordinate with other elected officials at the County, regional and state level, including the congressional delegation.·Order evacuations and implement this plan.·Keep the public informed during emergency situations.·In coordination with the County OPSSS, declare a local state of emergency, request the Governor declare a state of emergency, or invoke the emergency powers of government, when necessary.·Request assistance from other local governments, when necessary.·Exercise overall responsibility for plans and operations for emergency and disaster assistance within the Town.Town Council·Monitor the emergency response during disaster situations and provide direction where appropriate.·Ensure funds are available to support emergency operations as outlined in this plan.·Communicate with the public and provide guidance on responding to an emergency or disaster.·As necessary, vote to extend the disaster declaration for the Town beyond seven days.·Host community meetings to ensure needs are being addressed and information is provided to residents.·Promulgate the codes, regulations, and ordinances of the Town, and provides the funds required to implement and enforce an effective mitigation program.·Enact emergency ordinances, as appropriate.Town Attorney·Advise Town officials concerning legal responsibilities, powers, and liabilities regarding emergency operations and post-disaster assistance.·Prepare, as appropriate, emergency ordinances (i.e., gouging and curfews) and local declarations.·Assist with the preparation of applications, legal interpretations or opinions.·Assist in obtaining waivers and legal clearances needed to dispose of debris and materials resulting from an emergency or disaster.·Assist with the implementation of isolation and quarantine orders and other court orders, as needed.·Advise town officials on other legal matters arising from an emergency or disaster.Town Administrator·Activate the Town EOP.·Provide direction and control of Town departments and organizations during emergency operations. In the event the TCC is activated, the Town Administrator will serve as the TCC manager.·Direct and reallocate Town assets and resources during an emergency.·Serve as the lead for the Town in managing recovery operations.·Implement the policies of the governing body related to emergency management.Town Engineer·Develop and maintain the Public Works and Engineering Annex to this plan.·Manage the public works and engineering operations during an emergency situations.·Oversee the repair and restoration of key Town facilities and systems.·Manager debris removal operations.Director, Street and Road Department·Provide personnel, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations upon request.·Develop and maintain SOPs/SOGs for emergency tasks.·Assess damages to Town streets.·Monitor the status of the Town’s transportation infrastructure and repair roads and traffic control systems, as necessary.·Provide for traffic control, as necessary.·Manage snow and debris removal on Town streets.·Provide support for evacuations.Director, Water and Sewer·Develop and maintain SOPs/SOGs.·Conduct damage assessments of water supply, distribution and control facilities, sanitary sewer systems and related facilities.·Manage the repair and restoration, as necessary, for Town water and sanitary sewer systems.·Provide for emergency water supply and assist with distribution.·Ensure the continued supply of potable water.·Ensure continuous wastewater collection services.·In conjunction with the County division of Health Services provide warnings and advice for contaminated or low water levels and “boil water” alerts.Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company·Provide fire prevention, suppression and rescue services.·Provide support for emergency notifications.·As appropriate, establish initial on-scene incident command.·Provide emergency triage, medical care and patient transportation.·Assist in evacuation operations.·Assist in search operations.·Provide emergency medical care, triage, and transportationLaw Enforcement·Provide available staff, resources, and facilities to support emergency operations.·As appropriate, establish on-scene incident command.·Assist in evacuation operations.·Provide security of emergency site(s), evacuated areas, shelter areas, vital facilities, supplies, and other assigned locations.·Provide assistance in search operations.·Provide law enforcement services.·Initiate on-scene warning and alerting in cooperation with the Mount Airy Volunteer Fire Company.·Provide traffic control and management.·Conduct investigations in accordance with Federal, State, and local laws.Parks and Recreation·Provide available staff and resources to support emergency operations.·Provide facilities, as required, for use as staging areas and/or points of distribution.APPENDIX 4Carroll County EOP Annex AssignmentsANNEXASSIGNED TO:Annex A: WarningAnnex B: Communications and Information TechnologyAnnex C: Shelter & Mass CareAnnex D: Radiological ProtectionAnnex E: EvacuationAnnex F: Fire and RescueAnnex G: Law EnforcementAnnex H: Health and Medical ServicesAnnex I: Emergency Public InformationAnnex J: RecoveryAnnex K: Public Works and EngineeringAnnex L: UtilitiesAnnex M: Resource ManagementAnnex N: Direction & ControlAnnex O: Human ServicesAnnex P: Reserved for future use.Annex Q: Hazardous Materials & Oil SpillResponseAnnex R: Reserved for future use.Annex S: TransportationAnnex T: Donations and Volunteer ManagementAnnex U: LegalAnnex V: Terrorist Incident ResponseAnnex W: Animal Health EmergencyAnnex X: Private Sector CoordinationAnnex Y: Family SupportAnnex Z: Damage AssessmentGEOGRAPHIC BRANCHES

Others have mentioned the fact that the US has alliances through NATO now.My addition is to challenge the implication in the question that the “US waited to be provoked before aiding the UK.” That is very far from being true.The complete story of the US aid to the allies prior to Pearl Harbor would fill a book. A big one. The following is a brief summary.Officially neutral until Japan attacked the US Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor, the US had actively support Britain and France prior to war being declared in Europe in September 1939. In the years prior to war erupting in Europe, both Britain and France found themselves rearming to counter a Germany who had secretly contravened the Versailles Treaty almost before the ink was dry on it. The violations massively, and at first secretly, increased when Hitler came to power in 1933. By the time that the violations became public, Germany had a significant head start on rearmament.The political situation deteriorated in 1938 and Germany and Italy became more overtly aggressive. Various European powers, especially Britain and France, knew that they needed to rearm faster than was possible using their own industry. Both nations turned to the only nation with the military and industrial capacity to assist them in the short run - the United States.The problems they encountered were many. While the US was a manufacturing powerhouse, it was still deeply in the Depression and its development of new weaponry had lagged since the end of World War I. Like Europe, the people in the US were opposed to another war in Europe. Unlike Europe, they had the protection and isolation of the Atlantic Ocean to shield them from aggression. Still the US was sympathetic to the allied cause having warred with Germany 2 decades previously and were willing to produce and ship the equipment needed for the Allies.To the consternation of many of those who knew about it, this included the most modern aircraft and other weapons that the US was producing at the time. Thus in 1938 the British and French made large orders for US fighters and bombers that had yet to enter US service. Included in this sale was:The Hawk 75 which in French service shot down more German aircraft than any other single fighter type flying with the French Air Force in 1939–1940 despite being less than 13% of the fighter strength of that Air Force.Curtiss P-36 HawkThe Lockheed Hudson which proved to be best medium range antisubmarine aircraft used by the RAF Coastal Command in the early war years.Lockheed HudsonMartin Maryland a useful light bomber and reconnaissance aircraft in the early war years that served in the Battle of France in French colors and later in the RAF as shown below:The Douglas A-20 Havoc DB-7/Boston was another light bomber used both by France and Britain in the early war period. The British used the Boston for a number of duties including: Bombing, as a night fighter and as an Intruder.When France fell in 1940, outstanding French orders were quickly taken over by Britain resulting in a number of aircraft originally ordered by the French serving with the RAF.When British and French Forces withdrew from Dunkirk, they did so without most of their equipment. There was no way for Britain to reequip their army using British and Commonwealth suppliers, so mush of the equipment Britain rebuilt its army with was supplied by the US who also supplied food, desperately needed aviation fuel, aircraft diverted from French contracts all in the latter half of 1940. Other supplied included 50 desperately needed destroyers.Early in 1941, Churchill notified FDR that Britain faced the possibility of defeat not because of Germany but due to an inability to continue to purchase the weapons and other materials it needed to fight and survive. FDR rose to the challenge and sold Congress on the idea of Lend-Lease, where the US would supply war materials freely with the agreement of the recipient to return the equipment when the war was over. The reality is the “return” was always something of a farce since much of it would be destroyed, damaged beyond repair, or simply obsolete by wars end. Still it gave a logical rational - however thin the logic was - to continue supplying Britain while the US paid the bill.After the initiation of Lend Lease, the amount of US supplies to Britain increased dramatically and after Germany invaded the USSR, the USSR was added as a Lend Lease recipient.Interestingly enough, during the time period above, the USSR was actually a significant supplier to the German war effort Those supplies were vital to Germany and in accordance with the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact and subsequent agreements.From the start of the war, Germany attempted to interfere with US and other allied shipments to Europe in the Battle of the Atlantic. Losses to U-Boats, German merchant raiders, Battleships and Cruisers was a major concern for Churchill and FDR since Britain could be defeated if these efforts sunk enough Allied merchant shipping. Even before the US officially entered the war, the US Navy was effectively engaging in an undeclared Naval war in the Atlantic. It was this war that Hitler used as a pretext to declare war on the US after Pearl Harbor was bombed and the US officially went to war with Japan.Note that all of the above, which is not anything close to complete, happened before the US actually entered the war. For a good summary of US military operations once the US was officially in it, I’d suggest reading this:Military history of the United States during World War II

Q. We know that many WWII German POWs were placed stateside and worked on farms until the war ended, but what happened to Japanese POWs?Japanese prisoners of war in america PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEWThe US maintained 425,000 enemy during the Second World War in prisoner-of-war camps from New York to California. The majority were Germans, followed by Italians and Japanese. 5,424 Japanese soldiers and sailors most captured involuntarily during the bloody battles of the South Pacific, tested the formidable ingenuity of the War Department. The very first prisoner Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki, commander of a Japanese midget submarine which had participated in the attack on Pearl Harbor, abandoned his damaged craft and swam for shore. As he crawled up onto Waimanalo Beach on Oahu, he was captured by one of the nervous military patrols positioned to repel a feared full-scale invasion. When it finally became evident that the disheveled POW knew less about Tokyo's war plans than did his captors, he was moved under heavy guard to a hastily constructed detention camp at Sand Island, Hawaii, where he remained until his transfer to the mainland on February 29, 1942. For the next six months, as German and Italian POWs poured into England and the United States from the battlefields of North Africa, Ensign Sakamaki remained the only Japanese military captive in American hands. In July 1942, he was finally joined by nine others.War Department's Provost Marshal General's Office created a network of permanent POW camps as well as hundreds of small branch camps designed as satellites around the larger camps located at or near existing military bases. Each camp averaged 2,500 prisoners, and adhered generally to the requirements of the Geneva Convention that the layout and food, sanitary, and health services be identical with that provided to American armed forces.There were several reasons for the substantial disparity in the number of prisoners from Europe, and those few from the Pacific. Foremost was the fact that unlike the German and Italian prisoners of war, who had been schooled in the provisions of the Geneva Convention, the average Japanese soldier was molded to prefer death to surrender. Moreover, the official Japanese Military Field Code commanded each Japanese soldier to remember that "rather than live and bear the shame of imprisonment by the enemy, he should die and avoid leaving a dishonorable name!" Capture by the enemy, even if wounded or unconscious and unable to move, was equated with irrevocable shame. Japanese soldiers were directed to save the last round of ammunition for themselves or to charge the enemy in a suicidal assault. Even on very rare occasions when a Japanese soldier might have been unable or unwilling to take his own life, the Pentagon's official histories of the war candidly admit that he might not have survived the heat of combat: "American troops, who were fearful of the widely publicized treacherousness of the enemy, were reluctant to take prisoners."Major battles in the Pacific theater often accounted for no more than a dozen Japanese captives, as against thousands of enemy killed. During the Burma campaign, for example, Commonwealth and American forces captured only 142 enemy prisoners (most of whom were badly wounded or unconscious) while killing 17,166!7 On Guadalcanal, between January 1 and February 15, 1943, the American XIV Corps took only eighty-four Japanese prisoners, thirty-three of whom were too sick or wounded to walk. In fact, from the opening salvo of the Pacific campaign, through the Battles of the Java Sea, Coral Sea, Midway, Guadalcanal, Savo Island, Bismarck Sea, New Guinea, Kula Gulf, Bougainville, Tarawa, and Makin, a grand total of only 604 Japanese were taken prisoner by the Allied forces. Not until the beginning of the Philippine campaigns in October 1944 did the number of Japanese prisoners of war approach the five thousand mark, including a twenty-nine-year-old sniper captured on Eniwetok-the only Japanese woman soldier taken prisoner in the entire war. The war was nearly over before significantly large numbers of Japanese soldiers, usually malnourished and disillusioned, surrendered to Commonwealth and American forces.The second reason for the low number of Japanese prisoners in the United States was the War Department's decision to turn the majority of its captives from the Pacific theater over to its allies. Since American forces lacked both the personnel and the rear-area facilities to detain large numbers of prisoners, an agreement was reached with Australia in September 1942 by which all captured Japanese-except for those whose potential military intelligence value necessitated their shipment to the United States proper-were turned over to the Commonwealth of Australia. In return, the United States assumed a proportionate share of the cost of their maintenance (through lend-lease aid), and was responsible for their final disposition at the end of the war.10 Thus, the Japanese prisoners who arrived in the U. S. were either brought in for special interrogation or because they were closer to the United States when captured than to the holding pens in Australia or New Zealand.The Japanese prisoners arrived in America at Angel Island, California, a small mountainous island in San Francisco Bay. A quarantine station of the Immigration Service before the war, Camp Angel Island was converted by the army into a temporary transit center for the incoming groups of Japanese captives before they were routed to the main interrogation center at Tracy, California. While at Angel Island the prisoners were deloused and their belongings disinfected;_____________________________________________________________________________Japanese Prisoners of War in Americaforms were processed and serial numbers assigned, and the prisoners given a much-needed medical examination. The majority of cases of malaria, syphilis, skin disease, intestinal worms, and minor combat wounds were treated in camp, and those few who required more serious treatment were cared for at Letterman General Hospital in San Francisco. When it came time to fill out the mandatory postal card to inform their families of their safety, and to file their names with the International Red Cross Prisoner Information Bureau, nearly all the Japanese captives resolutely requested that their families in Japan not be advised of their imprisonment."l Better they be considered dead than dishonored by captivity.Then, finally, came their first meals in America, and the prisoners were astonished at the quality and quantity of their food. Indeed, they found themselves better fed in captivity than in their own army. A typical menu was that offered at Camp Angel Island on September 16, 1944:Breakfast: Sausages, rice, browned crusts, apples, coffee, milk, sugar.Lunch: Sukiyaki, cabbage salad, rice, caramel pudding, water.Dinner: Spaghetti and hash, baked tomatoes, lettuce and tomato salad, rice, cakes, cocoa.While it would not be long before both the Japanese and German prisoners demanded menus more to their national tastes-which the War Department, anxious to protect the interests of American prisoners in enemy hands, quickly produced-the newly arrived Japanese captives had every reason to be calmed by their treatment thus far. For the few days until their shipment to the Tracy interrogation center, the Japanese spent their time listening to the camp gramophone, playing cards and Mah-Jong, and whispering among themselves as they strove to understand the ulterior motives of their captors.The American authorities did, indeed, have ulterior motives. Aside from Washington's general adherence to the Geneva Convention, which, admittedly, was losing its appeal as atrocity stories began to pour in from enemy camps, the War Department was following a specific and calculated plan of treatment. Since the main reason for the prisoners' shipment to the United States was for interrogation purposes, the confidence of the incoming POWs had to be won over. The task appeared formidable: the prisoners feared and despised their captors, both militarily and culturally-no less, in fact, than they were themselves hated in return. Moreover, the captives loathed themselves for their failure to die in combat. Yet army intelligence quickly detected an encouraging pattern among these seemingly overwhelming obstacles.The POWs' psychological makeup evolved into three distinct phases. Immediately upon capture, and up to forty-eight hours afterwards, the Japanese prisoners were of little value to the American interrogators. They were certain that they would be tortured and killed, and were either unresponsive or the information they offered was confused and unreliable. After several days, the army found that a second phase set in, as the prisoners realized that they were not to be tortured or in any way mistreated. This was the moment that the intelligence officers awaited; the prisoners' fear was changing to gratitude and they were anxious to reciprocate by talking freely. For the next ten days to two weeks, the prisoners were most receptive and informative. Then came the third and final phase, when the Japanese captives grew accustomed to the plentiful food and kind treatment, and became annoyed at being questioned. Continued interrogation only drove them into a shell of indifference and they were no longer reliable sources of military information.The interrogation of the Japanese prisoners taught army inteligence officers several additional curious lessons. For example, no threat of physical violence or solitary confinement succeeded in extracting information from a prisoner as effectively as the simple threat of forwarding his name to his relatives in Japan. Another lesson was the captives' realization that they knew no rules of life which applied in this situation. They were dishonored and their life as Japanese had ended. When their earnest requests to be allowed to kill themselves were denied, many discarded their traditional views and became model prisoners. An American official later recalled that "Old [Japanese] Army hands and long-time extreme nationals located ammunition dumps, carefully explained the disposition of Japanese forces, wrote our propaganda and flew with our bombing pilots to guide them to military targets. It was as if they had turned over a new page; as if, having put everything they had into one line of conduct and failed at it, they naturally took up a different line." One group of Japanese prisoners of war changed its outlook so dramatically that the men announced that "they had been badly misled by the Emperor and the Japanese military clique ... and wished to fight back to Japan side by side with Allied soldiers!"Still another important lesson discovered in the interrogation of the Japanese prisoners was that, unlike German or Italian captives who had to be questioned in isolation before older prisoners had the opportunity to intimidate them or alter their stories, the new prisoners were far more willing to talk freely after being consoled by those captured before them. Time and again it was found that the old prisoners advised the new ones to disclose everything to the authorities lest they all be blamed for lying or falsifying military information. One American army report noted that on numerous occasions, "a Japanese prisoner who had been doubtful regarding certain points would come of his own volition the following day and state that he had discussed the point with other members of the same group and his version was right-or wrong-as the case might be." Having learned these lessons about Japanese captives at the interrogation outposts on Guadalcanal and New Guinea, American intelligence officers now brought them to bear on select prisoners being shipped from Angel Island to Tracy.There were two interrogation installations in the United States during the war: Fort Hunt, a former Civilian Conservation Corps camp about seventeen miles from Washington, D.C., and Byron Hot Springs, an isolated spot west of San Francisco near Tracy. Both were kept so secret that architectural plans used by construction workers were labeled "Officers' School," although these men must have wondered why officers needed eight-foot fences, hidden microphones in the long rows of cells, barred windows, and heavy gates at the entrances from the main highway. The locations were known only as "P.O. Box 1142" and "P.O. Box 541," respectively. While, strictly speaking, these interrogation centers contravened or, at the very least, "bent" a dozen or so articles of the Geneva Convention of 1929 relating to the rights of prisoners of war, the War Department was convinced that not only was the potential military information well worth the international ramifications but also that the treatment of American prisoners in Japanese hands could not have been made much worse by violations of the Geneva Accords. In any case, the interrogations were so shrouded in secrecy that there was little chance of disclosure.The interrogations were generally conducted in an informal atmosphere by American intelligence officers, many of whom were Japanese-American specialists from the army's Military Intelligence Service Language School (MISLS) in Minnesota. It was a closed society; each of the forty-five interrogators was assigned to one prisoner whom he continued to interview until the authorities were satisfied that no further military information could be learned from the captive. The few surviving time sheets indicate that the interviews usually lasted from forty-five minutes to an hour and were conducted at a rate of two or three each day for a week or more.Yet, however informal these interviews, the interrogators were well aware of the seriousness of their task, and approached each Japanese prisoner in deadly earnest. Every question was planned, and the interrogators followed a lengthy and detailed checklist of questions concerning military equipment, fuel, rations, morale at the front as well as at home, rumors, personalities of commanders, postwar expectations, and so forth. The resulting reports, by contrast, were brief usually two or three single-spaced pages-concise, and frequent. Rather than chance the accumulation of critical military information, the interrogators nearly every four days forwarded their findings: a potpourri of items ranging from the deteriorating quality of Japanese clothing to the number of boiler rooms in the enemy aircraft carrier Hiryu. As the war progressed and the number of incoming Japanese captives increased substantially, so did the number of interrogations and reports. During 1944 the number of Japanese prisoners of war interrogated at Tracy were as follows:January 13 August 174February 5 September 74March 36 October 101April 132 November 75May 105 December 129June 87 July 146TOTAL 1,07723When it was clear that the prisoners had no further information of value, they were assembled into groups and shipped to several POW camps across the country.The War Department's network of prisoners-of-war camps by mid-1943 had reached five hundred main and branch enclosures and covered the nation from coast to coast. Their prime task, of course, was to house the thousands of Germans and Italians arriving each month from the battlefields of North Africa, which reached 360,000 by 1944. Since the number of Japanese prisoners was so small, they were simply shunted to existing camps as space and transportation became available. Although they would appear in dozens of camps, often just in transit, the bulk of the Japanese spent the remaining war years in one of three camps: McCoy, Wisconsin; Clarinda, Iowa; and Angel Island, California. While the largest and most representative was McCoy, the distribution of the Japanese in the United States was as follows:CAMP SER VICE OFFICERS NCO ENLISTED TOTAL COMMANDAngel Island 9 24 71 312 407Clarinda, Iowa 7 - 73 982 1,055McCoy, Wisconsin 6 3 10 2,749 2,762Meade, Maryland 3 1 - 1 2Kenedy, Texas 8 91 499 - 590Madigan General 9 3 - 2 524 Hospital, Washington, D.C.Camp McCoy, which began, typically, as a CCC camp in 1935, was located some five miles from the small town of Sparta, Wisconsin. It was ideal as both a training center and a prison camp since it was isolated yet located on the main line of the Milwaukee Railway between Milwaukee and Minneapolis, as well as on the branch line of the Chicago and Northwestern Railway. Commissioned as an internment site by the Provost Marshal General's Office in March 1942,25 McCoy within weeks became the new home for 293 enemy aliens brought in by the FBI (106 Germans, 5 Italians, and 181 Japanese), and one Japanese prisoner of war (none other than Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki from Hawaii). Eventually, he would be joined by nearly three thousand other Japanese military prisoners, as well as some one thousand Germans, and five hundred Koreans who had been captured serving with the Japanese. Despite the apparently substantial numbers of enemy prisoners at Camp McCoy, they constituted only a small segment of the tumultuous events taking place there. Thousands of soldiers-indeed several hundred thousand soldiers-were trained at McCoy and prepared for shipment overseas. The few thousand foreign prisoners of war, relegated to a remote area of the military post and heavily guarded, went almost unnoticed.The world for the Japanese prisoners consisted of Compounds 1 and 2 (with the Germans in Compounds 3 and 4, and the Koreans in Compound 5). Within each compound were two rows of old CCC barracks with approximately fifty army double-decked bunks in each. Several additional barracks were used as mess halls, and one barrack in each compound was fitted as a day-room and equipped with furniture, playing cards, a gramophone, and an assortment of Japaneselanguage books donated by the YMCA. Each camp was required by the Geneva Convention to maintain a canteen where, during certain hours, the prisoners could purchase toothpaste, shoe polish,. handkerchiefs, candy, crackers, cigarettes, soft drinks, and locally grown produce at the prevailing market price. In some camps even beer and light wines were permitted at the prisoner's own expense.Each enlisted POW received eighty cents a day to spend at the camp canteen. A trifling sum by today's standards, perhaps, but during the war years it would buy eight packs of cigarettes or eight bottles of beer. Officers were paid a graduated salary based on rank-lieutenants, $15 per month; captains, $25; and majors through generals, $35-despite the fact that American POWs in Japanese hands were rarely paid anything. A later agreement with the Japanese government that was publicized as the Army's Prisoner of War Circular No. 28, 6 May 1944, listed the following higher salaries for captive Japanese officers, though they were now to be charged for the cost of their food, clothing, laundry, and orderly service:Equivalent grades in United States Army Navy Monthly Pay Army Navy Taisho Taisho $128.91 General Admiral Chujo Chujo 113.29 Lieutenant General Vice Admiral Shosho Shosho 97.66 Major General Rear Admiral Taisa Taisa 81.08 Colonel Captain Chusa Chusa 62.90 Lieutenant Colonel Commander Shosa Shosa 45.51 Major Lieutenant Commander Taii Itto (Tokumu Taii 40.53 TaiiNito ii Itto 37.11 Taii Santo Taii Nito 32.23 Captain Lieutenant Taii Santo 28.71 Chu Itto Chui First Lieutenant Lieutenant junior grade Chui Nito Tokumu Chuif 28.00 Shoi cShoibkumu Shoi o Shoi 28.00 5.00 Second Lieutenant Ensign (Tokumu ShoiSince War Department regulations (and common sense) prohibited the prisoners from obtaining real money which might enable them to bribe guards or make good their escape, their pay was maintained in a U.S. Treasury Trust Fund (#218915), and all sums were paid to the captives in canteen coupons.While the military was responsible for the overall maintenance of the prisoners' existence, nearly everything else, the daily amenities of life, were supplied by a religious or humanitarian organization-usually the YMCA. The War Prisoners Aid of the YMCA, as the captives soon learned, constituted an influence over their lives second only to the U.S. Army. The Japanese prisoners, no less than the Germans, Italians, and Koreans, received from the YMCA such items as their stationery, musical instruments, library books, sports equipment, phonograph records, hobby materials, handicraft tools, and religious items of all sorts. No requests were too insignificant. During one of his monthly inspection visits to Camp McCoy, for example, the representative of the YMCA, Dr. Howard Hong, noted that the prisoners appreciated his organization's earlier donations of Japanese volumes for the library, the colored crepe paper and thin wire needed by those making artificial flowers, and the Mah-Jong sets and Go games. But he cited the need for incense sticks for Buddhist services; a clarinet, flute, snare drum, and large harmonica; and some tennis equipment. He closed his report with the conclusion that the "Health and morale among the prisoners are excellent."Yet beneath this idyllic surface, there were serious problems in the Japanese prisoner community. A major difficulty was the strain which existed between the three nationalities imprisoned at McCoy. The Germans in the adjoining compound, separated as much by their respective racist ideologies as by reminders that Germany and Japan had been enemies in the First World War. The German prisoners, on the other hand, openly ridiculed their Japanese allies, often gesturing or mimicking across the fence that separated them. Every evening was potentially explosive since they all shared the same canteen, barber shop, and PX facility. "After dinner, they gulp their daily ration of two bottles of 3.2 beer and soft drinks," camp commander Lt. Colonel Horace I. Rogers told a reporter from Collier's, "but for each race, the other is nonexistent. They never look at each other, even in furtive curiosity. They hate each other."30 Relations between the truculent Japanese and the more cooperative Koreans were even more acrimonious and deeply rooted in the centuries of discrimination and subjugation by the Japanese over their peninsular neighbor. The capture of the Koreans gave them an opportunity to assert their national independence. Visiting State Department, Red Cross, and YMCA officials were always pleasantly surprised to learn that the Koreans generally requested nothing more than Christian Bibles and cloth to make Korean flagsrequests that the authorities were understandably happy to grant.Visiting officials to the camp were soon gritting their teeth when it came to meeting with the spokesman for the Japanese prisoners who, at Camp McCoy, was Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki. The complaints by the Japanese were petty and unending. They did not want to work with American women in the camp laundry; they resented being housed with three Marshall Island natives; they demanded coal for the barracks stoves instead of the wood made available by the camp authorities; they wanted more books and dictionaries; they did not want American personnel present in their barracks during Saturday morning cleaning; and on and on. On several occasions, the Japanese went over the head of the American camp commander, Lt. Colonel Horace Rogers, and lodged complaints with the Spanish embassy in Washington, D.C., which undertook to look after their interests. Each such complaint was immediately followed by a visit from the Spanish consul in nearby Chicago who would investigate the charges and help smooth out the difficulties.Finally, there were major divisions and animosities within the Japanese prisoner community itself. The most persistent and difficult problem was the rivalry between army and navy personnel. While such rivalries are common to all armed services, they were especially prevalent among captured survivors of a society based on the veneration of the warrior, and exacerbated by the need to blame someone for their nation's military defeats. Naval prisoners far outnumbered those from the army, and each incoming group of Japanese sailors from the battles of Midway or the Coral Sea increased the preponderance of naval prisoners over their increasingly hostile army colleagues.Another problem among the prisoners derived from the timing of their capture. The later in the war they were captured, the greater the implied resistance to the enemy, and the less shame and dishonor for having been captured. Consequently, each arriving group of prisoners viewed those who greeted them with arrogance and disdain, forcing yet another layer of hostility on an already highly anxious and introspective prisoner community. Each party was aware that the next layer of hostility was only as far away as the next arriving group of captives.Lastly, there was the ever-present question of honor and suicide. While suicide in a prison camp was not as glorious as death on the battlefield, to some, death by any means was preferable to living with the shame of failure. "Our desire for suicide, however, was thwarted on every hand," recalls Kazuo Sakamaki rather melodramatically, considering the tiny number of self-inflicted injuries among the Japanese POWs. "We had no knives to cut our throats. We had no ropes to hang ourselves with. Some of us banged our heads against every object in sight; some men refused to eat. And yet we did not die.... Our life was a dilemma. We wanted to die and yet we could not die. We wanted to kill ourselves and we could not." This issue was nearly always at the boiling point and was kept there by a small number of unruly hard-liners who rejected any compromise with their required fate. On occasion they went so far as to challenge the authority of their ranking POW officer, the venerable naval Lt. Commander Kametaro Matsumoto, for attempting to promote peaceful hobbies among them. While their challenge failed to dislodge the old officer, or ferment suicidal militarism among the prisoners, or swing control from the naval to the army officers, the event helped highlight the problems with which the American authorities had to contend.The War Department had a solution to these difficulties: put the prisoners to work. The captives would be kept occupied and, it was hoped, too tired to contemplate mischief. They could also help alleviate the domestic labor shortage caused by the shipment of millions of Americans overseas. The Geneva Convention permitted belligerents to utilize the labor of able prisoners of war, officers excepted, so long as their labor did not aid directly in the war effort. Such work fell into two broad categories: maintenance of military installations and contract work for private employers. With the initiation of the government's labor program on January 10, 1943, the German, Italian, and Japanese prisoners of war immediately began performing a variety of menial and clerical jobs within their own compounds and on military bases across the nation. They crated and packaged supplies, took inventories of equipment, operated laundries and sawmills, loaded creosote poles, marked surplus property, worked on company trash details, toiled at general construction work, did kitchen work, and served as orderlies to their senior officers. Contract labor was a different matter, though no less important. Farmers and small businessmen located near POW camps petitioned the local office of the War Manpower Commission for groups of twenty or more prisoners, although the regulations, certifications of need, objections from labor unions, and bureaucratic delays often exasperated all but the most laborstarved employers.The more than five thousand Japanese prisoners posed a particular problem. Unlike the German prisoners who went to work with the knowledge that it was not only unavoidable but perhaps even preferable to idleness, the Japanese proved to be poor workers. They were wracked by inner conflicts, indecisively led by their noncommissioned officers, and, most importantly, distrusted by their captors. Anti-Japanese sentiment was implacable in some American communities. When, for instance, the War Relocation Board released three Japanese Americans from an internment camp on the West Coast and shipped them to the labor-starved town of Marengo, Illinois, the residents arose in a storm of protest. The three startled farm boys from California were marched back to the train station by an angry mob led by the mayor, the president of the Park Board, and the commander of the local post of the American Legion. Officials recognized that this community, or others like it, would likely respond no better to the appearance of Japanese military captives. The result was that the overwhelming majority of Japanese prisoners worked on military posts, under guard, rather than on contract work in the civilian sector. To overcome the reluctance of some commanders to make maximum use of their Japanese prisoner-of-war labor, General Wilhelm D. Styer, commander of the U.S. Army in the Western Pacific, thundered: "We must overcome the psychology that you cannot do this or that. I want to see these prisoners work like piss ants! If they do not work, put them on bread and water!"Yet a portion of the Japanese prisoners, in some cases as many as fifteen to twenty percent, simply refused to work. On a few occasions, the cause was strife within the prisoner community, especially the refusal of army prisoners to take orders from naval prisoners. But most of those who refused to work did so on the grounds that their labor would assist the American war effort. Some feigned illness while others refused to work. Nearly every routine camp report to the Provost Marshal General's Office (PMGO) mentions such recalcitrant prisoners.The problem was how to get the prisoners to work without violating their rights or jeopardizing the safety of American prisoners. For the first two years of the war, the War Department prevented POW camp commanders from exercising any more pressure than a reprimand, an admonition, the withholding of privileges, and, in extreme cases, a court martial. Generally speaking, these were useless gestures that held no fear for combat-hardened enemy soldiers. Finally, in October 1943, the PMGO reinterpreted Article 27 of the Geneva Convention to permit the use of reasonable pressure in getting prisoners to comply with a work order. Called "administrative pressure," the policy authorized the camp commander to impose a restricted diet and reduced privileges for any recalcitrant prisoner. This was not a punishment, the War Department reasoned, since the prisoner could terminate the pressure at any time simply by complying with the order; such "administrative pressure" was just an inducement to obey a proper command.Given this new latitude, prison camp commanders now met each potentially explosive situation with vigor. At Camp McCoy, for example, even the normally "generous and kind" Lt. Colonel Rogers startled his Japanese POWs by his swift action. According to an amused delegation from the Spanish consulate:On May 30, 1944, about 22 Japanese officers ordered their men not to work. Colonel Rogers spent several hours in attempting to persuade the officer prisoners to change their minds. That night he approached the 90 non-coms and asked them whether they would cooperate with him. After 9 had absolutely refused to cooperate he put them in the guard house for the night and made no attempt to interview the rest.The next morning the prisoners staged a sit-down strike, refusing to turn out for roll-call, breakfast or work. After issuing a clear warning to the noncoms, Colonel Rogers ordered out his troops with bayonets and forced all prisoners to march at the double five miles to a place of work, to work all morning without the usual 10 minutes rest every hour, and to return to the camp at the double at noon. The prisoners of course became exhausted and about 12 stragglers received minor bayonet wounds. A few were so overcome that they had to be picked up by a truck which was ordered along for the purpose. This treatment effected a cure, for a spokesman for the non-coms informed Colonel Rogers that there would be no further trouble.Each incident had to be handled individually. Normally, prisoners who refused to obey a work order were sentenced to the stockade for fourteen days; in extreme cases the prisoners spent fourteen days at hard labor. In rare instances when the number of striking POWs ran into the hundreds and posed the threat of a camp uprising, the troops were called out. On only one occasion-when three Japanese naval prisoners being treated for tuberculosis at Denver's Fitzsimons General Hospital rushed their guards-were prisoners shot dead on the spot.Curiously, the War Department's greatest fear never materialized. From the moment that the first shiploads of prisoners arrived in the United States, the government worried that thousands of escaped Nazi and Japanese prisoners would sabotage and rape their way across the country while American military forces were locked in combat overseas. Elaborate precautions were taken in the location and construction of the camps, and camp commanders were encouraged to find the most efficient balance of security measures from among such options as additional floodlights, patrolling war dogs, the censoring of prisoner mail, sporadic bed checks, a network of prisoner informants, shakedown inspections, and a general aura of firm military discipline. FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, the symbol of domestic security, heightened public anxiety by warning that "even one escaped prisoner at large, trained as he is in the techniques of destruction, is a danger to our internal security, our war production, and the lives of our citizens!" Communities which hosted Japanese prisoners, such as Sparta, Wisconsin, near McCoy, were constantly warned to be especially vigilant and to report immediately any suspicious activities. "The Japanese, with their reputation for trickiness and sneakiness," the authorities cautioned, "are apt to make a greater attempt to disturb our homefront security than the Germans ever did."Despite the many obstacles to prisoner escape-substantial security measures; a fatiguing labor program; an array of artistic, musical, athletic, educational, and spiritual outlets; and the most compelling obstacle of all: there was simply nowhere to go-some captives still sought to flee. Since most prisoners in the U.S. were German, they not surprisingly accounted for most of the escapes, 1,036.41 Some escapees merely walked away while a guard's attention was directed elsewhere,while others cut fences, passed through the camp gates in makeshift American uniforms, smuggled themselves out aboard commercial delivery trucks, jumped over the compound fences from barracks rooftops, climbed out of hospital windows, or tunneled underground. The Japanese, to the government's astonishment and relief, seldom attempted to escape. Unlike the Germans who were breaking out at the monthly rate of three escapes per ten thousand captives, the Japanese attempted only fourteen escapes throughout the war, all from McCoy. The first to flee was Terumasa Kibata, who slipped away from his work detail, ten miles north of the camp, on July 3, 1944. While the records indicated that Kibata suffered from shell shock and was probably not in full control of his faculties, a near-hysterical search was initiated by the police, military authorities, and FBI. Two army planes were brought in for air surveillance. Even before this collective weight could be brought fully to bear, a bewildered Kibata wandered back into camp the day after his escape. He explained to the startled guards that he had hoped to "catch a train," though he was unsure about his destination or purpose for escape.The next escapes did not occur until nearly a year later. During the early morning hours of May 22, 1945, three Japanese POWs, Takeo Nakamura, Kokei Tanaka, and Hajime Hashimoto, all twenty-four years of age, dug under a fence enclosure in what was probably the most well-planned escape of them all. They had plotted since September of the previous year, stealing a Texaco road map from the glove compartment of the camp ambulance, a pair of bolt cutters from a storage area, and extra food from the mess hall. When finally apprehended, Nakamura had a duffel bag filled with enough items to cover a two-page list by the FBI, and included a styptic pencil, sixteen assorted fish hooks, a hundred "U.S. Army" matchbooks, and seven changes of socks. A Wisconsin farmer spotted him a week after his escape as he poled down the Mississippi River on a makeshift raft near the town of Prairie du Chien. His comrades did not make it that far. They were captured several days later, less than twenty miles west of the camp and near the community of West Salem, as they marched along Highway 16 in their Japanese uniforms with the letters "PW" stenciled in bright yellow on both front and back.No sooner had local farmers begun to relax than two more Japanese broke out in early July. The populace was warned that the POWs would try to steal food from local farms or take milk from cows in pastures, and that "these men, with their strange philosophy of 'dying for the Emperor,' could cause a great deal of damage. Residents in the county are urged to report anything they may see or hear that might aid authorities to track down the Japs." After being gone about a week, one escapee was captured at a local farm where he had knocked at the back door, rubbed his stomach to indicate to the startled farmwife that he was hungry, and was given some bread by the terrified woman who then dashed to the telephone. The highway patrol took him into custody as he waited politely at the back door for the next course. His comrade was apprehended on July 17 on the outskirts of West Salem, Wisconsin, where he was discovered by a Chicago & Northwestern railroad policeman huddled in a boxcar. He offered no resistance and, in the vernacular of the front-page news announcement, "the Nip was returned to confinement." Immediately, however, another Japanese prisoner slipped away. The local population, doubtless beginning to wonder about the highly touted security measures at McCoy, girded themselves for yet another "desperate Jap on the loose." The police and FBI were alerted as usual, dog patrols scoured the countryside, and two days later the escapee was sighted while creeping along the outer perimeter of the camp on his hands and knees. Apprehended without resistance, he told his captors that he escaped for fear that he would be beaten by the other prisoners who suspected him of being an informant. He was nonetheless returned to his compound with unknown results.Four more escapes occurred before the end of the war, but all the captives were returned in a matter of days. The last Japanese prisoner to escape during the war was Yuzo Ohashi, a recent captive from Iwo Jima. Early on the morning of August 29, 1945, he slipped away from his work detail and, under the mistaken belief that "Mexico was located about 300 miles south of Camp McCoy," spent the next four days moving south and foraging for food. He was apprehended on September 2-the day of Japan's official surrender-at Cashton, Wisconsin, about twenty-two miles south of McCoy. He told his guards that Japan had clearly lost the war and that he did not wish to return home in shame. It was escape, Ohashi explained, or suicide.As the end of the war with Japan approached, American authorities worried about the possibility of mass suicides among the POWs. Imaginations ran wild, fueled by stories about the mass suicides on Iwo Jima and Okinawa; the riots by the Japanese prisoners at Camps Featherston and Cowra in New Zealand; and by the appearance of a lengthy alarmist article in the Rocky Shimpo, a Japanese-language newspaper published in Denver, which predicted a dreaded mass suicide of the prisoners at Camp McCoy. Despite such fears, the end of the war passed uneventfully with no suicides among the POWs.With Japan's surrender came the question of democracy in postwar Japan. The public mood was perhaps best summarized by a Texas cowboy in a "man-on-the-street" opinion poll, who stated that "You can't civilize or educate Germans or Japs in a short length of time. We've got to give them a new form of government so we might as well start making Democrats out of them right now."52 The War Department agreed. As early as April 1945, the Special Projects Division of the PMGO had considered a program to reeducate the Japanese prisoners despite a ban on such activity by the Geneva Convention. Following a secret study conducted among the Japanese POWs at McCoy, Clarinda, and Angel Island, the PMGO determined that such an indoctrination effort would not only provide the American occupation forces in Japan with reliable government officials, but would serve as a laboratory to test the educational and rehabilitation programs under consideration for the postwar period. The project was secretly authorized by the Secretary of War on July 18, 1945, after which the prisoners were screened, evaluated, and the most cooperative among them selected for reeducation. The potential converts to democracy, a total of 205 men, were then sent to one of three specially designated "re-orientation centers": Camps Huntsville, Kenedy, or Hearne, Texas.The program was directed by Lt. Colonel Boude C. Moore, born in Japan to missionary parents, educated in the United States, and resident of Japan from 1924 until 1941. He was assisted by Dr. Charles W. Hepner, a luminary from the Far Eastern Branch of the Office of War Information, who had spent some thirty years in Japan. Together they organized a dazzling program of lectures by the faculty of nearby Sam Houston State Teachers College, with simultaneous translation into Japanese; study of the English language and literature; comparisons of American and Japanese newspapers, books, and magazines; and the translation of material for distribution to the Japanese prisoners not participating in the program. The most important activity was the assignment every two weeks of a new "study topic" which required group and individual research and discussion. The topics ranged from an assessment of Japan's civilian and military morale to the comparison of various segments of Japanese and American ways of life. Moore and Hepner hoped that these exercises would cause the prisoners to consider the nuances of the subjects and require some measure of democratic input by all members. They also believed that the reports would serve as a barometer of the POWs' morale and allegiance to the Emperor.Augmenting these pursuits was a heavy dose of American music, newspapers, movies and cartoons, and such recreational activities as softball, table tennis, and baseball. The prisoners were also encour-aged to attend Sunday religious services in an effort "to replace their traditional Emperor-worship with a more positive philosophy, and to show them the close relationship between democracy and Christian principles." When the program ended in December 1945 and the POWs prepared for repatriation home, the authorities believed that a significant, if unknown, number of the prisoners had embraced the principles of the American dream. Unfortunately, no follow-up investigation traced the careers of the Japanese "graduates" and their impact, if any, on postwar politics.No sooner was the war over than Washington began repatriating Japanese POWs as promptly as shipping permitted.55 While Japanese prisoners in the Philippines, Hawaii, and Okinawa were not released for another year-due as much to Allied fears for the security of postwar Japan as to the need for cheap labor-the prisoners in the U.S. started home less than a month after the war ended. Beginning in October 1945, the Japanese POWs at McCoy, Clarinda, Hearne, Kenedy, and Huntsville were sent to a cluster of holding camps at Lamont, California. There they kept busy with the usual military post-related tasks as carpenters, cooks, and janitors and also as contract workers on local farms. By the end of December 1945, vessel space became available for 1,120 men (including 675 sick and badly wounded) and the captives were trucked to the Los Angeles Port of Embarkation for immediate shipment overseas. Each departing man was fingerprinted once again, his records updated, and his belongings searched for "contraband" or money in excess of the 500 yen ($125) or 200 yen ($50) which the officers or enlisted men respectively were allowed to bring back to Japan. A week later, on January 5, 1946, another 1,462 Japanese departed; on January 20, three days after a third group of 441 prisoners left Lamont for Los Angeles, that camp was deactivated. Also during January the remaining 2,376 Japanese prisoners departed from a similar system of camps in Corcoran, California, to the piers of San Francisco and Japan. A single Japanese prisoner remained to recover from his wounds, and on June 1, 1948, he waved an indifferent farewell to Angel Island from the railing of his departing ship. It was over. For the 5,400 repatriated Japanese captives, however, numerous difficulties still lay ahead.The events which greeted the returning Japanese were bitter-sweet. The emotion of seeing the port of Uraga and Mt. Fuji was mixed with shame of returning alive from enemy captivity. Ensign Kazuo Sakamaki became something of a public figure, not only as a former POW, but as the first Japanese prisoner of the war. "Everyday, letters poured in," Sakamaki recalls, quoting from a representative sample:Your past is not wrong at all. You need not feel ashamed. On the contrary, we owe you thanks. With a new heart, please work for a reconstruction of our beloved country. No wonder we lost the war, Mr. P.O.W. No. 1. Although I am a mere merchant, I know how to commit hara-kiri. A man who does not know what shame is, is a beast. If you want to die now, I will gladly come and show you how it's done. Which is the more manly life-live long and cheap, or live short but glorious? Shame on you.And finally, I cannot understand how you could return alive. The souls of the brave comrades who fought with you and died must be crying now over what you have done. If you are not ashamed of yourself now, please explain how come. If you are ashamed of yourself now, you should commit suicide at once and apologize to the spirits of the heroes who died honorably.Many years passed before Sakamaki and his more than 1,500,000 fellow former prisoners of war held by Russia, China, Britain, and the United States 61 became comfortably integrated into Japanese society, a process made far easier for those who had been held in the United States. They returned better fed and clothed than their comrades in other Allied camps. They were also more emotionally stable and often had at least a smattering of the language of their new occupiers. Summing up his four years of war, Sakamaki described a metamorphosis which startled even himself:My steps were these: all-out attack, failure, capture, a sense of dilemma, mental struggle, attempts at suicide, failure again, self-contempt, deep disillusionment, despair and melancholy, reflections, desire to learn and yearning for truth, meditation, rediscovering myself, self-encouragement, discovery of a new duty, freedom through love, and finally, a desire for reconstruction.I claim no credit for this transformation. I wish to preach to no one. I only hope that this will show to all ... that man is capable of being made anew....The key to it all, Sakamaki concluded, was the concept of democracy. "I learned it as a prisoner. It was the best education of my life."Japanese prisoners of war in World War II - WikipediaAllied prisoner of war campsJapanese POWs held in Allied prisoner of war camps were treated in accordance with the Geneva Convention. In an attempt to win better treatment for their POWs, the Allies made extensive efforts to notify the Japanese government of the good conditions in Allied POW camps. This was not successful, however, as the Japanese government refused to recognise the existence of captured Japanese military personnel.Most Japanese captured by US forces after September 1942 were turned over to Australia or New Zealand for internment. The United States provided these countries with aid through the Lend Lease program to cover the costs of maintaining the prisoners, and retained responsibility for repatriating the men to Japan at the end of the war. Prisoners captured in the central Pacific or who were believed to have particular intelligence value were held in camps in the United States.Japanese POWs practice baseball near their quarters, several weeks before the Cowra breakout. This photograph was taken with the intention of using it in propaganda leaflets, to be dropped on Japanese-held areas in the Asia-Pacific region.Prisoners who were thought to possess significant technical or strategic information were brought to specialist intelligence-gathering facilities at Fort Hunt, Virginia or Camp Tracy, California. After arriving in these camps, the prisoners were interrogated again, and their conversations were wiretapped and analysed. Japanese POWs generally adjusted to life in prison camps and few attempted to escape.There were several incidents at POW camps, however. On 25 February 1943, POWs at the Featherston prisoner of war camp in New Zealand staged a strike after being ordered to work. The protest turned violent when the camp's deputy commander shot one of the protest's leaders. The POWs then attacked the other guards, who opened fire and killed 48 prisoners and wounded another 74. Conditions at the camp were subsequently improved, leading to good relations between the Japanese and their New Zealand guards for the remainder of the war.More seriously, on 5 August 1944, Japanese POWs in a camp near Cowra, Australia attempted to escape. During the fighting between the POWs and their guards 257 Japanese and four Australians were killed.Other confrontations between Japanese POWs and their guards occurred at Camp McCoy in Wisconsin during May 1944 as well as a camp in Bikaner, India during 1945; these did not result in any fatalities.In addition, 24 Japanese POWs killed themselves at Camp Paita, New Caledonia in January 1944 after a planned uprising was foiled.Post-warA Japanese prisoner of war watching a British Royal Air ForceDakota transport landing at Bandoeng, Java, during May 1946.Soviet and Chinese forces accepted the surrender of 1.6 million Japanese and the western allies took the surrender of millions more in Japan, South-East Asia and the South-West Pacific.In order to prevent resistance to the order to surrender, Japan's Imperial Headquarters included a statement that "servicemen who come under the control of enemy forces after the proclamation of the Imperial Rescript will not be regarded as POWs" in its orders announcing the end of the war. While this measure was successful in avoiding unrest, it led to hostility between those who surrendered before and after the end of the war and denied prisoners of the Soviets POW status. In most instances the troops who surrendered were not taken into captivity, and were repatriated to the Japanese home islands after giving up their weapons.Japanese prisoners released from Soviet captivity in Siberia prepare to disembark from a ship docked at Maizuru, Japan, January 1946.Repatriation of some Japanese POWs was delayed by Allied authorities. Until late 1946, the United States retained almost 70,000 POWs to dismantle military facilities in the Philippines, Okinawa, central Pacific, and Hawaii. British authorities retained 113,500 of the approximately 750,000 POWs in south and south-east Asia until 1947; the last POWs captured in Burma and Malaya returned to Japan in October 1947.The British also used armed Japanese Surrendered Personnel to support Dutch and French attempts to reestablish their colonial empires in the Netherlands East Indies and Indochina respectively.At least 81,090 Japanese personnel died in areas occupied by the western Allies and China before they could be repatriated to Japan. Historian John W. Dower has attributed these deaths to the "wretched" condition of Japanese military units at the end of the war.Nationalist Chinese forces took the surrender of 1.2 million Japanese military personnel following the war. While the Japanese feared that they would be subjected to reprisals, they were generally treated well. This was because the Nationalists wished to seize as many weapons as possible, ensure that the departure of the Japanese military didn't create a security vacuum and discourage Japanese personnel from fighting alongside the Chinese communists.Over the next few months, most Japanese prisoners in China, along with Japanese civilian settlers, were returned to Japan. The nationalists retained over 50,000 POWs, most of whom had technical skills, until the second half of 1946, however. Tens of thousands of Japanese prisoners captured by the Chinese communists were serving in their military forces in August 1946 and more than 60,000 were believed to still be held in Communist-controlled areas as late as April 1949.Hundreds of Japanese POWs were killed fighting for the People's Liberation Army during the Chinese Civil War. Following the war, the victorious Chinese Communist government began repatriating Japanese prisoners home, though some were put on trial for war crimes and had to serve prison sentences of varying length before being allowed to return. The last Japanese prisoner returned from China in 1964.Hundreds of thousands of Japanese also surrendered to Soviet forces in the last weeks of the war and after Japan's surrender. The Soviet Union claimed to have taken 594,000 Japanese POWs, of whom 70,880 were immediately released, but Japanese researchers have estimated that 850,000 were captured.Unlike the prisoners held by China or the western Allies, these men were treated harshly by their captors, and over 60,000 died. Japanese POWs were forced to undertake hard labour and were held in primitive conditions with inadequate food and medical treatments. This treatment was similar to that experienced by German POWs in the Soviet Union.The treatment of Japanese POWs in Siberia was also similar to that suffered by Soviet prisoners who were being held in the area.Between 1946 and 1950, many of the Japanese POWs in Soviet captivity were released; those remaining after 1950 were mainly those convicted of various crimes. They were gradually released under a series of amnesties between 1953 and 1956. After the last major repatriation in 1956, the Soviets continued to hold some POWs and release them in small increments. Some ended up spending decades living in the Soviet Union, and could only return to Japan in the 1990s. Some, having spent decades away and having started families of their own, elected not to permanently settle in Japan and remain where they were.Due to the shame associated with surrendering, few Japanese POWs wrote memoirs after the war.